EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plainti-appellee, vs. ROMEO G.

JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Prospero Cresceni, Gancayco, Balasbas & Associates, Saguisag & Associates, Balisado
Law Office, and Lazaro Law Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant is a full-edged member of Congress who is now conned at the

national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts
of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. Accused-appellant led a motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

Accused-appellant insisted that having been re-elected by his constituents, he had

the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. According to him, his covenant
with his constituents cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraint arising
from pending criminal cases. He asserted that the duty to legislate ranks highest in
the hierarchy of government.

When the voters of his district elected accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results, which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison.

What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-

appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for ve days or
more in a week virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant
to his position. As such, an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's
status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public ocers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Accused-appellant is only one of
250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of
the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function
well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

The Court found the election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classication in criminal enforcement. The functions and duties of the oce are not
substantial distinctions, which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restrict in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and connement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class. The Court was constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that
re-election to public oce gives priority to any other right or interest, including the
police power of the State.

Instant motion was denied.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; PRIVILEGES ARISING FROM BEING

ELECTED MAY BE ENLARGED OR RESTRICTED BY LAW. True, election is the
expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of surage, a free
people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its
benets. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. There is an unfortunate
misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government
oce, by itself, frees the ocial from the common restraints of general law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact,
the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.

2. ID.; ID.; RULING IN AGUINALDO CASE (212 SCRA 768, AT 773) DOES NOT
APPLY IN IMPRISONMENT ARISING FROM ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW;
CONFINEMENT PENDING APPEAL IS NOT REMOVAL. Accused-appellant's reliance
on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that "The Court
should never remove a public ocer for acts done prior to his present term of oce.
To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their ocers.
When a people have elected a man to oce, it must be assumed that they did this
with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by
reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people,"
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-
quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public ocer for acts done prior to his present term of oce. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same
way that preventive suspension is not removal, connement pending appeal is not
removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise,
disqualified.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY
IMMUNITY FROM ARREST AND DETENTION; GRANTED IN A RESTRICTIVE SENSE
AND MAY NOT BE EXTENDED BY INTENDMENT, IMPLICATION OR EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATION. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the
provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended
beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE. The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the
Legislative Department: Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; . . .. Because of the broad coverage of felony
and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman
like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code
could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same
general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were
pending appeal. The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as
follows: Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all
oenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the
same. For oenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to
conne it within carefully dened parameters is illustrated by the concluding
portion of the provision, to wit: . . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the
member involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease
upon its failure to do so. The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive
rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the
custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor oenses, it is
enough that Congress is in session. cEaCTS

5. ID.; ID.; MEMBERS OF CONGRESS CANNOT COMPEL ABSENT MEMBERS TO

ATTEND SESSION IF REASONS FOR ABSENCE IS A LEGITIMATE ONE. The
accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is
underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution . . .. However, the
accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable
by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.

6. ID.; ID.; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; ALLOWING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO

ATTEND CONGRESSIONAL SESSIONS AND COMMITTEE MEETINGS WOULD BE A
MOCKERY OF THE PURPOSES OF CORRECTION SYSTEM; EMERGENCY OR
COMPELLING TEMPORARY LEAVES FROM IMPRISONMENT ARE ALLOWED TO ALL
PRISONERS AT DISCRETION OF AUTHORITIES OR UPON COURT ORDERS.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. What the
accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant
to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for ve (5) days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to
his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status
to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the
Court in Martinez v. Morfe: . . .

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; AS A DETAINEE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN

ALLOWED TO DISCHARGE HIS DUTY AS MEMBER THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. No
less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House
of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional oce situated at Room N-
214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills,
Quezon City, manned by a full complement of sta paid for by Congress. Through
[an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an oce at the
Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to
his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he
has led several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his
salaries and other monetary benets. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been
discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent
with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee,
accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at
the National Penitentiary to perform these acts. When the voters of his district
elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the connes
of prison.

8. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; PERFORMANCE OF

LEGITIMATE DUTIES BY PUBLIC OFFICER IS NOT AN EXCUSE TO FREE A PERSON
VALIDLY IN PRISON. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public ocers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties
imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant
asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not
to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELECTION TO POSITION OF CONGRESSMAN IS NOT A

REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION IN CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT. The Court
cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. We, therefore, nd that
election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classication in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the oce are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and connement are germane
to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

10. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AFTER CONVICTION IN REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT, ACCUSED MAY BE DENIED BAIL AND THUS SUBJECTED TO
INCARCERATION IF THERE IS A RISK OF HIS ABSCONDING; RATIONALE BEHIND
CONFINEMENT; CASE AT BAR. One rationale behind connement, whether
pending appeal or after nal conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect
itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others. A person charged with
crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in
United States v. Gustilo , it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal
law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the
Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to
incarceration if there is risk of his absconding. The accused-appellant states that the
plea of the electorate which voted him into oce cannot be supplanted by
unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform
congressional duties outside his regular place of connement. It will be recalled that
when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he ed and evaded
capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to
attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is
now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is
invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to
reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-dened Constitutional restraints, it
would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal system.

11. WORDS AND PHRASES; IMPRISONMENT, ELABORATED. Imprisonment is

the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to
prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. More explicitly,
"imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a
punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal
to the accused. The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another;
any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according
to his own pleasure and will. Imprisonment is the detention of another against his
will depriving him of his power of locomotion and it "[is] something more than mere
loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits dened by wall or
any exterior barrier." It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its
nature, changes an individual's status in society. Prison ocials have the dicult
and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting,
as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry
into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the
curtailment and elimination of certain rights.
GONZAGA-REYES, J ., concurring opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; CONTINUED INCARCERATION

OF ACCUSED IS A VALID CURTAILMENT OF HIS RIGHTS TO PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
PENDING APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION. The Bill of Rights provides All persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sucient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required. This constitutional provision denying the right
to bail for oenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is
strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court
found which accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. In People v. Divina we held that the trial court's
judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the crime charged is
strong. Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid
and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional liberty
pending appeal of his conviction.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY

IMMUNITY FROM ARREST; GRANT OF ACCUSED'S MOTION TO ALLOW HIM TO
ATTEND LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS CONSTITUTE AN UNJUSTIFIED BROADENING
THEREOF. Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from
arrest to legislators provide legal justication for accused-appellant's motion. The
Constitution states that A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all oenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof. I agree with the ponencia that to allow
accused-appellant to attend legislative sessions would constitute an unjustied
broadening of the privilege from arrest bestowed by the Constitution upon
members of Congress. Neither the legislative history of this provision nor the
general principles of ocial immunity support an expanded interpretation of such
privilege.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSCRIBED BY NATURE OR GRAVITY OF OFFENSE

CHARGED; COULD ONLY BE INVOKED FOR RELATIVELY MINOR OFFENSES,
PUNISHABLE AT MOST BY CORRECTIONAL PENALTIES. It was never the intention
of the framers of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to shield a member of Congress
from the consequences of his wrongdoings. Thus, despite the widening of its scope
to include criminal oenses, the privilege from arrest is still circumscribed by the
nature or the gravity of the oense of which the accused is charged. Hence, the
commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable by aictive penalties or with
capital punishment, does not fall within the scope of the constitutional privilege. A
member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrests for relatively
minor oenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties. As enunciated in
Martinez v. Morfe , "when it comes to freedom from arrest, it would amount to the
creation of a privileged class, without justication in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal oense, they would be considered immune during their
attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE; REASON. The
accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, an aictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the privilege of
parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from the above stated rationale for
legislative immunity, a liberal construction of the constitutional privilege is not in
order.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABILITY THEREOF TO ACCUSED IS ALREADY MOOT AND

ACADEMIC; REASON. Under the factual circumstances of this case, the
applicability of this privilege from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and
academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that stage of the criminal
process at which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the accused by
means of his arrest. Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely being
arrested. As a matter of fact, he has already been arrested, tried and convicted by
the trial court.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICIALS; DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION

CANNOT APPLY TO CRIMINAL ACTS WHICH RE-ELECTED OFFICIAL MAY HAVE
COMMITTED DURING HIS PREVIOUS TERM. Accused-appellant's contention that
his re-election constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such an expression of
the popular will should not be rendered inutile by even the police power of the State
is hollow. In Aguinaldo v. Comelec, Aguinaldo v. Santos and in Salalima v. Guingona
we laid down the doctrine that a public ocial cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to
oce operates as a condonation of the ocer's previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting o the right to remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation
cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-elected ocial may have committed
during his previous term. The administrative liability of a public ocer is separate
and distinct from his penal liability.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-edged member of Congress who

is now conned at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape
on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts 1 is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant led this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-
bailable offense.cdtai
The issue raised is one of first impression.

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are
called upon to balance relevant and conicting factors in the judicial interpretation
of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.

The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of

House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that

1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be

rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not even the
police power of the State.

2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation

without representation.

3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his

suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by the
people.

4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice
to be heard.

5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend

sessions of the U.S. Congress.

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona de member thereof and urges

a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of
accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when

allowed to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states
that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him
as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he
has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant
with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it
cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending
criminal cases.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise
of surage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benets. However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our
first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top ocials of Government
executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an
unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high
government oce, by itself, frees the ocial from the common restraints of general
law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In
fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption. cdll

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption
as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms.
It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:

Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives

shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress,
and in going to and returning from the same; . . ..

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted
under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary
immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all
persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all

oenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and
returning from the same.

For oenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to
conne it within carefully dened parameters is illustrated by the concluding
portion of the provision, to wit:

. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a
recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its
failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation
of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also
been removed. For relatively minor oenses, it is enough that Congress is in
session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend
sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states
that

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,

but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties,
as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The connement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, 2 which states,

inter alia, that
The Court should never remove a public ocer for acts done prior to his
present term of oce. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their ocers. When a people have elected a man to oce,
it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if
he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.

will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-
quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public ocer for acts done prior to his present term of oce. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the
same way that preventive suspension is not removal, connement pending
appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or,
otherwise, disqualified. cdasia

One rationale behind connement, whether pending appeal or after nal conviction,
is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and
warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration
of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, 3 it is the injury to the public which
State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus
subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding. 4

The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into
oce cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of
confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he
ed and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which
accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-dened
Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal
system.

Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of

Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail,
for official or medical reasons, to wit:

a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the

Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to
expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;

b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his

dentist in Makati City;

c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical

Center, Makati City;

d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this

case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and
private vehicle.

He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the
prison premises, to wit:

a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for

the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2)
planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this
purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own
vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his
place of confinement.

b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist

in Makati City.

c) to be conned at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his

heart condition.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for ve (5) days
or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the
following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe: 5

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortied by

policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity
to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge
their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of
their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be
accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would
amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justication in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal oense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the
proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions
eciently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal
law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like
any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing
to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be
expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go
after legislators belonging to the minority, it suces to answer that precisely
all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous
of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an
attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary
would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.

The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga
del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona de
member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary
detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he
has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave
jail.
dctai

We remain unpersuaded.

No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the
House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional oce situated at
Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan
Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of sta paid for by Congress.
Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an oce at
the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends
to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention,
he has led several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving
his salaries and other monetary benets. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has
been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative
consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a
detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did
so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the connes of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters
elect a person with full knowledge that he is suering from a terminal illness, they
do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of

constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws." 6 This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. 7 The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective ocial result in a substantial distinction that allows dierent
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial dierentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly conned
under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public ocers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the
duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the
President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular
duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of
a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor
with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular aiction.
An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police ocer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner
into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious

discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. 8

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. 9

We, therefore, nd that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable

classication in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the oce are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and connement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class. 10

Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a

person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. 11

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty.
As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is
personal to the accused. 12 The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of
another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action
according to his own pleasure and will. 13 Imprisonment is the detention of another
against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion 14 and it "[is] something
more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits
defined by wall or any exterior barrier." 15

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individual's status in society. 16 Prison ocials have the dicult and often thankless
job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of
attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the
social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and
elimination of certain rights. 17

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's

claim that re-election to public oce gives priority to any other right or interest,
including the police power of the State. cdtai

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ .,

concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, JJ., concur in the main and
separate opinion.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., see separate concurring opinion.

Separate Opinions
GONZAGA-REYES, J ., concurring opinion:
For resolution in this case is a motion led by accused-appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos,
who has been convicted by the trial court of two counts of statutory rape and six
counts of acts of lasciviousness, which judgment is currently pending appeal before
this Court. As a member of the House of Representatives, accused-appellant claims
that his constituents are deprived of representation by reason of his incarceration
pending appeal of the judgment of conviction and that he should therefore be
allowed to discharge his legislative functions, including attendance of legislative
sessions and committee meetings.

I concur in the ponencia of my colleague Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago

in holding that accused-appellant's motion is bereft of any legal merit. Cdpr

The Bill of Rights provides

All persons, except those charged with oenses punishable by reclusion

perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sucient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required. 1 (emphasis supplied)

This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for oenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz

SEC. 7. Capital oense or an oense punishable by reclusion perpetua

or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital
oense, or an oense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape, which
is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In People v . Divina 2 we held that the trial
court's judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the crime
charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of accused-appellant
is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional
liberty pending appeal of his conviction.

Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from arrest to

legislators provide legal justication for accused-appellant's motion. The
Constitution states that

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all oenses

punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or
in any committee thereof. 3

I agree with the ponencia that to allow accused-appellant to attend legislative

sessions would constitute an unjustied broadening of the privilege from arrest
bestowed by the Constitution upon members of Congress. Neither the legislative
history of this provision nor the general principles of ocial immunity support an
expanded interpretation of such privilege.

Unlike the present Constitution, the 1935 Constitution 4 limited the privilege from
arrests to "all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace." This provision
was taken from the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which was in turn based upon
the American Constitution. In accordance with American precedents, the words
"treason, felony and breach of the peace" have been construed to include all
indictable oenses. 5 Thus, under the 1935 Constitution the freedom from arrest
only encompassed civil arrests.

Under the 1973 6 and 1987 Constitutions, the privilege was broadened to include
arrests for crimes punishable by imprisonment of six years or less. Despite the
expansion of the privilege, the rationale for granting members of Congress
immunity from arrest remained the same to ensure that they are not prevented
from performing their legislative duties. 7 In fact, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission rejected the proposal of one of its members to expand the scope of the
parliamentary immunity to include searches because, unlike arrests, it was not
demonstrated that the conduct of searches would prevent members of Congress
from discharging their legislative functions. 8

It is a well-established principle that ocial immunity is a necessary adjunct to the

vigorous and eective performance of ocial functions. Members of Congress, in
particular, who are called upon to exercise their discretion and judgment in enacting
laws responsive to the needs of the people, would certainly be impeded in the
exercise of their legislative functions if every dissatised person could compel them
to vindicate the wisdom of their enactments in an action for damages or question
their official acts before the courts. 9

It was never the intention of the framers of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to
shield a member of Congress from the consequences of his wrongdoings. Thus,
despite the widening of its scope to include criminal oenses, the privilege from
arrest is still circumscribed by the nature or the gravity of the oense of which the
accused is charged. Hence, the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable
by aictive penalties or with capital punishment, does not fall within the scope of
the constitutional privilege. A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity
from arrests for relatively minor oenses, punishable at most by correctional
penalties. As enunciated in Martinez v. Morfe, 10 "when it comes to freedom from
arrest, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justication in
reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal oense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same." dctai

The accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable

by reclusion perpetua, an aictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the privilege
of parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from the above-stated rationale for
legislative immunity, a liberal construction of the constitutional privilege is not in
order.

It should also be mentioned that, under the factual circumstances of this case, the
applicability of this privilege from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and
academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that stage of the criminal
process at which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the accused by
means of his arrest. Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely being
arrested. As a matter of fact, he has already been arrested, tried and convicted by
the trial court.

Accused-appellant's contention that his re-election constitutes a renewal of his

mandate and that such an expression of the popular will should not be rendered
inutile by even the police power of the State is hollow. In Aguinaldo v. Comelec, 11
Aguinaldo v. Santos 12 and in Salalima v. Guingona 13 we laid down the doctrine
that a public ocial cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term, since his re-election to oce operates as a condonation of the
ocer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting o the right to remove
therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts
which the re-elected ocial may have committed during his previous term. 14 The
administrative liability of a public ocer is separate and distinct from his penal
liability.

Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. Since
the Constitution itself provides for the immunities from the general application of
our criminal laws which a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
enjoy, it follows that any expansion of such immunities must similarly be based
upon an express constitutional grant. cdphil

I vote to deny the motion.

Davide, Jr., C.J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. RTC Decision, pp. 54-55.

2. 212 SCRA 768, at 773 [1992].

3. 19 Phil. 208, 212.

4. Cubillo v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980].

5. 44 SCRA 37 [1972].

6. Art. III, Sec. 1.

7. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.

8. Skinuer v. Oklahoma, 315 US 535.

9. See Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Edition, p. 548.

10. See Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155;
Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; Ceniza v. Commission
on Elections, 96 SCRA 763 [1980]; People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.

11. Black's Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe 5th Ed., p. 681.

12. 20 Words And Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466, citing US v. Safeway Stores
[Tex.] C.C.C.A. Kan., 140 F 2d 834, 839 and US v. Mitchell, 163 F. 1014, 1016 at p.
470.

13. Ibid., p. 470, citing Pine v. Okzewski, 170 A. 825, 827, 112 N.J.L. 429.

14. Id., p. 472, citing US v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas. 1084, 1087.

15. Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.

16. Sheldon, Krantz, 1988 Supplement. The Law of Correction and Prisoners' Rights,
3rd ed., p. 121.

17. Ibid.

GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring:

1. 1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 13.

2. 221 SCRA 209 (1993).

3. Art. VI, Sec. 11.

4. Art. VI, Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going
to and returning from the same; and for any speech and debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place.

5. Martinez v. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972), citing Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S.
425.

6. Art. VIII, Sec. 9 A member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all oenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
during his attendance at its sessions, and in going to and returning from the
same; but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty-four hours after its adjournment for a recess or
for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
A member shall not be questioned nor held liable in any other place for any speech
or debate in the Batasan or in any committee thereof.
7. 1987 Constitution, II RECORD 90.

8. Ibid., 178-185.

9. Mechem, F.R., A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers (1890), 431.

10. Supra.

11. Res., G.R. Nos. 105128-30, May 14, 1992.

12. 212 SCRA 768 (1992).

13. 257 SCRA 55 (1996).

14. Salalima v. Guingona, id.