PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS
concubinage.
ANAYA vs PALAROAN
GR No. L-27030; Nov. 26, 1970
- The non-disclosure to a wife by her
husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is not a ground for
annulment of marriage.
- FRAUD as a ground for annulment of
marriage is limited exclusively by ART. 86:
Art. 86 Any of the following circumstances
shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of
ART. 85:
1. Misrepresentation as to the identity of
one of the contracting parties;
2. Non-disclosure of the previous
conviction of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and the
penalty imposed was imprisonment for
two or more;
3. Concealment by the wife of the fact
that at the time of the marriage, she
was pregnant by a man other than her
husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage.
FRANCISCO vs TAYAO
GR No. L-26435; March 4, 1927
- The wife is not entitled to a decree of
divorce where her husband has been
convicted of adultery.
Philippine Divorce Law (Act No. 2710)
Sec. 1 - A petition for divorce can only be filed
for adultery on the part of the wife
or concubinage on the part of the husband
Sec. 3 - The divorce may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse, provided there has been
no condonation of or consent to the adultery
or concubinage, as the case may be
Sec. 8 - A divorce shall not be granted without
the guilt of the defendant being established by
final sentence in a criminal action.
GANDIONCO vs PENARANDA
G.R. No. 79284; November 27, 1987
- The action for legal separation may
proceed independently even without
resolution of the complaint for
- A decree of legal separation, on the ground
of concubinage, may be issued upon proof
by preponderance of evidence in the action
for legal separation. No criminal proceeding
or conviction is necessary.
- To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs.
Tayao has been modified, as that case was
decided under Act. No. 2710, when
absolute divorce was then allowed and had
for its grounds the same grounds for legal
separation under the New Civil Code, with
the requirement, under such former law,
that the guilt of defendant spouses had to
be established by final judgment in a
criminal action. That requirement has not
been reproduced or adopted by the
framers of the present Civil Code, and the
omission has been uniformly accepted as a
modification of the stringent rule in
Francisco v. Tayao.
ONG ENG KIAM vs LUCITA ONG
G.R. No. 153206; October 23, 2006
- Abandonment for valid or justifiable ground
is not a ground for legal separation.
- In order for abandonment to constitute a
ground for legal separation, it must be for
without justifiable cause and for more than
one year.
Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code - legal
separation shall be denied when both parties
have given ground for legal separation.
- The abandonment referred to by the Family
Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. vs IYOY
G.R. No. 152577; September 21, 2005
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, the Supreme Court issued definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, one of which is that:
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical.
- In this case, the evidence may have proven
that Fely committed acts that hurt and
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the
rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging,
and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an
American; and even her flaunting of her
American family and her American
surname, may indeed be manifestations of
her alleged incapacity to comply with her
marital obligations; nonetheless, the root
cause for such was not identified. If the
root cause of the incapacity was not
identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily
established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither
could it be proven to be in existence at the
time of celebration of the marriage; nor
that it is incurable.
BUGAYONG vs GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033; December 28, 1956
Art. 100 (CC) The legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided
there has been no condonation of or consent to
the adultery or concubinage. Where both
spouses are offenders, a legal separation
cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion
between the parties to obtain legal separation
shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
- The only general rule in American
jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with
the guilty party, after the commission of
the offense, and with the knowledge or
belief on the part of the injured party of its
commission, will amount to conclusive
evidence of condonation; but this
presumption may be rebutted by evidence.
- If there had been cohabitation, to what
extent must it be to constitute
condonation?
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse
between the parties ordinarily is sufficient
to constitute condonation, and where the
parties live in the same house, it is
presumed that they live on terms of
matrimonial cohabitation.
A divorce suit will not be granted for
adultery where the parties continue to live
together after it was known or there is
sexual intercourse after knowledge of
adultery or sleeping together for a single
night, and many others. The resumption of
marital cohabitation as a basis of
condonation will generally be inferred,
nothing appearing to the contrary, from the
fact of the living together as husband and
wife, especially as against the husband.
- There is no ruling on this matter in our
jurisprudence but we have no reason to
depart from the doctrines laid down in the
decisions of the various supreme courts of
the United States above quoted.
LAPUZ-SY vs EUFEMIO SY-UY
G.R. No. L-30977; January 31, 1972
- An action for legal separation which
involves nothing more than the bed-and-
board separation of the spouses (there
being no absolute divorce in this
jurisdiction) is purely personal.
- Being personal in character, it follows that
the death of one party to the action causes
the death of the action itself actio
personalis moritur cum persona.
- The right to the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains (or of the absolute
community of property), the loss of right by
the offending spouse to any share of the
profits earned by the partnership or
community, or his disqualification to inherit
by intestacy from the innocent spouse as
well as the revocation of testamentary
provisions in favor of the offending spouse
made by the innocent one, are all rights
and disabilities that, by the very terms of
the Civil Code article, are vested
exclusively in the persons of the spouses;
and by their nature and intent, such claims
and disabilities are difficult to conceive as
assignable or transmissible. Any property
rights acquired by either party as a result
of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines could be resolved and
determined in a proper action for partition
by either the appellee or by the heirs of the
appellant.

CERVANTES VS. FAJARDO
GR. No. 79955; January 27, 1989
Does a natural parent, especially the natural
mother, have a better right as to the custody of
a child than those of the adoptive parents who
are leading a life better than the natural
parent? NO
- In all cases involving the custody, care,
education and property of children, the
latter's welfare is paramount. The provision
that no mother shall be separated from a
child under five (5) years of age, will not
apply where the Court finds compelling
reasons to rule otherwise.
- In all controversies regarding the custody
of minors, the foremost consideration is the
moral, physical and social welfare of the
child concerned, taking into account the
resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents.
- A decree of adoption has the effect of
dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child. The
adopting parents have the right to the care
and custody of the adopted child and to
exercise parental authority and
responsibility over her.
ESPIRITU vs CA
G.R. No. 115640; March 15, 1995
The custody of the children determined by the
age of the minor child? NO
- The task of choosing the parent to whom
custody shall be awarded is not a
ministerial function to be determined by a
simple determination of the age of a minor
child.
Art. 363 (CC) In all questions on the care,
custody, education and property of the
children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from
her child under seven years of age, unless the
court finds compelling reasons for such
measure.
Art. 213 (CC) In case of separation of the
parents parental authority shall be exercised by
the parent designated by the Court. The Court
shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
- Whether a child is under or over seven
years of age, the paramount criterion must
always be the child's interests. Discretion is
given to the court to decide who can best
assure the welfare of the child, and award
the custody on the basis of that
consideration.
DE LA CARMARA vs RUEDA
G.R. No. 11263; November 2, 1916
- The power to grant support is not
dependent upon the power to grant divorce
which is apparent from the very nature of
the marital obligations of the spouses.
- The mere act of marriage creates an
obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife. This obligation is founded
not so much on the express or implied
terms of the contract of marriage as on the
natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of
such vital concern to the state itself that
the laws will not permit him to terminate it
by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife
to seek protection in the parental home. A
judgment for separate maintenance is not
due and payable either as damages or as a
penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal
sense of the term, but rather a judgment
calling for the performance of a duty made
specific by the mandate of the sovereign.
ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ
42 Phil 54; August 11, 1921
Can the court grant the petition of the husband
to compel his wife to live with him? NO
- It is not within the province of the courts to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to,
the other.
- What is involved in this case is a purely
personal right which cannot be enforceable
by process of contempt. At best, the court
may render a judicial declaration that his
wife has presented herself without
sufficient cause and that it is her duty to
return.
VALDEZ vs. RTC Branch 102 of Quezon
City
G.R. No. 122749; July 31, 1996