Jim and Bob

Keith Burgess-Jackson
3 February 2017

Jims reasoning:1 Im a botanist. I had nothing to do with the situa-

tion in which I find myself. Im not responsible for the Indians who are
threatened by Pedro. If he chooses to kill them, then he is responsible
for their deaths, not me. If DU implies that it is permissible for me to
kill an innocent person, then DU must be rejected. I believe that it is
intrinsically wrong intentionally to kill an innocent person, even if do-
ing so is the only way to prevent a great evil (such as the deaths of 19
innocent people). If this seems squeamish or self-indulgent, then mod-
ify the situation. Am I permitted to kill an innocent person in order to
prevent the deaths of two innocent people (for that, too, would maxim-
ize net utility)? In short, DU permits (allows) too much. There are
limits to what morality permits people to do in the name of promoting
the overall good.2

1 Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South American town.

Tied up against the wall are a row of twenty Indians, most terrified, a few defiant, in
front of them several armed men in uniform. A heavy man in a sweat-stained khaki
shirt turns out to be the captain in charge and, after a good deal of questioning of Jim
which establishes that he got there by accident while on a botanical expedition, explains
that the Indians are a random group of the inhabitants who, after recent acts of protest
against the government, are just about to be killed to remind other possible protestors
of the advantages of not protesting. However, since Jim is an honoured visitor from
another land, the captain is happy to offer him a guests privilege of killing one of the
Indians himself. If Jim accepts, then as a special mark of the occasion, the other Indians
will be let off. Of course, if Jim refuses, then there is no special occasion, and Pedro here
will do what he was about to do when Jim arrived, and kill them all. Jim, with some
desperate recollection of schoolboy fiction, wonders whether if he got hold of a gun, he
could hold the captain, Pedro and the rest of the soldiers to threat, but it is quite clear
from the set-up that nothing of that kind is going to work: any attempt at that sort of
thing will mean that all the Indians will be killed, and himself. The men against the
wall, and the other villagers, understand the situation, and are obviously begging him
to accept. What should he do? Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in
Utilitarianism: For and Against, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1973), 75-150, at 98-9.
2 Jim is advocating what Samuel Scheffler calls an agent-centred restriction

(ACR). See Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Inves-

tigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1982), 2. (Other people call it a constraint.) An ACR says that certain acts (such
as lying, torturing, or intentionally killing an innocent person) are forbiddeneven if
performing those acts would maximize the good. As Scheffler puts it, an ACR holds that
it is sometimes wrong to do what will produce the best available outcome overall. Ibid.

Bobs reasoning:3 I worked my entire adult life to save for my retire-

ment. The Bugatti, which is uninsured, is my retirement. Without it,
I am destitute. I had nothing to do with the situation in which I find
myself. Im not responsible for the child on the tracks and had nothing
to do with the train that is barreling down on the child. If the child is
killed by the train, then someone elsethe childs parents, the train
company, or whomeveris responsible for the childs death, not me. If
DU implies that it is obligatory for me to sacrifice my retirement for
the sake of a stranger, then DU must be rejected. If this seems selfish,
then modify the situation. Am I obligated to give up my legs to save
the child? My legs and arms? Am I required to sacrifice my life if that
is what it takes to save the childs life, on the ground that the child has
more life left than I do? In short, DU requires (demands) too much.
There are limits to what morality requires people to do in the name of
promoting the overall good.4

3 Bob is close to retirement. He has invested most of his savings in a very rare

and valuable old car, a Bugatti, which he has not been able to insure. The Bugatti is his
pride and joy. In addition to the pleasure he gets from driving and caring for his car,
Bob knows that its rising market value means that he will always be able to sell it and
live comfortably after retirement. One day when Bob is out for a drive, he parks the
Bugatti near the end of a railway siding and goes for a walk up the track. As he does so,
he sees that a runaway train, with no one aboard, is running down the railway track.
Looking farther down the track, he sees the small figure of a child very likely to be killed
by the runaway train. He can't stop the train and the child is too far away to warn of
the danger, but he can throw a switch that will divert the train down the siding where
his Bugatti is parked. Then nobody will be killedbut the train will destroy his Bugatti.
Thinking of his joy in owning the car and the financial security it represents, Bob decides
not to throw the switch. The child is killed. For many years to come, Bob enjoys owning
his Bugatti and the financial security it represents. Peter Singer, The Singer Solution
to World Poverty, The New York Times (5 September 1999). Singer got this example
from Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996), 135-6.
4 Bob is advocating what Samuel Scheffler calls an agent-centred prerogative

(ACP). Ibid., 5. (Other people call it an option.) An ACP says that certain acts (such as
benefiting oneself or preventing harm to oneself) are permittedeven if performing them
would not maximize the good. As Scheffler puts it, an ACP has the effect of denying
that one is always required to produce the best overall states of affairs. Ibid.