University of Utah

A New Perspective on the Foreign Policy Views of American Opinion Leaders in the Cold War
and Post-Cold War Eras
Author(s): Jerel A. Rosati, Michael W. Link and John Creed
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 461-479
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/449086 .
Accessed: 02/02/2014 15:06

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Sage Publications, Inc. and University of Utah are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Political Research Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 A New Perspectiveon the
ForeignPolicyViewsofAmerican
OpinionLeadersin theCold
Warand Post-ColdWarEras
JEREL A. ROSATI ANDMICHAEL W LINK, UNIVERSITY
OF SOUTH CAROLINA
JOHN CREED, COLLEGE OF CHARLESTON

Thisarticlebreaksnewgroundin thestudyoftheforeign policyviews

ofAmericanopinionleadersby usinga systematic contentanalysisof
writings publishedin leadingforeign policyjournals.It is in suchjour-
nalsthatthedebateon thenatureanddirection ofAmerican foreign policy
is oftenplayedout.Such an approachallowsus to examinethelevelof
diversityin theforeign policythought ofopinionleadersand to provide
an initialassessment ofthelevelofcontinuityandchangein thisthought
sincetheendoftheCold War.Thefindings do notsuggesttheformation
ofa newconsensusoverthedirection ofAmerican foreignpolicyanytime
soon.Rather, betweentheColdWareighties and thepost-ColdWarnine-
tiesforeign havebeen markedby bothpersistence
policyattitudes and
change,resulting ina greater andcomplexity
diversity ofthought, as well
as greater optimism forthefuture ofU.S. foreignpolicy.Thestudyhigh-
the of
lights importance developing alternativeresearch strategiesand
data sourceswhichbothsupplement and complement moretraditional
surveyresearchapproachesin orderto morefullycaptureand under-
standtheforeign policythought ofAmerican opinionleaders.

In thewakeoftheColdWartherehasbeena renewed interest

among
in examining
scholarsand analysts theforeign
policy ofAmericans.
beliefs
Justas theVietnam ofa foreign
Warled to a splintering policyconsensus

NOTE: WewouldliketothankBillChittick, JoeHagan,Ole

RogerCoate,RobertGilbert,
Holsti,CharlesKegley,Bob Oldendick,JamesRosenau,StephenTwing,Steve
Walker,and GeneWittkopffortheirassistance, and construc-
helpfulcomments,
tivecriticism.

Political
Research Vol.51, No. 2 (June1998): pp. 461-479
Quarterly,

461

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 PoliticalResearch
Quarterly

amongthepublicin theseventies (see Destler, Gelb,andLake1984;Mann

1990;Rosati1993),theimpactofthecollapseoftheSovietUnionand the
end oftheCold Warareexpectedto havedramatic effectson theforeign
policy debate in the United States for the foreseeable future.One keytoun-
derstanding this debate lies in the and
writings viewpoints ofAmerican opin-
ionleaders.Itwasthesplitinbeliefs amongopinionleadersovertheVietnam
Warthatwas ultimately critical in generating thecollapseoftheColdWar
consensus throughout American society (Mann1990;Hallin1986;Schneider
1984;Mueller1973).Likewise, theviewpoints ofsuchopinionleaderswill
probably serve as a guiding force in the search for a newforeign policycon-
sensusas theUnitedStatesenters the21stcentury.
To date,however, studiesoftheforeign policybeliefsofAmericans, in-
cluding the elite and
public opinionleaders, have been driven almost exclu-
sivelybysurvey research approaches. Kegley(1986: 467) recommends that
"future research might consider severing itsalmostexclusive reliance on sur-
veyresearch methodologies andinsteadestimate thedistribution ofopinion
bytapping otherindicators." One alternative sourceforgauging theforeign
policy debate is the writings regularly in
published majorforeign policyjour-
nals.Itis inforeign policy journals, suchas Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy,and
TheNational Interest wherethedebateon thenatureanddirection ofAmeri-
canforeign policybyopinionleadersis often playedout(seeKegley1986).
Articles insuchjournalsareexcellent sourcesfortapping intotheforeign
policyviewsofAmerican opinionleaders.First,foreign policyjournalsare
majoroutletsthatAmerican opinionleaders-practitioners, policyanalysts,
journalists, scholars, intellectuals, andthelike-relyontocommunicate their
point of view (see Rosenau 1961). Second, foreign policyjournalsspanthe
political spectrum to reflect much of the foreign policydiscourse thatexists
the
throughout country (see Rosati 1993: 536). Third, foreign policy journals
arecommon sources offoreign policy information andviewsbeyond thepopu-
larmediatowhichmanypolitically attentive andactivemembers oftheelite
publicinterested in foreign policyarelikelyto turn(seeWeiss1974;Zaller
1992).In sum,analyzing thecontent offoreign policyjournalsshouldprove
a valuablecomplement to survey research, allowing us tobuildon previous
workson foreign policy beliefs.
Presented here,therefore, is a somewhat different perspective on thefor-
eignpolicy beliefs and attitudes of American elites. Byusingpublished writ-
ings as our basis for determining perceptions and attitudes, we are clearly
tapping intoa different strata oftheelitepublic-that is,thesmallpercentage
ofAmericans who actas opinionleadersand theattentive public-thanis
usually the case with survey studies such as those based on data collected by
on
theChicagoCouncil Foreign Relations. The opinion leaders examined here

462

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ForeignPolicyViewsofAmerican
OpinionLeaders

arevitallyimportant,however,tounderstanding theforeignpolicydebatein
theUnitedStatesas wellas theformation ofnewforeign policyattitudes. As
Rosenau(1961) makesclearin hisclassicPublicOpinion andForeign Policy,
thesearetheopinion-makers whoputtheir thoughts topaperforthepurpose
debateandmoving
ofstimulating policy
foreign ina particular
direction.There-
fore,ourfocusis noton theelitepublicas a whole,buton thisimportant
substrataofAmerican opinionleadersin theareaofforeign policy(see also
Almond1960;Galtung 1965;Neuman1986).
Bysystematicallyexamining thewritings ofAmerican opinionleaders,
wemeetthreeimportant we examine
ends.First, thelevelofdiversity offor-
eignpolicythinking amongAmerica opinionleadersas expressed in the top
journalsinthefield.Second,weprovide
policy-oriented aninitialassessment
ofthelevelofcontinuityandchangeinthisthought sincetheendoftheCold
War.Finally,we discusstheimplications ofthisstudyin lightofprevious
opinionresearch, highlightingtheimportance ofsupplementing thetradi-
tionalreliance
onsurvey researchwiththeanalysis dataas a means
ofdifferent
ofbetterunderstanding eliteforeign
policybeliefs.
RESEARCH STRATEGYAND CONTENT ANALYSIS

Inconducting thecontent presented

analysis fiveofthemostpromi-
below,
nentforeign policy(quarterly) thatspannedthepoliti-
journalswereselected
cal spectrum fromtherightto theleft:GlobalAffairs, TheNational Interest,
Foreign Affairs,ForeignPolicy,and World The
Journal.
Policy articles
selected
from these
journals included all"America andtheworld"-typepiecesbyAmeri-
canauthors, whichdealtwithgeneral assessmentsofU.S. foreignpolicyBy
usingsucharticles as thebasisofourdata,we areabletoanalyzetheforeign
policybeliefsofAmerican opinion leadersbasedonthesubjects'ownthoughts
andthemes as theytriedtomakesenseoftheworldaroundthem.Thiswas
accomplished byexamining therangeandnatureoftheviewsas theywere
expressed in the articles
by individualsandidentifyingobservablepatternsin
thebeliefs expressed.
Thevastliterature on socialcognition andschematheory that
indicates
thebeliefsystems ofindividuals thosemostattentive
andpublics,especially
and informed (in otherwords,thosemost"expert"), tendto be quitefrag-
mented andcomplex(seeFiskeandTaylor1991;Hurwitz andPeffley 1987;
Kinderand Sears1985; Milburn 1991; Rosati1995).1And as Bardesand

1 See
Key(1961) foran overview onAmerican
oftheearlyresearch publicopinionbefore
theprofound impact of thework of PhilipConverse(1964, 1970) and TheAmerican
Voter(Campbell,Converse,Miller,and Stokes1960) on thestudyofpoliticalbehavior

463

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 PoliticalResearch
Quarterly

Oldendick (1990:229)pointoutintheir review oftheliterature onpublicopin-

ionandforeign policy, "withno agreed-upon structure for foreign policyissues,
researchers mustdecidewhatassumptions willguidetheir investigation ofatti-
tudes."Inthisrespect, inorder todetermine theforeign policy viewsofAmerican
opinion leaders, itisnecessary toknowmoreabouthowthey perceive thenature
oftheworldinorder tounderstand theirprescriptions for how the United States
shouldoperate within theinternational system (see Conover and Feldman 1984;
Holsti1992;Jervis 1976;Steinbruner 1974;Tetlock 1983).
Thequestions guiding thecontent analysis presented herearegrounded
inthetheoretical andempirical literature,
especially in the studyofU.S. foreign
policyand the beliefs of politicalleaders.For example, we included items onthe
significanceofimages ofthestructure oftheinternational system, theposition of
theUnited States, andtherelative importance ofvarious foreign policy issues,all
ofwhichhavebeenhighlighted within theBrecher decision-making framework
(Brecher,Steinberg, and Stein 1969), Keohane and Nye's (1977) and Mansbach
andVasquez's (1981) international systems approach, Rosati's (1987) political
psychological study oftheCarter Administration's worldview, andYergin?s (1978)
historicalanalysis of the origins ofthe Cold War.Images of international threat
and
perceptions opportunities also have received prominent attention in such
works asHolsti's (1967)study ofJohn Foster Dulles's "inherent badfaith" imageof
theSovietUnionandJervis's (1976)studyofperceptions andmisperceptions.
weinclude
Finally, a focusonthestrategy andgoalsofpolicy, whichhasreceived
considerable attention inthevastliterature onAmerican diplomatic history (see,
Combs
e.g., 1983; Yergin 1978) as wellas more systematic foreign policy studies
(see,e.g.,Herrmann 1985;Rosati1987).
Itis withthisbackground inmindthatwe constructed sixkeyquestions
aboutU.S. foreign policy toserve as the basis of the journalcontent analysis.
Eachrepresents a substantive of
aspect foreign policythought. Thesixques-
tionsinclude:
1. Whatis theauthor's depiction ofthestructure oftheinternational sys-
tem;thatis,howdoestheauthorseethedistribution ofpowerin the
international system assessedon a unipolar, bipolar, multipolar, com-
plex-interdependence, and anarchic continuum?
2. Whataretheauthor's threat perceptions oftheinternational environ-
that in
ment; is, general, does the author tend to characterize the world
as a caldronofthreats oran arenaofopportunities?

(see Pomper1978-79). Kinder(1983), Kinderand Sears (1985), and particularly,

Oskamp(1977: chapter5) providehelpful withrespecttothedebateabout
background
ofpublicopinion.
thestructure

464

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ForeignPolicyViewsofAmerican
OpinionLeaders

3. Whatis theauthor's depictionoftherelative positionoftheUnited

that in
States; is, general, how does theauthor perceivetheU.S.vis-a-
vistheinternational system assessedin termsof ascendant,stable,or
in decline?
4. Whatis themajorforeign policyissue-areaofconcernfortheauthor;
thatis,is theauthormostconcerned aboutsecurity issues,economic
issues,humanrights/democracy issues,orothertypesofissues?
5. Whatforeign policystrategyshouldtheUnitedStatespursue;thatis,
in general, whatis theauthor'sbasicstrategic assessedin
orientation
terms ofproaction, or
reaction, disengagement? And,finally,
6. WhatgoalsshouldtheUnitedStatespursuein theworld;thatis,in
general, whatistheauthor'sgoalinterms ofthelevelofchangeposited
fortheworldassessedin termsoftransformation [extreme change],
reform [moderate change],orstatusquo [little
orno change]?
Theseareamongthemostsignificant corequestionsthattheforeignpolicy
debateactually revolvesaround.The first fourquestionsformthebasisfor
discerning a person's "worldview";thelasttwocapture theindividual's
"policy
orientation." In fact,tothink ofworldview andpolicyorientations inthisway
is quiteconsistent onoperational
withtheliterature codewhichtreats foreign
policybeliefs as a compositeof"philosophical"and"instrumental"beliefs(see
George1969; Walker1977).2
Thecodingandanalysis ofthesedatawasaccomplished in threesteps.
First,eachofthejournalswassearched toidentify relevant
"Americaandthe
world"-type We
articles. wanted tomaintaina broad and
orientation therefore
didnotincludearticles whichfocusedon policiestowardindividual coun-
triesorparticular of
regions the world.Additionally,sincewe weretryingto
discern theviewsofindividualauthorswe didnotincludearticleswithmul-
tipleauthors In all,205 articles
in ouranalysis. foranalysis,
wereidentified
representingtheviewsof87 authors duringthe1980-1989ColdWareraand
79 authors from the1990-1996Post-Cold Warera.3Therewere21 authors
whowerecommontoboththeColdWarand Post-Cold Wareras.Second,

2 Mostof thestudiesof publicopinionin U.S. foreign policyhave tendedto revolve

aroundthefifth and sixthquestionsconcerning policyorientation. However,thisis
witha growing
inconsistent publicopinion that
literature indicatesthat of
thestructure
foreignpolicybeliefs,amongthemasspublicno less,tendsto be morecomplexas
discussedaboveand based on multipledimensions(see Bardesand Oldendick1978;
Chittick 1989; Hurwitzand Peffley
and Billingsley 1987).
3 The distribution
of the205 articles
is as follows:74 Foreign 56 Foreign
Affairs, 34
Policy,
World Policy
Journal,27 GlobalAffairs, It shouldbe notedthat
and 14 NationalInterest.
GlobalAffairsceasedpublication in 1994.

465

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Political
Research
Quarterly

eachoftherelevant wasreadandcodedin terms

articles ofthesixquestions
discussedabove.Thefocuswason themajorthemes communicated ineach
article
bytheauthorrelative tothequestions. someofthearticles
Naturally,
weremorecomprehensive thanothersin providing
and explicit answersto
thesixquestions. Inordertoensurethereliabilityofthecontent two
analysis,
codersinitiallycoded20 randomly selectedarticles
fromtheforeign policy
journals.Intercoderagreement was93.3 percent, indicatinga highdegreeof
in
reliability thedata collection In
process.4 cases wherea singleauthorhad
published two or more within
articles one of thetime frames, webuilta com-
positepicture of the author'sviewsbased on the modal or most frequently
expressed viewpoint inthearticles. thedatawereanalyzed
Finally, toexamine
thepatterns offoreign policythought thatprevailed in themindsofthese
opinionleadersduring theeighties
andafter thecollapseoftheColdWarin
thenineties.
FOREIGN POLICY THOUGHT IN THE COLD WAR EIGHTIES

Let'sbeginwithhow American opinionleaderswho publishedtheir

thoughts in thetopforeign policyjournalsviewedtheworldthroughout the
(1980-1989).First,most
eighties American opinion leadersshareda com-
monperception aboutthestructure oftheinternational system(seeTable1).
Overthree-quarters (77 percent)ofthearticles thestructure
characterized as
with
bipolar, theUnited Statesand the SovietUnion considered thepredomi-
nantpowers.Anadditional 19.5 percentperceived theworldas beingcom-
plexand more interdependent.Only a handful of described
articles thesystem
as unipolarormultipolar,andnonecharacterized thedistribution
ofpoweras
anarchic.Next,there wasa significantlevelofdisagreementas tothenature of
theinternational that
system, is, whether the world should be perceived a
as
caldronofthreats oran arenaofopportunities. A sizablemajority(62.8 per-
cent)werepessimistic in theiroutlook,viewingtheworldas a threatening
place,while37.2 percent weremoreoptimistic, seeingopportunities
arising.

4 In termsofthedatacollectionprocess,thecodersattendeda training sessionwiththe

authorsto clarify termsand makesurecodingtookplace in a consistent manner.A
"pretest" was conductedto makesurethatthecoderswereactingin tandem.Thelevel
ofinterceder was calculatedas thepercentage
reliability agreement on 120 codeditems
(thatis, six questionstimestwenty articlescoded). The 93.3 percentagreement figure
indicatesthatthecoderswerein agreement on 112 of 120 coded answers.The 8 re-
sponseson whichthecodersdisagreedwerespreadacrossa numberofitemsandwere
nottheproductofproblemswithanyparticular question.Coderswerealso debriefed
afterdatacollectiontomakesurethatno irregularities occurredduringdatacollection.
Giventhisprocess,we havea highlevelofconfidence in thevalidity of
and reliability
thedatacollected.

466

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ForeignPolicyViewsofAmerican
OpinionLeaders

authors
Finally, werealsodividedinterms ofhowtheysawtheUnitedStates
vis-a-vis
theinternational
system.Overhalf(55.3percent)oftheauthors per-
ceivedtheUnitedStatesto be in a positionofrelative while41.2
stability,
percentsawtheUnitedStatesas a nationin decline.Lessthan4 percent felt
thattheUnitedStateswasan ascendant powerintheeighties.
Inotherwords, mostopinion
leaders
sawtheworldduring theeightiesalong
realist
traditional, ColdWarlines,where and
bipolarity threatdefinedthe global
systemandstabilityordeclinemarkedthepositionoftheUnitedStates within
thatsystem.Themajorissuesofconcern totheseauthors wereconsistent with
Alarge
this. of
majorityopinion leaders
(74.7percent) security to
perceived issues
TABLE1
ANDPOLICYORIENTATIONS
WORLDVIEWS OF AMERICAN
OPINIONLEADERSDURINGTHE
COLD WAR ANDPOST-COLDWAR ERAS
WarEra
% ColdWarEra % Post-Cold
(1980-1989) (1990-1996) % Change
StructureofInternational
System
Unipolar 1.1 25.6 +24.5
Bipolar 77.0 10.3 -66.7
Multipolar 2.3 21.8 +19.5
Complex-Interdependent 19.5 37.2 +17.7
Anarchic 0.0 5.1 +5.1
(N) (87) (78)
PerceptionofThreat
CaldronofThreats 62.8 43.4 -19.4
ArenaofOpportunities 37.2 56.6 +19.4
(N) (86) (76)
PositionoftheUnitedStatesin GlobalSystem
Ascendant 3.5 2.6 -0.9
Stable 55.3 76.9 +21.6
Declining 41.2 20.5 -20.7
(N) (85) (78)
MajorIssuesofConcern
SecurityIssues 74.7 61.0 -13.7
EconomicIssues 12.6 10.4 -2.2
Democracy/Human Rights 0.0 16.4 +16.4
OtherTypesofIssues 5.7 6.4 +0.7
MultipleIssues 6.9 5.2 -1.7
(N) (87) (79)
PreferredPolicyOrientation
Proaction 57.6 72.7 +15.1
Reaction 38.8 22.1 -16.7
Disengagement 3.5 5.2 +1.7
(N) (85) (77)
OrientationTowardGlobalChange
Transformation (RadicalChange) 2.3 2.6 +0.3
Reformation (ModerateChange) 50.6 75.3 +24.7
StatusQuo (Little/NoChange) 47.1 22.1 -25.0
(N) (87) (77)

467

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 PoliticalResearch
Quarterly

be ofprimary importance in worldpolitics.A muchsmallerpercentage (12.6

percent)saw economic issues as themost while
important, just under7 percent
sawsecurityandeconomics as equallycompelling concerns. inkeep-
Interestingly,
ingwiththerealistemphasisin theeighties, neither democracy norhumanrights
was considered a majorfocusforU.S. foreign policy.
DivisionsamongAmericanopinionleaderswereevidentas welloverthe
preferredforeignpolicystrategies and goals of theUnitedStates.Regarding
foreignpolicystrategy, nearly percentsupporteda proactiveapproachto-
58
wardglobalproblems,whilejust under39 percentpreferred havinga more
reactiveforeign policy.Only 3 of the87 authors presentedarguments in favor
of theUnitedStatesstrategically disengaging in some way from the interna-
tionalsystem.Similarly, roughlyhalfpreferred thattheUnitedStatespromote
globalreform (thatis,moderatechange),whiletheotherhalfweremorecom-
fortablewithmaintaining the statusquo. Justover 2 percentfavoredmore
radicalchange,involvingtransformation oftheinternational system.
CONTINUITY OR CHANGE IN THE POST-COLD WAR NINETIES?

What impacthas thecollapse of Sovietcommunismhad on the foreign

policythoughtofAmericanopinionleadersin the1990s?One ofthevaluable
aspectsof using data derivedfromforeignpolicyjournals duringthistime
periodis the opportunity to beginwatchingthosewho writeon thistopic
struggleto analyzeand comprehendthewhirlwindchangestakingplace in
Europe,theSovietUnion,and theThirdWorld.The momentouseventssur-
roundingthe end of the Cold War,the collapse of communismin Eastern
Europe,and thedisintegration oftheSovietUnionhaveraisedexpectations of
thepossibility ofprofoundchangein thebeliefsofAmericanopinionleaders
and thefutureofU.S. foreign policy.As NormanOrnsteinand MarkSchmitt
(1990: 169) ask: "How will the U.S. politicalsystemoperatewithoutanti-
communismas itscentralorganizing principle?"Indeed,a "greatdebate"over
in
theproperroleoftheUnitedStates theworldhas been generatedoverthe
pastseveralyearsin leadingforeign policyjournals.
The politicalpsychological literatureon cognitionsuggeststwoimplications
(seeHerrmann 1976;Larson1986;Oskamp1977;Rosati1987,1995).
1985;Jervis
Firstand foremost, individualstendto avoiduncertainty and displaycontinuity
in theirbeliefsovertime,thusresisting The
change. stability ofbeliefsmayespe-
be
cially thecase foropinionleaders,as opposed to themass public,becausethey
tendtohaveformed moreexpertandcognitively complex belief
systems (seealso
Almond1960; Fiskeand Taylor1991; Galtung1965; Milbum1991; Neuman
1986; Rosenau1961). In fact,individualcommitment to theirpoliticalbeliefs
tendsto be greatest among those who are among the most activein American
politics(see also Conway1991; SearsandWhitney1973).

468

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ForeignPolicyViewsofAmerican
OpinionLeaders

While individualbeliefsystemstendto be resistant, new beliefpatterns

can and do emerge,especiallyas a result profoundchangesin theenviron-
of
mentaccompaniedbyspectacularevents(see also Deutschand Merritt 1965;
Lebow1981; Pageand Shapiro1992). AsRobertJervis (1976: 262) has pointed
out: "sinceeventswithmajorconsequencesfora nationabsorbso much of
thecitizen'stimeand attention,theybothsocializethepreviously unconcerned
and changetheperceptualpredispositions of manypeople withestablished
views."Clearly,thecollapseofcommunismin EasternEuropeand theSoviet
Union has thepotentialto act as a catalystforchangesin the foreignpolicy
beliefsofAmericans.In sum, the politicalpsychologicalliterature indicates
thelikelihoodofboth continuity and changein the foreignpolicybeliefsof
Americanopinionleaders.5
In thisparticularstudy,"change"can resultnot onlyfromshiftsin the
contentof foreignpolicybeliefsacrossthe two timeperiods,but also from
changesin the typesof authorswho were publishedin the foreignpolicy
journalsinbothtimeperiods.Thiscould havean impacton ourstudyas 73.4
percent(or 3 of4) oftheopinionleaderswho wereincludedin thePost-Cold
Warsubsetwerenotin theinitialCold Warsetofopinionleaders.As a means
oftestingwhetherindividualattitudesactuallydid change,we replicatedour
analysisusingonlythe21 authorswho publishedarticlesin bothtimeperi-
ods. The typesofchangesseenin thissubsetmirrors thosereportedbelow for
the fullset of authors.The changesin attitudesnotedbelow,therefore, do
appear to reflect
accuratelychanges in theviews of American opinion leaders
and not simplychangesin publishingor editorialdecisions.(Resultsof this
analysisare availablefromtheauthorsupon request.)
Examiningattitudinal changesin thenineties,we analyzed"Americaand
theworld"-type for
articles thesameforeign policyjournalsfrom1990 through
1996. We foundevidenceof considerablechangein both worldviews and
recommendedstrategies forforeignpolicy.Lookingat Table 1 once again,we
findthatthe largestchangeoccurredin perceptionsof the structure of the
international system.While overthree-quarters of theauthors saw the world
as bipolar in the eighties,only 10.3 percentcontinuedto perceivesuch a
worldduringtheninetiesafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion.Authorswere

"wherethetheoryofcognitive
5 To providesomeconceptualbackground, consistency
assumestheexistenceofa beliefsystemwitha highdegreeofcoherenceand interde-
pendencebetweenbeliefsthatare extremely to change[therefore,
resistant ifchange
occursitcomesinlargeblocks],a socialcognition depictsindividualbelief
perspective
systemsas muchmorefragmented withdifferent
internally, beliefsor schemabeing
invokedunderdifferent formakingsenseoftheenvironment.
situations Thissuggests
likelihoodthatsomebeliefsmaychangeovertime"(Rosati1995: 54).
a greater

469

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Research
Political Quarterly

muchmorelikely inthenineties toseetheworldas complex-interdependent

(37.2 percent), unipolar (25.6 percent), ormultipolar (21.8 percent), while5
percent evenviewedtheworldas anarchic. In otherwords,therewasa sub-
stantialincreasein thediversity ofimagesconcerning thestructure ofthe
international system in the Post-Cold War era, with no clear consensus
emerging.
Notableshifts alsotookplacein terms oftheperceived natureofthein-
ternational A
system. majority (56.6 percent) saw the world as an arenaof
opportunity (up from 37.2 percent in the eighties), while 43.4 percent ofthe
authors continued tocharacterize theworldas a caldronofthreats. Similarly,
most(76.9 percent) oftheauthors sawtheUnitedStatesina morefavorable
globalposition ofrelative stability(upfrom 55.3percent), whichwasmatched
a
by corresponding drop in the percentage of authors who viewedtheUnited
Statesas a nationin decline.Virtually nobody saw the United Statesas an
ascendant power, however, no
reflecting change in thisparticular orientation
overtime.
Takinga closerlookathowworldviews changedbetween theColdWar
andPost-Cold Wareras,we turntoTable2. Ifwe consider "worldview" here
to be thejuxtaposition ofperceptions ofthestructure and character ofthe
international system alongwiththeposition oftheUnitedStatesintheglobal
system, we find that a considerable shiftin viewpoints tookplaceinthewake
ofthecollapseoftheSovietUnion.Mostnotableis thesharpincrease (from
3.4 percent to25.7percent) inthosewhoseetheUnitedStatesas maintaining
a stableposition ina worldcharacterized bya complex-interdependent struc-
tureand globalopportunities. Similarly,the nineties saw the emergence of
thosewhosawtheU.S. as thesole,stablesuper-power a of
in world opportu-
nities.Theriseoftheseworldviewswasmatched bytheprecipitous decline
in thosewhosawtheworldas threatening in character andbipolarinstruc-
tureandwhoperceived theUnitedStatesas beingeither stableorin decline
inthissystem. Thisgeneral is
pattern repeated for other "world views"as well
witha general shift away from thetraditional bipolar, realist perspective ofthe
eighties toward more diverse perspectives in the nineties-perspectives that
tendtodepicta morecomplex structure fortheinternational system, yet more
stabilityandoften greater opportunities fortheU.S. inthissystem.
Interestingly(returning toTable1),whileweseegreater diversificationof
worldviewsinthenineties, interms ofmajorissuesa majority (61 percent) of
foreign policywriters continued toseesecurity issuesas thedominant global
concern(reflecting a 10 percent declinefrom theeighties). Economic issues,
surprisingly,did not dramatically increase in importance (such issuesactually
decreased inmention somewhat, butremained important forthosewhoem-
phasizedmultiple issues).Yet, human and
rights democracy emerged as im-

470

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ForeignPolicyViewsofAmerican
OpinionLeaders

TABLE2
CHANGESIN WORLDVIEWS
FROMTHECOLD WAR TO POST-COLDWAR ERAs
Worldviews % ColdWarEra WarEra % Change
% Post-Cold
CI*/Opportunity/Stable 3.4 25.7 +22.3
Unipolar/Opportunity/Stable 0.0 10.8 +10.8
Unipolar/Threat/Stable 1.1 9.5 +8.4
Muitipolar/Threat/Stable 0.0 8.1 +8.1
Multipolar/Opportunity/Stable 1.1 6.8 +5.7
CI*/Threat/Stable 1.1 6.8 +5.7
Unipolar/Threat/Declining 0.0 4.1 +4.1
Multipolar/Threat/Declining 0.0 4.1 +4.1
Multipolar/Opportunity/Declining 1.1 4.1 +3.0
Unipolar/Opportunity/Ascending 0.0 1.3 +1.3
Anarchic/Threat/Declining 0.0 1.3 +1.3
Anarchic/Threat/Ascending 0.0 1.3 +1.3
Anarchic/Threat/Stable 0.0 1.3 +1.3

CI*/Threat/Declining 4.6 1.3 -3.3

Bipolar/Threat/Ascending 3.4 0.0 -3.4
Bipolar/Opportunity/Declining 8.0 1.3 -6.7
Bipolar/Opportunity/Stable 12.6 5.4 -7.2
Declining
CI*/Opportunity 10.3 2.7 -7.6
Bipolar/Threat/Declining 14.9 0.0 -14.9
Bipolar/Threat/Stable 37.9 4.1 -33.8
(N) (85) (74)
*CI = Complex-Interdependent

portantissues (from0 to 16.4 percent)as did theimportanceof "other"is-

sues, such as the global environment. This seems to suggestthatwhile the
worldviewsof the authorshave become morediverseand more optimistic
abouttheUnitedStatesand thefutureoftheinternational system,traditional
foreignpolicyconcernscontinueto prevail-althoughnot as powerfully as
during the Cold War eighties.
Modestchangesin thepreferred foreignpolicygoals and strategyofthe
UnitedStatesare in keepingwiththis(see Table 1). A largermajority(72.7
percent)of authorswereinterested in promotinga generallyproactiveU.S.
foreign policy(up from 57.6 percent),while22.1 percentcontinuedto prefer
a broadlyreactivepolicy.Interestingly,despitetheacademicand mediaatten-
tionfocusedon risingsentiment in favorofa disengagement approachtoU.S.
foreign of
policy,we findverylittleevidence growth for this among
perspective
opinionleadersin thePost-ColdWarera (risingless than2 percent)-which
seemstoindicatethatconcernsoverthepopularity of"American isolationism"

471

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Political
Research
Quarterly

amongopinionleadersmaybe overstated. therewas an increaseamong

Finally,
thosesupportingglobal reform(up from50.6 percentto 75.3 percent),al-
though22.1 percentcontinuedto prefer
maintenanceofthestatusquo. Once
for
again,support radicaltransformationoftheinternationalsystemremained
negligible, theavocationofmodestand moreincremental
reflecting goals for
changingtheglobalsystem.
THE CHANGINGRELATIONSHIP
BETWEENWORLDVIEWANDPOLICY
ORIENTATIONS

It is generallyacceptedthatpolicyrecommendations flowfrom,and are

usually consistentwith, how theworld is viewed (especiallyin termsofstruc-
or
ture,threats opportunities, and the positionof the UnitedStatesin the
world).As statedby AlexanderGeorgeand RobertKeohane(1980: 231-32),
"beliefsabout theopponentand thenatureoftheinternational settingoften
assume the role of axiomswhichguide and constrainpolicy-making." Our
data indicate,however,thatthisrelationship may not be so simple.
Table 3 providesa breakdownof the policyorientations citedmostof-
ten-proaction and reaction-byperceptions of the international system.6
Duringthe Cold War era we findthatthosewho saw the worldin bipolar
termswereevenlydividedas to theirprescriptions forforeign policystrategy:
50.8 percentadvocateda proactivestrategy, while49.2 percentsupporteda
morereactiveapproachto globalevents.Therewas, however,a muchstron-
gercorrelation betweenworldviewand policyorientation amongthosewho
saw theworldin complex-interdependent terms,with94.1 percentadvocat-
inga proactiveforeign policyIn thenineties,we findmoreoverlapconcern-
ing foreignpolicy strategydespite different outlooks on global structure.
Significant majoritiesofthosewith viewpointsrunningfromunipolarto anar-
chic-but especiallythosewho see a multipolar and complex-interdependent
world-supporteda moreproactiverolefortheUnitedStatesoverstrategies
based on reaction.
A similartrendis foundamongthosewithdifferent perceptionsof the
levelofthreatin theinternational system and those with differing viewsofthe
UnitedStates'positionin the global system.In the eighties,a majority(62
percent)of thosewho saw theworldas a caldronof threatsfavoreda more
reactiveforeign policy,whilea vastmajority(93.5 percent)ofthosewho saw
opportunities theU.S. voicedsupportfora proactiveforeign
for policy.In the
Post-ColdWarera,proactionwas advocatedby a majorityof thosewho saw

6 Giventhesmallnumberofcasesinthe"disengagement" category,we havenotincluded

in theanalysispresented
thisrecommendation in thissection.The sameis trueforthe
"globaltransformation"
categoryforTable4.

472

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ForeignPolicyViewsofAmerican
OpinionLeaders

TABLE3
BYWORLDVIEW
FOREIGNPOLICYSTRATEGY
ColdWarEra WarEra
Post-Cold
Reactive (N)
Proactive Proactive
Reactive (N)
ofInternational
Structure System
Unipolar 0.0 100.0 (1) 65.0 35.0 (20)
Bipolar 50.8 49.2 (63) 62.5 37.5 (8)
Multipolar 100.0 0.0 (1) 86.7 13.3 (15)
Complex-Interdependent 94.1 5.9 (17) 84.6 15.4 (26)
Anarchic 0.0 0.0 (0) 66.7 33.3 (3)
NatureofInternational
System
CaldronofThreats 38.0 62.0 (50) 56.7 43.3 (30)
ArenaofOpportunities 93.5 6.5 (31) 92.9 7.1 (42)
Position
ofUnited in
States System
Ascendant 33.3 66.6 (3) 100.0 0.0 (2)
Stable 45.7 54.3 (46) 73.2 26.8 (56)
Declining 81.3 18.8 (32) 85.7 14.3 (14)

opportunities(92.9percent) and,although toa muchlesser extent,threats (56.7

percent). intheColdWarera,thosewhoviewedtheU.S.as either
Similarly, an
ascendant ora stablepowertendedtoprescribe a reactivepolicystrategy, while
81.3percent ofthosewhofelt theU.S.wasa declining poweradvocated a proac-
tivestance.Inthenineties, proaction has become the dominant viewpoint recom-
mended by mostforeign policy authors, of how
regardless they viewed the position
oftheU.S.vis-sa-vistheinternational system.
A similarpicture emerges in terms ofthelevelofchangetheUnitedStates
shouldseekthroughout theglobalsystem (seeTable4). During theeighties, those
whoincreasingly sawa multipolar ormorecomplex globalstructuretended to
advocate moderate levelsofchange as thegoalofU.S.foreign whilethose
policy,
whosawa bipolar worldweresplitinterms ofthepromotion ofthestatus quoor
pursuing reformabroad. In the nineties,most authors tendtopreferglobal reform
overmaintenance ofthestatus quonomatter whattheir viewofthestructure of
theinternationalsystem, although this was lessthe case for
those with a bipolar,
multipolar,oranarchic viewThesamecanbesaidforthosewithvarying percep-
tionsoftheposition oftheU.S. in theglobalsystem-large majorities in each
categorysupport moderate reformation ofthe In
globalsystem. fact, in the nine-
ties,onlythosewho still
perceive the world tobe a threateningplace rather than
an arenaofopportunities weredividedevenly over whether to pursueglobal
reforms orsimply maintain thestatus quo.
Clearly,forboththeColdWarandPost-Cold Wareras,theperception of
threatversusopportunity has strongimplications fortheforeign policy

473

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 PoliticalResearch
Quarterly

TABLE4
FOREIGNPOLICYGOALBYWORLD VIEW
Cold WarEra Post-ColdWarEra
Reform
Status (N) ReformStatus (N)
Quo Quo
Structure
ofInternational
System
Unipolar 0.0 100.0 (1) 83.3 16.7 (18)
Bipolar 40.0 60.0 (65) 62.5 37.5 (8)
Multipolar 100.0 0.0 (2) 58.8 41.2 (17)
Complex-Interdependent 94.1 5.9 (17) 92.6 7.4 (27)
Anarchic 0.0 0.0 (0) 50.0 50.0 (4)
NatureofInternational
System
CaldronofThreats 26.4 73.6 (53) 50.0 50.0 (32)
Arena of Opportunities 93.5 6.5 (31) 97.6 2.4 (42)
Position StatesinSystem
ofUnited
Ascendant 0.0 100.0 (3) 100.0 0.0 (2)
Stable 42.6 57.4 (47) 76.8 23.2 (56)
Declining 69.7 30.3 (33) 75.0 25.0 (16)

orientation recommended. Thosewho saw theworldmorein termsofoppor-

tunityoverwhelmingly were morelikelyto be in favorof a moreproactive
U.S. foreign policyand globalreform in botheras.Those who saw theworld
morein termsof threatswere more likelyto favora morereactiveforeign
policyin supportofthestatusquo, althoughthisrelationship was notnearly
as strongin the1990s,probablydue to theprofoundchangesin thestructure
of the international systemand the positionof the United Stateswiththe
collapseoftheSovietUnionand theCold War.The netresultis foreign policy
viewswhicharebothmorecomplexand contradictory.7
In sum,thereis no simplepatternofcontinuity or changein theforeign
policythought of American opinion leaders as a groupbetweentheCold War
eighties and Post-Cold War nineties. At the aggregatelevel,beliefsdo not
simply remain the same or changedramatically as predictedbycognitivecon-
sistencytheory. of
Instead,patterns continuity and changestendto be com-
plex, messy, and sometimes contradictory one would expect fromthe
as
literatureon socialcognitionand schemata.Thereis no doubtthatwithchanges
in certainaspectsof worldviewand foreignpolicyorientations, the overall
levelofdiversity offoreignpolicythoughthas increased.Butwhiletheforeign

7
The post-ColdWar era maybe analogousto theimmediatepost-World
War II era,
whereAmericanopinion leaders faced a verydifferent
environmentand much
uncertainty.

474

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ForeignPolicyViewsofAmerican
OpinionLeaders

policythoughtof Americanopinionleadershas become morediverseand

complexfollowingthecollapseof theSovietUnion and theend of theCold
War, it is also importantto recognize that other aspects-such as the
continuedimportanceof the perceptionof threatand the focuson security
issues- havenot experiencedthatmuchprofoundchangeat all.

CONCLUSION

This studyprovidessome interesting and importantinsightsinto our

understanding of the foreignpolicy beliefsof Americanopinionleaders.It
confirms the
that breakdown of the foreignpolicyconsensushas resultedin
greaterdiversity offoreign policythoughtin thepost-Vietnam and post-Cold
warpoliticalenvironments (Chittick and Billingsley 1989; Chittick,Billingsley,
and Travis1995; Crabb 1976; Holsti 1992; Holstiand Rosenau 1984, 1986,
1988, 1990, 1993; Rosenauand Holsti 1983; Wittkopf1987, 1990). But it
does so froma new perspective.
The researchpresentedherehighlights theimportanceofdevelopingal-
ternativeresearchstrategiesand data sourceswhichboth supplementand
complementmoretraditional surveyresearchapproachesin orderto capture
and understandthediversity and complexity oftheforeign policythoughtof
Americans.As Kegley(1986: 467) has argued,"We need to look at opinion
wherever itis exhibited."Thisrequiresthatwe be open to new sourcesofdata
forpoliticalinquiry.Our contentanalysisofforeign policyjournalsrepresents
an initialstepalongtheselines,contributing to theunderstanding ofthefor-
eignpolicythought ofan important subgroup ofAmerican elites-those opin-
ion leaders and opinion-makerswho communicatetheirthoughtsto a
policy-oriented audiencewiththegoal ofstimulating debateand affecting the
directionofU.S. foreignpolicy(Rosenau 1961). It did so in terms six
of key
questionsaroundwhichtheforeignpolicydebatetendsto revolveforbetter
understanding how theworldis seenand itsimplications forthefutureorien-
tationofU.S. foreign policy as found in the major foreignpolicyjournals.
This studyalso examinedtheimpactoftheend oftheCold Waron for-
eign policythinking.It foundthatbetweenthe Cold War eightiesand the
Post-ColdWarninetiesforeign policyattitudesweremarkedbybothchange
and persistence, resultingin an even greater complexity ofoutlookand greater
optimismforthefuture of U.S. foreign policy(see Rosatiand Creed 1997, for
a morein-depthbreakdownof the foreignpolicyorientations of American
opinionleadersduringtheCold Wareightiesand Post-ColdWarnineties).
Thesefindings do notsuggesttheformation ofa new consensusanytime
soon, forthe battleamongAmericanopinionleadersover the directionof
U.S. foreign policyinvolvesforeign policyattitudes ofgreatdiversityand com-
plexity.This is what one would expect of a societymade up of over 250

475

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Political
Research
Quarterly

millionpeople withan increasingly pluralisticpoliticalenvironment

thathas
arisensince the VietnamWar and the end of the Cold War. Our research
suggeststhatthe diversityof thoughtthatprevailstodayamongAmerican
opinionleadersis likelyto persistand growmorecomplexin thefuturepoli-
ticsofU.S. foreignpolicy.
REFERENCES

Almond,G. A. 1960. TheAmerican PeopleandForeign NewYork:Praeger.

Policy.
B.
Bardes, A., and R. W Oldendick. 1990. "Public Opinion and ForeignPolicy:
A Field in SearchofTheory."Micropolitics 3: 227-47.
Brecher,M., B. Steinberg,
andJ. Stein.1969. "A FrameworkforResearchon
ForeignPolicyBehavior." Journal ofConflictResolution13: 75-101.
Campbell,A., P.E. Converse,W E. Miller,and D. E. Stokes.1960. TheAmeri-
can VoterNew York:Wiley.
Chittick,W O., and K. R. Billingsley.1989. "The Structure of EliteForeign
Policy Beliefs."WesternPolitical
Quarterly42: 201-24.
and R. Travis.1995. "A ThreeDimensional
W O., K. R. Billingsley,
Chittick,
Model ofAmericanForeignPolicyBeliefs."International StudiesQuarterly
39: 201-24.
Combs,J.A. 1983.American TwoCenturies
History:
Diplomatic ofChanging
Berkeley:University
Interpretations. ofCaliforniaPress.
Conover,P.J., and S. Feldman. 1984. "How People Organizethe Political
World:A SchematicModel."American JournalofPoliticalScience28: 95-
126.
M. M. 1991.Political
Conway, intheUnited
Participation States.
Washington,
DC: CongressionalQuarterly Press.
Converse,P. E. 1964. "The NatureofBeliefsSystemsin Mass Publics."In D.
and
Apter,ed., Ideology Discontent, pp. 206-61. New York:FreePress.
. 1970. "Attitudes Continuation
and Non-attitudes: ofa Dialogue."In
E. R. Tufte,
ed., TheQuantitative ofSocialProblems,
Analysis pp. 168-89.
Reading,MA: Addison-Wesley.
andCritics:
Crabb,C. V,Jr.1976.Policy-Makers Theories
Conflicting ofAmeri-
can ForeignPolicy.New York:Praeger.
Destler,I. M., L. H. Gelb, and A. Lake. 1984. Our Own WorstEnemy:The
Unmaking ofAmerican ForeignPolicy.New York:Simonand Schuster.
K.
Deutsch, W, and R. I. Merritt. of Eventson Nationaland
1965. "Effects
International Images." In H. C. Kelman,ed., International
Behaviorpp.
132-87. New York:Holt,Rinehart, and Winston.
New York:McGraw-Hill.
Fiske,S., and S. E. Taylor.1991. SocialCognition.
Galtung,J. 1965. "ForeignPolicyas a FunctionofSocial Position."Journalof
PeaceResearch
2: 206-30.

476

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ForeignPolicyViewsofAmerican
OpinionLeaders

George,A. L. 1969. "The 'OperationalCode': A NeglectedApproachto the

Studyof PoliticalLeaders and Decision Making."International Studies
Quarterly 13: 190-222.
George,A. L., and R. Keohane. 1980. "The Concept of NationalInterests:
Uses and Limitations."In A. L. George,Presidential inFor-
Decisionmaking
TheEffective
eignPolicy: UseofInformation pp. 217-37.Boul-
andAdvice,
der,CO: WestviewPress.
Hallin,D. C. 1986. The UncensoredWar:TheMedia and Vietnam.Berkeley:
Universityof California
Press.
R. K. 1985.Perceptions
Herrmann, inSoviet
andBehavior Pitts-
Policy.
Foreign
burgh,PA:University ofPittsburgh Press.
Holsti,0. R. 1967. "CognitiveDynamicsand Imagesof the Enemy:Dulles
and Russia."In D. J.Finlay,O. R. Holsti,and R. R. Fagen,eds.,Enemiesin
Politics,pp. 25-97. Chicago:RandMcNally.
. 1992. "PublicOpinionand ForeignPolicy:ChallengestotheAlmond-
LippmannConsensus."International StudiesQuarterly36: 439-66.
Holsti,O. R., and J. N. Rosenau. 1984. American Leadershipin WorldAffairs:
andtheBreakdown
Vietnam Boston:AllenandUnwin.
ofConsensus.
1986. "ConsensusLost:ConsensusRegained?:ForeignPolicyBeliefs
.
of AmericanLeaders, 1976-1980." International StudiesQuarterly30:
375-409.
1988. "ALeadershipDivided:The ForeignPolicyBeliefsofAmerican
.
Leaders,1976-1984." In C. W Kegley,Jr.,and E. R. Wittkopf,
eds., The
Domestic ofAmerican
Sources Policy:
Foreign Insights pp. 30-
andEvidence,
44. New York:St. Martin'sPress.
. 1990. "The Structure of ForeignPolicyAttitudesAmongAmerican
Leaders."Journal of 52: 94-125.
Politics
. 1993. "The Structure of ForeignPolicyBeliefsAmongAmerican
OpinionLeaders-After theCold War."Millennium: JournalofInternational
Studies22: 235-78.
Hurwitz,J.,and M. Peffley.1987. "How AreForeignPolicyAttitudesStruc-
tured?A Hierarchical Model."American PoliticalScienceReview81: 1099-
1119.
R. 1976.Perception
Jervis, Politics.
inInternational
andMisperception Princeton,
NJ:PrincetonUniversity Press.
C.
Kegley, W, Jr. 1986. "Assumptions and Dilemmasin theStudyofAmeri-
30:
StudiesQuarterly
cans' ForeignPolicyBeliefs:A Caveat."International
447-71.
Key,V O., Jr.1961. PublicOpinionandAmerican Democracy.NewYork:Knopf.
R. O., andJ.S. Nye.1977.Power
Keohane, World
andInterdependence: Politics
Boston:Little,Brown.
in Transition.

477

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Political
Research
Quarterly

Kinder,D. R. 1983. "Diversity in AmericanPublicOpinion."

and Complexity
InA. W Finifter,
ed.,Political TheStateoftheDiscipline,
Science: pp. 389-
428. Washington, DC: AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation.
Kinder, R., and D. 0. Sears. 1985. "PublicOpinionand PoliticalAction."
D.
In G. Lindzeyand E. Aronson,eds.,Handbook 3rded.,
ofSocialPsychology,
vol. II, pp. 659-741. New York:RandomHouse.
D. 1986.Origins
Larson, APsychological
ofContainment: Princeton,
Explanation.
NJ:PrincetonUniversity
Press.
Lebow,R. N. 1981.Between
PeaceandWar:TheNature Crisis.
ofInternational
Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.
Mann, T. E. 1990. "MakingForeignPolicy: Presidentand Congress."In
ofBalance:ThePresident,
ThomasE. Mann,ed.,A Question TheCongress
and Foreign
Policy,pp. 1-34. Washington, DC: Brookings.
Mansbach,R. W., and J.A. Vasquez. 1981. In SearchofTheory:
A NewPara-
digm ofGlobalPolitics.
New York: Columbia Press.
University
M. A. 1991. Persuasion
Milburn, ofPublic
TheSocialPsychology
andPolitics:
Opinion.PacificCove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Mueller,J.E. 1973. War,Presidents,
and PublicOpinion.New York:Wiley.
Neuman,R. 1986.TheParadoxofMassPublics:
Knowledge inthe
andOpinion
American Electorate.Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press.
Ornstein,N. J.,and M. Schmitt.1990. "DatelineCampaign'92: Post-Cold
WarPolitics."Foreign Policy79: 169-86.
Oskamp,S. 1977. Attitudes andOpinions. NJ:Prentice-Hall.
EnglewoodCliffs,
Page,B. I., and R. Y. Shapiro.1992. TheRational
Public: YearsofTrends
Fifty in
Americans' PolicyPreferences. of
Chicago:University Chicago Press.
Pomper,G. M. 1978-79. "The Impactof 'The AmericanVoter'on Political
Science."PoliticalScienceQuarterly 93: 617-28.
J.A. 1987.TheCarter
Rosati, QuestforGlobal
Administration's Community:
Beliefs
andTheirImpactonBehavior Columbia:UniversityofSouthCarolinaPress.
. 1993. ThePoliticsofUnitedStatesForeignPolicy.Dallas, TX: Harcourt
BraceJovanavich.
. 1995. "A CognitiveApproachto the Studyof ForeignPolicy."In J.
Neack,J.A. K. Hey,and PEJ.Haney,eds., Foreign PolicyAnalysis: Continu-
ity and Change in ItsSecondGeneration,pp. 49-70. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Rosati,J. A., and J. Creed. 1997. "Extendingthe Three-and Four-Headed
Eagles: The ForeignPolicyOrientationsof AmericanElitesDuringthe
18: 588-623.
'80s and '90s." PoliticalPsychology
J.N. 1961.PublicOpinion
Rosenau, andForeign NewYork:Random
Policy.
House.

478

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ForeignPolicyViewsofAmerican
OpinionLeaders

Rosenau,J.N., and 0. R. Holsti.1983. "U.S. Leadershipin a ShrinkingWorld:

The Breakdownof Consensusand the Emergenceof Conflicting Belief
Systems." World Politics
35: 368-92.
Schneider,W 1984. "PublicOpinion."In J. S. Nye,Jr.,ed., TheMakingof
America'sSovietPolicy,pp. 11-35. New Haven:Yale University Press.
Sears,D. 0., and R. E. Whitney.1973. PoliticalPersuasion. Morristown, NJ:
GeneralLearningPress.
Steinbruner,J.1974. TheCybernetic TheoryofDecision.Princeton,NJ:Princeton
UniversityPress.
Tetlock,P E. 1983. "Policy-Makers'ImagesofInternational Conflict."
Journal
ofSocialIssues39: 67-86.
Walker,S. G. 1977. "The InterfaceBetweenBeliefsand Behavior:HenryA.
Kissinger'sOperationalCode and the VietnamWar."JournalofConflict
Resolution21: 129-68.
Weiss,C. H. 1974. "WhatAmerica'sLeadersRead."PublicOpinionQuarterly
38: 1-22.
Wittkopf,E. R. 1987. "Elitesand Masses:AnotherLook at AttitudesToward
America'sWorldRole."International 31: 131-59.
StudiesQuarterly
PublicOpinionandAmerican
. 1990. FacesofInternationalism: Foreign
Policy.Durham,NC: Duke University Press.
D. 1978.Shattered
Yergin, oftheColdWarandtheNational
Peace:TheOrigins
State.Boston:HoughtonMifflin.
Security
andOrigin
J.R. 1992. TheNature
Zaller, ofMassOpinion. Cam-
Cambridge:
Press.
bridgeUniversity

1, 1996
Received:September
Accepted:November18, 1997

479

This content downloaded from 141.241.43.86 on Sun, 2 Feb 2014 15:06:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions