Institut für Tropentechnologie

The Three Gorges Project, the greatest dam project of the world and its
advocacies: Background and international voices in the context of the WCD

Nicole Kretschmer

The very controversially discussed Three Gorges Dam (TGD) project in China (first planning
started in 1919) entered its last phase, the 3rd stage construction, in 2004.

Picture 1: Model of the TGP in the visiting Picture 2: Right bank of the reservoir,
centre in Yichang; scale: 1:500 construction of the second power house
behind the coffer dam (3rd stage)

The end is scheduled for 2009, ninety years after the first official discussion took place. The
impressions collected at the building site and several kilometres upstream until Fengji City
were taken just before the first filling started in the end of April 2003. This article tries to
combine personnel impressions as well as background information in the context of the
recommendation of the World commission on dams (WCD).

The TGD project has been chosen as an example for different reasons. Mainly because it is
the largest dam construction of the world and reflects furthermore a country which is in a
transition process, but still remains one of the most active dam building countries today. The
review paper of China in the WCD Study (WCD, 2000) states that China has been involved in
the displacement of more people and the alteration of more rivers than any other society.
Nevertheless the amount of people which have to be resettled during the construction of the
TGD is higher than ever before. This is one reason why this issue will be critical reviewed in this
article. Additionally during the visit of the region one is permanently confronted with this
topic; either through construction sites, demolishing sites, where people still live or via
comments from guides. The resettlement is the most discussed issue in the media, but
moreover the issues of water quality as well as cultural heritage will be mentioned here.

History of the project

Some critics of the project argue that the project is not much more than a prestige project of
China’s government, at least of the leaders which suppressed since the early beginning
much of the controversial questions coming up. Looking at the history this can be in one or
the other way confirmed: Already in 1919 Sun Yatsen proposed to build a dam on the

112
Institut für Tropentechnologie

Yangtze River for power generation purposes. The idea was shelved due to unfavourable
political and economic conditions. The problem of mayor floods brought the idea up again
35 years later and the government adopted it in 1954 for flood control.

Vice minister of Electric power, Li Rui, after initially arguing for a multipurpose dam and
proposing to build smaller dams first until China can afford such a costly project, he
suggested construction should proceed in stages to allow time to solve technical problems.
But later he concluded that the dam should not be build at all since it would be too costly.
Furthermore he argued that the dam would flood many cities and fertile farmland and would
not much contribute to shipping.

Nevertheless Lin Yishan, head of the Yangtze Valley Planning Office, favoured the
construction. He was further encouraged in 1958 by the political climate and the support
from the late chairman Mao Zedong, who wanted China to have the largest hydroelectric
dam in the world. But depression resulted from a political campaign boasting. China’s
economic development ended the preparation work in 1960. Three years later the plans
were discussed again in the context of the “third front” industry in southwest China. But the
cultural revolution (1966) and the fear that the dam would be sabotages by the Soviet Union
(1969) resulted again in a delay. In 1970 work was resumed in Gezhouba (a smaller dam
downstream) which ran in great technical problems.

The economic reform introduced in 1978 underlined the need for more electric power to
supply a growing industrial base with the result of approval of the construction in 1979. A
feasibility study was conducted in 1982/83 to appease the increasing number of critics, who
complained that the project did not adequately address technical, social, nor environmental
issues (China Online, 2000). The former Premier Li Peng (Hydraulic engineer) brought the
project on its way. It was said, that his successor Zhu Rongji never liked the project. Also
before 1989 there was a high resistance against the project (Great China, 2003).

Due to its huge experiences (at least from the engineering point of view), positive as well as
negative, one could think that China should be able to overcome the problems of the three
gorges project. But the different leaders, responsible planners and engineers changed with
the long period of time and so did the visions, the moral, the economics etc.

Location of the dam

The Yanktze flows from the Tibetan Plateau, cuts across central China to the east coast of
Shanghai. Its river basin is located in the humid zone of China.

113
Institut für Tropentechnologie

Map 1: Agro climatic zones of China

Below the reservoir location has been illustrated. The dam is located in the middle part of
Xiling gorge about 50 km upstream of Yichang and the reservoir will have a length of
approximately 600 km, when it is filled up until 175 m, giving it a storage capacity of 39.3Mrd
cubic metres of water. The surface area of the filled reservoir will be 6900 km². This is almost
half of Schleswig-Holstein. The cost are estimated with US$ 24Mrd. and US$ 42Mrd. for
infrastructure for generation of current and transport (Helvetas-Wasser-Fachsheets).

Map 2: River Basin of the Yangtze, the dam is located in Yichang

In comparison to the worldwide largest river basins (the Yangtze is the world’s third largest
river), the population density of the catchment of the Yangtze is the second highest, after the
Ganges in India, with 224 persons/km² (Revenga et al. 1998, in WCD 2000).

Multipurpose dam as described by the advocacies

As already mentioned the dam is been promoted to be a multi purposes facility with the
following beneficial aspects: The main goal is the flood control of the Yangtze River. This was
strengthened by the disastrous flood in 1998, which was the worst flood in nearly half a
century. According to the press releases this flood was battering for months China’s

114
Institut für Tropentechnologie

heartland. Although millions of civilians and soldiers had been mobilized to fight against the
ever-swelling Yangtze River, the losses were huge. Officials at China's State Council said that
about 30 million people had to be displaced; 5.6 million homes have been washed away,
and almost 4.8 million ha of crops have been destroyed (Platt 1998). The second purpose of
the dam is the power generation with an annual output capacity of 84.7 TWh. Furthermore
navigation will be improved and result in an increase of annual one-way navigation capacity
from 10 million tons to 50 million tons to the harbours of Chongqing. The South to North water
transfer (from the humid to the arid regions of China) might get reality. Furthermore the
authorities promote the development of fishery in the reservoir, as well as tourism and
recreational activities (Three Gorges Project, CTGPC).

Chinese as well as international legal framework regarding infrastructure

development and resettlement, consequences for the TGD – Project
Studying the laws and regulation of China which are designed to settle the regulation of the
project affected people (PAPs) of new infrastructure it is obvious that they are well
developed and theoretically cover all areas of conflict. Reviewed by Zou Youlan it is stated
that the various laws and regulations covering resettlement and compensation, which have
been introduced since 1982 are approaching international standards and comply with the
standards and requirements of the World Bank Group.

The three main regulations are:

1. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, first adopted in 1982 and revised in
1999:”land in urban areas belongs to the State and land in rural areas and in city
suburbs belongs to the collectives, as well as house plots“
2. The Law on Land Administration, first adopted in 1986, revised in 1998, sets out
compensation criteria for land acquisition, and specifies legal procedures and
standards for resettlement plans;
3. Regulations for the Compensation for Land Acquisition and Resettlement for the
Construction of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Projects were adopted in 1991.

These regulations require a "resettlement with development" approach and call for
compensation in the early stages of resettlement and provision of rehabilitation assistance
after displacement. It also stipulates that all displaced persons shall be assisted to improve or
at least restore their former living standard in steps. The important policy implications of these
laws and regulations are to restore the original living standards, compensate and provide
employment to PAPs, and extend assistance to them for five to ten years after resettlement
implementation is completed. Grievance redress mechanisms are set up by project
authorities to settle disputes. Project budgets now are required to include all compensation
and resettlement costs.

In general there is an improving trend in the planning and execution of reservoir resettlement,
though some implementation aspects remain controversial and are increasingly covered by
the Chinese media. Resettlement policies and compensation standards are being continually
improved and livelihood restoration is a component of all resettlement projects. Special
resettlement offices have been established at provincial, city and county levels. Resettlement

115
Institut für Tropentechnologie

funds are made available at the local level, and there is extensive consultation with village
chiefs and PAPs. Fortunately, China's rapid economic development also provides more
opportunities for PAPs to move out of the agriculture sector.

The laws and regulations in China relating to land acquisition and resettlement at each
administrative level (national, provincial and county) are accepted by the World Bank.
Furthermore the project authorities generally follow the local regulations during resettlement
implementation. This is true for various projects in China supported by the World Bank.

The objective of the Bank policy is to aim at improving the livelihoods and standards of living
or at least restoring them to pre-displacement levels. To achieve this, their clients have to
develop a resettlement instrument, either a resettlement action plan (RAP) or a resettlement
policy framework (RPF) and ensure the project affected people (PAP) are fully compensated
and restored from the negative impact of involuntary resettlement. However, the Bank
considers the project completion only when the resettlement measures set out in the relevant
resettlement instrument have been implemented. With the careful planning and close
monitoring of the implementation, resettlement in China is generally discussed as successful
(WCD paper). A good RAP or RPF as well as a continuous monitoring during the different
resettlement phases are the most important requirements of the bank to contribute to the
financing of infrastructure projects.

Moreover the World Bank requests participation throughout the whole resettlement and
compensation process. In China a special policy exists, where it is stated that the national
land law of China requests that once a plan for land compensation and resettlement
subsidies is decided on, the local people’s government concerned shall make it known to the
general public and solicit comments and suggestions from the collective economic
organizations and the peasants.

Beside the national policies, China has been signed international conventions, like the
international convent on civil and political rights (1998) and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNIHCR) guiding principles on internal displacements, as well in
1997 the international convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
ratification in 2001.

Despite their general commitment to the interests of PAPs, the provincial and county
governments continue to face problems when they implement resettlement plans. Common
problems are the lack of good quality replacement land. Efforts to resettle people higher up
the slopes above the reservoirs, generally within the same village or county, have seldom
been successful due to poor land and low carrying capacity. There is still a tendency for
resettlement estimates to be kept as low as possible when a project is under consideration.

In China, the central and provincial design institutes have experience in resettlement
planning. However, their resettlement/social staff, numbering about 500, generally lacks
expertise in important areas like anthropology and sociology. Consequently, there is greater
emphasis on the physical aspects of resettlement, areas inundated, cost estimates etc. This
approach to resettlement planning has been largely influenced by Ministry of Water
Resources (MWR) directives issued in 1984 and 1985 that stressed impacts on land, houses,

116
Institut für Tropentechnologie

structures and population. The MWR is aware of this problem and is taking steps to improve its
directives and policies.

This short general view of the existing legal framework as well as possible sources of
implementation problems might give an idea about the complexity of the problem. The TGD
project forces the relocation of about 1.2 Million. Although the legal framework in China has
been developed extensively, the World Bank withheld the financial support to the TGD
project.

Financing
As already mentioned the World Bank Group who has provided the largest multi-lateral
development assistance since 1984 has finally refrained from financing the Three Gorges
Dam. The main reason was the lack on information on environmental and social mitigation.
Until 2000 eight dams in China were assisted by the World Bank with US$ 3.3 billion total
support.

After the NGO International River Network (IRN) and a coalition of US environment,
development and human right groups encouraged the US administration to withhold
financial support for the US companies; eager to bid for the project; the position of the US
government was clearly against the controversial Three Gorges Dam.

In May 1996 the US Export-Import Bank supported this direction with the announcement, not
to guarantee loans to US companies seeking contracts for the dam. The financing support
from outside the country is therefore not that high as usual. According to Wang Jiazhu 50 % of
the capital is from the state. Domestic loans are from the State Development Bank and the
issue of domestic bonds. Furthermore the responsible planners are counting on the revenue
from downstream Gezhouba dam and even more from the first units to come online (2003-
2009), while the last units are being constructed. The satellite image shows the working units
on the left bank of the river.

117
Institut für Tropentechnologie

Image 1: Quick Bird Satellite image of the completed Hydro Power units of the TGD project,
August 2003

Already now, one year after the starting of the filling it is already published that the
calculation
was based on much higher demand than there is in reality in present. This results in much
lesser revenues than previously expected. For the resettlement 45 % of the total project cost
has been calculated.

Unofficial estimates of the investment figure are as high as US$ 75Mrd. or more. Supporters
reported however, that the plan is within its US$ 25Mrd. budget.

The critics of the project state that the dam will far exceed the official cost estimate, and the
investment will be unrecoverable as cheaper power sources become available and lure
away ratepayers (China Online 2000). Before looking at the resettlement problems of the
project in more detail, Chinas experiences in dam building will quickly reviewed.

Chinas experiences with dams

China has been built almost half of the world estimated 45.000 dams. It remains one of the
most active dams building countries today. One reason for that is the uneven distribution of
water resources over China and the need to transfer the water from the south to the north.
Furthermore China faces the challenge in providing water and energy services for over
1.2Mrd. citizens.

The WCD states that China has build more than three times the number of large dams than
the USA and over five times the number of India. After the definition of the international
commission of large dams (ICOLD) a dam is called a large dam when the height above the
foundation is 15 m or higher or in case the height is between 5 – 15 m and the volume of the
reservoir is bigger than 3 MCM.

Despite the problems of the TGP, China’s dam infrastructure is aging, since a considerable
portion of large dams were built in the 1950`s and 1960`s. Furthermore the optimisation of
reservoir operation in the context of an integrated basin development plan is necessary to
discuss and implement (this is one goal of the WCD, see next paragraph).

Already in the past the most difficult challenge in implementation of large dams and other
large public infrastructure in China was resettlement. During the last 50 years, some 45 million
people have been resettled within China for all kind of infrastructure, of which dams are
estimated to account for about 12 million people. Before the land reforms of the early 1980s
reservoir resettlement often lead to economic hardship. In recent years the government has
enacted new policies, as described before that aim, at a minimum, to maintain incomes and
social well being for those who have to be moved.

118
Institut für Tropentechnologie

Chinas dam policies in the framework of the World Commission on dams (WCD) and
the Dams and Development Project of the UNEP (DDP)
The WCD has given a base for discussion about further development and international
exchange of experiences in the area of dam building. During the last years the official
Chinese point of view has been changed from strict rejection against the outcomes of the
WCD in the beginning (2000) and the relative positive comments and promises during the last
meeting in Berlin, 2003 (WCD 2003).

The WCD was one result of a World Bank sponsored work shop in Switzerland in April 1997.
Their objective was to conduct a rigorous independent review of the development
effectiveness of large dams, to assess alternatives and develop practical guidelines for further
development. This report was published in November 2000. The recommendations of the
commission are based on five objectives for sustainable development:

1. sustainability in the use of the world’s diminishing resource base;

2. openness and
3. participation in the decision-making process;
4. efficiency in the management of existing infrastructural developments and
5. accountability towards present and future generations (WCD, November 2000).

The Commission sets out the constructive and innovative way forward for decision making in
the form of the seven strategic priorities listed here:

1. gaining Public Acceptance

2. comprehensive Options Assessment
3. addressing Existing Dams
4. sustaining Rivers and Livelihoods
5. recognising Entitlements and Sharing Benefits
6. ensuring Compliance
7. sharing Rivers for Peace, Development and Security

These priorities should ensure equitable and sustainable development of water and energy
resources.
Concerning the evaluation of the environmental impact of dams the review paper of the
WCD concerning China (WCD COUNTRY REVIEW PAPER, 2000) states that it appears that no
reviews of the actual environmental effects of dams have been undertaken. None of the
available information has been compiled and analysed to develop “lessons learned” for use
in the planning and assessment of future dams. This kind of compilation could focus on for
example: the impact on agricultural production, erosion and siltation, both above and below
the dam, water pollution. Furthermore the economic values of environmental impacts should
be included in a cost-benefit analysis of a project. Here for example the loss of agricultural
production in the reservoir area and as well the loss of cultural and historic relics has to be
considered, the latter in terms of tourism.

119
Institut für Tropentechnologie

Regarding the resettlement issue in large dam projects the WCD report refer to the China’s
reservoir resettlement act (ADB, 1999) as well as to the recent changes in Chinese policy as
an interesting model for other countries. The ADB refers to Chinese regulations, framed in 1984
and updated in 1991, governing urban development projects, providing measures for
consultation and grievance resolution for persons affected by the construction of large dams.

Comments on the China Review of the WCD from NGO’s like International River Network (IRN)
were the absence of critical literature. Obvious corruption as well as comments of the
information reliability weren’t mentioned. The policies and laws, as well as the given promises
to the relocates are contrary to the reality (SOPHIA WOODMAN, 2000).

Looking at the harbour of Fengji city (Picture 3) this can be agreed upon. Since 20 years this
area hasn’t undergo any development.

Picture 3: Harbour of Fengji city

Despite the relative positive review paper of China one of the strongest critics of the WCD
report and its objective has been the government of China. The outcome of the work of the
DDP over the last three years will be presented as a future outlook in the end of the paper.

Regarding the Three Gorges Dam the following part will mainly discuss the resettlement issue.
In the TGP the highest number of persons affected by dam structures has to be relocated.
Since this issue has many factors to be considered and many reasons of problem
occurrences, this paper won’t be entitled to be complete. Two issues of the WCD report
regarding “People and large Dams, social Performance” can be witnessed at the TGP:

a. The delay between the decision to build a dam and the onset of construction and its
important social impact. This can result in communities living for decades starved of
development and welfare investment.

b. The impact of displacement of people and livelihoods are described widely.

Displacement culminates in physical exclusion from a geographic territory and economic
and social exclusion from a set of functioning social networks. Thus, affected people face
a broad range of impoverishment risks that include landlessness, joblessness,

120
Institut für Tropentechnologie

homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of common

resources, and community disarticulation that result in a loss of socio-cultural resilience.

Furthermore WCD states that under-counting of the displaced are well known. Frequently the
number of both directly and indirectly affected people has been underestimated. In all the
WCD Case Studies, the initial assessments of the projects failed to account for all the affected
people (WCD 2000).

Problems concerning resettlement in the TGD - Project

The good practices of resettlement, reported mainly by the WCD and the World Bank reports,
are described of lacking a critical view. International institutions, such as the World Bank and
UNDP allow the PRC to censor their reports and furthermore IRN states, that the World Bank
has not applied their own guidelines in a number of areas of work with China (Woodman
2000).

Since the World Bank refrained from being part of the financing group in the TGD project,
there is none independent institution or organization for monitoring the implementation of the
resettlement plans in this mega project. Looking at the IRN publications and other NGO like
human right watch or critical Chinese authors (e.g. Dai Quing 1998) it gets obvious that the
government faces many problems concerning the resettlement process. Procedures followed
by China in resettling the displaced by the Three Gorges Project fall short of those set by the
World Bank and required by the UN Conventions that China has signed (IRN 2003).

It is obvious that the responsible institutions are not well enough prepared to implement the
policies. One difficulty is the long period of planning and implementation time. The recent
years are a period of changes in China, mainly the shift from the planned towards the market
economy. Working places previously operated by the state and not under market pressure
are getting less; old factories can’t comply any more with the standards and have to be
closed. Especially in the reservoir area a lot of factories have been closed or will close during
the next years because of the environmental pollution, mainly the water pollution.

The 2nd main problem is the shift in policy during the construction time. Policy revision from
the original plan led to lesser available farmland for resettlement. This change was initiated by
Premier Zhu Rongji in 1998 after the devastating Yangtze floods, to curb soil erosion. He
required that farming land on slopes steeper than 25 % has to be reforested. The result was
that 125.000 peasants more had to be relocated out of the reservoir area, since there was no
longer arable land for them. Plans from 1992 in comparison envisaged open up new virgin
land within the reservoir area, to be given to the peasants.

Another main trend is the urbanization in China. At present only 30 % is urban. The prediction
is 60 % by 2050. One indication of this fact is the decrease of agriculture to the overall GDP. In
the mid 1990 agricultural GDP fell to less than 20 % (Country Study, China 2000).

Furthermore the uneven execution of the resettlement process by the different local
authorities is adding to the grievance of the PAP’s. Additionally the counties don’t have
enough money to employ well educated personal, who are able to deal with the
resettlement problem. High differences can be witnessed in the height of compensation.
Promises that have been made to the people haven’t been performed. Most of the peasants

121
Institut für Tropentechnologie

can’t afford new flats, since the compensation was much to low and promised weren’t
available.

Also corruption has to be mentioned. The list is long: from announcing wrong numbers of
PAP’s by the provinces to the state, announcing more arable land than they can provide,
misuse of the transferred money by the local officials, including the so called pocket money.
A chapter by its owe could be written about this, here just one citation of IRN:

“The “resettlement development” philosophy is also blamed for the corruption, or the
belief that there is widespread corruption. As two-thirds of the compensation
/resettlement funding is now given directly into the hands of the officials, they can
invest as they choose. Their books (even the fake ones) are never made available for
inspection, so the peasants have no idea whether the money has been well spent or
squandered by the officials.”

Fact is, that the state failed to establish a system, as recommended by international lending
agencies, whereby such complains can be openly addressed and investigated. Moreover
China rejects to allow outside inspections of the resettlement process. To be fair it has to be
said that in some provinces, where corruption has been detected the officials got their
punishment, whereas in others nothing happens. The WCD states in its report that in early 2000
the Chinese government released information that corrupt officials had embezzled US$60
million (500 million yuan) from resettlement funds for the Three Gorges dam project. An official
was sentenced to death for embezzling almost US$1.5 million from the project.

The most published concern regarding the resettlement process is the lack of participation
permission of the PAP’s by the state. Most of the villagers petitions are ignored and strikes or
similar organized complains against the authorities are being suppressed and responsible
PAP’s are even put in jail. Instead of a peaceful resettlement process, the project has
become an instrument of repression with widespread embezzlement of funds as well as
special discrimination of rural relocates in comparison to urban people. Xinhua news agency
reported that ~ 12 % of the total resettlement budget were embezzled, misappropriated or
illegally used in 1998 alone.

Apart from that the construction of the new cities is another serious problem. Most of them
are built by a standard design, which is intended to build on flat land and is not suitable for
the geological conditions of the steep three gorges area. The next picture shows as a positive
example the new city of Wuhan.

122
Institut für Tropentechnologie

Picture 4: New city of Wuhan, before the filling started

The new town of Fengji in contrast was half way constructed when they discovered that the
sandy soil is too soft to safely support the buildings.
Fengji is quite famous because of its Baidi Temple above the old town, which won’t be
submerged, when the reservoir will be filled up. What will change is the marvellous view to the
gorges.
The next picture shows the temple and its surrounding.

Picture 5: Baidi Temple above old Fengji town

To get in touch with the possible impacts of the relocation to the individuals one case will be
illustrated. The following fate of a villager of Fengji is the sad lot of a high number of rural
people:

Hong, a villager of old Fengji stated that everybody living there is certain that they have been
cheated, because the new housing costs two or three times the cost of the old one. He, his
family and 300 villagers were relocated in 2001 to a newly built migrants village in Fujian
Province. For them there was no work to be found because they couldn’t speak the local
dialect. He himself decided to return to Fengji and reopened his roadside restaurant (our luck

123
Institut für Tropentechnologie

during our visit because we had a wonderful Chinese breakfast there: comment of the
author). He personally admitted that it hasn’t been an easy choice.

Looking at this case (many others could be enumerated) shows that the people don’t really
have a vision for the future (Becker 2002). There are a lot of “returners” who don’t know how
their live will be after the flooding. Actually the government has to find a solution for all this
cases. For sure that won’t be an easy task. Additionally relocated urban people face similar
problems. The government established so called “Model Cities”. Welcoming ceremonies for
the first relocaties organised for the Chinese media were followed by ignorance of local
people, difficulties in understanding, problems in jobs, higher costs than initially promised etc.
The List is long.

The pictures below give an impression of the old town of Fengji, where already relocated
people came back to live in the demolished area until the water is coming, because they
didn’t manage to adapt in their new homes.

Picture 6 and 7: Left: Old town, or what’s left with newly constructed measures against erosion
of slopes. Right: the upper street of the old town can be seen. Here are still some buildings
used. But latest in 2009 everything will be submerged

Having a look on the review paper of the WCD the resettlement task of the TGP is described
in a more or less emotional way. The only problem announced there is the problem that
people have to leave their homes where their ancestors had lived for decades. Furthermore it
is said that the farmland which is to be inundated is 24.000 ha of mostly low yielded farmland
and accounts for 2.9 % of the total farmland in 19 counties. Reading this numbers the
resettlement doesn’t occur as a major problem of the project. But looking behind the
numbers and percentages it can be seen that this task occurs as one of the biggest problems
the government has to deal with. The last projects of China where the Wold bank was
involved are described in one sentence as “successful”. The largest number of PAP’s was
140.000 people (in Xiaolangdi). One has to be careful by comparing this to the resettlement
of 1.2 million.

Water Quality and geological issues

Perhaps a more devastating threat to river-dwellers is toxic waste. The land soon to be
submerged contains 178 waste dumps, 40.000 grave sites, and a total of 3 million tons of
refuse. Chinese environment officials warn that this waste threatens to turn the Three Gorges

124
Institut für Tropentechnologie

reservoir into a cesspit (Becker 2000). Becker states that according to a survey of 1993 (start of
the TGP) the industrial and mining enterprises released more than 1Mrd tons of wastewater
into the river annually; the river bed is a toxic sludge of mercury, cadmium, and arsenic. It is a
miracle that the issue of water quality has never been mentioned by the promoters of the
project, they even promote the fishing in the filled reservoir. Local journalists say they are
aware of the illegal pollution, but have been told by their editors not to report the stories.
Government inspectors admitted some time ago that the water quality on one stretch of the
river near Chongqing was no longer fit for human consumption - though it would not reveal
why. The government has announced to build 200 new sewage and waste water treatment
plants by 2010. Nobody knows, if this will be sufficient.

Another problem which was addressed already by the government through the allocation of
US$ 361 million is the so called “geological” disaster. Experts suppose that the dam structures
and reservoir filling could cause subterranean structures to shift and the land above them to
be unliveable. But the extent of such possible changes can’t be predicted in detail.

Cultural Heritage
Last, but not least the cultural heritage should be mentioned. A whole book can be written
about this. Here just some comments: Critical views say that the reservoir will flood many
historical sites and ruin the legendary scenery of the gorges and the local tourism industry.

Picture 8 and 9: Left: View to the famous Gorges of the Yangtze. Right: The three gorges at
the Daning river

The promoters respond that a lot of historical relics are being moved and the scenery will not
change that much. Latter nobody can really imagine. But being there and enjoying the
beauty it is hard to imagine that all of that will be soon gone. Furthermore the WCD states
that the combined problems of time constraints, under-budgeting, and a shortage of
qualified personnel are seriously hampering the salvation and preservation of the impressive
archaeological and cultural sites. The result will be that some relicts are being preserved the
rest will be inundated by the rising water.

125
Institut für Tropentechnologie

Positive development of the Chinese attitude to the WCD objectives and future
perspective of one of the most dam building countries
The development concerning the WCD objectives is going in a positive direction. Therefore
this article will end also with a positive future prospect. Since the release of the report almost
three years had passed, when the third WCD platform dialogue took place in 2003 in Berlin
and positive changes could be observed. The WCD dialogue took place by an initiative of
the BMZ (Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and development). The results were
most promising: The acceptance to the principles of the WCD is growing worldwide. This is
mostly due to the contribution of the DDP. Even the government of China send a signal of
willingness for co-operation (three years before they have been one of the strongest
opponents). The task of the DDP is to follow up with the WCD, to promote a dialogue on
improving decision-making, planning and management of dams and their alternatives based
on the WCD core values and strategic priorities. In 2002 DDP had successful consultations with
governments of the most important dam building countries. The result was that the Chinese
MWR as well as the State Environmental Protection Administration of China are new members
of the DDP (after a meeting in September 2002, Beijing); furthermore India, Turkey and Brazil.
Membership includes the active collaboration. Moreover the Chinese State Power
Cooperation mentioned their interest to be a member. This year (2004) it is planned to
develop and sign concrete co-operation agreements.

After such a success of obtaining more and more willingness to participate one can hope for
the future, that the governments will try to find solution to be conform with the
recommendations of the WCD and national as well as international discussions and
exchange will go on. This hopefully will lead to less problems in new projects with an more
integrative participative process and improved management of existent structures.

Literature:
ADB, 1999: Asian development bank, 1999b, p.20-21, cited in the WCD Report

Becker, Jasper (2002):Peasants dig in as dam water rise, Chinese officials along 375 miles of
the Yngtze must relocate 550.000 residents by the year’s end:
http://www.irn.org/programs/threeg/index.asp?id=021204.digin.html; release
12.04.2002

China Online, 3.10.2000: Three Gorges Dam Project,

http://www.chinaonline.com/refer/ministry_profiles/threegorgesdam.asp

Country Study China (2000): Executive Summary, WCD:

http://www.dams.org/kbase/studies/cn/cn_exec.htm

Dai Qing (1998): ed. The river Dragon has come! The three gorges dam and the fate of
China’s Yangtze River and its people, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY

Dams and Development Project (DDP), United Nations Environment Programme, Interim
Report

126
Institut für Tropentechnologie

Great China – Newsletter (30.06.2003): Citation of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1.06.03:

http://www.huang-jaumann.de/download/deutsch/2003/newsletter0306.pdf;
19.02.04

Helvetas-Wasser-Fachsheets: Staudämme; www.helvetas.ch

IRN (2003); Human Rights Dammed of at Three Gorges, An investigation of resettlement and
human rights problems in the three gorges dam project, January 2003

IRN and human rights in China, Major Problems found in TGD Resettlement program, March
13, 1998

IRN: Three Gorges Campaign, www.irn.org

Plat, Kevin (1998): As Yangtze Rises, China Must Choose; Christian Science Monitor; 7.August
1998, Website of: The Christian Science Publishing Society

Sophia Woodman (2000):IRN's Three Gorges Campaign: Comments on World Commission on

Dams' China Country Review Paper, of the research director, Human rights in
China, May 25, 2000

Three Gorges Project, China Yangtze Three Gorges Project Development Corporation
(CTGPC)

Wang Jiazhu (2000). Progress at the Three Gorges Project. Hydropower and Dams, Issue4,
2000

WCD (2000): Dams and Development: A new Framework for Decision-Making, A Report for
the World Commission on Dams, November 2000, Earthscan Publications Ltd,
London and Sterling, VA

WCD (2000): WCD Country Review Paper: Experience with Dams in Water and Energy
Resource Development, in the Peoples Republic of China, Final Report
November 2000

WCD Platform Dialog, Berlin 2003: http://www.gtz.de/dokumente/dams/WCD-Plattform-

Gespraech_03.pdf

Xinhua, China Daily (2003-09-08): China ready for the third phase of Three Gorges Project

Zou Youlan, World Bank Resettlement Policies in China, Senior Social Development Specialist,
World Bank Office in Beijing

Images:

Quick Bird Satellite Image: http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-

8/08/content_253235.htm, 19.02.2004

Pictures: Made by the IAHR Student Chapter Stuttgart Group during the China Excursion in
March/April 2003

127