JURISDICTION

General Rule: Jurisdiction over subject matter cannot be waived; judgment without
jurisdiction is VOID

Abbain vs. Chua

- March 12, 1958. Chua commenced suit for forcible entry and illegal,
detainer" against HatibAbbain at the Peace Court of Bongao, Sulu. He averred
that he is the owner of a piece of land (4 ha) located in Bongao, Sulu. That his
tenant (Chua) and have been always dividing the fruits or copra harvested
therefrom on fifty-fifty basis. But the defendant "by means of force, strategy
and stealth unlawfully entered and still occupies the land in question after I
have repeatedly demanded of him to vacate the premises due to his failure to
give the 50% share of the harvest. Peace court ruled in favor of the plaintiff
claiming that the action was an ejectment proceeding and not based on a
tenancy agreement. The question of jurisdiction was contested because the
Court of Agrarian Relations has the orig and exclu jurisdiction based on the
express statutory provisions of RA 1199

- Abbain filed in the CFI Sulu against Chua and Judge Managula for "relief from
judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao and/or annulment of its
decision in Civil Case No. 21 with preliminary injunction." 2 Petitioner there
averred that: (1) the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao did not have
jurisdiction over said Civil Case 21 which is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations; and (2) because of
"fraud, mistake or excusable negligence," he was deprived of a hearing in
said Civil Case 21, and prevented from taking an appeal from the
decision therein rendered. Then directly appealed to the SC
- RULING: Justice of the Peace Court had no jurisdiction over the case.
Because, Tongham Chua's suit comes within the coverage of the statutory
provision (Section 31, R.A. 1199) heretofore mentioned that "[a]ll cases
involving the dispossession of a tenant by the land-holder," shall be under the
"original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court (Court of Agrarian
Relations) as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take
cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes"
- "a dead limb on the judicial tree, which should be lopped off or wholly
disregarded as the circumstances require
- The judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court is not merely a voidable
judgment. It is void on its face. It may be attacked directly or collaterally.
Here, the attack is direct. Petitioner-appellant sought to annul the judgment.
Even after the time for appeal or review had elapsed, appellant could bring,
as he brought, such an action. More, he also sought to enjoin enforcement of
that judgment. Since the judgment here on its face is void ab initio, the
limited periods for relief from judgment in Rule 38 are inapplicable.

Sps Atuel vs. Sps Valdez

- Atty. Manuel D. Cab (Cab) is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Poblacion,
Sibagat, Agusan del Sur
- Cab appointed Federico Atuel (Atuel) as administrator of the Cab Property.
 - Valdez is the nephew of Atuel, who recommended to Cab to lease a portion of the Cab
Property to Valdez.[6] On 9 October 1978, Cab and Valdez entered into a Lease of
Improved Agricultural Land under which Valdez leased a 1.25-hectare portion
- 1088, Cab informed Valdez that their lease contract had already expired, and demanded
that Valdez stop cultivating the 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property and vacate the
same.
- Municipal agrarian reform officer informed Cab that Valdez was properly
identified as a tenant, and thus deemed to be the owner of the land he cultivated.
- On 17 September 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
approved the Town Plan and Zoning Ordinance of fifty-eight municipalities, including that
of Sibagat.The HLURB classified the Cab Property as 90 percent residential, and the
remaining portion as institutional and park or open space.
- the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez (Spouses Valdez) filed a complaint[9] for
Recovery of Possession with Damages with the Dept of agra relations-adjudicatory
board in Malaybalay, Bukidnon against the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.
- On 4 March 1993, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, after hearing the case, issued a
decision
- Court of Appeals ruled that the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of emancipation patents

- SC reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals because of the DARABs lack
of jurisdiction
- The DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses
Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession of the Subject Lot. Though
the parties do not challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court
may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction.[19] The Court has
discretion to determine whether the DARAB validly acquired jurisdiction over
the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by
law. It may not be conferred on the court by consent or waiver of the parties
where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action.
- In such case, the RTC has jurisdiction.
- For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a
tenancy relation between the parties.
- They and the Spouses Valdez have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian
relations whatsoever.
- Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general
jurisdiction. Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve possession of real property

RULE 9 (1)
- Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However,
when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall
dismiss the claim

RULE 15(8)
- Omnibus motion. Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion
attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all
objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived
-

Applied Food Ingredients vs. CIR

- Petitioner is a Value-Added Tax (VAT) taxpayer engaged in the importation

and exportation business, as a pure buy-sell trader. Petitioner alleged that
from September 1998 to December 31, 2000, it paid an aggregate sum of
input taxes for its importation of food ingredients. Subsequently, these
imported food ingredients were exported between the periods of April 1, 2000
to December 31, 2000, from which the petitioner was able to generate export
sales amounting to P114,577,937.24. The aforestated export sales which
transpired from April 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000 were zero-rated sales,
pursuant to Section 106(A (2)(a)(1) of the NIRC of 1997. Petitioner alleged
that the accumulated input taxes for the period of September 1, 1998 to
December 31, 2000 have not been applied against any output tax. On March
26, 2002 and June 28, 2002, petitioner filed two separate
applications for the issuance of tax credit certificates. On July 24,
2002, in view of respondents inaction, petitioner elevated the case
before this Court by way of a Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A.
Case No. 6513. Trial ensued and the CTA First Division rendered a Decision on
13 June 2007. It denied petitioners claim for failure to comply with the
invoicing requirements prescribed under Section 113 in relation to Section
237 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997 and Section 4.108-
1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.On appeal, the CTA En Banc likewise
denied the claim of petitioner citing violation of the invoicing
requirements.

- Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates a mandatory

provision of law. It violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and renders the petition premature and thus without a
cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction
over the taxpayers petition.
- "Inaction by the CIR" in cases involving the refund of creditable input tax,
arises only after the lapse of 120 days. Thus, prior thereto and without a
decision of the CIR, the CTA, as a court of special jurisdiction, has no
jurisdiction to entertain claims for the refund or credit of creditable input tax
- The period of 120 days is a prerequisite for the commencement of the 30-day
period to appeal to the CTA. In both instances, whether the CIR renders a
decision (which must be made within 120 days) or there was inaction, the
period of 120 days is material.
- Thus, strict compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a
claim to prosper, whether before, during, or after the effectivity of the Atlas
doctrine, except for the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling No DA-489-03
on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi doctrine was
adopted, which again reinstated the 120+ 30 day periods as mandatory and
jurisdictional.
EXCEPTION: JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL

- Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.

TIJAM vs. SIBOGHANOY (landmark case)

- This case therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and
throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question of
jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse decision.
- Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the
purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active
participation.
- The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time
but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right
or claim to be enforced or asserted
- the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter
of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the
party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such
a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
- is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

SEAFDEC vs. NLRC

- Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of

jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer
jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is
conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can
provide one. Settled is the rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with
appropriate jurisdiction is null and void
- Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture
Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the
jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC
- PIL: In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one
State, they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal
law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading
authority "they must be deemed to possess a species of international
personality of their own.

SOLIVEN vs. FAST FORMS PH

 - Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration, stressing that respondent
is barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court since it has invoked
the latters jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief in its answer to the
complaint and actively participated in all stages of the trial
- While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, this rule
presupposes that estoppel has not supervened. [13] In the instant case,
respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the
trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly,
respondent is estopped from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction,
especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered.
- A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction

FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE

- MTC: Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine,
and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
- it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either
of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such
cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice cannot be toleratedobviously for reasons
of public policy.
- instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the
supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general
rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the
issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
- On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the
reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence.
They invoked the trial courts jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief
the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed
their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.
- A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the
subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by
consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has
been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from
the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however,
that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in
Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-
waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket
doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in
Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually
 overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

- Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover,
jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the
defenses contained in the answer

- Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the

relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that
is the subject of the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or
tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence,
susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.