The Role of America's Alliances in The Philippines' Balancing Policy On China: From The Aquino To The Duterte Administration

the role of americas
alliances in the
PHILIPPINEs
balancing policy
on china:
Dr. RENATO C. DE CASTRO

the role of americas
alliances in the
PHILIPPINEs
balancing policy
on china: from the
aquino to the
duterte
administration
Dr. RENATO C. DE CASTRO
Copyright 2017 by Albert Del Rosario Institute
for Strategic and International Studies
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BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Ambassador Albert del Rosario
was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines from 2011 to 2016. He also served as
Philippine Ambassador to the United States of America from 2001 to 2006.
Manuel V. Pangilinan
is CEO and managing director of First Pacific Company Limited. He is also the chairman of
MPIC, PLDT, Meralco, and Smart Communications, among others.
Edgardo G. Lacson
is an honorary chairman of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI). He
was the former president of the Employers Confederation of the Philippines.
Benjamin Philip G. Romualdez

is the president of the Chamber of Mines of the Philippines since 2004. He is also the vice
president for Industry of the PCCI.
Ernest Z. Bower
is senior adviser for Southeast Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS). He is CEO of BowerGroupAsia (BGA), and a leading expert on Southeast Asia.
Renato C. de Castro, Ph. D

is a full professor of international studies at De La Salle University Manila (DLSU). He
holds the Charles Lui Chi Keung Professorial Chair in China Studies.
Judge Raul C. Pangalangan, Ph. D

is a judge of the International Criminal Court. He was previously a dean of the University of
the Philippines College of Law and publisher of the Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Epictetus E. Patalinghug, Ph. D

is a professor emeritus at the Cesar E.A. Virata School of Business, University of the
Philippines (UP), Diliman.
Francisco A. Magno, Ph. D

is the executive director of the Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance and President of
the Philippine Political Science Association. He is a professor of political science at DLSU.
Carlos Primo C. David, Ph. D

is a professor of Geology and Environmental Science in UP Diliman. He heads the Philippine
Council for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology Research and Development.
CONTENTS
Executive Summary viii
Introduction 1
Harnessing the Spokes and Linking them Together 3

The Philippines-US defense ties are part of a network of bilateral alliances
known as the hub-and-spokes system. The system has
evolved to adjust to changing political milieus
The Goal: Balancing an Emergent China 5

The Philippines short-term territorial defense goal is to establish a modest
border protection program.
Leveraging on the Hub 9
Leveraging on the Spokes 14
Engaging Japan in Fostering Maritime Security 15

The strategic partnership conveys the two countries commitment to ensuring
maritime security and opposition to unilateral actions that change the status quo
Engaging South Korea as a Long-time Security Partner 20

The Philippines and South Korea cooperated on the purchase of 12 lead-in
fighter jet trainers, the Air Forces first major acquisition since the Vietnam War
Jump-starting Philippines-Australia Security Relations 22

Australia has a Status of Forces Agreement with the Philippines. The
partnership has included regular military exercises and
transfers of navy ships to the Philippines
The Hub and Spokes System in Action:

The Case of Operation Damayan 24

Philippine Policy of Linking Spokes in the Balance? 26
Conclusions 30
Acknowledgements
About the Author

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Special Study examines the history and strategic logic of the Philippines
efforts to foster closer security ties with the US and its security partners Japan,
South Korea, and Australia. These moves are primarily aimed at strengthening the
territorial defense capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the
face of the Chinese challenge in the South China Sea.
The Philippine-US defense ties are part of a network of bilateral alliancesoften
called the hub-and-spokes systemthat has sustained US strategic leadership in
East Asia since the Korean War in the early 1950s. The US developed a system of
separate bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines,
and a trilateral security arrangement with Australia and New Zealand, that could
ensure US participation in Asian security affairs.
When the alliances were formed, the US bore the burden of sustaining them,
while the allies were initially free-riders. The US was able to control the separate
agenda of each relationship without too much debate and sans the danger of being
ganged-up. Consequently, to some degree, the Asian allies resented American
domination of these alliances.
Nevertheless, these alliances had an enduring effect on the US and on the allies
foreign policies. They created an inertia or stasis born out of shared interests, which
caused these security relationships to outlive the Cold War. Since the end of the
Cold War, the US and its three Asian allies have institutionalized their efforts to
minimize their competitive and divergent interests. They have preserved their
bilateral relations, and/or formed new patterns of security ties among them.
Dynamic partnerships enable the Philippines to strategize its territorial/maritime
defense. The Philippines persistently develops its military interoperability with the
US and executes naval diplomacy, targeted engagement, and security assistance
arrangements to improve the countrys maritime security. The Philippines efforts
to forge security ties with Japan, South Korea, and Australia are also hedged on its
strategic bets in the light of its limited military capabilities.
The Philippines enhanced strategic relations also help the Armed Forces of the
Philippines overcome other inadequacies, such as in conducting humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations during and after natural calamities.
The Special Study concludes by exploring the future of the Philippine policy of
linking Americas alliances together under the Duterte Administration.
viii
The Role of Americas Alliances in
the Philippines Balancing Policy
on China: From the Aquino to
the Duterte Administration
RENATO C. DE CASTRO, PH.D
I n October 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) ravaged the central
part of the Philippines with torrential rain and sustained winds of up to 150
miles per hour. Dubbed a super-typhoon, Haiyan killed more than six thousand
people and left more than three million Filipinos in five major island-provinces
Leyte, Samar, Panay, Cebu, and Palawanwithout homes. The typhoon destroyed
nearly 550,000 residential houses and devastated farmlands and fishponds in these
islands-provinces, which account for about 12% of the countrys gross domestic
product.1 Consequently, it was predicted that the destruction wrought by the
typhoon could adversely affect the countrys economic growth.
The aftermath of the typhoon raised questions regarding the Aquino
administrations preparedness and capability to deal with major natural calamities.
In the most affected island-provinces of Samar and Leyte, the first humanitarian
and relief efforts were conducted by international relief agencies and foreign
governments such as the US, Australia, Israel, and Japan, and not by the Philippine
government.2 The nearly total destruction of a Philippine city (Tacloban) and the
extensive damages to the five fore-mentioned provinces tested the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFPs) limited capacity for airlift and sea transport in an
archipelagic environment.
1
2 THE PHILIPPINES BALANCING POLICY ON CHINA
A few days after the typhoon hit the country, the AFPs relief efforts were still
hampered by a shortage of all-weather communication facilities such as satellite
phones and weather-safe radios. The New York Times reported that the Philippine
Air Force (PAF) could not deploy its aging fleet of cargo/transport planes because
of a lack of spare parts and technical maintenance. The three C-130s and 28
operational helicopters exposed the Philippine governments and its militarys
limited and deplorable capacity for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Risk
Reduction (HADR) operations. In particular, the brunt of complaints and criticism
fell on the AFPan overstretched, poorly funded militaryfor its late arrival to
the disaster zone.3
Within 48 hours after the onslaught of the typhoon, the Philippine government
requested for international assistance. Immediately, the US military launched
Operation Damayan (assistance)a massive humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief operation for the typhoon victims. The American forces were supported by
several military contingents from other US allies in the Asia-Pacific region. During
the first week, Japan, Australia, and South Korea joined forces with the US. The
massive HADR operation affirmed USs commitment to its ally and the relevance
of its hub-and-spokes system, not only in addressing the geo-strategic security
challenges but also in the conduct of HADR activities. It showed the effectiveness of
the Philippine governments strategy of
linking the USs hub-and-spokes system
of alliances together.
On account of its inadequacies, the
AFP relies on cooperation with its ally
and other security partners in pursuing
its mandated missions and objectives.4
The Philippine military depends on
its security engagements with foreign
militaries to effectively address and
respond to security challenges. This
course of action could be traced back
to 2011, when the Philippines adopted
a delicate balancing policy in the face of
an emergent and assertive China in the
THE PHILIPPINES BALANCING POLICY ON CHINA 3
South China Sea; the Aquino administration had acknowledged the need for US
diplomatic support and military assistance relative to its territorial row with China.
Furthermore, it started establishing defense linkages with other American allies
in the region: Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Militarily weak, the Philippines
found it imperative to leverage the US and its other bilateral partners to enhance
its security and develop the AFPs capabilities for territorial defense.5
This paper examines the Philippines efforts to connect the separate US bilateral
alliances in the Asia-Pacific region as it forges security arrangements with Japan,
South Korea, and Australia. It explores this main question: How does the Philippines
establish defense relations with Japan, South Korea, and Australia? It also raises the
following corollary questions: What is the Philippines game plan in engaging these
three US allies? What is the implication of this move on the US alliances in East
Asia? How can the Philippines and the US maximize this move to link the spokes?
What is the future of this policy under the Duterte administration?
Harnessing the Spokes and Linking them Together
The Philippine-US defense ties are part of a network of bilateral alliancesoften

called the hub-and-spokes systemthat has sustained US strategic leadership in
East Asia since the Korean War in the early 1950s.The US developed a system of
separate bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines,
and a trilateral security arrangement with Australia and New Zealand, that could
ensure US participation in Asian security affairs.6 These security arrangements were
formalized after the signing of a peace treaty with Japan in September 1951 and the
signing of alliance treaties with the aforementioned Asia-Pacific countries. During
the Eisenhower administration, the treaties formed part of an overall US design to
surround the Eurasian landmass with American and Allied military power.7
Although the US signed separate defense agreements with Japan, South Korea,
Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, and Australia, the alliances constituted a
system in a number of ways. First, they extended American strategic deterrence
from Western Europe to East Asia, providing a Western military buttress against
the Soviet Union and China and against the imminent process of regional
decolonization.8 Second, the treaties allowed the United States to maintain a credible
military presence through the basing structures for American forward deployment
in East Asia. Third, they enabled the US to act as Asias primary security guarantor
and common contact for the regions non-communist armed forces. Fourth, the
US dominated the terms and their conditions of Americas alliances and their
dynamics.
When the alliances were formed, the US bore the burden of sustaining them,
while the allies were initially free-riders. The partnerships reflected a power
asymmetry, in which the US became the hub of the East Asian security wheel, with
its spokes pointing to the individual allies in the region. The US was able to control
the separate agenda of each relationship without too much debate and sans the
danger of being ganged-up on by its allies, in contrast to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Consequently, to some degree, the Asian allies resented
American domination of these alliances. Nevertheless, these alliances had an
enduring effect on the US and on the allies foreign policies. They created an inertia
or stasis born out of shared interests and bonds of anti-communism, which caused
these security relationships to outlive the Cold War.
History, however, shows a pattern of alliances disintegrating as allies interests
and purposes change in the face of emerging threats or new global conditions.
This pattern has not applied to the Philippine-US alliance, as well as to US security
relations with Japan, and South Korea. Instead, the Philippines security ties with
the US were revitalized in the late 20th century and became cohesive and relevant
in the 21st century. These durable alliances have evolved from mere expedient and
mechanical aggregations of national capabilities directed at a specific threat to
something qualitatively different.
Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the US and its three Asian allies
have institutionalized their efforts to minimize their competitive and divergent
interests. They have preserved their bilateral relations, and/or formed new patterns
of security ties among them. Individually and collectively, they have devised
diplomatic/strategic processes and built structures that create islands of stability
amidst a sea of changes in the 21st century regional security environment. In other
words, they have designed new approaches as to security/political management
to counter the centrifugal forces weakening their raison dtre, to maximize their
mutual benefits and minimize alliance cost, and to promote their unity and
cohesion.
These innovations have enabled the alliances to adjust to a changing politico-

security milieu.9 Way into the second decade of the 21st century, the US continues
to build greater inter-operability and to update its combined exercises with its allies.
It is enhancing maritime domain awareness and the maritime security capabilities
of its partner states in the face of Chinas maritime expansion.10 These guarantee
the strong collective capacity of the allies to effectively support the deployment of
American forces in a regional crisis.
The Goal: Balancing an Emergent China
On 2 March 2011, two Chinese patrol boats harassed a survey ship commissioned
by the Philippines Department of Energy (DOE) to conduct oil exploration in
the Reed Bank (Recto Bank), 150 kilometers east of the Spratly Islands and 250
kilometers west of the Philippine island of Palawan. The Aquino administration
was stunned by the Chinese action since this maritime encounter happened east of
the Spratlys and within the countrys adjacent waters. Two days after the incident,
the Philippine government filed a protest before the Chinese embassy in Manila.
In early June 2011, the Philippines sought clarification on the sightings of China
Marine Surveillance (CMS) and Peoples Liberation Armys Navy (PLAN) ships
near the Kalayaan group of islands.
The Aquino administration expressed serious concerns over Chinese
encroachments into the countrys Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to stake Chinas
territorial claim and to possibly construct an oilrig on the uninhabited Iroquois
Bank. According to the Philippine foreign affairs and defense departments, these
Chinese actions are clear violations of the China-ASEAN 2001 Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea.11 In response, the Chinese foreign
ministry sternly told the Philippines to stop harming Chinas sovereignty and
maritime rights and interests, which leads to unilateral actions that can expand
and complicate the South China Sea dispute.12 Consequently, President Aquino
realized that the Philippines was potentially on a direct collision course with China
regarding the South China Sea issue. The 2 March 2011 incident at the Reed Bank
and Chinas arrogant response to the Philippines diplomatic queries prompted the
Aquino administration to hasten the development of the AFPs territorial defense
capabilities. In June 2011, the executive branch and the AFP agreed on a multi-year,
multi-billion-peso defense-spending plan for upgrades. The Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) released a Multi-Year Obligation Authority (MOA) to
the Department of National Defense (DND), allowing the AFP to enter into multi-
year contracts with other governments or private manufacturers. The DBM also
committed PHP 40 billion (estimated USD 800 million) over five years (2012-2016)
to develop the AFPs capabilities for better awareness of the Philippine territorial
waters and EEZ.
In the proposed rolling program, the executive branch would allocate PHP
8 billion (an estimated USD 160 million) annually for the procurement of air-
surveillance radar, surface attack aircraft, close air-support aircraft, combat utility
helicopters, and long-range patrol aircraft.13 Also covered were current upgrade
programs such as the installation of a radar and communications network along
the coast of Palawan and East Mindanao under the Coast Watch South Project and
the acquisition of three refurbished US Coast Guard Hamilton class cutters for the
Philippine Navy. These projects, according to former AFP Chief-of-Staff General
Eduardo Oban Jr., prioritized territorial defense over domestic security.
In October 2011, DND Secretary Voltaire Gazmin released the Defense
Planning Guidance (2013-2018) restructuring the AFP to a lean but fully capable
armed forces able to confront the challenges to the countrys territorial integrity
and maritime security. It envisions the development of an effective force projection
capability to monitor the Philippines territorial waters and EEZ. It contains the
following measures:14
a) Reduction of infantry and marine battalions and redirection of

limited financial resources to key priorities such as theater mobility,
close air-support, air-surveillance, and air-defense;
b) Acquisition of naval assets for off-shore patrol, strategic sea-lift, and

accompanying base support system and platform to sustain the deployed
maritime assets;
c) Development of the AFPs long-range maritime air patrol and

surveillance abilities through the acquisition of necessary assets and
developing an accompanying base support system; and
d) Reactivation of the Philippine Air Defense System (PADS) through

the acquisition of air surveillance radar and a squadron of air defense/
surface attack aircraft to provide air defense coverage over areas of high
concern.
The Philippines short-term territorial defense goal is to establish a modest

but comprehensive border protection program. This program is anchored on
the surveillance, deterrence, and border patrol capabilities of the Philippine Air
Force (PAF), the Philippine Navy (PN), and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)
that extend from the countrys territorial waters and, eventually, to its contiguous
EEZ.15 This objective requires prioritizing the AFPs material and personnel
requirements for territorial defense. However, the long-term goal, according to
the 2011 AFPs Strategic Intent, is to develop the force structure and capabilities
enabling the Philippine military to maintain a credible deterrent posture against
foreign intrusion or external aggression, and other illegal activities while allowing
free navigation to prosper.16
Despite its determination to shift the AFPs focus from internal security to
territorial defense, the Aquino administration was constrained by insufficient
financial resources even with its modest defense acquisition goals. In 2011, the
Philippine government could only obtain two former US Coast Guard cutters.
It could not readily purchase blue-water missile-armed ships, search-and-rescue
vessels, naval helicopters, strategic sea lift ships, and top-of-the-line interceptors
that could be deployed to protect its oil exploration projects and territorial claims
in the South China Sea.
To acquire the necessary equipment for territorial defense, the AFP waited
for the Philippine Congress to legislate the extension of the AFP modernization
law (Republic Act 7898) after it expired in February 2010. In December 2012, the
Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 10349 authorizing the extension of
the AFP modernization law. The law, however, allots only PHP 75 billion (US1.
5 billion) for the next five years. This amount is miniscule for the purchase of
modern fighter planes, missile-armed frigates, sea-based and land-based missile
systems, patrol vessels, and long-range reconnaissance planes along with support
facilities such as radar sites, forward operating bases, hangars, communications,
maintenance, and command and control facilities.
In 2012, the Center for New American Security (CNAS) released a study on
Philippine defense requirements in the face of Chinas growing assertiveness in
the South China Sea. The study argued that for the Philippines to have a credible
defense capability, the AFP should acquire 48 upgraded F-16 fighter planes, several
corvette or frigate-type surface combatants, and four to six midget submarines.17
This assessment was far beyond the AFPs plans and beyond the amount the
government was willing to pay. Moreover, the AFPs current build-up for territorial
defense capabilities is especially expensive because, in many cases, the military has
had to start from scratch. For example, the Philippine air defense capability was
actually zero because the PAF was practically a helicopter air force. It had only one
operational radar with a very limited coverage area.18The PAF needs to develop and
acquire radars, hangars, forward operating bases, maintenance, as well as command
and control facilities.
The Philippines aspires to build a credible and sizeable force capable of defending
the countrys interests and the land features it occupies in the South China Sea.19
Despite this modest plan, scant financial resources immobilized the Aquino
administration. So far, the Philippine government has acquired two second-hand
US Coast Guard cutters (The BRP Gregorio Del Pilar and the BRP Alcaraz), and
has ordered 12 F/A-50 multi-purpose fighter planes from South Korea. Though
the PN has acquired six Multi-Purpose Attack Crafts (MPAC), the DND has
postponed the purchase of missile-armed MPAC until the DBM releases the
funds.20 Furthermore, it could not source the much-needed materiel such as blue-
water missile-armed ships, search-and-rescue vessels, naval helicopters, strategic
sealift ships and interceptors for deployment in the South China Sea.
Consequently, the International Institute for International and Strategic
Studies (IISS) 2012 Military Balance bemoaned: President Aquino vowed that
the Philippines would provide a stronger military defense for its South China
Sea claims; this promise may have been aspirational rather than grounded in
concrete policy-making or budgetary provision.21 Yet, even if its slow pace and
scant budget allocation are rectified, the AFPs territorial defense build-up would
hardly deter the PLAN in the contested sea because of the latters procurement of
modern surface combatants and submarines since the start of the 21st century.22
The military imbalance between the Philippines and China will not be resolved
in the foreseeable future despite the AFPs improved defense posture. Thus, the
Philippines had no recourse but to link the AFP arms modernization program to
its 64-year old security alliance with the US and to the other American allies in
East Asia.
Leveraging on the Hub
A significant factor behind the Aquino administrations bold moves to confront

China in the South China Sea dispute, despite its military inadequacies, was the
countrys alliance with the US. The Aquino administration was aware that no
amount of financial resources would enable the Philippines to face an assertive
China in the South China Sea; the AFPs maritime border patrol system was
designed for limited deterrence and asymmetric combat but not for naval warfare.
Thus, the current military build-up was intended to complement the deterrence
provided by the US forward deployment and bilateral alliances in East Asia. In the
final analysis, the Philippines territorial defense stance was predicated on the US
assertion of its position as the dominant naval power in the Pacific.
Prior to 1992, Philippine-US security relations were kept intact by several
bilateral defense arrangements. The two countries became formal allies in 1951
upon signing of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). They also became
members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1956. However,
the most important of these bilateral defense arrangements was the 1947 RP-
US Military Bases Agreement, which facilitated the hosting of major American
naval and air facilities in Philippine territory. The US bases in the Philippines
extended vital logistical support to American forward-deployed forces operating
in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and even the Persian Gulf during the Cold
War. Furthermore, these air and naval assets acted as de facto armed forces against
external threats since the Philippine military was primarily involved in internal
security operations.23 With the withdrawal of these American military facilities in
the country in 1992, the alliance assumed a different form.
The US Global War on Terror in 2001, and the tension between the US and
China after 2008 augured well for the Philippines security agenda vis--vis an
expansionist China. The revitalized Philippines-US alliance achieved two strategic
objectives. One, the Philippine government received US support for its counter-
terrorism/counterinsurgency campaigns. Two, the US deepened its alliance

with the Philippines, not only to neutralize terrorist groups, but also to counter
Beijings political and economic influence in the country. Consequently, the US
provided technical and military assistance to the AFP to firm up the two countries
partnership against Chinas naval might and assertiveness.
In 2010, Chinas bullying behavior in the South China Sea caught the attention
of the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Board (MDB), the liaison and consultative
body that oversees the Philippine-US defense posture against external threats. The
MDB annual meeting on August 18, 2010 discussed the security challenges that the
allies face, e.g. terrorism, domestic insurgency, and potential flashpoints like the
maritime dispute in the South China Sea. Both countries decided to complement
each others military capabilities, enhance inter-operability between their armed
services, and strengthen the AFPs territorial defense capabilities with tangible US
security assistance and joint training exercises. These joint exercises are as follows:24
A. Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHIBLEX)an annual, bilateral

training exercise conducted by the US Marine and Naval Forces
with the AFP in order to strengthen interoperability and working
relationships in a wide range of military operations from disaster relief
to complex expeditionary operations. An estimated 3,500 US marines
and sailors from the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3rd MEB) and
approximately 1,200 AFP counterparts conduct joint training activities
in several parts of the Philippines.
B. Balikatan Exercise (Shoulder-to Shoulder)is an annual Philippines-

US military bilateral training exercise and humanitarian assistance
mission. The annual Balikatan exercise focuses on the training of
both armed forces for HADR and other humanitarian crises that
endanger public health and safety. It also helps develop a high-level of
inter-operability between the US military and the AFP, and enhances
military-to military relations and combined combat capabilities. The
Philippine and US armed service members perform humanitarian and
civic assistance projects in various parts of the Philippines.
C. Cooperation Afloat Readiness And Training (CARAT)is a series

of bilateral military exercises between the US Navy and the armed
forces of several South and Southeast Asian armed forces including the
AFP. Each phase of the CARAT Exercises is based on the shared goal
of the host country. However, the US Navy makes sure that all CARAT
exercises have the common theme of developing maritime security
capabilities, and increasing inter-operability among the participants.
Skill areas conducted during CARAT include Maritime Interception
Operations; riverine, amphibious, and underwater warfare operations;
diving and salvage operations; naval gunnery and maneuvering events;
and HADR operations.
The Philippines and the US also hold a bilateral strategic dialogue annually. The
dialogue provides an opportunity for the foreign and defense departments of the
two countries to affirm the strength of the Philippine-US alliance and the dynamic
[security] partnership for peace, security, and stability.25 In late January 2011, the
first bilateral strategic dialogue discussed current security challenges and identified
new areas for cooperation. The allies also agreed to upgrade their mutual capabilities
in maritime security through the following:26 a) US funding support to the AFPs
Capability Upgrade Program (CUP), especially in the acquisition of equipment,
and refurbishing and maintenance of existing AFP materiel; and b) the provision of
additional funding of USD 40 million for the Coast Watch South project to boost
the Philippine militarys surveillance, communication, and interdiction capabilities
in the South China Sea.
In November 2011, the Philippines and the US signed a joint communiqu on
the 60-year-old MDT, declaring their mutual interest in maintaining the freedom
of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce, and the transit of people across the
seas.27 The allies expressed their adherence to a rules-based approach to resolve
competing maritime claims through peaceful, collaborative, multilateral, and
diplomatic processes within the framework of international law. The communiqu
also stated that the MDT has never been stronger and will continue to expand
to enhance the Philippine militarys defense, interdiction, and apprehension
capabilities in the countrys maritime domain.
The two allies held the second bilateral strategic dialogue in Washington, D.C.
in January 2012. It aimed to shift the [security] partnership into a higher gear at a
time when the two countries ties have become broad-based, modern, mature, and
resilient.28 During the talks, Philippine foreign affairs and defense officials asked
their counterparts for increased US military presence in the country. They decided
to streamline the diplomatic clearance process for US personnel and ships entering
the country for combined training and interoperability.29 The two countries
completed negotiations on the Framework Agreement on Increased Rotational
Presence and Enhanced Agreement (IRP). The IRP facilitates the deployment
of American troops and equipment on a rotational basis, thus circumventing the
sensitive issue of re-establishing US bases in the country.
On 28 April 2014, Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and US Ambassador
to the Philippines Philip Goldberg signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) a few hours before President Obama arrived to Manila for
his first state visit. EDCA is not a new treaty; it merely updates and enhances the
1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.30 This executive agreement provides the framework
by which the Philippines and the US can develop their individual and collective
defense capabilities.31 The EDCA allows American forces to utilize AFP-owned and
-controlled facilities but the Philippine base commander has unhampered access to
those locations. With the Philippines consent, the US military can build or improve
the infrastructure inside these installations for the joint use of both militaries.
Through the EDCA, US forces can implement innovative access arrangements
in the Philippines, namely:32 a) forward operating sites--expandable warm
military facilities with limited US military support presence; and b) cooperative
security locations--facilities with little or no permanent American presence and
are maintained by the host nation. These less expensive, less visible, and less
vulnerable access arrangements offer greater strategic and operational flexibility
for the US. They are less likely to create local political problems and are expected
to promote long-term security cooperation between the US and the Philippines.
More importantly, these operationally flexible facilities located all over a sprawling
archipelagic country located near China can complicate the PLAs anti-access/
area denial strategy. Moreover, the use of air and naval infrastructure all over the
country will facilitate the rapid and massive deployment of American forces in case
of an armed confrontation in the South and possibly even in the East China Sea.
During the Sixth Annual Bilateral

Security Dialogue (BSD) between the
US and the Philippines in Washington
D.C. on March 18, 2016, it was
announced that American forces will
be allowed access to the following
AFP bases: Antonio Bautista Air Base
in Palawan; Basa Air Base and Fort
Magsaysay in Luzon; Lumbia Air Base
in northern Mindanao; and Mactan-
Benito Ebuen Air Base in Cebu. All the
agreed locations are air bases rather than
naval facilities, signifying the Pentagons
intention to bring back American
airpower in the Philippines through
the deployment of fighter bombers, air-refueling tankers, and P-8 maritime patrol
aircraft instead of naval vessels and ground units.33 Stationing these aircraft on the
main island of Luzon will prove useful to the US in any of three most likely cases
of armed confrontation with Chinain the South China Sea, in the Taiwan Straits,
and in the disputed Senkaku Islands.34 Neither of the former US military facilities,
Clark Air Field and Subic Bay, was included on the list. Nonetheless, US Secretary
of Defense Ashton Carter, visiting the Philippines in mid-April 2016, said, that
more bases could be added to the number available for US rotation and that both
Clark and Subic in some form could be used by US forces.35
Similarly, the implementation of EDCA augurs well for the Philippine military.
PAF fighter pilots can train with their American counter-parts in these five airbases.
Furthermore, the PAF can also use facilities that American forces will improve or
build inside its facilities. In addition, the Obama administration requested Congress
for a USD 50 million from the US Congress to fund the Maritime Security Initiative
in Southeast Asia. The lions share of the funds will go the AFPs capability building
program.36 Expectedly, there will be allocation for the purchase of equipment to
monitor activities and movements in the South China Sea.37
In the long-term, the effects of EDCA will go beyond the modernization of
the Philippine military and increased inter-operability between the armed forces
of the two allies. The EDCA will have two far-reaching strategic and diplomatic
implications. First, temporary and rotational US military presence will strengthen
the Philippines resolve to uphold its territorial claims in the South China Sea and
test American credibility in honoring its defense commitment to the country.
Second, the use of air/naval infrastructures in the Philippines will facilitate the
rapid and massive deployment of American forces in case armed clashes erupt
in potential flashpoints such as the South China Sea, East China Sea, and in the
Taiwan Strait.
Leveraging on the Spokes
A dynamic partnership with the US enables the Philippines to strategize its

territorial/maritime defense through domain awareness. Therefore, the Philippines
persistently develops its military interoperability with the US and execute naval
diplomacy, targeted engagement, and security assistance arrangements to improve
the countrys maritime security.38 Enhanced strategic engagements with the US
also necessitate the linking of the Philippines with other American allies in East
Asia such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia.
The Philippines 2011 National Security Policy proposed that the Philippines
must pursue its cooperation arrangements with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, India,
and Australia, among others. Meanwhile, the AFPs 2011 Strategic Intent stated that
while the Philippines has only one formal defense treaty (the 1951 MDT with the
US), it would be beneficial for it to engage and strengthen its relationship with 17
countries that have signed security cooperation agreements with the AFP. Australia,
Japan, India, and South Korea are among those countries.39
The Philippines efforts to forge security ties with Japan, South Korea, and
Australia are hedged on its strategic bets in the light of its limited military capabilities.
They likewise augment the countrys alliance with the US. The 2010 Strategic
Direction of AFP International Military Affairs indicated that the Philippine
military shall maximize gains from the alliance with the US, while seeking security
arrangements with other potential allies such as Australia, South Korea, and Japan
that are key players in the Asia-Pacific region.40 The document also confirmed that
the Philippines intends to develop relations with them to enhance the countrys
security and develop its military (specifically territorial defense) capabilities.41

The Philippines strategy of linking the spokes of the bilateral alliances together
jibes with Washingtons agenda of revitalizing Americas well-established alliances
in Northeast Asia and deepening Americas security relationship in South and
Southeast Asia.42 This is Washingtons positive response to the geo-strategic
significance of the littoral states in East and Southeast Asia (from the Sea of Japan to
the Bay of Bengal), which is rapidly emerging as the most politically, economically,
and strategically important area. With the US pivot to Asia, linking the bilateral
alliances is one way of reassuring the allies that the US has the ability and will to
fulfill its security commitments in the Asia-Pacific.43
Engaging Japan in Fostering Maritime Security
Historically, the Philippines and Japan have maintained vigorous economic and
transnational relations. Both countries adhere to democratic governance, civil and
political liberties, free trade, freedom of navigation, and respect for human rights.
Furthermore, they are US allies whose maritime security is threatened by Chinas
renewed aggressiveness in its maritime domain.44 In 2005, the two countries started
the yearly Political-Military Dialogue that tackles several security issues of common
interests such as the situation in the Korean Peninsula, Chinas arms build-up, the
South China Sea dispute, nuclear proliferation in Asia, and maritime security.
However, Japans ability to forge closer security relations with the Philippines
was restrained by its pacifist 1947 constitution. Despite this restriction, the two
countries cooperate bilaterally by: a) enhancing maritime security through joint
activities by their respective Coast Guards; b) conducting joint counter-terrorism
and UN peace-keeping trainings; c) countering nuclear-arms proliferation; and
d) facilitating the rotational deployment of forward deployed US forces in East
Asia. Since 2011, Japan has closely monitored Chinas increasingly heavy-handed
behavior in the South China Sea where, initially, it had no direct interest.
In July 2011, then Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and President
Aquino agreed to bolster security relations between Japan and the Philippines.
After President Aquinos third visit to Japan, Tokyo and Manila announced the
holding of an elevated dialogue on maritime and oceanic affairs, exchanges between
Filipino and Japanese defense and maritime officials, as well as Japans capacity-
building training of the 3,500-strong PCG.45 In September 2011, then Japanese
Prime Minister Naoto Kan and President Aquino issued a joint statement in Tokyo
affirming that the South China Sea connects the Asia-Pacific to the world, and that
peace and stability therein is of common interest to the international community.46
Prime Minister Kan also instructed the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) to train the
PCG, hold consultations with Filipino naval officers, and increase joint coast guard
exercises.47
The Obama administrations Strategic Rebalancing to Asia provided
further impetus for Japan to balance China in the South China Sea. This policy
initiative occurred when China was moving beyond its initial strategic focus on
Taiwan toward developing its naval capabilities. It generated regional tension by
challenging the claims of smaller littoral states over parts of the South China Sea.
In November 2011, President Obama announced before the Australian Parliament
that with the American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan coming to a close, the
US was refocusing on the fast growing but increasingly Chinese-influenced Asia-
Pacific region.48 This new policy involved a substantial reorientation of US global
strategy and a shift from the post-9/11 focus on the war of terror to a rebalancing
of American attention, efforts, and resources to meet the challenges and to seize
opportunities in East Asia. Succinctly, it implied that the US was prepared to ensure
stability in Asia, protect its allies, and strategically balance an assertive China.
The shift also required strengthening US strategic presence in Japan and South
Korea, which will remain the strategys cornerstone, even as Washington also
builds up its security relationship with other states in the region, especially those
in and around Southeast Asia.49 Specific to the South China Sea issue, the Obama
administration accentuated its vital interest on ensuring the freedom of navigation
on the sea lanes in the South China Sea that can only be guaranteed if it remains
a global commons, that is, it belongs to all states and is not subject to a sovereign
control by a single powerful regional state. In line with this policy, the Obama
administration supported the formation of a maritime coalition in the South China
Sea to balance China. To complement the US initiative of the coalition, Japan
currently pursues defense cooperation and naval exchanges with Philippines and
Vietnam.50
In April 2012, at the start of the two-month stand-off between Philippine
and Chinese civilian ships at Scarborough Shoal, Japanese Ambassador to the

Philippines Toshio Urabe emphasized the close-knit triangular relationship
among Japan, the Philippines, and their closest (mutual) allythe US51 In May
2012, three Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) surface combatants arrived in
Manila for a four-day port call.52 The visit came after Tokyo announced its plans to
provide the Philippines with 10 new patrol vessels to bolster the latters maritime
patrol capability. The newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun linked the ship visit to the on-
going Scarborough Shoal standoff and editorialized that Japan could not just stand
idly by and wait for China and the Philippines to clash openly.53 It also stressed that
it is in Japans national interest to ensure that its sea-lanes remain safe.54
The MSDFs ship visit to the Philippines happened just a few days after the US
Navys Virginia class attack submarine, the USS North Carolina, made a routine
port call at Subic Bay in Luzon. Routine though they were, the visits were made
during the Scarborough stalemate and were extensively publicized. In a sense,
Washington and Tokyo were insinuating that they would not hesitate to act jointly
if any form of Chinese armed aggression threatens the Philippines.55
In July 2012, Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto and his Filipino
counterpart, Voltaire Gazmin, inked a bilateral agreement on maritime security.56
The agreement calls for high-level dialogues between defense officials and reciprocal
visits by the MSDF chief-of-staff and the PN flag commander. It also features various
security related activities such as the Multinational Cooperation Program in the
Asia-Pacific (MCAP); Multilateral Logistic Staff Talks (MLST); Training Exchanges
and Subject Matter Exchanges on HADR and Logistics; and Exchange Visits and
Student Exchanges in the two countries respective Staff Colleges. A few days later,
Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario announced that Tokyo was likely to
provide the PCG with ten 40-meter boats as part of Japans Official Development
Assistance (ODA) to the Philippines by the end of the year.57 Newspapers also
reported that two additional bigger vessels are being considered for transfer to the
Philippine government under a grant.
In January 2013, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida announced the
provision of essential communication systems equipment to the PCG for maritime
safety.58 On 27 June 2013, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera and his
Philippine counterpart, Voltaire Gazmin, confirmed the continuous exchanges
of information aimed at strengthening Philippine-Japan defense relations and on
working together to make US strategic rebalancing a reality in Asia.59 To further

defense cooperation the Asian allies undertake these activities:60 Reciprocal visits
between the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF)
and the Flag Officer of the Philippine Navy (PN); the holding of the Japan-Philippines
Maritime Chief of Staff Meeting; port calls in the Philippines by JMSDF vessels; and
active participation in the Pacific Partnership 2012. The two defense ministers also
extended the two countries security cooperation to aviation, highlighted by the
visit to the Philippines by the Chief-of-Staff of the Japanese Air Self Defense Force
(JASDF). During the same meeting, Secretary Gazmin also raised the possibility
of allowing the Japanese SDF access to the former American military bases in the
Philippines if Tokyo is interested in such arrangement.61
In December 2013, President Aquino met Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in
Tokyo and discussed Chinas establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ) in the East China Sea.62 President Aquino was worried that China might
extend the zone into the South China Sea, adversely affecting Philippine security.
Prime Minister Abe assured President Aquino that Japan would not allow China
to change the regional status quo by force, and that Japan would cooperate with
the Philippines to ensure that the freedom of navigation and overflight would not
be infringed.63 To cap off their one-on-one meeting, the two leaders signed the
agreement on Japanese soft loans to finance the 10 patrol boats for the PCG.
In June 2014, President Aquino and Prime Minister Abe again met in Tokyo and
discussed Chinas ambition to become a major naval power in East Asia.64 The two
also discussed how their countries could cooperate to enhance the recently forged
Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership.65 President Aquino reiterated the PCGs
request for 10 brand new 40-meter long multi-role patrol boats that are financed
through a USD 184 million soft loan from the Japan International Cooperation
Agency.66 Abe told President Aquino that three of the vessels would be delivered in
2015 while the other seven would be available in 2016. The PCG declared that the
10 new boats would be used to patrol the waters around the seven islands claimed
and occupied by Philippine forces in the Spratlys. They would also be deployed to
monitor the presence of foreign naval vessels in the several reefs and shoals within
the countrys EEZ that are currently occupied by Chinese forces. Abe promised to
provide VSAR and Inmarsat communication systems to the PCG for its maritime
domain operations.
During his state visit to Japan in early June 2015, former President Aquino
consulted thoroughly with Prime Minister Abe on the peace and stability in the
Asia-Pacific region.67 The two leaders issued a joint declaration on A Strengthened
Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and Goals for Peace,
Security, and Growth in the Region and Beyond. The document conveyed the
two countries commitment to ensuring maritime safety and security in the South
China Sea and their serious opposition to unilateral actions to change the status quo
in the contested territory including Chinas large-scale projects and construction
of outputs on the land features. This was directed against Chinas construction of
artificial islands in the contested sea.68
The declaration also contains a detailed action plan for strengthening the strategic
partnership. Identified collaborative activities include sharing of intelligence data
on security environment and challenges; information exchange and coordination
on respective security policies; collaboration on maritime matters (including
domain awareness); humanitarian assistance; and most importantly, the provision
of defense equipment and technology.
On 29 February 2016, Manila and Tokyo signed a new defense pact that
establishes the legal parameters for the transfer of defense equipment and
technology from Japan to the Philippines. Then Defense Secretary Gazmin and
Japanese Ambassador to the Philippines Kazuhide Ishikawa said that the agreement
would further strengthen the security and defense cooperation between these
the two countries. It also provides for the Philippines and Japan to conduct joint
research and development and engage in the joint production of defense equipment
and technology.69 The accord stipulates the formation of a Philippine-Japan joint
committee that will manage the transfer of defense equipment and technology from
Japan to the Philippines, as well as how the materiel and know-how can be used.70
Both parties expected that the agreement would not only enhance their evolving
security partnership but will also advance the development, production, and
establishment of technological bases of Japans growing defense industry. Japan has
similar defense agreements with the US and Australia. This pact, however, is Japans
first with an East Asia country.
In May 2016, the two governments agreed in principle to lease five JMSDF TC-
90 surveillance planes to the PN. Those planes will be used to patrol the disputed
areas of the South China Sea and in search-and-rescue missions during natural
disasters.71 Tokyo assured Manila that it would will take responsibility for the
maintenance of the TC-90s as well as well as train the PN personnel who will fly
the aircraft. An anonymous Philippine defense official remarked that this new
security accord opens the door to a lot of opportunities beyond the confines of
mere equipment transfer or sale.72
Engaging South Korea as a Long-time Security Partner
The Philippines and South Korea have a long history. Philippines-South Korea
diplomatic relations were formally established in 1949. The strength of this
relationship was tested during the Korean War, when the Philippines deployed the
Philippine Expeditionary Forces as part of the US-led UN forces that defended
the Republic of Korea (South Korea) against the aggression of the Democratic
Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea). The Philippines was the only Southeast
Asian state to send a sizeable force to fight in the Korean War. Both countries are
also US allies that share common interests in maintaining security and stability
in Northeast Asia, and in ensuring that North Korea behaves responsibly in the
interest of regional peace.
In May 1994, the Philippines and South Korea signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on Logistics Cooperation and Defense Cooperation,
amended in July 2007. It specifically directs both countries to identify specific firms
in their respective defense industry that will participate in a cooperative defense
project. The two countries militaries conduct various defense-related activities
such as sharing of and intelligence information; mutual exchange of visit by
military personnel and experts; military education and training; and humanitarian
assistance and international peacekeeping activities. They also hold regular
annual meetings such as the following:73 a) The Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP)-Republic of South Korea Armed Forces (ROKAF) Intelligence Exchange
Conference; a) The Army-to-Army Intelligence Exchange Conference; and c) the
Joint Committee Meeting on Logistic and Defense Industry Cooperation between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of South Korea. In 2008, the DND
acquired various types of ammunition for its light artillery units from Poongsan
and Hanwa Corporations, two well-known South Korean arms manufacturers.
In November 2011, President Aquino announced the PAFs planned purchase of

two squadrons of second-hand F-16C/D through the US Excess Defense Articles
(EDA).74 This acquisition, however, could have caused tremendous financial strain
to the AFP, which is still actively engaged in internal security operations. In fact,
relative to its role in Oplan Bayanihan, the PAF actively serves counter-insurgency/
counter-terrorism functions: a) intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR); b)
precision-attacks to minimize collateral damages in ground support operations;
and c) education and information dissemination campaigns to win the peoples
hearts and minds. In the same month, South Korean President Lee Myung Bak
and President Aquino discussed recent developments in the Korean Peninsula
and in the South China Sea. They expressed hope that their security cooperation
could produce peaceful solutions to these two conflicts according to international
law, norms, and standards. President Aquino reiterated the AFPs need for defense
materiel, including surface combatants and training aircraft.
In May 2012, President Aquino said the PAF might acquire brand-new lead-in
jet trainers that could be converted into fighter planes by modifying their airframe.75
In an interview, President Aquino admitted that the government found it too
expensive to buy, let alone maintain, second-hand fourth-generation jet fighters
with only five years left in service. A sound alternative, he said, was to buy cheaper
new fighter aircraft from the United Kingdom, France, Italy, or South Korea.
In 2012, the Philippine government started negotiating a government-to-
government procurement agreement with South Korea for the purchase of 12
Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) F/A-50 Golden Eagles. The F/A-50s design
was largely patterned after the US-designed Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting
Falcons. Both fighter planes have similar features: single engine, speed, size, cost,
and the range of weapons system. These interceptors could secure the Philippines
air-space and function as trainer planes to develop the PAF pilots air command
maneuvering skills.76 Finally, during his two-day state visit in South Korea in
October 2013, President Aquino said that both governments were finalizing the
deal worth PHP 18.9 billion (estimated USD 450 million). Once turned over to the
Philippines, these jet fighters would serve as the PAFs interim interceptors until
the defense budget could afford to purchase and maintain fourth-generation fighter
planes.
The Philippines signed a contract with Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) for
12 F/A-50 fighter planes for the PAF in March 2014. Under a government-to-
government contact guaranteed by the state-owned Korea-Trade Promotion
Agency (KOTRA), KAI would deliver the fighter planes to the PAF in the next
38 months. This was the PAFs first major aircraft acquisition since the Philippine
bought 25 F-8 Crusader fighter-bombers from the US in 1979 to supplement its
squadrons of pre-Vietnam War F-5 aircraft. On 1 December 2015, the Philippines
received the first two of the 12 FA-50s.
Jump-starting Philippine-Australia Security Relations
The 1995 Philippine-Australia Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperative

Activities provides the legal basis for Philippine-Australian security relations. It
enables the Australian Defense Force and the AFP to undertake several defense
related activities in the holding of mutually beneficial cooperative defense activities
such as the MTA LUMBAS (2001), the First Philippines-Australia Maritime
Surveillance Exercise (MARSUVEX), and the Australian hosted multilateral Fleet
Concentration Period Exercise KAKADU.77 Aside from these military exercises,
there are regular exchange visits by Filipino and Australian defense and high-ranking
military officials covering confidence building measures and regular intelligence
exchanges on various security issues. Consequently, in a 2006 bilateral review, the
Australian government described its security relations with the Philippines as very
strong and based on friendly ties as well as common strategic interests in a secure,
stable and prosperous region.78
The Philippines and Australia are formal US treaty allies that are also engaged
in joint security training. The two countries navies hold an annual naval exercise,
Philippine Navy-Royal Australian Navy Exercise LUMBAS, to enhance their
interoperability and readiness. The Philippine Army and the Royal Australian
Army have also conducted Land Activity Dawn Caracha that focused on the
training of Special Forces units. The Australian military has trained senior AFP
officers in Australian military school, and provided 28 flat-bottomed airboats for
combat and disaster relief operations. Both countries also cooperate in counter-
terrorism training under the Philippine-Australia Capacity Building Project that
began in July 2001. The project provides financial and technical assistance to the
Philippines for law-enforcement, immigration, and port and transport security.

Since 2005, Australia has provided financial and technical support to the Coast
Watch South project.
In 2007, the Philippines and Australia signed the Philippine-Australia Status-
of-Forces Agreement (SOFA). The agreement follows the format of the Philippine-
US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1997. The SOFA provides legal
guarantees to Australian forces conducting joint-counter terrorism exercises in
the Philippines. It also commits the ADF to advise the AFP on its logistics, and
acquisition policy. The SOFA, however, does not oblige either party to assist the
other in case of an armed attack by a third party.
In October 2011, Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd and Foreign Affairs
Secretary Del Rosario met to discuss key regional and bilateral matters, to include
enhanced cooperation on disaster response, consolidation of counter-terrorism
measures and, crucially, maritime security concern, such as the South China Sea
dispute. Although Australia is not a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute,
it shares with the Philippines the strategic interest of unimpeded access to the
regions maritime commons.79
In July 2012, after five years of intense debates and deliberations, the Philippine
Senate finally ratified the SOFA. After the ratification, the DND announced that
Australia looked forward to joining the annual Philippine-US Balikatan (Shoulder-
to-Shoulder) joint military exercise.80 In October 2013, the two countries defense
ministers created the Joint Defense Cooperation Working Group (JDCC) and the
Defense Cooperation Working Group (DCWG) to enhance their countries defense
relations through the annual conduct of the previously mentioned Army-to-Army
exercise Dawn Caracha, Dusk Caracha, and the Navy-to-Navy Maritime Training
Activity Lumbas and Kakadu and the Air Force Training Pitch Black.81 Eventually,
the Australian Defense Force (ADF) sent 68 participants to the Philippine-US
Balikatan Exercise 2014.
With improving Philippine-Australian security relations, President Aquino
offered Australia a strategic partnership similar to what the country has forged with
the US and Japan.82 He commented that both countries have been usually on the
same side of issues that confronted them during World War II, the Korean War,
and the Vietnam War.83 He added that Australia and the Philippines share the same
values, and have similar forms of government, as well as face the same regional
and global challenges. On 18 November 2015, on the side of the Asia-Pacific

Economic Communitys (APEC) Leaders Meeting in Manila, President Aquino
and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull signed the Joint Declaration on
Australia-Philippines Comprehensive Partnership.
In March 2016, the PN officially took delivery of three former Australian
Balikpapan-class land craft heavy (LCH) from Australia. The three LCHS are
former ships of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships that were transferred to
the Philippines as part of a set of five vessels acquired from Australia. The first two
were donated and commissioned into the PN in 2015. The three newly acquired
ships were sold to Manila for PHP 270 million (USD 5.8 million). The acquisition
of the five LCHs will bolster the PNs humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations, and they are also useful in transporting troops from one island to
another and for the conduct of amphibious operations all over the Philippines
archipelago.
The Hub-and-Spokes System in Action:

the Case of Operation Damayan (Sharing)
Given the Philippines geographic predisposition to natural calamities such

as typhoons volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes, the AFP has become the
governments crucial conveyor of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. From
the Philippine militarys perspective, the deployment of military personnel and
equipment across the archipelago allows the AFP to be the first responders after a
natural disaster.84
However, the widespread destruction of lives and properties in the aftermath
of Typhoon Haiyan exposed the AFPs weakness in terms of HADR operations.
Although the government immediately ordered the deployment of troops to the
typhoon-devastated areas, the AFPs HADR operations were hampered by the
shortage of large troop carriers, the lack of basic provisions including food, heavy
equipment, reliable communication technology, helicopters, and strategic sea and
airlift capabilities.85 Consequently, 48 hours after Typhoon Haiyan made landfall,
the government had no recourse but to request foreign assistance.
Then US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed US Pacific Command
to support the US governments humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

operations in the Philippines.86 The morning after Typhoon Haiyans onslaught,
the Joint Special Operations Task ForcePhilippines (JSOTF-P) conducted aerial
reconnaissance missions over the disaster-ravaged areas. As the full extent of the
devastation became apparent, the JSOTF-P quickly launched HADR operations.87
In subsequent days, lead elements of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade
from Okinawa arrived in the Philippines. With the help of the US Marines, the
American HADR operations shifted to surface maritime search and rescue (SAR),
airborne maritime SAR, medium-heavy helicopter lift support, fixed-wing lift
support, and logistic enablers.88 The US Marines also brought 22 MV-22 Ospreys
to deliver relief assistance, ferry passenger, and survey damages and devastations
in areas inaccessible by other means of transportation. On 15 November, the USS
George Washington and its escorts arrived in the Philippines. On board the ship
was Carrier Wing 5, which was designated for HADR. In the next four days, the
US Pacific Command deployed 2,150 Marines and sailors, and some 50 ships and
aircraft to help distribute food, water, and other supplies; speed up the delivery of
relief supplies; and facilitate the movement of AFP/PNP units by reopening roads,
ports, and airports.89
Other US allies joined the HADR operation. The Australia Defense Force (ADF)
deployed a C-17A Globemaster and a C-130 that airlifted doctors, paramedics,
and logistic support staff to the disaster areas. After delivering the ADFs HADR
contingent to Leyte, the two planes were used for delivering relief supplies and
transporting more than 5,800 passengers including 3,500 internally displaced
persons. Australia also sent the HMAS Tobruk to deliver 110 tons of humanitarian
assistance and Australian engineers from the 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment to
Leyte.90 Japan sent three Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyers carrying
nearly 1,000 Ground Self Defense Force to deliver emergency supplies to remote
areas.91 Japan dispatched three CH-46 transport helicopters, three UH-1 utility
helicopters, transport vessel Osumi, two KC-767 air tankers, seven C-130 transport
aircraft, and U-4 utility support aircraft.92 Finally, the Republic of Korea deployed
two C-130s and sent a 529-military contingent consisting of engineers, doctors,
and technical specialists for relief and recovery operations. Members of the ROK
contingent were deployed in several towns in Leyte and Samar where they remained
for six months.93
The allies combined efforts demonstrated how the hub-and-spokes system of

bilateral alliance could operate in peace and, possibly, even in a wartime situation.
For the Philippines, the involvement of the US and its allies affirmed American
commitment to its security partners and the reliability its bilateral system of
alliances. From a strategic perspective, Damayan in the Philippines offered tangible
benefitsthe ability to operate in far-flung places, build military-to-military
relations, and get first-hand training or experience on inter-operability.94 The
outpouring of Americas and its allies humanitarian efforts and assistance to the
thousands of Filipinos left homeless, sick, and hungry by Typhoon Haiyan was
a monumental show of support to the Philippines, and an impressive expression
of the hub-and-spokes systems cohesion and ability to respond even to a crisis
situation.95
Philippine Policy of Linking Spokes in the Balance?
The future of the Philippines policy of challenging China by leveraging on Americas

bilateral alliances in East Asia, however, is on the line in light of the election of
President Rodrigo R. Duterte. During the campaign, Davao City Mayor Duterte
was critical of the Aquino administrations foreign policy agenda of challenging
Chinas maritime expansion in the South China Sea by fostering closer security
relations with the US and Japan.96 He declared that he is willing to have bilateral
talks with China over the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea dispute.97 He
also suggested the possibility of joint exploration with China of the South China
Seas natural resources. Mayor Duterte was also disparaging of the Philippines-US
alliance as he said that he has little confidence that the United States would honor
its treaty commitment to the Philippines when it came to the South China Sea
dispute.98
In the first weeks of its term, the Duterte administration seemed to be following
his predecessors geopolitical agenda of challenging China in the South China Sea.
President Duterte, however, changed gears after the United States became critical
with his domestic agenda of waging a so-called war on drugs and criminality that
had claimed more than 3,000 lives. His current pronouncements and decisions
indicate that he plans to distance the Philippines from its only strategic ally, the
United States. Instead, he wants warmer and closer relations with China.
During the two Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summits and
the East Asian Summit (EAS) in Laos, President Duterte gave remarks that were
interpreted as insulting to US President Barack Obama. This led to the cancellation
on the scheduled bilateral meeting between the two heads of state. He skipped
the US-ASEAN Summit and then, instead of reading his prepared speech on the
12 July Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) award to the Philippines on the
South China Sea arbitration, he criticized American human rights abuses allegedly
committed against the Filipino Muslims in Mindanao in the early 20th century.
This was President Dutertes reaction to Washingtons growing criticism of alleged
human rights violations resulting from his anti-narcotics/anti-criminal campaign
in the Philippines.99
On 12 September 2016, President Duterte announced that US Special Forces
operating in Mindanao must leave the country, arguing that there could be no peace
in this southern Philippine island as long as these American troops are operating
there. The following day, he declared that the Philippine Navy (PN) would stop joint
patrols with the US Navy in the Philippines EEZ in order to avoid upsetting China.
During his two-day official visit in Vietnam in late September 2017, he promised
that the Philippine-US Amphibious Landing Exercise (Phiblex) 2016, which took
place from 4-12 October 2016, would be the last military exercise between the two
allies during his six-year term.100
President Duterte explained that while he pledged to honor the long-standing
defense treaty with the US, China opposes joint military drills in the Philippines.
This leaves him no choice but to serve notice to the US that this will be the last joint
military exercise between the two allies. President Dutertes announcement on the
termination of joint Philippine-US military exercises is considered the strongest
indication of a slow breakdown in the alliance that the Obama administration had
been trying to shore up in the light of the US strategic rebalancing to Asia.
In late September 2017, President Duterte announced that he would forge
new alliances with China and Russia to cushion the fallout from the possible
withdrawal of the US from the Philippines in 2017. He also announced that he
would visit Russia and China this year to chart an independent foreign policy and
open (new) alliances with these two regional powers that have historic rivalries
with the Philippines only strategic ally, the US. During his 21 October state visit
to Beijing, President Duterte declared his separation from the United States and
his realignment with China as two countries agreed to resolve their dispute in the
South China Sea through bilateral negotiations.101
President Dutertes declaration of his separation from his countrys only treaty
ally is seen as a serious setback for the United States, and a great Chinese diplomatic
victory that would have a radiating effect in the region that would bring other
estranged neighbors closer to Chinas orbit. This move revealed President Dutertes
scheme of moving the Philippines away from its traditional links to the US toward a
more independent posture. After his arrival to Manila, however, President Duterte
announced that he would not sever his countrys alliance with the United States
as he clarified that his separation merely means charting another path in terms
of foreign policy. He explained that his separation from the US means that the
Philippines will not dovetail the US foreign policy, as it will chart its own path.
President Duterte added that he would not abrogate the 1951 MDT and he has
not made any move against the 2014 EDCA.102 He also added that he had no plan
to forge any military alliance with any other country than the US, downplaying
concerns that he is strategically and diplomatically veering toward China.103 He
added that he only plans to have an alliance of trade and commerce with China.104
Interestingly, even his pronouncement to end joint military exercises with US
became controversial when National Defense Secretary Lorenzana revealed that
the cabinet was not consulted and that no final decision had been made on the
matter.105
Nevertheless, President Dutertes announcement of his break from the US
caused the postponement of the annual Mutual Defense Board (MDB) Meeting on
24th October that was supposed to held in Manila, as the president had not put in
writing what exercises with the US would be terminated and as the Philippine side
waited for the aftermath of the 8 November US presidential election.106 An AFP
spokesperson revealed that the Philippine defense secretary would try to convince
President Duterte in a cabinet meeting to retain some of the useful exercises with
the condition that he would seek assurance from his American counterparts that
the Philippines would not be treated as a vassal state.107
After the November 8 cabinet meeting, Secretary Lorenzana announced that
President Duterte decided to retain the Philippine-US alliance and to implement
the EDCA.108 However, according to the defense secretary, joint military trainings
will continue but will be scaled down into small unit exercises that will focus on
Special Forces, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics operations.109 He also

announced that the annual Balikatan (Shoulder-to-Shoulder) exercises involving
thousands of American and Filipino troops would continue but would be refocused
from its war fighting scenario to humanitarian, engineering, and civil activities.
However, the annual US Navy-Philippine Navy CARAT or Cooperation Afloat
Readiness training, and PHIBLEX US-Philippine Marines amphibious landing
exercise will be terminated. Secretary Lorenzana declared that: President Duterte
practically approved all the military recommendations except those joint military
exercises that will involve amphibious/landing exercises. President Duterte
approved the following activities: holding command, tabletop, staff, and simulation
exercises and trainings; the maintenance of bilateral humanitarian and disaster
response (HADR); holding joint exercises on counter-terrorism; increasing focus
on engagements on addressing non-traditional security challenges such as counter-
narcotics and transnational crimes; and more focus on civil action and engineering
project for civilian communities.110
Ironically, while the President Duterte is seeking a fresh relationship with
Beijing, he is also fostering a security partnership with Chinas foremost rival in
East Asia, Japan. President Duterte has been very critical about the Philippine-
US alliance but he has never criticized the Philippine-Japan security partnership.
Prior to his working visit to Japan, President Duterte expressed his willingness to
advance defense cooperation between the Philippines and Japan.111 During his
working visit, President Duterte discussed maritime security cooperation with
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. President Duterte sought Japans support for joint
ventures in key infrastructure development, especially in terms of harnessing
Japanese expertise in developing high-quality and modern public transportation
system. More significantly, he also engaged Prime Minister in a discussion of
greater politico-social and defense cooperation, particularly in maritime domain
awareness and maritime security.112
During his visit, he signed the Exchange of Notes on Japanese Official
Development Assistance for the provision of two large-scale patrol vessels that
were given aside from the 10 patrol vessels that Tokyo is in the processing of
delivering to the PCG. Japans provision of the two 90-meter patrol vessels will
boost the capabilities of the PCG since white ships are often used on the front line
of the various territorial disputes in maritime East Asia. On 12 October, the PCG
commissioned the first Multi-Role Response Vessel (MRRV) PCGS Tubbataha that
will be used for patrol, search and rescue, and law-enforcement operation in the
Philippine maritime territory. The nine remaining vessels will be delivered serially
until 2018.
Significantly, Japan has also started to provide the Philippines with military
equipment and training. President Duterte also witnessed the signing of the
Memorandum of Implement and Letter of Arrangement for the transfer of
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)s training aircraft TC-90s maritime
reconnaissance planes for the PN.113 Japan will also provide the training for PN
aviators and will develop the infrastructures for these reconnaissance aircraft that
will be patrolling the South China Sea.114 Interestingly, President Duterte also
hinted that the Philippine could conduct naval exercises with Japan, but he repeated
that there would no more joint exercises with the United States.
The most significant accomplishment of Dutertes working visit to Japan
was the two countries signing of the 26th October 2016 Japan-Philippine Joint
Statement.115 The statement commits both countries to the maintenance of the
freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea that holds the sea-
lanes vital for global economic activity and viability. The two leaders also reaffirmed
the importance of the stronger (security) ties between Japan and the Philippines to
promote the peace, stability and maritime security of the region. It also highlights
the importance of alliances as it states: The two leaders look to their network of
friendships and alliances, in particular the ever stronger ties between the Japan
and the Philippines, to help promote the peace, stability and maritime security of
the region.116 President Dutertes decision to maintain the US-Philippines security
ties intact and to enhance Philippine-Japan security partnership, indicate that,
despite his efforts to improve Philippine-China economic relations, he still sees,
the importance of alliances in Philippine foreign policy.
Conclusion
With the Duterte administrations current efforts to establish rapprochement with

China, it should also consider it both crucial and urgent to engage the US and
its other bilateral allies diplomatically and strategically. Former Foreign Affairs
Secretary Albert Del Rosario states: the administration should nevertheless

reconsider its strategy in terms of potentially alienating established economic and
security partners. The Philippines should maintain its good relations with trusted
friends and economic and security partners.117 He further added that As for the
plan to pursue closer relations with China, it doesnt have to be a zero sum game;
you can pursue the friendship of other nations without having to sacrifice those
who all the time had been there to help us.118
As the Duterte pursues its economic alliance with China, it should also take note
of how these bilateral security partners have helped the Philippines in its times of
need. The Philippines alliance with the United States enables the Philippines to
address its pressing security concerns such as terrorism and territorial/maritime
defense through domain awareness. Noteworthy, too, is its desire to develop the
AFPs interoperability with the US Armed Forces, both in counter-terrorism and
territorial defense capabilities. Significantly, the Philippine security relations with
the US enable it to cooperate with other American allies in East Asia such as Japan,
South Korea, and Australia.
The Philippines taps the JCG in providing technical and material assistance to
the PCG. As part of its security arrangements with Japan, Tokyo will provide 12
patrol boats for the PCG. A well-developed PCG is extremely important in deterring
Chinese intrusion into the countrys EEZ. Likewise, the plans to purchase 12 F/A
Golden Eagles fighter planes from South Korea: These interceptors are the next best
alternative to the more expensive F-16 jet fighters from the US. The Philippines
has also ratified a SOFA with the Australian Defense Force to enhance security
cooperation that includes the Coast Watch South project and the joint Maritime
Training Activity Lumbas.
All these efforts are aimed to strengthen the Philippines territorial defense
posture. By establishing informal security ties with the US, Japan, South Korea, and
Australia, the Philippines harnesses the military know-how and resources of these
allies against a pressing strategic concern in maritime Southeast AsiaChinas
expansionist moves in the South China Sea. To boot, these engagements enable
the Philippines to address another crucial security matterthe AFPs inadequacies
conducting HADR operationsthrough the support and help of the US and its
allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, maintaining the Philippines links with
these countries also provides it a diplomatic leverage in dealing with China despite
the two countries recent rapprochement.
Despite his initial vitriolic rhetoric against the US and the Philippine-US
alliance, President Duterte has not abrogated the alliance. He has also strengthened
the Philippines security partnership with Japan. If the Duterte administration will
find it imperative to harness the Aquino administrations policy of linking the
bilateral alliances together, it should consider the following measures:
a) Maintain stable and healthy security relations with the United

States by implementing the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) of 1997
and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) of 2014.
The Philippines should also explore how the EDCA can facilitate the
involvement of Japan, South Korea, and Australia in enhancing the
AFPs capabilities in maritime security and Humanitarian Assistance
and Disaster Risk Reduction (HADR).
b) Continue pursuing its vibrant strategic partnerships with other

US bilateral allies: 1) Japan in terms of acquiring coast guard vessels,
maritime reconnaissance planes, and exploring the prospect of a Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that will facilitate large-scale training
exercises between the AFP and JSDF; 2) South Korea in terms of
acquiring the FA/50s and possibility two Pohang class frigates for the
PN; and 3) Australia in terms of continuous military exercises between
the AFP and the ADF and acquisition of Australian heavy transport
ships.
c) Lay the groundwork for a constructive bilateral negotiation with

China that will be guided by the primacy of the rule of law and close
consultation with the Philippines ally and security partners.
d) Build up the Philippines maritime capacity through arms acquisition

from and training with the US and its key security partners such as Japan,
South Korea, and Australia.
e) Coordinate Philippines foreign and defense policies with the US

and its security partners through annual defense consultations, joint
trainings in counter-terrorism and maritime security, HADR, United

Nations Peacekeeping Operations, and in the East Asian Summit.
1
Josephine Cuneta, Typhoon Left Nearly $13 Billion in Damage: Government Report Details Losses
Along with a Rebuilding Plan, Wall Street Journal (18 December 2013). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/
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2
David Piling, Philippines Typhoon Knocks Benigno Aquinos Reputation, Financial Times (November
14, 2013). p. 1.http://search.proquest.com/docview/1468025495?accountid=38643
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Andrew Jacobs, Typhoon put Philippine Military in Harsh Light: Tardy Relief Efforts Show how Poorly
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4
Melanie Rodulfo-Veril, AFP Regional Security and Defense Cooperation, Security Sector Reform:
Modern Defense Force Philippines (Quezon City: working Group on Security Sector Reform, Ateneo University,
2014). Pp. 132-154.
5
Office of Plans and Program (J-5), Strategic Direction of AFP International Military Affairs (Camp
Aguinaldo, Office of Plans and Program, May 2010). p. 2.
6
Sheldon Simon, The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration (Lexington, Massachusetts: DC Health
and Company, 1988), p. 4
7
These alliances were considered part of the United States response to the June 1950 North Korean invasion
of South Korea and to a certain degree, were also spurred by the San Francisco Peace Treaty between the United
States and Japan. As a result of its peace treaty with its former enemy, Washington signed a bilateral security
pact with Tokyo that came into force on 28 April 1952. The treaty allowed American forces to remain in Japan
to protect the country against both external and internal threats. Then on 27 August 1952, the United States
signed another defense pact with the Philippines in an effort to win this countrys support for Washingtons peace
settlement with Tokyo. In addition to these two treaties, Washington also signed a defense treaty with Seoul as
an American concession to President Syngman Rhees promise to support the armistice to end the Korean War
and to moderate his efforts to go north. The US-South Korea Security Alliance was signed in October 1953 and
provides for consultation to act in case of an external in accordance with [the signatories] constitutional process.
Fred Greene, ,US Policy and the Security of Asia (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), pp. 71-78.
8
William T. Tow and William R. Feeney, Introduction, US Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security (eds.)
William T. Tow and William R. Feeney (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p. 2.
9
Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 165-166.
10
See Department of Defense, The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving US National Security
in a Changing Environment. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2015). p. 26.
11
Carl Thayer, Chinas New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea, International Journal
of China Studies 2, 3 (December 2011). p. 563.
12
Anonymous, China Says Philippines Harming Sovereignty, Interests in Spratlys, BBC Monitoring Asia-
Pacific (9 June 2011). p 1. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=64&did=2369715781&Src...
13
William B. Depasupil, Armed Forces to Spend P14b to Upgrade naval, aerial defense, Tribune Business
News (29 June 2011). p. 1. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=48&did=2386470651&Src...
14
Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin, Defense Planning Guidance, 2013-2018 (Quezon City:
Department of National Defense, 11 October 2011). pp. 11-16.
15
National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011-2016 (Quezon City: National Security Council,
April 2011). p. 39.
16
Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent (Quezon City: Camp
Aguinaldo, 2011). p. 27.
17
Asia News Monitor, FP Modernization: 48 jetfighters, more Naval Vessels, and 4 Mini-Submarines, Asia
News Monitor (8 July 2012). p. 1. http://searcg.proquest.com/docview/1023939317?accountid=285
18
For an interesting discussion on the dismal state of the PAF see Galileo Gerard R. Kintanar, Developing an
Air Power Culturethe Missing Dimension, Digest: Strategic and Special Studies (3rd Quarter 2012). pp. 35-48.
19
Secretary of Defense, op. cit. p. 4.
20
Asia News Monitor, Philippines: DND Postpones Bid Opening for Missile-Armed MPACs, Asia News
Monitor (7 April 2015). p. 1 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1669932527?accountid=28547
21
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, op. cit. p. 276.
22
Richard A. Bitzinger, Recent Developments in Naval and Maritime Modernization in the Asia-Pacific:
Implication for Regional Security, The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington D.C:
National Defense University, 2011). p. 24.
23
AFP Modernization Board, Annual Accomplishment Report 2006. Quezon City: General Headquarters,
Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2007. p. 1.
24
Interview with an anonymous US Defense Attach, United States Embassy in Manila, September 2014.
25
US and Philippines to Hold Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, Targeted News Service (26 January 2011). pp.
1-2. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=63&did=2265055391&Src...
26
Co-Chairs Statement, Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, United States Embassy in
Manila, 27-28 January 2011. p. 10.
27
Philippines-United States: Philippines, US Affirm Mutual Defense Treaty as Foundation of Relationship;
Signed Manila Declaration, Asia News Monitor (18 November 2011). p. 2. http://proquest.umi.com/
pqdweb?index=156&did=251358305&Sr...
28
Jerry E. Esplanada, 2nd Philippine-US Strategic Dialogue set Next Year, McClatchy-Tribune Business
News (28 October 2011). pp. 1-2. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=2496704781&Srch...
29
Floyd Whaley, Philippines in Talk to Expand US Military Ties, The International Herald Tribune (27
January 2012), p. 1 and 3.
30
Philippine News Agency, New Defense Agreement Enhances Philippine, US Alliance on Security
ChallengesDND Chief, The Philippines News Agency (28 April 2014). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/
31
Jim Garamone, US-Philippine Pact Expands Defense Cooperation, Targeted News Service (28 April
2014). P. 1 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1519453450/17CC0F621D4441CBPQ/55?accountid=...
32
For details regarding this new forms access arrangements see Robert Harkavy, Thinking about Basing,
Naval War College Review 58. 3 (Summer 2005). pp. 12-42.
33
Daniel Katz, Countering China: Back to the Philippines, The Asian Wall Street Journal (21 January 2016).
A. 12.
34
Ibid. p. 12.
35
Sheldon Simon, US-Southeast Asia Relations: ASEAN Centrality? Comparative Connections: A
Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (May 2016) Vol. 18, No. 1. pp. 47-48.
36
Jose Katigbak, US, Philippines Agree on Five Base Locations under EDCA, The Philippine Star (20 March
2016). p 1.
37
Ibid. p. 1.
38
Office of the Secretary of National Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance, 2013-2018 (Camp Aguinaldo:
Department of National Defense, 11 October 2011). p. 18.
39
Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, op. cit. p. 34.
40
Office of Plans and Program (J-5), Strategic Direction of AFP International Military Affairs: Executive
Summary (Camp General Aguinaldo, Office of Plans and Program, May 2010). p. 2.
41
Ibid. p.2.
42
Abraham M. Denmark and Brian M. Burton, The Future of US Alliances in Asia, Global Asia 5, 4 (Winter
2010). p. 58.
43
Philip C. Saunders, The Rebalance to Asia: US-China Relations and Regional Security, Strategic Forum
No. 281 (August 2013). p. 9.
44
See National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2011 (Tokyo: National Institute
for Defense Studies, 2012).
45
Japan and Philippines Strengthen Maritime Security Ties, Janes Country Risk Daily Report 18, 195 (09
September 2011). p. 1. http://search.prospect.com/docview/894795349/13A384763AF488...
46
Christian V. Esguerra, Philippines Gets Japan Support on Spratly Dispute, Tribune Business News (28
September 2011). p. http://search.proquest.com/docview/894306416/13A34DA4D4DFF70...
47
James Hookway and Yoree Koh, Japan, Philippines Seek Tighter Ties to Counter China, Wall Street
Journal (27 September 2011). p. 1 http://search.proquest.com/docview/894125705/13A349E13622FC...
48
Nicholas, Peter; Parson, Christi, In Asia, Keeps Focus off Terrorism, Tribune News Service (19 November
2011). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/9049986405/137DFCA20DB399...
49
Michele Flournoy and Janine Davidson, Obamas New Global Posture, Foreign Affairs 91 4 (July/August
2012). p. 59.
50
Robert Ross, The Problem of the Asia Pivot, Foreign Affairs 91, 6 (November/December 2012). p. 79.
51
Japan/Philippines/United States: Japan Envoy Notes Close-Knit Relations among Philippines, Japan, and
US Asia News Mentor (11 April 2012). p. 1 http://search.proquest.com/docview/993161337/13A384763AF88...
52
Philippine Navy Says Japan Sending Three Warships for Port Call to Manila, BBC Monitoring Asia-
Pacific (26 May 2012). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1023495212/13A384763AF48...
53
Ibid. p. 1.
54
Ibid. p. 1.
55
Alec Almazan, US N-sub in Subic a Strong Signal to China: Routine Visit Comes amid Reports China is
Mobilizing Fleet for Philippines Ops, The Business Times (18 May 2012). p.1. http://search.proquest.com/docvie
w/1014157381/13914D940E373...
56
Japan and Philippines Sign Defense Pact, Janes Country Risk Daily Report (4 July 2012) 19, 134. p. 1.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/102349/13A38763AF488...
57
Jerry E. Esplanada, Philippines, Japan to Enhance Maritime Security Ties, Philippine Daily Inquirer (9
July 2012). p. 1 http://globalnation.inquirer.net/43508/philippines-japan-to-enhance...
58
Anonymous, Philippine/Japan: Philippines, Japan Agree to Enhance Cooperation in Maritime Security,
Asia News Monitor (14 January 2013). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1269104724?accountid=28547
59
Anonymous, Philippines, Japan Agree to Strengthen Defense Ties, BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific (27 June
2013). p. 2. http://search.proquest.com/docview/137173115?accountid=28547
60
Embassy of Japan in Manila, Press Release on the Visit of His Excellency Mr. Itsunori Onodera, Minister
of Defense of Japan to the Philippines, (27 June 2013). p. 1.
61
Ibid. p. 2.
62
Jiji Press English News Service, Japan, Philippines to Cooperate on Chinas Air Defense Zone, Jiji Press
English News Service (13 December 2013). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1467745056
63
Ibid. p. 1.
64
Gulf News, Aquino and Abe Discuss Maritime Disputes, Gulf News (25 June 2014).p. 1. http://search.
proquest.com/docview/1539577105?accountid=28547
65
Ibid.p. 1.
66
Ibid. p. 1.
67
The Philippines News Agency (PNA), Japan Shares Philippines Serious Concern over Chinas Reclamation
Activities in West Philippines Sea, The Philippines News Agency (5 June 2015).p.1. http://search.proquest.com/
68
Japan-Philippines Joint Declaration: A Strengthen Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and
Goals of Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and Beyond (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2015).
69
Embassy of Japan, Signing of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government
of the Philippines concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Press Release (29 February
2016). p. 1.
70
Ibid. p. 1.
71
Associated Press, Philippines to Discuss Lease of Japan Surveillance Planes, Associated Press (3 May
2016). p. 1.
72
Associated Press, Japan to Supply Philippines with Military Equipment, The Associated Press (25
February 2016). p. 1.
73
Interview with the Defense Attach of the Republic of Korea, (25, September 2014).
74
Jon Grevatt, Philippines to Hasten Recreation of Dedicated Combat Wing with Ex-USAF F-16 Purchase,
Jane Defense Industry 29, 1 (January 1, 2012). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/910358069/1367C416F
31C55.
75
Aurea Calica, Aquino: Government Can Now Afford to Buy New Fighter Jets, The Philippine Star (17
May 2012). p. 2.
76
Asia News Monitor, Philippines: F/A-50s to Boost Countrys Capability to Defend Territory, Asia News
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77
International Affairs Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans (J-5), Philippines-Australia
Defense Relations (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, June 2014). p. 1.
78
Australia, Philippines to Sign Defense Treaty: Envoy, Xinhua News Agency (25 August 2006). p. 1. http://
search.proquest.com/docview/452462495/135CBA374052DE...
79
Australia Foreign Minister to Discuss Defense Ties During Philippines Visit, BBC Monitoring Asia-
Pacific (20 October 2011) p. 1 http://search.proquest.com.docview/899030868/135CB96541D630...
80
Asia News Monitor, Philippines/United States: Aussies Plan to Join Balikatan Exercise, Asia News
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81
International Affairs Division, op. cit. p. 1.
82
Asia News Monitor, Philippines/Australia: Aquino says Philippines is Offering Australia
a Strategic Partnership, Asia News Monitor (19 October 2012). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/
83
Ibid. p.2.
84
Mereniza C. Gomez, The Evolving Role of the AFP: Skewing towards Non-Traditional Roles, Security
Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force Philippines (Quezon City: working Group on Security Sector Reform,
Ateneo University, 2014). pp. 142-154.
85
Jacobs, op. cit. pp. 1-2.
86
US Department of Defense Information, 3rd MEB to Provide Humanitarian Assistance to Philippines,
Federal Information and News Dispatch, Inc., (11 November 2013).p. 1 http://search.proquesr.com/
docview/1449814525?
87
For details on the JSTOF-Ps HADR operations see Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines,
Operations Damayan Special Warfare (January-March 2014). pp. 53-58.
88
US Department of Defense Information, op. cit.p. 1.
89
Asia-News Monitor, United States/Philippines: US Role in Typhoo Relief Boost New Military Deal with
Manila, Asia News Monitor (27 November 2013). p. 1. http://search.proquesr.com/docview/1461714619?
90
MENA Report, Australia, Philippines: Australian Defense Force Completes Philippines recovery Operation,
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91
Mitsuru Obe; and Yuka Hayashi; and Alexander Martine, Japan Deploys Self-Defense Forces to Aid
Philippines, Wall Street Journal (21 November 2013).p.1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1459826760?
92
Asia News Monitor, Philippines: Fumigation Starts in Evacuation Centers in Tacloban, Asia News
Monitor (27 November 2013). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1461712178?
93
Gulf News, South Korea Sends 529 Troops for Haiyan Response Efforts, Gulf News (29 December
2013).p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1471067423?
94
Eric Talmadge, US Typhoon aid Boosts Nations Image: To Americas Allies, Response, Charleston Daily
Mail (18 November 2013). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1459428111?
95
Andrew Jacobs, Asia Rivalries Play Role in Aid to the Philippines, New York Times (15 November 2013).
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96
Dan Steinbock, Value: Dutertes Pragmatic Agenda for the Philippine, Newstex Global Business Blog (20
May 2016), p. 1 hhtp://journal.georgetwon.edu/dutertes-agenda-for-the-philippines/e
97
Emily Rauhala, Rise of the Philippines Duterte Stirs Uncertainty in the South China Sea: The
Controversial, Tough-Talking Mayor has Suggested He Could Take a Softer Line toward China, The Washington
Post (10 May 2016). p. 1.
98
David Feith, The New Political Risk in the South China Sea, The Wall Street Journal Asia (18 May 2016).
p. 2. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1789309151?accountid=28547
99
Oxford Daily Brief Service. Philippines: New Foreign Policy may be Destabilizing. Oxford Analytica
(16 September 2016). p. 1.
100
Gabriel Dominguez, Philippine Leader Threatens to Break up with US, Janes Defense Weekly (5
October 2016). p. 1. http://0-search.proquest.com.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/printviewfile?accountid=28547
101
Ben Blanchard, Duterte Aligns Philippines with China, Says US Has Lost, Reuters (20
October 2016). p. 1. http://www,reuters.com/articles/US-China-philippines-idUSKCN12K0AS?utm_
source=Arangkada+News+Clips&utm-campaign=ead5023818-Arangkada_News...
102
Anonymous, Americas Erratic Philippine Ally, Wall Street Journal (24 October 2016)
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103
Kyodo News Service, Duterte Nixes Military Alliance with Nation Other than US, Kyodo News
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104
Ibid. p. 1.
105
Ibid. p. 1.
106
Reuters, Philippines, US to Determine Fate of Joint Exercises Next Month, Reuters (26 October 2016).p.
1 http://news.trust.org/item/20161026195526-rde12/
107
Ibid. p, 2.
108
Alexis Romero, Fewer Drills with US but EDCA, Balikatan to Stay, Philippine Star (7 November 2016).
p. 1. http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/11/07/1641549/fewer-drills-us-edca-balikatan-stay
109
Catherine S. Valente, EDCA, Ph-US War Games to Continue, The Manila Times (9 November 2016) p.
1. http://www.manilatimes.net/edca-ph-us-war-games-continue/295391/
110
Prashanth Parameswaran, How Much Will Duterte Wreck the US-Philippines Military Alliance/ The
Diplomat (15 November 2016). p. 1. http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/how-much-will-duterte-wreck-the-us-
philippines-military-alliance/
111
Jiji Press English News Service, Duterte Willing To Advance Defense Cooperation with Japan,
Jiji Press English News Service (25 October 2016). p. 1. http://0-search.proquest.comlib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/
docview/1831939351/fulltext/D08500A05DBB4259PQ/362?accountid=28547
112
Gil C. Cabacungan, Duterte, PM Abe to Discuss Maritime Defense Cooperation, Philippine Daily
Inquirer (26 October 2016). p. 2. http://globalnation.inquirer.net/147950/duterte-pm-abe-to-discuss-martime-
defense-cooperation?utm_source=Arangkada+News+Clips&utm_campaign=eb219...
113
Ian Nicolas P. Cigaral, Maritime, Regional Issues Top Philippine-Japan Joint Statement, Business World
(27 October 2016). p. 1. http://www.bworldonline.com/content.PHPPHPPHP?section=Nation&little=maritime-
regional-issues-top-phil-japan-joint-statement&id=135503&id=13550&utm_source=Arangkada+...
114
Ibid. p. 1.
115
Japan-Philippines Joint Statement (Issued in Tokyo, 26 October 2016). p. 1.
116
Ibid. p. 2.
117
Ben De Vera, Duterte Foreign Policy Unfortunate Says ex-DFA Chief, Philippine Daily Inquirer (28
September 2016).p.1. http://globalnation.inquirer.net/145660/duterte-foreign-polic-unfortunate-says-ex-dfa-
chief-del-rosario
118
Ibid. p. 2.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ADR Institute gratefully acknowledges all those who have extended their support,
cooperation, and commitment in the development of this project. This publication
would not have materialized without their help.
We are fortunate enough to engage with insightful persons from different

sectors, namely: the academe, public and private sectors, as well as civil society
organizations, who have shared their expertise and have actively contributed to
discussions in various fora.
We would also like to thank Prof. Victor Andres Dindo Manhit, President of
the ADR Institute, for his leadership, vision, and guidance in making this endeavor
possible.
Last but not the least, we would like to thank the following for their hard work
and dedication, and for working tirelessly towards the completion of this project:
Deputy Executive Director for Research, Ms. Angelica Mangahas, and Senior
Research Associate, Ms. Weslene Uy, who both served as the editorial staff;
Our design consultant, Ms. Carol Manhit, for the publication lay-out and cover
design;
And the rest of the ADRi team headed by Executive Director, Atty. Katrina
Clemente-Lua, Deputy Executive Director for Programs, Ms. Ma. Claudette
Guevara, Program Associate, Ms. Vanesa Lee, and External Affairs and Social
Media Associate, Ms. Krystyna Dy.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Renato Cruz De Castro is a full professor

in the International Studies Department, De La
Salle University, Manila, and holds the Charles
Lui Chi Keung Professorial Chair in China
Studies. In 2016, he was a U.S.-ASEAN Fulbright
Initiative Researcher from the Philippines, based
in the East-West Center in Washington. He is
an alumnus of the Daniel Inouye Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, U.S.A.
In 2009, Dr. De Castro became the U.S. State
Department ASEAN Research Fellow from
the Philippines and was based in the Political
Science Department of Arizona State University. He earned his Ph.D. from the
Government and International Studies Department of the University of South
Carolina as a Fulbright Scholar in 2001, and obtained his B.A. and two masters
degrees from the University of the Philippines.
Professor De Castro has conducted several courses on International Relations
and Security Studies in the National Defense College and Foreign Service Institute.
He is also a member of the Board of Trustees of the Albert Del Rosario Institute for
Strategic and International Studies (ADR Institute).
A consultant in the National Security Council of the Philippines during the
Aquino Administration, Professor De Castros research interests include Philippine-
U.S. security relations, Philippine defense and foreign policies, U.S. defense and
foreign policies in East Asia, and the international politics of East Asia.
He has written over 80 articles on international relations and security that
have been published in a number of scholarly journals and edited works in the
Philippines, South Korea, Canada, Malaysia, France, Singapore, Taiwan, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States.

The Role of America's Alliances in The Philippines' Balancing Policy On China: From The Aquino To The Duterte Administration

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The Role of America's Alliances in The Philippines' Balancing Policy On China: From The Aquino To The Duterte Administration

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the role of americas

Dr. RENATO C. DE CASTRO

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Design by Carol Manhit

Printed in the Philippines by Rex Publishing

Victor Andres Dindo C. Manhit

Benjamin Philip G. Romualdez

Renato C. de Castro, Ph. D

Judge Raul C. Pangalangan, Ph. D

Epictetus E. Patalinghug, Ph. D

Francisco A. Magno, Ph. D

Carlos Primo C. David, Ph. D

Executive Summary viii

Harnessing the Spokes and Linking them Together 3

The Goal: Balancing an Emergent China 5

Leveraging on the Hub 9

Leveraging on the Spokes 14

Engaging Japan in Fostering Maritime Security 15

Engaging South Korea as a Long-time Security Partner 20

Jump-starting Philippines-Australia Security Relations 22

The Hub and Spokes System in Action:

About the Author

Harnessing the Spokes and Linking them Together

The Philippine-US defense ties are part of a network of bilateral alliancesoften

These innovations have enabled the alliances to adjust to a changing politico-

The Goal: Balancing an Emergent China

a) Reduction of infantry and marine battalions and redirection of

b) Acquisition of naval assets for off-shore patrol, strategic sea-lift, and

c) Development of the AFPs long-range maritime air patrol and

d) Reactivation of the Philippine Air Defense System (PADS) through

The Philippines short-term territorial defense goal is to establish a modest

Leveraging on the Hub

A significant factor behind the Aquino administrations bold moves to confront

terrorism/counterinsurgency campaigns. Two, the US deepened its alliance

A. Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHIBLEX)an annual, bilateral

B. Balikatan Exercise (Shoulder-to Shoulder)is an annual Philippines-

C. Cooperation Afloat Readiness And Training (CARAT)is a series

During the Sixth Annual Bilateral

Leveraging on the Spokes

A dynamic partnership with the US enables the Philippines to strategize its

security and develop its military (specifically territorial defense) capabilities.41

Engaging Japan in Fostering Maritime Security

and Chinese civilian ships at Scarborough Shoal, Japanese Ambassador to the

working together to make US strategic rebalancing a reality in Asia.59 To further

Engaging South Korea as a Long-time Security Partner

In November 2011, President Aquino announced the PAFs planned purchase of

Jump-starting Philippine-Australia Security Relations

The 1995 Philippine-Australia Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperative

Philippines for law-enforcement, immigration, and port and transport security.

and global challenges. On 18 November 2015, on the side of the Asia-Pacific

The Hub-and-Spokes System in Action:

Given the Philippines geographic predisposition to natural calamities such

to support the US governments humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

The allies combined efforts demonstrated how the hub-and-spokes system of

Philippine Policy of Linking Spokes in the Balance?

The future of the Philippines policy of challenging China by leveraging on Americas

Special Forces, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics operations.109 He also

With the Duterte administrations current efforts to establish rapprochement with

Secretary Albert Del Rosario states: the administration should nevertheless

a) Maintain stable and healthy security relations with the United

b) Continue pursuing its vibrant strategic partnerships with other

c) Lay the groundwork for a constructive bilateral negotiation with

d) Build up the Philippines maritime capacity through arms acquisition