COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2004, 18 (2), 233249

Defensive pessimism, self-esteem instability,

and goal strivings
Niwako Yamawaki, Brian T. Tschanz, and David L. Feick
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA

Defensive pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986a) is conceived as an adaptive

motivational strategy employed in academic contexts. The present research
investigates some potentially deleterious correlates of the defensively pessimistic
strategy. We examined the hypothesis that defensive pessimists would have a
relatively high ratio of negative-to-positive academically relevant self-thoughts,
and these accessible thoughts would be related to high self-esteem instability.
Mediational analyses generally supported this hypothesis. However, defensive
pessimism-optimism differences in self-esteem seemed to partially account for the
mediated effects. We also found support for the hypothesis that, relative to opti-
mists, defensive pessimists would tend to be less oriented toward mastery goals
and more oriented toward performance-avoidance achievement goals in academic
settings. Results were discussed in terms of the processing correlates and adaptive
trade-offs of defensive pessimism.

A rather extensive body of research serves witness to the relative psychological

and health merits of optimism vis-a-vis pessimism (for relevant reviews, see
Scheier & Carver, 1992; Taylor & Brown, 1988). The general conclusion from
this research is that the psychological and physical health outlooks for pessimists
are rather gloomy. However, a ray of hope has penetrated this dark cloud with
the recent discovery of a subtype of pessimism, called ``defensive pessimism'',
that appears to be in some respects adaptive (Norem & Cantor, 1986a).
Defensive pessimism is conceptualised as a strategy for coping with anxiety

Correspondence should be addressed to Niwako Yamawaki, who is now at: Department of

Psychology, Brigham Young University, 1001 Kimball Tower, P.O. Box 25543, Provo, Utah 84602,
USA; e-mail: Niwako_Yamawaki@byu.edu
David L. Feick is now a researcher at Yahoo!Inc., 3420 Central Expressway, Santa Clara, CA
95051, USA. Brian T. Tschanz is now at Utah State University, 2810 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT
84322-2810, USA.
This research was conducted as Niwako Yamawaki's master's thesis and was presented in part at
the 1998 annual meeting of the American Psychological Association in San Francisco. First
authorship was determined by a coin-flip between the first two authors. We would like to thank Fred
Rhodewalt and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

# 2004 Psychology Press Ltd

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/pp/02699931.html DOI:10.1080/02699930341000004
234 YAMAWAKI, TSCHANZ, FEICK

about an upcoming performance. It entails setting up low expectations for the

performance, and then utilising negative self-thoughts to motivate preparatory
efforts to prevent the low expectations from actually being realised (e.g., ``I
think of how unprepared I am in order to motivate myself to study''; Norem &
Cantor, 1986b). The anxiety, low expectations, and preparatory efforts then
serve to produce performances by defensive pessimists that are equivalent to
those of optimists (Norem & Cantor, 1986b). Moreover, if allowed to engage in
their strategy of intentionally focusing on potentially negative outcomes and the
feelings associated with them, defensive pessimists have been shown to exhibit
less post-performance negative affect (Norem & Illingsworth, 1993) and better
objective performances (Norem & Cantor, 1986b; Norem & Illingsworth, 1993;
Sanna, 1998; Showers, 1992; Spencer & Norem, 1996) than defensive pessi-
mists for whom this strategy has been disrupted.
Despite these benefits, it has been found that by their third year of college,
individuals who had been identified as defensive pessimists as freshmen reported
more negative psychological symptoms and less life satisfaction than did optimists
(Cantor & Norem, 1989). Likewise, relative to optimism, defensive pessimism has
been associated with lower self-esteem (Norem & Cantor, 1986b), and greater
depression (Showers & Ruben, 1990). Moreover, although defensive pessimism
has been conceptualized as a coping mechanism for managing anxiety about an
upcoming performance, beyond harnessing the anxiety to motivate good per-
formance (e.g., Norem & Cantor, 1986b), the evidence that it serves this function
well is not especially strong. For example, Norem and Illingsworth (1993) did,
indeed, find that defensive pessimists who were allowed to engage in their typical
performance strategy of thinking through possible outcomes showed a con-
sistentbut nonsignificanttendency to report less anxiety relative to defensive
pessimists who had been prevented from engaging in the strategy. However, the
anxiety-buffering effects of the strategy were not nearly as impressive as its
performance-preparatory effects (see Sanna, 1998, for a similar discussion).
In sum, there is some evidence to suggest that, despite its adaptive value for
those who employ it, defensive pessimism also may be associated with a number
of negative psychological outcomes. The purpose of this paper is to examine a
theoretically interesting subset of these outcomes. We turn to the discussion of
the first of them.

Negative self-thoughts, self-esteem level, and

self-esteem instability
Defensive pessimists typically perform well in the domain in which they are
pessimistic (e.g., Norem & Cantor, 1986b; Norem & Illingsworth, 1993;
Showers, 1992). Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that they may generally
have at least moderately positive self-views and self-esteem. The strategy itself
may in some respects help to maintain self-esteem. For example, Norem and
Illingsworth (1993) found that encouraging defensive pessimists to engage in
 DEFENSIVE PESSIMISM 235

their preferred strategy resulted in not only better performance but greater
posttest feelings of control and satisfaction. Sanna (1996) found similar effects
of preferred strategy on performance and posttest affect.1
Nonetheless, Norem & Cantor (1986b) found that defensive pessimists had
significantly lower self-esteem than did optimists. Additionally, they found
defensive pessimists', but not optimists', self-esteem was significantly increased
by a manipulation designed to encourage them (although the encouragement
manipulation decreased defensive pessimists' performance). Therefore,
although the self-esteem of defensive pessimists may be moderately positive in
an absolute sense, it also may be lower and more responsive to contextual
influence than the self-esteem of optimists.
Similarly, we believe defensive pessimists' self-esteem also may be vulnerable to
self-generated influence. That is, the frequent, motivated activation of negative self-
related thoughts (i.e., thinking about possible failure) that is inherent in the defensive
pessimists' performance strategy should render these types of thoughts auto-
matically accessible constructs through which information about the self is more
efficiently processed (Bargh, 1982; Bargh & Tota, 1988). Thus, the defensively
pessimistic strategy is likely to result in automatic, frequent, short-term, downward
fluctuations of moderately positive self-views and associated self-esteem, rendering
the self-esteem somewhat unstable (e.g., Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow,
1993). Self-esteem instability, in turn, has been associated with a number of negative
outcomes, the most consistent of which has been depression (e.g., Butler, Hokanson,
& Flynn, 1994; Kernis, Granneman, & Mathis, 1991; Kernis, Waschull, Greenier,
Whisenhunt, & Berry, 1998; Roberts & Monroe, 1992).2

1
Showers (1992, study 1) found that among social defensive pessimists, a negative-focus
manipulation led to superior performances but more negative post-interaction moods relative to those
produced by a positive-focus manipulation. It is difficult to know what to make of this finding, however,
because Sanna (1998) found that putting defensive pessimists in a negative mood led to more strategy-
consistent thinking, better performances, and more positive posttest affect than did putting them in a
positive mood. It is worth noting that the negative-focus condition employed by Showers also tended to
depress optimists' post-interaction mood. Perhaps, then, there was something especially depressing
about the particular negative-focus manipulation employed in this study, rendering even its perfor-
mance-enhancing effects insufficient to alleviate the negative mood it engendered.
2
Unfortunately, the precise nature of the negative implications of self-instability for defensive
pessimists is somewhat ambiguous. Self-esteem instability has been found to interact with level of
esteem to affect many outcome variables. For example, among high self-esteem but not low self-esteem
individuals, self-esteem instability has been found to be positively related to anger and hostility (Kernis,
Granneman, & Barclay, 1989) and to more extreme cognitive reactions to interpersonal feedback
(Kernis et al., 1993). On the other hand, Kernis and Waschull (1995) reported findings from their
laboratory that unstable, low self-esteem individuals tended to be more neurotic, accepting of negative
interpersonal feedback, and self-deprecating along a number of evaluative dimensions than stable, low
self-esteem individuals. Moreover, unstable, low self-esteem individuals have alternatively been found
to be relatively more (Kernis et al., 1998; Whisenhunt, Greenier, & Waschull, 1993) and less (Kernis et
al., 1991) vulnerable to depression. Further clouding the issue, Kernis et al. (1998) found that among
individuals who reported frequent daily hassles, self-esteem instability was related to depression
regardless of level of self-esteem (see also Butler et al., 1994; Roberts & Monroe, 1992).
236 YAMAWAKI, TSCHANZ, FEICK

Thus, we predicted that because defensive pessimists typically access a

number of relatively negative self-views in anticipation of an upcoming per-
formance, they would at any one time tend to have a greater number of negative
self-thoughts (or, more specifically, a greater ratio of negative-to-positive self-
thoughts) than would optimists. These accessed negative self-thoughts were
predicted to: (a) cause frequent downward fluctuations in self-esteem; and (b)
motivate efforts to ensure that the negative self-views and imagined outcomes
are not confirmed or realised, resulting in success and upward shifts in self-
esteem. These opposing influences of generated negative self-thoughts on self-
esteem should thus serve to create greater self-esteem instability among
defensive pessimists than among optimists. These predictions are displayed in
Figure 1.

Defensive pessimism and achievement/mastery

goals
The achievement-goals literature also suggests that defensive pessimism may
be associated with negative psychological outcomes. Recently, Elliot and his
colleagues (e.g., Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996; Elliot & Church, 1997) have
proposed a tripartite model of achievement motivation in which individuals
are postulated to have goals that are focused on one or more of the following:
(1) the development of task mastery in a particular domain (a ``mastery''
goal); (2) the attainment of favourable judgements of competence (a
``performance-approach'' goal); or (3) the avoidance of unfavourable judge-
ments of competence (a ``performance-avoidance'' goal). Experimental
manipulation of these three types of goal-pursuit has shown that, relative to
those who have been oriented towards performance-approach and mastery
goals, participants with performance-avoidance goals persisted in an intrinsi-
cally enjoyable activity for a shorter duration of time, and both derived less
enjoyment from and were less ``task-involved'' in that activity (Elliot &
Harackiewicz, 1996).
Norem and Cantor (1986a) proposed that defensive pessimists typically have
these two goals: avoiding failure and achieving success. That is, to have both
performance-avoidance and performance-approach goals. The defensively pes-
simistic strategy allows them to pursue these goals by actively preparing them
for failure should it occur, while controlling the feelings of anxiety and con-
comitant fear of failure brought about by the strategy so that the effort necessary

Figure 1. Predicted causal model of the relationships among optimism/defensive pessimism

(OP/DP), negative thoughts (NT), and self-esteem instability (SEI).
 DEFENSIVE PESSIMISM 237

for successful performance can be exerted. Optimists, on the other hand, were
postulated to be motivated primarily by desire for achievement. Although these
goal orientations have been implicitly assumed (e.g., Showers & Rubin, 1990),
they have never been empirically demonstrated.3
Conveniently, Elliot and Church (1997) have recently developed an
achievement goal questionnaire that assesses individual differences in tenden-
cies to adopt mastery, performance-approach (approach), and performance-
avoidance (avoidance) goals. Making use of this scale, we were able to assess
the hypothesised strategy-goal link in a relatively straightforward manner.
Specifically, it was predicted that, following from both their predicted moderate
(low) unstable self-esteem and the characterisation by Norem and Cantor
(1986b), defensive pessimists would be higher on avoidance goals than opti-
mists, but would not differ from optimists on approach goals.
There are also theoretical grounds to examine the link between defensive
pessimism and the pursuit of mastery goals. The defensive pessimists' active
avoidance of dreaded failure is likely to be inimical to the active pursuit of
mastery goals because the development of competence and task mastery often
entails a protracted process inclusive of failure experiences (Elliot & Church,
1997, p. 220). Therefore, we predicted that defensive pessimists would show
lower mastery scale scores than would optimists.

METHOD
Participants
Among a group of approximately 500 introductory psychology students who
participated in a mass testing session that was administered at the beginning of
the academic term, individuals were selected who: (1) were in either the lower
third (pessimistic) or upper third (optimistic) of the distribution of scores on the
Optimism-Pessimism Questionnaire (Norem & Cantor, 1986a; to be described
below); (2) reported an overall grade point average (GPA) of 3.0 or greater; and

3
Relatedly, Baumeister, Tice, and Hutton (1989) argue that moderate self-esteem individuals
(i.e., those individuals whose scores are near the conceptual midpoint of the self-esteem scale) are
primarily motivated to both self-protectively avoid failure and to attenuate the aversiveness of failure
should it occur. Close inspection of the distribution of self-esteem scores in Kernis and colleagues'
self-esteem instability research reveals that individuals whom they have labelled as low self-esteem
tend to have scores near the conceptual midpoint of the self-esteem scale (e.g., Kernis et al., 1991;
Kernis, Grannemann, & Mathis, 1992). Thus, these individuals can be characterised as having
moderate self-esteem. Like Baumeister et al., Kernis and colleagues also argue that these moderate
(low) self-esteem individuals tend to be primarily concerned with failure avoidance and self-esteem
protection. The latter theoreticians differ from the former, however, in asserting that avoidant, self-
protective concerns are only likely to be pronounced among moderate (low) self-esteem individuals
whose sense of self-worth is unstable (e.g., Kernis et al., 1993).
238 YAMAWAKI, TSCHANZ, FEICK

(3) endorsed the statement: ``I've generally done pretty well in academic
situations in the past.'' The latter two criteria were designed to distinguish
defensive pessimists from ``realistic'' pessimists. After this screening procedure
was completed, we were able to recruit 47 defensive pessimists (21 males, 26
females) and 47 optimists (26 males, 21 females) to participate in the study.
Participants were compensated for their participation with extra credit
towards their final grades in introductory psychology.

Procedure
On a Monday morning at least two weeks after the original mass testing
session, participants arrived at the laboratory and completed the following
measures.

The Optimism-Pessimism Questionnaire. This questionnaire is a 9-item

scale designed to assess defensive pessimism and optimism in academic
situations. Using this scale an ``optimism-pessimism'' score is computed by
subtracting the sum of the endorsements of the four pessimistic items from
the sum of the endorsement of the four optimistic items. As described above,
each participant must also indicate that they have had a history of past
academic success to be included in the study as either a defensive pessimist
or an optimist. Norem and Cantor (1986a) reported alpha-coefficients between
.65 and .85 for this scale. Thus, it appears to have adequate internal
consistency.

Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). Following Kernis et al.

(1989), self-esteem instability was computed using a 9-point version of this
widely employed, internally consistent and temporally stable scale (e.g.,
Dobson, Goudy, Keith, & Powers 1979). Participants were given eight copies
of this scale and were asked to complete one of them at each of the following
times: 10:00 pm Monday, 10:00 am and 10:00 pm Tuesday through Thursday,
and 10:00 am on Friday. At each of these times, participants were asked to
respond to the items according to how they felt at that particular time. They were
also asked to record the exact time of completion. Every morning that week,
participants left the scales they had completed the previous day in a box that was
located near their psychology classroom. All participants completed at least six
of these assessments.

The Negative-Thought Ratio Measure (Kendall, 1983). Participants were

asked to list as many thoughts that they believed could describe themselves
in academic situations. They were then asked to indicate whether each
thought was mostly positive or mostly negative by placing a ``+'' or a ``7''
by each, respectively. From these thought listings, a measure of the ratio of
 DEFENSIVE PESSIMISM 239

negative-to-positive thoughts (negative-thought ratio) was calculated for each

participant.

The Achievement Goals Scales (Elliot & Church, 1997). Participants

responded to 18 items developed by Elliot and Church (1997) to assess the
above-described performance approach goals (approach goals; 6 items),
performance avoidance goals (avoidance goals; 6 items), and mastery goals (6
items). A representative item used to tap approach goals is: ``It is important to
me to do better than other students.'' A representative item used to assess
avoidance goals is: ``My fear of performing poorly in this class is often what
motivates me.'' Finally, mastery goals were represented by items, such as: ``I
want to learn as much as possible from this class.'' Each of these items were
rated on 7-point scales (1 = not at all true of me; 7 = very true of me). Elliot and
Church reported internal consistencies of the approach, avoidance, and mastery
scales of .91, .77, and .89, respectively.
After the participants had turned in their final self-esteem scale on Friday
morning, they were thoroughly debriefed about the purpose of the study and
were compensated for their participation.

RESULTS
The test-retest reliability (interval between 2 and 5 weeks) of the optimism-
pessimism questionnaire was .61 for the optimistic items and .75 for the pes-
simistic items). The alpha-coefficient for the scale was .67. The alpha-
coefficients for the approach, mastery, and avoidance goals scales were .42, .55,
.62, respectively.

Calculation of the self-esteem instability measure. For each participant, the

standard deviation of his/her multiple self-esteem scores (described above),
excluding the self-esteem assessment at the first session, was the index of self-
esteem instability (e.g., Kernis et al., 1989). Each participant's first self-esteem
assessment was used as a measure of his/her level of self-esteem. In this manner,
we obtained a measure of self-esteem level that was independent of the measure
of self-esteem instability.

Effects of defensive pessimism-optimism on primary dependent measures.

As discussed below in the description of the mediation analyses, it is first
necessary to establish Defensive Pessimism-Optimism differences in both the
ratio of negative-to-positive thoughts and self-esteem variability. As can be
seen in Table 1, the means for the defensive pessimists were significantly
higher than the means for the optimists on both self-esteem instability, and
negative-thought ratio, indicating that the strategy variable was significantly
correlated with each of these variables. Thus, two requirements for our
240 YAMAWAKI, TSCHANZ, FEICK

TABLE 1
Dependent variable means as a function of optimism-defensive
pessimism and correlations between optimism-defensive
pessimism and the dependent variables

Variable DP OP t-value p-value r (r2)

Self-esteem instability 4.68 2.71 3.40 (< .01) .33(.11)

Negative-thought ratio 0.40 0.32 2.61 (< .02) .26(.07)
Avoidance goals 27.87 22.68 3.52 (< .01) .37(.14)
Mastery goals 32.32 34.43 72.02 (< .05) 7.21(.04)
Approach goals 26.83 27.49 70.38 (n.s.) 7.04(.00)

DP = Defensive pessimists; OP = Optimists. For all comparisons except

negative-thought ratio, df = 92 (df = 91 for that exception).

proposed mediational analysis, to be addressed more formally below, were

met.4
Also of interest were defensive pessimism-optimism differences in achieve-
ment goals. As predicted, defensive pessimists showed significantly higher
avoidance goals than did optimists. Also, as predicted, defensive pessimists
showed significantly lower mastery goals than did optimists. Finally, the mean
approach goal score for defensive pessimists was not significantly different from
that of optimists.
For both descriptive purposes and as a means of demonstrating relationships
predicted by the models to be tested below, the matrix of correlations among the
dependent variables is presented in Table 2. Most importantly, the zero-order
correlation between negative-thought ratio and self-esteem instability was sig-
nificant. It is also interesting to note that the correlations between these two
measures and the measure of avoidance goals were also significant.

4
We also calculated an alternate measure of self-esteem instability that takes into account the
direction of self-esteem fluctuation. Specifically, we determined the greatest upward shift in self-
esteem for each participant by subtracting from his/her maximum self-esteem score his/her median
self-esteem score, and the greatest downward shift in self-esteem for each participant by subtracting
his/her minimum self-esteem score from his/her median. We then analysed these scores in a 2 6 2
mixed-design ANOVA in which Shift Direction (upward vs. downward) was a within-subjects factor
and Defensive Pessimism-Optimism classification was a between-subjects factor.
The only significant effect of this analysis was a main effect of Defensive Pessimism-Optimism
such that the mean shift in self-esteem was significantly higher for defensive pessimists (M = 8.00)
than it was for optimists (M = 4. 41), F(1, 92) = 19.50, p < .001.
We then examined the effects of Defensive Pessimism for each Shift Direction for illustrative
purposes. First, it was found that the mean upward shift was higher for defensive pessimists (M =
7.17) than it was for optimists (M = 4.37), but not significantly so, t(92) = 1.45, n.s.. The mean
downward shift, on the other hand, was significantly greater for defensive pessimists (M = 8.83) than
it was for optimists (M = 4.44), t(92) = 2.48, p < .02.
 DEFENSIVE PESSIMISM 241
TABLE 2
Matrix of correlations among dependent variables

Variables NTR Avoidance Mastery Approach

SEI .32** .37** 7.07 .07

NTR .43** 7.01 .11
Avoidance 7.05 .07
Mastery .18
SEI = Self-esteem instability; NTR = Negative-thought ratio.
** p < .01.

Negative-thought ratio as a mediator of the defensive pessimism/self-esteem

instability relationship. Mediation analysis was conducted in order to test
whether defensive pessimists had greater self-esteem instability than did
optimists as a function of a having a negative-thought ratio of negative-to-
positive self-thoughts in the academic domain. According to Judd and Kenny
(1981), evidence that is consistent with a proposed mediation model is obtained
when the following three criteria are met: (1) the predictor variable (the
defensive pessimism-optimism classification) must show a zero-order relation-
ship with the hypothesised mediator (negative-to-positive thoughts ratio); (2) the
mediator must show a first order relationship (controlling for the relationship
between the predictor and the criterion) with the criterion variable (self-esteem
instability); and (3) when the relationship between the mediator and the criterion
is held constant, a previously significant zero-order relationship between the
predictor variable and the criterion variable should be significantly reduced.
This latter criterion would be manifested in a significant indirect effect of the
predictor on the criterion via its influence on the mediator (Cohen & Cohen,
1983).
In order to test this proposed mediational chain, the results of which are
displayed in Figure 2, the following regression analyses were conducted. First,
the ratio of negative-to-positive self-thoughts was regressed on the defensive
pessimism-optimism classification. As can be seen in Figure 2, this first
requirement for mediation was satisfied. Therefore, the second analyses
regressed negative-thought ratio on self-esteem instability after the defensive
pessimism-optimism classification had already been entered into the equation.
This second requirement was also satisfied. Finally, the last requirement for
mediation was examined by employing Sobel's (1982) approximate significance
test for the indirect effect of the predictor variable on the criterion via the
mediator. This analysis demonstrated that there was indeed a significant
mediated effect of the defensive pessimism-optimism classification on self-
esteem instability via the effect of the former on negative-thought ratio (p < .05,
one-tailed).
242 YAMAWAKI, TSCHANZ, FEICK

Figure 2. Path model of the relationships among optimism-defensive pessimism (OP/DP), nega-
tive-thought ratio (NTR), and self-esteem instability (SEI). The number of parentheses indicates the
standard regression coefficient between OP/DP and SEI before NT was entered into the regression
equation. * Path coefficient is significant at p < .05.

However, as can be seen in Figure 2, there was also a significant direct effect
(controlling for ratio of negative-to-positive self-thoughts) of defensive pessi-
mism-optimism on self-esteem instability. This suggests that defensive pessi-
mists have greater self-esteem instability than do optimists due to factors that are
both related and unrelated to the accessibility of negative self-thoughts.

Self-esteem differences and these differences as a rival alternative to the

supported model. It might be recalled that it was predicted that defensive
pessimists would have lower self-esteem than would optimists and that this self-
esteem would be moderate rather than low. In support of this, it was found that
the mean self-esteem score for optimists (M = 72.68) was significantly higher
than that for defensive pessimists (M = 61.58), t(92) = 4.74, p < .001. However,
the defensive pessimism mean was significantly above the conceptual midpoint
of 50 for the self-esteem scale, t(46) = 6.19, p < .001.
It should be noted, however, that the correlation between the defensive
pessimism-optimism classification and self-esteem was 7.44 (optimism coded
as 0 and defensive pessimism coded as 1). The correlations between self-esteem
and self-esteem instability, r(92) = 7.39, p < .001) and self-esteem and nega-
tive-thought ratio, r(91) = 7.37, p < .001) were also significant. This pattern of
correlations suggests that the effects displayed in Figure 2 may have been
reducible to self-esteem differences between defensive pessimists and optimists.
To test for this possibility, the above-described regression analyses were con-
ducted with self-esteem entered into the equations prior to the defensive
pessimism-optimism classification. It was found that the path coefficients dis-
played in Figure 2, although still in the predicted direction, were reduced.
Specifically, controlling for the effects of self-esteem, the standardised path
from defensive pessimism-optimism to negative-thought ratio was reduced to
 DEFENSIVE PESSIMISM 243

.11, t(91) = 1.31, n.s., the standardised path from negative-thought ratio to self-
esteem instability was reduced to .18, t(91) = 1.77, p < .05, one-tailed, and the
significant direct effect of optimism/defensive pessimism was reduced con-
trolling for the effects of self-esteem, .18, t(91) = 1.71, p < .05, one-tailed.
Finally, the mediated path from defensive pessimism-optimism to self-esteem
instability via negative-thought ratio was no longer significant (Sobel, 1982).
Thus, the path model displayed in Figure 2 appeared to have been partially
accounted for by defensive pessimism-optimism differences in self-esteem.

DISCUSSION
We made two separate predictions regarding the correlates of defensive pessi-
mism. In the following sections we will discuss our findings with respect to
these predictions.

Defensive pessimism, negative thoughts, and

self-esteem instability
It was hypothesised that the defensively pessimistic strategy would be reflected
in a relatively high ratio of negative-to-positive self-thoughts. These self-
thoughts, in turn, were predicted to lead to relatively high self-esteem instability.
Support for this hypothesis was somewhat equivocal. On one hand, our medi-
ation analysis demonstrated that defensive pessimism was associated with self-
esteem instability partially via its relationship with negative-thought ratio. On
the other hand, however, this mediated relationship was reduced to non-
significance controlling for the effects of self-esteem.
Due to the correlational nature of the analyses, it is difficult to know what to
make of the latter finding. It may be that the defensively pessimistic strategy is
relatively likely to be adopted by moderate self-esteem individuals because
these individuals are more likely than high self-esteem individuals to possess the
strategy-requisite negative self-thoughts. If so, by partialing self-esteem out of
the ``defensive pessimism ! negative thoughts ! self-esteem instability''
relationship, we may have also partialled out an important part of the process of
interest. All things being equal, moderate self-esteem individuals may be more
likely to employ the defensively pessimistic strategy because they happen to
possess a high proportion of negative self-related thoughts, which they can then
access to motivate themselves to work hard in order to avoid failure. Their self-
esteem may then tend to become destabilised by the activation of these negative
thoughts. In sum, the fact that the mediational model tested was no longer
significant when variance associated with self-esteem was controlled for does
not necessarily reduce its theoretical importance.
Moreover, there is reason to suspect that our hypothesised model, for which
we found support, reflects a crucial sequence of cognitive-affective events in the
psychological lives of defensive pessimists. If defensive pessimists are dis-
244 YAMAWAKI, TSCHANZ, FEICK

tracted from the strategic and systematic activation of negative self-thoughts,

their performance suffers (Norem & Cantor, 1986b; Norem & Illingsworth,
1993; Sanna, 1996). Thus, it is likely that the defensively pessimistic strategy
leads to the generation of negative self-thoughts, rather than simply vice versa.
Nonetheless, placing our own research in the context of the extant defensive-
pessimism literature, we believe that it is certainly plausible that moderate self-
esteem, self-esteem instability, defensive pessimism, and negative self-thoughts
are reciprocal causes and consequences for each other. We speculate that they
may be related in the following fashion. Individuals with a history of success but
also with an abundance of negative self-thoughts are relatively likely to have
moderate self-esteem. This relatively large availability of negative self-thoughts
is both likely to cause anxiety and to be used motivationally those who possess
them (e.g., by convincing themselves that they must work hard if they are to
avoid an imagined negative outcome). Individuals who use negative thoughts
and anxiety in this strategic, motivational fashiondefensive pessimistsare
then relatively likely to experience temporary downward shifts in self-esteem
and are likely to maintain their anxiety at a relatively high level. The preparatory
efforts thus motivated are then likely to result in successful performances,
driving self-esteem back up to a relatively high level. However, the motivated
activation of the negative self-thoughts is likely to render them even more
accessible in the future. In doing so, the defensively pessimistic strategy, which
requires them, will be even more likely to be used on subsequent occasions and
the cycle will begin anew.5
At this point we should note that the reliability of the defensive pessimism-
optimism scale was quite low. This low reliability likely attenuated the corre-
lations between the scale and measures of other constructs. Had we obtained
reliability coefficients for the scale that were more similar to those obtained by
other researchers (e.g., Norem & Cantor, 1986a, 1986b), we suspect that the path
coefficients in the model may have been greater.

5
We should note here that in research published subsequent to our data collection, Martin, Marsh,
and Debus (2001) hypothesised that unstable self-esteem should lead to the adoption of the defen-
sively pessimistic strategy, in contrast to our prediction of the opposite causal sequence. They
reasoned that because unstable self-esteem individuals are uncertain of their ability to succeed, it is to
their self-protective advantage to hold low expectations to do so. Although they found that a measure
of self-esteem instability was moderately correlated with defensive pessimism, their designlike
ourswas correlational and thus a causal sequence could not be established. Moreover, their
operationalisation of self-esteem instability was Rosenberg's (1965) Stability of Self Scale plus two
items from Campbell's Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al., 1996). This particular measure
asks individuals to report the extent to which they perceive that their self-esteem typically varies over
time, rather than how much it actually does vary. Kernis et al. (1992) found that actual variation (as
measured by calculating the standard deviation of self-esteem scores over time) and self-perceived
variation (as measured by the Stability of Self Scale) were essentially uncorrelated. Therefore,
despite the apparent similarity to our findings, it appears that Martin et al. examined an independent
correlate of defensive pessimism.
 DEFENSIVE PESSIMISM 245

We should also note that, in addition to negative self-thoughts, other factors

may have contributed to the relatively high self-esteem instability of defensive
pessimists. For example, Cantor and Norem (1989) found that relative to opti-
mists, defensive pessimists seemed to show greater cross-situational variability
in both perception of control and stress. The domain-specificity of defensive
pessimism was thought to have been responsible for the cross-situational
variability in these factors. That is, academic defensive pessimists reported no
more stress or less perceived control in social situationsa situation in which
they may have been optimiststhan did academic optimists. However, the
academic defensive pessimists reported considerably more stress and less con-
trol than did the academic optimists while in class or while studying. For similar
reasons, the academic defensive pessimists in our study may have experienced
greater variability in self-esteem across social and academic situations than did
the academic optimists.

Defensive pessimism and goal strivings

Supporting predictions, relative to optimists, defensive pessimists were more
likely to endorse performance-avoidance goals and less likely to endorse mas-
tery goals. It was also found that relative to optimists, defensive pessimists were
comparably likely to endorse performance-approach goals. The pattern of dif-
ferences with respect to performance-avoidance and performance-approach
goals was consistent with Norem and Cantor's (1986a) speculations concerning
the relative goal profiles of these two groups.
However, the findings concerning the mastery-goal strivings both contributes
to extant conceptualisation of defensive pessimists as well as sheds light on past
findings. As alluded to in the introduction, it may be that mastery goals tend to
be eschewed by defensive pessimists because they include the inherent risk of
failure, which is inimical to their successful pursuit of avoidance goals (Elliot &
Church, 1997). More interestingly, the combination of endorsing avoidance
goals and eschewing mastery goals has been associated with decrements in
intrinsic motivation (Elliot & Church, 1997; Elliot & Harckiewicz, 1996).
Cantor and Norem (1989) have suggested that the tendency for defensive pes-
simists to fall behind their optimistic peers academically as upperclassman may
be due to the tendency for the defensively pessimistic strategy to undermine
intrinsic motivation. Although our data do not directly speak to this possibility,
one interesting direction for future research would be to test the goal-strategy-
motivation-performance link. Specifically, it may be that defensive pessimists'
relative excess of avoidant strivings and deficiency of mastery strivings is
associated with low levels of intrinsic motivation, which, in turn, tend to
undermine academic performance in the long run.
Bridging the self-esteem instability and goals literatures, it is interesting that
the obtained relationship between defensive pessimism, negative-thought ratio
246 YAMAWAKI, TSCHANZ, FEICK

and self-esteem instability is analogous to that found between avoidance goals,

competence perceptions, and a variety of negative psychological outcomes
(Elliot & Sheldon, 1997). That is, by lowering one's level of perceived com-
petence, avoidance-goal strivings have been found to both lower self-esteem and
to reduce feelings of personal control, vitality, life satisfaction, and subjective
well-being. Similarly, defensive pessimism may lead to higher levels of self-
esteem instability by temporarily raising one's relative level of negative self-
thoughts, which may include negative competence-related thoughts.
The finding that defensive pessimists did not show a deficiency of approach
goals vis-a-vis optimists also may help to link our self-esteem instability and
goals findings. Elliot and McGregor (2001) found that the only common ante-
cedent to performance-approach and performance-avoidance goal orientations
was competence valuation, the extent to which individuals place importance in
or care about success. Kernis et al. (1993) found that when individuals placed a
high level of importance on perceived competence, they were likely to exhibit
relatively high self-esteem instability, particularly when they also reported a
high level of variability in day-to-day competence. Thus, in addition to a high
proportion of negative self-thoughts, defensive pessimists' relatively high level
of self-esteem instability may be related to a high level of importance placed on
perceived competence.
It must be noted before concluding that the obtained alpha-coefficients for the
goals scales were much lower than those reported in previous research using the
scale. Whether these low coefficients are due to the particular characteristics of
the sample or are rather due to the unique structuring of goal pursuits in the
population of Utah college students at large is not clear. Had they been higher,
however, the obtained relationships between strategy and goal pursuits may have
well been more substantial.

Conclusions and suggestions for future research

Although the predicted relationships between defensive pessimism and a num-
ber of outcome variables were indeed obtained in this study, we believe that
these findings only scratch the surface of a deeper and richer mine of defensive
pessimism-associated processes and outcomes. For example, although we were
able to relate defensive pessimism with moderate and unstable self-esteem, it is
not known whether defensive pessimism is associated with the correlates of self-
esteem instability that have been established by Kernis and his colleagues. Are
defensive pessimists, by virtue of their unstable self-esteem, more prone to anger
and hostility (Kernis et al., 1989), extreme reactions to interpersonal feedback,
neuroticism (Kernis et al., 1993), and depression (Butler et al., 1994; Kernis et
al., 1991, 1998; Roberts & Monroe, 1992; Whisenhunt et al., 1993)? With regard
to depression, in a study that compared the coping strategies of defensive pes-
simists with those of moderately-to-severely depressed individuals, Showers and
 DEFENSIVE PESSIMISM 247

Ruben (1990) found that defensive pessimists were more depressed than were
optimists. This finding was particularly striking because defensive pessimists
who were classified as moderately-to-severely depressed were excluded from the
analysis. Thus, there is reason to believe that the links between defensive pes-
simism, self-esteem instability, and depression might profitably be explored.
Moreover, although we were able to establish a link between defensive
pessimism, negative thoughts, and self-esteem instability, it also seemed that
defensive pessimists may have had greater self-esteem instability than did
optimists due to other factors. We suggested that these other factors might
include the domain-specificity of the strategy as well as a heightened tendency
of defensive pessimists to place a great deal of importance on perceived com-
petence. A study that explored all of these factors in a single design might prove
informative.
Although self-esteem instability is by its nature a dynamic construct, we
used a very static measure of negative thoughts to predict itthat is, the ratio
of negative-to-positive self-thoughts recorded at a single time. In future
research, it would be desirable to include a more dynamic measure of self-
thoughts. An experience-sampling study in which subjects simultaneously
report on self-esteem and valence of self-thoughts at regular intervals (e.g.,
Norem & Illingsworth, 1993). In this manner, it would be possible to deter-
mine whether self-esteem waxes and wanes with the valence of self-thoughts
in the hypothesised manner. If the process works as we have suggested, one
would expect to find both valence of self-thoughts and self-esteem dip as
defensive pessimists prepare for an important performance, and then rise
shortly after they succeed.
Our research also suggests that the links between defensive pessimism, goal
strivings, and intrinsic motivation should be explored. It has already been found
that defensive pessimists' excellent academic performances tend to wane in their
later college years (Cantor & Norem, 1989). It may be that defensive pessimism,
as a motivational strategy, paradoxically tends to kill motivation in the long run.
To this end, it would be valuable to conduct a study that attempts to link the
specific nature of goal strivings (e.g., a deficit of mastery strivings or an excess
of performance-avoidance strivings) among defensive pessimists with sub-
sequent levels of intrinsic interest in domain-relevant pursuits.
Finally, as Norem (2001) suggested: ``The effectiveness of a strategy
should be assessed in terms of the goals and problems of those who use it.
Strategy use in the real world is nonrandomly determined: Defensive Pessi-
mism is used by those who are anxious . . . [therefore] one must consider how
the anxious defensive pessimists might fare without their strategy'' (p. 93). In
other words, the costs and benefits of defensive pessimism should be assessed
by comparing defensive pessimists' outcomes with those of other anxious
individuals who do not use defensive pessimism. To find that defensive pessi-
mists are, for example, more prone to depression than are optimists but less
248 YAMAWAKI, TSCHANZ, FEICK

so than are anxious individuals who do not employ defensive pessimism

would hardly imply that defensive pessimism causes depression. Indeed, it
may suggest just the opposite.

Manuscript received 13 November 2001

Revised manuscript received 27 August 2002

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