ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC vs COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

G.R. No. L-16419 May 30, 1963

Doctrine/Principle: Meaning of Duty

FACTS:

On Aug 22, 1958 an operator of a spinning machine became sick and asked
permission to leave the factory. Due to lack of personnel foreman Eugenio Espejo
asked Gerson Karasig, who was then operating the shearing machine, to transfer to
the vacant spinning machine instead. Espejo asked Karasig four times to transfer
but the latter did not do so. After the fourth time, Espejo told Karasig to go home.
Karasig clocked out, approached the superintendent and requested not to be
transfer from one machine to another but he was insulted instead to go back to
college and learn how to obey the foreman. Karasig responded that he would rather
retire so the superintendent called his messenger to fetch some application forms to
be filled. The reason which Karasig wrote on the form for his retirement was the
unfair labor practice and inhuman treatment of his foreman. The management
decided to consider the note written in ink by Karasig in his card, "I stop at 9:10,"
and his leaving the factory without returning back anymore as a resignation. Said
management turned down the application for retirement of Karasig for the reason
that the applicant is not incapacitated to justify his retirement under the collective
bargaining contract.

ISSUE: WON there was ULP

COURT RULING:

The provisions of section 14, Republic Act No. 875, have no application to the
instant case, because they refer to the procedure of negotiating an agreement by
collective bargaining where there had not been any. Those of section 13 of the same
Act which impose "the duty of an employer and the representative of his employees
to bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Such duty to
bargain collectively means the performance of the mutual obligation to meet and
confer promptly and expeditiously and in good faith, for the purpose of negotiating
an agreement with respect to wages, hours, and/or terms and conditions of
employment, and of executing a written contract incorporating such agreement if
requested by either party, or for the purpose of adjusting any grievances or
question arising under such agreement, but such duty does not compel any party to
agree to a proposal or to make concession." The last clause of the above-quoted
provisions cannot be invoked by the complaining laborer represented by the union,
because the very terms of the collective bargaining agreement quoted above
entered into by and between the petitioner and the respondent union preclude its
availability. The grievance handling and grievance procedure stipulated and
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement which is binding upon both the
contracting parties not having been availed of or resorted to, the collective
bargaining "for the purpose of adjusting any grievances or question arising under
such agreement," is unavailable