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North Sea Continental Shelf Cases(Summary)

RuwanthikaGunaratneandPublicInternationalLawathps://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com,
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NameoftheCase:TheNorthSeaContinentalShelfCases(Germany/Denmark;Germany/Netherlands);Yearof
Decision:1969;andCourt:ICJ.

NB:Thispostdiscussedonlyaspectsofthecaserelatedtotreatyorcustomaryinternationallaw.

Overview:ThejurisprudenceoftheNorthSeaContinentalShelfCasessetsoutthedualrequirementforforming
customaryinternationallawStatepractice(objectiveelement)andopiniojuris(subjectiveelement).Itelaborated
thecriterianecessarytoestablishStatepracticewidespreadandrepresentativeparticipation.Thecasehighlighted
that the State practice of importance were of those States whose interests were aected by the custom. It also
identied the fact that uniform and consistent practice was necessary to show opinio juris a belief that the
practiceamountstoalegalobligation.TheNorthSeaContinentalSelfCasesalsodispelledthemyththatduration
ofthepractice(i.e.thenumberofyears)wasanessentialfactorinformingcustomaryinternationallaw.

ThecaseinvolvedthedelimitationofthecontinentalshelfareasintheNorthSeabetweenGermanyandDenmark
andGermanyandNetherlandsbeyondthepartialboundariespreviouslyagreeduponbytheseStates.Theparties
requested the ICJ to decide the principles and rules of international law that are applicable to the above
delimitation.ThepartiesdisagreedontheapplicableprinciplesorrulesofdelimitationNetherlandsandDenmark
reliedontheprincipleofequidistance(themethodofdeterminingtheboundariesinsuchawaythateverypointin
theboundaryisequidistantfromthenearestpointsofthebaselinesfromwhichthebreathoftheterritorialseaof
each State is measured). Germany sought to get a decision in favour of the notion that the delimitation of the
relevantcontinentalshelfisgovernedbytheprinciplethateachcoastalstateisentitledtoajustandequitableshare
(hereinaftercalledjustandequitableprinciple/method).ContrarytoDenmarkandNetherlands,Germanyargued
thattheprincipleofequidistancewasneitheramandatoryruleindelimitationofthecontinentalshelfnoraruleof
customaryinternationallawthatwasnotbindingonGermany.Thecourtwasnotaskedtodelimittheparties
agreedtodelimitthecontinentalshelfasbetweentheircountries,byagreement,afterthedeterminationoftheICJ
ontheapplicableprinciples.

FactsoftheCase:
NetherlandsandDenmarkhaddrawnpartialboundarylinesbasedontheequidistanceprinciple(AB
NetherlandsandDenmarkhaddrawnpartialboundarylinesbasedontheequidistanceprinciple(AB
and CD) (hp://iilj.org/courses/documents/SketchMap.pdf). An agreement on further prolongation of
theboundaryproveddicultbecauseDenmarkandNetherlandswishedthisprolongationtotakeplace
based on the equidistance principle (BE and DE) (hp://iilj.org/courses/documents/SketchMap.pdf)
whereasGermanywasoftheviewthat,together,thesetwoboundarieswouldproduceaninequitable
resultforher.Germanystatedthatduetoitsconcavecoastline,suchalinewouldresultinherloosing
outonhershareofthecontinentalshelfbasedonproportionalitytothelengthofitsNorthSeacoastline.
TheCourthadtodecidetheprinciplesandrulesofinternationallawapplicabletothisdelimitation.In
doingso,thecourthadtodecideiftheprinciplesespousedbythepartieswerebindingontheparties
eitherthroughtreatylaworcustomaryinternationallaw.

QuestionsbeforetheCourt(asrelevanttothispost):

Is Germany under a legal obligation to accept the equidistancespecial circumstances principle,

containedinArticle6oftheGenevaConvention,eitherasacustomaryinternationallawruleoronthe
basisoftheGenevaConvention?

TheCourtsDecision:

Theuseoftheequidistancemethodhadnotcrystallisedintocustomarylawandwasisnotobligatoryfor
thedelimitationoftheareasintheNorthSearelatedtothepresentproceedings.

RelevantFindingsoftheCourt:

Natureofthetreatyobligation:Isthe1958GenevaConvention,andinparticularArticle6,bindingon
Germany?

1.Article6oftheGenevaConventionontheContinentalShelfstatesthatunlessthepartieshaveagreed
on a method for delimitation or unless special circumstances exist, the equidistance method would
apply (see Article 6). Germany has signed but not ratied the Geneva Convention, while Netherlands
and Denmark are parties to the Convention. The laer two States argue that while Germany is not a
partytotheConvention(nothavingratiedit),sheisstillboundbyArticle6oftheConventionbecause:

(1)byconduct,bypublicstatementsandproclamations,andinotherways,theRepublichasunilaterally
assumedtheobligationsoftheConvention;orhasmanifesteditsacceptanceoftheconventionalregime;orhas
recognizeditasbeinggenerallyapplicabletothedelimitationofcontinentalshelfareas

(2)theFederalRepublichadhelditselfoutassoassuming,acceptingorrecognizing,insuchamannerasto
causeotherStates,andinparticularDenmarkandtheNetherlands,torelyontheaitudethustakenup(the
laeriscalledtheprincipleofestoppel).

2. The Court rejected the rst argument. It stated that only a very denite very consistent course of
conduct on the part of a State would allow the court to presume that a State had somehow become
boundbyatreaty(byameansotherthaninaformalmanner:i.e.ratication)whentheStatewasatall
times fully able and entitled to accept the treaty commitments in a formal manner. The Court held
thatGermanyhadnotunilaterallyassumedobligationsundertheConvention.Thecourtalsotooknotice
ofthefactthatevenifGermanyratiedthetreaty,shehadtheoptionofenteringintoareservationon
Article6followingwhichthatparticulararticlewouldnolongerbeapplicabletoGermany(i.e.evenif
one were to assume that Germany had intended to become a party to the Convention, it does not
presupposethatitwouldhavealsoundertakenthoseobligationscontainedinArticle6).

3. NB: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT), which came into force in 1980,
3. NB: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT), which came into force in 1980,
discusses more fully the obligations of third States to treaties. It clearly stipulates that an obligation
arisesforathirdStatefromaprovisionofatreatyonlyif(1)thepartiestothetreatyintendtheprovision
tocreatethisobligationforthethirdStates;and(2)thethirdStateexpresslyacceptsthatobligationin
writing(A.35oftheVCLT).TheVCLTwasnotinforcewhentheICJdeliberatedonthiscase.However,
as seen above, the ICJs position was consistent the VCLT. (See the relevant provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (hps://ruwanthikagunaratne.les.wordpress.com/2014/02/vienna
conventiononthelawoftreaties.pdf)).

4. The court held that the existence of a situation of estoppel would have allowed Article 6 to become
bindingonGermanybutheldthatGermanysactiondidnotsupportanargumentforestoppel.The
courtalsoheldthatthemerefactthatGermanymaynothavespecicallyobjectedtotheequidistance
principleascontainedinArticle6isnotsucienttostatethattheprincipleisnowbindinguponit.

5.Inconclusion,thecourtheldthatGermanyhadnotactedinanywaytoincurobligationscontainedin
Article6oftheGenevaConvention.Theequidistancespecialcircumstancesrulewasnotbindingon
Germanybywayoftreaty.

Natureofthecustomaryinternationallawobligation:IsGermanyboundbytheprovisionsofArticle6of
theGenevaConventionbywayofcustomaryinternationallaw?

6. Netherlands and Denmark argued that Article 6 also reected the accepted rule of general
international law on the subject of continental shelf delimitation and existed independently of the
Convention.Therefore,theyargued,Germanyisboundbyitbywayofcustomaryinternationallaw.

7. To decide if the equidistance principle bound Germany by way of customary international law, the
courtexamined(1)thestatusoftheprinciplecontainedinArticle6asitstoodwhentheConventionwas
beingdrawnup(2)andafterthelaercameintoforce.

WhatwasthecustomarylawstatusofArticle6atthetimeofdraftingtheConvention?

8.Thecourtheldtheprincipleofequidistance,ascontainedinArticle6,didnotformapartofexisting
oremergingcustomaryinternationallawatthetimeofdraftingtheConvention.TheCourtsupported
thisndingbasedon(1)thehesitationexpressedbythedraftersoftheConventionInternationalLaw
Commission on the inclusion of Article 6 (para. 62) and (2) the fact reservations to Article 6 was
permissibleundertheConvention(Article12).Thecourtheld:

Article6isoneofthoseinrespectofwhich,underthereservationsarticleoftheConvention(Article
12)reservationsmaybemadebyanyStateonsigning,ratifyingoraccedingfor,speakinggenerally,itis
acharacteristicofpurelyconventionalrulesandobligationsthat,inregardtothem,somefacultyof
makingunilateralreservationsmay,withincertainlimits,beadmied;whereasthiscannotbesointhe
caseofgeneralorcustomarylawrulesandobligationswhich,bytheirverynature,musthaveequal
forceforallmembersoftheinternationalcommunity,andcannotthereforebethesubjectofanyrightof
unilateralexclusionexercisableatwillbyanyoneoftheminitsownfavor.Thenormalinference
wouldthereforebethatanyarticlesthatdonotgureamongthoseexcludedfromthefacultyof
reservationunderArticle12,werenotregardedasdeclaratoryofpreviouslyexistingoremergentrules
oflaw(seepara65foracounterargumentandthecourtscarefuldierentiation)

Did the provisions in Article 6 on the equidistance principle aain the customary law status after the
Conventioncameintoforce?

9.ThecourtthenexaminedwhethertherulecontainedinArticle6hadbecomecustomaryinternational
9.ThecourtthenexaminedwhethertherulecontainedinArticle6hadbecomecustomaryinternational
lawaftertheConventionenteredintoforceeitherduetheconventionitself(i.e.,ifenoughStateshad
ratiedtheConventioninamannertofullthecriteriaspeciedbelow),orbecauseofsubsequentState
practice(i.e.evenifadequatenumberofStateshadnotratiedtheConventiononecouldndsucient
Statepracticetomeetthecriteriabelow).ThecourtheldthatArticle6oftheConventionhadnotaained
a customary law status (compare the 1958 Geneva Convention with the four Geneva Conventions on
1949 in the eld of international humanitarian law in terms of its authority as a pronouncement of
customaryinternationallaw).

10.Foracustomaryruletoemergethecourtheldthatitneeded:(1)verywidespreadandrepresentative
participationintheconvention,includingStateswhoseinterestswerespeciallyaected(i.e.generality);
and (2) virtually uniform practice (i.e. consistent and uniform usage) undertaken in a manner that
demonstrates (3) a general recognition of the rule of law or legal obligation (i.e. opinio juries). In the
NorthSeaContinentalShelfcasesthecourtheldthatthepassageofaconsiderableperiodoftimewas
unnecessary(i.e.duration)fortheformationofacustomarylaw.

Widespreadandrepresentativeparticipation

11.Thecourtheldthattherstcriteriawasnotmet.Thenumberofraticationsandaccessionstothe
convention(39States)werenotadequatelyrepresentative(includingofcoastalStatesi.e.thoseStates
whoserightsareaected)orwidespread.

Duration

12. The court held that duration taken for the customary law rule to emerge is not as important as
widespreadandrepresentativeparticipation,uniformusageandtheexistenceofanopiniojuris.

Althoughthepassageofonlyashortperiodoftime(inthiscase,35years)isnotnecessarily,orofitself,a
bartotheformationofanewruleofcustomaryinternationallawonthebasisofwhatwasoriginallyapurely
conventionalrule,anindispensablerequirementwouldbethatwithintheperiodinquestion,shortthoughit
mightbe,Statepractice,includingthatofStateswhoseinterestsarespeciallyaected,shouldhavebeenboth
extensiveandvirtuallyuniforminthesenseoftheprovisioninvokedandshouldmoreoverhaveoccurredin
suchawayastoshowageneralrecognitionthataruleoflaworlegalobligationisinvolved(textinbrackets
added).

Opiniojuris

13. Opinio juris is reected in acts of States (Nicaragua Case) or in omissions (Lotus case
(hps://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2012/07/27/lotuscasesummary/))insofarasthoseactsor
omissionsaredonefollowingabeliefthatthesaidStateisobligatedbylawtoactorrefrainfromacting
in a particular way. (For more on opinio juris click here
(hps://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2011/04/22/lesson24formationofcilopiniojuris/)).

14. The Court examined 15 cases where States had delimited their boundaries using the equidistance
method, after the Convention came into force (paras. 75 77). The court concluded, even if there were
some State practice in favour of the equidistance principle the court could not deduct the necessary
opinio juris from this State practice. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases conrmed that both State
practice (hps://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2011/04/22/lesson23formationofcilstate
practice/)(the objective element) and opinio juris
(hps://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2011/04/22/lesson24formationofcilopiniojuris/)(the

subjective element) are essential prerequisites for the formation of a customary law rule. This is
subjective element) are essential prerequisites for the formation of a customary law rule. This is
consistent with Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the ICJ.
(hps://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2011/04/21/lesson22customaryinternationallawasa
sourceoflaw/) The following explains the concept of opinio juris and the dierence between customs
(i.e.habits)andcustomarylaw:

Notonlymusttheactsconcernedamounttoaseledpractice,buttheymustalsobesuch,orbecarriedoutin
suchaway,astobeevidenceofabeliefthatthispracticeisrenderedobligatorybytheexistenceofaruleof
lawrequiringit.Theneedforsuchabelief,i.e,theexistenceofasubjectiveelement,isimplicitinthevery
notionoftheopiniojurissivenecessitatis.TheStatesconcernedmustthereforefeelthattheyare
conformingtowhatamountstoalegalobligation.Thefrequency,orevenhabitualcharacteroftheactsis
notinitselfenough.Therearemanyinternationalacts,e.g.,intheeldofceremonialandprotocol,whichare
performedalmostinvariably,butwhicharemotivatedonlybyconsiderationsofcourtesy,convenienceor
tradition,andnotbyanysenseoflegalduty.

15.ThecourtconcludedthattheequidistanceprinciplewasnotbindingonGermanybywayoftreatyor
customaryinternationallawbecause,inthecaseofthelaer,theprinciplehadnotaainedacustomary
international law status at the time of the entry into force of the Geneva Convention or thereafter. As
such,thecourtheldthattheuseoftheequidistancemethodisnotobligatoryforthedelimitationofthe
areasconcernedinthepresentproceedings.

RuwanthikaGunaratneandPublicInternationalLawathps://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com,
2008 present. Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and wrien
permissionfromthisblogsauthorand/orownerisstrictlyprohibited.Excerptsandlinksmaybeused,
providedthatfullandclearcreditisgiventoRuwanthikaGunaratneandPublicInternationalLawwith
appropriateandspecicdirectiontotheoriginalcontent.

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PostedinCases,Sourcesandtaggedformationofcustomaryinternationallaw,NorthSeaContinental
ShelfCases,thirdStatetreatyobligationsonFebruary28,2014byRuwanthikaGunaratne.14Comments

14 comments

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3.Pingback:NicaraguavsUnitedStates(summary)|PublicInternationallaw
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April24,2014at1:56PM

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