1.

People vs Dela Torre-Yadao

PONENTE: Del Abad
FACTS:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the
Philippine National Polices Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat, then headed
by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed 11 suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City. Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of
the Criminal Investigation Command told the press that it was a
summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those
who were slain. After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for
Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved. On review,
however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and
filed charges of murder against the police officers involved before
the Sandiganbayan. On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City
ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack

of probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the

recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the
desistance of the private complainants.

The case was reopened in March 27, 2001 but the CA rendered a
Decision, granting Lacsons petition on the ground of double
jeopardy but on appeal to the SC, the latter directed the RTC to try
the case. It was re-raffled to branch 81 presided by Judge Yadao.
Yadao in 2003 junked the murder case against Lacson and other
police officials for lack of probable cause.On March 3, 2004 the
prosecution filed the present special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion

when she dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of
probable cause

HELD: The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her
discretion when she set the motions for determination of probable
cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and
allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The
general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when
determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests,
to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. But here, the
prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in
their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier
submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not
unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining
probable cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and
examine the inconsistent statements and related documents that
the witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records.
The SC held that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause against the respondents.

The prosecution The prosecution points out that, rather than

dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge Yadao should have
ordered the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the
filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from
notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. But
the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is
not mandatory. The courts first option under the above is for it to
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause. That is the situation here: the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against
the respondents.

In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for

the crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

4. Soliven vs. Makasiar

Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with
others, was charged with libel by the then president Corzaon
Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and
others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit
because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his
contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued.
However, if a president would sue then the president would allow
herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely
she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the
functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in
court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for
contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a

person other than the president.

HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-
holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by
virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the
office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an
accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is
the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the

President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise
the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is
a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person.

5. People vs Grey
Facts
: An Information for Murder was filed against respondent Joseph
Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar; his son, respondent Francis
Grey; and two others for the death of Rolando Diocton before the
RTC of Gandara, Samar. The Information was accompanied by other
supporting documents and a motion for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Meanwhile, Presiding Judge Rosario Bandal denied the motion
for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Judge Bandal found the
prosecutions evidence to be insufficient to link
respondents to the crime charged. She directed the prosecution to
present, within five days, additional evidence. Later, the judge
inhibited. Thereafter, the venue was changed and Judge Naviadad
continued the proceedings of the case. Respondents filed a petition
for certiorari seeking TRO and preliminary injunction alleging that
the filing of the murder charge are based on perjured statements
since Joseph Grey announced his candidacy for the Congressional
election. The CA held that Judge Naviadad failed to abide with the
constitutional mandate of personally examining the existence of
probable cause. Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Naviadad erred in personally examining for
the existence of probable cause.
Ruling:
No. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence
of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report an
d require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
He should not rely solely on the report of the investigating
prosecutor. It is not mandatory in the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. In this case, the
judge, upon his personal examination of the complaint and evidence
before him, determined that there was probable cause to issue the
warrants of arrest after the provincial prosecution, based on the
affidavits presented by complainant and her witnesses, found
probable cause to file the criminal Information. This finding of the
Provincial Prosecutor was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.

6. OKABE V. GUTIERREZ

Facts:

Charged for Estafa, Petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial

determination of probable cause and to defer
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents
appended to the Information submitted by the investigating
prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint
for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the
affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents
counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties
were not attached thereto. The petitioner further alleged that the
documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor were not
enough on which the trial court could base a finding of probable
cause for estafa against her.

The court denied the petitioners motions on the following

grounds:

(a) Based on its personal examination and consideration of the

Information, the affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama and
the resolution of the investigating prosecutor duly approved by the
city prosecutor, the court found probable cause for the petitioners
arrest. Since the petitioners motion for a determination of probable
cause was made after the court had already found probable cause
and issued a warrant for the petitioners arrest, and after the latter
filed a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, such motion
was a mere surplusage;

In denying her motion for a determination of probable cause, she

posits that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:

If the RTC judge may rely on investigating prosecutors resolution in

the determination of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.

HELD:

NO. In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause

for the arrest of the accused, the judge should not rely solely on the
said report.[The judge should consider not only the report of the
investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit/affidavits and the
documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the
accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted
to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the
Information. The duty to make such determination is personal and
exclusive to the issuing judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely
on the certification of the investigating prosecutor that he had
conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with law and
the Rules of Court, as amended, and found probable cause for the
filing of the Information.

The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with
the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable
cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the
offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. The
purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable
cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start
those falsely charged of crimes from the tribulations, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial.

Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court in relation to

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the judge must make a
personal determination of the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Under Section 1, Rule
112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the investigating
prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary investigation of a case
cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent therein is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is for
the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a
public trial.
 If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing
of the Information against the respondent, he executes a
certification at the bottom of the Information that from the evidence
presented, there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense
charged has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. Such certification of the investigating prosecutor is,
by itself, ineffective. It is not binding on the trial court. Nor may the
RTC rely on the said certification as basis for a finding of the
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.

7. People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986)

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the
NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found
guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed
by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok,
allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police
authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched.
Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm,
allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are
confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive
activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept
ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial
statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation
on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it
is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the
search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial
court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7.
Issue: If defendants arrest, the search of his home, and the
subsequent confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-related
documents are lawful.
Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendants
house to arrest him upon the information given by Masamlok, they
had neither search nor arrest warrant with themin wanton
violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in
Villanueva vs Querubin, the state, however powerful, doesnt
have access to a mans home, his haven of refuge where his
individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in
the kind of objects he wants around him. In the traditional
formulation, a mans house, however humble, is his castle, and thus
is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government.
The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6
of the RoC:
 a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his
presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another
and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense.
However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said
warrantless arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the
time of defendants arrest, he wasnt in actual possession of any
firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any
subversive acthe was plowing his field. It is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An
essential precondition is that a crime must have beenin fact
or actually have been committed first; it isnt enough to
suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of
reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which
the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see
why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a
warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe
that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing
that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the
verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the
whereabouts of the accused were unknown.
In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged
subversive documents, assuming they were really illegal, the
defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the
time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of
the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV
(now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence.
Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional
right to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation.
His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive
documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the
aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable
doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm
and alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in
accordance with law.
The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help
in overcoming a rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, while the
government should continue to repel the communists, the
subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at
its command, it should always be remembered that
whatever action is taken must always be within the
framework of our Constitution and our laws.
 8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v . GO and DE LOS REYES

Donel Go (Donel) and Val de los Reyes (Val) were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Albay for two and three counts of rape,
respectively. Donel was apprehended but jumped bail, hence, he
was tried in absentia while Val initially remained unapprehended.
Five witnesses were presented and testified against Donel. He was
subsequently sentenced to death. Hence, the automatic review of
the Court. Val was later on apprehended and the two of the
witnesses who testified against Donel were presented during Vals
trial. However, the private prosecutor merely reread the questions
and answers as recorded in the transcript of the witnesses
testimony at Donels trial. On the other hand, the remaining two
witnesses never appeared in court and only the transcript of their
testimonies during Donels trial was used as evidence. Val was
convicted by RTC and was sentenced to a penalty of reclusion
perpetua

.
ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC abused its discretion when it allowed a

summary proceeding instead of a full trial

HELD:

Accused-appellant Val questions the regularity of the procedure

adopted by the trial court by allowing prosecution witnesses to
merely affirm on direct examination their previous testimonies taken
during the trial of accused-appellant Donel. Such proceeding, he
contends, violated his right to confront and cross-examine said
witnesses. This Court held that such procedure violated Sections 1
and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the then Revised Rules of
Court, which required that the testimonies of witnesses be given
orally. Those provisions are substantially reproduced in the Revised
Rules of Court. This Court held that the witness should have been
examined directly on the statements in her affidavit. The same rule
applies in the present cases against accused-appellant Val where
the prosecution witnesses were merely asked to confirm their
testimonies given at the trial of another in which he took no part.
The apprehensions of the prosecution that the lapse of time may
have compromised the memory of the witnesses are
understandable. But in any event, lapse of time is a matter that the
trial court would consider in weighing the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies; it does not justify the abbreviated procedure
adopted by the trial court, especially considering that the case
against accused- appellant Donel was tried before another branch of
the RTC.
9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v . GO and DE LOS REYES

Donel Go (Donel) and Val de los Reyes (Val) were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Albay for two and three counts of rape,
respectively. Donel was apprehended but jumped bail, hence, he
was tried in absentia while Val initially remained unapprehended.
Five witnesses were presented and testified against Donel. He was
subsequently sentenced to death. Hence, the automatic review of
the Court. Val was later on apprehended and the two of the
witnesses who testified against Donel were presented during Vals
trial. However, the private prosecutor merely reread the questions
and answers as recorded in the transcript of the witnesses
testimony at Donels trial. On the other hand, the remaining two
witnesses never appeared in court and only the transcript of their
testimonies during Donels trial was used as evidence. Val was
convicted by RTC and was sentenced to a penalty of reclusion
perpetua

.
ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC abused its discretion when it allowed a

summary proceeding instead of a full trial

HELD:

Accused-appellant Val questions the regularity of the procedure

adopted by the trial court by allowing prosecution witnesses to
merely affirm on direct examination their previous testimonies taken
during the trial of accused-appellant Donel. Such proceeding, he
contends, violated his right to confront and cross-examine said
witnesses. This Court held that such procedure violated Sections 1
and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the then Revised Rules of
Court, which required that the testimonies of witnesses be given
orally. Those provisions are substantially reproduced in the Revised
Rules of Court. This Court held that the witness should have been
examined directly on the statements in her affidavit. The same rule
applies in the present cases against accused-appellant Val where
the prosecution witnesses were merely asked to confirm their
testimonies given at the trial of another in which he took no part.
The apprehensions of the prosecution that the lapse of time may
have compromised the memory of the witnesses are
understandable. But in any event, lapse of time is a matter that the
trial court would consider in weighing the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies; it does not justify the abbreviated procedure
adopted by the trial court, especially considering that the case
against accused- appellant Donel was tried before another branch of
the RTC.
10. Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry
Fernandez and Ronald Muoz v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014
Brion, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed
an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the
ground that there no valid warrantless took place. The RTC denied
the motion and the CA affirmed the denial.

Records show that an altercation ensued between the petitioners

and Atty. Moreno Generoso. The latter called the Central Police
District to report the incident and acting on this report, SPO1
Monsalve dispatched SPO2 Javier to go to the scene of the crime
and render assistance. SPO2, together with augmentation personnel
arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the
alleged altercation and saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.

Atty. Generoso then pointed the petitioners as those who mauled

him which prompted the police officers to invite the petitioners to
go to the police station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding,
the City Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.
Generoso with a bladed weapon who fortunately survived the
attack.

Petitioners aver that they were not validly arrested without a

warrant.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners validly arrested without warrant when the police
officers did not witness the crime and arrived only less than an hour
after the alleged altercation?

HELD:
YES, the petitioners were validly arrested without warrant. Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable

cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the
person to be arrested has committed it.

The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed;
and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.

The Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just
been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it"
depended on the particular circumstances of the case. The element
of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances", however, under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires clarification. Circumstances may pertain to events or
actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or
observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus,
even though the police officer has not seen someone actually
fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his
personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime,
he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of

facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the
commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of
immediacy. In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of
immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be
gathered.

With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that the police
officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than
one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the
crime, it is reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances justifying the
petitioners warrantless arrests.