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Faith and Knowledge

SEGOND EDITI.ON

]OHN HICK
University of Ca,mbrid,ge

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS


ltlwca, New York
Preface
Frst edition ig57, second edtion copyright ig66

by Corneu Unversity
to the Second Edion
All rights reserved rl

GORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

FTst edition 1957


IN REVISING this book, first published nine years ago,
I have tried, often in response to the promptings o con-
Second edition ig66
structive critics, to make it more useul both as an intro-
duction to the problem of religious knowledge and as an
exposition o the view o faith which seemed to me, and
still seems to me, most adequate. In this endeavor 1 have
rearranged the structure o the book, omitting a good
/7Y, deal o material and introducing an equal or greater
amount o fresh material. The original chapter on belie
has been deleted, although the modified dispositional

7,%2, theory that it contained reappears in the last chapter, in


what is 1 think its proper context for the purposes of this
book-bridging the gap between faith and works and so
providing a clue to the nature of the Ghristian ethic. A
new opening chapter on the classic Thomist view o faith
as a propositional attitude has been added. The original
discussion of the idea of eschatological verification is now
Library o Congress Gatalog Card Number: 66-28oi8 given a fuller treatment, which also takes account o im-
portant criticisms that have been offered.
The heart o the book is in the two chapters of Part 11.
The chapter, "The Nature o Faith," which has been re-
printed in two anthologies o readings in the philosophy
o religion, emains unchanged.
I am indeed grateful to those fellow workers in this
PRINTEI) IN THE UNITEI) STATES 0F AMERIGA

BY VAIL-BALLOU PRESS, INC. V


PREFACE TO THE SEGOND EDITI0N

field who ha.ve used the first edition o the book, whether
to agree with it or to disagree with it. It is their interest
in it that has led me to prepare this second edition.

J.H.
The Divinity Sclwoz PrefaGe to the Fi,rst Edition
St. Jolm's Street
Cambridge, Engzamd
M"ch ig66

THIS book discusses a central problem in the episte-

ag/ mology o religion, namely the problem of the nature of


religious faith. Its standpoint is philosophically to the
"left" and theologically to the "right": that is to say, it
llHq looks for enlightenment in the directions of philosophical
analysis and theological neo-orchodoxy. For these reasons
it may perhaps be regarded as providing a distinctively
contemporary introduction to the area of thought with
which it is concerned. This introduction is effected, how-
ever, not by a systematic textbook treatment, but by the
Z,i-L:,7 presentation of a continuous argument.
Such usefulness as this essay may be found to ha.ve will
be due in large measure to the generously given criticisms
and suggestions o several of the writer's former teachers.
A version covering part o the subject matter of the pres-
ent book, as well as other topics not here included, was
originally produced as an academic thesis. My mentor in
this was Professor H. H. Price of Oxford, to work under
whose guidance was a philosophical experience which, I
should like to think, has left its mark on my writing. The
present version was criticized chapter by chapter in type-
script by Professor H. H. Farmer of Cambridge, Professor
A. D. Ritchie and Mr. P. L. Heath o Edinburgh, and
Professor T. E. ]essop o Hull, to each o whom 1 am most

30C4 vii

U n iversi dad
l beroa meri ca na
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

grateful for doing me this substantial kindness. Needless


to say, the many remaining faults of the work are not at-
tributable to them but represent my own original con-
tribution.
Finally, I should like, as an expression o gratitude, to
dedicate this book to the office-bearers and members of Conterlts
Belford Presbyterian Church, Northumberland, England,
whose constant kindness to their Minister and his family
is linked in my memory with the writing o the book.

J.H.
Ithaca, New York Preface to the second Edition .....
]o;mLaf f y 1957
Preface to the First Edition .....
Introduction..........

Paxt I
Faith as Propositional Belief
1 TheThomist-GatholicviewoFaith. . .
2 Modernvoluntaristviewsof Faith . . .
3 Faith and Moral ]udgment .....
4 Faith and the lllative sense .....

Pafft 11
Fam as the lnterpretatie Ezement wthn
Religious Experience
5 TheNatureof Faith .... ... 95

6 FaithandFreedom ..... '. . .120

Paft 111
The Logc of Fath
7 FaithandFact ...... 151

8 Faithandverification .... 169


9 FaithasKnowledge ..... .200

ix
CONTENTS

Pa;rt IV
Christicm Faith
10 ChristianFaith ..... 215

11 Faithandworks .... 237

IntroduGtion
Acknowledgments.... 264

Index o Names ..... 265

Index o Subjects .... 267

THE purpose of this lntroduction is to pose the ques-


ton to which the remainder o the book is an attempted
answer.
Our subject is the nature of religious faith, or the epis-
temological character o man's cognition or delusion, ap-
prehension or misapprehension of God. We are inquiring
into the manner and structure of the religious person's
supposed awareness of the divine.
This query is distinct from and relatively independent
o the ontological question as to the existence of God.
Whether or not there be a God, great numbers of people
have reported an experience which they describe as
"knowing God" or "being.aware of God." We are to be con-
cerned with the mode o this putative knowledge or aware-
ness, a mode which has long been accorded the special
name of "faith." We wish to know in what it consists and
how it is related to knowing and believing in general.
Such an investigation may well seem, to believer, non-
believer, and disbeliever alike, to be worth undertaking.
For the theist the inquiry is an act of ficzcJ gtcgr7 G.%*GZ-
Jec*tm, faith seeking in this case to understand itsel. No
further motive is equired for the venture than man's per-
8istent desire to understa,nd. ]ust as the epistemologist who
believes that men are aware of a physical world will seek to
1
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE INTRODUCTI0N

analyze their awareness of that world, so the epistemologist particular conception of deity to be presupposed in the
who believes that men are aware of God wi]l seek to ana- discussion.
lyze their awareness o God. This is the position of the This conception o God may be briefly, but for our
present witer. present purpose sufficiently, characterized as that o the
For the agnostic, on the other hand, the inquiry is a hy- unique infinite personal Spirit, "holy, righteous, wise and
pothetical one. JJ there is a. God, how is he known to men?
loving," who has created the existing universe and who is
The problem may be pursued simply as a classic philo- fashioning human personalities for eternal fellowship with
sophical puzzle, or it may be considered with a view to its himself through their own free responses to the environ-
bearing upon the larger question of divine existence. For mental challenges and oppor~tunities which he appoints.
although this cannot be settled by epistemological consid- Before setting out to investigate the cognitive meaning
erations, nevertheless the findings of epistemology are rele- o "faith" it will be well to take note o the other main use
vant to it. Religious people claim to apprehend God by to which the word is put in the language o religion, and to
faith, and epistemological investigation should be able to ndicate the relation between this and the use which we
indicate whether the kind of cognition claimed is such as are to examine.
"Faith" is employed both as an epistemological and as a
might reasonably be expected to occur if there is indeed a
God to be known. nonepistemological term. The words fic{GJ and ficztcG.a pro-
The same inquiry into the nature o religious faith is Vide conveniently sel-explanatory labels or the two uses.
also open to the philosophical atheist, although for him it We speak, on the one hand, of aith (fideJ) that there is a
will only concern the phenomenology o an illusion. God and that such and such propositions about him are
In this book, then, we start from what is for the theist true. Here "faith" s used cognitively, referring to a state,
the conviction, for the agnostic the hypothesis, and for the act, or procedure which may be compared with standard
atheist the delusion that God exists. nstances of knowing and believing. On the other hand, we
In thus formulating our problem in terms of "God" speak of faith (fidwc3.c) as a trust, maintained sometimes
rather than of "gods" we have already narrowed our con- despite contrary indications, thac the divine purpose to-
cem from religion in general to its monotheistic forms. I ward us is wholly good and loving. This is a religious trust
propose now to narrow it still urther to the ethical mono- which ma.y be compared with trust or confidence in an-
theism of the ]udaic-Christian tradition. For this book is other human person.
not a comprehensive treatment of the place o faith in the It is significant that in the Bib]e faith appears frequently
religions of the world, but only an essay on the epis.temol- as fid%c3. and hard]y at all as fidcs. The reality o the di-
ogy o faith as it occurs in that form of religion which con- vine Being is assumed throughout as a manifest fact. For
stitutes a live option for most of the participants in our within the borders of living re]igion the validity of faith in
Western stream of culture. We shall not, however (except divine existence, like the validity of sense perception in or-
in the last two chapters), be concerned with the religion o 1 Martin Buber, n Tztm -TypGf of Fa!.n, trans. by N. P. Goldhawk
the Old and New Testaments as claiming to constitute a (London, ig5i), uses the Greek i.J!.J and the Hebrew Emtma/3
source of "special revelation," but only as providing the (trust) to indicate the historical sources of these two uses of "faith."

2
3
FAITH AND KNOWLEDCE INTRODUCTION

dinary daily lie, is simply taken or granted and acted porary secular philosophers and Protestant theologians-
upon. The biblical writers are not conscious o their belie who have abandoned the traditional theistic proos as
in the reality o God as being itsel an exercise o faith, but being nondemonstrative. For a theology without proos
only o their confidence in his promises and providence. [he central epistemological problem becomes that o the
It is only when the religious believer comes to reflect nature o faith-the subject which we are to discuss in these
upon his religion, in the capacity of philosopher or theo- chapters.
logian, that he is obliged to concem himsel with the noetic From some sections o Protestant neo-orthodoxy there
status o his faith. When he does so concern himself, it has come the contrary objection that faith is an unique di-
emerges that faith as trust (fidtwc.ai) presupposes faith vine gift, lying as such outside the scope o human epis-
(fidGJ) as cognition of the object of that trust. For in order temology. Lovell Cocks, for example, writing as an ex-
to worship God and commit ourselves to his providence we ponent of this standpoint, tells us that "only the believer
must first have fa.ith that he exists. And it is this logically can say what faith is, and even he cannot anatomise it. For
(though not temporally) prior sense o "faith" that we are Chere is nothing he can say of it except t:hat it is the hear-
to investigate in the following chapters. Our primary con- ing of the Word o God." 2 Faith, he insists, may not be
cern, then, is with faith as cognition, and we shall treat o compared with other modes of cognition and made a sub-
faith as trust only so far as may be required by our main ject o philosophical study. This would amount to a denial
Purpose. o its divine origin. "To show that faith is a human capac-
There are at 'the outset objections a.gainst such an in- ity, continuous with reason, or maybe the very ground o
quiry to be met from two different, and indeed opposite, all our apprehension of the real, is to demonstrate `the va-
quarters. 1idity of religious experience' at the expense of inva.lidat-
There is first the Scholastic doctrine that the existence of ing aith's own verdict upon itsel." 8
God is capable of logical demonstration; so that faith en- 1 this is accepted, it rules out c}Z7 3.m&.&.o t,he investigation
ters into belief in God only in such as are .incapable o fol- upon which we have embarked. We must therefore con-
lowing the theistic proofs, and then only as a confidence in sider candidly Cocks's objection. His position is this: We
the authority of those who ha.ve propounded them. This may expound the Word that is heard, but we cannot in-
claim is seldom maintained today outside the Roman quire into the nature o the hearing; we cannot compare it
Church. It is now widely acknowledged that the a priori with other hearings and seeings and knowings and believ-
path to a proof ot. divine existence had been blocked by ings; and this because its object is the unique Word o
Kant's criticism of the ontological and cosmological argu- God.
ments, while the various a posteriori routes have been fa- We may cordially endorse Cocks's basic contention that
tally undermined by Hume's attack upon the argument "the human act of faith is t.he analogue o the divine act o
from (or to) design. I do not propose, however, to enlarge revelation." 4 But this does not entail thac no philosophi-
the field o discussion by seeking to rebut the Scholastics' cal account of faith can be given. It would o course be a
claim in detail. The problem to be treated here only arises 2By Fa,ith AZone (London, ig48), p. 78. 8Ibid., P. 72.
for those-and they are the great majority of both contem- 4 Ibid., p. 75.

4 5
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE INTRODUCTI0N

logically possible view that a man's awareness o God is cnt receive the attention which they both merit and richly
caused by a direct and miraculous divine operation upon reward. john Oman was probably the most original Brit-
the man's mind or brain, without natural preconditions; ish theologian of the first half of the twentieth century, and
and on such a doctrine all that Cocks says concerning the his teaching conceming the relation between religion and
impossibility o an epistemology o faith would hold good. environment, and the apprehension of the supernatural
However, Cocks is not advocating any such divine-injec- in and through the natural, provides (as it seems to me) an
tion theory o faich. Faith is for him a free response to important key to the problem of religious knowledge. A1-
God's gracious sel-disclosure. Accordingly he allows that though 1 shall not refer to Oman's discussions in detail,
"faith is psychologically continuous with the rest o our either by way of exposition or of criticism, those who are
experience." 5 But in this case it seems arbitrary for him to a.cquainted wth The Natural a,nd tlw Supei.na,tural (L98L)
assert that no more can be said toward an understanding o will find in the present essay an attempt to work out
faith than that it is the hearing o the Word of God. He has Oman's basic standpoint in relation to the very different
shown nothing to rule out the possibility o epistemologi- world o contemporary philosophy.
cal analogies between our awareness o God and, for ex- Part 111 will explore some o the main questions raised
ample, our awareness of other human persons. He has said by contemporary philosophy for this or any theory of the
nothing to exclude the possibility o links between the ap- nature o faith. And finally, in Part IV, the theory pro-
prehension of God and the apprehension of his creation, or posed in Part 11 will be brought to bear upon the distinc-
even the mediation o the former through the latter. He tively Christian apprehension o God.
has in fact said nothing that should right]y deter us from
attempting an epistemological study of religious faith.
The method o investigation will be as follows. Part I
will review four types or groups of theory conceming the
nature of theistic faith. These are not of course the only
theories in the field. But they are, I think, the most impor-
tant theories, both in themselves and in relation to the
standpoint to be developed in Part 11. In each case 1 shall
offer criticisms o the theory under discussion, and yet
from each o them a significant truth will be carried for-
ward into the next part.
In Part 11 1 shall offer for the reader's consideration an
account of the nature of religious faith and its relation to
human cognition. This account owes much to the thought
of a philosopher o religion o the last generation whose
works, perhaps because of their difficulty, do not at pres-
5 Ibid., p. 89.

6
PART I

Faith as Propositional Belief


The Thomist-Caiholc
View of Fo;ith

ACCORDING to the most widespread view of the mat-


[er today faith is unevidenced or inadequately evidenced
belief. To quote a typical definition, "The general sense is
belief, perhaps based on some evidence, but very firm, or
at least more firm, or/and o more extensive content, than
the evidence possessed by tihe believer rationally wa.r-
rants." 1 Faith thus consists in believing strongly various
propositions, of a theological nature, which the believer
does not and cannot /znow to be true. To know here is
taken to mean either to observe directly or to be able to
prove by strict demonstration. Where this is possible, there
is no room for faith. It is only that which lies beyond the
scope of human knowledge that mu.st be taken, i at all, on
faith or trust. When in such a case we do adopt some be-
1ie, the lack of rational comp,ulsion to assent is compen-
8ated by an act of will, a voluntary leap o trust, so that the
1 C. |. Ducasse, A Phizosophica,l Scrutiny of Rezigion (New York,
1953)i PP. 73-74. This type of formulation goes back to Kant, with his
account of faith (GJc%Z7c) as belie on grounds that are subjectively
sufficient but objectively insufficient (Cr&.3.gwc o/ P%rc RGCLfom, 2d
ed p. 85o; trans. by Noman Kemp Smith H.ondon, ig33], p. 646).

11
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THOMIST-CATHOLIG VIEW 0F FAITH

man of faith comes to believe something which he cannot Conssts in our believing them. Faith, says Aquinas, occu-
prove or see. i)ies a position between knowledge (s".cnz.o) and opinion
This general view o the nature o faith, so far as it goes, (OP8.7%.o) and accordingly falls on a common scale with
would probably be accepted today by many both Gatholic them; and since they are both concerned wich proposi-
and Protestant Ghristians, as well as by the agnostic and tions, so also is fa.ith. The particular propositions which
atheist critics o Christianity. For it represents the domi- ire the objects o Christian faith are the articles, or distin-
nant Western tradition of thought on the subject from the gushable segments, or Ghristian truth 4 which are a.uthor-
time it was established by St. Thomas Aquinas in the thir- i[atively summarized in the Church's creeds.5 Faidi, then,
teenth century. It is, accordingly, to Aquinas that we must for Aquinas, in practice means,believing the articles o the
turn if we are to go to the roots o this tradition. creeds. It is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly
Aquinas discusses faith in all its aspects in his Stmmci such central articles as the lncarnation and the Trinity,
TGozog.", the second part of the second part, Questions bm apart from these it is sufficient, especially in the case of
i-7.2 His conclusions can be presented under three main llie unleamed, to believe implicitly, that is, to be ready to
headings. believe the articles o the faith if and wihen they are explic-
i. First, aith is a propositional attitude: that is to say, it i[ly presented to one's understanding.
consists in assenting to propos,itions. This is unambigu- At every point, then, faith is concerned with proposi-
ously stated, and its implications unambiguously accepted, tons. This is made clear once again in the definition pro-
both by Aquinas and throughout the Catholic tradition mulgated by the First Vatican Council (i869-i87o) as fol-
that has followed him. Aquinas explains that since "the low: faith "is a supematural virtue by which we, with the
thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the ad and inspiration of the grace o God, believe that the
knower" and "the mode proper to the human intellect is Chngs revealed by Him are true, not because the intrinsic
to know the truth by composition and division," 3 man's truth o the revealed things has been perceived by the nat-
knowledge of God takes the form o knowing propositions ural light o reason, but because o the authority o God
about him, though God himsel is of course not a proposi- I`Iimself who reveals them, who can neither deceive nor be
tion but the supreme Being. There is thus a sense in which deceived." 6 And the object of faith is defined as "all those
the ultimate object of faith is the living God-that is, the [hngs . . . which are contained in the written word o
God and n tradition, and those which are proposed by the
propositions which are believed by faith are propositions
about him. But the immedia.te objects o faith are these Church, either in a so]emn pronouncement or in her ordi-
nary and universal teaching power, to be believed as di-
propositions themselves, and our cognitive relation.to God
Vinely revealed." 7
2For an attractive contemporary restatement o the Thomist 2. Second, the propositions which faith believes, or at
positon, see ]ose Pieper, Bez.Gf o7id Fa.ft, trans. by R. Winston 4^I_bd.,Q: i,4t.6. 6Ibd., Q. i, Art. 9.
and C. Winston (New York, ig63, and London, ig64). ODogmatic Constitution, ch. 8, in Denzinger, Enc!+.c!2.on
8 Stmmci Thcozog!.", pt. ii, ii, Q. i, Art. 2. Englsh Dominican
Symbolorum, no. i789.
tra.nslation, revised by Antop G. Pegis, .BCLf!.c Wri..ngf o/ Sa7
1 |bid., no. L792.
ThomcLs g%!.ncu (New York-, .ig45).

12 13
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE , THOMIST-GATHOLIC VIEW OF FAITH

any rate those that are of fa.ith absolutely, i.e., that can.be incellect assenting to the truth at the command o the
accepted only on faith, are o a special kind. They express will. 9
"mysteries"; thac is to say, they are propositions whose
n is accordingly in the nature o the case impossible to
truth can never (in this life) be directly evident to us, and have knowledge and faith simultaneously in relation to the
which therefore have to be accepted on authority. These same object; knowledge is intellectual vision, whilst faith
Christian mysteries are such that the human mind could is firm and undoubting belief concerning that which is not
never discover them for itself, and such that the mind, ha.v- (at any rate in this life) directly knowable. It is o course
ing come to possess them, cannot fully penetrate and com- n some cases possible for two different people to have
prehend Chem. Chief examples of the Ghristian mysteries knowledge and faith respectivdy in relation to the same
are the unity of deity and humanity in the person o object; for it may happen that "what is an object o vision
Christ, and the nature of God as three in one and one in or scientific knowledge (Jcc.tm) for one man, even in the
three. state of a. wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of faith,
It follows from this that faith is to be distinguished from because he does not know it by demonstration." 1 But "in
knowledge or Jc&.cm.. By Jc.G7}8.c} Aquinas means the di- one and the same man, about the same object, and in the
rect and indubitable knowledge that we ha.ve when we same respect, sc8.c7?.c} is incompatible with either opinion
"see" sel-evident truths or when we attain to further
Or faith." ii
truths by strict logical demonstration. In Jca.G??*.c the truth As well as being distinguished from knowledge, faith is
compels assent either by self-evidence or by the force of th also to be distinguished from opinion (oP3.na.o). Opinion,
demonstration that has led the mind to it: we cannot help like faith, is an assent which is not compelled by its object
-in so far as we are rational-believing that which is to us but produced by an act of choice; but it differs from faith
either self-evident or proved by strict logic. Faith, how- in that if the choice "be accompanied by doubt and fear o
ever, differs from sc3.cn.c in that the object of faith does the opposite side, there will be opinion; while, if there be
not compel assent. For, since the propositions that are be- certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be
lieved by faith are mysteries, we cannot directly see or faith." 12 Faith thus involves an act o commitment which
prove their truth. Aquinas says, "Now the intellecc assents sets aside the uncertainty that would otherwise be present
to a thing in two ways. First, through being moved to assent in face o propositions which are not able by themselves to
by its very object, which is known either by itself . . . or Compel assent. Belief "cleaves firmly to one side,"18
through something else already known. [This is sc8.G7?8.a;.] whereas in opinion there always remains a certain admix-
. . . Secondly, the intellect assents to something, not ture of active or latent doubt.
through being sufficiently moved to this assent by its Thus faith is distinguished fTom Jc3.c7t3.c} by a difference
prper object, but through an act o choice, whereby it between their objects: the object of sc.cm3.cL is such as to
turns voluntarily to one sde rather than to the other." 8
Ibid., Q. 4, Art. 5. Ibi., Q. i, Art. 5.
This is faith, which is thus characterized as "an act o the 11Ibi., Q. L, Art. 5. 12Ibid., Q. i, ALrt. 4.
sS%77imci Theozog{.c, pt. Ii, il, Q. i, Art. 4. 18 Jb.cZ., Q. 2, Art. i.

14 15
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THOMIST-GATHOLIG VIEW OF FAITH

compel the assent o the human mind, whilst the object o of God. This suggests that it is probable that God has come
faith is not.14 And faith is distinguished from opinion by to ihe aid of mankind and taught the truth about llis wishes
the subjective or psychological difference that opinion is l`or mankind and the way to realise them. We now tum to
and faith is not accompanied by a.n inner feeling o doubt ]iistory, and in history we find that he founder of Ghristianity
made ie claim to be die messenger from God bringing a revela-
or uncertainty.
tlon of good news, and tha.t the Catholic Church has unfail-
3. The third main aspect o Aquinas' doctrine of faith, ingly reiterated that claim. The next step is to examine that
its voluntary character, follows naturally; faith is belief claim, since ic is not impossible and is, indeed, even probable.
which is not compellingly evoked by its object but which An examination of it can end only in one conclusion, that it
requires an act of will on the believer's part. We must now s made out. The historical evidence, the previous history o
ask the following questions: What motivates this decision the ]ewish people, the holiness and audiority o Christ, which
to believe? Is it an arbitrary and irrational "1eap in the i.ule out the hypodiesis that He could have been a dupe or
dark"? Or are there reasons for it? According to the cleceiver, the miracles He worked, which are too closely bound
Thomist-Catholic tradition, there are reasons. For faith, up with the narrative of llis teaching and character to be
defined as belie in divinely authorized doctrines, presup- interpolations, the Resurrection, which has never successully
been gainsa.id-all these facts can lead the reasonable inquirer
poses the previous knowledge boch that there is a God and
that he has authorized the doctrines in question. This con- to only one conclusion: Clirist is the messenger of God or God.
This once granted, the rest follows irresistibly.15
dition is acknowledged in Catholic theology, which pro-
vides "preambles to faith" designed to identify as divine And so the conclusion is reached that the Roman hier-
the utterances which faith then obediently accepts. The archy, culminating in the Pope, is the appointed guardiari
preambles begin with the scholastic proofs of God's exist- and teacher of the truths which God has imparted.
ence, and then proceed along a well-defined path whose 1 we now ask more particularly whether these rc-
course is summarized by the Catholic theologian, M. C. flmbtZci fidc3. are held to be rationally compelling, so that
D'Arcy as follows: anyone who examines them and who is not prejudiced
igainst the truth must acknowledge them, or whether, on
It is easy to pass from these conclusions [of the existence and
the contrary, some degree o faith enters into their accept-
unity of God] to others, for instance that God might reveal
further knowledge about llimself if He chose. The question,
ance, no satisfactorily unambiguous answer is forth-
therefore, now is whether He has communicated such further coming.
knowledge to us. We find when we look at the history of the On the one hand it is held, in agreement with non-
human race that man left to himself has made a bad .muddle Catholic critics and commentators, that the preambles to
of religion, and that, nevertheless, he has always longed for faith must make out their case before the court o human
some cleeper ancT more intimate relation with and knowledge reason. This was pointed out, for examp]e, by the Protes-
14In ths respect faith is less certain than sc!.c7t2.. In another
tant ]ohn Locke. He defines faith, in agreement with the
sense however it is more certan than sce.c72..cw for its object, whch
scholastic tradition, as "the assent to any proposition, not
is a divine truth, s in itself more certain than are the mundane LM. G. D'Arcy, The Nature of Belief (London, ig45), PP.
objects of human Jc.c7t!.a (.b.d., Q. 4, Art. 8). 824-225.

16 17
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THOMIST-CATHOLIC VIEW OF FAITH

. . . made out by the deductions o reason, but upon the ^gain, Aquinas, discussing the question whether the de-
credit o the proposer, as coming from God in some ex- inons ha.ve faith (for "Even the demons believe-and
traordinary way o communication." 6 He then points out hudder," ]ames 2:ig), says that they do, but that their
that, within the terms o this definicion, our reason must f.iich is no credit to them since it is extorted by the evi-
establish that a particular proposition has in fact come {1ence. "The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe by
from God before our faith can have anything to exercise the evidence o signs, and so their will deserves no praise
itself upon, and that therefore the certainty attaching to ror their belief .... Rather are they compelled to believe
faith can never exceed that o the reasoning which pre- by their natural intellectual acumen." Indeed, "The very
ceded it: "though faith be founded on the testimony of facc tha.t the signs of faith are so evident, that the demons
God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us, yet iire compelled to believe, is displeasing to them." 19 These
we cannot have an assurance of the truth o its being a di- siatements seem to imply that there are coercive historical
vine revelation greater than our own rationally acquired reasons for believing that the Church's message has the
knowledge; since the whole strength o the certainty de- scatus of divine revelation.
pends upon our knowledge that God revealed it." 17 This On the other hand in his main discussion o the nature
idea is not resisted, but is on the contrary emphasized by of faith Aquinas teaches that faith is a virtue precisely be-
many Gatholic writers. For example Canon George D. Cause it is 72o compelled. We have already noted his stress
Smith, writing on "Faith and Revealed Truth" in the upon the part played by the will in the genesis of faith.
corrLposi+c work The Tea,ching of the Catlwzic Clwrch, d;e- Faith is belief which is not coercively evoked by intrinsic
scribes the evidence of miracles as "peremptory," and says: evidence but which is produced by a voluntary adhesion to
divine revelation. The rcmb%Zc} fidG. constitute reasons
The human mind, then, is able to leam with certainty the
providing a motive for faith, but these reasons are not so
existence of God; is able, by the proper investigation o the compelling as to undermine the believer's freedom, and
facts, to conclude that Ghrist is the bearer of a divine message,
therefore merit, in believing. "The believer has sufficient
tha.t he founded an infallible Ghurch for the purpose of prop-
motive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of
agating that message; and finally, by the process indica.ted in
divine teachin.g confirmed by miracles, and, what is more,
apologetics, to conclude tha.t die Catholic Church is that di-
vinely appointed teacher of revelation. These things, I say, by the inward instigation of the divine invitation; and so
can be known a.nd proved, and by those who have the requisite he does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient
leisure, opportunicy and ability, are actually known and reason for scientific know]edge [cEd sc3.e7td%m] and hence
provecl with all the scientific certainty of which the subject is he does not lose the merit." 2 The act o belief is thus
patient. The preambles of faidi, therefore, rest upon the solid sufficiently evidenced
whelming.ly evidencedtoasbe
to rational
cease to and
be ayet
freenot
andsomerito-
over-
grouncl of human reason.18
10 Essay concerning the Huma,n Understa,nding, T.k. rv, ch. i8, rious act. It is indeed required by the structure o Aquinas'
Sec. 2. 10 Summa Theologica, pt. ii, ii, Q. 5, Art. 2.
17JZ%.d., sec. 5. 18 New York, i927, I, i3. 20 Ibd., Q. 2, Art. 9.

18 19
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THOMIST-GATHOLIC VIEW OF FjuTH

theology as a whole, in which faith has its place as one o even in minds which are wickedly resistant to it. The con-
the three theological virtues, that aith be recognized as in~ tradiction remains in full force.
volving a responsible acc o the human will. This recogni- Aquinas' dilemma is caused by the necessity under
tion, however, is not easily reconciled with the claim that which he labors to account for the epistemological condi-
the demons are compelled by the visible evidences, even tion of the demons as beings who believe God's revela.tion
against their will, to acknowledge the Ghristian mysteries by faith rather than by sight, but whose fai[h is not merito-
as divine revelations. rious since they are unqualifiedly evil and condemned
Aquinas' only suggestion for harmonizing these two creat:ures. The only effective solution would seem to be to
divergent exigencies o his theology occurs in connection jectison the demons, in the hope+that they are mythological,
with the same problem of demonic faith. He here distin- iind thus set aside the epicycle of theory thac was developed
Co accommodate their faith. 1 this were done we could re-
guishes two motives for faith. "Now, that the will moves
the intellect to assent may be due to two causes. First, by gard Aquinas' discussion ot. human belief as represeming
the fact that the will is ordered towards the good; and in his central contribution to the epistemology of faith. His
this way, to believe is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, be~ ieaching is, then, that Cmristian faith is;a voluntary accept-
cause the intellect is convinced that it ought to believe ince of the Church's doctrine, not because this can be di-
what is said, though that conviction is not based on the rectly seen by our intellects to be true, but because the his-
evidence in the thing said [but on external evidences]. torical evidence of prophecy and miracles leads (without
. . . Accordingly, we must say that faith is commended coercing) a mind disposed toward goodness and truth to
in the first sense in the faithful of Ghrist. And in this way accept that teaching as being of divine origin.
faith is not in the demons, but only in the second way, or Many will accoum it a virtue that the Thomist-Catholic
they see many evident signs, whereby they recognize that position makes its primary appeal to human reason, turn-
the teaching of the Ghurch is from God." 21 The two mo- ing to ecclesiastical authority only after this authority has
tives then are the implicit direction of the will or the per- been accredited by reason. The Ghurch's claim to be be-
sonality toward the Good or God, which occurs as a gift o ]ieved is based upon historical evidences which are to be
divine grace, and the compulsion o the evidence o mira- assessed by the exercise o reason. But this virtue carries
cles, prophecy, and so forth. But this distinction does not wth it the danger that the court to which the Ghurch thus
remove the contradiction which Aquinas has built into his appeals, the court of human reason, may not return a fa-
doctrine. On the one hand, in discussing huma.n faith he vorable verdict. Indeed, if the jury is mankind at large, the
teaches that the historical evidence for the revelator.y status situation is that Cacholics are convinced of the Roman
o the Ghurch's teaching does not compel assent, and tha.t .Ghurch's credentials, whilst the rest o humanity is not.
faith motivated by assent accordingly remains free and Further, the appeal to reason must in practice be an appeal
meritorious; but, on the other hand, in discussing demonic to the reason of individuals. As such, however, it is in
faith he teaches that this same evidence does compel assent grave danger, from the Catholic point of view, o being in
21 Ibd Q. 5, Art. 2. effect an appeal to individual private judgment.

20 21
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THOMIST-CATHOLIC VIEW OF F"TH

A common reply to this suggestion is that a.lthough pri- We now have the Thomist-Catholic analysis o faith be-
vate judgment is necessary to enable us to recognize a di- fore us. To introduce labels which will draw attention to
vine revelation, the revelation once accepted is found to be the three main aspects o it which we have noted, we will
intrinsically authoritative and self-guaranteeing. In Car- say that it is intellectualist, in thac ic regards faith as a
dinal Newman's simile, the lamp of privace judgment may propositional attitude; fideistic, in that it regards faith and
be required to enable us to find our wa.y; but once we have knowledge as mutually exclusive; and voluntaristic, in that
reached home we no longer have need of it. Newman's it sees faith as the producc of a conscious act of will. These
analogy, however, is misleading. Once a tra+eler has safely three elements have remained linked together in Catholic
reached his destination, it does not matter by what route thought down to the present da,y. In recent writings from
he has arrived: he does not suddenly dissolve into thin air the more liberal wing of Catholic thought an impulse is
if it is discovered that he has come by an unauthorized ndeed evident toward a less rigidly intel]ectualist view.
There is apparent a desire to escape ffom the older image
path. The validity of a reasoned conclusion, however, is
not con-espondingly independent o the "route" by which o faith as merely the acceptance of theological proposi-
it has been reached. 1 the arguments which have led to a tions, and to draw into the doctrine o faith the "I-Thou"
conclusion are found to be invalid, it is let unsupported encounter between God and man which has been so much
and must either collapse or be established afresh upon an- stressed in modern Protestant theology, partly under the
other basis. Again, rational argument has been likened to a influence of the Tewish thinker, Martin Buber. Thus Eu-
ladder by which we climb up to a position of faith, bm gne Joly in the volume on faith in the TtGm3.G#*
which can then be dispensed with. But to reach a conclu- ?ntury Epcyclopedia of Ca;thozicsm airmo:n:e:-ii;:Vi;s
sion by reason and then to renounce the authority of rea- discussion s to be concerned "simply and solely with meet-
son would be more like cutting off the branch on which ing the living God," 28 and at one point he characterizes
one is sitting. The steps o an argument are not like the faith as "a personal encounter with the living God." 24
steps o a ladder: they are mc)re akin to the links of a chain This sounds very different ffom the traditional view of
from which something is suspended. And a chain o rea- faith as a believing of theological propositions on the au-
soning can be no stronger than its weakest link; probable thority o God who has revealed them. At the end o the
arguments never suffice to establish a certain conclusion. book, however, Toly offers as normative the definition of
Thus we can never properly be more certain of the truth faith promulgated by the First Vatican Council and
of a revealed proposition than of the soundness of our rea- quoted above on page i3, with its straight Thomist doc-
sons for classifying it as revealed. We cannot claim that the been several writings by English Catholic theologians who are fully
revelation once accepted is self-guaranteeing, for (as ]ohn aware of the difficulty noticed above, e.g., Dom Mark Pontifex,
Locke pointed out) its guarantee is valid only i it is in-
#.2:;go,uTS^nA,:s^e_nt
BCJ2.G/ (London, ig45); .Dom
t^+=`d=,
llltyd L.9`2`7,;`
Trethowan,. CGra#.7ty
, 9. oL,k;=y; (Lpndon,
..`;:;:;
deed a genuine revelation, and whether this is so must first 1948).
be decided by reason.22 28Q%'e-cG gt% croi.rG? (Paris, ig56), trans. by Dom llltyd

22 0n the question of the rational coerciveness or otherwise o Trethowan as TJvft 3.J Fam (New York, ig58), p. 7.
24ibid., p. 86.
the rcmcibtZo ficc, and their relation to the act o aith, there have

22 23
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THOMIST-GATHOLIC VIEW OF FAITH

trine expressed in uncompromisingly intellectualist terms. l`iith develops in partnership with a corresponding concep-
In expounding it ]oly himsel falls back into the wa.ys o [ion o reve]ation. The Thomist-Gathlic notion of faith is
thinking which it embodies and ffom which he fails to es- iit:companied by a view of revelation as the divine commu-
cape. "God," he says, "has revealed all that it was necessary iiication to man o the truths, belie in which comprises
for us to know about him and about his plans for the l`iith. In the words of T7# Cc}oz&.c E%cyczoccZ3.cz, "Reve-
world .... The apostles, the hearers and witnesses of Iiition may be defined as the communication of some truth
Christ, have handed on this revelation to the .Ghurch l)y God to a rational creature through means which are be-
which has the mission o faithfully preserving and infalli- yond the ordinary course of nature." 28 God has commu-
bly interpreting the revelation completed by ]esus Christ. iiicaited the knowledge that is necessary to man's salvation,
. . . We admit [a doctrine] because Ghrist has declared it irst through the prophets of lsrael and then in a. fuller and
to us and because the Ghurch has infallibly transmitted to rinal way through Christ, and this knowledge has ever
us these words o Ghrist and their proper interpreta- flince been preserved and propagated by the Church. The
tion." 25 In this crucial discussion in }oly's book, to which l}ible finds its place within this scheme o thought as the
the preceding discussions were "approaches," 26 there is I}ook in which the saving truths are written down and
no reference to the divine-human encounter or to meeting made available, under the Church's guardianship, to all
the living God; faith has reverted to its traditional charac- mankind. This view requires of course a theory o the
ter as belie in the dogmas o the Church. Again, even so Rible's ultimate divine authorship and hence its verbal in-
impressively bold and independent a Gatholic as the late errancy, such as was laid down in the pronouncement of
Father Gustave Weigel, S.]., said in his last book, "To a llie First Vatican Council concerning the books of the
Catholic, the word `faith' conveys the notion of an int:ellec- I}ible that "having been written by the inspiration o the
tual assent to the content of revelation as true because of JJloly Spirit, they have God as their author." 2 (Whether
the witnessing authority of God the Revealer .... Faith (;od's revelation is wholly contained within the Bible, or
is the Catholic's response to an intellectual message com- whether there is essential supplementary knowledge in the
municated by God." 27 oral traditions of the Church seems, in the light of the Sec-
We will now note briefly the wider context of theologi- ond Vatican Council, to be at present an open question for
cal thought within which this intellectualist understanding Catholics.)
o faith has its place. Faith and revelation are correlative These various principles also determine the Thomist-
terms, faith being the cognitive aspect o man's response to Catholic account o the relation between faith and reason.
divine revelation, so that a conception of the nature of According to` this account there are two sets o theological
26JZu.c!., PP. isi-i82. 2JZ.C!., P.180. truths: those that are accessible to human reason and that
2T Faith a,nd Understamdng in America, (New York, ig59), P. \. cn be established by phiiosophicai demonstration (such as
Note however Weigel's description o faith a "an intellectual act that God exists and that he is one), and those exceeding
which s simultaneously an orientation of man towards the revealing
Lord,'' in lris contribution to the New York University lnstitute o[ gs New York, igi2, XIII, i.
Philosophy in ig6o, RcZ.got Expcr.c7we amd Trth, edited by 20 Dogma,tic Constitution, ch. 2. Denringer, Enchiridon Sym-
Sidney Hook (New York, ig6i), p. io4. bolorum, no. .|89.

24 25
FHTH AND KNOWLEDGE THOMIST-GATHOLIG VIEW 0F FAITH

the cope of reason (such as that God is triune). The lectualist assumption is to be found not only throughout
former constitute the corpus o natural theology and the the greater part of Christian thought, past and present, but
latter of revealed theology; and the former are grasped by also in most of the criticism of Ghristianity, which has not
reason, the latter by faith. The truths of natural theology, unnaturally been a reaction against the dominant Chris-
however, as well as being rationally available, are also pre- tian view. For example, ]ulian Huxley in his RGZ3.g.o??
zt/3.ot RGUGZ.o7? speaks of "the hypothesis o revela-
sented for acceptance by faith. For otherwise many would
fail to attain them, being too unlearned, too busy or too tion," which is "that the truth has been revealed in a set o
indolent to pursue the abstruse metaphysical reasonings god-given commandments, or a holy book, or divinely-
required for a philosophical knowledge of God. Again, inspired ordinances." 3L Again, ,Walter Kaufmann, in his
those few who did come to know God by the way of ra.- hz[rdhitng Critique of Religion cmd Plrilosophy, rewezLls
tional reflection would arrive at that knowledge only late his understanding o the Ghristian concept o revelation
n lie, since metaphysical reasoning presupposes consider- when he says, "Even if we grant, for the sake of the present
able previous training and study. And finally, the conclu- argument, that God exists and sometimes reveals proposi-
sions of human reasoning are subject to a certain suspicion tions to mankind .... " 32 And again, Richard Robinson,
in the minds of nonphilosophers because of the possibility in 4" 47zc3.J'J ytGJ, a book oten of singular beauty, de-
of errors in reasoning, and therefore the truths of natural fines faith as "assuming a certain belief without reference
theology are always treated by many with a certain reserve. to its probability," and as "belie reckless of evidence and
For all these reasons "it was necessary that the unshakeable probability." He thereore urges the virtue of undermin-
certitude and pure truth concerning divine things should ing faith: "We ought to do what we can towards eradicat-
be presented to men by way of faith." 30 ing the evil habit o believing without reg.ard to evi-
dence." 33
The Thomist-Gatholic understanding of faith as the be-
lieving of revealed trutlis likewise determines a view o the Is there any alternative account o religious faith which
cloes not proceed ffom this widespread intellectua.list as-
nature of theological thinking. The theologia.n's task is not
to create doctrines as a philosopher may create metaphysi- sumption? An alternative has always been implicit in the
ca.l theories. The Ghristian truths are already known, hav- piety of ordinary religious men and women within both
ing been given in revelation, and the theologian's task is to ]udaism and Christianity, and has now been made explicit
systematize them, expound them, and guard them ffom er- in the main streams of twentieth-century Protestant theol-
roneous and misleading modes o exposition. ogy. According to this altemative view revelation consists,
The central thread which holds these conceptions to- not in the divne communication of religious truths, but in
the sel-revealing actions of God within human history.
gether is the intellectualist assumption which restricts the
entire discussion to propositional truths: revelation is God has acted above all in that special stream of history
which Christianity sees as Hc3.JgGJc/?3.c7z*G, holy history:
God's communicating of such truths to man, faith is man's
obedient believing of them; and they are written down in beginning with the calling out of the Hebrews as a people
the Bible and systematized by the theologians. This intel- 81 Revised ed.; London, ig57. P. 207.
82NewYork, ig58, p. 89. 83 0xord, ig64, pp. i2o, i2i.
30 S%mma conra Ge%&.JCJ, bk. i, d. 4, Par. 5.

26 27
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THOMIST-GATHOLIG VIEW OF FAITH

of propositions, nor is faith a believing o such proposi-


in covenant with their God; continuing through their
tions. The theological propositions formulated on the basis
stormy career, during which God was seeking through
events and circumstances, as interpreted to them by the o revelation have a secondary status. They do not consti-
iute the content of God's self-revelation but are human
prophets, to lead his people into a fuller knowledge o .ind therefore fallible verba.lizati.ons, constructed to aid
himself; and culminating in the Cmrist event, in which
both the integration o our religious experience into our
God's love or mankind was seen directly at work on earth
in the actions o ]esus. Revelation, considered as com-
own minds and the communication of religious experience
to others. The formulation and approval of doctrine is
pletedcommunication,consistsintheconjunctionoGod's thus a work not of faith but o reason-reason operating
activity within our human experience, with the human
upon the data o revelation. The function of faith in this
recognition that the events in question a;re God's actioTS.
sphere is to establish the premises, not the conclusions, o
As William Temple wrote, "there is event and apprecia-
[heological reasoning.
tion; and in the coincidence o these the revelation con-
According to this view the two objects o "natural" and
sists." 34 The events are always in themselves ambiguous, "revealed" theology, God's existence and God's revelation,
capable o being seen either simply as natural happenings
merge into one. The divine Being and the divine self-
or as happenings through which God is acting towards us.
communication are known in a single apprehension which
For example, in the prophetic incerpretation o history
is the awareness of God as acting self-revealingly toward us.
embodied in the Old Testament records, events which
The believer does not make two separate acts o faith, nor
would be described by a secular historian as the outcome
im act o reason and an act of faith, directed respectively to
o political, economic, sociological and geographical factors
divine existence and to divine revelation. He claims to
are seen as incidents in a dialogue which continues
know "that God exists" because he knows God as existing
through the centuries between God and his people. Again,
and having to do with him in the events of the world and
the central figure of the New Testament could be regarded
of his oi.vn life.
in purely human terms, as a political agitator or as a danl
It would be an oversimplification to say that this non-
gerous critic o the religious establishment, but could also
be seen and worshiped as the one in whom the world en- i)ropositional, 72e&.ZJgGJc7n.c7}*Z.chc conception o the revela-
tion-faith complex represents the Reormed in distinction
counters the divine Son made man. Thus, when the revela-
rrom the Catholic point of view. In the early days of the
tory events are seen and responded to as divine actions,
Reformation, as part of the great upsurge o direct, per-
man exists in a conscious relation to, and with knowledge
8onal religious experience and piety which in the sixteenth
o, God: and this total occui:Tence is revelation. Faith is an
century burst the limits of a decadent and legalistic scho-
element within this totality in that it is the human recog-
l-asticism, the foundations were laid for a nonpropositional
nition o ambiguous events as revelatory, and hence the
doctrine of faith. For Luther, faith was not primarily ac-
experiencing of them as mediating the presence and activ-
ceptance o the Church's dogmas but a wholehearted re-
ity o God.
flponse of trust and gratitude toward the divine grace
So understood, revelation is not a divine promulgation
34Nfl%re, Mom flmd Gocl (London.1934)j P. 314.
revealed in ]esus Christ. Indirectly it included acceptance
29
28
FAITH AND KnvowLEDGE THOMIST-CATHOLIG VIEW OF FAITH

o all the fundamental Ghristian beliefs; but Luther's pri- faith means primarily and centrally the holding of unevi-
mary emphasis was upon faith as a total reliance upon the denced beliefs has continued to operate and has produced
omnipotent goodness o God. I[n a distinction that Lucher some o the theories o faich which we shall examine in the
himself drew, faith is not beliie *72c} but belie a.?t.35 But next two chapters.
Protestant theology suffered a :rapid decline after Luther's
insight. Calvin, the great systematizer o Reformed theol-
ogy, represents an intermediatte position, with his derini-
tion of faith as "a firm and certain knowledge o God's
benevolence towards us, foumded upon the truth o the
ffeely given promise in Ghrist both revealed to our minds
[in the Bible] and sealed upion our hearts through the
Holy Spirit." 36 But after Galwin there was a decisive re-
lapse into a Protestant scholasticism as narrowly intellec-
tualist as that o the Thomisit-Gatholic tradition. In the
Westminster Gonfession o Faiith of i647, for instance, it is
said o "saving faith" that "Ry this faith, a Ghristian be-
lieveth to be true whatsoever is revealed in the word, for
the authority of God himsel.f speaking therein"; 37 and
more than t:wo hundred years later a Calvinist theologian
i.vas writing as though he were strict Thomist: "And i.ve de-
fine faith . . . to be the assenit of the mind to truth, upon
the testimony of God, conveyig knowledge to us through
supernatural channels .... Reason establishes the acc
that God speaks, but when wG know what he says, we be-
lieve it because he says it." 38
In more recent times the :notion of divinely revealed
propositions has virtually d:isappeared from Protestant
theology, being replaced by the idea of revelation through
history.3 But among philosophers discussing t.he prob-
lems o religion, the basic in tellectualist assumption that
35 Wcr/tc (Weimar ed.), VII, 215.,
30Jns*G.tcs, bk. iii, ch. 2, par. 7. 87 Ch. i4, par. 2.
38A. A. Hodge, OtZc.nGs of Tc.'ozogy (London, i868), PP. 49-50.
39 0n this development see ]ohm Baillie, Tftc JcZcc} of RetJcci.o7i
in Recent Tlwught (New York., ig56).

30 31

</ 3b# U n i ve rs i d a d
l beroa m erj c a na
MODERN VOLUNTARIST VIEWS 0F FAITH

Behind such statements there lies a long ancestry, going


back even beyond St. Thomas Aquinas, with his descrip-
tion of faith as an act of the intellect moved by the will.
We shall perhaps best see this standpoint in its relation to
t:ontemporary questionings i we study two very different.
Modern Voluria;Tist Views modern writers who offer variations on the voluntarist
theme. These are William ]ames, the apostle of prag-
matism, with his famous doctrine of the Will to Believe;
of Faith ind F. R. Tennant, the Cambridge theologian and author
o the massive P&.Zosophi.cZ T7zcozogy. In each case 1 shall
preface the discussion with an expository "pilot scheme,"
ii.eating the same issue in brief as it appears in the writings
of a precursor.
Our pilot scheme for the Will to Believe is Pascal's
"Wager." 3 In considering this remarkabl'e passage 4 we
THE way o thinking to be considered in this chapter is
that which stresses the part played by the will in the act or should, in justice to Pascal, remember two facts. First, the
state o faith. We are familia.r ffom recent works o philo- iirgument of the Wager is not propoed as a normal path to
sophical theology with such statements as the ollowing: belief in God; it is rather a final and desperate attempt to
move the almost invincibly apathetic unbeliever. And sec-
Faith is distinguished from the entertainment of a probable
ond, the Pc7?Jc'cJ as published consists o notes written by
proposition by the fact that the latter can be a completely Pascal only for his own future use when preparing a work
theoretic affair. Faith is a "yes" of self-commitment, it does
not turn probabilities into certainties; only a sufficient in- in which, in its finished form, there would no doubt have
crease in the weight of evidence could do that. But it is a
s The earliest appearance o the Wager idea would seem to be in
volitional response which takes us out o the theoretic atti-
tude.1 Arnobius, who asks, "is it not more rational, of two things uncertain
and hanging in doubtful suspense, rather to believe that which
0r again: cmies with it some hopes, than that which brings none at all? For
in ie one case there is no danger, i that whidi is said to be at
The distinctive feature of faith, in contrast with mere belief, liand should prove vain and groundless; in the other there is die
is the element in it of will and action .... Faith is not merely greatest loss, even the loss o salvation, if, when the time has come,
the assent that something is true, it is our readiness o act on i[ be shown that there was nothing false in what was dedared"
wha.t we believe true.2 (Co7tr n.o7icJ, bk. ii, sec. 4, transla.tion in T72G 47c-NG.cG7%
Fal'/tGrJ, vol. VI). Gf. Margaret Leigh, "A Ghristian Sceptic of the
1D. TL. E""ett, The Nature of Meta,Physcaz Thtnkng (LondorL, Fourth Century: Some Parallels between Arnobius and .Pascal,"
1945). P. i40. Hibbert Jourha,Z, XIX (ig2C+ig2i).
-S. i. rfhorrLpson, A Modem Philosophy of Rezigion (Chica.go, 4PcmJGJ, 45i. In Octt/rcs Comp.}cs, ed. ]. Ghevalier (Paris,

i955)j P. 74. 1954), PP. i2i2 ff.; in Brunschvicg's ed., no. 233.

32 33
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE MODERN VOLUNTARIST VIEWS 0F FAITH

been safeguards and qualfications of various kinds. We lication. However, William Tames has used the same basic
shall, then, be noting an important idea which Pascal for- dea in the interests of an understanding of the divine na-
mulated in the course of his reflections, but one which does ture more consonant with Ghristian theism; and to this we
not by itself rei)resent his central thinking concerning the- now turn.
istic belief. In his famous essay Ttic W7&.ZZ o BGZ.Gc,6 supplemented
The Wager passage assumes that from the point of view Py....previous essa;y, The Sentiment of Ration-az-ity (L8|9),
of our cognitive capacities the problem of divine existence William James offered a deense o faith which has had a
must be classed with the question whether a coin will fall wide and cominuing influence in many circles. His teach-
head or tail at a paTticular throw. It is a matter which the ing in these writings represenced a stage in his movement
unaided reason has no means o deciding. He thus likens [owards the fully developed pragmatist philosophy. When
the choice between belief and disbelief to a game of James applies his later doctrine to religion, he does so only
chance. In our cosmic gambling den we cannot avoid wa.- in very general terms, discussing belie in "the salvation o
the world" instead of the prior and more precise issue o
gering eiher that God does or does not exist. How then
are we to decide? "Pesons le gain et la perte, en prenant divine existence.7 But his earlier "will to believe" argu-
choix que Dieu est. Estimons ces deux cas: si vous gagnez, ment, which we are to examine here, is worked out both
vous gagnez tout; si vous perdez, vous ne perdez rien. fully and persuasively.
Gagez donc qu'il est, sans hsiter." 5 For you will then win The kind of faith of which it is a defense is the knd
eternal life and felicity i you are right and lose next to which is least obviously defensible. It is not quite that de-
nothing if you are wrong. Make a wager by which you can 8cribed by the schoolboy who said that "Faith is when you
lose nothing and may gain everything. The system is infal- believe, 'cos you want to, something which you know ain't
lible! And indeed if God is conceived on the model o a true." But neither is it, on a superficial view, greatly re-
touchy Eastern potentate, Pascal's Wager might well be a moved from this; for it consists n treating as certain a
rational form of insurance. For to postulate such a God is proposition which you know (or believe) is not certain.
"Faith," says Tames, "is synonymous with working hypoth-
to suppose that we live in a place which some declare to be
the court o an all-powerful despot. He is said to be invisi- esis .... [The believer's] intimate persuasion is that the
ble but inordinately jealous for homage, and we are ad- odds n its favour are strong enough to warrant him in act-
vised to make a slight bow to the apparently empty throne ng all along on the assumption of its truth." 8 Again,
"Faith means belie [strong enough to determine action]
whenever we pass it. If he does not exist after all, we lose
little, while if he does exist, we may thereby save our n something concerning which doubt is still theoretically
lives. POssible." 0
The fact that the Wager translates so readily into some- Before examining Tames's main position, we must reer
what barbarous earthly terms reveals its essentially non- OFirst published in Tfte NGz Worzcz, V, no. i8 (Turie, i896),
religious character. It is its implied conception of the deity nnd reprinted in T/tG TV3.Z o BcZ3.ctJc 73cZ O/w EfJoyf (New York,
that has shocked many readers since the Wager's first pub- 1897).
5 Jb3.cZ., p. i2i4. Cf. ]ames Cargile, "Pascal's Wager," PJ%.ZosoPJty, 7 Pragm.Jm (New York, igo7), Ch. 8.
8The Will to Believe and Otl" Essays, p. 95. 9 Ibid., p. 9o.
July' 1966.

34 35
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE MODERN VOLUNTARIST VIEWS OF FAITH

to a subsidiary question, o some intrinsic importance, consequence of the precursive faith in one another o those
which he raise3 in the course o his discussion. He points mmedjately concerned.13
out that "there are . . . cases where faith creates i[s own
verification"; 1 there are truths which "cannot become And he concludes: "Where faith in a fact can help create
true till our faith has made them so." l Such cases are not Che fact, that would be an insane logic which should say
inffequent in ordinary life. The performance o any feat that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is `The low-
requiring a steady nerve is ]argely dependent upon the est kind o immorality' into which a thinking being can
agem's own belief that his powers are adequate for the fall." 14
task. Tightrope walking, for example, must be a supreme Although these examples see,m undeniably real, the sug-
act of "faith." On such occasions the proposition "1 can do gestion that a proposition can be made true by the purely
this" is true if it is believed sufficiently wholeheartedly, external circumstance that someone believes it, is on the
and false i it is not. Fa.ith creates fact! A like phenomenon face of it remarkable and deserving of further investiga-
is found in recovery from illnesses. It is sometimes the case tion. If such propositions always referred to the future
that if a patient loses hope, he will relapse, whereas if he their oddness might be regarded as only apparent. For it is
firmly expects to recover, he is likely to do so. And the a familiar fact that our beliefs affect our actions and that
speed o recuperation is often relaced to the strength of the our actions in tum cause changes in the world. But, unor-
tunately, self-verifying beliefs do not always refer to the fu-
patient's own faith in his recovery.
Prevenient or creative faith also plays an important part iure. They not only take such forms as "1 Jhcz succeed in
in the sphere of personal relationships. Such a fact as 4's doing X" but also such forms as "1 c% do X." And
liking for 8 may depend partly upon B'J faith that 4 1ikes whereas the first of these statements appears to be a.bout
him, and upon his resulting courtesy, trust, and reciprocal ihe future, the second appears to be about the present.
affection. As ]ames says, "The previous faith on my part in And yet a proposition describing present fact must, surely,
.ilready be true or false irrespective of whether it is be-
your liking's existence is in such cases what makes your lik-
ing come. But if 1 stand a]oo, and reuse to budge an inch Ieved.
until 1 have objective evidence, until you shall have done The solution o the problem is, I think, that the word
"can" performs here a hypothetical-prophetic rather than
something apt, as the absolucists say, c}d c%org%cmdwm cLs-
JG"Jtm mGtm, ten to one your liking never comes." E n descriptive function. "1 can" means (in this context) "1
Finally as ]ames also points out: flhall if 1 try." Thus "1 can do X" is a proposition about any
future attempt 1 may make to accomplish X. And that this
A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what proposition should be true if 1 believe it (and go on be-
leving it up to and into the moment o action), but alse
it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a
trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. f 1 disbelieve it, would be no more odd than the fact that
Wherever a desired resulc is achieved by the co-operation o the proposition "|t wi|| rain here tomorrow is tru if cer-
many independent persons, its exstence as a fact is a pure tan meteorological events are now occurring (and con-
10JZM.d., p. 97. 11Jbcz., p. 96. 12JZ.C!., PP. 23-24. 18Jb!.cZ., p. 24. 14Jb.d., P. 25.

36 37
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE MODERN VOLUNTARIST VIEWS OF FAITH

tinue to develop according to a certain pattern), and false Cwo topics are distinct. The only justification for the refer-
if they are not. There is then, on reflection, no serious log- ence to precursive faith in his essy would be the peda-
ical puzzle involved in the suggestion that faith may some- gogic one that it might serve to break cl.own a reader's non-
times have the power to produce its own verification. rational prejudice against the faith-attitude, and so pre-
But while ]ames's doctrine of creative faith is thus fa.r pare his mind for the argument proper.
well founded, it is of limited application. It is relevant to Tames opens his main argument fTom the same premise
belies about matters which depend wholly or partly upon o epistemological agnosticism as Pascal. Nothing can be
processes governed by ourselves. But-to pass directly to gained, he says, by waiting for proof that God does or does
the belief with which we are specially concerned-can it not exist, for such proo may never be forthcoming. Bm
apply to the conviction that there is a God? Can human nevertheless the issue is of tremendous concern to us; there
faith turn an "atheous" into a theistic universe? It would s no more important question than that concerning the
o course be possible to construct in thought a metaphysi- reality o God. And "we cannot escape the issue by reman-
cal system within which this could happen; but in terms of ing sceptical and waiting for more light, because, although
the ]udaic-Christian view of God as Creator (with which we do avoid error in that way G./ rGZG.gG.om Z7e %m"G, we lose
]ames was working) such a possibility does not arise. the good, c./ 8. e rtG, just as certainly as i we positively
Human faith cannot create the Creator of the human race. chose to disbelieve." 5 The decision between belief and
Faith may perhaps be required for the d&.Jcoucry o God- disbelief is thus a "living, momentous, and forced option,"
this, as we shall see, is ]ames's central contention-but it and one which nevertheless cannot be decided by racional
cannot be required to bring God into existence. The part enquiry. Whichever way we decide, we run a risk. "In
which, as ]ames has noted, is played by the aith-attitude in either case i.ve c*, taking our lie in our hands." 16 If we be-
human personal relationships is not strictly relevant, or lieve, we risk accepting falsehood; if we disbelieve, we risk
such faith does not create the person of the friend but only losing the truth and the practical good which in this case
makes that person friendly. It might be argued that the accompanies it. Which o these risks should we accept?
faith-attitude has a like part to play in the relationship be- The skeptic is he who prefers to risk losing the truth:
tween man and God. But this would noc be faith making Better risk loss of truth than chance of error, that is your
theism true. On the contrary, such faith could only be faith-vetoer's exact position. He is actively playing his stake
effective if theism were already t]:ue; for otherwise there as much as the believer is; he is backing the field against the
would be nothing in the cosmos to respond to our advances religious hypothesis, just as the believer is backing the reli-
of trust and worship. Precursive faith, then, is a re.al and gious hypothesis against the field. To preach scepticism to us
important phenomenon, but it does not bear directly upon as a duty until "sufficient evidence" for religion be found, is
theistic belief. tantamount therefore to telling us, when in presence of the
]ames himself does not appear to have been entirely religious hypothesis, that to yield to our fear of its being error
clear as to this. He attaches his mention o precursive faith is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may be
to his main Will to Believe argument as though they were true. It is not intellect against all passions, dien; it is only
adjoining links in a single logical chain. But in fact the i5ibd., p. 26. 10Ibd., p. 8o.

38 39
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE MODERN VOLUNTARIST VIEWS OF FAITH

intellect with one passion laying down its law. And by what, concerns the existence of a crJomciz God and that in order
forsooth, is the supreme wisdom o this passion warranted? t:o know persons we have to be willing to make a venture
Dupery for dupery, what proof is there that dupery through o faith and to meet them halfway. He says:
hope is so much worse than dupery through fear? 1, for one,
can see no proof; and 1 simply refuse obedience to the scien- The unverse is no longer a mere J to us, but a Tot, if we
tist's command to imitate his kind of option, in a case where are religious; and any relation that may be possible from
my own stake is important enough to give me the right to person to person might be possible here .... To take a
dioose my own form o risk. If religion be true and the evi- ivial illustration: just as a man who in a company of gen-
dence for ic be still insufficient, I do not wish . . . to forfeit
tlemen made no advances, asked a warrant for every conces-
my sole chance n life of getting upon the winning side, that sion, and believed no one's word without proof, would cut
chance dependng, of course, on my willingness to run the himself off by such churlishness from all the social rewards
risk of acting as if my passional need of ta.king the world re- that a more trustworthy spirit would earn, so here, one who
ligiously might be prophetic and right.17 should shuc himself up in snarling logicality and try to make
[he gods extorc his recognition willy-nilly, or not get it at all,
He is asserting, in other words, our right to be]ieve at our might cut himself off for ever from his only opportunity o.
own risk whatever we feel an inner need to believe. One making the gods' acquaintance .... 1, therefore, for one, ca.n-
further passage should be quoted (from Tc SGn3.mcn of not see my way to accepting the agnostic rules for truth-seek-
Rci}3.omZa.y) to underline the essentially sporting nature ing, or wilfully agree to keep my willing nature out of the
of ]ames's attitude to these ultimate issues of belie: game. I cannot do so for this plain reason, that a rule of
thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowl-
0 course 1 yield to my belie in such a case as this or distrust edging certain kincls of truth if those kinds of truth were
it, alike at my peril, just as 1 do in any of die great practical really there, would be an irrational rule.20
decisions of life. If my inborn faculties are good, I am a
All valuable personal relationship, ]ames points out, is
prophet; if poor, I am a ailure; natur spews me out of her
mouth, and diere is an end of me. In the total game of life genetically based upon faith, upon treating others in a
we stake our persons all the while; and if in its theoretic part more trustful way than the evidence currently warrants. 1
our person will help us to a conclusion, surely we should also we were never willing to trust people in this manner, we
stake them there, however inarticulate they may be.18 should never find out whether they are in fact trustworthy.
Without an element o venture, o willingness to antici-
This is the essence o the "will to believe" or, as it would
pate proo, such relationships as love and friendship could
more accurately be called, the "right to believe," 19 argu- never arise. Indeed, we might say, elaborating Tames's
ment. ]ames adds, however, a urther consideration in brie discussion, that nozuzcdgc in the personal sphere
favor o the reasonableness o theistic belief. He points out consists precisely in faith which has been put into practice
that the relevant live option for most o us in the West and verified in our experience. But clearly, if this is so, we
17 Jb..c!., pp. 26-27. 18 JbS.C., P. 94. cannot have the verification without the experimnt. We
19 In a letter ]ames said that his essay "should have been called
cannot achieve a tested and verified faith if we refuse to
by the less unlucky title the R..gh* to Believe" (Trie Gc" o/
Wi+ZZc.om JcimcJ, 11 [London, ig2o], 207). 20 Ibid., pp. 27-28.

40 41
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE MODERN VOLUNTARIST VIEWS OF FAITH
"live options," i.e., to propositions which we already ha.ve
begin with an untested and unverified aith; we cannot
enjoy the flower i we never plant the seed. To decline some inclination to adopt. But surely such a restriction is
aith, in the personal sphere, is thus to decline knowledge unwarranted. For whether or not a belief constitutes a
"live option" to a particular mind has no bearing upon its
also, for knowledge here is simply faith which has been
acted upon and found to be true. truth or falsity. All sorts o accidental circumstances may
But while this consideration, drawn from the character predispose us toward a proposition; the mere fact that it is
of the "I-Thou" world, is both sound and important, it widely held in the society around us is often sufficient. For
adds little to ]ames's "right to believe" a.rgument. It a Ghinese, Conucianism (or rather, today, Communism)
merely underlines the fact that 8.f hG !ftG&.fc.c hypohGJc.J c.J tends to be a live option; for an Arab, Mohammedanism;
.rtG, itve shall miss the truth by reusing faith. It thus and foi- a Briton or an American, Ghristianity: and each
makes our loss more certain i theism should "win" with- religion to the exclusion of the others. But it would clearly
out our having backed it. It does not, however, increa.se be a.bsurd to suppose that the truth varies geographically
the odds in favor o that hypothesis. The argument from with the liveliness of the local options. If we are rational,
the nature o personal relationship is important for the then, and have been convinced by T/3c W8.ZZ o BGZ&.cG, the
neighboring topic of faith as trust (fidwc3.), but not for mere thought o what might be gained if a proposition is
that of faith as cognition (ficzcJ). true will automatically render it a live option to us, in
We now have before us the full range o ]ames's discus- whatever parc of the world we may happen to live. Thus
sion and can proceed to the stage o criticism. the example which ]ames offers of a thoroughly dead op-
The first thing to be said about this view of faith is that tion is an instance of one which his own argument, if
it is not the view of the ordinary religious believer. The sound, should bring to life in any thoughtful mind. He
ordinary believer does not regard his faith as a prudent supposes the Mahdi to write to us, saying, "1 am the Ex-
gamble. He regards it as in some sense kmozuzcdgG of Goc}. pected One whom God has created in his effulgence. You
He does not think it possible, except as a purely verbal shall be infinitely happy if you confess me; otherwise you
concession, that God might not exist. His atcitude is thus shall be cut off from the light of the sun. Weigh, then,
entirely different from that of the gambler. For the latter your infinite gain if 1 am genuine against your finite sacri-
is conscious that he is dealing in uncertainties, while the fice if 1 am not!" 21 I do not see how ]ames could consist-
man of faith is convinced that he has met with certainty. ently refuse such an invitation. For if it is rational to be-
Keeping, however, within the borders o Tames's theory lieve in the Ghristian God on the ground that this mc}y be
itself, we may note some o the consequences which would the only way of gaining the final truth, then it is equally
follow from an attempt to take his argument seriously. It rational to believe in any alternative religious system
would, I think, be found to prove too much. For it author- which mciy also be the sole pathway to Truth. The fact
izes us to believe ("by faith") any proposition, not de- [hat our minds are more accustomed to one claim. than to
monstrably false, which it might be advantageous to us, in another is an irrelevancy. To a purely rational mind, lib-
this world or another, to have accepted. It is true that crated from the accidents o geography nd illuminated by
21 JZ7..cZ., P. 6.
Tames tries to narrow our license for gratuitous belie to
42 43
MODERN VOLUNTARIST VIEWS 0F FAITH
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
power of the evolutionary process. "Life from beginning
]ames's argument, it must appear as important to believe to end," he said, "is a striving for s.elf-consciousness and
in the Mahdi or Mohammed or any other sel-assertive per-
betterment. At first there is only the venture o a primitive
son who offers a heaven and threatens a hell as to believe
trustfulness in trying open possibilities-an instinct which
in the orthodox God of Europe and America. And indeed
the more stupendous the promises and threats, the more precedes knowledge and is the chie means o acquiring
and increasing it. Such is faith at the very outset of life." 22
justified the belie. And he writes elsewhere :
However, i we were to set out on a course o rational
self-insurance against all possible risks of losing the truth, We shall find that almost every forward step in the progress of
we should quickly find that the promised rewards are for life could be formulated as an a-ct o faith-an a.ct not war-
the most part mutually exclusive. In order to make sure o ranted by knowledge-on ie pan o the pioneer who first
one good, i it exists, we have to risk losing other goods, i made it. There was little, for example,. in all tha.t the wisest
hey exist. Accordingly, the only reasonable course would fish could know, to justify the belief that there was more scope
be to wager our faith where the greatest good is to be for existence on the earth than in the water, or to show that
hoped for if our faith should turn out to be justified. That persistenc endea.vours to live on the land would issue in the
transformation of his swim-bladder into lungs. And before a
is to say, we should all believe in that religion or philoso-
bird had cleaved die air there was surely little, in all that the
phy which we most desire to be true. For it may be that it most daring of saurian speculators could see or surmise con-
o.J true, a.nd that only by pinning our faith on it can we re- ceming that untrodden element, to warant him in risking his
alize its benefits. neck in order to satisfy his longing to soar; although, when he
But when we have spelled out ]ames's conception of did try, his forelimbs were transformed to wings at length,
faith thus far, we cannot help asking whether it is much and his dim prevision of a bird became incarnate in himself.23
betteror indeed any better-than an impressive recom-
Whether the evolution of the forms of life takes place by
mendation o "wishul thinking." Is he not saying that
means of random variations, some o which, possessing su-
since the truth is unknown to us we may believe what we
like and that while we are about it we had better believe perior survival value, lead their species in that direction,
or, altematively, by means o some teleological potency
what we like most? This is certainly unjust to ]ames's inten-
tion; but is it unjust to the logic of his argument? I do not immanent within nature as a whole or within its individ-
see that it is: and 1 therefore regard ]ames's theory as open ual ,organisms, is of course in dispute and will no doubt
to Tefutation by a rGdwcc.o d b5wrdtm.
long remain so. Ward's theory is compatible only with the
Our "pilot scheme" for the discussion o F. R.. Ten- ]atter possibility, a possibility which is far from being es-
nant's theory will be a brie comment upon some related 22Esfciys .n P7w.Zosophy (London, ig27), p. 349. Ward'S theory
views of ]ames Ward, whose thought constituted one of of faith has been fairly influential, being taken up by others as well
Tennant's formative philosophical influences. ns by Tennant. For example, D. S. Cairns, in Thc R.ddzc of hc
In the writings o ]ames Ward we meet the conception Worzd (London, igi8), pp. 8o f., used Ward's argument.
28JZ?G.d., p. i06.
o faith as working within nature and providing the motive
45
44
FJUTH AND KNOWLEDGE MODERN VOLUNTARIST VIEWS 0F FAITH

tablished. However, even i we waive the uncertainty of has developed from Ward's rough ground plan. His theory
the. scientific foundation of Ward's view, we shall 1 think o faith is expounded in P/?c.ZoJoJ%.ccZ T7zcozogy, volume 1,
be daunted by other aspects o it. Chapter i i, and more popularly in T72G Ncitrc oJ BcZ.cf,
For is there really any proper continuity or true analogy Ghapter 6.
between, on the one hand, the developments which led Tennant treats the religious and scientific modes of cog-
through thousands of generations from the fish to the la.nd nition as continuous with one another and as exhibiting an
animal and, on the other hand, the human "instinct" or identical logical structure. He seeks to reveal the faith-
desire to worship a higher being? We should not, in justice attitude as active behind both religious and scientific be-
to Ward's stature as a philosopher, make too much of his 1ie. According to this theory aith is "the conative source
somewhat Aesopian language, referring as he does to the o all knowledge." 24 In all awa.reness other than the bare
fish's "Z7ezi.cf that there was more scope for existence on the apprehension o sense data there is, Tennant argues, a
earth than in the water," or the saurian's "Zomgng to soar" phase of "postulation" or "creative imagination," followed
and its "dim P?.G&.sc.om" o the bird. Instead we may note by empirical verification. Each of these phases involves
some o the implications and limitations of his basic con- conation, and thus "conation is genetically a source of all
ception. The suggestion is that the fish's "groping" for lmowledge higher than involuntary sense-knowledge." 25
the land is analogous to man's "groping" or God, with This conative element in or behind all awareness is what
the difference that the latter groping has attained to sel- we call faith. He therefore distinguishes faith from belief
consciousness. We are invited to picture evolution as a (and knowledge) as follows :
grand procession o 1ife through the ages, climbing steadily "Belief" seives to emphasise the cognitive, and "faith" to lay
to its human pinnacle and urging man himsel to launch stress on the conative, side of experience involving venture.
out into a higher spiritual sphere. Theistic faith thus Belief is more or less constrained by fact or Actuality tha.t al-
stands justified as "only the full and final phase o an as- ready is or will be, independently of any striving of ours, and
cending series." But such a theory overlooks the innumer- which convinces us. Faith, on the odier han.d, reaches beyond
able loose ends and cul-de-sacs o prehistory. Most of the [he Actual or the given to the ideally possible, which in the
experimental gropings o life, and feelings towards new first instance it creates, as the mathematician posits his entities,
forms, have ended in ignominious extinction. Even the and then by practical activity may realise or bring into Actu-
"wisest" of fish and the "most daring o saurian specula- ality. Every machine of human invention has thus come to be.
tors" ha.ve been deceived more often than not. It is only Again, a.ith may similarly lead to knowledge of Actua.lity
the fortunate few that have perpetuated their kipds. By which it in so sense creates, but which would have continued,
in absence of die faith-vemure, to be unknown: as in the dis-
what right, then, do we hail as prophetic the analogous
covery of America by Columbus.26
hopes o wise men and human speculators concerning an
invisible realm of spirit? May not this also prove to 1% one We must pause to notice an ambiguity in Tennant's ter-
of nature's many cul-de-sacs? minology. For it is not immediately evident precisely
Without stopping to press these questions, we pass to the 24 Philosophicaz T1.eozogy, (CaLmbridge, L92&), 8o8.
carefully elaborated struture of thought which Tennant 2|bid., p. zg8. 28Ibid p. 29|.

46 47
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE MODERN VOLUNTARIST VIEWS OF FAITH

which element in his various examples he intends to iden- Science postulates what is requisite to make the world amen-
tify as faith. In cases of invention and discovery there are able to the kind of thought that conceives of the structure of
the universe and its orderedness according to quantitative law;
two distinguishable phases prior to verification: (i) The
theology, and sciences o va.luation, postulate what is requisite
act o mental synthesis or supposal, i.e., the formula.tion o
to ma.ke the world amenable to the kind of thought that con-
an hypothesis; this is the work o creative imagination.
ceives of the why and wherefore, the meaning or purpose of
(2) The continuing affective attitude or concern which the universe, and its orderedness according to teleological
leads one to undertake and persevere in the attempt to ver-
principies.28
ify one's hypothesis; this is akin to hope (tinged with ob-
stinacy) that one's theory is correct. Sometimes Tennant And he concludes that science and theology are alike "sub-
seems to be identifying faith with one and sometimes with stantiations of the hoped for a'nd the unseen; the electron
the other. Perhaps, however, we should assume that the and God are equa.lly ideal positings of faith-venture, ra-
two factors jointly constitute faith as he conceives it. tionally indemonstrable, invisible; and the `verifications'
His contention, then, is that faith plays a necessary part of the one idea, and of the other, follow lines essentially
in the acquisition o knowledge (and belie) alike in the identical, accidentally diverse." 29
scientific and in the religious spheres. He continues: It is clear from this that the notion o verification plays a.
crucial part in Tennant's epistemology. Faith, on his view,
There is, o course, no necessity as to the hopeful issue of is valuable only as a stage on the way to verification. The
faith in either actualisation or knowledge. Hopeful experi- relative values of religious and scientific beliefs must there-
menting has not produced the machine capable of perpetual
fore depend upon the extent to which they are respectively
motion; and had Columbus steered with confidence for Utopia,
capable of being verified. There is a further importa.nt pas-
he would not have found it. But when faith succeeds, it is
sage which enlarges on this. It occurs in P7".Zoso7%.ccLZ
defined with psychological a.ccuracy as the substantiation, or
"realisation," of things hoped for and unseen. The religious Tcozogy, but 1 shall quote instead the slightly more ex-
writer who gave us this definition, goes on to enumerate in- panded version in Tennant's later and semipopular book
stances of the heroic life which faith enabled men o old to Thc Nc}trG of BcZ.Gf, in which the same view of faith is
achieve .... We might . . . extend this writer's roll of the proposed, often in the same words, but somecimes with ad-
faithful, and say: by faith, or by hope, Newton founded physics ditional explanations. He refers to the instances of faith
on his few and simple laws of motion; by faith the atomists of cited in the famous eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the
ancient Greece conceived the reign o law throughout the ma- Hebrews. These, he says, are "examples of the gaining o
terial world; and so on indefinitely.27 material and moral advantages, the surmountings of trials
0n this basis Tennant would accord to scientific and reli- and afflictions, and the attainment o heroic life, by men o
old who were inspired by faith. It is thus that faith is prag-
gious belief a common epistemological status. For,
matically `verified' and that certitude as to the unseen is es-
Without more venturesome response from human subjects
tablished." 3 He then proceeds to define more precisely,
than is involved in infallible reading off o the self-evident,
there would have emerged neither religion nor science . . . 28Ibid., p. 299. 2Ibid., P. 808.

27 JZ7&.d., pp. 297-298.


80 The Nature of Belef (London, L948), P. 70.

48 49
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE MODERN VOLUNTARIST VIEWS OF FAITH
and thereby to reduce, the claim which he has previously Catholic view: (a) As acceptance of the "religious hypoth-
made for religious as compared with scientific belief : esis" faith is a propositional attitud. (b) Faith is o the
same epistemological order as scientific knowledge, but
It should be observed, however, tlia.t such verification is only
operates at a lower level of evidence. (c) Faith is not con-
for [subjective] certitude, not a proving o [objective] cer-
tainty as to external reality. The fruitfulness of a belief or cerned with the material world itself, which is the sphere
of faih for die moral and religious lie is one thing, and of scientific knowledge, but with the invisible, in the form
the reality or existence o what is ideated and assumed is of the teleological meaning of the world. (d) Faith is char-
another. There ai.e instances in which belief that is not true, acterized by the conative element within it.
in the sense o con.esponding with fact, may inspire one with What are we to say o this transplanted version of the
lofty ideals and stimulate one to strive to be a more worthy traditional Thomist analysis of faith?
person. And though the foundations of inductive science are It appears to me paradoxical tha.t such an argument
matters of faii, and Science's verification o them is also should be offered, as it is by Tennant, in defense of reli-
merely pragmatic, it is of a different kind from that which is
gious faith. It must surely constitute one o the most dam-
illustrated in die Epistle [to the Hebrews]. Verification of
aging defenses in the whole history of apologetics. For
a scientific postulate or theory does not consist in disciplining
stripped to the bare bones, Tennant's contention is this.
the scientific researcher, either as a lover of ti-udi or as a moral
The scientist postulates various entities-such as the elec-
citizen, and consequently cannot be likened to the pragmatic
verifica.tion of religious faith. It consists in finding that the tron-and finds that he achieves practical results by assum-
ing that these entities exist; and on the basis o this
postula.te or theory is borne out by appeal to external facts
and tallies with them. It is true that this latter kind of verifica- pragmatic verification he concludes that there is a certain
tion also falls short of logical certification; for to be Jw ex- probability that they do exist. The religious man likewise
planation of facts, a theory must not only fit and be exempli- postulates an object, God, and finds that to live as if God
fied by the facts, but musc be the o7?Zy o??G that does so; and existed makes for moral and spiritual success in life; hence,
diat scarcely admits o pi.oof. Still, such verification has prob- it is concluded, there is a certain probability that God too
abimy o a higher ordei- than the other. Nevertheless, veri- exists. The probability of the theistic hypothesis is admit-
fication such as religion claims for its faith will satisfy most tedly lower than that o a verified scientific hypothesis, for
men.81
the latter receives objective and the former only subjective
Here, then, is Tennant's theory. Although its language certification. But nevertheless the pragmatic verification o
is very different from that of Aquinas-reflecting the wide religious faith is such that "it will satisfy most men." 32
The question, however, is whether it o%g72 to satisfy
difference between the medieval world and the age of
modern science-nevertheless it is to be noted that the most men. And it seems clear to me that, when conceived
basic themes are the same. Tennant is indeed a kind of on these lines, it ought not. For Tennant's argument is un-
modern secular Thomist in his conception of faith. For he demined by the admission (in the passage last quoted)
retains, in new forms, the basic features of the Thomist~ that "fruitfilness of a belie or of faith for the moral and
religious life is one thing, and the reality or existence of
81 |bd., pp. |0J|1.
82 The Na,ture of Belief, P. 7i.

50
51
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE MODERN VOLUNTARIST VIEWS OF FAITH

what is ideated or assumed is another. There are instances orever in the outer coui`Cs, for its verification is weak ad
in which a belie that is not true, in the sense of corre- its probability uncertain and impossible to assess. Under
sponding with fact, may inspire one with loty ideals and such conditions religion could only wither and die. For to
stimulate one to strive to be a more worthy person." This the believer faith is not a probability but a certainty; and
is a point upon which Tennant several times insists. Thus to assimilate it to the ever-tentative theorizings o science,
he says in another place, "Spiritual efficacy, or capacity to as something less certain than an accepted hypochesis in
the physical sciences, would be to destroy it.
promote pious and moral life, is one thing; Reality o the
ideal Objects figuring in efficacious doctrines is anoth- Once again, then, we must set aside the voluntarist anal-
er." 88 But if this is so, as o course it is, then religion'S ysis as failing to encompass faith,as it actually occurs in the
experience of religious people.
proffered verification is radically and fatally ambiguous.
In a half acknowledgment of this Tennant concedes And yet although Tames and Tennant both ascribe to
that, whereas the verification o a cientific hypothesis the human will too large and central a part in the act o
"consists in finding that the postulate or theory is borne faith, it would equally be a mistake to accord to it no place
out by appeal to external facts and tallies with them," 84 at all. Faith is an activity o the whole man, and as such
the verification of the religious hypothesis consists in the there is a volitional side to it. I shall suggesc later that reli-
spiritual disciplining of the researcher himself, and that gious faith is a "total interpretation," or mode of apper~
the one kind of verification cannot be likened to the other. ceiving the world. And in the entry into modes o apper-
Science verifies by comparing theory (or more precisely, ception the will has its part to play, a part which we shall
note at a later stage.
predictions derived from a theory) with facts, and religion
by observing its theory's emotional and spiritual concomi- The consideration o Tennant's theory raises the topic
tants in the theorist. However, in spite o this Tennant o "scientific faith"; and this is accordingly a convenient
still makes the claim that "science and theology are o the point at which to refer to what is perhaps the most fre-
same epistemological status." 35 Yet on his own analysis quently eipployed strategy for the defense of religious
they cannot be. For while science often claims a high de- faith. This form of apologetic accepts without cricicism the
gree of probability for its deliverances, theology can only popular conception of faith as voluntary or gratuitous be-
rightly claim that its conclusions have a beneficial effect lieving as distinguished from belie which is compelled by
upon the believer. And any evidential weight which these weight of evidence or by logical demonstration. It is when
effects ma.y have is counterbalanced by .the admission that someone believes, in a case where the same balance of evi-
illusions might ha.ve no less beneficial effects. dence leaves others uncertain or disbelieving, that in ordi-
Tennant's analysis of religious faith amounts then, it ap- nary usage we characterize his belief as faith. Thus "faith"
r.efers to a conviction which exceeds its purely logical war-
pears to me, to a disguised surrender of its claims. Religion
rant; it denotes the adoption o a proposition either in the
gains entry into the courts of Science by claiming to be a
hypothesis susceptible o verification; but it must remain absence o ob].ective grounds or more strongly than such
88 Phizosophical Theology, I, 8oz. 84 Nattwe of Belief, p. io. grounds authorize. Faith is an activity which-whether
8 phizosoplrical Theology,1, 8o8. legitimately or illegitimately-jumps across gaps in the evi-

52 53
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE MODERN VOLUNTARIST VIEWS OF FAITH

dence, arriving at certitude where a neutral calculus would ln spite of its being "on the side of the angels," this rea-
authorize only a judgment o probability. The deense o 8oning appears to me to be insecurely funded, depending
religious aitri with which we are now concerned accepts - as ic does upon an ambiguous use o the term "faith." It is
this analysis but seeks to involve other types o cognition true that in all pra.ctical affairs, including scientific re-
in a similar predicament. It claims that oZZ our important 8earch, we make suppositions. We do this because we are
certitudes are imperfectly evidenced, and that theistic con- iigems and because we do not know the future: in order to
viction accordingly does not stand in need o any special i(:t we are obliged Co make assumptions, therefore, at least
iibom the continued existence and structure o our envir-
justification. Not only religion but the greater part o our
life and knowledge is already based upon faith in this', onment. But these assumptions are not "acts of fa.ith" as
sense. Scientific activity, or example, depends upon aitht` the phrase is used n religion. Religious faith is absolute
in the "unifomity" of nature; all social intercourse and implicit belief; the articles of a creed are no merely
fath n the charcters o our frends; and the smp]esti provisional assumptions. The scientists (gwcz scientist)
maneuver in the physica.l world upon faith in the reliabm cloes not believe "religiously," i.e., absolu.tely and implic-
ity o our sense organs. We cannot then, it is ai-gued, eithe] ]tly, tha,t the universe will continue to exhibit the same
"]aws" tomorrow as yescerday and today. He merely has no
as scientists, as social beings, or as practical men, throw dia
1ectical stones at those who profess to live by faith. For i reason to suppose thac it will not; and since it is only on
this respect we all dwell in equally brittle glass house the assumption of "uniformity" that he can plan his re-
And i science and ordinary life can properly be base 8earches, he cheerfully makes that assumption. His is an act
uponfaith,whynotreli8ional_SO_? _^ . . n . , ,___T
rcligion. He says, "And snce you have been wont to laugh at our
This was the thesis o- Lord Balfour's influential book,
laiih, and with droll jests to pull to pieces our readness o belief
The FOLmda,tions of Bezief (\896). In zL +zLter series o ioo, say, 0 wits, soaked and filled with wisdom's draught, is there
Gifford Lectures, those of G. M. Gwatkin, the same argu ln life any kind of business demanding diligence and ac[ivity, which
ment is expressed in a conveniently concise orm: ihe doers undertake, engage in, and essay, without believing that
lc can be done? Do you travel about, do you sail on the sea, without
Christians are not the only people who walk by faith and no believng that you will return home when your business is done?
by sight.
- We all do it, and must do it every moment o ou r _ __ ___ __
Do you break up the earth wth the plough, and fill t with dfferent
life. Even as we venture from step to step, whether of 1{nds of seeds without believing that you will gather in the fruit
1ife or o the abstrusest scientific argument, in faith that wth the changes of the seasons?" (Conrfl 7ioG.o7te5, bk. ii, sec. 8,
sequences of nature will not fail us, so we wing our way
___L I iranslation in Thc j4nG-N.ce7!c Fa!Acrs, vol. VI).
___Jl

earth to heaven in faith that these sequences are no.t without Moving from the Churd Fathers to contemporary philosophers,
one o the most recent invocations o "scientific faith" in aid of
a Cause.36
reli.gious faith occurs in Raphael Demos, "Are Religious Dogmas
30Tc Kmowzedge of God (Edinburgh, igo7),1, i6.The first Cognitive and Meaningful?" in cdcmG.c Ft.ccc!om, og!.c,. o7id
Ghristian apologist- to argue in this manner was Origen (GTomm RGJi.gon (American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division,
CGZswm,
------ `` -, _ _ bk. , i, ch. ii). Arnobius later developed the possibilities
~,~ o
ig58), 11. A widely read work which adopts the same general
this type _ of apologetic, ridiculing his pagan opponents Btandpont is Alan Richardson's Chr.J!.am j4Pozogc.cs (London,
------ J J _ L \, .1 _ or bein
-1___?_L-

willing to accept on faith almost anything except the Christian 1947).

54 5`5
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

not of faith but of policy. He is moreover prepared to


withdraw his assumption i the acts ever ail to justify it.
Relatively slight irregularities on nature's part, it is true,
prompt him to seek to enlarge his conception o the natu-
ral order rather than relinquish his belie in nature's or-
derliness; and to this extent his faith verges on the reli-
Fa;ith and Moral 3udgment
gious. But any considerable and massive inuption o
chanceandchaoswouldreducethescientisttodespair.His
attitude thus stands in contrast to that o the religious be-
1iever, whose faith is an unshakable dogma, able to absorb
and reinterpret all adverse or seemingly contradicting cir- ANOTHER widely influential approach to the epis-
cumstances.87 [emological nature o faith, considered as propositional
There is, then, no such easy path as some have supposed conviction, traces the genesis of aith to man's moral experi-
fromthe`.faithoscience"toa"scienceoaith." ence. Historically, this way o thinking first arose in re-
W C. G. Ah Ber\net` The Dizemma of Rezigio.u Knowzedge (New iction ffom the previously dominant view that religious
Haven, ig8i), PP. i5-16. beliefs could be sustained by rational demonstration. Re-
jecting that view, Immanuel Kant and his followers turned
from physical and metaphysical science to ethics or the
ground o faith, and this move produced, or expressed, a
new understanding of the nature o the acc o faith itself.
Any exposition of Kant's positive account of religious
belie should be prefaced by a reference to his negative
contention in this field. In the C7.8.3.gtG of P%rc RGcuo73
Kant denies that the existence of God is capable o rational
(1emonstration. He subjects the traditional theistic proofs,
onto]ogical, cosmological, and teleological, to fundamental
criticisms, criticisms which have generally been accepted
l)y subsequent philosophers. He thus excludes the possibil-
.ty of constructing a logically certified theology. However,
having thus judged logical demonstration to be incapable
of providing a basis for theistic belief, Kant found its basis
]n another exercise of rationality. It was one o his mo-
mentous contributions to modern philosophy to insist that
(.is indeed plain men have always taken unspeculatively
57
FJUTH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND MORAI, TUDGMENT

for granted) reason operates practically as well as theoreti- one'spersonalhopesandwishes,istobeperformedsimply


cally. Rationality can be expressed in decisions as well as in and solely because it s rght. Some Words of H. T. Paton's
conclusions, and can issue in actions as well as reflections. express well the essence of the Kantian ethic: "An action
Reason is the capacity to see not only what propositions done from duty has ik moral worth, not from the resul
are true but also what actions ought to be performed. It is Cattansorseekstoattain,butffomaformalprincipleoi-
able to issue commands to the will. These commands are of maxim~the principle of doing one's duty whatever that
two kinds, categorical or moral, and hypothecical or tech- duty may be." 8
nical. The latter type of imperative presupposes a desired We are noc concerned here with the further details of
end and, under the hypothesis that this end is to be a,t- Kanti ethical theory in the Grnczcg7tg, buc with the
tained, commands the requisite actions. A categorical im- connection between morality and religion as this is set
perative on the other hand commands without reference to or_t+nthecrtqueofpract,ca__riea:s.;\.
our desires, enjoining an action as right and thereore as We have noted that Kant regards all actions performed
obligatory irrespective of the manner in whih it gTatifies merely to fu.lfill our desires or to gain pleasure or happi-
or thwarts our personal wishes. It requires the doing of nessasdevoidodistinctivelymoralworth.Heis,however,
duty for duty's sake. far from ignoring the unique position of happiness as the
In tLis Groundwork of the Meta,Physic of Morals Ka:nt ultimate goal of human desire. On Che contrary, he says
defines the formal nature o the categorical imperative. that"tobehappysnecessarilythedesireofeveryrational
The basic principle involved is that of "universalisability," buc fini being." 4 Ths recognition of the inevitable par-
formulated by Kant as "Act only on that maxim through tcipation of happiness in any end which human nature
which you can at the same time will that it should become may set itself combines with Kantt doctrine of the good
a universal 1aw," 1 or (in a subordinate formula) "Act as wll to form his conception o Che %mmtm bo%tm. One
if the maxim of your action were to become through your mght expect, after readng the G"mdJGg%mg and the Ana-
will a universal 1aw o nature." 2 Translating these imper- Iytic of the second Cr.fa.g%G, that for Kant the Jtmm%m
atives into the indicative mood, Kant's contention is that a /Jo%tm would consist simply in the right ethical disposi-
man is morally good, not insofar as he acts in response to iionotherealmofwills;forthefundamentaldogmafrom
his personal desires or with his own private interests in which his ethical theory begins is that "ic s impossible to
view, but insofar as he acts upon a principle which applies conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it,
impartially to others and to himself. The test of right ac- Whichcanbetakenasgoodwithoutqualification,excepta
tion is thus whether the principle (or "maxim"). involved good wim 6 But when in the Dialectic of the CrG.3.qt# o/
is one which could properly be adopted by anyone else in Pr% RGc{5om Kant comes to discuss the idea of the
similar circumstances. Such action, being independent o Jimmtm omtm he begins by drawing a distinction be-

1 Grundlegung zur Meta,Physih der Sitten (2d ed.), p. 52. 1 ba:we 8 Ibid., p. 2o.
4Tcrt#Tqu=o,\f,P,r\:C^t.i.C:_TeoOn]^`Pt.1,T.k.-,ch.i,T+erna.rkri,tra.ns.
quoted from p. 88 of H. ]. Paton's translation, published under the
title of Tbc Momz a[" (London, ig48). l)y L. W. Beck (New York, ig56), P. 24.
2JbS.d., p. 89. C GrtcZcgtt3g (2d ed.), p. 2; Paton's translation, p. 6i.

58
59
FAITH AND MORAL TUDGMENT
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
stepping stone from morality to religion. For the practical
tween two senses o Z?omm, namely JwprGmwm and com-
reason, pursuing the stmmum Z7omm, must assume that
swmmawm. The JwprGmtm Z7o%wm is that which consti-
its attainment is possible, and must therefore postulate a
tutes an ethicl end in itself, a good which is valuable per
Good Will powerful enough to ensure a final apportion-
se and for its own sake, quite apart from any further goods
ment of happiness to virtue. The compulsion to postulate
to which ic may contribute. This is for Kant, as he has
divine existence is thus a .compulsion to "assume that with-
from the first insisted, the good will, or the state o virtue.
out which an aim cannot be achieved which one otgh to
The bo%tm co%swmmawm, on the other hand, is the most
set beore himself invariably in all his actions," 8 namely
complete and comprehensive good, the good which is not
the summum b onum. .
itsel an element in any larger good; and this consists not
The theistic postulation is accordingly an act of faith
in virtue alone bt in vii-tue rewarded with happiness.
This is the state o affairs which a rational being would (GZc"Z7G) made necessary by our moral nature.9 The right
is still to be done for its own sake, but the postulate .of
will i he had unlimited power; and this is what Kant re-
divine existence (together with the related postulate o im-
fers to as the s%mmtm bo7ttm. "That virtue (as the
mortality) is involved in the doing of it. These two postu-
worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition o what-
Iates are indeed "not conditions of the moral law, but only
ever appears to us to be desirable and thus o all our pur-
conditions o the necessary object of a will which is deter-
suit o happiness a.nd, consequently, that it is the supreme
mined by this law." They "proceed from the principle
goodhavebeenprovedintheAnalytic.Butthesetruthsdo of morality, which is not a postulate but a law by which
not imply that virtue is the entire and perect good as the
reason directly determines the will. This will, by the fact
object of the faculty of desire o rational finite beings. For
[hat it is so determined, as a pure will, requires these nec-
this, happiness is also required."
essary conditions for obedience to its precepts. These pos-
Kant makes it clear that desire for happiness cannot pro-
tulates are not theoretical dogmas but presuppositions of
vide the motive o moral goodness; for goodness thus moti-
necessariiy Pr,acticai import." ii
vated would not be moral. Virt:ue simply for its own sake
The last sentence indicates Kant's view of the epistemo-
remains the sole good which is to be pursued as an end in
logical status o such postulates. They do not represent in-
itself. But nevertheless virtue is not the w7ioze good possi-
8ights of theoretical reason, but conclusions which reason
ble to man. The complete good would consist in virtue
.is a theoretical activity accepts ffom reason as a practical
crowned with happiness, virtue enjoying the happiness
lctivity.
which it merits. This is the swmm" bonwm which "rea-
son presents to all rational beings as the goal of. all their But i pure reason of itself can be and really is pra.ctical, as
moral wishes"; this is "the necessary highest end o a the consciousness o the moral law shows it to be, it is only
morally determined will." 7 one and the same reason which judges a priori by principles,
This conception o the swmmwm bonwm is for Kant the 8 Jb..c!., Preface; Beck's translation, p. 5.
0 Gf. !.b.d., pt. i, bk. ii, di. 2, Jcc. 5.
6 Gri.tG.qw of Pt.acG.caz Reaon, pt. i, bk. ii, di. 2; Beck's trans-
10 Jb!.d., Preface; Beck's translation, p. 4.
1ation' p.114. 11 JbG.d., pt. i, bk. ii, ch. 2, sec. 6; Beck's translation, p. i37.
1 Ibid p. \\9.
61
6o

/3rjff/
FAITH AND MORAL TUDGMENT
FAITH AND KNOwljEDGE
ognition o all duties as divine commands"; 15 but such
whether lor theoretical or for pra.ctical purposes. Then it is
commands ai-e not o the nature of.personal communica-
clear that, i its capacity in the former is not sufficient to es-
ta.blish certain propositions positively (which, however, do tions, but racher "essential laws of any ffee will as such." 16
not contradict it), it must assume these propositions just .as This cannot, I think, be regarded as an ana.lysis of the
soon as they are sufficiently certified as belonging imprescrip- faith of the ordinary religious believer; and in the la.ter
tively to the practical interest of pure reason. It must assume very fragmentary Ot PoJ%mtm Kam moved toward a
them indeed as something offered from the outside and not rather different view according to which the experience o
grown on its own soil .... It must remember that they are the moral 1aw, instead of being treated as the basis for a
not its own insights but extensions of its use in some other theistic postulation, is thought~of as in some manner medi-
respect, viz., the practica|.12 ating the divine presence and will. From our standpoint in
Again, from these religious postulates this essay the latter type of position is more helpful than
Che former; and we therefore turn to a somewhat similar
die theoretical knowledge o pure reason does not obtain an view which has been worked out by a twentieth-cencury
accession, but it consists only in this-that those concepts British writer, Donald M. Baillie.
which for it are otherwise problematical (merely thinkable) In Fcu. o." God, Baillie advocates an analysis of faith as
are now described assertorically as actually having objects, arising out o moral experience. He makes it clear, how-
because practical reason inexorably requires the existence o ever, that by moral experience he means our appreciation
these objects or the possibility o its pra.ctically and abso-
o all values, aesthetic and intellectual as well as ethical.
lutely necessary object, the highest good. Theoretical reason
I-Ie speaks "sometimes o absolute values, goodness, truth
is, therefore, justified in assuming them.18
and beauty, but sometimes briefly o Gonscience, as the
For the purpose o our inquiry, the main comment to be revelation of God and the bed-rock o faith." 17
madeuponthisKantaintheoryisthatitleavesnoroomfor Baillie points out that in the Victorian age, an age pe-
any acquaintance with or experience o the divine, such as culiarly haunted by religious doubts, one religious soul
religious persons claim. The ideas o God and immortality after another made a like discovery as to the basic character
are believed, as a necessary assumption, to have an object and credentials of his faith. "It wa.s a case o faith being
and a situation respectively corresponding to them; but driven back by intellectual difficulties upon its own last de-
this assumption is still "no extension o knowledge to fences, and thus discovering what these defences actually
. . . supersensuous objects." 4 We may make a justifiable .ire-the certainties o the moral consciousness. These a
intellectual move to the belie that there is a God; but we man could not doubt, in actual life; and these, taken seri-
cannot be conscious o God himsel, nor thereore can we ()usly and faithfully, carried with them a religious faith in
enter into any kind o personal relationship with him. It is goodness at the heart of the universe." 18
true tha.t Kant conceives his theory as authorizing "the rec- 15 JZ%.cZ., sec. 5; Beck's translation, p. i34. 10 JZJ.d.
T] Fa,th in God and lts Christiam Consummation (Ed3inburgh,
12JZ7.c!., pt. i, bk. ii, ch. 2, sec 8; Beck's translation, pp. i25-i26.
1927)' P. 181.
13 Jb&.d., sec. 7; Beck's translation, P. i89.
is |bid., P. L51.
14 JZ7.d., sec. 7; Beck's translation, P. i4o.

62
63
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND MORAL TUDGMENT

Baillie illustrates this from the writings o F. W. Robert- whch is beyond our imagining, but which is all our heart's
son, Tennyson, Browning, Tolstoy, and others. He chooses Desire.2o
such writers as these, rather than professional philosophers This then, n outline, is Donald Baillie's account o the
who have come to a like conclusion, because he is con- logic of religious assent. " is not a matter," he says, "of
cerned with faith itself as an actual experience, and not ai.gung from the existence in man of a unique faculty
with the subsequent apologetic for it: "Citations from the called Conscience to the existence o a supematural Au-
literature of academic philosophy or theology would not thor who could have implanted it." 21 Rather, "What we
have served our purpose so well, since it might be com~ here claim is that ths voice o Conscience, which we all ac-
pl.ained that we were exhibiting the philosophical proo o cept, tells us, when really unde'rscood, not only o duty, but
theism rather than the actual standing-ground o the reli- o God, and not as an exp]anation of its o".gG.m, but as in-
gious man's belief, and thus were throwing no light upon VOIved in the co7?cn of its utterances." 22
the nature of faith." 19 This passage makes it clear that In asking next how an awareness of God is thus involved
Baillie's concern is identical with our own. He is interested n our awareness of moral values, Baillie insists thac the
in the analysis of faith as an actual occurrence, rather than connection is not one o philosophical postulation such as
in the validity of the various theistic arguments. Kant (in his critical period) taught. We do not arrive at
Baillie sums up as follows the view which he supports: dvine existence as a postulate of the practical reason.

Religious faith is essentia.1ly the conviction that our highest Surely the realm of religious reality is given us in, or with,
values must and do count in the whole scheme of things, that our moral consciousness in a much more direct way than
they are not simply our little dream, but reveal the very that .... Eiier our moral values tell us something about
meaning and purpose of the universe, that love is at the heart the nature and purpose of reality (i.e. gives us the germ of re-
of all things; that (to use Charles Secretan's phrase which Igious belie) or they are subjective and therefore mea.ningless.
William ]ames adopted) "perfection is eternal"; that the world The conviction, "1 ought to do ths," i it means anything at
"means intensely and means good"; tha.t our highest values all, tells me something not simply about myself or about the
"are the answer of man's hearc to something, to someone, that action indicated, but about the very meaning of the universe.23
is not himself, and yet is like himsel in the love of right-
When we meet, as we do, morally earnest men who are
eousness, truth, and beauty." This is the conviction whid,
unable to believe in God-good, kindly, and conscientious
when worked out and lived out, becomes faith in God. It is
for this fundamental conviction that every sincere doubter is agnostics and atheists-we must therefore hold that they
rea.1ly struggling in the last resort, and it is out of diis germinal have an implicit or unconscious faith, which they are pre-
conviction that the whole rich harvest of religious belief vented from rea.lizing rough intellectual misunder-
grows: the conviction that our ideals of love and duty have the 8landings. For
very Purpose and Will of the universe behind them, and are Cod is what we really desire in every simple, spon.taneous,
laid upon us by One in whom somehow they are perfectly disinterested choice of the ideal in our daily lives. God is
realised-are indeed but the shadowings of a Divine Reality
19 JZ)i.d., p. 166. :::;g:: 3;.]:;.2_]73..2]J".P. ]52. 22Jc.d., p. i7o.

64 65
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND MORAL TUDGMENT

what we really love whenever we truly love our fellows. God means o an argument rom the objectivity of values to the
is what we dimly know, even in apprehending our duty in the existence of God.
commonplace details of practice. But the more we live our- Under the latter heading Baillie treats divine existence
selves into the ideal, in a daily life of duty and love, the clearer as a corollary of moral experience, capable of being
becomes our conscious knowledge of God, in whidi alone we
grasped by an exercise of intelligence. "Our moral convic-
can rest, and which alone, in its turn, can empower us to
tions," he says, "our absolute values, the utterances of our
realise the ideal. And this is more dian morality: this is
Conscience, which remain indubitable to us in actual life,
reiigion.24
even through the darkest periods of religious doubt, c7t-
From exposition we turn to comment. Our purpose
throughout this book is to study theistic faith from the T:_t _:n t.J:e ?f
l.r.oduction last.
thea?aly.ss
dea of-beGod:'
-gtven2T~so
a meari;g
tiat withou; ;'hi;_
t+m cois--::
standpoint of epistemology. We are attempting an analysis tious man, "whether he realizes it or not, ezG.et/GJ Jome-
of faith considered as a mode of cognition; not a philo- /eG.ng zh3.c 8.tioGf not only duty but God, not only
sophical apologia for the content of religious faith. Donald morality but religion." 28 Again, "our moral conscious-
Baille adopts a similar aim. It is therefore as an account o ness, when taken in earnest, 3.7atJoGJ %J in a whole realm
the act or state of faith that we desire to examine this the- of religious truth." 2 It is not suggested that God's exist-
ory. This should be emphasized at the outset, for there ap- ence is given together with conscience as a fact patent to
pears to be an oscil]ation in Baillie's thought between the all; rather it is an ultimace implicate, available to all but
variant interests and methods of epistemology and apolo- grasped only by some. Thus Baillie's thesis is not that con-
getics. science witnesses openly to God, but that the acknowledge-
The teaching of Fc%. .n God is, as we have seen, that ment of the authority of conscience logically carries with it
theistic faith is "a. conviction arising out of the moral con- a recognition of God's existence. Respect for conscience,
sciousness." 25 The fact that there is a God is given in and Baille holds, cannot ultimately be justified withouc resort
with the utterances of conscience, as part o those utter- Co theism. The act of faith is thus the inference which un-
ances.2 However, it is clear from Baillie's further discus- folds to the moral]y eamest man the final implicates of
sion that he does not hold divine existence to be part of that by which he is living.
the 77?m.JGJ content o conscience; for there are conscien- IC is by this method o drawing out the metaphysical im-
tious persons who do not acknowledge a God. How then is plications of our moral experience that many o the fore-
the apprehension o the divine relaced to our moral expe- most Christian apologists o recent generations have pro-
rience? ceeded. However, as will appear in Chapter 7, I am not
Baillie's answer to this question moves upon two planes. myself able to adopt either this or any other form of natu-
In some passages he is describing the historical origin of re- ral theology designed to present theism as the most likely
ligious faith in the human mind, namely, in the apprecia- explanation o the universe. I cannot discover any logically
tion of and response to values. In other and more numer- compulsory inference-route ffom the character of our ethi-
ous passages he is setting forth a validation o faith by 22Torbbd;:,Pp.. LL679L ({=y ,}ttaaL\:c=)).. 28 Ibid. (mY talcs).
24Ibid., pp. 228-224. 2lbid., p. L55. 2 C. bicl., P. L7o.

66
67
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

cal experience to divine existence, any necessary transition


ffom respect for conscience to belief in God. 1 there were
any such demonstrative proof, capable o being resisted
only by intellectua.l obtuseness, it could hardly have failed
by now to gain general acceptance. There would be no in-
telligent and conscientious atheists or agnostics. But in fact Fa;ith and the lllative Sense
there are such persons, as Baillie acknowledges. It there-
fore seems clear that some other factor than logical calcula-
tion lies behind the move from morality to God; and this
other factor is of course precisely religious faith.
There is a second strand in Baillie's discussion, and one
from which we may gladly carry forward something valua- F. H. BRADLEY once spoke o metaphysics as the find-
ble into Part 11. This other strand is the thought o our ap- ng o bad reasons for what we believe upon instinctJ
prehension of the divine as mccz&.cicd through our appre- Cardinal Newman would have approved this dictum. He
hension of values. This occurs in isuch passages as the was deeply conscious o the fact thac our more fundamen-
following: tal convictions are reached, not by the intellect alone, but
The germ o faith in God is present (we have now seen) even by the whole man functioning as a thinking, feeling, and
in mora.1 conviction. To put it somewhat dangerously: faith willing unity. There is a passa8.e in his account of his grad-
is what every one knows, if only one is willing to know it. ual conversion to Roman Gatholicism which gives expres-
Faith is the inward voice which all can hea.r increasingly son to this view. "For myself," he says, "it was not logic,
according to their loyalty. This is the real "religious ci P7.e.or3.." [hen, thac carried me on; as well might one say that the
It is the ezementa,l seri,se of the Diuine which expresses itseLf quicksilver in the barometer changes the weather. It is the
G.7? c}ZZ o%r cZ%cs, though not completely in any of them or in concrete being that reasons; pass a number of years, and 1
all o them put together.80 find my mind in a new place; how? the whole man moves;
The thought is expressed even more explicitly in the Paper logic is but the record of it." 2
words of George Tyrrell, which Baillie quotes, "The sense The central aim o Newman's main contribution to phi-
o the Absolute is given not Z7cJz.dc, but .7t and w.h and losophy, his EJJc{y 8.m 48.d oJ a Grommcir of 4JJGm (first
*tirotgA the sense of the ldeal in every department." 81, published in i87o), is to describe the informal ways in
This second element occurs much less extensively jn Don-' which our convictions are in fact arrived at, particularly in
ald Baillie's discussion than the argument from morality to matters of religion, in distinction from the theoretical pro-
religion, but it is more germane to our purpose in this es- cedures of "paper logic." His object is to describe rather
say. In Part 11 we shall attempt to go yet further in the than to speculate, and his discussion is for the most part
same direction. 1 F. H. Bradley, j4e""G " ReaJ{.y (2d ed.; London, i897),
30 Jb.cZ., p. i86 (my italics). p. xiv.
81 JbS.cZ., p. 222, quoting Tyrrell, c% Orci73cZS., p. xi. 2 4oog!. ro y* S%a (2d ed,.; London, i865), p. i88.

68
69
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND THE ILLATIVE SENSE

(issent, then assent is a stage within inference, and the two


psychological in subject matter and empirical in method.
However, the border between the psychological and the ire inseparable. But, says Newman, in fact they are not in-
Heparable. For, first, i.ve often assent to a proposition long
epistemological is notoriously difficult to maintain, and
Newman's pages in fact provide a combined psychological- if ter we have forgotten how to infer it; and on these occa-
epistemological discussion which throws light upon both iions assent is psychologically divorced from inference.
sides of the border. And second, the move from inference to assent, from con-
Newman's analysis rests upon an initial distinction be- (1itional to unconditional acceptance, is seldom a purely
tween inference and assent. To infer a proposition by a .iutomatic one. It is often a further and important step,
logica.1 calculus, he says, is not Go 8.PJo to assent to th?t nnd a step which is taken by the "whole man." Sometimes,
liowever, the "whole man" will refuse to take it, so that in-
proposition; for inference is hypothetical while assent is
categorical. In arguing from P to g we infer q on the hy- ference is complete qua. inference and yet fails to produce
.issent. For example, iive may be presented with a "water-
pothesis P. Inference as such cannot lead us to assent to q,
but only to "i P then q." For inference is concerned solely tight" argument, and yet have va.gue and perhaps un-
with the relations between propositions; with the validity formulable doubts about its premises such that, although
"\11.1 ::::

of an argument, not with the truth o its conclusion. The we are unable to state grounds for challenging them, and
tl;:.tl

""1llll:i,i
acceptance of an argument as valid does not in itsel consti- .ilthough we acknowledge the formal validity of the rea-
lu tute the adoption o its conclusion: "though acts o assent soning, yet we still cannot accord our whole-hearted assent
1 ;' :1

require [in the cases he is considering] previous acts o in- to its conclusion. Or it may be that although we feel confi-
lT.:,'

ference, they require them, not as adequate causes, but as dent about both the premises and t:he reasoning considered
l ' :jl

ID Jc.mG g" tiom conditions." 3 0therwise assent and infer- in themselves, yec the conclusion conflicts with other al-
(

1'

ence would be identical, and one o the two terms would ready formed convictions, of longer standing in our minds,
'Ilu
l ' ,..'

be otiose. which prevent us from assenting to it. Newman describes


the kinds of motive which might lead us to withdraw our
111 ;:'u

1 ' tl.'d

If a professed act can only be viewed as the ne.cessary and adherence from a previously accepted belief while having
immediate repetition of anotiier act i assent is a sort of no formal objection to raise against the reasoning on
reproduction and double of an act o inference, i when in-
which it is based:
ference detei-mines that a proposition is somewhat, or not a
little, or a good deal, or very like truth, assent as its natural There may have been some vague feeling that a fault lay a.t
and noi.mal counterpart says that it a.J somewhat, or not a the ultimate basis, or in the underlying conditions, of our
little, or a good deal, or very like truth, then 1 do not see i`easonings; or some misgiving that the subject-matter of them
what we mean by saying, or why we say at all, that here is was beyond the reach of die huma.n mind; or a consciousness
any such act.4 hat we had gained a broader view of things in general than
when we first gave our assent; or that there wer'e strong ob-
1, in cases o assent to a reasoned conclusion, we may
jections to our first acceptance, which we had never taken
assent only when we infer, and i whenever we iner we into account.5
3 4 Grammar of 4Jsem, ed. G. F. Harrold (New York, ig47), P. 82.
5 Jb.cZ., pp. i26-127.
4 Jb.d., P. 124.

71
70
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND THE ILLATIVE SENSE

And M. G. D'Arcy adds the observation that "owing to a the terms o a real proposition being particular and those
natural timidity of mind some cannot believe tha.t their o a notional proposition general. He then equates real
views and arguments are sound until they find an inde- apprehension with the apprehension of "rea.l" propositions
and notional apprehension with the apprehension o "no-
pendent witness or hear another supporting the same
[ional" propositions:
point o view." 6 In such cases as these we may be con-
scious that the proposition in question is in a sense proved, Now there are propositions, in wliich one or both o the tems
and yet nevertheless be unable to assent to it. Therefore, are common nouns, as standing for what is abstract, general,
says Newman, assent is neither equivalent to inference nor and non-existing, such as "Ma.n is an animal, some men are
an automatic concomitant o it. As a psychological observa- leamed, an Apostle is a creation of Christianity, a line is a
tion-namely, that unqualified adoption does not always length without breadth, to err is human, to forgive divine."
supervene upon the conclusion of an inference which we These 1 shall call notional propositions, and the apprehension
regard as valid-Newman's 'distinction appears to be well with which we infer or assent to diem, notional.
And there are other propositions, which are composed of
founded.
sngular nouns, and of which the terms stand for things ex-
Further, says Newman, speaking still as a psychological
temal to us, unit and indivdual, as "Philip was the father
observer, assent is an "all or nothing" phenomenon. "1
of Alexander," "the eari goes round the sun," "the Apostles
human nature is to be its own witness, there is no medium first preached to the ]ews"; and these 1 shall call real proposi-
between assenting and not assenting." 7 We may often tions, and their apprehension real.8
assent on insufficient grounds, and often fail to assent when
the grounds are ample, but this does not alter the fact that So far Newman's statement is clear; the distinction be-
assent, when it occurs, is distinct from the perception o tween real and notional apprehension rests upon a forma.l
division between singular and general propositions. The
grounds for belief. For assent is an unconditional ac-
ceptance of and adherence to a given proposition without distinction thus belongs to the province o 1ogic. But New-
doubt or hesitation. Evidence for a proposition may grow man then proceeds to upset this position by adding that
"the same proposition may admit of both these interpreta.-
until at last the moment comes when we assent to it. But
our assent does not grow with the evidence. To assent is to tions at once, ha.ving a notional sense as used by one man,
be certain, and 1 cannot be more than certain, or partially, and a real as used by another." For example, "No one
comparatively, or increasingly certain: "assent" is (in Gil- could possibly confise the real assent o a Christian to the
bert Ryle's terminology) an achievement or "got it" word. fact of our Lord's crucifixion, with the notiona.1 acceptance
Related to this dividing o assent from inerence. is New- o it, as a poinc of history, c)n the part of a philosophical
man's famous distinction between "real" and "notional" heathen." 1 Here the real-notional antithesis clearly re-
fers, not to two propositioml forms, but to two mods o
thinking. The distinction is a useful one, but unfortu-
nately Newman introduces it in a misleading way. He dis- apprehending propositions. The distinction has now be-
tinguishes first between real and notional propositions- come a psychological one.
It is this latter, psychological distinction with which
0 The Na,ture of Bezief (2d ed.., London, L945), P. LL8.
s|bid., p. 8. Olbid. .-Olbid., p. 8o.
1 C*ammar of ASsent, P. i88.

72
73
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND THE ILLATIVE SENSE

Newman .is really concerned and which he uses in his later ionally. His mind would be operating as a we||-
discussions. The contrast is perhaps more familiar today as i}rogrammed calculating macline.
that between the "cashed" and the "uncashed" use o sym- Notional thinking has botl] its uses andl its abuses. These
bols. Symbols can be used either as counters to be com- `ii`e indicated in Hobbes's iphorism, ``Words are wise
bined and calculated 3.nGr Jc, or as signs to be "cashed" in iiien's counters, they do but ]eckon by them; but they are
terms of their appropriate mental images. In their un- the money o fools." 12 The advantage iof uncashed sym-
cashed use we apprehend words (and other indicative sym- I)o]s is that we can manipuhte them miore speedily than
bols) "notionally," treating them as ends in themselves, as images, encumbered as these are by a drag o associations.
objects in their own right; and in their cashed use we ap- Notional]y apprehended woJds 'Can conveniently be car
prehend them "real-1y," treating them as means or instru- imlated with in accordance ".ith linguistic rules, the final
ments, as tokens representing objects beyond themselves. wt.ige only being cashed in nental images and executive
Perhaps the only cases o purely notional or uncashed (lecisions. Thus, for example it is useful for certain pur-
thinking occur in mathema.tics and in the manipulation of i)oses to classify and label su(h items as Periods o history,
variables in symbolic logic. At various removes from this Nystems of philosophy, groups of People, and even individ-
in the direction of fully real apprehension we find numer- mls, so that, in Newman's rirase, a person "is made the
ous cases of a predominantly notional use o symbols. For ]ogarithm of his true self, and in that Shape is worked with
examp]e, the schoolboy pari-ots, "William the First, io66- the ease and satisfaction oE Iogarithms." 13 Indeed a||
io87; William the Second, io87-iioo . . ." as an almost wpeech and all fully verbalize thinking is to a considerable
purely verbal exercise: althugh i he comes to acquire a t`xtent notional, consisting ifl operations with symbols in
body o information about these men, ;nd an imaginative iccordance with syntactical ].ules. But Symbols employed
grasp o the life of their periods, the phrases gradually be- in this way should be used as a Short Cut to, and not as a
come charged with significance for him. Aga.in, to quote Bubstitute for, an end-state wliich is Cashe.d or apprehended
one o Newman's own illustrations: "real-ly." In other words, ouf Counters must be treated as
fluch, and at the end of the game the result of the transac-
a clever schoolboy, from a thorough gi-ammatical knowledge tions must be realized in the hard Currericy of experience.
o both languages, might turn into English a French treatise Real apprehension, on the other hand, is the use o sym-
on national wealth, procluce, consumption, labour, profits, l)ols to evoke images and to ]-ecall releva.nt associations, so
measures of value, public debt, and the circulating medium,
tha[ the idea presented for attention receives an infusion
with an apprehension of what it was his author was stating
of life from our stored mem()ries. Thus, when 1 read of a
sufficient for making it clear to an English i.eader, hile he
had not die faintest conception himself what the treatise, i.iorm raging in the Atlantic or a great fire burning in San
which he was translating, really determined.11 Francisco, the words borrow Pieaning from my memories
{)f storms or fires and so operace, not merely notionally, as
He would be efficiently transposing the s,ymbols, but ap- (1etached labels, but real-ly, as Calling up vivid pictures to
prehending the propositions expressed by them only no- my imagination. To quote a Well-known passage of New-
man's:
11Jb.cZ., p. i8. mctw.a*J72, bk. i, ch. 4. .t3 0P. Ct.}.j p. 25.

74 75
FAITH AND THE ILLATIVE SENSE
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
"Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori," is a mere common-! guage the doctrine which is, as D'Arcy says, "Newman's
answer to the prob]em that he set out t solve." 17
place, a terse expression o abstractions in the mind o the` It will be convenient to introduce Newman's theory o
poet himsel, i Philippi is to be the index o his patriotism,
whereas it would be the record o experiences, a sovereign informal inference and its correlative illative sense, by
dogma, a grand aspiration, inflaming the imagination, pierc- contrast with the view against which he was reacting. This
ing the heart, o a Wallace or a Tell.14 may be called rationalism, in one o that term's several'
uses. This is the view, derived from Descartes, and mod-
This real-notional distinction is related to that between
elled on the mathematical ideal, that knowledge consists in
inerence and assent in that inferences, which are essen-
apprel the possession of clear and distinct ideas, and is increased
tiallyconditional,are"especiallycognatetonotional
-'`-_--J _-_-_ loo1
by chains of such ideas arranged in the orm of demonstra-
henson, and assents, whch ar unondtona], to reaL. 6
tive proos; so that to know P is equivalent to being able to
However, the two distinctions are only offered as pro
bar Prove . Locke, sturdy empiricist though he was, remained
legomena
1,
to Newman's main task, which is to la.y 11
n this sense a rationalistl8 and it is Locke whom New-
the grammar o assent, the procedures by which me
man takes as the spokesman of this point of view. Locke
arrive at their convictions. He is dealing solely with co]
had written:
victions concerning matters o fact, which are as suc
outside the scope o- demonstrative proo; and he is intei There is nobody n the commonwealth of learning, who does
ested primarily in the grammar o religious conviction, o iiot profess himself a lover of truth: and there is not a rational
faith.16 creature that would not take it amiss to be thought otherwise
The title under which Newman introduces his mai of. And yet for all this, one may truly say there are very
contribution to our understanding in this sphere is "th fcw lovers of truth for truth's sake, even amongst those who
I11ative Sense." The phrase invokes the ghost o the dis i}ersuade themselves that they are so. How a man may know
carded faculty psychology. However, we need not wasi whether he be so in eamest, is worthy enquiry: and 1 think
time in chiding Newman upon this, or in elaborately exo there is this one unerring mark of it, viz., the not entertaining
cising the hau-nted words. Instead we can better occui nny proposicion with grea.ter assurance than the proofs it is
bum upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure o
ourselves by trying to restate in more contemporary la
i`88ent, it is plain, receives not truth for the love o it; loves
14Jb..c!., pp. 8-9. 15Jbi.d., p. io. itoc truth for truth's sake, but for some other by-end. For,
16 Newman does not renounce the official Roman Catholic vie m the evidence that any proposition is true (except such as
o faith as an adoption o theological belies on audiority. nre sel-evident) lying only in the proofs a man has o it,
others o his writings this theme has free rein. (For example
says that "the very meaning, the very exercise o aith, is join \, OP. cit., p. \\o.
the
lL+\, Church"
1-+ ------ [Semonf,
L_ 11, i84].)
---.., BT_t
` in die Gramm"r 11of
__ sseri
___1.?_: 18 Cf. ]ames Gibson, .ockc'f Thcory of Knozzcdgc (Gambridge,
employs
`,+L+l{*\,J`, a-` different
_--_-_ usage and refers to all1 specifically
_____L_
religio
1__l=_C /_C
1)17). Noman Kemp Smith (Co77mGnoyy o Kfl?t's Cr..gte o/
assents as faith (c. p. 75). He also calls sudi assents belie (c.
PWW j2G"on, p. 592) goes so far as to say that "Locke gives more
68). Whidever word he uses, he is discussing the subject wi
Xircme expression than even Descartes does, to the mystically con-
which we are concerned in this book, namely religious ai
Clvcd mathematical method."
considered as putatively cognitive.
77
76
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AjND THE II,LATIVE SENSE

whatsoever degi.ee of assent he affords ic beyond he degrees I-Iow then is it not inconsistent widi right reason, with the
of that evidence, it is plain that all the sui.plusage of assurance love of truth for its own sake, to allow .in his [Locke's] words
is owing to some other affection and noc to the love of truth: quoted above, certain strong "probabilities" to "govern oui.
it being as impossible, diat the love of truth should carry my ihoughts as absolutely as the most eviclent demonstrations"?
assent above the evidence there is to me that it is true, as that how is there no "surplusage of assurance beyond the degrees of
the love of truth should make me assem to any proposition, the evidence" when in the case of these strong probabilities,
or the sake o that evidence, which it has not tiia.t it is true; we pemit "our beliief, dius grounded, to rise to assurance," a;
which is, in effect, to love it as a trudi, because ic is possible he pronounces we are rational in doing? 23
or probable that it may not be true.10
The rationalist, in fact, is un,able to practice what he
In a sense o course this is axiomatic. We should all wish preaches; and the only escape from his self-appointed
to adopt propositions with a confidence proportionate to dilemma consists in accepting an enlarged view o knowl-
their probability, and t:o be certain only o such proposi- edge. In Newman's .terminology, iive must recognize the
tions as we know to be true. But that this is in practice a validity o "informal" as well as "formal" inference.
less simple matter than Locke had made it appear is In explanation of the general principle underlying what
brought out by Newman's comments. Locke admitted, he lie calls informal inerence, Newman bases an analogy
points out, that although i.ve do noc strictly ftmow the truth upon. the opening ZGmma o Newton's P".tm8.8.o. He says:
o such useful propositions as that fire warms and iron
We know tha.t a regular polygon, inscribed in a circle, its sides
sinks in water, yet for all practical purposes we behave as if
being continually diminished, tends to become that circle, as
we did. f such pseudo-knowledge Locke said that "we re- [s limit; but it vanishes before it has coincided with the circle,
ceive it as easily and build as firmly upon ic as if it iivere so that its tenclency to be the circle, though evei. nearer fulfil-
certain knowledge; and we reason and act thereupon with ment, never in fact gets beyond a tendency. In like manner,
as little doubt as if it were perect demonstration."20 [he conclusion in a real or concrete question is foreseen in the
"These probabilities," he says, "rise so near to certainty
number and direction o accumulated premisses, which all
that they govern our thoughts as absolutely, and influence converge to it, and as the result of their combination, ap-
all our actions as fully, as the most evident demonstration; i)roach it more nearly than any assignable difference, yet do
and, in what concerns us, we make little or no difference iiot touch it logically (though only noc touching it) on account
between them and certain knowledge." 21 of the nature of its subject-matter, and the delicate and im-
It seems then that the rationalist doctrine o apportion- i)Icit character of at least part of the reasonings on which it
(lepends. It is by the strength, variety, or multiplicity of
ing our assent strictly to the evidence is one for use. only in
the study, while we act in practical life upon other and less i)remisses, which are only probable, not by invincible syllo-
.isms-by objections overcome, by adverse theories neutralised,
exacting principles-as indeed David Hume, in his philos- l)y difficulties gradually clearing up, by exceptions proving
ophy of belie, was quick to acknowledge.22 Newman there- the rule, by unlooked-for correlations found for received
f ore asks : ti`mhs, by suspense and delay in the process ssuing in trium-
19Efsciy, bk. iv, di. ig, sec. i. i)hant reactions---by all these ways and ma.ny others, it is that
20Efsci)), bk. iv, di. i6, sec. 6. 21JZ7.d. tlie practiced and experienced mind is able to make a sure
22 TrcaG.5c, bk. i, sec. 8 (see, e.g., Selby-Bigge's ed., p. 269). -8 Gra,mmar of Assent, p. i28.

78
79
FAITH AND THE ILLATIVE SENSE
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
doubter. We believe it because the belie coheres with the
divination that a conclusion is inevitable, of which his lines of
reasoning do not actually put him in possession.24 mass o our other belies and is not. contra.dicted by any
tem o our experience.
Reasoning o this kind is not demonstrative; and yet it is Our reasons for believing that we are circumnavigable ar?
rational to adopt and to act upon its conclusions. To New- such as these:-first, we have been so taught in our diildhood,
man, approaching these matters with the assumption that and it is so on all the maps; next, we have never heard it
all valid inference is syllogistic or capable o being trans- contradicted or questioned; on the contrary, everyone whom
lated into syllogisms, this was a revolutionary discovery. we have heard speak on the subject of Great Brita.in, every
For it suggested to him tha.t we can know without being book we have rea.d, inva.riably topk it for granted; our whole
able to prove. national histoiy, the routine transactions and current events
Perhaps the best known pages of the Grmmc}r are those of the country, our social and commercial system, our political
in which Newman gives concrete illustrations o this prin- i.elations with foreigners, imply it in one way or anothei-.
ciple. I will cite only his use of the belief that Britain is an Numberless facts, or what we consider facts, rest on the truth
of it; no received fact rests on its being otherwise.26
island (or more exactly, a group of islands). I have not
sailed round the entire coast of Britain, and even if 1 had, "On the whole," Newman concludes, "1 think it is the
or thought that 1 had, the proof o its insularity would be fact that many of our most obstinate and most reasonable
far from complete. It would amount to no .more than a certitudes depend on proofs which are informal and per-
probable inference, for 1 should still not have viewed it all sonal, which baffle our powers o analysis, and cannot be
at once and oZ7JcrGd it to be. an island. I might all the time brought under logical rule, because they cannot be sub-
have been sailing along the shore o an inland sea. Perhaps, mitted to logical staistics." 27 Passing over the curious
however, I know of someone who has been sufficiently high phrase "logical statistics," it appears to me that Newman
in an airplane or a rocket to see directly that Britain is en- has made out his main contention, namely tha.t the reason-
tirely surrounded by water. Even so his report cannot ing by which we arrive at many, perhaps most, of the cer-
count as strict proof for me; it constitutes only evidence tainties by which we live, does not consist in acquiring
authorizing a judgment o probability. For the observer Cartesian "clear and distinct ideas" and perfectly cogent
might have been deluded oi- be lying; and his photogi-aphs chains of reasoning, but rather in appreciating the drift of
might be faked, or might merely record some atmospheric a miscellaneous mass of evidence. The reasons for our con-
distortion. In short, although we are completely certain clusions operate, in a phrase of ]ohn Wisdom's, "like the
that Britain G.J an island, so that, as Newman says, "there is legs o a chair, not like the links of a chain." 28 A great
no security on which we should be better content .to stake mass of facts fit together in terms of our belie, though no
our interests, our property, our welfare, than on the fact ne of them strictly entails it. Our capacity to see a. 1arge
that we are living on an island," 25 yet most o us cannot field of evidence as a whole and to divine its significance is
properly claim to kmow (in the strict rationalist sense) what Newman calls the illative sense.
that it is so, nor could we easily prove it to a persistent 20Ibid., p. 224. 2Tlbd., P. 229.
28 Proc. j4?.!.J!o. SoC., ig44.-1945j P.195.
24J!.cL p. 244. 26Jzn.Cl., p. 228.

81
8o
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND THE ILLATIVE SENSE

ln his discussion o informal inference and the illative What Newman is rightly concerned to stress in this con~
sense Newman is, I think, drawing attention to two dis- nection is that although the man of ekperienced judgment
tinct facts which it will perhaps be well to treat separately. may be una,ble to give public, or even private, expression
to his train o i-easoning, his conclusions are not on that
(a) He is concerned to make the point that our reasoning
is often implicit, or unconscious, but that it is none the less accoum any the less rational. Indeed the reasons which
rational on that account. (b) He argues also that our rea- people give on demand for an "intuitive" verdict are often
soning concerning mattei-s o fact involves an unavoidably not the reasons on which their verdict is in fact based; for
they ma.y be quite unable to formulate these reasons. Diag-
personal or subjective element, a recognition o which is
vital to the study of such flndamental convictions as those nostic skill in a particular field, and skill in the deploy-
of religion. ment of words, are different skills; and a lack of the latter
does not entail any deficiency in the former. Noting this
(a) When we acknowledge that "one should attend to
the undemonstrated dicta and opinions o the skilul, the fact, ]. S. Mill cites in illustration "Lord Mansfield's advice
old, and the wise" 29 we are recognizing, z.7tcr oZ.cL, the to a man of practical good sense, who, being appointed
validity and importance o implicit or unconscious (and governor of a colony, had to preside in its court of justice,
subconscious) trains of reasoning. For the judgments of without previous judicial practice or legal education. The
the experienced-or example, the experienced mechanic, advice was to give his decision boldly, for it would proba-
soldier, farmer, or physician-are often not consciously rea- bly be right; but never to venture on assigning reasons, for
soned but are instead arrived at with an apparently intuiL [hey would almost infallibly be wrong." 3 Gonsider also
tive directness. The aged shepherd is probably quite un- such personal assessments'as that "So-and-so can be relied
able to explain why he feels sure that it will ra.in to- on to arbitrate impartially," or "has no sense of humour,"
morrow, and yet his judgment is based upon evidence, in or "would be a useful person to be with on a lion hunt."
the form of a multiplicicy of meteorological signs which he Very often we believe such propositions, and believe them
has learned by experience to interpret aright. His feeling as a result of prolonged and accurate observations of the
represents the outcome o a reasoning process of the forT person in question, and are yet unable on being chal-
"if P, r, s, , etc., then very probably g",. but this process is lenged to point to any-or at any rate, to sufficient-
habitual and unconscious. Indeed the more experienced evidence to support them. This difficulty in citing
the judging mind the less does it need consciously to re- evidence may well be due, not to our conclusion's being
hearse and scrutinize the processes leading to its conclu- based on imdequate evidence, but on the contrary to its
sions. Tust as, in reading print, the practiced reader has no I)eing based upon such a vast multiplicity of evidence that
need to spell out each letter of a word and each word of a we cannot now separately recall the particular items. If a
sentence, passing instead straight from the GGs! appear- ihan's character makes a consistent impression upon us
ance o a phrase to its meaning, so the expert in any field ()ver a period of time, we normally come to hold a definite
tends to take in the relevant signs at a glance and to inter- md evidenced opinion of him. And yet we may be power-
Icss to convey to another the grounds for our opinion. In
pret them without conscious effort.
29 Aristotle, N.co7nacJwcim Ef7%.cs, bk. vi, di. 2. 80 ogc, bk. ii, d. 3, Par. 8.

82 83
FJUTH AND THE ILLATIVE SENSE
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
long it would requii.e or iem to concentrate, and how many
such cases there has been a.n unconscious accumulation of hours must elapse before diey could make their attadk.82
relevant observations, issuing in a reasoned-but uncon-
sciously reasoned-conclusion. In short then, reasoning (b) Newman's epistemologically more important con-
may be implicit and yet rational; and our ca.pacity or such tention is that into all reasoning concerning matters of
reasoning is one aspect o what Newman calls the illative [act-as distinguished from demonstrations of the relations
Sense. between ideas-there enters a personal or subjective ele-
Considered from this point o view the illative sense menc. "A cumulation of probabilities," he says, "over and
as Newman notes, a specialized character. "It is in fact,,j above their implicit character will vary both in their num-
attached," he says, "to definite subject-matters, so that a.ti ber and their separace estimatea value, according to the
given individual may possess it in one department ol particular intellect which is employed upon it. It follows
thought, for instance, history, and yet not in another, for that what to one intellect is a proo is not so to another.
instace' philosophy." 31 We may be familiar with a give . . . We judge for ourselves, by our own lights, and on
field o t~houghtT-or experience and able to move abou our own principles; and our criterion of truth is not so
adroitly withi-n it, while being lost in a neighboring subi much the manipulation of propositions, as the intellectual
ject. Trie P7"om.mos, for examp]e, or man of practical wj and moral character o the person maintaining them, and
dom in the sphere o moral choice, may have no te`chnic the ultimate silent effect o his arguments or conclusions
competence i`n dealing with horses or children. The school Upon our minds." 83
boy may be expert at dissecting a radio or a motor engin In short, it is not a mind but a person that reasons. We
bu.t hav'e an obstinately undeveloped grasp o Latin gram are never in a position to say (except o tautologies), "It is
mar. Newman cites as a striking example o a specialize certain that ..., " but only, "1 am certain that . . ." All
flair Napoleon's military genius: our probable reasoning is relative to ourselves, in the sense
that it is affected by the cognitive capacities and limitations
By long experience, joined to a great natural quickness an o our own minds. Further, we cannot stand outside the
precision
L, o eye, he had acquired the power ofn,1 judging, wit special structure o our intellect in order to criticize it. It
extraordinary accuracy, bot-h of the amount of the enemy'1
is, as Newman says, "unmeaning in us, to criticise or find
force oppose.d to him -in the field, and of the probable resu]
fault wich our own nature, which is nothing else than we
o the movements, even the most complicated, going forwar
in the opposite armies .... He looked around him for ourselves, instead o using it according to the use of which
11

little whiie-with his telescope, and immediately formed a cle it ordinarily admits. Our being, with its faculties, mind
conception of the position, forces and intention of the whol and body, is a fact noc admitting of question, all things
hostire array. in tis way he couid, with surprising accurac being of necessity referred to it, not it to other things." 34
calculate in` a few minutes, according to what he could see As an account of the genesis of many of our commonest
their ormation and the extent of the ground which they o and most assured belies, Newman's doctrine o the iliative
cupied, the numerical orce of amies of 6o,ooo or so,ooo me
JL- _1__
82JZ).d., pp. 253-254., quoting Sir A. Alison's H.J*oyy, X, 286-287.
and i their troops were at all scattered, he knew at once ho
83Jb.d., pp. 223, 23o. 34JZ)8.d., P. 268.
a Gra,mma,T of AsserLt, P. 272.
85
84
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND THE ILLATIVE SENSE
sense is, I think, to be accepted as substantially cori-ect. No proofs. But he does recognize very clearly that they are not
one believes on a. basis o apodictic proo, and very few on brought home to the individual mind by such supposed
a basis o direct sensory experience, such matters as "that proofs, and that men's assent to them is normally an act,
the earth, considered as a phenomenon, is a globe; that all not o 1ogical inference but of wha.t he has called the
its regions see the sun by turns; that there are vast tracts on illative sense.
it of land and water; that there are really existing cities on
In thus speaking of Natural Religion as in one sense a matter
definite sites, which go by the names o London, Paris,
of private judgment, and diat wii a view of proceeding from
Florence and Madrid." 35 0ur beliefs concerning matters
C to the proof of Christianity, I seem to give up the intention
of fact beyond the range of our own personal observation of demonstrating either. Certainly 1 do; not that 1 deny that
are normally based upon the convergence of a mass of in- demonstration s possible. Truth certainly, as such, rests upon
dications and testimonies; and in the appreciation o some grounds intrinsically and objectively and abstractedly demon-
o these fields of data a. personal flair or illative sense is re- 8trative, but it does not follow from this that the arguments
quired. In such cases the grammar o assent is "Che cumu- producible in its` favour are unanswerable and irresistible.
lation o probabilities too fine to a.vail sepa.rately, too sub- These latter epiiets are relative, and bear upon matters of
tle and circuitous to be convertible into' syllogisms, too fact .... The fact of revelation is in icself demonstrably true,
numerous and various for such conversion, even were they but it is not therefore true in-esistibly; else, how comes it to be
convertible." 3 Providing that this analysis is n`ot pressed resisted? There is a vast distance between what it is in itself,
too far, ignoring the public checks and interim verifica- .ind what i[ is to us. Light is a quality o matter, as truth is of
Christianity; but light is not recognised by the blind, and
tions which make for agreerient and tend to produce com-
ihere are those who do not recognise truth, from the fault, not
mon conclusions, all this can receive the Nc.ri.Z ObJc} not
of truth, but of themselves.38
only of Newman's Church but of the wider commonwealth
of learning. I-Ie therefore wishes "to prove Ghristianity in the same in-
It is when we go on to consider whether and in whac formal way in which 1 can prove for certain that 1 have
manner these principles are applicable to religious beliefs been born into this world, and that 1 shall die out of it" 89
that the subject becomes philosophically both more diffi- -or (to ,draw other and perhaps more apposite examples
cult and more interesting. What is the function of the from his own previous discussion) that Great Britain is an
illative sense in matters o religion? island, or that cities called Paris and Rome stand on defi-
Newman's answer to this question occurs in an impor- nite sites with specific geogi-aphical relations to one an-
tant interlude between his discussions of natural. and re- other. Newman is clear that neither in religion nor in
vealed religion.37 His answer is not, I shall suggest, finally ordinary matters of fa.ct beyond one's own observation can
satisfactory; but it does nevertheless represent a significant 1ssent be compelled by a "knock downi" argument.
advance upon the views which had typically prevailed be- IC is not wonderful then, Pie says] that, while 1 can prove
fore him. He does not indeed reject the dogma that the Cmristianity divine to my own satisfaction, I shall not be able
basic teachings of religion are certifiable by demonstrative to force it upon any one else. Multitudes indeed 1 ought to
35Jbc.d., p. i84. 30JZ73.d., p. 2ig. 37JZ.d., PP. 3io-3i5. 88Ibd., pp. 8ii-8i2. 80Ibd., P. 8i2.

86
87
FAITH AND THE ILLATIVE SENSE
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear .... If
succeed in pei-suading o its truth without any foi-ce at all, be.
the cause of these emotions does not bclong to this visible
ca.use they and 1 start from the same principles, and what is a
world, the Object to which [the conscientious person's] percep-
proof to me is a proo to them; but i anyone starts from any tion is directed must be Supema.tural and Divine.42
other principles but ours, I have not the power to change his
principles or the conclusions which he draws from them, any His second argument is based upon the almost universal
more than 1 can make a crooked man straight .... [It is a belief of mankind in the existence of a god or gods, and the
fa.ct that] in any enquiry about things in the concrete men di[- .ilmost universal practice of some form of worship. In this
fer from each other, not so much in the soundness o their connection he stresses especially the recurrent theme of
reasoning as in the principles which govern its exercise, that sacrifice, which (he holds) implies both a moral deity and
those principles are of a personal cha.racter, that where diere a conscious human`need for the expiation of sins. These
is no common measure of minds, there is no common measure
o arguments, and that the validity of proof is determined, not phenomena Newman regards as powerful evidences of
Clivine existence.43
by any scientific test, buc by the illative sense.40
Thirdly, Newman cites what he interprets as a provi-
Newman accordingly holds that the i-eligious believer clential ordering of the world.
can offer grounds for his faith, not inde'ed compulsive In ie prominent events of the world, past and contemporary,
grounds but nevertheless "grounds which he holds to be so the fate, evil or happy, of gi-eat men, the rse and fall of states,
sufficient, that he thinks others do hold them implicitly or popular revolutions, decisive battles, the migration of races,
in substance, or would hold them, i they inquired fairly, the replenishing of the earth, earthquakes and pestilences,
or will hold if they listen to him, or do not hold them from critical discoveries and inventions, the history of philosophy,
impediments, invincible or not as it may be, into which he the advancement of knowledge, in these the spontaneous piety
has no call to inquire." 41 The na.ture of these grounds is of the human mind discerns a Divine Supervision .... Good
explained in the last quarter of the Grmmor of 4JJGm, in to Che good, and evil to the evil, is instinctively felt to be, even
which Newman describes the converging evidences which from what we see, amid whatever obscurity and confusion, the
universal rule of God's dealings with us.44
seem to him to point unmistakably to the truth o his own
religious creed. He adduces three pointers to theism, fol. Then, proceeding from natural to revealed religion,
lowed by further pointers to the specifically Ghristian form Newman points to the prophecies of a Saviour in Old
o theism. There is not-nor does there profess to be- Testament ]udaism, and the fulfillment o these prophe-
anything new or distinctive in this section o Newman'8 cies in the life and death o ]esus Christ; to the spectacle of
book, and we ma.y therefore summarize his xposition Ghrist's disciples going out int:o the world to conquer it,
somewhat briefly. His first argument makes use o the fact not by force but by love; to their resilience under persecu-
of conscience. tion; and to the world-wide expansion of Christianity and
the remarka.ble power which it has maniested through the
1, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are
ages.
frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, this im.
42JbG.cZ., pp. 83-84. Cf. PP. 296-298.
plies that there is One to whom we are responsible, beforo
48Jb.d., pp. 297-3oi, 8o6-3io. 44Jb!.d., PP. 3o5-8o6.
40JZ).cZ., pp. 3i3-3i4.. 4JbS.d., P. 293.

88 89
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND THE ILLATIVE SENSE

This very brief resum will, I think, sufrice for our unconsciously committed, has become a recognized philo-
sophical malady.
present purpose. It serves to indicate the scope and style o
Newman's argument in the last quarter of the Grflmmcw. Newman's thought did not extend to Chis distinctively
To have examined these pages at greater length would present-day puzzle; but within its own borders his contri-
only have deflected us from our main concern, which is not bution to the study of faith is o solid and lasting value. He
with the details or the validity o Newman's argument but saw clearly that in the sense in which men actually use the
rat:her with its general character and purpose. term, we mow a gTeat many things which we are not able
Newman's basic though unformulated assumption is to prove, and that the religious person's knowledge o God
diat our belief in divine existence and in divine revelation falls within this category. He further pointed out that reli-
is concerned with propositions, and with propositions o g.ious judgments have a marked family resemblance with
the same logical type as "New York is to the north of exercises of the illative sense, or the acquired capacity to
Washington" or "Lincoln was born in isog." The only respond to indefinable indications in a given field and to
important difference which he recognizes is that certain marshal a mass o apparently unrelated evidences and di-
accidental factors, hopes and fears and the influence of vine their trend. The judgmem o religious faith consists
human wickedness, which are not usually evoked by prop- in what one of Newman's commentators has called a
"global impression" or interpretation.46 But this impres-
ositions of purely mundane import, tend to intervene in
matters of religion to confuse men's judgments. He sion or interpretation is not, as both Newman and his com-
assumes that truth in both. the natural and the supernatu- mentator assume, directed upon a logically homogeneous
ral spheres may be ascertained in essentially the same way range of data. The structure o the theistic interpretation
-the adding up of probabilities until they amount to is even more complex than Newman recognized. Further,
virtual certainty. His method o establishing Ghristianity is the even more basic question has to be raised as to whether
that o "an accumulation of various probabilities"; for faith, in its primary sense, is rightly regarded as a proposi-
"ffom probabilities we may construct legitimate proo, tonal atcitude at all. However far Newman may diverge
Sufficient for certitude." 45 from the Thomist tradition as regards the psychology of
However, this method of probabilification, consisting in faith, he leaves unquestioned the assumption that faith is
the amassing of evidences from the different sides o hu- essentially a matter of believing theological propositions.
man experience, begs fundamental questions. The propo- It is this assumption that will be rejected in Part 11.
sitions "God exists" and "]esus Ghrist is the Son o God" 40 D'Arcy, o. c&.., pp. i3o ff.

differ in logical type from "Boston exists" and "]ohn


Smith is the son o Richard Smith"; and it cannot be
assumed without careful inquiry that they are established
by `comparable procedures. Newman himself was not con-
scious of the need for any such inquiry; indeed it is only
during the last decades. that the "type fallacy," which he
45Jb.cZ., P. 312.

90 91

4/ 3DC/
PART 11
r=

Faith as the lnterpretative


Element within Religious
Experience
The Nolwe of Faith

WE G.OME now to our main problem. What manner o


cognition is the religious man's awareness of God, and how
is it related to his other cognitions?
We become conscious of the existence o other objects in
the universe, whether things or persons, either by experi~
encing them for ourselves or by inferring their existence
from evidences within our experience. The awareness o
God reported by the ordinary religious believer is o the
former kind. He proesses, not to have inferred that there
is a God, but that God as a living being has entered into
his own experience. He claims to enjoy something which
he describes as an experience of God. The ordinary be-
liever does not, however, report an awareness o God as
existing in isolation from all other objects o experience.
I-Iis consciousness of the divine does not involve a. cessation
of his consciousness of a material and social environment.
n is not a vision o God in solitary glory, filling the be-
liever's entire mind and blotting out his normal field of
perception. Whether such phrases correctly describe the
mystic's goal, the ultimate Beatific Vision which figures in
Ghristian doctrine, is a question for a later chapte.r.1 But
.it any rate the ordinary person's religious awareness here
on earth is not o that kind. He claims instead an appre-
1 See Ghapter 8.

95
FfflTH AND KNOWLEDGE THE NATURE OF FAITH
"merpretation." We shall find that interpretation takes
hension of God meeting him in and through his material
and social environments. He finds that in his dealings with i)]ace in relation to each o the thre.e main types o exist-
the world of men and things he is somehow having to do L`nce, or orders of significance, recognized by human
with God, and God with him. The moments o ordinary thought-the natural, the human, and the divine; and that
lie possess, or may possess, for him in varying degrees a re- n order to relate ourse.1ves appropria:ely to each, a pri-
ligious significance. As has been well said, religious experi- mary and unevidenceable act of interpretation is required
ence is "the whole experience o religious persons." 2 The which, when directed toward God, has Craditionally been
believer meets God not only in moments o worship, but tei.med "faith." Thus 1 shall try to show that while the ob-
also when through the urgings of conscience he feels the jecc o religious knowledge is.unique, its basic epistemo-
]ogical pattern is that of all our knowing.
pressure of the divine demand upon his lie; when through
the gracious actions of his ffiends he apprehends the divine This is not to say that the logic of tr.eistic be]ief has no
grace; when through the marvels and beauties o nature he peculiarities. It does indeed disp]ay certain unique fea-
traces t:he hand o the Greator; and he has increasing [ures; and these (1 shall try to show) are such as follow
knowledge of the divine purpose as he responds to its from the unique nature o its object, and are precisely the
behests in his own life. In short, it is not apart from the peculiarities which we should expect if that object is real.
course o mundane lie, but in it and through it, that the In the present chapter, then, we shall take note of the com-
ordinary religious believer claims to experience, however mon epistemological pattern in which ieligious knowledge
imperfectly and fragmentaTily, the divine presence and partakes, and in the following chapter we shall examine
activity. some special pecularities o religious :mowing, and espe-
This at any rate, among the variety of claims to religious cially its noncompulsory character.
"Significance" seems to be the least misleading word
awareness which have been and might be made, is the
claim whose epistemological credentials we are to examine. available to name the fundamental chracteristic of expe-
Can God be known through his dealings with us in the rence which 1 wish to discuss. Other possible terms are
"form" and "meaning." But "form," as the word is used in
world which he has made? The question concems human
experience, and the possibility of an awareness o the di- Che traditional matter-form distinction, would require care-
vine being mediated through awareness o the world, the ful editing and commentary to purge i: o unwanted Aris-
supematural through the natural. totelian associations. "Meaning," on the other hand, has
In answer to this query 1 shall try to show, in various been so overworked and misused in tlie past, not only by
fields, that "mediated" knowledge, such as is postulated plain men and poets, but also by theo]ogians and philoso-
by this religious c]aim, is already a common and accepted phers,8 as to be almost useless today, except in its restricted
feature o our cognitive experience. To this end we must Cechnical use as referring to the equi./a]ence of symbols.
study a basic characteristic of human experience, which I We may perhaps hope that after a pericd o exile the wider
shall call "significance," together with the correlative men- con.cept o "meaning" will be readmitted into the philo-
tal activity by which it is apprehended, which 1 shall call 8 Cf. Ogden and Rchards, Te Mc7%.ng oJ MGon2.%g (7th ed.;
2Wi|liam Temple, Nci*trG, Man cmd GocZ (London, ig84)j P. 334. London, ig45), di. 8.

96 97
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THE NATURE OF FAITH

sophical comity of notions. Indeed Brand Blanshard has entiaced field, or a sheer "buzzing, booming confusion,"
long braved the post-Ogden and Richards ban by his use would be incapable of sus[aining consciousness. For our
of t:he phrase "perceptual meaning." 4 I propose here, how- consciousness is (to repeat) essemially consciousness of sig-
ever, to use the less prejudged term "significance." nificance. Except perhaps in very early infancy or in states
By significance 1 mean that fundamental and all- of radical breakdown, the human mind is always aware o
its environmenc as having this quality o fundamental
pervasive characteristic o our conscious experience which
cZc fcLco constitutes it for us the experience o a "world" familiarity or intelligibility. Significance, then, is simply
and not of a mere empty void or churning chaos. We find ihe most general characteristic o our experience.
ourselves in a relatively stable and ordered environment in Significance, so defined, has an essential reference to ac-
which we have come to feel, so to say, "at home." The tion. Gonsciousness of a particular kind of environmental
world has become intelligible to us, in the sense that it is a significance involves a judgment, implicit or explicit, as to
familiar place in which we have learned to act and react in Che appropriateness o a particular kind, or range o kinds,
appropriate ways. Our experience is not just an unpre- of action n relation to that environment. The distinction
dictable kaleidoscope o which we are bewildered spec- between types of significance is a distinction between the
tators,` but reveals to us a familiar, settled cosmos in which reaccions, occurrent and dispositional, which they render
we live and act, a world in which we can adopt purposes appropriate. For the human psychophysical organism has
and adapt means to ends. It is in virtue of this homely, evolved under the pressure o a continual struggle to sur-
familiar, intelligible character of experience-its possession vve, and our system o significance-attributions has as a re~
of significance-that we are able to inhabit and cope with 8ult an essentially pragmatic orientation. Our out]ook is
our environment. ins[inctively empirical and practical. Physiologically we
If this use of "significance" be allowed it will, I think, are so constituted as to be sensitive only to a minute selec-
readily be granted that our consciousness is essentially con- lion of the vast quantity and complexity of the events tak-
sciousness of significance. Mind could neither emerge nor ing place around us-that precise selection which is prac-
tically relevant to us. Our ears, for example, are attuned to
persist in an environment which was totally nonsignificant
to it. For this reason it is not possible to define "signifi- .i fragment only of the full range of sound waves, and our
cance" ostensively by pointing to contrasting examples o eyes to but a fraction of the multitudinous variations o
significant and nonsignificant experience. In its most gen- ]ight. Our sense organs automatically select from nature
eral form at least, we must accept the Kantian thesis that those aspects in relation to which we must act. We appre-
we can be aware only of that which enters into a certain hend the world only at the macroscopic level at which we
framework of basic relations which is correlated with the have practical dealings with it. As Norman Kemp Smith
`has said, "The function of sense-perception, as of instinct,
structure o our own consciousness. These basic relations
represent the minimal conditions of significance for the S noc knowledge but power, not insight but adaptaton." 5
human mind. The totally nonsignificant is thus debarred For an animal to apprehend more o its environment than
ffom entering into our experience. A completely undiffer- 6P`rolegomena to an ldealist Theory of Knowledge (London,
4 The Nature of Thought (London, L989), 1, Chs. 4-6. 1924). PP. 82-33.

98 99

m
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
THE NATURE OF FAITH

Significance, then, is a relational concept. A universe de-


is practically i-elevam to it would prove a fatal complica-
tion; it would be bemused and bewildered, and unable to void of consciousness would be neithcr significant nor non-
significant. An object or a sense-field is significant Jor or o
react selectively to the stimuli indicating danger, food, and
a mind. We are only concerned here with significance for
so on. And it is equally true at the human level that the
significance of a given object or situation for a given indi-
the human mind, but it is well to remember that the lower
vidua.l consists in the practical cZ3.#cremcG which the exist-
animals also are aware of their environment as being sig-
ence o thac object makes to that individua.l. It is indeed nificant, this awareness being expressed not in words or
concepts but in actions and readinesses or action.
one o the marks o our status as dependem beings that we
live by continual adaptation to our environment; and There is, I hope, no suggestion o anything occult about
from this follows the essentially practical bearing o that
this fundamental feature of or experience which 1 am
calling "significance." The dlifficulty in discussing it is not
which constitutes significance for us.
novelty but, on the contrary, overamiliarity. IC is so com-
Although the locus o significance is primarily our en-
vironment as a whole, we can in thought divide this into pletely obvious that we can easily overlook its importance,
smaller units of significance. We may accordingly draw a or even its existence. There is also the related difficulty
Chat we do not apprehend significance as such, but only
provisional distinction between two species o significance,
object-significance and situational significance, and note each distinguishable aspect of our experience as having its
the characteristics o significance first in terms o the own particular type o significance. For significance is a
former. genus which exists only in its species. Tust as we perceive
Every general name, such as "hat," "book," "fire," the various colors, but never color in general, so we per-
"house," names a type of object-significance. For these are ceive this and that kind of significance, but never signifi-
isolable aspects o our experience which (in suitable con- ca.nce simpziciter.
texts) render appropriate distinctive patterns o behavior. After this preliminary characterization of the na.ture o
The word "hat," for example, does not name a rigidly significance, we may take note of the mental activity of in-
delimited class of objects but a particular use to which Cerpretation which is its subjective correlate. The word
"interpretation" suggests the possibility of differing judg-
things can be put, namely, as a covering for the head. Ob-
ments; we tend to call a conclusion an interpretation when
jects are specially manufactured for this use; but if neces-
Sary many other items can be made to fulfill the function we recognize that there may be other and variant accounts
o the same subject matter. It is precisely because o this
of a hat. This particular way o treating things, as headgear,
is the behavioral correlate of the type of object-sigr}ificance suggestion of ambiguity in the given, and of alternative
which we call "being a hat." Indeed the boundaries o each modes of construing data, that "interpretation" is a suita-
distinguishable class o objects are defined by the two foc!. ble correlate term for "significance."
o (i) physical structure and (2) function in relation to Two uses o "interpretation" are to be distinguished. In
human interests. Our names are always in part names for one of its senses, an interpretation is a (true or false) Gw
functions or uses or kinds of significance as apprehended /pJ7tci8.o7t, answering the question, Why? We speak, for ex-
ample, o a. metaphysician's interpretation of the universe.
from the standpoint o the agent.
ioo 101
lT___
',,,,i'l

THE NATURE 0F FAITH


FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
compatible (e.g., "That is an animal" and "That is a dog";
ln its other sense, an interpretation is a (correct or incor- or "He died by asphyxiation" and "He was murdered").
rect) rGcogmc.o7i,6 or attribution o significance, answer- Of two logically alternative interpretations only one (at
ing the question, What? ("What is that, a dog or a fox?") most) can be the correct interpretation. But two compati-
These two meanings are closely connected. For all expla- ble interpretations may both be corretct. We shall be con-
nation operates ultimately in terms o recognition. We cerned henceforth with this latter kind of difference, in
explain a puzzling phenomenon by disclosing i context, which several levels or layei-s or orders of significance are
revealingitaspartoawiderwholewhichdoesnot,forus, found in the same field of data.
stand in need of explanation. We render the unfamiliar
intellectually acceptable by relating it to the alrea.dy rec- iev:iteorf:i]::::no8 ::;e::.:i:igapn]:e.examples 0 different
ognizable,
`, t9---'_--r-_ _ , indicating a connection o? continuity betweeF'
. ` __._ i>.`. :. +L iitlinnp ra.qe )f the Unl- (a) I see a rectangular red object on the floor in the
the old and the new. But in the unique case o the un corner. So far 1 have interpreted it as a "thing" (or "sub-
verse as _a whole
Y -L\J+-t-,, ' . __ _ the distinction between explanation an 1_
stance"), as something occupying space and time. On look-
recognition
+ `-`~_0___ ___ _ ails to arise. For the 1 universe
1 has no ^-,a`rr`lc
___1_:_-J. wide ing more closely, however, I see that it is a red-covered
context in terms o which it might be explained; an expia book. I have now made a new interpretation which in-
1 ____C__^ ^_it, ^^+1C;C!f in a 1|pi-reT)tion o it
nation o it can thereore only consist in a perception oi : cludes my previous one, but goes beyond it.
significance.
`,+C3--_ ----- __ _ In this case, therefore, ._1_ interpretation is bo
_ i.1-^:^.:^ ira^/`m
(b) There is a. piece of paper covered with writing. An
recognition and explanation. Hence the theistic reco illiterate savage can perhaps interpret it as something
tion, or significance-attribution, is also1a metaphysical .1 _____1_--
made by man. A literate person, who does not know the
However, although the explanator
planation
L,+`^.--______ or _ theory. particular language in which it is written, can interpret it
and the recognitioi aspects o theistic -11,faith are insepar as being a document. But someone who understands the
ble, they may
` ,--, ___ _ _ J ,
usefully be distinguished for purposes o
language can find in it the expression of specific thoughts.
exposition. In the pre-sent chapter
__J.
1. . we _shall be examinm
=__ ,L____^+,++1^t\ t]C! Each is answering the question, "What is it?" correctly,
interpretation, incl-uding the religious interpretation, as but answering iit at different levels. And each more ade-
recognition, or perception of significance.
quate attribution o significance presupposes the less
An act o recognition, or o significance-attribution, is adequate ones.
complex occurrence dealing with two different types ( This relationship between types of significance, one type
ambiguity
u.+.+JL-,^O`'`-_ J in --_ the given. There are, on the one hand, inte
. . , _____L.._iit, au^liici.`rp /p o.. "That is being superimposed upon and interpenetrating another, is
pretations which Uare mutually exclusive (e.g., "That is a pattern which we shall find again in larger and more im-
ox" and "That is a dog," reerring to the same object), ar
portant spheres.
on the other hand interpretations which are m.utual We have already noted that significance is essentially re-
0 This is a slightly off-dictionary sense o "recognition," equat 1ated to action. The significance of an object to an individ-
it, not widi the identification o die appearances o an object ual consists in the practical difference which that object
different
LLLL|`=L ILL.times
| as appearances
|J.J+^` ------- L-|- o the same object,
\ but wii__-
,,_+____=L= makes to him, the ways in which it affects either his imme-
apprehension o wha[ lias been discussed above as the "significanc diate reactions or his more long-term plans and policies.
o objects.
108
102
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THE NATURE 0F FAITH

There is also a reciprocal influence o action upon our relations to one another. And it is the resulting situation
interpretations. For it is only when we have betgun to act taken as a whole that carries significance for us, reridering
upon our interpretations, and have thereby verified that some i-anges o action and reaction appropriate and others
our environment is capable o being successfllly inhabited inappropriate. We live and plan and act all the time in
in terms o them, that they become ully "real" modes o terms o the situational significance o our environment;
experience. Interpretations which take the dispositional although of course our interest may focus at any given mo-
orm o readinesses for action, instead of immediate overt ment upon a particular component object within the cur-
activity, borrow this feeling o "reality" from cognate in- rent situation.
terpretations which are being or ha.ve already been con- We do not, it is true, as plajn men generally think o the
firmed in action. (For example, when 1 see an apple on the familiar situations which constitute our experience from
sideboard, but do not immediately eat it, I nevertheless moment to moment as having "significance" and of our ac-
tions as being guided thereby. But in the fundamental
perceive it as entirely "real" because 1 have in the past
verified similar interpretations o similar apple-1ike ap- sense in which we are using the term, our ordinary con-
sciousness o the world is undoubtedly a continuous
pearances.) It is by acting upon our interpretations that
we build up an apprehension of the world around us; and consciousness of significance. It is normally consciousness
in this process interpretations, once confirmed, suggesc and o a routine or humdrum significance which is so familia.r
support further interpretations. The necessity o acting-in- that we take it entirely for granted. The significance for
terms-o to "clinch" or confirm an interpretation has its me, for example, o my situation at the present moment is
importance,
---- J-__ _______ , as we shall note later, in relation to the_=tl_
spe-`, such that 1 go on quietly working; this is the response
111, _._-,_J_

cifically religious recognition which we call theistic faith. rendered appropriate by my interpretation of my contem-
We have been speaking so far only o object-significance.t`1 porary experience. No fresh response is required, for my
But, as already indicated, object-significance as contraste( routine reactions are already adjusted to the prevailing
with situational significance is an expository fiction. A] context of significance. But this significance is none the less
object absolutely per se and devoid of11.context would hav real for being undramatic.
_ - .11 1 _ _ _ _____L -

no
L-`, significance
_-0-__-_--_ oi us. It can be intelligible only as part o The component elements of situational significance are
our familiar world. What significance would remain, fo not only physical objects-tables, mountains, stars, houses,
example, to a book without the physical circumstance hats, and so on-but also such nonmaterial entities as
sight,
--0__ _, the conventions o language and writing, the
sounds and lights and odors and, no less important, such
r __-_1_ = _1_

quired art o reading, and even the literature


_L _ __
.1. o which
__ _1_=_1_ th
= __-`11~,
psychological events and circumstances as other peoples'
book is a part and te civilization within Which it oCcurs thoughts, emotions, and attitudes. Thus the kinds o situa-
An object owes its significance as much to its context as ti tional significance in terms of which we act and react are
itself; it is what it is largely because o its place in a. wide enormously comp]ex. Indeed the philosopher who would
scheme o things. We are indeed hardly ever conssious o trace the morphology of situational significance must be a
anything in complete isolation. Our normal consciousnes dramatist and poet as well as analyst. Attempts at sig-
11 _ , JL ____-- -

is o groups o objects sta.nding in recognizable patterns o nificance-mapping have been undertaken by some o the

104 105
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THE NATURE OF FAITH

existentialist writers: what they reer to as the existen- other groupings within the inclusive group of the human
tial character of experience is the fact that we are our- species as a whole. The complex web f interplays within
selves by definition zt/&.fh7} any relational system which and between these two expanding series gives rise to the
constitutes a situation for us. However, these writers have infinite variety o situations of which our human life is
usually been concerned to bring out the more strained and composed.
hectic aspects of human experience, presenting ic oten as a Finally, enfolding and interpenetrating this interlock-
vivid nightmare o metaphysical anxieties and perils. They ing mass of finite situations there is also, according to the
are undoubtedly painting ffom real lie, particularly in nsistent witness of theistic religion, the all-encompassing
this anguished age, but 1 venture to think that they are situation o being in the presence of God and within the
depicting it in a partial and one-sided manner. sphere of an on-going divine purpose. Our main concern,
A "sicuation" ma.y be defined, then, as a state o affairs ater these prolonged but unavoidable preliminaries, is to
which, when selected or attention by an act o interpreta- be with this alleged ultimate and inclusive significance and
tion, carries its own distinctive practical significance for us. its relation to the more limited and temporary signifi-
We may be involved in many different sicuations at the cances through which it is mediated.
sa,me time and may move by swift or slow transitions o in- Our inventory, then, shows three main orders of situa-
terpretation from one to another. There may thus occur tional significance, corresponding to the threefold division
an indefinitely complex interpenetration o situations. For o the universe, 1ong entertained by human thought, into
example 1 am, let us say, sitting in a room playing a game nature, man, and God. The significa.nce for us o the physi-
of chess with a friend. The game, isolated by the brackets cal wor]d, nature, is that o an objective environment
o imagination, is a situation in itsel in which 1 have a whose character and "laws" we must learn, and toward
part to play as one o the two competing intelligences pre- which we have continually to relate ourselves aright if we
siding over the chess board. Here is an artificial situation are to survive. The significance for us of the human world,
with its conventional boundaries, structure, and rules o man, is that of a realm of relationships in which we are re-
procedure. But from time to time my attention moves sponsible agents, subject to moral obligation. This world
from the board to the friend with whom 1 am playing, and of moral significance is, so to speak, superimposed upon
1 exchange some conversation with him. Now 1 am living the natural world, so that relating ourselves to the moral
in another sicuation which contains the game of chess as a world is not distinct from the business o relating ourselves
sub-situation. Then suddenly a fire breaks out in the to the natural world but is rather a particular manner of so
building, and the attention of both o us shits at opce t doing. And likewise the more ultimately fateful and mo~
our wider physical situation; and so on. There are the mentous matter of relating ourselves to the divine, to God,
wider and ;ider spatial situations o the street, the city, s not distinct from the task o directing ourselves within
the state, continent, globe, Milky Way, and finally, as th the natural and ethical spheres; on the contrary, it .entails
massive permanent background situation inclusive of a] (without being i.educible to) a way of so directing our-
else, the physical universe. And there are also the widenin selves.
circles o family, class, nation, civilization, and all th |n the case of each of these three realms, the natural, the
lo6 107
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THE NATURE .OF FAITH

human, and the divine, a basic act of interpretation is re- solipsist pi-edicament into an objective world o enduring,
quired which discloses to us the existence of the sphere in causally interacting objects, which re sha.re with other
question, thus providing the ground for our multiarious people. Given the initial rejection o solipsism (or rather
detailed interpretations within that sphere. given the interpretative bias o human nature, which has
Consider first the level of natural significance. This is prevenced all but the most enthusiastic o philosophers
the significance which our environment has for us as ani- rrom falling into solipsism) we can, I think, find corrobo-
mal organisms seeking survival and pleasure and shunning i rations of an analogical kind to support our belief in the
pain and death. In building houses, cooking food, avoiding` unobserved continuance of physical objects and the reality
dangerous precipices, whirlpools, and volcanoes, and gen-. o other minds. But the all-impmtant first step, or assump-
erally conducting ourselves prudently in relation to th tion, is unevidenced and unevidenceable-except for per-
materia.l world, we are all the time taking account of wha missive evidence, in that one's phenomenal experience is
"there" to be interpreted either solipsistically or other-
I am calling (for want of a better name) the mc}tra)Z sig
nificance of our environment. wise. But there is no event within our phenomenal experi-
We have already noted some instances o natural signifi ence the occurrence or nonoccurrence of which is relevant
cance when discussing the recognition of objects and situ to the truth or falsity o the solipsist hypothesis. That
tions. It is a familiar philosophical tenet, and one whic hypothesis represents one possible interpretation of our
may perhaps today be taken as granted, that all consciot experience as a whole, and the contrary belief in a plural-
experience o the physical world contains an element o ity of minds existing in a common world represents an
interpretation. There are cobined in each moment o alternative and rival interpretation.
experience a presented field o data and an interpretativ It may perhaps be objected that it does not make any
acivity of the subject. The perceiving mind is thus alway practical difference whether solipsism be true or not, and
in some degree a selecting, relating and synthesizing agen that these are not therefore two cZ&.#GrGm interprecations o
and experiencing our environment involves a continuo our experience. For i our experience, pheonomenally con-
activity of interpretation. "Interpretation" here is sidered, would be dentical on either hypothesis, then the
course an unconscious and habitual process, the process alternative (it will be said) is a purely verbal one; the
which a sense-field is perceived, for example, as a thre{ choice is merely a choice of synonyms. I do not think, how-
dimensional room, or a particular configuration of color ever, that this is the case. Phenomenally, there is no differ-
patche within that field as a book lying upon a table. I ence between a dream n which we know that we are
Ierpretacion in this sense is generally recognized as a factG dreaming and one in which we do not. But, nevertheless,
in the genesis of sense perception. We have now to no .there is a total difference between the two experiences-
however, the further and more basic act of interpretatii total not in the sense that every, or indeed any, isolable
which reveals to us the very existence of a material wor. aspects o them differ, but in the sense that the two experi-
a world which we explore and inhabit as our given en ences taken as wholes are o different kinds. We are aware
ronment. In attending to this primary interpretative of precsely the same course of event:s, but in the one case
we are noting the judgment which carries us beyond t this occurs within mental brackets, labeled as a dream,
lo8 109
THE NATURE 0F FAITH
FAITH AND KNOWI,EDGE
Whether there be body or not? Tht is a point, which we
while in the other case we are ourselvcs immersed within must take for granted in all our reasonings." 7
the events and live through them as participants. The phe- But the ordering of our lives in relation to an objective
nomena are apprehended in the one case as dream consti- material environment thus revealed to us by a basic act of
tuents and in the other case as "rea.l." And the difference interpretation is not the most distinctively human level o
caused by a genuine assent to solipsism would be akin to experience. It is characteristic of mankind to live not only
the sudden realization during an absorbipg dream tha.t it G.S in terms o the natural significance of his world but also in
only a dream. 1 the solipsist interpretation were to be seri- the dimension of personality and responsibility. And so we
ously adopted and wholeheartedly believed, experience find that presupposing conscioiHness of the physical world,
would take on an unreal character in contrast with one's and supervening upon it, is the kind o situational signifi-
ormer nonsolipsist mode o experience. Our personal re- cance which we call "being responsible" or "being under
lationships in particular, our loves and friendships, our obligation." The sense of moral obligation, or o "ought-
hates and enmities, rivalries and coloperations, would have ness," is the basic datum of ethics. It is maniested when-
to be treated not as transsubjective meetings with other ever someone, in circumstances requiring practical deci-
personalities, but as dialogues and dramas with oneself. sion, feels "obligated" to act, or to refrain from acting, in
There would be only one person in existence, and other some particular way. When this occurs, the natura.1 signifi-
"people," instead o being apprehended as independent cance o his environment is interpenetrated by another,
centers o intelligence and purpose, would be but human- ethical significance. A traveler on an unfrequented road,
like appearances. They could not be the objects of affec- for example, comes upon a stranger who has met with an
tion or enmity, nor could their actions be subjected to accident and who is lying injured and in need o help. At
moral judgment in our normal nonsolipsist sense. In short, the level of natural significance this is just an empirical
although it must be very difficult, if not impossible, for the state o affairs, a particular configuration of stone and
sanely unctioning mind seriously to assent to solipsism earth and flesh. But an act or reflex of interpretation at the
and to apperceive in terms o it, yet this does represent at moral level reveals to the traveler a situation in which he is
least a logically possible interpretation o experience, and under obligation to render aid. He feels a categorical im-
constitutes a dc.#Gt.Gri interpretation from our ordinary be- perative laid upon him, demanding that he help the in~
lie in an independently existing world o things and per- jured man. The situation takes on for him a peremptory
sons. It follows that our normal mode of experience is it- ethical significance, and he finds himself in a situation o
sel properly described as an interpretation, an interpreta- inescapable personal responsibility.
tion which we are unable to justify by argument but.which As has often been remarked, it is characteristic o situa-
we have nevertheless no inclination or reason to doubt. In- tions exhibiting moral significance that they involve, di-
deed as Hume noted, nature has not left this to our choice, rectly or indirectly, more than one person. The other or
"and has doubtless esteem'd it an affair o too great impor- others may stand either in an immediate personal relation-
tance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and specu- ship to the moral agent or, as in large-scale social issues, in
1ations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe 7 Trco.sc, bk. i, pt. iv, sec, 2 (Selby-Bigge's ed., pp. i87-i88).

in the existence o body [i.e., matter]? but 'tis vain to ask, 111

110
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THE NATURE OF FAITH

a more remote causal relationship. (The sphere of politics be a moral solipsisc, or absolute egoist, recognizing no re-
has been defined as that of the .mpersonal relationships be- sponsibility toward other people, no one can prove to him
tween persons.) Ethical significance, as the distinctive sig- that he has any such responsibilities. The man who, when
nificance o situations in which persons are components, confronted with some standard situation having ethical
includes both of these realms. To feel moral obligation is significance, such as a. bully wantonly injuring a child, fails
to perceive (or misperceive) the practical signicance for to see it as morally significa.nt, could only be classified as
onesel of a situation in which one stands in a responsible suffering from a defect of his nature analogous to physical
relationship to another person or to other people. That the blindness. He can of course be compelled by threats of
perception o significance in personal situations sets up (in punishment to conform to a stated code o behavior; but
Kant's terms) a categorical imperative, while natural situ- he cannot be compelled to feel moral obligation. He must
ations give rise only to hypothetical imperatives, condi- see and accept for himself his own situation as a responsi-
tional upon our own desires, is a defining characteristic of ble being and its corollary of ethical accountability.
the personal world. Has this epistemological paradigm-o one order o sig-
Glearly, moral significance presupposes natural signifi- nificance superimposed upon and mediated through
cance. For in order that we may be conscious of moral ob- another-any further application? The contention of this
ligations, and exercise moral intelligence, we must first be chapter is that it has. As ethical significance interpene-
aware o a stable environment in which actions have fore- trates natural significance, so religious significance inter-
seeable results, and in which we can learn the likely conse- penetrates both ethical and natural. The divine is the
quences of our deeds. It is thus a precondition of ethical
highest and ultimate order of significance, mediating
situa.tions that there should be a stable medium, the world, neither o the others and yet being mediated through both
with its own causal laws, in which people meet and in of them.
terms of which they act. The two spheres o significance, BuC what do we man by religious significance? What is it
the moral and the physical, interpenetrate in the sense that that, for the ethical monotheist, possesses this significance,
all occasions o obligation have reerence, either im- and in what does the significance consist?
mediately or ultimately, to overt action. Relating onesel The primary locus of religious significance is the be-
to the ethical sphere is thus a particular manner o relating liever's experience as a whole. The basic act of interpreta-
onesel to the natural sphere: ethical signiricance is medi- tion which i-eveals to him the religious significance of life
ated to us in and through the natural world. is a uniquely "total interpretation," whose logic will be
As in the case of natural situational significance, we can studied in Part 111. But we must at this point indicate
enter the sphere of ethical significance only by our oivn act what is intended by the phrase "total interpretation," and
of interpretation. But at this level the interpretation is a offer some preliminary characterization o its specifically
more truly voluntary one. That is to say, it is not orced theistic form.
upon us from outside, but depends upon an inner capacity Consider the following imagined situation. I enter a
and tendency to interpret in this way, a tendency which we room in a strange building and find that a militant secret
are free to oppose and even to overrule. If a man chooses to society appears to be meeting there. Most of the members

112 113
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THE NATURE OF FAITII

are armed, and as they take me for a fellow member 1 of the world as a whole as mediating a divine presence and
judge it expedient to acquiesce in the role. Subtle and purpose. He sees in his situation as a human being a sig-
blood-thirsty plans are discussed for a violent overthrow o nificance to which the appropriate response is a religious
the constitution. The whole situation is alarming in the trust and obedience. His interpretative leap carries him
extreme. Then 1 suddenly notice behind me a gallery in into a world which exists through the will of a holy,
which there are batteries o arc lights and silently whirring righteous, and loving Being who is the creator and sus-
cameras, and 1 realize that 1 have walked by accident onto tainer o all that is. Behind the world-to use an almosc
the set of a film. This realization consists in a change o in- inevitable spatial metaphor-there is apprehended to be an
terpretation o my immediate environment. Until now 1 omnipotent, personal Will whose purpose toward man-
had automatically interpreted it as being "real life," as a kind guarantees men's highest good and blessedness. The
dangerous situation demanding considerable circumspec- believer finds that he is at all times in the presence of this
tion on my part. Now 1 interpret it as having practical sig- holy Will. Again and again he realizes, either at the time
nificance of a quite different kind. But there is no corre- or in retrospect, that in his dealings with the circumstances
sponding change in the observable course o events. The of his own lie he is also having to do with a transcendent
meeting o the "secret society" proceeds as before, al- Creator who is the determiner o his destiny and the source
though now 1 believe the state o affairs to be quite other of all good.
than 1 had previously supposed it to be. The same phe- Thus the primary religious perception, or basic act o
nomena are interpreted as constituting a.n entirely differ- religious interpretation, is not to be described as either a
ent practical situation. And yet not quite the same phe- reasoned conclusion or an unreasoned hunch that there is
nomena, or 1 have noticed important new items, namely, a God. It is, putatively, an apprehension of the divine
the cameras and arc lights. But let us now in imagination presence within the believer's human experience. It is not
expand the room into the world, and indeed expand it to an inference to a general truth, but a "divine-human en-
include the entire physical universe. This is the strange counter," a mediated meeting with the living God.
room into which we walk at birth. There is no space left As ethical significance presupposes natural, so religious
for a photographers' gallery, no direction in which we can significance presupposes both ethical and natural. Entering
turn in search of new clues which might reveal the signifi- into conscious relation with God consists in large part in
cance of our situation. Our interpretation must be a *oZ adopting a particular style and manner of acting towards
interpretation, in which we assert that the world as a our natural and social environmencs. For God summons
whole (as experienced by ourselves) is of this or tha.t kind, men to serve him t.72 the world, and in terms of the lie of
that is to say, affects our plans and our policies in such and the world. Religion is not only a way o cognizing but also,
such ways. and no less vitally, a way of living. To see the world as
The monotheist's faith-apprehension of God as the un- being ruled by a divine love which sets infinite valu'e upon
seen Person dealing with him in and through his experi- each individual and includes all men in its scope, and yet
ence o the world is from the point o view of epis- to live as though the world were a realm of chance in
temology an interpretation of this kind, an interpretation which each must fight for his own interests against the rest,
114 115
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THE NATURE OF FAITH

argues a very dim and wavering vision of God's rule. So far ence as a whole and in all its aspects, up to .the presem
moment.
as that vision is clear it issues naturally in a trust in the
But on the other hand the theistic interpretation is more
divine purpose and obedience to the divine will. We shall
akin to the ethical than to the natural significance-attribu-
be able to say more about this practical and dispositional
tion in that it is clearly focused in some situations and
response, in which the apprehension o the religious sig-
impe,rceptible in others. Not all the moments o lie medi-
nificance o life so largely consists, when we come in Part
IV to examine a particular form o theistic faith. At ate equally the presence of God to the ordinary believer.
He is not continuously conscious of God's presence (al-
present we are concerned only with the general nature o though possibly the saint is), but conscious rather o the
the a.wareness of God.
divine Will as a reality in the background of his life, a. real-
Rudolf Otto has a somewhat obscure doctrine of the
ity which may at any time emerge to confront him in abso-
schematiza.tion o the Holy in terms o ethics.8 Without
lute and inescapable demand. We have already observed
being committed to Otto's use of the Kantian notion, or to
how one situation may interpenetrate another, and how
his general philosophy o religion, we have been led to a
some sudden pressure or intrusion can cause a shift of in-
parallel conception o the religious significance o lie as terpretation and attention so that the mind moves from one
schematized in, mediated through, or expressed in terms
interlocking context to another. Often a more important
o, its natural and moral significance. As Tohn Oman says
kind o significance will summon us from a relatively
of the Hebrew prophets,
trivial kind. A woman may be playing a. game o cards
What detemines their faith is. not a theory of the Supema- when she hears her child crying in pain in another room;
tural, but an attitude towards the Natural, as a sphere in and at once her consciousness moves from the artificial
which a victory of deeper meaning than the visible and of world of the game to the real world in which she is the
more abiding purpose than the fleeting can be won .... The mother of the child. Or an officer in the army reserve may
revelation o the Supernatural was by reconciliation to the be living heedless of the international situation until sud-
Natural: and this was made possible by realising in the Na- den mobilization recalls him to his military responsibility.
tural the meaning and purpose of the Supematural. The int.errupting call of duty may summon us from trivial
or relatively unimportant occupations to take part in mo-
In one respect this theistic interpretation is more akin to
mentous events. Greater and more ultimate purposes may
the natural than to the ethical interpretation. For while
without warning supervene upon lesser ones and direct
only somG situations have moral significance, !Z situations
our lives into a new channel. But the final significance,
ha.ve for embodied beings a continuous natural signifi-
which takes precedence over all others as supremely im-
cance. In like manner the sphere of the basic religious
interpretation is not merely this or that isolable situatiop, portanc and overriding, is (according to theism) that o
our situation as being in the presence of God. At any time
but the uniquely total situation constituted by our experi-
a man may be confronted by some momentous decision,
8 ThG Jdea of fhG Hozy, tra.ns. by T. W. Harvey (London, ig28),
some far-reaching moral choice either of .means or o ends,
ch. 7.
9 Thc Na}wrai ari W StPGmawd (Cambridge, ig3i), P. 448. in which his responsibility as .a servant of God htrude.s
11'7
.116
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE THE NATURE OF FAITH

Cerpreting his experience in this way. He lives in the pres-


'

upon and conflicts with the requirements of his earthly


"station and its duties," so that the latter pales into unim- ence o God, though he is unable to prove by any dialectical
portance and he acts in relation to a more ultimate en- process that God exists.
vironment whose significance magisterially overrules his To say this is not of course to demonstrate that God docs
customary way o lie. When the call o God is clearly exist. The outcome o the discussion thus far is rather to
heard other calls become inaudible, and the prophet or bring out the similarity o epistemological structure and
saint, martyr or missionary, the man o conscience or of status'between men's basic convictions in relation to the
illumined mind may ignore all considerations o worldly world, moral responsibility, and divine existence. The aim
prudence in responding to a claim with which nothing else o the present chapter has thus been to show how, i
whatever may be put in the balance. [here be a God, he is known to mankind, and how such
To recapitulate and conclude this stage of the discus- knowledge is related to other kinds o human knowing. I
sion, the epistemological point which 1 have sought to hope thac at least the outline o a possible answer to these
make is this. There is in cognition of every kind an unre- questions has now been offered.
solved mystery. The knower-known relationship is in the
last analysis st&. gc7%r5.. the mystery o cognition persists
at the end o every inquiry-though its persistence does not
prevent us from cognizing. We cannot explain, for exam-
ple, how we are conscious o sensory phenomena as consti-
tuting an objective physical environment; we just find our-
selves interpreting the data of our experience in this way.
We are aware that we live in a real world, though we can-
not prove by any logical formula that it a.J a real world.
Likewise we cannot iexplain how we know ourselves to be
responsible beings subject to moral obligations; we just
find ourselves interpreting our social experience in this
way. We find ourselves inhabiting an ethically significant
universe, though we cannot prove that ic t.s ethically signifi-
cant by any process of logic. In each case we discover and
live in terms o a particular aspect of our environment
through an appropriate act o interpretation; and having
come to live in terms o it we neither require nor can con-
ceive any further validation of its reality. The same is true
o the apprehension of God. The theistic believer cannot
explain 72ozu he knows the divine presence to be mediated
through his human experience. He just finds himself in-
118 119
FAITH AND FREEDOM

ality. I urther suggested that religious faith, considered as


cognitive, is an interpretative act of this kind. That we
"know God by faith" means that we interpret, not only
this or that item of our experience, but our experience as a
whole, in theistic terms; we find that in and through the
Fa;ith amd Freedom entire field of our experience we are having to do with
God and he with us. Our knowledge of him is thus, like all
our knowledge o environment, an apprehension rea.ched
by an act o interpretation, alchough it differs from the rest
o our knowing in that in this case the interpretation is
uniquely total in its scope.
IN THE last chapter we ha.ve considered an analysis o I hope that in the argument o the preceding chapter,
theistic faith as an act o "total interpretation." Religious thus briefly recapitulated, I have presented what is at least
faith, I have suggested, shares a common epistemological a possible account of our cognition of God. It remains now
structure with cognition in other fields. To know this or to ask whether any greater attraction can be claimed for it
that object is to apprehend our environment as significant than the somewhat austere virtue o 1ogical possibility. Is
in this or that way. For example, to perceive a gate in my there anything to recommend this view apart from its own
path is to be aware o my environment, in tha.t particular internal. coherence? Granted that, if there be a God, he
region, as rendering certain actions or readinesses for ac- mc}y be known to mankind in the manner suggested, can
tion appropriate and others inappropriate. Again, to per- we discern any positive reason why he sotZcZ make himsel
ceive in some situation that 1 am under a moral obligation known in this, on the face of it, strangely indirect fashion?
to act in this or that wa.y, is to be aware o my environment I think that we can discern such a reason, a reason which
as constituting a realm of personal relationships, the pres- turns upon the safeguarding of our personal freedom and
ent practical significance o which for myself is this moral responsibility in re]ation to the divine Being.
requirement. Each distinguishable order and kind o sig- Our knowledge o God, on the view advocated here, is
nificance makes its own immediate or potential "differ- not given to-us as a compulsory perception, but is achieved
ence" to the cognizer. Awareness of significance, whether as a voluntary act o nterpretation. Indeed 1 have argued
natural or ethical or of any other order, consists accord- that not only awareness of the divine but all awareness of
ingly in the formation within us o volitional dispositions, environment contains an unavoidable element o personal
adjusting our plans and policies to the perceived chracter interpretation. Cognition can, accordingly, never be for-
of our environment. A11 awareness of environment, I have mally infallible. Our apprehension o reality is never cor~
argued, is awareness of it as significant. rect merely by definition. If it is right, it is right although
Significance, we noted, is apprehended by an activity o it could have been wrong. If it succeeds, it succeeds in spite
interpretation. That is to say, recognition is not a purely of the fact that it might have failed. As ]ohn Oman says
automatic reflex, but an exercise o intellgence or ra.tion- (using "meaning" instead Qf "significance"), "knowing is
120 121
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FREEDOM

not knowledge as an effect o an unknown external cause, sel-directing beings, but is an integral part of that ac-
but is knowledge as we so interpret that our meaning is the tivity.
actual meaning of our environment." To interpret The extent of our cognitive freedom varies in respect o
aright is to know; to interpret amiss is to be in error. How- the different aspec.ts of our environment. It is at a. mini-
ever, the fallibility which religious judgments share with mum in sense perception, and for that reason passes un-
all other interpretations does not constitute an epistemic noticed by the man in the street. For in perceiving the ma-
defect, but rather a virtue. What 1 have called compulsory terial world, the physical pole of cognition has become so
perception, or the mere impinging of the surrounding fully developed in all of us, as the result of a long process
world upon our consciousness, is the lowest and least inter- o evolution, that it is stable a,s between mind and mind.
esting level of cognition. As H. H. Price remarks, "It is the Hence as animal organisms we all perceive the same world
capa.city of making mistakes, not the incapacity of it, which -that is to say, our several experience-histories are capable
is the mark of the higher stages o intelligence . . . Only o being correlated in terms of a hypothetical universal ex-
an intelligent being can err." 2 The cost of being a cogniz- perience. At this level o experience we are-broadly
ing person, and not merely a. complex machine registering speaking, and with occasional lapses-compelled to experi-
the impacts of the surrounding world, is that every veridi- ence correctly. We have all learned, within comparatively
cal perception is an achievement. We pay for the privilege slight limits, to discern uniformly the "natural" signifi-
of being right by running the risk of being wrong. cance of our environment. For there are constant practical
In order to know our environment aright, then, we have checks and verifications to guide us. If we reach out to
to interpret it aright. Only at an elementary level does it pluck a star, thinking it to be a shining spot just above our
force itself baldly and unambiguously upon our attention. heads, our hands grasp empty air; i we try to walk through
We are thus endowed with a significant measure o cogni- a brick wall, believing it to be an open door, we are
tive freedom. Our powers of apprehension are improved quickly cured of our error. The margin of cognitive free-
and extended not by eliminating but by deliberately per- dom is here a narrow one. The physical world is thus
fecting their interpretative phase. We must often exert public to members of the same species, not only because
ourselves in relation. to a suspected or reported or hal- the raw material of their several experience-histories is
apprehended aspect of reality in order to become more similar, but because under the pressure of identical biolog-
fully aware o it. What we can know depends in conse- ical needs they interpret their data in common patterns.
Biologically valuable habits o ordei-ing our experience
quence, to an important extent, upon what we chose to be
and to do. We are endowed with responsibility as well as having once been established, further experiments are lia-
freedom in our cognitive life. Kno.wing is accordingly not ble to consist only in perilous deviations from the path ap-
an experience distinct from our general activity as free and proved by nature. Indeed our interpretative activity is at
this level so nearly a function o our environment .that we
The Na,turaz a,n.d the Supernaturaz (CaL"bridge, \98i), P. L75.
2 TJw.72k.ng 7}d Exc7i.ence (London, ig53), pp. 87, 3i6, See als0 are not normally aware in ordinary practical life that we
are interpreting at all.
P. 95.

122 123
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FREEDOM

This is why knowledge of the physical world has always landscape as being beautiful is not forced upon our atten-
been regarded by common sense as the standard type of tion as are its physical configurations `as such when these lie
knowledge, and why, in our contemporary Atlantic cul- before our open eyes. Most of us have voluntarily to make
ture, the physical sciences are accorded a. unique authority an effort, to "go out of our way," i we are to discover the
as arbiters of truth. For the same reason a. fundamental dis- aesthetic riches about us. In this respect human beings do
tinction has traditionally been drawn becween "judgments not all experience the same world.
of fact" and "judgments o value," the former being in A similar situation obtains in relation to moral signifi-
effect assertions in relation to which there is no room for cance. This is t\he distinctive significance o situations in
informed disagreement, and the latter being regarded by which we have to do, directly or indirectly, with other peo-
contrast as matters of personal taste. But if by "fact" is ple. Moral significance is the "difference" made for us by
meant simply "that which is the case," then we must insist the world as mediating a. system of personal rela.tionships.
that other things besides the changing structure of a cloud The perception of ethical significance, which is based upon
of molecules are the case. The proper distinction is not be- the awareness of moral obligation, is more akin to aesthetic
tween "objective" knowledge of facts and "subjective" appreciation than to sense perception. Everyone, I think
value judgments, but between those facts in relation to we must hold, has an inna.te capacity for moral experience,
which the subjective pole of cognition largely ca.ncels out but this capacity is very variously developed in different
between different individuals, and those facts in relation to people. One man is more perceptive than another, more
which it varies ffom person to person and is consequently sensitive to life's ethical requirements. Further, in addi-
noticed as a factor in cognition; tion to the diverse general moral development of different
When we turn ffom the natural to the moral and the individuals, men's consciences are liable to development, in
aesthetic significance of our environment, variations and varying fields. A man may be acutely aware, for example,
divergences o interpretation are at once apparent. In of his duties toward his own family while being chronically
Herbartian terminology, we have all acquired a very simi- blind to obligations coming from beyond that circle. Or he
lar "apperceiving mass" in relation to our environment as may have a keen scholarly conscience, painstakingly accu-
it is known to us through sense perception, but have devel- rate within a particular academic field, and yet be grossly
oped more individual and specialized apperceptive equip- dishonest in pra.ctical life. In short, there is a very wide
ment for dealing with its nonphysical aspects. Outside the range of individual variations in the interpretation o our
basic sphere in which wrong interpi-etation is biologically environment in terms o moral significance.
disastrous to the individual or the species, the responsibility A factor emerges here which bears upon religious sig-
for discovering the nature of our envii-onment rests to a nificance. To perceive onesel to be under obligation to do
considerable extent with ourselves. We can, for example, or to refrain from doing some particular action, is Go c.so
at will develop or neglect to develop our capacity for ap- to acknowledge the validity of that obligation; in short, to
preciating beauty. I do not wish to introduce the subject of feel obligated by it. The perception already involves a rec-
aesthetics into the present discussion. But it is perhaps per- ognition of the rightful authority of the demand. It is in-
missible to note in passing that the characteristic of, sa.y, a deed precisely this acknowledgment of moral authority
124 125
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FREEDon{[

that constitutes such a.wareness as the awareness of specifi- we are determined to arrive, and relegating to the back-
cally c7%.cZ significance. Moral interpretation is accord- ground those which tell against it. Thus we "talk ourselves
ingly never a detached noticing but always an act in which into" a more comfortable view of the matter. There is a
the whole self is involved. The judgment "1 ought . . ." is Classic display o this process in the second chapter of SG7?JG
an existential judgment. flmd Sc7&.ba.ZG.y, where ]ane Austen shows herself to be well
For having once seen clearly that one otg to do %, all aware of the rema.rkable power of self-deception at the
but the most hardened wrongdoers are unable to be at command o the human mind.
peace with themselves until they have done, or at least at- There is truth, in other words, in the Socratic equa.tion
tempted to do, %,. and it is more than a surmise thac even of virtue with knowledge. Socra,tes spoke of knowledge of
in hai-dened exceptions deliberate wickedness sets up pro- ihe Good, but his thought can readily be transposed into a
found inner strains and tensions which must sooner or deontological key as knowledge of the right. Human
later react disruptively upon the personality as a whole. wrong doing does not usually result from sheer refusal to
Man is essentially a social bei.ng, made for community and do that which has been seen and accepted as morally
fellowship; and the whole tendency and bias o his na.ture obligatory, but rather from a deliberate failure to recog-
is to acknowledge the validity of the moral claims which nize that it 3.J obligatory. This willful moral blindness is an
this involves. He Tesponds instinctively to the require- exercise of cognitive freedom. The line on which we make
ments of family and group life. He can indeed, in his ego- our stand is the outer defense of our personality, the fron-
ism, violently override the clear dictates of conscience. But tier o awareness. If the invading duty passes that border
this is not the normal pattern of wickedness. Human it joins forces with a fifth column within us and almost
beings seldom do evil af evil; we usually persuade oui.- certainly wins the day. Our best chance of turning it back
selves first that the evil is really good, or at least not nearly lies out on the cognitive frontiers, where the passes are
as evil as it seems. Our selfishness takes the form of moral narrow and strongly held.
shortsightedness; we fail to see our neighbor's need as con- This frontier o the personality, which each man con-
stituting a call upon ourselves. Egoism is thus normally to trols for himself, safeguards his personal integrity and lib-
be diagnosed as (culpable) insensitivity; the selfish man is erty in relation to those aspects of the environment which
morally incognitive. Our rejection of moral obligations would lay a cZc%.m upon him. We have the primary, cogni-
which we are unwilling to accept does not typically take tive freedom to recognize or to reject the credentials of any
the form of a blank refusal to do what we see to be right, imperative which claims authority over us. Duty's embassy
but rather of an evasion at the prior stage of cognit.ion, the must stand beyond the gates of perception and wait for
turning of a blind eye to the moral facts o the situ.ation. recognition, and only if we ourselves allow it to enter can
We try to exclude from our minds an obligation which is it establish a sway over us. It is through our control of this
beginning to dawn unwelcomely upon us. We juggle with fTontier that we take the decisive step toward egoism. or fel-
the ethical weights, seeking to shift the ba.1ance from one 1owship. It is here that the fundamental direction o our
side to the other. We re-think the problem, bringing for- lives is chosen.
ward those factors which support the conclusion at which The epistemological pattern which we see emerging is
126 127
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FREEDOM

one in which certain aspects of our environment orce treat the other person as an autonomous mind and will, a
themselves upon our attention, while others can only reach responsible and self-directing consciousness with views and
us if we ourselves admit them across our personal frontiers. rights of his own which must be consulted and respected-
As we have seen, our cognitive freedom is at a minimum n short, as another Grson. In the I-It relationship we
vis-a-vis the physical world, which is our environment in- treat the other merely as an object to be moved about (as,
terpreted in terms of its "natural" significance. It has for example, when he is unconscious) or as an animal to
greater scope in relation to the aesthetic and ethica.l signifi- be coerced (as in terroristic methods of prison discipline)
cance of the world about us. And it is at a maximum, we or, at one remove toward the personal, as a lab'or unit or a
must now proceed to notice, in our cognition of the reli- pair of hands to be hired-in short, not as a person but as a
gious significance of our environment, its significance as thing or a commodity. The difference between these two
mediating the divine presence. types of relationship is familiar to common observation,
One o the distinctive emphases of recent Protestant the- and is brought to sharp focus on those occasions when we
ology has been upon the nature o God as e"omZ. That are discussing someone in his absence, analyzing his char-
God is personal, a ZrG, or rather a Tou, and not an J, is o acter and motives, and he unexpectedly enters the room
course implied on every page of the Bible, and has never and joins the group who are discussing him. At once
been seriously doubted by Christian thought. But it has there is an nvoluntary shift from an I-It to an I-Thou re-
not by any means always been regarded as centrally impor- lationship toward him. We can no longer treat him as a
tant, and has sometimes been treated as little more than a specimen to be dissected, for he manifestly stands on an
linguistic convention. Within. the last two or three dec- equal footing with ourselves as a separate mind and will,
ades, however, the thoroughgoing personalism o the an unique personality, one who can analyze and criticize as
Ghristian faith has been powerfully emphasized by a num- well as be analyzed and criticized. In all fully personal
ber of thinkers, and recognized as a normative principle of dealings with people we respect their personal indepen-
theology. God, these theologians have insisted, is the di- dence and integrity; we treat them, not as means, but as
vine Thou, who deals with us as a Person with persons, as a ends in themselves; we regard them as of the same ultimate
Father with children.8 status as ourselves, so that their views and wishes, their
Between people two different kinds of relationship are hopes and fears, their arguments and prejudices, are en-
possible. There are personal relationships and nonpersonal titled to consideration along with our own.
relationships between persons. In Martin Buber's lan- Nature, or as we should rather say from the standpoint
guage 4 we can enter both into I-Thou and I-It relatiopships of Christian faith, God acting through Nature, has so fash-
with others. In the I-Thou relationship we apprehend and ioned man's personality as to protect his individual auton-
s Perhaps the most important single work expressing die implica-
omy, thus making possible fully personal relationships
tions of ths recovered insight is ]ohn Oman's Grocc 7id PcrJoncizaly
both between man and man and between man and God. It
is written into the constitution of human nature that the
(ist ed., Cambridge, igi7; 4th ed., ig8i).
4Jch tmci Dt (ig28), trans. by R. Gregor Smith, J a7td Thot ultimate J, the "pure ego," is for ever inaccessible to oth-
(2d ed., Edinburgh, ig58). ers. As an item in the physical world a person can be
128 129
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FREEDOM

pushed around by superior force; but in the inner recesses that which the speaker intends by them. The symbols are
of his personality he is not thus manipulatable. He can be n themselves inert and neutral. 1 t.he two minds fail to
coerced into outward conformity, but not into inward as- achieve a shared meaning in their use of them, the symbols
sent: "A man convinced against his will is of the same remain opaque, a baffling barrier to the understanding-as
opinion still." However completely he may be external]y when we hear speech in an unknown language. But a cor-
ruled and regimented, the individual remains the sole in- responding interpretation of the symbols ffom both sides
habitant of his own inner realm of consciousness. His ul- brings about a. meeting of minds. The opaqueness fades
timate privacy is secured by th.e circumstance tht person- and the symbols become, so to say, transparent. We see
ality can communicate with and seek to influence personal- straight through them to their meaning-as in reading we
ity only through the medium of symbols, which require scarcely notice the individual marks on the paper but are
the co-operation of both parties if they are to convey me.an- conscious only o the words and thoughts which they sym-
ing. We cannot insert our thoughts into another's mind as bolize. Thus symbols have the dual capacity to veil and to
we drop a letter into a mail box. Not even "brainwashing" reveal, both safeguarding our mental autonomy and pri-
techniques can do this-although they can, over a period of vacy a.nd also enabling us voluntarily to transcend that pri-
time, so refashion a personality as to make it receptive to vacy and to enter into re]ations with other minds. We
certain ideas. Mind can only communicate with mind in- have, in other words, an u]timate freedom to establish or
directly, through a reciprocal use of symbols.5 Whether to avoid communication. Without this freedom our status
these be physical gestures such as pointing, or imitative as responsible personal beings would be profoundly im-
noises, or the complex symbolism of a developed la.nguage, paired. If the intellect could be directly manipulated, and
they must be not merely performed and observed, but thoughts thrust into the mind, we should no longer be dis-
mGcb7? and tmczcrJood if they are to function as vehicles of tinct and autonomous persons. We should be in the posi-
communication. Communication between minds is only tion of a patient under hypnosis, with the normal cogni-
established when the hearer understands by the symbols tive barriers broken down and the citadel of the mind
5The phenomenon of telepa.thy might seem to constitute an helpless before the invasion of every suggestion which is
exception o tlris. For people are sometimes the involuntary directed upon it.
recipients of telepathic "messages." A thought, whether in the At this point, however, a qualification must be entered.
foim of a mental image or of a verbal pattern, occurs to 8 as It will be obvious that this picture of communication as
a. .result of its occurring to 4, without any spoken words or other
requiring voluntary co-operation from both sides applies
signs being employed between them. This is not however a case of
communication unmediated by symbols. The actual causal. linkage only "in principle" to our ordinary everyday use o the
between the two minds may be an opera.tion upon rather tha.n with symbolism o 1anguage. Using the distinction between
symbols; but communication only occurs when the appropriate sym-
"fomal" and "material" freedom, we may say that we are
bols, whether words or images, are presented to and understood by formally but not materially free to receive or reject mean-
the receiving consciousness. The symbols may ha.ve arrived by a ings mediated through speech. When someone speaks to
purely psychological route, instead o any of the more usual physical us, we do not normally consider whether to regard his
routes; but they still have to arrive, and communication still cannot
` take place without their succesful appropriation. noises as intelligible words or as mere gibberish. We can-

180 131
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FREEDOM

not help interpreting them as words, and likewise as we sessed a real cognitive ffeedom in relation to the spoken
hear the words we cannot help understanding them. We symbolism o language. And yet, having pointed to this
have become so entirely "geared in" to social lie, in which primitive liberty, we must reaffirm that in normal life it
langua.ge plays an essential part and in which we are in al- exists only formally, being therein akin to our interpreta-
most constant rcLor with other persons through the tive liberty in respect of the environing physical world.
medium of speech, that the habit of interpreting certain Our formal cognitive freedom in relation to persons,
sounds (and likewise certain visible marks) as words, and thus guaranteed by the necessity for all interpersonal com-
words as conveying meaning, holds us in an involuntary munication to pass through the medium of symbols, be-
state of intercommunication with our fellows. 1 we did comes a material and importarLt freedom in relation to the
succeed in breaking this habit we should run the risk o divine Person. There are two reasons for this, one immedi-
being regarded as insane. Our normal everyday under- ate, arising from our own cognitive limitations, and the
standing of the symbols o a familiar language has taken on other more ultimate, arising from the nature of the divine
something of the involuntariness and compulsion o sense Being who has ordained those limitations. The immedia.te
perception. As we are compelled by the disciplines of our reason is that God is not, like human persons, a i)art of the
physical environment to interpret its sensible signs aright, material world; and therefore his presence is less manifest
so we are induced by the psychological pressures of society to us, as sentient beings who are organic to our environ-
to engage in the conventional commerce of speech. Like a ment, than is that of our fellows. But the more ultimate
bridge player who has been initiated into the rules o the reason is that the infinite nature of the Deity requires him
game and is then expected to play his cards correctly, we to veil himself from us i we are to exist as autonomous
have all been taught the rules of the language-game and persons in his presence. For to know God is not simply to
are required to respond appropriately when addressed. know one more being who inhabits this universe. It is to
However, the analysis of communication as involving a know the One who is responsible for our existence and
willingness to be communicated with remains formally who determines our destiny; One in whose will lies our
true even of everyday speech, in spite of the fact that in the final good and blessedness, so that the fulfillment of his
circumstances of social life we have now sold our freedom purpose for our lives is also our own perect sel-fulfill-
into the slavery of habit. For the habit is acquired, the ment; and One whose commands come with the accent of
freedom innate. On occasions we can glimpse an original absolute and u.nconditional demand, claiming our obedi-
freedom underlying the habit. For example, a child could ence at whatever cost to our other interests, even i neces-
not learn to use a language unless he were wil]ing.to co- sary at the cost of life itself.
operate with his mother or teacher by an anxiety to please Glearly, to become aware of the existence of such a
and a willingness to learn. Again, we can imagine a child being must affect us in a manner to which the awareness of
who had only been speaking for a short while suddenly other human persons can offer only a remote parallel. The
being cut off from human society for many years and find- nearest analogy on the human level is the becoming aware
ing on a first renewed contact with mankind that he pos- of another which is at the same time a falling in love with
132 133
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FREEDOM

divine object. He speaks to man through the world, through


that other. This is an awareness ar removed fiom ca.sual
tlie system of society and nature in which He has placed him.6
observing; in it the observer is himsel prooundly in-
volved and affected, so that the whole course o his life may If man is to be personal, God must be dGWJ cibJcond.%s.
thenceforth be changed. However, in all 'our purely He must, so to speak, stand back, hiding himsel behind his
human relationships the other remains ultimately on "the creation, and leaving to us the freedom to recognize or fail
same level" as ourselves, whereas in the knowledge o God to recognize his dealings with us. Thereore God does not
the Other is one to whom the only appropriate relation- manipulate our minds or override our wills, but seeks our
ship is the utter abasement o worship. In "finding God" unforced recognition of his presence and our ffee alle-
the worshipper abdicates from the central position in his giance to his purposes. He desries, not a compelled obedi-
world, recognizing that this is God's rightul place. His life ence, but our uncoerced growth towards the humanity re-
must become consciously reorientated towards a Being in- vealed in Christ, a humanity which both knows God as
finitely superior to himself in worth as well as in power. Lord and trusts him as Father. He could, o course, as the
There is thus involved a radical reordering o his outlook omnipotent God, create beings who in all outward ways
such as must be undergone willingly i it is not to crush conform to this pattern, without having ever sought it for
', ) ', ,
and even destroy the personality. For so great a change can themselves in freedom and responsibili[y. BuC instead he
lH only be a conversion of the same person, and not the sub- has created beings whom he is leading gradually through
stitution o another person, if there is throughout a con- their own choices and decisions toward his kingdom. It is
tinuity, not only o memory, but also of insight and of as- thus integral to the divine plan, as we see it in operation,
sent. Only when we ourselve.s oztmo?.c.Zy recognize God, that men's integrity as persons, their individual freedom
desiring to enter into relationship with him, can our and accountability, are respected, above all in the utter]y
knowledge of him be compatible with our freedom, and so fateful and final sphere o their confrontation by God,
with our existence as personal beings. If God were to re- which is the sphere of religion. Thus faith is a correlate of
veal himself to us in the coercive way in which the physical freedom: faich is related to cognition as "free will" to
world is disclosed to us, he wou]d thereby annihilate us as conation. As one of the most interesting o the early theo-
free and responsib]e persons. Referring to the way in 1ogans, Irenaeus, said, "And not merely in works, but also
which, on the human level, a more powerhl personality in faith, has God preserved the will o man free and under
may unwittingly overshadow and diminish a weaker per- his own contro|." 7
sona.1ity, H. H. Fa.rmer asks, There is accordingly a simi]arity-together, as we shall
see presently, with an important dissimilarity--between
If that danger exists in respect o human personality, how
the manner of our cognition in ethics and in religion.
much more in respect of the personality o God in its relation
with finite creatures whom He seeks to fashion into personal 0 H. H. Famer, Thc Worzd and GocZ (2d ed., London, ig86), p
life? Wherefore, in pursuit of that purpose He has withdrawn 73.
7 4gcu.7w EcrcJ!.cJ, bk. N, di. 37, par. 5, translation in T/tc 47}c-
Himsel behind symbols. Neither for man's thinking, nor for
Nc.ccmG Fci!ftcrJ, vol. I (Grand Rapids, ig56).
his loving, does He present Himsel as a single, unmediated
135
184
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE .FAITH -AND FREEDOM

Concerning the apprehension o moral significance we gious"? For an enormous range of phenomena have been
concluded that man has an innate tendency to interpret labelled religious-from the mana-taboo beliefs o primi-
his social experience in ethical terms, though remaining tive peoples to the most exalted forms of ethical theism;
individually free either to develop or to stunt or distort from the Brahmanic-Hindu view o the Absolute as a non-
that tendency. Man is by nature an ethical animal; he is personal Unity to the ]udaic-Ghristian and lslamic view o
spontaneously receptive to the moral claims o the realm of the Absolute as moral personality; from swarming poly[he-
isms and belie in evil deities who demand the sacrifice of
personal relationships. As the mind displays a disposition
to interpret the data of sensation in terms of our familiar human blood, to the Ghristian belie in one God, holy,
material world, so also it reveals a disposition to interpret righteous and loving, creator ,and ruler o the universe,
man's social environment in ethical terms. And in a like who seeks kindness and compassion between man and
manner the human mind reveals to the student o the in- man, and who descends in the self-giving o incarnation to
cidence and history o religions a tendency to interpret its enable men to fulfill his will; and so on through all the
experience in religious terms. Man is a worshipping ani- wide variety covered by the highly elastic noun "religion."
mal, with an ingrained propensity to construe his world re- Where, i anywhere, is the factor which links together such
1igiously. At the same time, as in the case o his ethical in- diverse belies and activities?
terpretations, he has the freedom either to encourage or to There is, I think, despite this bewildering variety, a
Chwart this propensity. The evidence for the existence o basic common factor in all that has ever by general consent
such an innate re]igious tendency or disposition is the al- been cal]ed religion. This is the belie (implicit or ex-
most universal occurrence of ieligion in some form among plicit) that man's environment is other and greater than it
mankind in every age concerning which we have evi- seems, that interpenetrating the natural, but extending
dences..Theoretical atheists are-even in present-day Com- behind or beyond or above it, is the Supernatural, as a
munist Russia-a very small minority o highly sophisti- larger environment to which men must relate themselves
cated individuals whose very sophistication suggests that through the activities prescribed by their cult. The Super-
they have repressed, rather than that they are cib o.m.c.o de- natural, whether conceived as one or as many, as good or
void of, this otherwise universal bias in the human mind evil or part goo`d and part evil, as lovable or fearful, to be
toward a religious interpretation of the phenomena o lie.8 sought or shunned, figures in some fashion in everything
In speaking of an innate religious bias o human nature, that can be termed religion.9 And our innate tendency to
What-we must now askTdo we mean by the term "reli- interpret our world religious]y is a tendency to experience
it "in depth," as a supernatural as well as a natural envi-
8 The doctrine o an innate human tendency to interpret life in
ronment.
terms o a divine presence and activity is by no means incompatible,
as some assume it to be, with a "high" view o revelation. No less This religious bas operates, in modern man at any rate,
Calvinistic a theologian than Tohn Galvin himself firmly asserted only as an "inclining cause." In primitive man, however, it
that "There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural may well have operated as a. "determining cause." For the
instinct, an awareness o divinity" (Jns.tes, bk. i, ch. 8, sec. i. anthropologists ha.ve taught us that individua.l personality
Battles' transla.tion). Again, "a sense o divinity which can never 0 C. |. Orr[:an, The Natura,l a,nd the Superna,tui.a,l.
be effaced is engraved upon men's minds" (.Zu.d., sec. 8).

136 137
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FREEDOM

and thought have only gradually become separated out the insight first of in`dividua]s, then o the few, and later of
ffom the group mind o the tribe. In primitive societies the many, God has gradually been creating in mankind a
the individual is so entirely merged in the group, and his capacity to receive a fuller revelation of his nature and
religious ideas are so entirely molded by the collective purpose, which revelation has culminated, according to the
mind o which he is part, that speculation and doubt are claim of the Christian religion, in divine incarna.tion in
rare occurrences. Any kind o critical thinking on the part the person of ]esus Christ.
o the individual about the common dogmas and the estab~ There have, then, proceeded cw3. cLfJt through the ages
lished deities and taboos of the tribe has been a. compara- the gradual liberation of the individual mind from absorp-
tively late development in the history of the race, a devel- tion in the group mentality of me tribal family, and the
opment associated with economic and other changes tend- gradual realization by that mind of deeper and more far-
ing to larger social units and the consequent release of the reaching demands meeting it through its awareness of the
individual from the closely knit existence of the tribe. It is Supernatural. Thus man's cognitive freedom toward his
only at this comparatively recent stage of development that environment, as mediating cZcM.mJ upon his personality,
our cognitive ffeedom in relation to the divine has become has been preserved. Mankind has been brought through
effectively operative. Prior to that, mankind's innate bias his religious infancy to a stage at which a fuller and more
towards religion, although not irresistible, was not (as far demanding sel-disclosure of the divine is matched by
as we know) in fact resisted, but held an unquestioned man's own fuller ffeedom and responsibility.
sway over men's minds. This innate religious bias of our nature, inclining but
Occuning, significant]y, hind in hand with this growth not determining us to interpret our world religiously, is an
of individuality there has come about a development essential precondition of any truly personal relationship
within religious awareness toward deeper and more pene- between God and man. For it enables us to preserve our
trating conceptions of the czcmcmdJ which the Supernatu- autonomy in God's presence. It is in .virtue of this tend-
ral makes upon humanity. From nonrational taboos there ency that we are able both to know God and yet to be
has been a development to the ethically rational demand genuinely free in relation to him. If mankind had no such
for righteousness, and from an exclusive interest in out- bias toward a religious response to life, if the idea of the
ward acts and observances to a larger concern which em- Super.natural found-no` spontaneous hospitality ,in the
braces the inner thoughts and intents o the heart. Like all human mind, then only a quite overwhelmingly .unambig-
phenomena in the field of religion this development is ca- uous self-disclosure could reveal the divine to man; and
pable of both a naturalistic and a theistic interpretation. this revehtion would b received by compelled and not a
The natura]istic interpretation would reduce it to its social volun-tar.y awareness. Iri order to be cognitively free in rela-
and economic concomitants. The theistic imerpretation, tion o God .we riust pgssess an innate GndG7?cy to recog-
on the other hand, sees behind this process a divine pressure nize his presence behind the phenomena of life, an yet
upon the minds of men, gradually drawing them forward .tendency which i not irresistible but which we may re-
through their own free responses to God's providential press without doing manifest violence to our nat,ure.
dea.1ings with them in the events of their world. Through This, I suggest, is the substance.o the answer to the
138 1.39
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FJUTH AND FREEDOM

d.egree, lest He be entirely manifest, so that there might be


question which was posed for the present chapter. The rea-
son why God reveals himself indirectly--meeting us in and something which through being known would nourish the
heart of man, and again something which through being
through the world as mediating a. significance which re-
hidden would stimulate it.10
quires an appropriate response on our part, or as a realm
of symbol which is opaque or transparent according to our But it is Pascal who, in a passage curiously reminiscent o
own use o it-is that only thus can the conditions exist for that from Hugh o St. Victor, has most vividly made the
a GrJonciz relationship between God and man. point. Speaking of Christ, he says:
The classic exemplification o this principle occurs in It was not then right that He should appear in a manner
-the Christian doctrine of the lncarnation. That doctrine
manifestly divine, and completely capable of convincing all
will be treated more at length from a slightly differem men; but it was also not right that He should come in so
angle in Chapter io. But we may note at this point tha.t ft: hidden a manner that He could not be known by those who
employs to the full the notion of God as revealing himsel should sincerely seek Him. He has willed to make Himself
indirect]y, in a manner which requires for its success an, '
quite recognizable by those; and thus, willing to appear
appropriate human activity of interpretation. The selfg openly to those who seek Him with all their heart, He so reg-
disc]osure of God in ]esus Christ, as set forth in Ghristian\`; ulates the knowledge of Himself that He has given signs of
teaching, is a veiled revelation which achieves its purposd Himself, visible to those who seek Him, and not to those who
'
seek Him not. There is enough light for those who only de-
only when men penetrate the divine incognito by an uri
sire to see, and enough obscurity for those who have a contra]:y
compe]Ied response of self-commitment and trust-the;{
disposition.11
Purpose o the ve]ing being Precisely to make that free rea;'
sponse possible. Kierkegaard, with his concept o indirecq:! Without wishing to compile an anthology on this subject I
communication, has great]y aided the Christian underi: should like to add one more statement, that o Samuel
standing of the divine method in revelation; althoughi Taylor Coleridge, who wrote that divine existence "could
Luther, n his blunt and ]ess subtle way, had seen it witb` not be intellectually more evident without becoming
equal c]arity. But ]ong befoTe ether Luther or Kierkei: morally less effective; without counteracting its own end
by sacrificing the life of faith to the cold mechanism o a
gaard, the twelfth-century theologian Hugh of St. Victof
offered a strikng statement of the divinelv intended corS worthless because compulsory assent." 12
relation between ambiguity and faith. He says: Thus far we have seen that the discovery o God as lying
behind the world, and of his presence as mediated in and
God from the beginnng w].`shed neifher to T)e enti.relv man through it, arises from interpreting in a new way what was
fest to hiiman cr`TisroiisTipss nor eiitirelv hidden. rFori if H already before us. It is epistemologically comparable, not
were entireiv hidden, faitti woii]d i.ndeed not b aided um
10 0n the Sa,craments of the Christian Failh, bk. ., pt. iii, sec. 2,
knowledge, and lack of faith would be exc`ise(1 on the gi-oim
trans. by Roy T. Deferrari (Gambridge, Mass., ig5i), Pr}. 4i-42.
of gTioTance. Wherefore. it was necessary that God shoiil
11 Pc%5'cs, ed. Brunschvicg, trans. by W. F. Trotter (London, ig32),
show Himself, though hdden, Iest He be entrelv coTiceale
no. 480.
.and entirely unknown: and a.gain, t was riecessary that H 12 B.ogrcipJw.fl L.ercw.a, Everyman ed. (London, igo6), p. io6.
should conceal Himself, though shown and known to som
141
140
FJUTH .AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FREEDont[

to the discovery o a man concealed behind a screen, or of Chaldean army []eremiah] beheld the form of ]ahwe
inferred electrons underlying the observed behavior o righting for them and through them against His own peo-
matter, but to what Wittgenstein called "seeing as." 13 He p|e." 14 It is important to appreciate that this was not an
drew attention to this in the case of puzzle pictures. In interpretation in the sense of a theory imposed retrospec-
such a case, as we gaze at the enigmatic page covered with tively upon remembered facts. It was the way in which the
dots apparently scattered over it at random, it suddenly prophet actually experienced and participated in these
da.wns upon us that this is, say, the picture o a man stand- events at the time. He consciously lived in the situation ex-
ing in a grove of trees. We thus come to apperceive the perienced in this way. And in general, the religious man
familiar data as significant in a fresh way, a wa.y which su- finds his experience to be signi,ficant in a way which both
persedes our original interpreta.tion. To reach the reli- transcends and transforms his earlier nonreligious mode o
gious case, however, we must expand the notion of "seeing experience and reveals it as mediating a personal relation-
as" into that of "experiencing as," not only visually but ship with the divine Person.
through all the modes of perception functioning together. This discovery differs in character from the reappercep-
We experience situations as having different kinds o sig- tion of a puzzle picture, not only because the religious in-
nificance and so as rendering appropriate different kinds of terpretation is an uniquely total one, but also because the
practical response. The Old Testament prophets, for ex- totality which it discloses constitutes a situation within
ample, experienced their historical situation as one in which the interpreter is himsel inextricably involved as a
which they were living under the sovereign claim of God, constituent, a situation which makes continual practical
and in which the appropriate way for them to act was as demands upon him. Indeed all changes in apperception~
God's agents; whereas to most of their contemporaries, whether the trivial change in viewing the puzzle picture or
who were "experiencing as" in a different way, the situa- the immensely important change of religious conversion-
tion did not have this religious significance. The prophets' involve the will, either as making a. deliberate choice, or as
interpretation o Hebrew history, as this is embodied in voluntarily accepting and adopting the new pattern o sig-
the Old Testament, shows that they were "experiencing nificance which offers itsel to the mind. But in the special
as" in a. characteristic and consistent way. Where a secular case of theistic faith the whole personality, including the
historian would see. at work various economic, social and will, is engaged in an even more far-reaching manner. For
geographical factors bringing about the rise and fall of to know God is to know oneself as standing in a subordi-
cities and empires, the prophets saw behind all this the nate relationship to a higher Being and to acknowledge
hand o God raising up and casting down and gradually the claims of that Being upon the whole range o one's life.
ulfilling a purpose. When, for example, the Cmaldeans The act of will, or the state of willingness or consent, by
were at the gates of ]erusalem, the prophet ]eremiah expe- which one adopts the religious mode o apperception is ac-
rienced this event, not simply as a foreign political threat cordingly also an act of obedience or a willingness tQ obey.
but also as God's judgment upon lsrael. As one we]1- Thus although belie in the reality of God, and a practical
known commentator says, "Behind the serried ranks of the 14 ]ohn Skinner, Prophccy ncz RcZ3.g3.o7? (Gambridge, ig22), p.
18 Philosophical lnvestigatons (Oxord, ig58), Pt. 11, sec. \L. 261.

142 143
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FREEDOM

trust and obedience towards him, must be distinguished in ma.y well be that the world is richer in its significance for
thought, they occur together and depend closely upon one mankind than the nonreligious person. has realized. It may
anocher: r7cZcJ and fid%c3. are two elements in a single be that the religious mode of apperception is the one
whole, which is man's a.wareness of the divine. In this which "gets the most out of life." But to describe this man-
study we are concerned only with the cognitive element in ner o experiencing in terms of an actually existing tran-
faith; but a. fuller trea.tment of the subject of faith would scendent divine Being is to invoke an ontological myth-
have much to say also about its volitional and fiduciary ele- perhaps an inevitable myth, but (so the atheist would in-
ments. sist) none the less mythical. The word "God," according
This analysis o religious faith as interpretation is not it- to him, is the name for a logical construction out of human
self a religious, or an antireligious, but an epistemological experience, a personified formula to aid our appreciation
doctrine. It can with logical propriety be accepted, and de. of life's more elusive profundities. It would, I think, be
veloped for their different purposes, both by the theist and along some such lines as these that an atheist, having ac-
by the atheist. For the ambiguity o "the given," which we cepted an epistemological analysis of religious faith as an
have found at every stage to be a precondition o faith, ex- act of "total interpretation," would conceive its ontologi~
tends to the nature of faith itself. It therefore now remains cal bearings. On his view, the religious interpretation is
to show how this view of faith might be integrated into the closely analogous to the aesthetic interpretation as a way of
theistic and antitheistic world views respectively. viewing and feeling about the world.
The atheist's use o such an analysis might well be con- For the theist, however, the aesthetic analogy holds only
ceived in terms of the philos.ophical study of language. He up to a certain point and then breaks down. And in break-
might point out (as does ]ohn Wisdom) 15 that language ing down it misses all that is most distinctive in religion.
is used not only to convey information and to express emo- For aesthetic apperception terminates in the world itsel,
t:ions but also to alter our apprehensions, to set an object which is contempla.ted, enjoyed, and valued for its own
or a situation in a new light which reveals it as, in a sense, sake. But religious apperception passes through the world
a different object or situation; and that the statement that to God, seeing the natural as mediating the Supematural.
there is a God functions in this way. The theistic assertion It thus entails an ontological claim which has no analogy
serves to bring out characteristics of the world and of in the sphere of aesthetics. Aesthetic apperception asserts
human experience which are concealed by the contrary as- that this and that are beautiful, but need not assert that
sertion. What the theist describes as "knowing God" con- Beauty exists as a Platonic essence subsisting in another
sists in regarding and feeling about the world in a.certain realm. But theistic religion, in claiming that the world
way, a way characteristically different from that in which mediates a divine activity, must also claim that God exists
one regards it who does not "know God." But, he would as a real Being, transcending our world as well as meeting
add, this difference is purely subjective. There is no extra us in and through it. This ontological claim is the final
Person, whom we call God, in addition to the world. It point of distinction not only between religion and aes-
15 Gf. "The Logic of God," in Prcido,v cmc! D.Jcouc?y (Oxford, thetics but also between religion and ethics. Moral obliga~
1965). tion is apprehended in practical 1ife simply as a. felt
144 145
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FREEDOM
"ought," and its theological analysis in terms o the will of the` endles-s beauty of the earth he sees the smile (as it
God rests upon the further act o interpretation which we were) of the earth's Creator; in his neighbors he discovers
call religious faith. The perception o duty as such involves fellow children o the heavenly Father; in the imperatives
no claim concerning divine existence. Bt the perception o morality he feels the pressure upon him of the absolute
of life's religious significance does entail such a claim. For demands of God; in life's joy and happiness he discerns the
the theist, the word "God" does not designate a. logical bountiful goodness of the Lord, and in its frustrations and
construction, nor is it simply a poetic term for the world as disappointments he sees, even if usually only in retrospect,
a. whole; it refers to the unique transcendent personal God's austere but gracious discipline saving him ffom too
Creator of the universe. And the awareness of God which complete involvement in purel;y earthly hopes and pur-
the theist claims is not any kind of inference from the poses. In both joy and sorrow, success and failure, rejoicing
character of the world, but an awareness of God as acting and mourning, he sees, however fitfully and faintly, the
towards him through the circumstances and events of his hand of God holding him within the orbit of the on-going
life. divine purpose, whose fulfillment can alone secure his own
The theistic believer does not apprehend these circum- final fulfillment and blessedness. Thus the believer's daily
stances and events as being themselves divine, as the aes- life is of a piece with his inner life of prayer, when he
thetic analogy would suggest, but as 77tGd&.cL of God's activ- speaks to God in direct communion. The God to whom he
ity towards him. Directly, each moment of experience ex- prays in secret he finds openly in the world. All o 1ife is
presses either natural law or human decisions or the or him a dialogue with the divine Tot,. in and through
interaction of these; but ultimately the whole historical all his dealings with life he is having to do with God and
process expresses the divine intention o the creation o God with him.
human souls through their free response to the continuous The limita.tions of an epistemological analysis of reli-
opportunities of God's wise appointments and require- gious faith are made clear by the fact that it is thus capable
ments. To the person who has found God, the whole of of both a theistic and an atheistic application; and that
lie can thus mediate the divine presence and purpose; limitation should perhaps be stressed again at this point. I
or as we expressed this on a previous page, life can at have been trying in these chapters to show how, if there be
any point focus God's presence upon us; the ultimate a God, he ma.y be known to us; I have not been trying to
significance can at any moment intrude upon and super- establish, or even to probabilify, the proposition that there
sede all 1esser significances. Thus the believer's entire 3.5 a God. I have sought to show that, from the standpoint
view of life and practical response to it are transformed- of epistemology, the kind of cognition of God which reli-
not as the same mind looking upon a new world, but as a gious people profess to experience is the kind which they
new mind looking upon the same world and seeing it as might reasonably be expected to enjoy if there is indeed a
different. To the believer "the heavens declare the glory of God to be known such as theism asserts. But whether the
God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork"; 16 in theistic claim is justified is not a question for the epis-
10 Psalm i9:L. temologist, or indeed for any category of specialist as such.
146 147
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

lt is a question for each individual exercising his cognitive


powers in relation to the environment in which he finds
himself, and responding in his own personal freedom and
responsibility to its claims and calls.

PART 111

The Logic of Faith


Faith amd Fact

FAITH has been presented in the last two chapters as


the interpretative element within the religious person's
claimed awareness of God. Such a view raises at once the
question whether faith entails any factual claims about
"what there is" and "how things are" in the universe, or
whether it is what R. M. Hare has ca.lled a Z?Za., that is, a.
way o looking at the world which terminates in the world
itself.1 The aim o this chapter is to present the full chal-
lenge of that question.
Faith is an uncompelled mode of "experiencing as"-
jexperiencing the world as a place in which we have at
all times to do with the transcendent God; and the propo-
sitional belief to which it gives rise is correspondingly non-
coercive in that it is not only presently unverifiable but
also unable to be supported by arguments o probability.
This is not because it is in any degree improbable, but
because the concept of probability is not applicable to
total interpretations. For proba.bility, whether defined in
terms of frequency ratios or authorization of belief, is.a re-
1ational concept. Nothing can be said to be probable per se
but only in relation to data. beyond itself. And in the spe-
1R. M. Hare, "Theology and Falsification," in Nczu EJJciyJ .n
Phizosophicaz Theology, ed. Ah G.. N. Flew a.nd A. G. MZLclntyre
(London, i955).
151
FAITII AND KNOWI,EDGE FAITH AND FAGT
cial case of our experience as a whole there is nothing be- not applicable to the character of the "totality o all that
yond itsel which could stand in a probabiliying relation i8, 4
to it. We may confirri this by applying the two main types of
The theistic problem has often in the course o its long
probability theory to the theistic problem. According to
history been stated in terms of probability. Given the uni- the frequency theory, probability is a. matter of statistics.
verse as we experience it, with its various suggestions both If, to cite a stock example, ioo balls are mixed together in
of chance and of design, it has seemed natural to ask .i bag, io of the balls being known to be red and go black,
whether the probability o its being God-produced is .ind the balls are to be drawn out one by one, then the
greater or less than the proba.bility of its being non-God- proposition, "The next ball will ,be red," if reiterated, will
produced.2 Given those features of our experience (such be true io times out o ioo, and its probability a.t any one
as the sense of moral obligation) which seem to invite a ucterance is thereore io/ioo or i/io. Applying the ffe-
theistic explanation and those others (such as pa.in and
quency principle to the probability of causes, the st:ate-
death) which seem to contradict such an explanation, it ment that the probability o ci being the cause of % is i/n,
has appeared reasonable to try to estimate the relative means that % is a member of a class of objects (or events)
probabilities of these rival interpretations. Is theism or this proportion (namely i/n) o which are known to have
atheism-philosophers have asked-the more likely ac- been caused by c}'s. Here is a tenable analysis o probabil-
count o the universe? iiy. But clearly, on such a basis nothing can be said about a.
The conc.ept of probability has undergone useful clarifi-
cause of the universe; for the universe is not a member of a
cation during the decades of this century, and it is, I think, class of universes, and therefore it cannot be made the sub-
clear that on any accepted analysis of it these theologica]
ject of any such statistical pronouncement. .
queries are unanswerable. Indeed they are strictly speaking A like conclusion follows ffom the older definition of
unaskable; they are logica.lly improper questions. The
probability in terms of reasonableness or authorization of
uniqueness o the universe rules such inquiries out. If, in belief.5 0n this view a proposition is probable, not in iso-
Gharles Peirce's phrase,3 universes were as plentiful as
1ation but in relation to other, evidence-stating proposi-
blackberries, we might be able to estimate the probable
tions. A judgment of probability thus presupposes a corpus
character of this particular universe on the basis of the al- of (actual or supposed) items o information @, g, r)
ready known characters of other universes. But since there
8uch that belie in these prior propositions authorizes be-
can by definition be only one universe, no such compara- lie in a further proposition (%); and the strength or confi-
tive procedure is possible. The concept `of probability s dence of the belief thus authorized is .the rheasure (al-
2A `probability argument of this kind is developed by Pierre though not a measure capbl.e f precise numerica.1 state-
Lecomte du Noy .in H%mm D.cs.ny (New York, ig47), and is 4 C. Da:Nd. Hme, Dia,Zogues conc,eming Na,tu+az Religiori, pt. ii
criticized by Wallace 1. Matson n T7M EXG.Jc7tcc of GocZ (Ithaca,
(I{emp Smith's ed., p. i85), and Arthur Pap, EJcm,enJ of 147?azy.c
1965). PP. io2-iii.
PAi.Zosophy (New York, ig49), PP. i97-200.
3 "The Probabilities of lnduction" in Tric P/t.ZoJoPJ2y of PeG.rcc,
ti Gf. ]. M. Keynes; j4.Trct.Je on..Probcib.2.y (London, ig2i),
ed. ]. Buchler (New York, ig4o).
ch. l.
152
158
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FACT
ment) of the probability of % in relation to P, g, and ?.. People do indeed cherish such convictions about the
Here too is an intelligible analysis of probability. But once iiniverse, and do express them in terms of probability or
again it is not applicable to the theistic problem. For in likelihood. But what they are thus expfessing is an individ-
the case of a proposition stating a total interpretation, ti.il impression or feeling or "hunch" which cannot be
there can, by definition, be no data outside the interpre. i}valuated by any kind of ca.lculus and cannot therefore be
tant, no corpus o prior propositions through relation to linparted as other than a private judgment. It represents
which it could receive a probability-value. ihe personal response of the whole man to his environ-
The concept of probability then, we must conclude, is iiient, and is as such outside the sphere o demonstrative
not applicable to comprehensive world-views. We cannot i'L]asoning. Religious philosophers have on the whole rec-
weigh one metaphysical system against another as rela. i}8'nized this, at any rate since the widespread abandon-
tively more or less probable. Since there is by definition iiient o the theistic proofs. But not by any mea.ns all have
only one universe, all that can be required o an interpre. iic:cepted the full implications of a theology without proofs.
tation of it is that account be taken of the entire field of In place of the traditional ontological and cosmological
the known da.ta. No wcy of accounting for the data can bc ilemonstrations they have sought to set up an alternative
said to be, in any objectively ascertainable sense, more (irgument to the effect that, considered as a metaphysical
probable than another. Hence if theism and naturalism are iystem, the Christian world view is at least as convincing as
alike permissible interpretations of the phenomena of (iny other, or perhaps more convincing than any other.
human experience, they must in the eyes of logic stand on This, they claim, can be made good to reflective reason
an equal footing. without the aid of concealed bias or preformed convic-
But, it may be said, while this is true of probability con- tions. The program o such philosophical theologians, of
sidered as a mathematical or logical concept, is there not whom F. R. Tennant is perhaps the outstanding recent
also an alogical type of probability? Whatever the philo. i'epresentative, is twofold. They first offer powerful criti-
sophical theory of probability may permit, riost people do {:isms o the various psychological and sociological versions
in fact reach a conviction that some one interpretation o[ (}f naturalism; and then depict the spiritual, moral, and
the universe is more probable or likely than others. Some :`esthetic experience of mankind as pointing unmistaka-
range of facts-perhaps their own moral experience, or the l)1y towards theism. The critical part of the program has
Christian revelation; perhaps the evil and tragedy' which l)een performed with considerable success. The standard
they have witnessed, or the apparently impersonal mech. naturalistic theories do indeed display serious inconsisten-
anism of the universe-outweighs all else in their minds, (:ies and inadequacies under examination, and these can be
and they see it as overwhelmingly likely that theism, or exposed by arguments which are as valid for the unbe-
naturalism, is true. In so judging are they not employing, liever as for the religious believer. But in the constructive
perhaps without knowing it, the concept of "alogical prob. .ipologetic the method changes, overtly or covertly,. fi.om
ability?" 0 impersonal demonstra.tion to personal persua.sion, from
6 For a defense of this concept see F. R. Tennant, P7u.ZoJoph.caJ irgument to recommendation. For there are no common
Tcozog)) (Cambridge, ig28),1, dl. ii. qcales in which to measure, for example, the evidential
154 155
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FACT

wight of apparent universal mechanism against that o its desired havn when it allows ts.sails to be .filled in par't
the impact of Christ upon his disciples. There is no obje With the wind of natural religion.7
tive measuring rod by which to compare the depth 1 But is it in fa.ct the case that a complete and consistent
which wickedness can sink with the height to which goo Cheism and a complete and consistent naturalism are alike
ness can rise, and so to balance the problem o evil, whi(
possible? For there are both naturalistic thinkers who
challenges theism, aga.inst the problem o good, whi( doubt whether theism amounts even to a coherent logical
challenges naturalism. Looked at in a completely neutr
possibility, and religious thinkers who doubt whether a
1ight, and through the spectacles of no philosophy, the fa consistent and thoroughgoing naturalism is really capable
of the world would present a checkerboard o alternati of being formulated. It is therefore necessary to say some-
black and white. It can be seen either as white diversifi thing in reply to each o these doubts. It is obviously not
by black-a divinely ruled world containing accident
possible within the limits of this discussion to attempt to
pockets of evil; or as black diversified by white-a godl examine all the many considerations which have from time
world containing the incongruous factor o moral goo [o time been offered both as theistic and as antitheistic evi-
ness. When the theist and atheist argue together, each dence. Such a task would require a volume, or rather a li-
trying, by emphasizing this at the expense of that and ' brary. All that 1 can do is to refer to those key items which
drawing this into the center and relegating that to t have generally been felt to weigh most heavily both for
perimeter, to bring the other to see the universe as he hi and against theistic belief, showing that in each case the
self sees it. The difference between them is not due to a evidence is ambiguous and is capable of being accommo-
variation in logical acumen. or calculating capacity, but date both in a theistic and in an atheistic world view.
the difference between two radically different ways We may begin with the antitheistic evidence. Its main
viewing and engaging in the experiences of human ] item is the fact of evil. We know in general, it is said, what
And their respective arguments are but eldborate aft a universe would be like which had been created by an
thoughts, excogitated to support and justify convictions omnipotent and infinitely good crea.tor. It would be "the
ready arrived at by another path. best of al] possible worlds." But we can all suggest numer-
The point of entry of theism into the human mi ous improvements in the existing world. Therefore this is
then, is not a philosophically immaculate natural theolo not the best o all possible worlds; and hence it cannot be
but the spontaneous religious response to the world whi the work of the kind o creator alleged by ethical mono-
some call natural religion. As H. H. Farmer has said in cheism.
recent discussion of these matters, Such is the skeptic's reasoning. But it goes beyond what
7RGUGZci*.om cmd RcZ.g.o7D (London, ig54), p. i3. This does not
The degree in which a reasoned case for theism carries cc mean that argument has 7io office to fulfill in the service o religion.
viction . . . depends on the degree in which there is alrea Although it cannot create faith, it can both prepare the wa.y for it
present in the mind a disposition towards theistic belie; or, and confiim and strengthen t when present. Gf. the continuation
other words, natural theology can only make progress towai of Farmer's discussion, pp. i3 ff.

156 157
FJUTH AND FACT
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
We turn now to an equally brie discussion o the the-
is warranted. It assumes that the best of all possible worlds
istic evidence. This consists in (a) certain general charac-
must at any given moment be incapable o improvement.
teristics of the world and o human ekperience-such as the
Whether tha.t is so must depend upon the purpose, i any,
order and beauty of nature, and man's universal moral
for which the world exists. The theist's claim is that it ex-
sense and propensity to worship; and (b) certain particu-
ists because God wills that it should exist, and that its
lar happenings, such as alleged miracles, a.nswers to prayer,
function in the divine plan is that of a process through
and specia.l revelations and theophanies.
which moral persona.lity is gradually being created by free
In the former group the item upon which stress is most
response to environmental challenges and opportunities. It
often laid today by religious apologists is man's moral ex-
is a process within which human beings can develop those
perience. It is argued that the s~ense of obligation implies a
qualities of unselfishness, love, and courage which are transcendent personal Will as its source and g,round. The
evoked by difficulties and obstacles and by situations which
view thus baldly stated in a sentence has been set forth in
may demand the sacrifice of the self and its interests for the
impressive detail by leading religious philosophers.9 And
sake o others. Perhaps a. universe in which men live thus as
ffee and responsible beings, endowed with the power to yet to many nonbelieving philosophers it entire]y lacks
cogency or even plausibility, from which we can only con-
bring sorrow and pain, as well as happiness and delight,
clude that "the wind of natural religion" has been carrying
both to themselves and to one another, is capable o pro-
the argument home in the one case, while for lack of that
ducing a far higher value in the sphere of personality than a
wind it remains becalmed in the other.
ready-made hedonistic paradise. Hence it is possible that
To note this is not of course to rebut the claim that the
our own at present imperect and untidy universe is after all
sense of obligation mediates the pressure of a divine Will
the best of all conceivable universes, not in the sense that
upon our lives. The point is simp]y that this religious
none o its individual items is at present incLapable of im-
analysis of moral obligation (whether true or alse) is a
provement, but in the sense tha.t taken as a whole and corollary rather than a premise of theism. Taken by them-
throughout its entire history the universe is such that to re-
selves the facts of our ethical experience are capable o
move its present finite evils would be to preclude an infinite
either a naturalistic or a theistic exp]anation, and our
future good. Whether this is in fact the case cannot be deter-
choice at this point is determined by our prior conviction
mined simply by inspecting the world around us. We can-
as to the theous or atheous character of the universe.
not tell from within it, during the brief period of observa. An even briefer comment, to the same effect, may be
tion afforded by a man's life on this earth, or indeed by made upon revelations and theophanies in some words of
scrutinizing the entire scroll of recorded history, .whether
Thomas llobbes, who pointed out that when a man claims
this earthly scene is a "vale of soul making" or a "fortui-
thac God spoke to him in a dream, this is "no more than to
tous concourse o atoms." All that we can say is that in
spite of the antitheistic evidence the religious claim my 0 The views of one such thinker have been considered in the lat-
nevertheless be true.8 ter part of ch. 4. For an important recent sympathetic treatment o
lhe moral argument, see H. ]. Paton, Thc Moczcm Prcd3.ccmG7?
8 I have argued this position much more fully in Eu8.Z cmc! /tc Go(J
(London, 1955).
of ot/e (London and New York, ig66).
159
158
FJUTH AND KNOWLEDGE
FAITH AND F'ACT
say he dreamed that God spake to him." Moi-e generally,
student of psychical research might subsume the phenom-
we must acknowledge concerning any ostensively revela-
ena under the heading o "psychokinesis," the alleged
tory experience, whether vision, voice, inner feeling,
trance, or dream, that the intellectual move from the expe- power of the mind to influence directly the configurations
o[ matter beyond the agent's own body.L The motive
rience itself to the religious interpretation of it is always
capable of being queried; for it is true of any move tha.t it power answering the prayer would then be that of the be-
1iever's own intense desire nd faith. Likewise it might be
may be a mistaken move.
said that prayers for the bodily healing of others take effect
With regard to alleged miracles and answers to petition-
either by means of psychokinesis or, perhaps more proba-
ary prayer, new data have come into prominence in recent
bly, by operating telepathically,upon the patient's uncon-
years through the investigations grouped together under scious mind, and via this upon his body. The Jpa.rtmz
the name of psychical research or parapsychology. It is
effects o prayer may likewise be ob`served either in the
sometimes prophesied by students of this new science that
their researches will rehabilitate religion in the modern person praying or in someone else on whose behal he in-
tercedes. In the former case n explanation in terms o
mind. It is true that the first effect o acquaintance with
autosuggestion might be capable of covering the observed
the data and speculations of parapsychology is frequently
facts. In the latter case the hypothesis of telepathy could
to assist religious belief by sweeping a.way the remains o
again be invoked. It `might be said that we are constantly
scientific and philosophical materialism. But a. 1ater effect
influencing one another unconsciously, and that in effica-
is to make possible, in principle if not in detail, a. more
cios prayer this effect becomes concentrated and specifi-
thoroughgoing naturalism than has hitherto been pro-
cally directed. 1 these possibilities are allowed, there
pounded, at an-y rate in Westem thought. For it is now would remain no compulsion to postulate divine interve'n-
possible to suggest a nontheistic explanation of undisputed [ion in response to prayer; a prayer might bring its wn
"miraculous" happenings and effective "answers to
answer by means of parapsychological mechanisms which
prayer." Such explanations have not yet been exploited by are as yet only partly understood. Further, precognition
the sel-styled Rationalists; but we may presume that when
they have emerged from the narrow valley of nineteenth- (for which there is a growing body of evidence) could be
used in a nituralistic interpretation o "providen'tial" es-
century materialism they will hail these investigations with
capes ffom accident and of warnings received through
delight.
dreams and visions. These are samples of the way in which
Suppose it to be esta.blished, for example, that the pray-
the findings of psychical research might be brought to bear
ers of religious people are fulfilled in a significantly larger
to dissolve away certain traditional forms o theistic evi-
proportion of cases than would be expected as the re.sult of dence-
"chance." Such prayers may be petitions either for mate-
Thus it appears that a consistent naturalistic theory,
rial or for spiritual aid. In the case of P7zyJ3.cflz effects, the
covering all the special phenomena o religious experience
10c8.ci7icm, pt. 8, ch. 32. For a philosophically elaborate and history as well as the general facts of nature, is possi-
contemporary use of this argument, see C. 8. Martin, RezS.gc.ow ble, at least in principle. Consequently the religious inter-
BcZ.cf (Ithaca, ig59). Ch. 5.
11Cf. ]. 8. Rhine, T#c Reoch of *72c M{.7id (New York-, ig47).
16o
i6l
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
FAITH AND FACT
pretation of life cannot be accepted merely in default of an faith as a kind of Z?.k (although he does not use Hare's
alternative. This is all t:hat a survey of the evidence entitles
term). Randall conceives of religion. as a human activity
on to say-that the observed facts are systematically am-
which, like its compeers, science and art, makes its own
biguous, constituting permissive evidence both for theism
special contribution to man's culture. It has the two main
and for naturalism.
functions of nourishing and strengthening our commit-
It follows from this conc]usion that theism is not an ex-
ment to mora.l values, and o cultivating our awareness o
perimental issue. There is no test observation, no crucial some of life's more elusive depths and "splendors." This
instance such that i 4 occurs theism is shown to be true,
latter function of revealing aspects of life and o the world
while if 8 occurs theism is shown to be false. From this
which remain unnoticed in oup secular moods is the near-
conclusion it is but a short step for a. naturalistically in-
est approach which religion makes to a cognitive activity.
clined thinker to the conception of religious faith as a way
In this connection Randall offers an interesting analogy
of seeing and feeling about the world, a way which entails
with art. The artist reveals to his fellows dimensions of
no claim concerning the existence of a transcendent divine
beauty in the world which they had not hitherto per-
Being. There is great interest today in the possibility of a
ceived. Art "makes us see the new qualities with which
religious naturalism which will recognize the importance
that world, in co-operation with the spirit o man, can
and value of religious forms of life whilst rejecting the tra-
clothe itself." The prophet and the saint function in a sim-
ditiona.l belie in the existence of God. The issue is
ilar way. "They teach us how to discern what human na-
whether religion should be defined in terms of God, as
ture can make out of its natural conditions and materials.
men's varying responses to a real supernatural Being, or
They enable us to see and feel the religious dimension o
whether God should be defined in terms of religion, as one
our world better, the `order of splendor,' and of man's ex-
o the basic symbols with which religion works. Our twen-
Perience in and wich it." i2
tieth-century At]antic culture seems to be in process of
Thus far this is compatible with the view of faith as reli-
adopting the latter a.lternative. The characteristic contem-
gious "experiencing as" developed in the two previous
porary stress is upon the social and psychological usefulness chapters. But Randall himself uses the notion within a
of religion, and its statistically certifiable dividends, rather
naturalistic philosophy, in that he conceives the subject
than upon its claim to be true. The distinctive religious at-
matter of religion to be confined to human nature and its
titude today sees religion as an activity which has value in-
natural environment. God does not in any sense exist as a
dependently o any alleged connection with a divine crea-
real Being; he is "an intellectual symbol for the religious
tor and redeemer. Indeed whether or not, or in wha.t sense,
dimension of the world, for the Divine." 18 This religious
there is a God is regarded as a technical question. about
dimension, says Randall, is "a quality to be discriminated
which religious thinkers differ.
in human experience of the world, the splendor o the vi-
R. M. Hare has introduced the term bza.k for a convic-
sion that sees beyond the actual into the perfected and
tion which, although unverifiable and unfalsifiable, is also
`L2 The Role of Knowledge in Westem Religion (Boston, ig5&),
unshakable. But it is ]. H. Randall, ]r., who has devel-
oped most fully a naturalistic use of the view of religious pp. 128-129.
18 JbG.d., P.112.

162
168
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FAGT
eternal realm of the imagination." 4 This last statement someone invisible to mortal eyes. I believe that the more care-
reveals the naturalistic presupposition of Randall's think- fully we look the more we sha.ll find.\ confirmation o this."
ing. The products of the human imagination are not eter- They examine the garden ever so carefully and sometimes they
nal; they did not exist before man himsel existed, and come on new things suggesting that a gardener comes and
they can persist, even as imagined entities, only so long as sometimes they come on new things suggesting the contrary
men exist. The Divine, as defined by Randall, is the tem- and even that a malicious person has been at work. Besides
examining die garden carefully they also study what happens
porary mental construction or projection o a recently Co gardens let without attention. Each learns all the other
emerged animal inhabiting one of the satellites of a minor
learns about this and about the garden. Consequently, when
star. God is not the creator and the ultimate ruler of the
after all this, one says, "1 still berieve a ga.rdener comes" while
universe; he. is a fleeting ripple o imagination in a tiny [he other says, "1 don't" their different words now reflect no
corner o space-time. difference as to what they have found in the garden, no di-
]ohn Wisdom is another philosopher who has presented ference as to what they would find in the garden if they looked
a "seeing as" view of religious cognition. His understand- further and no cl.ifference about how fast untended gardens
ing of re]igion is more subtle and elusive than that o fall into disorder. At this stage, in diis context, the gardener
Randall, but seems in the end, ]ike Randall's, to constitute hypothesis has ceased to be experimental, the difference be-
a form of religious naturalism.5 I shall quote here only the tween one who accepts and one who rejects it is not now a
now famous parable of the garden, with which, in ig44, matter of the one expecting something the other does not ex-
Wisdom opened the recent discussion of t:he verifiability of pect. What is die difference between them? The one says, "A
religious belies. gardener comes unseen and unheard. He is manifested only in
his woi-ks with which we are all familiar," the other says,
"There is no gardener" and with this difference in what they
Two people return to their long neglected garden and find
among the weeds a few of the old plants surprisingly vigorous. say about the gardener goes a difference in how they feel
towards the garden, in spite of the fact that neither expects
One says to the other "It must be that a gardener has been
anything of ic which the other does not expect.10
coming and doing something about these plants." Upon in-
quiry they find that no neighbour has ever seen anyone at
work in their garden. The first man says to the other "He must We can restate the problem in a more formal mode by
have worked while people slept." The other says, "No, someone means of the logical truism that in order t assert some-
would have heard him and besides, anybody who cared about thing a proposition must deny something. To assert, for
the plants would have kept down these weeds." The first man example, tha.t this table top is square is to deny that it is
says, "Look at the way these are arranged. There is purpose round, rectangular, elliptical, triangular, or a.ny other
and a feeling for beauty here. I believe that someone comes, unsquare shape. If my original assertion is to amount
14 Jb.d., P.119.
to anything, if it is to make any truth-claim, it must carry
15 This at any rate is an nterpretaton wliich Wisdom's published 10 "Gods," Proc. 4r!.Jo. Soc., ig44-ig4.5, pp. igi-ig2, .reprinted
writings as a whole (especially "The Logic of God") invite, although in og.c and a72gwoge, ed. A. G. N. Flew, First Series (Oxford,
there s a. contrary indication in Parc}cZox 7id D!.Jcot/cyy (Oxord, ig5\), a.nd rL Wsdorn, Philosophy and Psycho-Ana,lysis (Oxord,
ig65). PP. 53-54. 1958).

164 165
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND FACT

these denials with it. To affirm that the table is quare in a were greatly to increase, would this be taken as disproving
sense defined as compatible wich its being round, rectangu- theism? No; there is no assignable liriit to the capacity of
lar, elliptical, and so on, would not constitute a genuine as- religious faith to trust in God despite daunting and appar-
sertion. For it would be equally consistent with whatever ently contradicting circumstances. Would then cmy con-
shape the table might be found on inspection to have. A ceivable happening compel the faithful to renounce their
genuine assertion, as a putative statement of fact, must lay religious belie? There may well of course be psychological
itself open to correction and reutation. It must commit limits to the persistence of challenged and discouraged
itself to something being there which might conceivably faith, 1imits which will differ in each individual. But is
turn out not to be there, or to something happening which there any Zog&.ccLZ terminus any definite quamum of un-
might not happen, or happening in this way when it might favorable evidence in face of which it would be demonstra-
instead happen in that way. The maxim applies, "nothing bly irrational to maintain theistic belief? It does not
venture, nothing gain"; in order to achieve a meaningful appear that there is or could be any such agreed limit. It
assertion we must be willing to run the risk of error. In seems, on the contrary, that theism is to this extent com-
order to say something which may possibly be true we patible with whatever may occur. But i this is so, we must
must say something which may possibly be false. The un- ask: Does theism constitute a genuine assertion? Antony
derlying principle may be sta.ted as follows: i a proposi- Flew has posed the question in a characteristically forth-
tion is to constitute a (true or false) assertion, the state right and challenging way, and 1 shall conclude the state-
of the universe which satisfie must differ, other than in ment of the problem by quoting his words:
the fact of including this assertion, from any st:ate of the
Now it often seems to people who are not religious as if there
universe that satisfies 72o-P. was no conceivable event or series of events the occumence
Applying this princip]e to theology, the questions are of which would be admicted by sophisticated religious people
asked o the theist: How do you suppose the present state t:o be a sufficient reason for conceding "There wasn't a God
of the universe to differ from the state in which it would after all" or "God does not really love us then." Someone tells
be i there were no God? What do you czcmy by your asser- us that God loves us as a father loves his children. We are
tion that there is a God? What does the theistic assertion reassured. But then we see a child dying of inoperable cancer
allege to exist or to happen or to happen thus, which of the throat. His earthly father is driven frantic in his efforts
might conceivably fail to exist or occur or which might oc- to help, but his Heavenly Father reveals no obvious sign of
cur otherwise? At what point, in short, does it lay itself concern. Some qualification is made-God's love is "not a
open to confirmation or refutation? merely human," or it is "an inscrutable love," perhaps-and
we realise that such sufferings are quite compatible with the
When we ask these questions there at once unfolds be-
truth o the assertion that "God loves us as a father a]ut, o
fore us the prospect of an endless regress. Is the occurrence
course . . .)." We are reassured again. But then perhaps we
of evil and pain in the world incompatible with the truth ask: what is this assurance o God's (appropriately dualified)
of theism? No, for reasons alrea.dy sketched in this chap- love worth, what is this apparent guarantee really a. guarantee
ter.17 If the extent or intensity of the world's pain and evil against? ]ust what would have to happen not merely (morally
17 See pp. i57-158. and wrongly) to tempt but also (logically and rightly) to en-
166 167
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

title us to say "God does not love us" or even "God does n.o
exist"? I therefore put . . . the simple central questiori
"What would ha.ve to occur or to have occurred to
a disproof of the love of, or o the existence of, God" 1

Flew here links together the two questions


respectively, divine existence and the divine character a
Fo,ith amd VerifiGa,hon
loving. And since our concem is with specifically Christi
faith we may accept this and indeed go further and, as a
act of definition, merge the latter issue in the former. W
sha.11 accordingly concentrate our discussion upon the e
istence of God, meaning by this the existence o a lovii THE previous chapter has let the task o showing that
God as set forth in Ghristian teaching. Ghristian faith is not merely a Z)t.-a way of regarding the
It is obvious, even at a first glance, that there is som world which is in principle neither verifiable nor falsi-
thing unusual, perhaps even unique, about such a. belit fiable-but a mode of cognition to which the alternatives
One might reasonably expect that since the deity is 1 "veridical or illusory" properly apply. We have already
definition unique, as the crea.tor of all that is, the logic acknowledged that verifiability is a valid criterion o fac-
our belief in his existence will display characteristics whi' Lual meaning. Accordingly, in order to be either veridical
are not found elsewhere. And we shall in fact find that th or illusory the mode of experiencing that we call religious
logic of theism is both unique and complex.
faith must be such that the theological statements which
18 "Theology and Falsification," n Nctu EJJyJ .n Ph.Zofop/%.cc express it are either verifiable or falsifia.ble. It must make
Theology. an experienceable difference whether they are true or
false. In a formula used above, a state of the universe
which sa.tisfies the faith-assertions must differ in some ex-
perienceable way ffom states of the universe which fail to
satisfy them. In other words, the existence o God must be
experientially verifiable.
The notion of verificaton has, especially during the pe-
riod between the two world wars,`been among the most in-
tensively discussed of philosophical concepts; and the gen-
eral upshot of the discussions has been that this is not a
smple, readily defined idea, but rather a range or family
o interrelated notions. The core of the concept o verifica-
tion, I suggest, is the removal of ignorance or uncertainty
concerning the truth of a proposition. That is verified
169
FAITH AND VERIFICATION
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
verified. The impersonal passive, it is verified, now be-
(whether embodies a theory, hypothesis, prediction, or comes logically secondary. To say that has been verified
straightforward assertion) means that something happens
is t:o say that (at lea-st) someone has i;erified it, often with
which makes it clear that P is true. A question is settled so
the implication that his or their report to this effect is gen-
that there is no longer room for rational doubt concerning
erally accep[ed. But it is impossible, in this usage, for P to
it. The way in which grounds for rational doubt are ex-
have been verified without someone having verified it.
cluded varies o course with the subject matt:er. But the "Verification" is thus primarily the name for an event
general feature common to a.1l cases of verification is the which takes place in human consciousness.L lt refers to an
ascertaining of truth by the removal of grounds for ra-
experience, the experience of ascertaining that a given
tional doubt. When such grounds are removed, we rightly
speak o verification ha.ving taken pla.ce. proposition or set of propositi'ons is true. To this extent
verification is a psychological notion. But of course it is
To characterize verification in this way is to raise the
also a logical notion, for not cmy experience is rightly
question whether the notion is purely logical or is both called an experience of verifying. Both logical and psycho-
logical and psychological. Is the statement that P is verified
logical conditions must be fulfilled in order for verification
simply the statement that a. certain state o affairs exists (or
t:o have taken p]ace. In this respect, "verify" is like
has existed), or is it the statement also that someone is "know." Knowing is an experience which someone has or
aware that this state of affairs exists (or has existed) and
undergoes, or perhaps a dispositional state in which some-
notes that its existence establishes the truth o ? A geolo-
one is, and it cannot take place without someone having or
gist predicts that the earth's surface will be covered with undergoing it or being in it; but not by any means every
ice in fifteen million years. Subpose that in fifteen million
experience which people have,.or every dispositional state
years the earth's surace c.J covered with ice, but that in the in which they are, is rightly called knowing.
meantime the human race has perished, so that no one is
With regard to this logico-psychological concept of veri-
left to observe the event or to draw any conclusion con-
fication, such questions as' the following arise. When 4,
cerning the accuracy of the geologist's prediction. Do we
but.nobody else, has ascertained that P is true, can P be
now wish to say that his prediction has been verified, or
said to have been verified; or is it required that others also
shall we deny that it has been verified, on the ground that..
have undergone the same ascertainment? How. public, in
there is no one left to do the verifying?
other words, must verification be? Is it necessary that
The use of "verify" and its cognates is sufficiently vari-
could in principle be verified by anyone without. i-estric-
ous to permit us to speak in either way. But the only sort
tion even` though perhaps only 4 has.in fact verified it? 1
of verification of theological propositions which is likely to 1This suggestion is dosely related to Carnap's insistence that,
interest us is one in which human beings participate. We
n contrasti to "true," "confirmed" is time-dependent. To.say that
may therefore, for our present purpose, treat verification as a statement is confirmed, or verified, is to say that it has been
a. combined logical and psychological, rather than as a confiimed at a particular time-and, I would add, by a Particular
purely logical, concept. I suggest then that "verify" be con~ person. See Rudolf Carnap, "Tiuth and Confimation," Feigl and
strued as a verb which has its primary uses in the active SellaLrs, Rea,dngs in Phizosophicaz Ana,lysis (New York., ig49); pp.
l l g ff .
voice: I verify, you verify, we verify, they verify or have
171
170
FAITH AND VERIFIGATI0N
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
sun will be observed to rise within twenty-four hours is in-
so, what is meant here by "in principle"; does it signiftr, tended unconditionally, a.t least as cgncerns conditions to
or example, that P must be verifiable by anyone who per- be fulfilled by the observer; he is not required by the
forms a certain operation; and does it imply that to do this terms of the prediction to perform any special operation.
is within everyone's power? But even in this case there is an implied negative condi-
These questions cannot be given any general answer ap- tion thac he shall not put himself in a sicuation (such as
p]icable to all instances of the exclsion o rational doubt. immuring himself in the depths of a. coal mine) from
We cannot properly stipu]ate, for instance, that verifica- which a sunrise would not be perceptible. Other predic-
tion must by definition be fully public.2 We must deter tions however are explicitly conditional. In these cases it is
mine for each subject matter what type f verification [rue for any particular individ'ual that in order to verify
ought t be obtainable. the statement in question he must go through some speci-
Verification is often construed as the substantiation of a fied course of action. The prediction is to the effect that if
prediction. As the exclusion of grounds for rational doubt, you conduct such an experiment you will obtain such a re-
however, verification does not necessarily consist in the sult; for example, if you go into the next room you will
proving conect of a prediction; a verifying experience,: have such-and-such visual experiences, and i you then
does not always need to have been predicted in order to,. touch the ta.ble which you see you will have such-and-such
have the effect of excluding rational doubt. But when we tactual experiences. The content of the "i" clause is al-
are interested in the verifiability o propositions as the ', ways determined by the particula.r subject matter. The
criterion for their having factual meaning, the notion of ,,t logic o "table" determines what you must do to verify
-entails Predictions
prediction becomes which can be
central.1 verified or contains
a proposition falsified, or\
its statements about tables; the logic of "molecule" deter-
mines what you must do to verify statements about mole-
character as an assertion (though not of course its charac.- cules; an.d the logic of "God" determines what you must
ter as a rwG assertion) is thereby established. do to veriy statements about God.
Such predictions may be and often are conditional. For In those cases in which the individual who is to verify a
example, statements about the features of the dark side of proposition must himself first perform some operation, it
the moon are rendered meaningful by the conditional pre- clearly cannot follow from the circumstance that the prop-
dictions which they entail to the effect that i an observer osition is known to be true that ccryz7ody has in fact
comes to be in such a position in space, he will make such verified it or will at some future time verify it. For
and-such observations. It would in fact be more accurate to whether or not any particular person perorms the requi-
say that prediction is always conditional, but that. some- site operation is a. contingent matter.
times the conditions are so obvious and so likely to be ful- What is the relation between verification and falsifica-
filled that they require no special mention, while somei tion? We are all familiar. today with the phrase, "theology
times they require for their fulfillment some unusual exi and falsification." Antony Flew s and others instead. of ask-
.pedition or operation. A prediction, for example, that the 8 A. G. N. Flew, "Theology and Falsification," in Ncw EJJciyf t.n
2As does, e.g., Paul F. Schmidt, in Rezc.gotA KnottJzedgG P!.ZosoPJ".az TftGozogy. On the pliilosophical antecedents of this
York, ig6i), p. 60.
178
172
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND VERIFIGATION

ing the question, "What possible experiences would veriF contain a series o three sevens, but it will always be true
`God exists'?" have raised the matching question, "What
that such a series may occur at a po.int not yet reached in
possible experiences would falsify `God exists'?" or "What anyone's calculations. Accordingly, the proposition ma.y
conceivable state o affairs would be incompatible with the one day be verified i it is true, but can never be falsified i
existence o God?" In posing the question in this wa.y it it is false.
was a.pparently assumed that verification and falsification The hypothesis o continued conscious existence after
are symmetrically related, and that the latter is apt to be bodily death provides an instance o a different kind of
the more accessible o the two. such asymmetry, and one which has a direct bearing upon
In the most common cases, certainly, verification and the theistic problem. This hypothesis has built into ic a
falsification are symmetrically related. The logically sim- prediction that one will, after the date o one's bodily
plest case of verification is provided by the crucial instance. death, have conscious experiences, including the experi-
Here it is integral to a given hypothesis that i, in specified ence o remembering that death. This is a prediction
circumstances, 4 occurs, the hypothesis is thereby shown to which will be verified in one's own experience if it is true,
be true, whereas if 8 occurs the hypothesis is thereby but which cannot be falsified if it is false. That is to say, it
shown to be false. Verification and falsification are also can be false, but h* it is false can never be a fact which
symmetrically related in the testing of such a proposition anyone has experientially verified. This circumstance does
as "There is a table in the next room." The veriftring ex- not undermine the meaningfulness of the hypothesis, how-
periences in this case are experiences of seeing and touch- ever, since it is also such that if it be true, it will be known
ing, predictions o which are entailed by the proposition in to be true.
question, under the proviso that one goes into the next It is important to remember that we do not speak of
room; and the absence of such experiences in those cir- verifying logically necessary truths, but only propositions
cumstances serves to falsify the proposition. concerning matters o fact. Accordingly verification is not
But it would be rash to assume, on this basis, that verifi- to be identified with the concept of logical certification or
cation and falsification must always be related in this proof. The exclusion of rational doubt concerning some
symmetrical fashion. They do not necessarily sta.nd to one matter of fact is not equivalent to the exclusion of the logi-
another as do the two sides o a coin, so that once the coin cal possibility of error or illusion. For truths concerning
is spun it must fall on one side or the other. There are fact are not logically necessary. Their contrary is never self-
cases in which verification and falsification each corre- contradictory. But at the same time the bare logical possi-
spond to a side on different coins, so that one can fail to bility of error does not constitute ground for rational
verify without this failure constituting falsification. doubt as to the veracity of our experience. 1 it did, no em-
Consider, for example, the proposition that "there are prical proposition could ever be verified, and indeed the
three successive sevens in the decimal determination of 7r." notion of empirical verification would be without.use and
So far as the value of 7r has been worked out, it does not therefore without sense. What we rightly seek, when we
change from the notion of vffification to that of falsification, see desire the verification o a factual proposition, is not a
Karl R. Popper, ThG og.c of Sc.cm.fic DricotJcry (ig84; E,T., ig59). demonstration of the logical impossibility of the proposi-
174 175
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND VEHFIGATION

tion being false (for this would be a sel-contradictory de- mation is thus built into the Christian concept of God;
mand), but such kind and degree of evidence as suffices, in and the notion of eschatological verification seeks to relte
the type of case in question, to exclude rational doubt. this fact to the problem o theological meaning.
These features of the concept of verification-that verifi- Let me first give a somewhac genera.1 indication of this
cation consists in the exclusion of grounds for rational suggestion, by means of a parable, and then try to make it
doubt concerning the truth of some proposition; that this more precise and eligible for discussion. Here is the para-
means the exclusion of doubt from particular minds; that ble.
the nature of the experience which serves to exclude Two men are traveling together along a road. One o
grounds fo rational doubt depends upon the specific sub- them believes tha.t it leads to, a Celestial City, the other
ject matter; that verification is often related to predictions
that it leads nowhere; but since this is the only road there
and that such predictions are often conditional; that verifi- is, both must travel it. Neither has been this way before,
cation and falsification may be asymmetrically related; and therefore neither is able to say what they will find
and, finally, that the verification of a factual proposition is around each next corner. During their journey they meet
not equivalent to logical certification-are all relevant to both with moments of refreshment and delight, and with
the verification of the religious claim, "God exists." I wish moments o hardship and danger. All the time one o them
now to apply these discriminations to the notion of escha- thinks of his journey as a pilgrimage to the Celestial City
tological verification. and interprets the pleasant parts as encouragements and
The strength of the notion of eschatological verification the obstacles as trials of his purpose and lessons in endur-
is that it is not an c}d /?oc invntion but is based upori an ance, prepared by the king of that city and designed to
actually operative religious concept of God. In the lan- make of him a worthy citizen of the place when at last he
arrives there. The. other, however, believes none of this
guag of Ghristian faith, the word "God" stands at the cen-
ter o a system of terms, such as Spirit, grace, Logos, incar- and sees their joumey as an unavoidable and aimless ram-
nation, Kingdom of God, and many more; and the ble. Since he has no choice in the matter, he enjoys the
distinctively Christian conception of God can only be fully good and endures the bad. But for him there is no Celes-
grasped in its connection with these related terms. It be- tial City to be reached, no all-encompassing purpose r-
longs to a complex of notions which together constitute a daining their journey-only the road itself and the luck o
the road in good weather and in ba.d.
Picture of the universe in which we live, o man's place
therein, o a comprehensive divine purpose interacting During the course o the journey the issue between
with human purposes, and of the general nature of the them is not an experimental one. They do not entertain
eventual fulfillment of that divine purpose. This Cmristian different expectations about the coming details o the road,
but only about its ultimate destination. And yet when they
picture of the universe,
tive expectations entailing
concerning the as it doe
future, certain
is a. distinc-
very diffeient do turn the last corner it will be apparent that one.o.f them
picture from any that can be accepted by one who does not has been right all the time and the other wrong. Thus, al-
believe that the God of the New Testament exists. Fur- though the issue between them`has not been experimental,
ther, the differences are such as to show themselves in it has nevertheless from the start been a real i.ssue. They
human experience. The possibility o experiential confir- have not merely felt differently about the road; for one

176 177
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND VERIFICATION

was feeling appropriately and the other inappropriately in make sense, however, only if the logically prior idea o
relation to the actual state of affairs. Their opposed inter- continued personal existence after death is intelligible. A
desultory debate on this topic has been going on for several
pretations o the road constituted genuinely rival asser-
tions, though assertions whose status has the peculiar char- years in some of the philosophical periodicals. C. 1. Lewis
acteristic of being guaranteed retrospectively by a uture has contended that the hypothesis of immortality "is an
Crux. hypothesis about our own future experience. And our un-
This parable has of course (like all parables) strict limi- derstanding o what would verify it has no lack of clar-
tations. It is designed to make only one point: that Chris- ity." 4 Moritz Schlick agreed, adding, "We must conclude
tian doctrine postulates an ultimate unambiguous state o tha.t immortality, in the sense, defined [i.e. `survival after
existence .n r8.c as well as our present ambiguous exist- death,' rather than `never-ending life'], should not be re-
ence 3.n .ci. There is a state o having arrived as well as a garded as a `metaphysical problem,' but as an empirical
state of journeying, an eternal heavenly lie as well as an hypothesis, because it possesses logical verifiability. It could
earthly pilgrimage. The alleged future experience o this be verified by following the prescription: `Wait until you
state cannot, of course, be appealed to as evidence for die!' " 5 However, others have challenged this conclusion,
theism as a presem interpretation o our experience; but it either on the ground that the phrase "surviving death" is
does suffice to render the choice between theism and sel-contradctory in ordinary language or, more substan-
atheism a real and not a merely empty or verbal choice. tially, on the ground that the traditional distinction be-
And although this does not affect the logic of the situation, tween soul and body cannot be sustained. I shoulcl like. to
it should be added that the alternative interpretations are address myself to this latter view. The only self of which
more than theoretical in that they render different prac- w know, it is said, is the empirical self, the walking, talk-
tical plans and policies appropriate now. ing, acting, sleeping individual who lives, it may be, for
The universe as envisaged by the theist, then, differs as a some sixty to eighty years and then dies. Mental events and
totality from the universe as envisaged by the atheist. This mental characteristics are analyzed into the modes of be-
difference does not, however, from our present standpoint havior and behavioral dispositions of this empirical self.
within the universe, involve a difference in the objective The human being is described as an organism capable o
content of each or even any of its passing moments. The acting in the "high-level" ways whih we characterize as
theist and the atheist do not (or need not) expect different intelligent, thoughtful, humorous, calculating, and the
events to occur in the successive details o the temporal like. The concept o mind or soul is thus the concept not
4 "Experience and Meaning," PhG.ZoJopnG.caz RG3.cttJ, ig34, re-
process. They do not (or need not) entertain divergent
expectations of the course of history viewed from within. P_rinte_
'(New Tig49),
York, Fegl P.
aLnd SellaLrs, Readings in Philosophicaz Ana.lysis
142.
But the theist does, and the atheist does not, expect that 5 "Meaning and Verification," P/%.Zosoh!."Z Rcu&.GztJ, ig36, re-
when history is completed it will be seen to have led to a
printed in Fegl and Sellars, oP. c.., p. i6o.
particular end-state and to have fulfilled a specific purpose, . S e.5., A...E. N. Plew, "DezLth," New Essa;ys in Phlosophi-
namely that of creating "children of God." cciz Tticozogy,. "Gan a Man Witness His Own Funeral?" ZZ.Z)bcr
The idea o an eschatological verification of theism can ]oumaz, L956.

178 179
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND VERIFICATION

of a "9host in the riachine" (to use Gilbert Ryle's loaded o "the resurrection world." The principal questions to be
asked concern the ielation between the physical world and
Phrase 7) but .o the riore flexible and sophisticated ways
in which human beings behav'e and have it in them to be- the resurrection world, and the criteria of personal iden-
have. According to this view there is no room for the no- tity which are operating when it is alleged that a certain
tion f soul in distinction ffom body; and i there is no inhabitant of the resurrection world is the same person as
soul in distinction from body there can be no question of an individual who once inhabited this present world. The
the soul surviving the death of the body. Against this first o these questions turns out on investigation to be
the more difficult of the two, and 1 shall take the easier one
philosophical backgrourid the specifically Christian (and
also ]ewish) belief in the resunection o the flesh or body, first.
in contrast to the Hellenic notion o the survival o a Let me sketch a very old pos'sibility (concerning which,
disembodied soul, might be expected to have attracted however, I wish to emphasize not so much its oddness as its
more attention than it has. For it is consonant with the possibility!), and then see how far it can be stretched in
conception o man as an indissoluble psychophysica.1 unity, the direction of the notion of the resurreccion body. In the
and yet it also offers the possibility of an empirical mean- process of stretching it will become even more odd than it
ing for the idea o "life after death." was before; but my aim will be to show that, however odd,
Paul is the chie biblica.1 expositor of the idea of the t remains within the bounds of the logically possible. This
resurrection o the body.8 His view, as 1 understand it, is progression will be presented in three pictures, arranged
this. When someone has died he is, apart from any special m a self-explanatory order.
divine action, extinct. A human being is by nature mortal First picture: Suppose that at some learned gathering in
ahd subject to annihilation by death. But in fact God, by England one o the company were suddenly and inexplica-
an act o sovereign power, either sometimes or always bly to disappear, and that at the same moment an exact
resunects or (better) reconstitutes or recreates him-not, replica of him were suddenly and inexplicably to appear at
however, as the identical physical organism that he was be- some comparable meeting in Australia. The person who
fore death, but s a somc PriG%mcifa.ko7t ("spiritual body") appears in Australia is exactly similar, as to both bodily
mbdying the dispositional charcteristics and memory and mental characteristics, with the person who disappears
traces of the deceased physical organism, and inhabitin9 an in England. There is continuity of memory, complete sim-
enviionment with which the Jomci mGwmcb*.kom is contin- larity of bodily features, including even fingerprints, hair
uous as the ahte-morteri body was continuous with oui and eye colora`tion and scomach contents, and also o be-
les, habits, and mental propensities. In fact there is every-
present world. In discussing this notion we may well.aban-
don the word "spiritual," as lacking today any precise thing that would lead us to identift the one who appeared
established usage, and speak of "resurrection bodies" and with the one who disappeared, except continuity of oc-
cupancy o space. We may suppose, for example, that on
7 rhc Co7}ccP* of M.nd, ig49, which contains a classic exposition
flying to Austraiia to interview t:he repiica o the mn who
of the in`terpretation .o\ "mental" qualities as characteristics of
b.ehavior.
disappeared a deputation of his colleagues finds that he is
8I Gor.15. .` in all respects but one exactly as though he had traveled

18o
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FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND VERIFIGATION

ffom Cambridge to Melboume by conventional means; and this circumstance may be stated as strongly as you please,
and yet he describes how, as he was sitting listening to Dr. Z. nnd can indeed hardly be overstated, yet it does not exceed
reading a paper, on blinking his eyes he suddenly found the bounds of the logically possible. Once again wie must
himsel sitting in a differenc room listening to a different magine some of the deceased's colleagues going to Aus-
paper by an Australian scholar. He asks his colleagues how tralia to interview the person who has suddenly appeared
the meeting wem after he ceased to be there, and what [here. He would perfectly remember them and their meet-
they made of his disappearance, and so on. He clearly ng, be interested in what had happened, and be as amazed
thinks of himself as the one who was present with them at .ind dumbfounded about it as anyone else; and he would
their meeting in England. I suggest that faced with all perhaps be worried about the p,ossible legal complications
these circumstances his colleagues would soon, i not im- i he should return to claim his property; and so on. Once
mediately, find themselves thinking o him and treating tigain, I believe, they would soon find themselves thinking
him as the individual who had so inexplica.bly disappeared of him and treating him as the same person as the dead
from their midst. We should be extending our normal use Cantabrigian. Once again the factors inclining us to say
o "same person" in a way which the postulated facts that the one who died and the one who appeared are the
would both demand and justify if we said that the one who same person would outweigh the factors inclining us to say
appears in Australia is the same person as the one who dis- [hat they are different people. Once again we should have
appears in England. The actors inclining us to identiy to extend our usage o "the same person" to cover this new
the men would far outweigh the factors disinclining us to Case.
do this. We should have no Teasonable alternative but to Third picture: My last supposal is that the rep]ica, com-
extend our usage of "the same person" to cover the strange plete with memory, etc., appears, not in Australia, but as a
new case. resurrection replica in a different world altogether, a
Second picture: Now let us suppose tha.t the event in resunection world inhabited by resurrected persons. This
England is not a sudden and inexplicable disappearance, world occupies its own space, distinct from the space with
and indeed not a disappearance at all, but a sudden death. which we are now familiar. That is to say, an object in
Only, at the moment when the individual dies, a rep- the resurrection world is not situated at any distance or in
lica o him as he was at the moment beore his death, any direction from an object in our present world, al-
complete with memory up to that instant, appears in Aus- though each object in either world is spatially related to
tralia. Even with the corpse on our hands, it would still, I each other object in the same world.
suggest, be an extension of "same person" requir.ed and Mr. X, then, dies. A Mr. X replica, complete with the
warranted by the postulated facts, to say that the same per- set of memory traces which Mr. X had at the last moment
son who died has been miraculously recreated in Australia. beore his death, comes into existence. It is composed o
The case would be considerably odder than in the previous other material than physical matter, and is locate.d in a
picture, because of the existence of the corpse in England resurrection world which does not stand in any spa.tial re-
contemporaneously with the existence o the living person 0 On ths possibility, see Anthony Quinton, "Spaces and Times,''
in Australia. But 1 submit tha.t, although the oddness of Phlosophy, XXXVII, no. i4o (ig6i).

182
183
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND VERIFICATION

lationship with the physical world. Let us lea.ve out o con. t}ne know that he is not in a like situation with the person
sideration St. Paul's hint that the resurrection body may be ]ii picture number two, who dies in England and appears
as unlike the physical body as is a full grain o wheat from (is a full-blooded replica in Australia, 1eaving his corpse in
the wheat seed, and consider the simpler picture in which li:ngland-except that now the replica. is situated, not in
the resurrection body has the same shape as the physical Australia, but on a planet o some other star?
body.10 It is of course conceivable that the space o the resurrec-
In these circumstances, how does Mr. X know that he tion world would have properties which are manifestly in-
has been resurrected or recreated? He remembers dying; or {:ompatible with its being a region of physical space. But
rather he remembers being on what he took to be his on the other hand, it is not essential to the notion of a
deathbed, and becoming progressively weaker until, pre- resurrection world thac its space should have properties
sumably, he lost consciousness. But how does he know that clifferent ffom those o physical space. And supposing the
(to put it lrishly) his dying proved fatal; and that he properties are not different, it is not evident that a resur-
did not, after losing consciousness, begin to recover rected individual could learn ffom any direct observations
strength, and has now simply awakened? that he was not on a planet of some sun which is at so great
The picture is readily enough elaborated to answer this .i distance from our own sun that the stellar scenery visible
question. Mr. X meets and recognizes a number of rela- from it is quite unlike that which we can now see. The
tives and friends and historical personages whom he knows B'rounds that a resunected person would have for believing
to ha.ve died; and from the fact o their presence, and also [hat he is in a different space ffom physical space (suppos-
ffom their testimony that he. has only just now appeared in ing there to be no discernible difference in spatial proper-
their world, he is convinced that he has died. Evidences o ties) would be the same as the grounds that any of us may
this kind could add up to the point at which they are quite have now for believing this concerning resurrected indi-
as strong as the evidence which, in piccures one a.nd two, viduals. These grounds are indirect and consist in all those
convinces the individual in question that he has been considerations (e.g., Luke i6:26) which lead most o those
miraculously translated to Australia. Resurrected persons who consider the question to reject as absurd the possibil-
would be no more in doubt about their own identity than ity of, for example, radio communication or rocket trave]
we are about ours now, and would be able to identify one between earth and heaven.
another in the same kinds of ways, and with a like degree In the present context, however, my only concem is to
o assurance, as we do now. claim that this doctrine of .the divine creation of bodies-
If it be granted that resurrected persons might be able to composed of a material other than that o physical matter,
arrive at a rationally founded conviction that their exist- but endowed with sufficient correspondence of characteris-
ence is os-morcm, how could they know that the world tics with our present bodies and sufficient continuity o
in which they find themselves is in a different space from memory with our present consciousness for us to speak o
that in which their physical bodies were? How could such a the same person being raised up again to life in a new
10As would seem to be assumed, for example, by lrenaeus environment-is not self-contradictory. 1, then, the doc-
(4dGrJt# HaerGJcs, bk. ii, d. 84, sec. i).
trine cannot be ruled out cZ7 .nc.a.o as meaningless, we may

184 185
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND VEHFICATION

go on to consider whether and how it is related to the pos- to the traditional doctrine, which figures especially in
sible verification of Cmristian theism. Catholic and mystical theology, of the Beatific Vision of
So far 1 have argued that a survival prediction such as is God. The difficulty presented by this doctrine is not so
contained in the corpus o Cmristian belief is in principle much that of deciding whether there are grounds for be-
subject to future verifica.tion. But this does not take the ]ieving it, as o deciding what it means. I shall not, how-
argument by any means as far as it must go if it is to suc- ever, elaborate this difficulty, but pass directly to the in-
ceed. For survival, simply as such, would not serve to veriy vestigation of a different and, as it seems to me, more intel-
theism.11 It would not necessarily be a state of affairs ligible possibility. This is the possibility not o a direct
which is manifestly incompatible with the nonexistence o vision of God, whatever that might mean, but of a J.*%8.o%
God. It might be taken just as a surprising natural fact. which points unambiguously to the existence of a loving
The atheist, in his resurrection body, and able to remem- God. This would be a situation which, so far as its religious
ber his lie on ea.rth, might say that the universe has significance is concerned, contrasts in a certain importa.nt
turned out to be more complex, and perhaps more to be respect with our present situation. Our present situation is
approved of, than he had realized. But the mere fact o one which seems in some ways to confirm and in other
survival, with a new body in a new environment, would ways to contradict the truth of theism. Some events around
not demonstrate to him that there is a God. It is fully com- us suggest the presence of an unseen benevolent intelli-
patible with the notion of survival that the life to come be, gence and others suggest that no such intelligence is at
so far as the theistic problem is concerned, essentially a work. Our situation is religiously ambiguous. But in order
continuation of the preserit life, and religiously no less for us to be aware of this fact iive must already have some
ambiguous. And in this event, survival after bodily death dea, however vague, of what it would be for our situation
would not in the least constitute a final verification of Co be not ambiguous, but on the contrary wholly eviden-
theistic faith. tial o God. I therefore want to try to make clearer this
I shall not spend time in trying to draw a picture o a presupposed concept o a religiously unambiguous situa-
resurrection existence which would merely prolong the tion.
religious ambiguity o our present lie. The important There are, I suggest, two possible developments of our
question, for our purpose, is not whether one can conceive experience such that, if they occurred in conjunction with
of afterlife experiences which woulcl 7}o. verify theism one another (whether in this lie or in another life to
(and in point of fact one can fairly easily conceive them), come), they would assure us beyond rational doubt of the
but whether one can conceive of afterlie experiences reality of God as conceived in the Christian faith. These
which zuotZcZ serve to verify theism. are, firJ, an experience of the fulfillment of God's purpose
I think that we can. In trying to do so 1 shall not appeal for ourselves, as this has been disclosed in the Christian
revelation, and Jcconcz, in conjunction with the first, an
110ccasionally n published discussions the notion of eschato.
experience o communon with God as he has revealed
logical verification has been equated with, and rejected as, this
very incomplete and inadequate idea. See, e.g., Frank 8. Dilley,
himself in the person of Christ.
Meta,Physics a,nd Rezigious Langua,ge (New York, ig64), P. 4i. The divine purpose for human life, as this is depicted in

186 187
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND VENFIGATION

the New Testament documents, is the bringing o the present condition as is mature adulthood from the mind of
human person, in society with his fellows, to enjoy a cer- a little child; nevertheless, we possess already a compara-
tain valuable quality of personal life, the cont:ent of which tively vague notion of this final fulfillment, and as we
is given in the character o Ghrist-which quality o life move towards it our concept will itself become more ade-
(that is, life in relationship with God, described in the quate; and if and when we finally reach that ulfillment,
Fourth Gospel as eternal life) is said to be the proper des- the problem o recognizing it will have disappeared in the
tiny of human nature and the source o man's final self- process.
fulfillment and happiness. The verification situation with The other feature that must, I suggest, be present in a
regard to such a fulfillment is asymmetrical. On the one state of affairs that would verify theism, is that the fulfill-
hand, so long as the divine purpose remains unfulfilled, we ment o Gocl.'s purpose be apprehended cu the fulfillment
cannot know that it never will be fulfilled in the future; o God's purpose and not simply as a natural state of
hence no final falsification is possible of the claim that this affairs. To this end it must be accompanied by an experi-
ulfillment will occur-unless, of course, 'the prediction ence of communion with God as he has made himsel
were to conta.in a specific time clause, which, in Ghristian known to men in Christ.
teaching, it does not. But on the other hand, if and when The specifically Ghristian clause, "as he has made him-
the divine purpose .J fulfilled in our own expei-ience, we self known to men in Christ," is essential, for it provides a
must be able to recognize and rejoice in that fulfillment. solution to the problem of recognition in the awareness of
For the fulfillment would not be for us the promised ful- God. Several writers have pointed out the logical difficulty
fillment without our own conscious participation in it. involved in any claim to have encountered God.12 How
It is important to note that one can say this much with- could one know that it i.vas God whom one hacl encoun-
out being cognizant in advance o the concrete form which tered? God is described in Christian theology in terms o
such fulfillmem will take. The before-and-after situation is various absolute qualities, such as omnipotence, omnipres-
analogous to that of a. small child looking forward to adult ence, perfect goodness, infinite love, etc., which cannot as
life and then, having grown to adulthood, looking back such be observed by us, as can their finite analogues, lim-
upon childhood. The child possesses and can use correctly ited power, local presence, finite goodness, and human
in various contexts the concept of "being grown-up," al- love. One can recognize that a being whom one "en-
though he does not know, concretely, wha.t it is like to be counters" has a given finite degree o power, but how
grown-up. But when he reaches adulthood he is neverthe- does one recognize that he has t7ilimited power? How does
less able to know that he has reached it; he is able to recog- one observe that an encountered being is omm3.present?
nize the experience of living a grown-up life even though llow does one perceive that his goodness and love, which
he did not know in advance just what to expect. For his one can perhaps see to exceed any human goodness and
understanding o adult maturity grows as he himself ma- love, are actually infinite? Such qualities cannot be. given
tures. Something similar may be supposed to happen in in human experience. One might claim, then, to have en-
the case of the fulfillment of the divine purpose for human 12For example, H. W. Hepbum, Chw.sc.an.y 7td Proczo;,
life. That fulfillment may be as far removed from our (London, ig58), pP. 56 ff.

188 189
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND VERIFIGATION

countered a Being whom one presumes, or trusts, or hop ]esus' teaching concerning the character o God in his in-
to be God; but one cannot claim to have encountered z finite transcendent nature.
Being whom one recognized to be the infinite, almighty The further question as to how an eschatological experi-
eternal Creator. ence of the kingdom o God could be known to be such
This difficulty is met in Ghristianity by the doctrine o has already been answered by implication. God's union
the lncarnation-although this was not among the consid with man in Christ makes possible man's recognition o
erations which l.ed to the formulation of that doctrine the fulfillment o God's purpose for man as being indeed
The idea o incarnation provides answers to the t:wo rep the fulfillment o God'J purpose for him. The presence o
lated questions: "How do we know that God has certai Ghrist marks this kingdom as being beyond doubt the
absolute qualities which, by their very nature, transcen kingdom of the God and Father of the Lord ]esus Christ.
human experience?" and "How can there be an eschatolo It is true that even the experience of realizing the prom-
ical verification of theism which is based upon a reco ised kingdom o God, with Christ reigning as Lord of the
tion of the presence of God in his Kingdom?" New Aeon, would not constitute a logical certification of
In Christianity God is known as "the God and Father o his claims nor, accordingly, of the reality of God. But this
our Lord ]esus Ghrist." 3 God is the Being about who will not seem remarkable to any philosopher in the em-
]esus taught; the Being in relation to whom ]esus live piricist tradition, who knows that it is only a confusion to
and into a. relationship with whom he brought his dis( demand that a factual proposition be an analytic truth. A
ples; the Being whose c}gc}Pc toward men was seen on eartl set o expectations based upon faith in the historic ]esus as
in the lie of ]esus. In short; God is the transcendent Gre the incarnation o God and in his teaching as being di-
ator who has revealed himself in Christ. Now ]esus' teac vinely authoritative could be so fully confirmed in post-
ing about the Father is a part of that sel-disclosure, and i mortem experience as to leave no grounds for ra.tional
is from this teaching (together with that of the prophet doubt of the validity of that faith.
who preceded him) that the Chi-istian knowledge of God' There remains of course the problem (which falls to the
transcendent being is derived. Only God himsel knows hi New Testament scholar rather than to the philosopher)
own infinite nature; and our human belief about that n whether Christian tradition, and in particular the New
ture is based upon his self-revelation in Christ to men. Testament, provides a sufficiently authentic "picture" o
Karl Barth expresses it, "]esus Ghrist is the knowability o the mind and character of Ghrist to make such recognition
God." 14 0ur beliefs about God's infinite being are possible. I cannot here attempt to enter into the vast field
capable of observational verification, being beyQnd th of biblical criticism, and shall confine myself to the logical
scope of human experience, but they are susceptible o i point, which only emphasizes the importance of the his-
direct verification by the removal o rational doubt co torical question, that a verification of theism made possible
cerning the authority of Ghrist. An experience o the rei by the lncarnation is dependent upon the Christian's hav~
o the Son in the kingdom o the Father would confir ing a genuine knowledge o the person of Ghrist, even
that authority and therewith, indirectly, the validity o though this is mediated through the life and tradition o
13|| Cor. ii:3i. 14 C7}trch Dogm&.cs,11, Pt.1, P. i50. the Church.
190 191
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND VERIFICATION

One further point remains to be considered. When wei


ask the question, "To zuhom is theism verified?" one is
theistic faith can be verified-found by one who holds it to
be beyond rational doubt-yet it can.not be proved to the
initially inclined to assume that the answer must be, "To nonbeliever. Such an asymmetry would connect with that
everyone." We are inclined to assum.e that, as in my para- strand of New Testament teaching which speaks o a divi-
ble of the journey, the believer must be confirmed in his sion of mankind even in the world to come.
belie and the unbeliever converted fTom his unbelief. Having noted this possibility 1 will only express my per-
But this assumption is neither demanded by the na.ture o sonal opinion that the logic of the New Testament as a
verification nor by any means unequivocably supported by whole, though admittedly not always its explicit content,
our Christian sources. leads to a belief in ultimate universal salvation.15 How-
We ha.ve already noted tha.t a verifiable prediction may ever, my concern here is not to seek to establish the reli~
be conditional. "There is a table in the next room" enta.ils gious facts, but rather to establish that there a.re such
conditional predictions o the form: i someone goes into things as religious facts, and in particular that the exist-
the next room he will see .... But no one is compelled ence or nonexistence of the God of the New Testa.ment is a
to go into the next room. And it may be that the pre- matter of fact and claims as such ev.entual experiential
dictions concerning human experience which are en- verification.
tailed by the proposition that God exists are conditional However, various difficulties in the argument o this
predictions and that no one is compelled to fulfill those chapter have been pointed out by philosophical and theo-
conditions. Indeed we stress in much o our theology that logical critics; and 1 should like now to consider these diffi-
the manner of the divine self-disclosure to men is such that culties. I believe that in each case the objections arise ffom
our human status as free and responsible beings is re- regarding the notion of eschatological verification as at-
spected, and an awareness of God is never forced upon us. tempting to do differem jobs ffom that assigned to it here.
It may then be a condition o post-mortem verification We will begin with a basic clarification which will en-
that we be already in some degree conscious of God by an able us to meet some o the difficulties. n is not being de-
uncompelled response to his modes o revelation in this nied here that the religious man already enjoys a genuine
world. It may be that such a voluntary consciousness o knowledge of God; it is not being suggested that he has to
God is an essientia.l element in the fulfillment of the divine wait until after death to find out with certainty whether
purpose for human nature, so that the verification of `God exists. On the contrary, faith has been presented in
theism which consists in an experience o the final fulfill- Part 11 as an awareness o the divine presence, an experi-
ment of that purpose can only be experienced by. those encing of the world as a realm in which we have at all
who have already entered upon an awareness of God by times to do with God and he with us. And this present con~
the religious mode o apperception which we call aith. sciousness o God is independent o any beliefs that the
If this be so, it has the consequence that only the theistic religious man may have about an afterlife. Thus the Old
believer can find the vindication of his belief. This circum- Testament prophets were intensely aware of the presence
stance would not o course set any restriction upon who 15 I have discussed this difficult matter more fully in E.Z 7td 7M
can become a believer, but it would entail that while God of oG (London and New York, ig66), PP. 377-888.

192 198
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND VERIFICATION

and power of God whilst being devoid of any significant granted that the dispute between himself and an atheist
hope o a lie beyond death. concerns a momentous question o fact: the exis[ence or
It is not, then, being suggested that the existence of God nonexistence o a transcendent divine Being. But in our
has the status in the believer's mind o a tentatively own time, as a result o investigacions of the concepts o
adopted hypothesis which awaits verification after death.1 meaning and verification, this assumption has been ques-
The believer can already have, on the basis of his religious Cioned. Do the core religious statements (such as "God
experience, a warrant as to the reality of God. He may al- loves mankind") really have the logical character o fac-
ready know God in a way which requires no further verifi- tual assertions? Or are they incapable in principle o either
cation. verifica.tion or falsification, and. thus factually vacuous?
Now to the extent to which the believer actually has a These questions challenge the religious apologist to point
to any features o theological discourse which establish its
present consciousness of God, he cloes indeed need no fu-
ture verification of God's reality, and the life o heaven factual character. The task is not to show that religious
will not fundamentally change his cognitive relation to his 8[atements are true, but to show that they make factual
Maker. But this does not render the notion o eschatologi- assertions, and are accoi-dingly true-or-false. And ic is this
cal verification any less apposite to the function for which task that the notion of eschatological verification is in-
it has been advanced-namely, establishing the factual voked to perform. It draws out of the system of Christian
character of theistic belie in response to questions raised belie--which can be regarded as a complex expansion of
by contemporary philosophy. IC is not that the believer the Christian concept o God-that element which makes
needs further confirmation of his faith, but that the phi- an experientia.11y verifiable claim, in virtue o which the
losopher.-whether believer or not-wants to know what belief-system as a whole is established as being factually
aspects of Christian belie bring that system of belie [rue-or-fa]se. Thus the purpose of the reerence to eschato-
within the accepted criteria o factual meaningulness. logical verification is simply to show thejinquirer who is
The religious man has always assumed-usually without concerned about the questions raised by logical positivism
formulating this as a philosophical position-that the prop- and its philosophical descendants that thie theistic assertion
ositions expressing his faith-awareness of God have the is indeed-whether true or false-a genuinely actual asser-
character of factual statements: tha,t they are factually true tion.
or false, and of course, according to him, true. That is to IC must be added, however, that a state o faith which is
sa.y, the ordinary religious believer has always ta.ken it for so complete that it leaves no room for doubt, and thereore
16It is misnterpreted in this way by D. R. Duff-Forbes.in his no room for the exclusion of doubt by further verifiring
discussion of 1. M. Grombie's use of the idea of eschatological experiences, represents an ideal that is seldom attained in
veriBc;zLtion n New Essays in Phizosophica,Z Theology, p. i26. See this life. Faith is in practice a variab]e state, with both its
Duff-Forbes' "Theology and Falsification Again," 4%J}rcizci.an moments of indubitable consciousness of God and its times
Jo%mc oJ P7M.ZoJoP73y, 39 (ig6i), p. i58. See also a reply to this o precarious living upon the memory of those moments.
article by Antony Flew, "Falsification and Hypothesis in Theology,"
Even the perfect God-consciousness of Tesus seems to have
Australasia,n Journa,Z of Philosophy, 4o (L96z), aLnd urther rep+y by
Duff-Forbes. faltered in the experience which evoked his cry o derelic-

194 195
FJUTH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND VERIFICATION
"apprehencled as the ulfillment of God's purpose and not
tion on the cross, "My God, my God, why hast thou for-
saken me?" Thus whilst in its strongest possible form faith Simply as a natural state of affairs." 18 .
needs no further verification, in its common forms it does And referring to the second condition, he says:
not exclude the possibility o such future confirmation.
An important philosophical objection has been pre- Unless we already understand what is meant by "God," how
can we possibly understand such words as "Christ," "The
sented by Kai Nielsen in an article on "Eschatological
Christ," "The Son of God," or "Our Lord ]esus Ghrist"? How
Verification." 17 He offers several secondary criticisms, but
can utterances incorporating them be used to make verifiable
his main criticism is that the argument begs the question statements? What would count as verifying them? What com-
by presupposing that which is to be shown. Nielsen fo- cc3.ciz7ZG experiences, post-morte or otherwise, would tell us
cuses attention upon the two suggested conditions fulfill- what it would be like to encounter not just Tesus, but the
ment of which, it is claimed, would remove grounds for ra- Christ, the Son o God, and the Son of Man, or our Lord,
tional doubt as to the existence of the God o Ghristian where "Our Lord" does not just mean a wise teacher or a
faith: namely, the completion of God's purpose for us as monarch whom we meec either now or hereafter? If we do noc
this has been disclosed in the New Testament, and an es- know what it would be like to verify "God exists" directly,
chatological confirmation of the authority of ]esus and we have no bettei-idea of what it would be like to verify "The
hence of his revela.tion of God. Nielsen claims that these Son o God exists," where "The Son o God" is not identical
conditions presuppose that we already know wha.t it is for in meaning with "]esus." 19
God to exist, to have a purpose for us, and to be encoun- Certainly the philosophical elucidation of the Christian
tered in Christ, and that they cannot be used to establish concept of God raises the most profound, elusive, and per-
the meaning, nor therefore the factual meaning, of these haps insoluble problems. And it is therefore correspond~
religious ideas. Speaking of the first of the two allegedly ingly difficult, or even impossble, to state in full what it is
verifying conditions, Nielsen says: for God to be real. For to set forth the complete truth-
But wha.t we do not know is what it would be like to verify conditions o "God exists" would require an exhaustive
"There is divine existence." We have no idea at all of what definition o the divine nature. And Nielsen is right in
it would be like for that statement to be either true or false. saying that the notion of eschatological verification does
. . . And . . . to appeal to the divine purpose for man as- not enable us to do this. But it was not invoked to do this.
sumes we already know what it would be like to verify that It was invoked to establish that the statement "God exists"
our lives have such a purpose. We do not know what must is factually true-or-false. It does this by showing that the
be the case for it to be true or false tha.t our lives have. a pur- concept of deity, in its Ghristian context, involves escha-
pose, a GZoJ, a destiny or final fulfillment. We do not know tological expectations which will be either fulfilled or not
wha.t must happen for us to assert correctly that so and so s fulfilled. But ic is not suggested that the fulfillment o
LI ln Ca,nadian Journaz of Theology, XVI1, no. 4 (\96o). See a.lso these expectations, by participation in the ultimate King-
a reply by George Mavrodes, "God and Verification," in X, no. 8 dom o God, defines the mGcz7%.ng o "God exists." In try-
18 Nielsen, "Eschatological Verification," PP. 276-277.
(ig64), and a reply to this by Nielsen, "God and Verification Again"
in 2H, no. 2 (i965). 1 Ibid., p. 217.

196
197
FAITH AND KNOWI-EDGE FAITH AND VEmFIGATION

ing to describe a situation in which it would be irrational conception of this Being as infinite, uncreated, eternal,
for a human being to doubt the reality of God, as allegedly and so on. But the starting poim and basis o the Christian
revealed in Christ, one is not undertaking to define ex- use of the word "God" remains the historical figure of
haustively the nature o God or, therefore, the truth- Tesus, as known through the New Testament records. Un-
conditions of "God exists." der his impact we come (in some degree and at some
If it is asked how we can be in a posicion to tell the times) to experience life in a distinctively new way, as liv-
difference between God existing and God not existing ing in the presence of the God whose love was revealed in
without fully knowing what "God" means, the general an- the words and actions of ]esus. Is the appropriateness of
swer is that such combined knowledge and ignorance is a this response to the haunting figure o Tesus-this response
very common epistemological situation. As Nielsen himself of personal discipleship, of acceptance of his teaching, and
emphasizes on another occasion, we can oten use a word of coming to experience life in its relation to "the God and
correctly, applying it to the right objects or situations, and Father o our Lord ]esus Christ"-in any way verifiable by
yet be unable to give a satisfactory philosophical analysis o future events? Surely our participation in an eschatological
its meaning.2 We all know what "This is a macerial ob- situation in which the reality of God's loving purpose for
ject" or "He is alive" means, and we may have an assured us is confirmed by its fulfillment in a. heavenly world, and
knowledge o many things that they orc material objects in which the authority of ]esus, and thus of his teaching, is
and of many people .that they rG alive, and yet be unable to confirmed by his exalted p]ace in that world, would prop-
define fully what it is to be a material object or to be alive. erly count as confirmatory. IC would not (to repeat) amount
And so in the theologica.l case we must not rule out a priori to logical demonstration, but it would constitute a situa.-
that one mighc be able to be aware o the presence of God, tion in which the grounds for rational doubt which obtain
to identiy an act o God, and to recognize God's rule, with- in the present life would have been decisively removed.
out being able fully to define or comprehend the divine Such eschatological expectations-without the detailed im-
nature. agery in which earlier ages have clothed them-are an
Within Christianity it is possible to talk about the infi- integral part o the total Christian conception of God and
nite God, incomprehensible though he still remains, be- his activity. And they suffice, I suggest, to ensure the fac-
cause he has become finitely incarnate in ]esus o Naza- tual, true-or-false character o the claim that God, as so
reth. That is to say, God is identified as the Being about conceived, exists.
whom ]esus taught and whose attitude to mankind was ex-
pressed in ]esus' deeds. Building upon ]esus' teachi.ng, to-
gether with that of the Hebrew prophets before him,
Christian theologians have developed the philosophical
20 "God and Verification Again," Ccmadi.cm Jo%moz o/ T/tcoogy,
XI, no. 2 (ig65) PP. i36-i87. Cf. G. E. Moore, Somc Mcu.m Proz)Zc77#
of Philosophy (London, ig58), pp. 2o6-2o6 md Philosophical
Pcipe7iJ (London, ig59), PP. 36 ff.

198 199
FAITH AS KNOWLEDGE

At the end of the medieval period we find in Descartes'


writings the completed shift from Platonic ldeas to propo-
sitions as the supposed objects of human knowledge. In-
stead o being acquaintance with the fully (as distin-
Faith as Knowledge guished from the imperfectly) real, knowledge has become
awareness of the truth of either self-evident or necessarily
(as distinguished from contingently) true propositions
and their implicates. Mathematics is accordingly regarded
as exemplifying the epistemolggical ideal. From this back-
ground, the background of European rationalism, there
I HAVE argued for the view o faith as the interpreta- has arisen the widely held dogma that to know anything is
tive element within religious experience and as having the equivalent to being able to prove it.
function of preserving our cognitive ffeedom in relation to We need not discuss separately the two variants o the
God; and 1 have argued that the language in which the traditional teaching, relating knowledge to "reality" and
faich-awareness o God is expressed is cognitive in charac- to "truth" respectively. The central tenet of the theory in
ter, so that such statements as "God created the world" and either form is that knowing (sharply distinguished from
"God loves mankind" are factually true-or-false assertions.
believing) is self-authenticating and infallible. We cannot
Is the religious man entitled to describe his awareness of 7iozu anything that is not in fact the case; and when we
God as a form of knowledge? Or should faith be equated are in the state of mind called knowing, what we know
with belie, in sharp distinction from knowledge? must be so. That X knows P entails that P is true; whereas
From the time of Plato almost until our own day knowl- that X believes does not entail anything concerning the
edge has generally been regarded as direct and infallible truth-value of P. As ]ohn Cook-Wilson, a leading modern
acquaintance with "rea.1ity" (in ancient philosophy) or exponent o this way of thinking, says, "Belief is not
with "truth" (in modern philosophy). The idea of knowl- knowledge and th`e man who knows does not believe at all
edge, thus defined, is drawn by analogy from our dominant what he knows; he knows it." 2 To know is to be con-
sense, vision. Knowing is a generalization o seeing, seeing fronted by fact or truth, and to be aware that one is
being construed as simple intuition. Thus a modern Pla- confronted by it. Thus knowledge is by definition infalli-
tonist asks, "How does knowing differ from opining and ble-although it need not of course be exhaustive.
believing?" and replies, "The true answer to this question It is essential to this position that (in a curious but un-
can be given in three words, `By being vision.' " 1 Knowl- avoidable locution) when we know, we know that we
edge is hei-e conceived in terms o the metaphor o intel- know. To quote Cook-Wilson again, "The consciousness
lectua.l vision. that the knowing process is a knowing process must be con-
1A. E. Taylor, "Knowing and Believing," Proc. 4r.Jo. Soc.,
tained within the knowing process itsel." 3 There can
ig28-ig29, reprinted in PhS.osoP/%."j Stdc.cJ (London, ig84), p. 2 Sta,tement and lnference (London, ig26), 1, ioo.
8 Ibid., p. \ol.
398.

200 201
FAITII AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AS KNOWLEDGE

therefore be no question of a crit:erion of knowledge exter- "know" only with the aid, and by the means, of the cog-
nal to the act of knowing; knowing is a sel-contained nitive equipment with which we are endowed. We have to
process. The c]aim to know requires no endorsement from conduct our epistemological thinking with the same pow-
outside; knowledge shines in its own light with a. sufficiem ers of intellect that our epistemology itself studies. We
and self-certificating authority. cannot step outside our nature in order to examine it from
We may conveniently refer to this view as the infallibil- without; for wherever we step our nature steps with us. In
ist theory or definition of knowledge. It is commonly short, all our cognition is (in a sense which will be made
argued in favor o it that unless we do actually possess more precise as we proceed) relative to ourselves, and con-
knowledge in this sense-even if it be narrowly restricted tains an inescapably subjective element.
in extent-there can be no certainty o anything, no fixed The traditional idealization of the concept o know]edge
point upon which to build our beliefs or by which to guide is not only specu]ative; it is also self-deeating. Its effect is
our lives. Unless there are at ]east some icems of indubita- to elevate "knowledge" to a metaphysical peerage in which
ble know]edge, we are condemned to an endless relativity it loses all contact with common human experience, and
of shiting opinions. It is further argued that the denial o thereby to degrade almost all concrete instances o cogni-
all knowledge in the infallibilist sense is a sel-refuting tion to an inerior status o "beliefs." Thus a procedure
denial; for it a.mounts to the claim to "ozu that nothing is which began by exalting human cognition ends in a gen-
strictly knowable. eral deflation of it and promotes the skepticism which it
Now all this, while fully coherent with the premises on sought to combat.
which it is based, represents., as so many more recent For knowledge, in the sense o an infallib]e acquaint-
epistemologists have emphasized, a misleading approach to ance with truth (or reality) does not occur. There is no
our field of inquiry as a whole. Instead of sitting down be- state or activity of mind called "knowing" which carries
fore the facts and treating our cognitive experiences as with ic an absolute guarantee o freedom from error. This
data to be described, compared, and classified, the infalli- is conceded in principle by the inevitable admission that
bilist philosophers have defined a priori an ideal concept we sometimes erroneously .m that we know. Indeed it is
of knowledge and have assumed that this must be exempli- a commonp]ace that the state of knowing and the state of
fied in our experience. They have constructed an epis~ being in error are not psychologically distinguishable; to
temo]ogical model, instead of scrutinizing human knowl- be in error is just to appear to oneself to be knowing when
edge in the sense in which we actually possess it and seek- in fact one does not know. Thus Cook-Wilson conceded
ing to determine precisely what that sense is. They ha.ve, in that when a man comes to a conclusion with complete con-
effect, in the spirit o "high priorism," sought to view viction but upon a mistaken view of the evidence, he "is in
human knowledge from a vantage point outsde human exactly the same frame of mind as when he decides that the
nature and thus to play the part of an angelic or godlike evidence proves and it really does prove." 4
intelligence. The late A. E. Taylor, defending a Platonic account o
But such a standpoint cannot be achieved. We can 4JZ,.d'' p. lo6.

202 203
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AS KNOWLEDGE

knowledge as "direct and immediate apprehension o anything at all cannot be justified by |ogica| evidnce." 7
truth," allowed this and sought to guard against its damag- There is no need to elaborate this argument; its sren8th
ing implication. He says, lies on the surface. How can we profess to noz thac there
is no such occurrence as knowledge?
That 1 sometimes suppose myself to know when 1 do not The problem vanishes when we remember tllat the
really know is a fact having the same sort of significa.tion as "skeptic's" (i.e., the non-infallibilist's) claim is not to
the equally familiar facts that 1 sometimes suppose a demon- know, in the ideal sense, that there is no such occurr'ence as
stration which really involves a fallacy to be cogent, that I knowledge in the ideal sense. That wou|d indeed b a. Self-
sometimes suffer from hallucinations of die senses, and that
refuting claim. He is instead urging a general abandon-
my memory is sometimes at fault. What the fact really shows
ment of the infallibilist standpoint. He wishes to reject the
is merely that there is no psychological criterion by which we
can infallibly discriminate knowledge from belief, any more traditional classification of cognitions under the tw(J heads
that there is such a criterion for the discrimination of sense o fallible belie and inallible knowledge. 4Z our C08ni-
or memory from imagination.5 tions, he believes, are fallible. And there does not appear
Co be any circularity or inconsistency in the holdin8 0
But, if this is so, knowledge is not after all self-authenticat- such a belief.
ing. To allow that we can mistakenly think that we know Nor-to refer to another possible misunderstaniding-
is to abandon the claim that knowledge is any kind o sel- does this view involve that there is no such thling as
sufficient and self-guaranteeing intellectual vision. It does "truth,"-that is to say, that there are no true propo`itions.
not suffice to say that we may 72cLz/e genuine knowledge, It involves only that we have no infallible test of truth. AS
even though we cannot %nozu that we have it; for what we William James has said, "No bell in us tolls to let uL know
then have is not knowledge but only true belief. To know, for certain when truth is in our grasp." We are in t:he last
on this theory, involves knowing that we know. But if resort thrown back upon the criterion of coherencie With
there is a]ways the possibility that this second-order know- our mass of experience and belie as a whole; ther is no
ing may be illusory, then we can never be sure that we further criterion by which the criteriological adeqdacy 0
know; in other words, we can never knozu. this mass can itself be tested. This is sure|y our actual
We have still however to meet the familiar charge that Situation as cognizing subjects. We find .ourselves ali.Ve and
such a denial is self-refiting, on the ground that "only by receiving a multitude of impressions. During thle first
knowledge can we know whether there be such a thing as months o consciousness we gradual|y become aware 0
know]edge." 6 There is, according to` ]ohn Laird,. "still repetitions and similarities among these impression. Pres-
vitality in the age-long refutation of scepticism, that to ently a continuous environmental order dawns upion US;
assert that you know that you don't know anything at all is and we are conscious of a world of definite and reliatively
a contradiction, and that to suspect that you don't know enduring objects and persons. This world exhibit!S a. CZG
5 0P. c., P. 385. /Co stability in virtue o which we are able to exp'lore it
OM. C. D'Arcy, The Nature of Belief (2nd ed.., London, ig45), and able to supplement our own experience by the Feports
T Knowledge, Bezef and, Opinion (London, ig8o), P. \8|..
P. 4.3. .

204 2C)5
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AS KNOWLEDGE

o others. No apparent cZc 7.wrG necessity guarantees the to count as a sufficient basis for the claim to know. The
persisting structure o our environment. But so long as it speaker must also ha.ve the ?.c.g/c to. feel sure. In other
continues to present itself to our senses, to maintain its words, we require rational or adequately grounded certi-
perceptual solidity and completeness, to respond consist- tude. By this is not meant a certainty which is automati-
ently to our reality tests, and to change in an orderly fash- cally inerrant, but one which has been arrived at judi-
ion upon which we can found verifiable predictions, so ciously and self-critically. For in educated usage "knowl-
long we shall have a use for our present system of cognitive edge" does not reer to a merely casual absence of doubt
terms, and so long we shall continue to treat our experi- but to a stable and tested certaimy which has withstood
ence in its entirety as our touchstone o reality and truth. critical scruciny. It is not o course possible to specify the
This is a perfectly satisfactory situation; at least it is one in exact amounc o criticism necessary to constitute rational
which we have all been contem to live since the day o our certainty. But there sometimes comes a point in our cogni-
birth. And there is nothing to be gained by claiming to tive procedures when we feel confident that we have
possess knowledge in some quite other, mysteriously direct grasped the truth o the proposition in question and are
and infallible sense. conscious of a sense of intellectual satisaction, o security,
But if knowledge is not an infallible and sel-guarantee- or immoveableness, achievement, finality, which is for us
ing mode o cotgnition, what is it? Under what circum- the inner hallmark o knowledge.
stances do we rightly say "1 know . . ."? This dogmatic sense of immoveableness carries the im-
"1 know" registers the highest possible cognitive claim,
portant rider that what is thus evident to us can be evident
and does so in a form which (a.s ]. L. Austin pointed out) 8 to others also. When we are rationally certain o a proposi-
authorizes others to rely upon our sta.tement in a way tion we are thereby assured that anyone else conffonted
analogous to that in which "1 promise . . ." functions. with the same evidence or reasoning can likewise be cer-
Thus knowledge is a diploma word; and there has been tain of it. It is here that knowledge, despite its subjective
much discussion in recent works of epistemology o the aspecc, displays an objective character. It is objective in the
conditions under which it is proper to award this diploma. sense that it is "the same for everyone." That which 1
One such condition is the psychological state o an un- know is in principle knowable by others. For the certainty
qualified feeling of certainty. It would be absurd to say "1 of a rational being involves the assumption that those
know P-but 1 am not sure o it." We only make the claim grounds which have been sufficient to evoke certainty in
implied by "1 know" i we are absolutely certain. Indeed it himself are likewise sufficient to evoke it in any other ra-
is thus far true that, as ]ohn Locke said, "To know and to tional mind acquainted with them. In other words, we are
be certain is the same thing; what 1 know, that 1 am cer- certain that "it is certain that . . ."
tain of ; and what 1 am crtain of' that 1 know." 0 Should we add as a third (or ihdeed perhaps as the first
However, we do not allow the feeling of certitude alone and most fundamental) elemenc in the definition o knowl-
8 "Other Minds," Proc. j4r&.Jo. Soc., suppl. vol. XX (ig46), i7o- edge that, in addition to the knower possessing rational
175. grounds for certainty, that which is known must in fact be
0 Second Letter to Stillingfteet. the case? It is generally held that this is part o the defini-

2o6 207
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AS KNOWLEDGE

tion of knowledge. Thus A. ]. Ayer says that "the necessary And whenever it is uttered "1 know . . ." means strictly
"1 (claim to) know .... "
and sufficient conditio.ins for knowing that something is the
case are first that what one is said to know be true, sec- What consequences now follow for claims to religious
ondly that one be sur`e of it, and thirdly that one should knowledge? For undoubtedly men of faith have claimed
have the right to be sure." 10 and do claim to know such facts as that God is real. They
There is, however, a difficulty. 1 knowledge is so defined have been sure of this, and have claimed-or it has been
that we are only knowing when, as well as being and hav- claimed for them-that theirs is a rational certainty, based
ing the right to be surte, that of which we are sure is in fact upon adequate grounds. These grounds consist primarily
the case, then knowle:dge is .elevated int:o something that in their own religious experience. To the Old Testament
we may have but can never know that we have. For we can prophets and the New Testament apostles, for example,
never claim that in aiddition to gTounds for rational cer- whose religious experience lies behind the biblical writ-
tainty that , we ha.ve some further and independent ings, God was an experienced reality. He was known to
guarantee that . There is thus a significant case for them as a dynamic will interacting with their own wills; a
defining knowledge, i.n order that the word shall have a sheer given reality, as inescapably to be reckoned with as
practical use, in tei-m.s of rational certainty alone. destructive storm and life-giving sunshine, or the fixed
But on the other hiand this would lead to paradoxical contours o the land, or the hatred of their enemies and
departures from common usage. For we are sometimes ra- the friendship of their neighbours. The biblical writers
tionally certain and wet mistaken (that is, we are some- were (sometimes, though doubtless not at all times) as
times rationally certaiin that past rational certainty was vividly conscious of being in God's presence as they were
erroneous), and we no`rma]ly say in such a case that we did of living in a material environment. Their pages resound
not really know after all. We do not say, "1 knew P, but and vibrate with the sense of God's presence, as a building
now 1 know not-." And in order to avoid this we seem might resound and v,ibrate from the tread of some great
driven to define knowledge in such a way that one can being walking through it.
never be said to know something that is not in fact the case. This experiencing of life as a "dialogue with God" is the
However, these two apparently conflicting considera- believer's primary reason for being sure that God is real.
tions are reconciled by distinguishing between, on the one In testing such a reason we must be careful to ask the right
hand, the definition off knowledge and, on the other hand, question. This is not: do someone's accounts of his experi-
the conditions which .justify a cZc%.m to know. There can ence o the divine presence and activity provide an ade-
only be knowledge of when is true; but a claim to quate reason for someone else, who has had no such ex-
know P is justified by :a rational certainty that , even if it perience, to be sure that God is real? Or, can one validly
should subsequently become clear that P was not true. infer the existence of God from the reports o rel,igious
Thus knowledge cannot (by definition) be erroneous; but experiences? The answer in each case is no. But the proper
it is always possible fom a knowledge claim to be erroneous. question is whether the religious man's awareness of being
in the unseen presence of God constitutes a sufficient rea-
10 The Problem of Kno.`wzedge (London, L956), P. 84. son f or the religious man himsezf to be sre o the realty
2o8 209
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AS KNOWLEDGE

o God. He does not profess to infer God as the cause of his Russell does not profess that the nonexistence o God can
distinctively religious experiences. He professes to be con- be proved.l There is, however, another and more funda-
scious of living in the presence o God; and this conscious- mental ground on which someone might disallow the reli-
ness is (in the classic cases) as compelling as is his con- gious man's knowledge-claim. He might hold that such a
sciousness o the na.tural world. claim has no content since the religious concept o God is
It is to be observed that we are not inquiring whether so formed that there can be no possible verification or
there is any such thing as knowledge o God; in order for falsification o belie in divine existence. This is a relevant
there to be agreement about this there would first ha.ve to and weighty argument, which can be met only by with-
be agreement as to whether there is a God to be the object drawing the factual element n the religious knowledge-
o such knowledge. We are focussing attention instead claim or by showing that this claim is, after all, open to
upon the question whether it is proper for the man who eventual verification or falsification within human experi-
reports a compelling awareness of God to cZcM.m to know ence. In the previous chapter 1 have tried to follow the
that God exists. We are concerned with the circumstances latter course.
in which it is reasonable for a man to claim to have a ra- 11 See Bertrand Russell and F. G. Coplestone, "A Debate on the
tional certainty that there is a God; not with the question Exstence of God" (British Broadcasting Corporation, ig48), re-
whether there .J a God. printed in Russell's Why J 4m No Ohrc.JG.a7t (London, ig57), P. i44,
It seems that a sufficiently vivid religious -experience and in Te Ex.Jc7?cc of God, ed. Tohn Hick (New York and London,
would entitle a man to claim to know that God is real. In- 1964)' P. 167.

deed i his sense of the divine presence is sufficiently


powerful he can hardly fail to make this claim. He is sure
that God exists, and in his own experience of the presence
of God he has a good, and compelling, reason to be sure of
it. The onus lies upon anyone who denies that this fulfills
the conditions of a proper knowledge-claim to show rea-
sons for disqualifying it. The negative fact that he does not
himself experience life as a relationship with God does not
authorize him to deny that others do experience it in this
way, or to deny that a person for whom life has this quality
can properly claim to know that God is real. 0 cou.rse, i
someone made the positive counterclaim to know that
there is no God, he would (by implication) be claiming to
know that the re]igious man's knowledge-claim is ill~
founded-though not necessarily that it is unreasonable.
But who would make such a counterclaim? Even so nota-
ble a critic o religious knowledge-clams as Bertrand
210
211
10

ChTisa;n Faith

THE two previous Parts have offered an account o the


epistemological character of religious faith. Such faith, I
have suggested, is an act of interpretation. Within the
]udaic-Ghristian religious tradition-with which we are
concerned-the believer's experience as a whole is inter-
preted as a sphere in which at all times he is ha.ving to do
with God and God with him. For Christian theism is the
conviction that all life is under the control o a single, sov-
ereign, personal will and purpose whose scope includes
and yet transcends this present world and whose fulfill-
ment secures man's deepest happiness and well-being. This
at least is its propositional formulation. But the faith o
which we have been speaking does not consist in the intel-
lectual acceptance o such propositions but in the concrete
interpretation of life and all that it brings in these terms,
seeing its requirements, disciplines, mercies, rebukes, and
joys as mediating the divine presence.
We have thus far discussed this theistic apperception as
an already operative mode o cognition, without concern-
ing ourselves with its origin. Now we go on to inquire,
What induces a man to experience the world religiously? I
have argued that the human mind possesses an innate
readiness and tendency to interpret its experience in reli-
gious terms; but what is it that activates this capacity? In
215
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE CHRISTIAN FAITH

terms of the figure of the puzzle picture referred to earlier, Christianity sees God's self-disclosure in Christ as the
we are now seeking the cause of the switch in the process o climax of a long process of revelation taking place through
the events o ]ewish history, as this was interpreted by the
perception by which we come for the first time to perceive
what lies before us as a coherent picture. Whei-e is the clue great pi-ophets. In the story o the Hebrew people-in their
which prompts a man to interpret his experiences in terms epic escape from slavery in Egypt, in their settlement in
of a. divine purpose and so to discern God "behind" the Canaan as Tahweh's convenant nation, their persistent fail-
ure to keep the appointed commandments of their reli~
phenomena of the world?
The general na.ture of the answer is 1 think clear gion, the growing threats to their independence from the
enough. Religious interpretations of human experience expanding empires of Assyria and Babylon, the eventual
arise from special key points within that experience which clestruction of Terusalem and the exile of its leaders, and
act as focuses of religious significance. These key-points then in their return and in the period of reconstruction-
both set going the tendency of the mind to interpret reli- the prophets saw a clear and momentous religious signfi-
cance. God was seeking to make o a selected people a
giously and also act as patterns guiding the forms which
such interpretations take. Among the endless variety of source of spiritual illumination for the world, "a light to
life's phenomena some moment or object or person stands lighten the Gentiles." 2 The prophetic era ended with this
out as uniquely significant and revealing, providing a clue hope unfulfilled, and the Hebrews began to cherish the
to the character of the whole. Some item o experience, or expectation that God would intervene in the history of ls-
rael by sending his Messiah to inaugurate the divine king-
group of items, impresses the mind so deeply as to operate
as a spiritual catalyst, crystallizing what was hitherto a dom. This latter was generally thought of in materialistic
cloud of relatively vague, amorphous feelings and aspira- terms, as a revival and enlargemem o David's kingdom,
tions, and giving a new and distinctive structure to the and as resulting in the world dominion of the Tewish peo-
"apperceiving mass" by which we interpret our stream of ple. Tesus came, according to his own claim, as the ex-
experience. A sufficiently powerful spiritual catalyst may pected Messiah-expected, and yet not expected, for he
cause a total reapperception, changing a man's entire view reinterpreted the Messianic idea in relation to the divine
of the world. Such a conversion, whether gradual or sud- plan for lsrael, viewing himsel as the spiritual servant,
den, forms or reforms the personality around a. new center, and not the earthly lord, of humanity. He came to heal the
thereby winnowing its interests and imparting cohernce, sick, give sight to the blind, bind up the broken hearted,
impetus and direction to its energies. and preach to the poor the good tidings of the kingdom,
In Christianity the catalyst of faith is the person of. ]esus and to give his own life or the salvation of mankind.
Ghrist. It is in the historical figure of ]esus the Christ that, As we study the Christian claim concerning Christ, it
according to the Christian claim, God has in an unique will make for clarity i we distinguish within it two move-
and final way disclosed himself to men. ments or phases, which we may call faith G.ti Christ and
faith from Christ. There is, first, faith directed upon the
1Ian Ramsey, in RcZ.g!.ot# 7tgtage (London, ig57) and
elsewhere, has illuminatingly discussed the relation between sudi person of Cmrist himself in an act of interpretation which
2 |saiah 46:6.
disclosure situations and religious convic[ion.

2'16 217
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE GHRISTIAN FAITH

sees him as the unique Son of God; this is faith .n Christ. on the other hand, can and do change. The same deliver-
And there is, second, faith surveying the world from this ances o religious experience may be correlated and sys-
new-found standpoint, and interpreting life and all that it tematized in a variety of ways, alternative doctrinal sys-
brings in the light of the revelation o Christ; this is faith tems being builc upon the same experiential foundations.
Jrom Christ. In this second movement of faith Ghrist acts Within a given positive religion the rejection o the basic
as the spiritual catalyst for a reinterpretation of the believ- acts o faith must constitute heresy, while the rejection
er's experience as a whole. of orthodox doctrine amounts only to heterodoxy. The
We shall consider firsc the Christian's faith a.7t Ghrist, proper function of a creed is to state the former, not the
expressed in the assertion that in ]esus Christ God became latter. From this point o view,the Apostles' Creed, for ex-
incarnate. ample, is a genuine creed, whereas the Athanasian Creed is
In discussing this claim (as indeed in discussing each o a doctrinal manifesto in credal guise.
the main facets of Ghristian belief) we do well to distin- The cZocra.me o the lncarnation has a long and still con-
guish between, on the one hand, the basic convictions Cinuing history. The first attempc to create a doctrine o
which directly transcribe Ghristian experience, providing Ghrist's person took the form of the proclamation that in
matter for subsequent theological reflection, and on the Christ the Logos of Greek philosophy had become incar-
other hand, such theological reflection itself and the for- nat:e. Later the more universally intelligible concept of the
mulations in which it has issued. Using the terms to ex- divine Son became theologically central in connection
press a distinction, we may call these two types of religious with the developing doctrine o the Trinity, and it was
utterance primary affirmations o faith and theological proclaimed that Christ was the incarnate Son o God.
doctrines respectively. The former are the basic assertions Christian thought then focused itself upon the problem o
of faith which are characteristic of a given religion and the "hypostatic union," the relation between Ghrist's di-
which constitute for its adherents data for theological rea- vine nature and his human nature. Many questions arose
soning. The theological doctrines of a religion are the and many solutions were offered. Could it be said, for ex-
propositions officially accepted as interpreting its primary ample, that Christ's body was human but his soul divine?
affirmations and as relating them together in a coherent Or was Ghrist divine in the sense of being, among all man-
system of thought. The formulation o the primary affir- kind, uniquely obedient to God's will and thus uniquely a
mations is thus a descriptive and empirical process, the aim vehicle o the divine purpose? Or is kenosis-the sel-
o which is to express the basic data apprehended by faith. emptying by the Son of his divine attributes in order to
The construction of doctrine, on the other hand, is.specu- become man-the true key to an understanding of the ln-
lative in mechod, being philosophical thinking undertaken carnation? And so on, down to the most recent substantial
within t:he boundaries of a particular religion. contribution to the theory o the lncarnation, that of the
The affirmation o the "facts of faith" o a given religion late D. M. Baillie,3 who suggested that the union of na-
should be fixed and unchangeable; for they define the tures in Christ is to be conceived as the supreme instance
religion in question by pointing to the area o primary o the "paradox o grace" whereby a man's good deeds rep-
religious experiences from which it has arisen. Doctrines, 3 God WaS &.7i Oftr.J (London, ig48).

218 219
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE GHRISTIAN FAITH

resent at once free human volitions and acts of the divine among men. The intention of the dogma is made clea.r by
enabling grace. Some of these theories have been rejected its exclusion of Docetism, which denied the full humanity
by the Ghurch and others accepted as permissible specula- of Christ; his human body was said to be an appearance
tions. It is significam that the reason for the rejection o only, incapable o suffering and incapable o being sub-
those theories which were judged heretical during the jected to the indignity and ordeal of crucifixion. As against
Christological controversies was tha.t they denied by impli- this, orthodox Ghristian dogma insisted that ]esus was gen-
cation one or other of the basic "facts of faith." For the uin.ely human, and subject to temptation, facigue, sorrow,
function o doctrine is to provide a philosophical explana- pain, and ignorance. The act of interpretation. by which
tion of these facts, and when a doctrinal formulation has his contemporaries perceived this did not differ from that
the effect o denying whac it set out to explain, it is rightly by which human beings are normally recognized as such,
condemned as unsound doctrine. and need not detain us here.
However, we are not concerned here to enter the field of The balancing dogma of Christ's deity emerged less
Ghristological discussion. The point 1 wish to make is that easily. It operated as a dispositional attitude of the disci-
these various doctrines of the person of Ghrist are philo- ples toward their Master befoi-e it came to conscious
sophical speculations characterized by the fact that they propositional expression in their minds. To what extent it
accept the primary affirmations of Christian faith as data to approached explicic formulation during his lifetime is im-
be explained. Thus in making an epistemological study of possible to determine with certainty. The declaration o
the central datum that God has revealed himsel to men in Peter at Caesarea Philippi, "Thou art the Ghrist, the son
Christ, we are not asking Which, if any, of the various of the living God," 4 might at first seem to resolve this
Christo]ogical theories erected upon it is correct. We are doubt: but comparison of the Synoptic accounts suggests
not dealing with Ghristian doctrine at all, as cl.efined that is ToS oo Too @vTos, "the son o the living God," in
above, but with a "fact of faith" sta.ted in a primary Chris- Matthew is an addition, representing a later conviction of
t:ian affirmation. We are thus concerned with the experien- the Church. Probably during Christ's lifetime his disciples
tial data upon which the various doctrines of Christ's per- were too close to him and too busy doing his work to in-
son have been based. dulge in speculations concerning his person, apart from
There is, I think, no room for debate as to the content of asking themselves, as was inevitable in J.ews, whether theii-
the basic claim of .Christian faith concerning Christ. This beloved rabbi was the long-awaited Messiah.
claim is succinct]y expressed in an early credal formula The precise timetable o the dawning o the Ghurch's
(quoted by Harnack): "]esus Christus, Deus et homo." conviction of Ghrist's deity is not important in relation
The conviction out of which the entire theology of the ln- either to the truth-value of that conviction or to its episte-
carnation has arisen is that Christ is in some sense both mological analysis. The important point is that it repre-
God and man. sented the unfolding of a judgment which was ci.1ready
The dogma that Christ was a man is self-explanatory. It implicit in the practical attitudes and reactins, the feel-
is the assertion that he came within the purview of the ings, hopes, and loyalties of the disciples while they fol-
apostolic witnesses as one more human being, as a man 4Matt. i6:i6. Gf. Mark 8:27-29; Luke 9:i8-2o.

220 221
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE GHRISTIAN FAITH

lowed ]esus in Palestine. From an early stage their rel the flesh? It is to be noted once again that we are inquir-
tionship to him, and their attitude to his words and deed ing, not into the truth or falsity o their judgment, but
contaii;ed the seed o the Christological dogma. He ha into its cognitive structure.
spoken and acted in ways which a.t the time seemed natur The Ghristian's faith in the deity o Ghrist is an inter-
and appropriate, but which could be seen on reflection pretation of a human lie and personality as being more
imply a more than human sta.tus. He had assumed autho than human, as being continuous with the life o God..
ity to orgive sins, authority to declare God's will to me This interpretation both involves and transcends an ethical
11
valuation o his personality. The deity of Christ was medi-
power ov~er disease and insanity; and had treated1., the r
sponses of men and women to himself as o crucial sign ated first through his moral eharacter. For in wha.tever
TJ 0,

cance for their final destiny; and his right to do this ha manner ]esus Ghrist rst impressed his disciples-whether
been a.ccepted even beore its ar-reaching implicatio as a wonder-worker, as a teacher, or as a magnetic and
began to be realized. The seed o theology had thus be numinous personality-the outstanding fact about him,
.,

sown, and during the period o intense mental ferment .t which soon gripped them, was his sheer moral goodness
lowing Ghrist's death that seed grew. The Church ea] and purity, his total lack o concem for himself and the ab-
accorded to Tesus the semidivine Tewish title o Messi solute dedication of his life to his hea.venly Father's pur-
and the sem`idivine title o the world o mystery cul poses.7 This quality had the dual effect o constituting a.
Kt`ip[os. But the process o development continued furthe rebuke to men's selfishness, and yet being powerfilly
and Christian thought soared to the ultimate heights o tl attractive and inspiring to those who had the humility to
acknowledge its rebuke.
Tohannine theology with its proclamation that "God t
loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, th On the one hand, ]esus' very existence was a persistent
whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but ha. condemnation of greed, pride, and uncharitableness. As
everlasting life" 5-a proclamation which has its Pauli] the light creates shadows, moral perection reveals moral
equivalen in, for example, the Ghristological passage ( imperfections. To recognize that someone else is better
hymn) o Phil. 2 :5-i i, to which the kenotic theories of t than oneself is thereby to become acutely aware of one's
Inca.rnation trace their origin. IC was not long-pema own faults. Peter's reaction in the presence o Ghrist is said
some twenty years-before the mind of the early Chur to have been to cry out, "Lord depart from me, for 1 am a.
had crystallized into the conviction which was later typ sinful man." 8 But to those who, like Peter, accepted the
cally expressed in the second-century epistle, 11 Clemen rebuke, ]esus' character had a profoundly inspiring qual-
"Brethren, we ought so to think of Tesus Christ, as.o Go ity, creating in them a new determination to live according
to the divine will. Christ's goodness was not a narrow tight-
(s 7rp} OoS), as of a ]udge of living and dead."
What is the epistemological character o this attributic 1ipped, puritanical goodness, but spontaneous and natural.
of divinity to Ghrist, first by the disciples who were asso He dicl not seek to impose his teaching by authority; in-
ated with' him during his earthly life, and then by subs( stead his teaching came with an intrinsic authority, as o
7 Gf. ]ohn Knox, Jcst.. orc 7td Chr!.J (New York, ig58), P. 34.
quent generations of be]ievers who have not met him
5]ohn 3:i6. 6II clem. i:i. 8 Luke 5:8.

222 228
FJUTH AND KNOWLEDGE CHRISTIAN FAITH

the truth shining in its own light. Men and women wer.G trines which he taught, concerning the kingdom o God,
dra.wn to him by his unhesitating moral insight and by th the love of God, and reconciliation with God, were to his
complete conformity of his own lie to that insight. He wa disciples manifest facts made visible and tangible in the
a.ble .to confront them with the limitless ideals o the S.erh person of their Teacher. God ruling, God loving, and God
mon on the Mount because he was himself maniestly liv,i forgiving were words made flesh in ]esus Christ.
ing out those ideals; he called men to follow in a path \ It was their experience that the k3.7?gczom or r%Zc oJ God
which he himself was treading day by day. was a presem fact in Christ's own life, and that to serve
Thus far, then, the early Christians' interpretation o him was to dwell within the borders o that Kingdom. It
Christ was a perception of ethical significance. It was ]esus'. appeared to them, as they looked back over their Master's
career, that in Tesus the divine purpose had invaded this
perfect moral character, and the compelling authority o
his ethical teaching, that constituted the sharp spearhead o world and had sought and won their free allegiance. But
his impact upon men. But there was also another an the kingdom was still a hidden kingdom, like (in the para-
deeper element in their faith. Behind that spearhead ( ble similes) seed in the ground or leaven in the dough. It
mora.l demand was the long driving shaft of a religious me was apparent only to faithful eyes and obedient wills; and
sage concerning the presence and the sovereign purpose ( its sign was to be a cross rather than a crown. Yet it was
God. At every point Christ's moral exhortations rest upo also the firm assurance of the disciples that the kingdom
assertions of religious fact. The ethical "oughts" of th which they had glimpsed in operation in the lie, death,
and resurrection of Ghrist was the rule of God destined
gospel are based upon an underlying metaphysical "is.
Forgiveness, mercy, love are right attitudes between me one day to be fully and perfectly manifested.
because they are already God's attitude toward men. An Again, it was the experience o the disciples that Goci'J
they are pra.cticable and realistic policies because the worl fqftGry Zot/G was revealed in the life of Christ. Tesus told
in which men are called to practice them is God's worl men that God loves and cares for each of them with an in-
finitely gracious, tender, and wse love; and the assertion
]esus did not simply urge his hearers to love God and t(
1ove their neighbors. He made credible t them a vision Was credible on his lips because this supernatural agape
the world as ruled by divine Love, thereby releasing the was apparent in his own dealings with them. There was no
ffom selfish preoccupations and setting them free to lov practical distinction between the divine love about which
one another as themselves.9 Tesus taught with such direct authority and that which was
As in the ca`se of ]esus' moral impact upon men, so l{ seen and felt in his actions. The will and power o 1ove
his revelation of Gd as Ruler of this world, and o th which flowered out from him in healing to men's bodies
world as the sphere o God's rule; consisted not only in 1]
and renewal o their spirics was manifestly continuous with
uttering these truths, but even more in the embodiment i the eternal heavenly ]ove o which he spoke. It was as
them in his own person. The. biblical metaphor which d though in Tesus the divine agape had taken on human per-
scribes Ghrist as "the Truth" is for Christian faith a stri sonality and dwelt among them.
ingly apt metaphor. For the three closely interrlated do And it was likewise the experience of the discip]es that`
0 S.e Chapter ii. hG dG.tJG.%G /orgG.G%GJS'o which ]esus spoke came to them

224 22'5
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE CHRISTIAN FAITH

through him as a transforming experience. When he pro- causal connection between the disciples' acquaintance with
nounced pardon for men's sins, they felt not only forgiven the historical ]esus and their interpretation of him as
by him but reconciled to God himself. They came to bel being the incarnate Son of God. But what of the faith o
lieve that in Tesus the divine agape had broken through subsequent generations of believers, who have never had
the barrier of their own sinfulness and made it possible for the opportunity to know ]esus in the flesh? What is the
them to worship and serve God in gratitude and peace. It origin of the faith of Ghristian people in subsequent ages
was as though in Christ God was at work reconciling the \t, and in our own day?
world to himself. One o the most striking phenomena reflected in the
This threefold sense of. a divine purpose and love and New Testament documents is the unbroken continuity of
forgiveness embodied in Ghrist was later reflected in the Christian faith between the minority who had companied
thought o the Church as the dogma of Christ's deity. It with ]esus in Palestine and the ever growing majority who
became the conviction o his disciples that the Lord had had never seen the Lord. This continuity of Christian ex-
noc only been teaching them concerning the kingdom a.nd perience found expression in the concept of the Holy
rule of God; he had been exhibiting that rule in opera- Spirit. ]esus himself had spoken of the Spirit which would
tion. He had not only been speaking about the divine love; come upon the disciples after his departure. That Spirit
he was himself the divine love speaking. .He had not only came to them in an experience of intense mental and emo-
been reerring to God's forgiveness as a possibility; he had tional upheaval at the Feast of Pentecost, fifty days after
been directly offering that forgiveness. ]esus' crucifixion and some days after the last of his resur-
It has been the task o Ghristian theology ever since to rection appearances. From that time onward new disciples,
try to determine the meaning o this conviction or philo- many of whom had never seen ]esus or heard him preach,
sophical understanding. But here was the original experi- and including men and women in lands far beyond the
ential ground out o which Ghristological doctrine grew. borders of his native Palestine, received the Spirit in
The disciples' innate tendency to interpret their experi- equal measure and became no less wholeheartedly devoted
ence religiously was powerully evoked by and ocused to the Lord than were those who had known him in
upon the person o Christ, and it deepened into a con- Galilee and ]erusalem.11 Paul, for example, had not, so far
sciousness that in some infinitely significant and momen- as we know, seen ]esus in the flesh. But nevertheless Paul's
tous sense Tesus Christ was God incarnate. faith was entirely Christocentric. And the great Ghristians
We have thus far been considering the recognition o of later ages-Augustine, Francis, Luther, Loyola, Wesley,
Christ's divinity by those who were his disciples during his Bonhoeffer, and many thousands o others-have been as
earthly lie. They did not indeed formulate and proclaim completely dedicated to Ghrist's service as were the origi-
this recognition until after their Master's death and resur- nal band of apostles. These later disciples have experi-
rection, but when they did come to formulate it they were enced Christ as the Spirit who is able to be present in all
aware that they were bringing into full consciousness what 10Mark i3:ii; Matt. io:ig-2o; Luke i2:ii-i2; John i4:i6-i7,
had already been implicit in their practical attitude to- 26; i5:26; i6:i8; Acts i:5.
11 Cf. Acts ii:i5-17; 15:8-9.
ward him throughout his ministry. There was thus a direct
226 227
FHTH. .AND. KNOWLEDGE CHRISTIAN FAITH

ages and places, and who is yet indissolubly linked with the ordinary believers in every age that this life, with its min-
Tesus o the gospel records. For the work o the Spirit has gled moments of joy and sorrow, paih and pleasure, hard-
been continuous with that of me incarnate Ghrist. Indeed ship and ease, and with its varying mixture of tears and
the Holy Spirit is sometimes referred to in the New Testa- laughter, is wholly within the secure grasp of God's pur-
menc as the Spiric of Tesus or the Spirit of the Lord,12 and pose; so that at no point are men outside his care or
always comes to men in conjunction with the preaching o[ beyond the scope of his redemptive activity.
the apostles or their successors concerning him. This distinctively Ghristian experience of ]ie as a sphere
The faith in Christ, then, o the great majority o Cmris. in which the divine purpose disclosed in Christ is every-
tians, the increasing multitude who have not known the where at work is superimposed in the believer's mind
earthly ]esus, is related in a dual way to the aich of the upon his no less certain experience of the world as a system
apostolic witnesses. It is identical with that faith in that it of natural cause and effect. Men's scientific and prescien-
is a like interpretation o the person of Tesus Ghrist as in- tific beliefs about their environment have of course varied
carnating the divine agape. And yet it differs in that Ghrist widely through the ages and in different cultures. In the
in the flesh has become Christ in the Spirit, making him- earliest period all natural phenomena were attributed to
self known to each succeeding generation through the animating spirit or life within any object which exhibited
records of his earthly life. change. A second broad stage assumed a background of
There is much in all this that would require expansion regularity in which all manner of arbitrary agencies, gods
and justification in a theological treatise. However, our con- and spirits, demons and faii-ies, the unseen powers of the
cem here is confined to the epistemological character of air and of the earth, black and white witchcraft and magic,
Ghristian faith in its two movements, as faith .n Christ and were thought to intervene to influence the course o
as faith from Ghrist. We have seen that in its first phase it events. Today, civilized man has (apart from numerous re-
is an interpretation of Tesus Christ as mediating the divine 1apses into superstition) abandoned these beliefs, holding
presence. From this we turn to the second phase, ffom the instead that all observable events occur in accordance with
"natural law," i.e., exhibit regular and in principle pre-
Ghristian's discovery of Christ as his divine Lord to his re-
sulting reinterpretation o all 1ife in the light o Christ's dictable patterns of sequence, though interacting in cer-
Lordship. Our subject is the wi'de range o Christian expe- ta.in cases with free human volitions. These several stages
rience which the doctrine o providen.ce seeks to expound represent a considerable span of development in human
and explain. Once again, however, we are not concerned thought. But in relation to the Christian experience of
with the various doctrines excogitated by the theo|ogians, providence, all these philosophies, from the animistic to
but with the primary faith and experience of ordinary the scientific, can be classed together as postulating a sys-
Christian believers, in New Testament times and since, tem of natural (as distinguished ffom divine) causation. It
which constitutes the data upon which the theologians makes no difference for our present discussion by what
have worked. agencies, demonic or natural, the observed conformity of
It has, with impressive consistency, been the faith o matter to predictable patterns is achieved. The significant
12Rom. 8:9-io; 11 Cor. 3:i7; 3:i8; Acts i6:7, where the best point is that nature constitutes a complete and self-
MSS have 7 7ryS#a 'ITo'00. sufficient (though, for religious faith, a created) system.
228 229
GHRISTIAN FAITH
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
originally it would seem by ]esus himself, to Old Testa.-
We Shall q>r the purposes o this discussion ignore the pre
ment prophecy. "How is it written. o the Son of man,"
Scientific V'ariants of this view and confine our attention to
the Conteiqporary view o the course of nature as exhibit- Tesus asks, "that he must suffer many things, and be set at
noght?" 14 The early Church from the first echoed this
ing causal `"la.ws."
thought and spoke o ]esus as being "delivered up by the
Adding, then, the Christian's religious interpretation o
determinate counsel and foreknowledge o God." 15 In the
life to his {scientific understanding of it, his resulting con-
minds of the first generation of Christians, this conviction
Viction is twofold and indeed paradoxical. It is paradoxical
was linked with, and given meaning and credibility by,
in a mannr which (as D. M. Baillie has pointed ouC) 3 is
their experience of a new, recgnciled relationship to God,
paralleled by the dual dogma of Ghrist's humanity and which they felt to have come about through Christ's self-
deity. For the Christian wishes to affirm of the events o a
sacrifice for them upon the cross. They felt that in some
human experience-history both that they have their placo
way (for the definition of which theologians ha.ve ever
Within a natural causal sequence and also t:hat they ha.Ve
since been searching) Christ's death had been undergone
their Place: within the purpose and providence o God. In a
on their behal. Part of the accepted teaching which Paul
familiar iuustrative simile, the changing pattem of events
both received and transmitted was that "Christ died for
Can be P]oitted both in the "horizontal" plane o mundane
our sins," 16 a saying which, as Vincent Taylor remarks,17
Cause and teffect and in a "vertical" plane in which each oC-
reads almost like an excerpt ffom a primitive creed. Belie
currence sqands in direcc relacion to the divine Will.
in the reconciling effect of his death goes back to teaching
The Supreme instance o this in the New Testament,
of Jesus himself, which survives in such sayings as that the
and indee| the event from wriich the Cmristian conception
Son of man came "to give himself a ransom for many" 18
of Provide!nce is derived, is the death of ]esus Christ. On
and that his blood was to be "shed for many." 19 There-
the one haind, the Synoptic passion narratives, representing
after the belief is expressed again and again in every part
Probably lthe earliest documentation o Ghrist's life, are o the New Testament, as one of its recunent and distinc-
Wholly reailistic in their portrayal of motive. They depict
tive themes.2 These two related convictions, that Christ's
the High Priest's determination to kill Tesus, within the
death was foreordained in the purpose of God and that it
law or Wiithout; Tudas' greed; the mob's blood lust; Pi-
had made possible the new lie which Christians experi-
late'S Cowardice; the soldiers' callousness; and the quiet
enced, coalesced in the mind of the Church into the
Courage oif the victim. At every stage in the drama, free
14Mark 9:i2; Cf. i4.:2l.
and respo]nsible human decisions determine the course o
15Acts 2:23. Gf. 3:i8; I Gor. i5:3; I Pet. i:20.
events. The judicial murder of ]esus is in tne fullest sense i6 | Cor. 15:3.
a human act. T] The Alonement in New Testa,ment Teo,ching (London, igt[o),
And ye3t on the other hand the New Testament pro- P. 22.
Claims noi |ess insistently that ]esus' death is an act o di- 18 Mark io:45. 1 Mark i4:24.
20John i:29; Rom. 3:25; 4:25; 5:8; I Cor. 5:7; I Thess. 5:io;
Vine gracq:, the c]ima:}[ o God's work for man's salvation.
I Tim. 2:5-6; Titus 2:i4; I John 2:2; 8:5; 4:io; Heb. 2:9; 9:i4, 26,
This is e.]xpressed first in the relating off Jesus' death,
28; io:i2; i8:ii-i2; Rev. 5:9.
13 0P. C..., pp. ill-118.
81
280
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE CHEISTIAN FAITH

theological kerygma that "when the fulness o the time was experience of and reaction to evil. The Ghristian's faith
come, God Jc7t* forth his Son . . . to redeem"; 21 that God /?.om Christ, his recognition of God's prvidence in all life,
"got/G his only-begotten Son"; 22 and has "5en the Son to is the obverse of his faith a.7? Ghrist; it is, according to the
be the Savior o the wor|d." 23 Ghristian claim, the Spirit of Ghrist within the believer
Thus the New Testament writings witness to the para- enabling him to see and to act according to the mind of the
doxical conviction that the crucifixion o Ghrist was a Lord. For there is a specifically Christian mode of response
fearful crime, for which the perpetrators were fully to to life's evils and catastrophes. Viewed through Christian
blame, and that it was the very pivot of the divine plan for eyes, evils do not cease to be evils; wrong deeds do not cease
the salvation of men. ]esus himself brings these two themes to be culpable defiances o God's will, rising sometimes to
together in the saying, "The Son o man indeed goeth, as it a demonic intensity, nor do accident and disease cea.se to
is written of him: but woe to that man by whom the Son of be dreadful in their consequences. Life's tragedies are not
man is betrayed." 24 In the early Cmristian preaching re- apprehended by Christian faith, when it is unspoiled by
corded in the Acts of the Apostles the same two thoughts speculative theology, as in any ordinary sense acts of God.
stand side by side. Thus Peter tells a ]ewish audience in Like the cross o Ghrist they manifestly come ffom mun-
dane causes, which can be observed and traced. And yet it
]erusalem thac ]esus, "being delivered by the determinate
counsel and oreknowledge o God, ye have taken, and by has been the persistent claim o those seriously and whole-
wicked hands have crucified and slain." 25 heartedly committed to the way of Ghristian discipleship
The death o ]esus, then, seen through Christian eyes, is that tragedy may nevertheless be turned through a man's
the greatest crime in history and yet at the same time the reaction to it from a cause of despair and alienation from
occasion o man's salvation. It discloses in one revealing God to a stage in the fulfillment o God's loving purpose
moment the appalling extent o human blindness and sin, for that individual. As the greatest of all evils, the cruci-
in that they led men to crucify the divine Son, and the fixion of Christ, was made the occasion of man's redemp-
depth of the sel-giving love o God, in obedience to which tion, so other evils can be used in the divine strategy of
salvation if they are met in a spirit derived from that in
Tesus accepted this fate ac men's hands. For by giving its
ultimate scope to man's wickedness and folly the cross o which Christ faced the cross, a spirit of trusting acceptance,
Ghrist reveals the full character and power of evil. And by without bitterness oi- despair. As ]esus saw his execution
his bearing of that evil in forgiving love it brings home the by the Romans as an experience which his heavenly Father
divine forgiveness to men's hearts and draws them into a desired him to accept, and which was thereby to be
new and reconciled relationship to God. As the uni.que brought within the sphere of the divine purpose and made
to serve the divine ends, so the Christian response to
paradox o man's redemption, it is both the worst and the
best thing that has ever happened. calamity is to accept the adversities, pains, and afflictions
The crucifixion of Ghrist, thus interpreted as both a which life brings, and thereby enable them to be turned to
human and a divine act, the supreme evil turned to su- a positive spirituai Use.20

preme good, is the paradigm for the distinctively Christian 26 The Christian interpretation of life, and especally of its set-
21 Gal. 4:4-5. 22Tohn 3:i6. 23 I Tohn 4:i4. backs and tragedies, is considerably easier to expound than to prac-
24Mark i4:2i. 25Acts 2:23. Cf. 4:io; i8:28-29. tice; but nevertheless we can sometimes observe .the transforming

232 233
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE GHRISTIAN FAITH
This principle of acceptance and of the offering of or the sense that spiritual values have no relation to the de-
life to be used in the outworking o the divine purpi tails o a man's environment and habitat, but in the sense
applies not only to daunting and testing moments but that they can find appropriate expression in any set of
our human experience as a whole. To interpret with i earthly circumstances. Whether a human being is a Ghi-
mind o Ghrist is to see the unimportance of those thi] nese o the tenth century B.c., or a Palestinian peasant of
which he regarded as spiritually indifferent-wealth the first century A.D., a medieval nobleman or serf, or an
power, outward pomp, and earthly glory-and the English agricultural laborer, an American university pro-
importance of those things which he treated as being spir fessor, or a housewie of the twentieth century-rich or
itually momentous and decisive-the opposites o love an poor, influental or insignificant, illiterate or highly
hatred, faith and despair, forgiveness and malice, sel educated-defines only the setting or stage o his existence.
giving and greed, spiritual vision and blindness. The tru The stage provides the scenes and determines the fom of
values, as they are seen by Chriscian faith, are independen the action. However, a man's life does not consist in the
of the point in time, the geographical location, the statio stage but in the quality of his performance on it. It is the
in society, and the cultural background o the person i spiritual use which he makes of lie's circumstances, not
whom they are maniested. They are independent, not the details of the circumstances themselves, that will build
his eternal character and destiny. There is thus a sense in
power of Christian faith at work n face o calamity. I witnesse
this some years ago n a cottage in Northumberland where an ol which, for Ghristian faith, it is indifferent what shape life's
shepherd and his wife had both been paralyzed by strokes within occasions and problems and opportunities take, but all-
day or two of each other, and wre both dose to death. The important how the individual reacts to and participates in
accepted their affliction wiiout bitterness, and aced the prospec: them, of whatever kind they may be.27
of death in simple Ghristian trust. Their family gathered roun And yet of course there is another sense in which life's
them and filled the home with loving care. After a period durin
outward circumstances are far from unimportant. Al-
wlridi they lived each day without any expectation of seeing th
next, they both began to recover; and we all rejoiced. But th though it is ultimately indifferent into zha set o circum-
strange fact is that even i it had been otherwise, one would sti st:ances an individual is bom, yet having been born at some
have felt ma.t something fine had taken place in the sphere ( particular stage o human history and into some one par-
human diaracter and its reaction to adversity, something enno ticular race and nation and family and endowed with a
bling to those in whom it occurred and inspiring to those who we
aware of it. It s difricult to escape the feeling that although t] particular genetic inheritance, these circumstances now
sudden prostrating illness was n itsel a sheer evil, utterly contra
constitute the appointed sphere within which (and in the
to die divine will, yet that evil having come about, it was .mad changing o which) the individual must live his lie and
tto serve God's ultimate purpose of tlie spiritual growth of h exercise his freedom and responsibility. The outward cir-
creatures. That purpose, as it is conceived by Ghristianity, fa cumstances as such do not indeed express God's design;
transcends ths world and all its achievements and failures, and i they express rather man's marring o that design. But
forwarded in the present life not by the outward events as suci
nevertheless God's purpose embraces each man's given sit-
whidi constitute human history but by the character o men'
-:.C_. P. T. Tiorsyi, The Justif ication of God (London, ig4S),
nner participation in and reaction to those events and by th
spiritual use which is thereby made o them. P. 139.

284 235
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

uation; for in and through and out o it the fllfillment


the divine purpose is either forwarded or retarded. 11
point in the infinite variety of the human scene can
made a point on the soul's journey to the divine kingdo
Thus the whole of life is interpreted by Christian fai
as a sphei-e .of inceraction with the will and purpose Faith and Works
God. Through the web of natural causation and the thre
o human aims and desires, there is seen to run the divi
purpose of the making o "children of God" who shall
"heirs of eternal life." Interpenetrating the significance
events as physical occurrences rendering appropriate
"FAITH without works," we read, "is dead." 1 This is
tain bodily reactions, and interpenetrating their et:
significande as involving other persons .and req certainly true for the conception of faith presented in this
moral choices, the Christian finds in life a further book. From this point of view the Ghristian ethic describes
more ultimate significance as the scene o God's gradt the way of lie of one who is conscious o being in God's
creation of spiritual personality, a significance to which t presence. This is also, I would suggest, the New Testament
appropriate reaction is the acceptance of life and all t understanding of the Christian life.
brings and its positive use as a sphere of service and In Tesus' teaching either "religion" or "ethics," i ab-
ship. stracted fTom its relation to the other, would be radically
altered in character and would forfeit the power to grasp
and change human lives. On the one hand Tesus' moral
teaching, so far from being an irrelevant appendix to his
religious message, is an essential part of his disclosure o
the character o God. The New Testament reveals God as
such that for us to be aware of him makes a profound prac-
tical difference for the conducc of our lives; and ]esus'
ethic is his description of this practical difference, spelled
out especially in the matter o a man's dealings with his
neighbor. Thus Tesus' moral teaching helps to define his
vision of God as Lord and Father by indicating, in con-
crete terms, what it means to act upon that vision. On the
other hand ]esus' religion constitutes the rational basis for
his moral teaching, without which the latter would be ab-
surdly quixotic and unpractical. For whether or not it is
lTams 2:26.

237
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND WORKS

rational to behave in a given way depends upon the char- which the acknowledged sovereignty 0 God, or the willing
acter o the environment in which we are living; and doing o the divine will, is something as yet unrealized
which is to be ardently hoped and prayed for, rather than
Tesus' tea.ching about the world in its relation to God
depiccs our environment as such that the Ghrist-style o 1ie something already present in the world, must surely be
this: it is the tna.crsciz acknowledgment o God's sover-
is alone realistically appropriate to it.
In the teaching of Tesus, belie in God and the following eignty, the willing doing o the divine will by all men.
of a distinctive way of life are connected by the idea of the When this occurs human society, in this or another woi-ld,
kingdom o God. To know God as Lord and Fa.ther is to will have become a. perfect manifestation o the rule o
live in a certain way, which is determined by the character God, fulfilling the divine intention for human lie. The
and purposes o God. So to live is to stand within the di- kingdom in this ultimate sense is the heavenly city, the
vine kingdom, and the Cmristian ethic is a description o new ]erusalem, about which the voice o Ghristian hope
the way o 1ife o that kingdom. ca.n speak only in myth and symbol. This, however, is not
Considerable work has been done in recent decades on the aspect o the kingdom which gives rise to the Christian
the meaning o the New Testament phrase "kingdom o ethic. That ethic describes the life o the kingdom, not in
God" or "kingdom o Heaven," and two conclusions may its eventual universal form, but in its already operative,
now be said to have the secure if truistic status of common- though fragmentary, earthly existence.
A central example of a realized eschatological saying o
places.
i. The kingdom of God is not a territorial concept. To ]esus is this: "If it is by the finger of God that 1 cast out
di.aw out more formally the thought which is given in demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you." 2
In what sense was ]esus proclaiming that the Rule of God
Tesus' teaching in images, parables and imperatives, the
kingdom means the acknowledged sovereignty or operative had arrived, and that its power was apparent in his own
rule o God in the lives o created beings endowed with healing acts? Surely the original meaning can be only that
fi-eedom. Wherever in human lie God's will is willingly the kingdom was present on earth in himself. The coming
done, there the divine sovereignty is manifested on earth, :`( of ]esus as the Christ was the coming of the kingdom. In
and there the kingdom o God is properly said to have his life the sovereignty o God was acknowledged unre-
come. The kingdom is the rule o God in the realm of servedly and in his actions God's purpose was directly ful-
freedom which God has created. filling itself on earth. For ]esus' will was to do the will o
2. As is equally well known, there are sayings o Tesus his Father in heaven, and the rule of God accordingly be-
which speak o the kingdom o God as having already come came a. reality in his actions. Wherever he was, there the
kingdom was a concrete fact and there the powers o the
(sayings which give rise to the concepc of realized or in~
augurated eschatology), and sayings in which the kingdom kingdom were at work combatting physical and spiritual
is spoken o as lying still in the future (supporting the disease and drawing men and women into reconcil.iation
contrasting notion of futurist eschatology). As an example with the eternal Source of their being.
of a saying o the latter kind there are the familiar words of It follows that whenever ]esus gains a disciple, the king-
2 Luke ii:20.
the Lord's Prayer, "Thy kingdom come." The sense .in
288 239
FAITH AND WORKS
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
o a new law, a set of requirements Py which his (lisciples
dom gains a citizen. As the i.ule of God was an opei-ative
are enjoined to live.
realityinthelieo]esus,soitisalsopi-esentintheliveso
This appearance of constituting a code of mora| regula--
his disciples to the extent that they are "in Christ" and re-
tions must at once be suspect, for it conflicts marke(lly With
sponsive to that Spirit which is "the spirit o ]esus." The
Rule o God, then, has been inaugurated on earth in the Jesus' attitude to the existing Mosaic Law. His objection to
the Law was not merely that it needed revision in Various
coming o the Cmrist and extends its ffontiers into the lives
o all who ollow him. particulars. It came under a more radical objec:tion to
legalistic morality as such. A system of laws must.t in the
How is ]esus' moral teaching related to the coming of
nature of the case, prescribe a'nd proscribe specic overt
the kingdom?
deeds. But ]esus' critique of the Law arises from .his Per-
]esus' ethic may be described as the ethic o the king-
dom. That is to say, it is a general account o the wa.y o
::3t:i::%:tf:::[tL;n%:mmeis,se:;ee::eddeendstt:eares]tyatbeES:::::
lie of an individual who acknowledges the rule o God in
but by changing people themselves.
this present world. It specifies the mode o behavior of one
This is certainly not because the physical deed Was un-
who knows and seeks to sei-ve the God revealed in Cmrist.
important in Jesus' eyes. It would be truer to say that he
In Tesus' own life God's will was perfectly fulfilled; and in
was concerned neither with motives in the abstract, nor
so ar as men and women become his disciples, entering by
with physical events simply as such, but with their Lmity in
adoption into his relationship with the heavenly Father,
motivated deeds, in which human beings act and r.eact re-
they become citizens o the kingdom wr:ose mores Tesus
sponsibly toward one another in the unseen presnce of
was concerned both to preach and to pra.ctice.
God. ]esus' parable o the widow's mite 4 i||ustraites the
To say tha.t the Christia.n ethic is a de5crPon o a way
sense in which he was and the sense in which he Was not
o lie is to say tha.t it is not to be construed primarily as a
concerned about overt acts as such. The widow in. giving
set o commandments. 0 course any description o a way
her last penny was performing an action which, fr.Om the
o 1ie can be translated into the imperative mood; and in
the main this is what the Catholic tradition has done to poinc of view of its inner character, was the placin:g 0 all
her resources without reservation ac God's disposal andj as
]esus' moral teaching. But Tesus himseH was concerned, a physical event, was the putting of an insignifica:nt Sum
not to impose a preormed pattern upon his disciples, but
into the temple treasury. The rich man who contributed a
rather to indicate to them the kind o 1ife they will 1ive as
much larger amount out of his ample fortune was prform-
they become conscious o God as their Lord and Father.
ing a different action which, in its inner character, iwas the
At this point an apparently contradicting fact must be
withholding of his main resources for himself and Which,
noticed, namely that Jesus' recorded ethical teaching is
as a physical deed, was the donation of a substantial Sum to
generally couched in the language of command. For exam- the temple. Comparing these two actions, ]ess Pro-
ple,"1sayuntoyou,Loveyourenemiesandprayforthose nounced the first to be more acceptable to God tnan the
who persecute you." 3 Being thus in large part a series o
second. In so doing he was neither abstracting deet'd from
imperatives, ]esus' pronouncements have the appearance 4 Mark i2:4i f. = Luke 2i:i f.
3 Matt. 5:44.
241
240
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND WORKS

motive (as though it were intrinsially preferable to give to misconceive the fundamental character of the Christian
small sums than large) nor motive from deed (as though life. Tesus' teaching does not deman.d that we live in a way
the widow's generous impulse would still have evoked his which runs counter to our deepest desires, and which
admiration if it had failed to produce her sacrificial deed), would thus require some extraordinary counterbalancing
but he was comparing total actions, or motivated deeds. inducement. Rather he reveals to us the true nature of the
The only way to change actions, in this total sense of the world in which we are living and indicates in the light of
term, is to change people. Foi- a man's actions are simp]y this the only way in which our deepest desires can be ful-
the reaction of his character upon the world o things and filled. In an important sense then Tesus does noc propose
people in which he finds himself. A radical solution o the any new motive for action. H@does not set up a new end to
problems o morality thus requires a change in people, and be sought, or provide a new impulse to seek an already
not merely a change in some of their deeds. 1 there is familiar end. Instead he offers a new vision, or mode o
change only in individual deeds, assuring their conformity apperception, o the world, such thac to live humanly in
to a specified pattern, the inner springs o action may re- the world as it is thus seen to be is to live the kind o life
main unchanged. The only way to get genuinely and con- which Tesus describes. The various attitudes and policies
sistently good fruit is to have a good tree. "Every sound or living which he sought to replace are expressions o a
tree bears good fruit, but the bad ti-ee bears evil ruit." 5 sense o insecurity that is natural enough i the world
How is anyone induced or empowered to live as a citizen really is, as most people take it to be, an arena of compet-
of the kingdom? To raise this question is to meet again ing interests in which each must safeguard himsel and his
from another angle the cios interdependence o religion own against the rival egoisms o his neighbors. 1 human
and ethics in the understanding of ]esus. life is essentially a form of animal life, and human civiliza-
From a point of view outside that of the biblical faith tion a refined jungle in which self-concern operates more
the question of the motive of the Christian life is a. very subtly but not less surely than by animal tooth and claw,
natural one, since that lie, as depicted in ]esus' teachings, then the quest for invulnerability in its many guises is en-
Voluntarily relinquishes much that is highly valued- tirely rational. To seek security in the form of power over
wealth, power and the approval o one's peers-and aims in others, whether physical, psychological, economic, or po-
general, not at promoting the agent's own interests as these litical, or in the orm o recognition and acclaim, would
are usually identified, but rather at serving his neighbors then be indicated by the character of our environment.
in their various needs. It is in other words a markedly But Tesus rejects these attitudes and objectives as based
other-regarding ethic; and it is generally assumed. that if upon an estimate o the world which is false because it is
people are to be guided by a concern for others as well as atheistic; it assumes that there is no God, or at least none
for themselves they must be provided with a special and such as Tesus knew. ]esus was accordingly far from being
overriding motive in the form o either some proffered re- an idealist, if by this we mean one who sets up ideals and
ward or threatened punishment. recommends us to be guided by them instead o by the
To pose the question of motive in this way, however, is realicies around us. He i.vas a i-ealist, presenting life in
5 Matt. 7: 17. which the neighbor is valued equally with the self, as dic-

242 243
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND WORKS
tated by the character o the universe as it really is. He which constitutes an ultimate background reality influenc-
urged men to live in terms of reality; and his morality ing the belever's reactions to the Various experiences o
differs from the common morality of the world because his his life.
vision o reality differs ffom the common view o the It is an established psychological thesis that the child
world. Whereas the ethic of egoism is ultimately atheiscic, who feels himself to be the object o a dependable love
the ethic o ]esus is radically and consistently theistic. It tends to develop one pattern of reactions to the world,
sets forth the way of life which is appropriate when God, as whilst the child who feels deprived of love tends to develop
]esus depicts him, is known to be real. The pragmatic, and an opposite pattern of reactions. A child's certainty o sur-
in a sense prudential, basis of ]esus' moral teaching is very roundng affection tends to evoke love in himsel, which,
clearly expressed in the parable, with which the Sermon on in its fuller development, is not simply an answering affec-
the Mount closes, o the houses built on sancl and rock. tion directed upon his parents but is a comprehensive atti-
The universe is so constituted that to live in it in the man- tucle toward people in general. To quote the psychiatrist
ner which ]esus has described is to build one's lie upon Erich Fromm, "Love is noc primarily a relationship to a
enduring foundations, whilst to live in the opposite wa.y is specific person; it is an actitude, an orientation of character
to go "againsc the grain" o things and to court ultimate which determines the relatedness of a person to the world
disaster. The same thought occurs in the saying about the as a whole, not toward one `object,' o love." 8
two ways, one o which leads to lie and the other to de- The parents' love has cosmic significance in the small
struction.7 ]esus assumes that as rational beings we want to world of the infant's consciousness. "The child, in these
live in terms o reality, and h is concerned to tell us what decisive first years of his life, has the experience of his
the true structure of realicy is. mother as the fountain of life, as an a]l-enveloping, protec-
The vision of the world, and of God acting Coward us in tive, nourishing power. Mother is food; she is love; she is
and through it, which issues in the Ghristian life, and the wamth; she is earth. To be loved by her means to be alive,
way in which this consequence follows wichout the incer- to be rooted, to be at home." 9 As the child grows this
vention of a special motive, is perhaps best illustrated from love becomes associated with power and authority. Indeed
findings in modern child psychology. Indeed, these find- the parents stand &.72 Zoco cZGa. to their small child; their love
ings provide something more than an illustration; for a means to him that he is in a fundamentally friendly world
child's awareness of his parents' 1ove, ancl his apperception and is dealing with superior powers which accept and
of his world as a sphere in which that love is a basic reality value him and are intent upon his welare. His conviction
influencing his reactions to specific occurrences, is con- to this effect develops, if he is fortunate in his environment
tinuous in psychological character with the conviction o during the early and most formative years, into mental
mature Christian faith as to God's love for his human chil- habits of sympathetic interest in others, of hopefulness and
dren, and the resulting apperception o this world as lying s Erich Fromm, T&G 4t.J of otJ3.mg (New York, ig56), p. 46.
wholly within the sphere o a sovereign purpose o good 9 Erich Fromm, "Values, Psychology and Human Exstence," in
6 Matt. 7:24 ff.
7 Matt. 7:i8-i4. The Dz.czcic/te also uses die figure o the two ways. g==. K.n~o_=`led_ge
York, i959). P. 155.n Human Vahies, -e.d. ALbrham H. Maslo;-'PT=

244
245
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
FAITH AND .WORKS
readiness to trust, of a. positive, appreciative and zestful re- world of Adam and Eve ater their expulsion from the. gai:-
action to his experiences. On the other hand the absence o den, whilst the nursery, and to a grater extent the cradle,
the basic conviction of being loved tends to build habits of
fearfulness, of aggression and aquisitiveness, suspicious and ?nd to a complete extent the womb, is a state o paradisal
innocence.i2
defensive attitudes, a pervading sense o guilt and a nega- The "fallen" nature o man and his world largely deter-
tive and pessimistic outlook upon lie.10 mines the content of Tesus' moral teaching by determining
It is important to note that the child who, in response to the character o the human situations within which the
a consciousness o surrounding love, develops the more rule o God is to be manifested. The Ghristian ethic is pri-
positive traits does not have any mo.G impelling him to marily a frontier ethic, an ehic for the clashing frontier
be outward-looking and outward-giving, in the sense o between the ongoing redemptive purpose o God and the
some end at which he aims and to which these attitudes life o the world which he is redeeming. I shall say more
and ways o behaving are seen as means. He is not seeking a.bout this shortly.
any reward or avoiding any penalty. In another sense o Recent investigations o the nature o belie have em-
"motive," however, we may say that he is motivated by
phasized the close connection, apparently taken or grant-
love, whilst the child who develops the negative disposi- ed in the teachings o Tesus, between believing that such-
tions is motivated by fear-a fearfulness which, like its op- and-such is the case and acting appropriately to such-and-
posite, love, is a genera.l attitude finding different expres- such being the case. We have learned that "belie" is
sions in different circumstances. largely a dispositional word, reerring to tendencies to be-
By analogy, the adult who believes in the love o God have in given circumstances in certain ways or ranges of
tends to maniest the "fruit of the Spirit" which is "love, ways. Formerly it was commonly assumed that believing is
joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gen- a simple mental act, an introspectable operation capable o
tleness, self-control." 1 To enter the kingdom of God is to being observed only by the individual performing it. But
become, in this respect, like a little child. there are strong reasons for holding that to be in a state o
But there are also immense differences between the believing some proposition is, primarily, to possess (or be
child's and the adult's consciousness of and response to the
possessed by) a set.o tendencies, liabilities, or dispositions
love of the Determiner of Destiny in his cosmos. There are to act in ways appropriate to the truth o that proposition
all the differences in complexity that exist between the in situations to which the proposition is seen to be rele-
problems o child and adult life. And, more importantly vant. Further, in so far as such tendencies demand and find
for ethics, the adult is confronted with and tragically en- occasion for expression in overt actions, their existence is a
meshed in the problem of evil. The adult's world is the
public fact, as readily observable by others as by ourselves.
10 For detailed clinical evidence see ]. Bowlby, n{Tcicrnciz CcirG To believe, for example, that fire burns (and to have the
a7id Mc7oZ Hcflzh (World Health Organiza.tion, ig52); more normal human aversion to pain) is to be disposed,
generally see lan Suttie, Thc Orc.g.ms of oe amd HoG (London, amongst other things, to avoid putting one's hand in fire,
1945).
11 Galatans 5:22-23.. :=`=.^..S..=_S`. |Ung.,Mddem Man in Sea,rch of a Soul ("rve:t
Books edition), PP. 96-97..
246
247
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND WORKS `

eating a lighted cigarette end, and so forth. And in gen- or to others that the earth is a glQbe on the average, say,
eral, to believe that such-and-such is the case is, inter alia, once in two years, and had `the proposition consciously
to be liable to behave, in relevant circumstances, on the in mind for only a few seconds on each occasion. And yet if
basis that such-and-such is the case. The criteria which au- at any time since 1 came to believe that the earth is a globe,
thorize a pronouncement that a given individual believes and when 1 was not pondering the matter, someone had
asked, "Does Hick believe that the earth is round or flat?"
P are his actions as-if-P, and in many cases these are as ac-
cessible to others as they are to the agent himself. His Jy- the correct answer would have been "Round." For 1 had
G.tig, even sincerely, that he believes P, is not conclusive; for not come to disbelieve it, or even to harbor doubts about
he may find out in a "moment o truth," when for the first it; and the proof of this is tlat whenever a situation arose
time circumstances require him to act upon his belief, that to which the belief was relevant, I was ready to take my
he does not in fact believe what he supposed that he be- stand confidently on the globular shape of the earth. In
1ieved. "You will know them by their fruits." 13 0ur ac- what then has my stored belie consisted? It has consisted
tions alone reveal infallibly what we believe. To say o in a tendency or disposition to act, in appropriate circum-
someone tha.t he believes P but always behaves on the stances, on the premise that the earth is a globe. Such ac-
assumption that not-P would thereore be a misuse o "be- tions may include, for example, asserting, when asked, that
1ieve. the earth is a globe; assenting when others have pro-
In philosophica.1 1iterature, the kind o believing which pounded this doctrine; drawing and acting upon infer-
has been discussed is propositional belie, or believing ences fi-om the globular shape o our planet; accepting as
ha. But the dispositional arialysis applies equally to be- veridical diagrams o the solar system, globe models o the
1ieving G.n. The general bea.ring o this analysis upon the earth, narratives of travelers who claim to have sailed or
relation between Ghristian belie (both "belie that" and flown round the world, and so forth. The disposition to act
"belie in") and Ghristian behavior will already be appar- on the basis that the earth is a globe is clearly a highly
ent, but before elaborating that connection it may be we]1 complex or flexible disposition, whose possible activating
to establish more fully the account o belie upon which conditions and modes of operation cannot be fully speci-
the argument is to rest. fied in advance. The important poiht is that to be in a
state of believing that such-and-such is the case is to have a
Tohn Locke pointed out long ago that as well as the
"actual" knowledge, which is currently beore an individ- dispositional set or stance to act on the basis that such-and-
ual's mind, everyone has a vast amount o "habitual" or such is the case.
stored knowledge.4 For example, I believe that the. earth To turn now to the bearing of the dispositional account
is a globe, and 1 have believed this ever since 1 was, ap- o belief on Christian ethics, what does it mean to believe
that the God depicted in the sayings and parables of ]esus
proximately, five years old. But 1 have certainly not been
holding this proposition continuously in mind throughout is real? We see what it meant for ]esus himsel by looking
the period during which 1 am correctly said to have be- at his life, which must accordingly be regarded as an essen-
lieved it. On the contrary, I may have remarked to mysel tial part o his revelation o God to the world. For him, to
13 Matt. 7:2o. 14Essay, bk. iv, d. i, sec. 8. know God meant to serve God with his entire being. In-his

248 249
FAITH. AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND WORKS

case the form of the service was determined by his unique it implies for human living. Fi nly when we know what
vocation as the one in whom men should see the divine it is to act on .the basis that God exists do we know what
Son. But as well as fulfilling this vocation, and indeed as a manner of being God is. When the prophets declared in
part of it' Jesus ws concerned to indicate to others what the name o the Lord a broadening range and an increas-
believing in God wou]d mean for them. Perhaps the ing depth of moral demand upon men's lives, they were
greater part of his ministry was devoted to this task; and proclaiming a greater and deeper understanding o God's
the early traditions concerning it constitute the New nature as a mora.l Being. And when Tesus revealed yet fur-
Testament content o the Christian ethic. For example, to ther the all-inclusive requirements of agape in human lie
believe in the heavenly Father is to live without anxiety.15 he was disclosing the ultimateh character o God as sover-
It is to be merciful to others, for the divine governance of eign Agape. It would have been impossible for the proph-
the world is such that "with the judgment you pronounce ets or for Tesus to have brought men to an awareness o
you will be judged, and the measure you give will be the God as their divine Lord without at the same time making
measure you get." 16 It is to turn the other cheek and to clear to them the practical difference which this awareness
go the second mile, not returning evil for evil but being all- makes for the conduct of life.
inclusive in one's love,"so that you may be sons o your Our actions are the product o wo interacting factors-
Father who is in heaven." 7 It is to treat as important our belies about the world, and the aims and desires in
`terms of which we inhabit the world as we believe it to be.
those things which ]esus treated as being spiritual]y
momentous-the opposites o ]ove and hatred, faith and We must now take furthei- account of this second factor,
despair, spiritual vision and blindness-and as unimpor- `considering at the same time an importanc objection
tant those things which he declared to be spiritual]y which might be raised against the view being developed.
indifferent-wealth, place, fame, and power. For those who For it might seem that there is very little scope for differ-
make these la.tter their overriding aim are destined to find ing conceptions of the nature o our environment, but al-
in them no final satisfaction; but on the other hand, most endless scope for variations in men's desires and aims,
``Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteo.usness, so that any change in a man's way of life must result from a
or they shall be satisfied." 18 The extent` to which one be- change in his fundamental objectives. However, I believe
lieves in the God whom ]esus revealed, and in his wise rule th.at in fact the contrary- is the case, and that we are all
over the universe, is the extent to which one lives. on that dominated by the same basic desire, which leads to a vari-
basis. To conduct one's life as though God is real is not ety of types of action because o differing understandings
something additional to believing in God, but is simply of the nature o our environment. The reasons for this be-
that belief in operation. lie can perhaps best be presented through a critique of the
The Christian understanding o God could not be contrary position.
taught, either initially by ]esus or subsequently by the The view which 1 wish to criticize may be expa.nded as
church, without indicating the practical difference which ollows. Given that our environment is such-and-such, we
15 Matt. 6:26. 16Matt. 7:2. 17 Matt. 5:45. will act in terms o it in one way i we are dominated by
is Matt. 5:6. desire x, and in another way i we are dominated by desire

250 251
FAITH AND KNOwljEDGE FAITH AND WORKS

sometimes desire 4 because we already have a desire for X,


y. For example, i I am shipwrecked with a group o com-
and because we see 4 as a constituent of or a means to X.
panions on a desert island and, when exploring by mysel,
discover a hoard o food, I will share my discovery with the For example, a man may seek civic offitce, say that o mayor,
others i I desire or value the common welare more than because of a prior desire for power. Again, as well as seek-
my private welfare, and 1 will keep it to mysel if 1 desire ing to become mayor, he may desire 8, ownership of the
my private welare more than that of the group. The ob- local newspaper, as another expression of the same craving
jective facts of the situa.tion are identical in either case, for power. In such a case the desires for 4 and for 8 both
and 1 proceed in one way or in another according as my minister to the more general desire for X. We may accord-
dominant desire is for this or for that. In either case 1 am ingly speak o higher-1evel cff more general, and lower-
acting in terms o the same estimate o my environment. level or more specific desires. Using this terminology, I
It would seem to follow that the moral character of our suggest that our desires form a hierarchical structure cul-
activity cannot be changed simply by changing our view o minating in a single highest-level desire of which all our
.the world. For whatever be the nature o our environment, other desires are expressions at varying levels o concrete-
or whatever we may believe its nature to be, there is still a ness. This highest-level desire is the desire for happiness..
variety of possible ways of behaving within it, from which To say that the ultimate goal o man's desire is happi-
our dominant aims and desires select a course of action. ness is of course to make no more than a formal or
Whatever the character or the supposed character o the definitional statement which leaves entirely open the ques-
world, it would still be possible to beha.ve in it relatively tion, In whac, specifically, does human happiness con-
selfishly or relatively unselfishly. And so it would appea.r sist? However, the ormal identification o the final objecc
that awareness o environment is the constant .actor, and of human desire is by no means merely trivial. It is the
desire the variable which must be altered i the mode of necessary initial move in an inquiry concerning the values
life of an individual or a group is to undergo any signifi- for which the Greator has designed us. This step was first
cant amendment. taken by an early philosopher whose thought is today re-
What is to be sa.id about this counter thesis? In the first ceiving increasing attention from ethical analysts. Aristotle
place, it is undeniable that we do all harbor a multitude o proposed as the name o the supreme good Gtdc%.mo?t&.c},
different desires. The desire for food when 1 am hungry is usually translated as "happiness." The adjectival form
a different desire from the desire for drink when 1 am means literally "looked after by a good daimon, or god," a
thirsty, and each is different from the desire for the good concepc which is obviously capable o being given concrete
opinion o my fellows or for a ig67 automobile. At this content in a variety of different ways. Thus in answer to
level, at which desires are directed upon specific objects, so the question, "What is the highest of all the goods that ac-
that to be desiring object 4 is not to be desiring object 8, tion can achieve?" Aristotle answers:
our desires are clearly many and various. As far as the name goes, we may almost say that the great
But it is equally evident that our multitudinous desires majority of mankind are agreed about this; for both the multi-
do not all operate on the same level. Some desires are par- tude and persons of refinement speak o it as Happiness, and
ticular expressions o another, more general desire. We conceive "the good life" or "doing well" to be the same thing

252 253
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND WORKS

as "being happy." But what constitutes happiness is a matter is. Our specific desires and more proximate goals are thus
of dispute; and the popular account o it is not the same as determined by our understanding of . the character o our
that given by the philosophers. Ordinary people identify it environment-determined, that is to say, by our judgment
with some obvious and visible good, such as pleasure or wealth as to whether it is so constituted that this or that course o
or honour-some say one thing and some say another, indeed action will lead to happiness. In so far as we believe the
very often the same man says different things at different world to be such that wealth brings happiness, we will seek
times: when he falls sick he thinks health is happiness, when wealth; in so far as we believe that the good esteem o our
he is poor, wealth.10
peers is a source of happiness, we will seek that; and so
For man's supreme good, Aristotle points out, will be that with all our many other specific,desires. Within the plural-
which he seeks for its own sake and not as a means to any- ity of our appetites o course conflicts arise. For example,
thing else. the desire for esteem sometimes operates as a curb upon,
say, the avidity for wealth, by inhibiting us from pursuing
Now happiness above all else appears to be absolutely final wealth in ways which would foreit esteem. Thus our
in this sense, since we always choose it for its own sake and many desires jostle one another, until they fa]l into a more
never as a means to something else; whereas honour, pleasure, or less stable pattern, which reflects our conception of the
intelligence, and excellence in its various forms, we choose
true character o our environment as the locale o our
indeed for their own sakes (since we should be glad to have
search for happiness. An individual's or a group's distinc-
ea.ch of them amiough no extraneous advantage resulted from
tive way o lie thus reveals, not an idiosyncratic conception
it), but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, in die
belie that they will be a means to our securing it. But no one of the human Jtmmtm bom%m, but distinctive convictions
chooses happiness for the sake o honour, pleasure etc., nor as as to what life-procedures are effective as means tQ or are
a means to anything whatever other than itsel.20 elements in the supreme end o happiness.
Often a man achieves the specific goals which he has set
The Christian cannot follow Aristotle in his conception for himself, only to find that they do not provide the hap-
o the concrete character o man's highest happiness,21
piness which he had anticipated from them. This experi-
but he can accept Aristotle's semantic stipulation that ence is impressive evidence for the contention that the
happiness is that which mankind desires above all else. We basic aim which our nature has set for us is happiness, and
all seek happiness as our fina.l goal; and we seek this and that our numerous specific goals are chosen because, too
that specific objective because we believe or assume that its often mistaken]y, we assume the world to be so constituted
attainment will minister to our happiness. that these things will give us the happiness that i.ve seek.
Now the question as to what will and what will. not Aristotle suggests that the happiness o any kind o crea-
make for our happiness is a. question a.bout how the world ture consists in its fulfillment o its own !cZoJ, or the reali-
10 Aristotle, Ni.comocJiccm E/ti.cs, bk. i, ch. 4; trans. by H. Rack- zation of its given potentialities. Everything, according to
liam (London, ig26). Aristotle, is constituted for some end, to achieve which is to
20 rbS.d., bk. 1, dl. 7.
21 For reasons well stated by George..F.-Thomas in Grir.5.a7i
fulfill its nature. For example, the cZoJ o a chrysan-
th-c;n-iriorat pmosophy (*ew or-kt ig55), pp. 4io-4L6. thmum seed is t`he full grown flower; and its happiness, i

25.4 255
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND WORKS

plant lie were endowed with self-consciousness, would provided that such fulfillment turns out to be n harmony
consist in its development into a perfectly formed chrysan- with the determining realities of its total environment. 1
themum. Happiness is thus relative to structure, being the the structure of human nature were undamentally in con-
fulfillment of a thing's nature, whatever that nature and flict with the wider structure o the universe in which our
its fulfillment may be. The happiness o a human being life is set, the fulfillment of the human f czos would not
must accordingly consist in his fulfillment o the potential- constitute man's ultimate well-being or happiness, but on
ities o specifically human nature. the contrary his ultimate ill-being and rustration. 1 the
According to Christianity, the purpose for which human whole nature o things should be either opposed or in-
beings exist, and which defines man's cZoJ, lies in a rela- different to those qualities which constitute man's nature
tionship with God. Men are created for fellowship with in its perfection, then we should conclude that full human
their Maker; the destiny open to them is that o "children happiness is 'an impossibility. 1, for example, the deve]op-
o God" and "ellow heirs with Ghrist." 22 In this connec- ment and exercise o love is one aspect o the perfection o
tion lrenaeus' suggestion of a two-stage creation o man- our nature, and if it shou]d prove that the character o the
kind, linked with his (exegetically dubious) distinction universe is radically inhospitable to love, then to achieve
between the "image" and the "likeness" o God, is an at- man's GZoJ would not be to achieve happiness. Aristotle
tractive speculation which deserves the renewed considera- assumed that the human coJ is capable o being devel-
tion of theologians today.28 Elaborating lrenaeus' hint, oped and maintained in the present world. Christianity,
the "image" o God in man is man's character as personal, claiming that .the universe has been created and is ruled
and God's "likeness" in man would consist in a quality of by the God and Father of our Lord ]esus Ghrist, affirms
personal existence which reflects finitely the divine life it- that the divine purpose for man is destined or final fTui-
sel and constitutes the intended perection o our human tion, and thereby gives assurance that the highest possibili-
nature. Man is already fashioned in God's image, as a cen- ties of man's nature, glimpsed in Ghrist, are his most pre-
ter of responsible personal 1ie; and this first stage o the cious heritage.
creative process provides the raw material for the further If, then, it is a. basic fact o human life that all men seek
and more difficult stage of drawing men, through their happiness, and if men pursue this and that concrete goal
own uncompelled responses, nto that likeness o God because they suppose that these will gain them happiness,
which is seen in Christ. This J.ma.Zc.tdo cZG3., as man's then different ways of life will arise, not from men setting
proper end, constitutes the form o .the highest happiness for themselves different basic goals (or there is only one
of which he is capable. such goal, namely happiness), but from their differing be-
The only addition which should perhaps be made to liefs as to the actual paths which lead to that goal. In other
Ariscotle's definition is an enlargement o its scope. Happi- words, their views of the nature of the world in which they'
ness consists in the fulfillment of a conscious being's nature live will determine the ways in which they live in it. Their
22Rom. 8:17. ethic will be determined by their interpretation o their
23 |renaeus, 4ga#.7is rcrcs3.GJ, bk. iv, chs. 87 and (especially) 88; environment. And in this case a new ethic will arise only
zLnd Proof of the APostolic Preaching, Ch. i2. from a new vision of the world, its fundamental nature
256 257
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND WORKS

and governance. As a- "moral reformer" ]esus employed ously described as inheriting eternal life, entering into lie,
this principle. He set human existence in the transforming` tasting immortality. Why should not the church declare to
light of God's presence, so that seeing their neighbors as the world that the end for which God has created his hu-
ellow children of the heavenly Father, who not only man crea.tures, and toward which he is gradually leading
counts the hairs o their heads but has created the woi-lds them through all the motley experiences o life as we know
and the aeons and guides all things according to his own it, is the fulfillment o the highest possibilities of our na-
good purpose, men should be freed from their fears and so ture in a fellowship stemming from God himself, which
enabl'ed to extend to others the respect and value which fulfillment constitutes the deepest happiness o which our
they automatically accord to themselves. being is capable? '
There may seem to be something incongruous or even All that has been said thus far must now be set in the
-paradokical in the thought that Chriscian ethics is based disturbing light of the central paradox o Christian ethics.
upon a universal search for happiness. Utilitarianism has This paradox reflects the familiar ambiguity of our human
gnerally been rejected by Ghristian moralists as being op- existence-that it is good and yet evil, that Christians are
posed to the biblical faith. And certainly the concrete con- saved and yet sinners, their souls justified and yet wrong,
ception of happiness proposed by ]ohn Stuart Mill, namely their lives set within the community of faith and yet con-
pleasure and the absence of pain, is from a Christian Point stantly reverberating to the dynamics of a fallen world.
Q-view seriously inadequate. A Christian critique o utili- In the New Testament this paradox of good and evil is
tarianism would maintain that its understanding o man's reflected in two distinguishable, though not always separa-
Jtmmtm bomm is relatively .shallow, trivial and impov- ble, .strands in the teaching of ]esus. On the one hand
erished because its perception of the human situation lack there is the repeated call to a serene trust in God as our
the wareness `of a transcendent divin purpose seeking to heavenly Father. The theme of these sayings is t:hat divine
give to men the supreme gift o a blessedness whose full love rules the universe, so that we may inhabit God's earth
glory transcends our imaginations. But this is not the most without anxiety, serene as the lilies of the fields.24 Such
usual Ghristian objection to utilitarianism. The Puritan sayings urge a life lived in the secure convicton that, in
instinct finds uncongenial the view that man is made for the Pauline phrase, "In everything God works for good
happiness. When the fram-ers of the Scottish Shorter Cate- with those who love him." 25 0n the other hand there are
chism asked, "What is -the chie end of man?" and an- sayings of intense moral demand, whose dominant symbol
swered "Man's chie end is to glorify God and enjoy him is not the flowers and birds of Galilee, cared for by the
for ever," they presumably added under their breaths."and open hand of God, but the stark cross on Calvary, raised by
to enjoy nothing else for eer." But their written words are human hatred. "If any man would come after me, let him
accurately Ghristian in heralding an enjoyment as the end deny himsel and take up his cross and follow me." 26 "If
for which God has created man. In the teaching o ]esus any one comes to me and does not hate his own father and
t.he final state of those who enter the kingdom is one o ex- mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, yes,
ultant and blissful happiness, symbolized as a joyous ban- 24Matt. 6:28-3o. 25 Rom. 8:28.
26 Mark 8:34 = Matt. i6:24 = Lk. 9:23.
quet, in which all and sndry rejoice together, and vari-
258 259
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND WORKS

and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple." 27 These all under this rubric. "If any one strikes you on the right
sayings are concerned with the vocation of the citizen o cheek . . . i anyone would sue you . . . if any one
the kingdom to deal as God's agent with the evil o Che forces you .to go one mi|e .... " 20
world. They promise him neither provision for his mate- The same analysis applies to these as to the sayings al-
rial needs nor safety for his person, but rather want:, peise~ ready considered. In the costing struggle against evil, as in
cution and a cross. passing through life's green pastures and beside its still
How are these two themes related to one another? What waters, living in the way which Tesus describes is a natural
is the connection between a serene trust in the God who outcome o seeing .the universe as he depicts it. But now
clothes the lilies of the field and feeds the birds of the a.ir, we must add that to see the wcmld as it really is means to
and faithful obedience to the Lord who calls us to an un- see it not only as the domain of a gracious divine provi-
conditional service, counting the cost and then not looking dence, but also as the scene o the outworking o God's
back? dynamic purpose; and to be aware o this purpose as it em-
The answer would seem to be .suggested by a third braces our own lives, acknowledging at the same time the
group o sayings in which the .two contrasting threads, the divine sovereignty, is to be committed to serve that pur-
golden thread of joy and the purple thread of suffering, are pose. The Christian ethic is the partial specification of this
woven together into a unity; for example, "Blessed are you service; it is an exposition in general terms o the way to
when men revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds forward God's designs for mankind. The content o that
of evil against you falsely on my account. Rejoice and be ethic is de[ermined by the nature o the purpose whose re-
glad, for your reward is grea.t n heaven, for so men perse- quirements it expresses. That purpose, which we see at
cuted the prophets who were before you." 28 The confron- work in Tesus, is redemptive in character, seeking to create
tation and the ultimate negation o evil is so central to good out o evil and out o ethical indifference. The divine
God's purpose for mankind that no final happiness can method, revealed in the life of Tesus, and supremely in his
come to the citizen of the kingdom that is not associated sel-giving death, is that o overcoming evil with good.
with the healed scars o his participation in the warfare of This method is wholly o a piece with ]esus' teachings
light against darkness. The citizen of the kingdom dwells about the frontier situations. It is the strate.gy o nonre-
sometimes within the borders of that kingdom, living in sistance to evil as a physical threat in order to resist it abso-
lutely as a spiritual threat. Jesus resisted the bitter hatred
joyful dependence upon God's providence; but often his
o the scribes and Pharisees, the cynicism of the Roman
place is out on the frontiers o the kingdom, grappling
with evil in the surrounding world. We must now turn to authorities, and the b]ood lust o the mob, by answering
the latter set o teachings, which deal with the relation- hatred with a reusal to hate, and by reacting to moral
ships between the citizens o the kingdom and the citizens blindness with compassion instead of resentment. To resist
o the world. Many o the most distinctive sayings of ]esus spiritual evil means to repudiate it abso]utely, to refuse to
27 Luke i4:26-27 = Matt, 10:37-88. adopt it into onesel. For evil is successully resisted only
28 Matt. 5:ii-i2 = Luke 6:22-23. 20 Matt. 5:39 ff.

26o 261
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FAITH AND WORKS

by -one who does not himsel`be`come evil in his reaction to of God "who through Christ reconciled us to himsel and
it. This is.so far from being easy that the greatest strength ga.ve us the ministry o reconciliation." 3 The Ghristian
o moral evil is its sel-propagating character. ethic is very largely concerned with the principles and pro-
cedures o that ministry.
We ha.ve seen We have examined the fundamental nature of the Ghris-
Good men made evil wrangling with the evil, tian ethic as presented in the teaching of ]esus. It is a des-
Straight minds grown crooked fighting crooked minds.30
cription, with sample illustrations from the circumstances
In order to overcome evil as a spiritual threat, ]esus had of firsc-century Palestine, o the way in which one behaves
to rerain from resisting the same evil as a physical threat. who experiences lie as a continous "dialogue with God."
He had to be willing to die, and had in fact to die, rather Faith inevitably expresses itself in works, because all men
than accept the defeat o adding evil to evil. To have live in the world as they see and expei-ience it; and reli-
evaded or resisted arrest, or to have abandoned his mission gious faith is seeing and experiencing the world as being
in flight, would have meant relinquishing God's redemp- under the ultimate control o sovereign persoml Love.
tive purpose in favor o sel-preservation. 31 || Cor. 5:18.
There is an obvious agreement between ]esus' own be-
havior in the face of human evil and the kind of behavior
described in the frontier situations cited in the Sermon on
the Mount. Turning the other cheek and going the second
mile mean, first, nonresistance to the implied physical
threat, and second, a complete negation of the evil attitude
o the aggressor .by resolutely refusing to adopt the like at-
titude oneself. To go the second mile with the exploiter is
to offer good in return for evil in order i possible to trans-
mute his evil into good.
For an exposition of Christian ethics the chie signifi-
cance of the moral congruence bet:ween ]esus' teaching
conceming the meeting o evil with good, and his manner
of meeting evil in his own life, is not merely that he was
magnificently consistent and lived as he taught. The sig-
nificance is rather that, since in the death o Christ we see
God himsel at work, reconciling the world to himself, the i
Christian ethic is guidance for those who are committed to
the service of that reconciling purpose. Thus Paul speaks
30Edwin Muir, "The Good Town," T7e abyr.m7 (London,
1949).

2_68
262
AGknowledgmertis Index of Names

GRATEFUL acknowledgment is made to the following Dilley, Frank B., i86 n.


Aquinas, St. Thomas, i2 ff 88, 5o
for permission to quote: Longmans, Green sc Co., Inc., for Aristotle, 82, 258-254 Ducasse, G.T., ii
4 Grcm.mar o/ 4JJc7i by ]. H. Newman; Cambridge Uni- Arnobius, 83 n., 54 n. Duff-Forbes, D. R., ig4 n.
Austen, ]ane, i27
versty Press Eor Philosophica,Z Theozogy by F. R. Ter[na.nt Austin, ]. L., 2o6 Emmett, Dorothy, 32
and EJJciyJ .m P/%.Zoso7zy by ]ames Ward; the Student Ayer, A. ]., 2o8
Famer, H. H Vii, i34-135. 156-157
Christian Movement Press and The Macmillan Company Baillie, Donald, 68 ff., 2ig, 230 Flew, Antony, i67-i68, i73 n., i79 nv
Eor New Esso;ys in PJlosoplco,l Theology editcdby A. G. Baillie, ]ohn, 3o n. 194 n.
aifour, A. J., 54 Forsyth, P. T 285 n.
N. Flew and A. Maclntyre; T.. and T. Clark for Fcu.h g.m Barth, Karl, igo Fromm, Erich, 245
God by D. M. Baillie; the Ariscotelian Society and Pro- Bennett, C. A., 56 n.
Blanshard, Brand, 98 Gibson, James, 77 n,
fessor ]ohn Wisdom for "Gods"; the late Dr. F. R. Ten- Gwatkin, G. M., 54
Bowlby, ]., 246 n.
nzLnt or The Natq,Lre of Belief; the Tpworth Press or peT- Bradley, F. H., 69
Bi.owning, Robert, 64 Hare, R. M., i5i, i62-i63
mission to use passages from my article "The Will to Be-
Buber, Martin, 23, i28 Hepburn, R. W., i89 n.
lieve," first published in T72G Lomczom Qtrcrzy, October, Hobbes, Thomas, 75, i6o
ig52; the editor of E7tcotmGr for permission to reprint Gairns, D. S., 45 n. Hodge, A. A., 3o
Calvin, ]ohn, 3o, i36 n. Hugh o St. Victor, i4o-i4i
my article "Belief and Life," which appeared in the Fall, Gargile, ]ames, 34 n. Hume, David, 78, iio-iii, i53 n.
ig59, issue; and the editor o T/?eozogy Todcy for permis- Carnap, Rudolf, i7i n. Huxley, ]ulian, 27
Ghrist, ]esus ie, 28, 89, i39, i89 n.,
sion to reprint my article, "Theology and Verification," i95, 2i6 ff., 237 ff. Irenaeus, i35, i84 n., 256
from the April, ig6o, issue. Gocks, H.F. Lovell, 5
Goleridge, Samuel Taylor, i4i ]ames, Willam, 33, 34 ffv 53. 205
Cook-Wilson, ]ohn, 2oi, 2o3 ]eremiah, i4.2-143
Goplestone, F. C 2i i n. ]o|y, Eugne, 28-24
Grombie,1. M., ig4 n. ]ung, G. .G 247 n.

D'Arcy, M.G., i6-i7, 23 n.i 72i 77. Kant, Immanuel, ii n., 57 ff., ii2
91' 204 Kaufmann, Waltcr, 27
Demos, Raphael, 55 n. Keynes, J. M., i53 n.
Descartes, Ren, 77, 2oi Kierkegaard, Sren, i4o

265
INDEX
Knox, ]ohn, 223 n. Price, H. H., vii, i22

Laird, Tohn, 2o4-2o5 Quinton, Anthony, i83 n.


Leigh, Margaret, 33 n.
Lewis, G. I.j 179 Ramsey, Ian, 2i6 n.
Lockc, Tohn, i7-i8, 22, 77-78, 206. Randall, ]. H., i62 ff.
248 Rhne, ]. 8., i6i n.
Luther, Martin, 29-30, 140 Richards, I.A., 97n.j 98
Richardson, Alan, 55 n.
Robertson, F. W., 64
Index of Subjects `
Martin, G. 8., i6o n.
Robinson, Richard, 27
Matson, Wallace 1., i52 n.
Russell, Bertrand, 2 io-2 i i
Mevrodes, George, ig6 n.
Rylc, Gilbert, 72, i8o
Mill, ]ohn Stuart, 83
Moore, G. E., ig8 n.
Schlick, Moritz, 179
Muir, Edwin, 262
Sclimidt, Paul F., i72 n.
Skinner, John, i42-143
Agnosticism, 2 Wi]liam James, 35 ff.
Napoleon, 84 Smith, George D., is
Assent, 7o ff. Kant, 6i ff.
Newman, ]ohn Hemy, 22, 69 ff. Smith, N. Kemp, 99
Atheism, 2, 144-145 Pascal, 33 ff.
Newton, Isaac, 79 Socrates, i27
Reformed, 29-30
Nielsen, Kai, ig6 ff. Suttie, Ian, 246 n.
Belief as disposition, 247 ff. F. R. Tennant, 46 ff.
Noy, Pierre Lecomte du, i52 n.
Bible, 3-4 Thomist, i2 ff.
Taylor, A. E., 2oo, 2o3-204
BZ2.*, i5i, i62 ff. Tames Ward, 44 ff.
Taylor, Vincent, 23i
Ogden, G. K., 97 n.j 98 as a wager, 33 ff.
Temple, William, 28, 96
0man, John, 7, ii6, i2i-i22, i28 n., Christan ethics, 237 ff. and the will, ii, i4-15, 32 ff., 53.
Tennant, F. R., 33, 44., 45 n.t 47 ff.t
137 n. 1 2 1 ff .
154 n.
Origen, 54 n. Duty, 58 ff. as will to believe, 35 ff.
Tennyson, AlfTed, Lord, 64
Otto, Rudol, ii6 . Falsification, i73 ff.
Thomas, George F., 254 n.
Evil,157-i58, 233 ff., 26i-262 Freedom, cognitive, i27 ff.
Thompson, Samuel M., 32
Existentialism, io5-io6
Pap, Arthur, i53 n. Tolstoy, Leo, 64
Pascal, Blaise, 33 ff., 139j 141 Trethowan, Illtyd, 23 n. God:
Faith: arguments for, 4-5. 57
Paton, H.J., 69,159n. Tyrcll, George, 68
as cognitive, 3-4, i2 ff. Beatific Vision 0. 95
Paul, St., iso
in the evolutionary process, 45-46 definition o, 3
Peirce, Charles, i52 Ward, ]ames, 44 ff.
and ffeedom, i33 ff. zLs deus absconditus, \85
Pieper, ]osef, i2 n. Weigel, Gustavc, 24
and the illative sense, 69 ff. exstence of, i
Pontifex, Mark, 23 n. Wisdom, ]ohn, 8i, i44, i64-165
as knowledge, 2oo ff. as personal, i28 ff.
Popper, Karl R., i74 n. Wittgcnstein, Ludwig, i43
as moral postulation, 6i ff., i5o
and the moral sense, 57 ff., 88-89
Happiness, 59o, 253 ff.
and probability, 85 ff., i5i ff.
il eilsgesclrichte, 27-28
as a propositional attitude, ii ff.,
Holy Spirit, 227-228
26 ff., 9o
and reason, 25 ff.
and religous experience, 95 ff. Interpretaton:
and science, 48 ff., 53 ff. defined, ioi-io2
as trustt 3-4 cthical, iii ff.
and verification, 5off., i65 ff., religious, i i3 ff.
169 ff. sensory, 98 ff., ios ff.
vews of :
D. M. Baillie, 63 ff. ]esus the Ghrist, 2i6 ff., 237 f.

266 267.
INDEX

]esus the Christ (con.) Revelation, 25, 28-2g


death of, 23o ff., 26i ff,
Incamation of, i4o, igo--igi, i98- Scholasticism, 4, i2 ff.
199. 2ig ff. Significance:
teaching of, 224-225, 237 ff. defined, 98
moral, i i i ff., i25
Kngdom o God, 225, 238 ff. natural, ios ff., i24
Knowledge, 2oo ff. object-significance, i oo ff.
religious, io7 ff., ii3 ff.
Mirade, i6o situational, io6 ff.
Situation, definition of, io6
Naturalism, i44-i45, i59 ff., i62 ff. Solipsism, iog-i io

0ld Testament, i42-i43i 193-194i


209, 217 Telepachy, i3o n.

Parapsychology, i6c+i6i Vatican Council 1, i3, 23, 25


Prayer, i6o-i6i Vatican Council 11, 25
Probability, i5i ff.
Verification, i69 ff.
eschatological, i76 ff,, ig3 ff.
Rationalism, 77 ff.
Religion, nature of, i36 ff.
Resurrection of the body, iso ff. Westminster Confession, 3o

268

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