Safety evaluation of a slab and buttress dam

Marius Jonker1, Francisco Lopez2 and John Bosler3

1
Principal Dams Engineer, GHD Pty Ltd, Level 8, 180 Lonsdale Street, Melbourne, 3000, Vic, Australia
2
Senior Dams Engineer, GHD Pty Ltd
3
Principal Dams Engineer, GHD Pty Ltd

This paper describes the safety evaluation and development of remediation options for Clover Dam, a 28 m
high slab and buttress structure situated in the alpine region in northeast Victoria, Australia. The review
was particularly challenging considering the complexity, age and cracked condition of the dam structure,
which required the development of an analysis method for this type of dam.
Completed in 1953, Clover Dam is one of five dams in the Kiewa hydroelectric scheme. The 76 m long dam
comprises a 45.7 m long covered slab and buttress section, supported on each abutment by concrete
gravity sections. The review was undertaken as a result of severe cracking occurring since the early 1970s
and because a detailed design review had not been undertaken since its construction.
Current guidelines for the safety review of existing dams provide little detailed information on slab and
buttress dams. Consequently, a methodology was developed to analyse Clover Dam. This methodology
could also be applied in the review of this type of dam in general, and is currently being used for safety
assessments of three other slab and buttress dams.
This paper focuses mainly on the dam structural assessments undertaken during the safety review. The
structural analyses involved 3-D finite element analyses for thermal, static and earthquake loading.
The outcome of the review was that both the gravity and buttress portions of the dam do not meet current
design standards. The development of practicable remediation options was complicated by the operational
constraints and the restricted access to those areas within the dam where remedial works were required.

Keywords: Slab and buttress dam, 3D finite element analysis, seismic assessment.

Introduction
Clover Dam consists of a 28 m high slab and buttress
structure, supported on each abutment by concrete gravity
structures of the same cross-sectional profile.
The dam was completed in 1953, and cracks were
reportedly first observed in the early 1970s. A formal
programme of routine surveillance of the dam began in
the early 1990s and included five-yearly comprehensive
crack surveys of the whole structure, which indicated that
cracking was continuing to develop.
In 2002 a decision was taken that, in view of the dams by
now severely cracked condition and because no safety
review had been undertaken since its completion, it was
timely to conduct a comprehensive assessment of its
status with respect to current dam safety standards and to
establish the possible causes of the cracking.
A failure modes analysis and full safety review of the dam
were undertaken in accordance with ANCOLD guidelines
(2003). This paper, however, focuses mainly on those
aspects of the safety review that identified major
structural deficiencies in the dam.
At the time of publication a feasibility study of upgrade
options was being undertaken and the paper closes with a
discussion of those options currently under consideration.
Description of the dam and scheme
The Kiewa Scheme
Clover Dam is part of the Kiewa Hydro Electric Scheme,
which was developed between 1939 and the 1960s in the
alpine region of North-East Victoria. The scheme is
situated on the east and west branches of the Kiewa River
and consists of a series of diversion weirs, tunnels,
penstocks, power stations and five dams. Clover Dam is a
vital link in the scheme, incorporating the link to transfer
water from the East Kiewa to the West Kiewa River for
the West Kiewa Power Station
The former State Electricity Commission of Victoria
designed and constructed Clover Dam during the period
1948 to 1953. The dam is currently owned, operated and
maintained by AGL Hydro.
General layout
Clover Dam comprises a slab and buttress structure with
gravity flanks, a bottom outlet pipe for controlled
releases, and an ogee spillway with flashboards.
The non-overflow crest reaches to a height of 28.55 m
above the lowest foundation level. The 76 m long dam
incorporates a central 61 m wide spillway. The buttress
portion of the dam is 45.7 m long, with the remaining
approximately equal lengths on the flanks made up of the
concrete gravity blocks. The spillway includes the full
buttress portion of the dam wall as well as part of the
gravity blocks, as shown in Figure 1.
Access into the slab and buttress section is via an access
shaft inside the gauge house on the left flank and a gallery
through the left flank gravity section.

Dams Securing Water for Our Future 1

 Access shaft 61 m wide spillway
and gallery

Gravity section Gravity section

45.7 m long slab and buttress section

Figure 1. Clover Dam viewed from upstream

Figure 3. Typical slab and buttress detail

Face slabs
Figure 2. View of right bank, spillway and apron The upstream face is composed of a number of inclined
slabs of varying thickness, stacked on top of each other
Buttresses between adjacent buttresses (or a buttress and the inside
The slab and buttress section includes five buttresses edge of a gravity block), with up to six slabs over the
equally spaced at 7.6 m centres, thereby creating six equal height of the dam at the highest point.
spans covered by the face and spillway slabs (see
Figure 1). The buttresses are up to 20 m high and of
constant thickness (0.76 m) above the foundation, which
is 1.22 m thick.
Each buttress (see Figure 3) incorporates two inclined
contraction joints between the foundation and upstream
face, effectively forming three inclined columns within
the buttress, to transfer the water loads to the foundation.
Each buttress face is lightly reinforced (19 mm diameter
bars each way at 305 mm centres). The bars extend
through the horizontal construction joints, but terminate Buttress
on each side of the inclined contraction joints.
Partial lateral support of the buttresses is provided by
mid-height horizontal struts spanning between the
buttresses, as well as between buttresses and the adjacent Figure 4. Face slab / buttress connection
gravity abutments. These struts also serve as a walkway Each panel rests on half the width (0.38 m) of the
through the dam. Access through the buttresses is by supporting buttresses. Crucially, the slabs are not tied to
means of openings in the buttresses at the level of the the buttresses or each other (refer Figure 4), and are kept
struts. in position by their own weight and the hydrostatic

2 IPENZ Proceedings of Technical Groups 33/1 (LD)

pressure, as well as a key along the perimeter of the panel
to provide interlocking with the adjacent panels. Each
panel is also keyed into the upstream face of the
supporting buttresses / gravity block. The vertical and
horizontal expansion joints separating the slabs are sealed
with copper waterstops and bitumen.
Spillway, slabs and apron
The 61 m wide spillway includes the six spans of the
buttress section of the dam, and a gravity section at each
end of about the same length as each span between the
buttresses, as shown in Figure 1.
The nappe-shaped spillway crest has been provided with
flashboards (wooden planks kept in position by steel
pipes) to allow operation of the dam above the full supply
level while retaining the flood capacity.
The spillway slab, similar to the face slab, consists of
individual panels, stacked on top of each other between
adjacent buttresses (or a buttress and the inside edge of a
gravity block), with up to six panels over the height of the
dam at the highest point. These panels are of constant
thickness and shaped to form the spillway crest.
The vertical and horizontal expansion joints separating
the spillway panels are not sealed.
Each panel rests on a 150 mm wide edge of the adjacent
buttresses. The panels are not tied to the buttresses or
each other (refer Figure 5), but are kept in position by an
extension of the buttress between the panels,
incorporating a key to secure the panels to the buttress,
and keys in the upper and bottom edge of the panels.
Unlike the upstream face panels, the spillway panels are
not keyed into the supporting buttresses / gravity block.
Buttress
Figure 5. Spillway slab / buttress connection
The apron consists of a 7.5 m long slab over the full width
of the spillway (see Figure 2). The upstream part is
curved to tie in with the spillway slab, with the sides at
the flanks curved to tie in with the natural rock level.
Current condition of the dam
The condition of the dam is being assessed through
weekly routine inspections and annual intermediate
inspections, in accordance with ANCOLD guidelines
(2003). A comprehensive inspection was conducted in
Dams Securing Water for Our Future
2002 as a basis for the safety review and the failure
modes assessment.
The spillway slab (downstream face) presents only a few
cracks, visible because of efflorescence on the concrete
face, and minor spalling. Longitudinal cracks extend
along the spillway crest, apparently along construction
joints where the crest beams and spillway slabs are
connected. The vertical faces of the training walls and
non-spillway walls at the sides of the spillway are covered
with severe map-pattern cracking, and the concrete
appears in poor condition.
Seepage has been noted on the right flank emanating from
the rock at the downstream end of the apron. Close-up
inspection has revealed a cavity behind the concrete at the
point of seepage.
The downstream face of the non-spillway section presents
some cracks, visible because of efflorescent on the
concrete face, and minor spalling. Longitudinal cracking
has occurred along the downstream face of the spillway
training walls.
Cracks in the order of 5 mm width are present in the shaft
and the gallery (see Figure 6), as well as along the vertical
and horizontal construction joints on the transverse faces
of the gravity blocks on both abutments. These faces are
also extensively covered with map-pattern cracking.
Seepage emanating from the cracks indicates that it is
bypassing the waterstops and that the cracks are
connected to the reservoir. Minor cracking is present
generally on all the internal faces of the face and spillway
slabs. Cracking has also been observed in the walkway
beams between the buttresses.
Figure 6. Cracks in gallery
Horizontal cracks in excess of 5 mm width are present in
the buttresses along the horizontal construction joints
intersecting the openings through the buttresses. These
cracks extend right through the buttresses and along most
of the length. Horizontal differential displacement (the
concrete above the crack appeared to have displacement
in the downstream direction relative to the base) of the
order of 5 mm is notable at the openings through the
buttresses, as shown in Figure 7.
3

Downstream movement
Figure 7. Horizontal displacement at crack in buttress
Assessment of cracking
Mechanisms
Certain observations were found common to similar
components of the dam, i.e.:
The gravity blocks:
Individual, deep cracks up to 2 mm width on the
construction joints, with seepage through these cracks.
Alkali aggregate reaction type surface map-pattern
cracking on all faces.
The buttresses:
Individual, horizontal cracks larger than 2 mm width
(up to 5 mm in places) passing through the structure,
on the construction joint in line with the top of the
opening through the buttress, in all five buttresses.
Alkali aggregate reaction type surface map-pattern
cracking in localised areas on some of the buttress.
The face slab:
Efflorescent deposits at the horizontal joints between
the panels, and seepage through these joints.
Parallel, individual cracks up to 2 mm width.
The spillway slab:
Efflorescent deposits are present on the horizontal
joints between the panels, with some seepage through
the joints, and the joints have opened up to 2 mm
width.
Parallel, individual cracks up to 2 mm width.
It is likely that there are two major mechanisms causing
cracking at Clover Dam, i.e., alkali aggregate reaction and
temperature stress. Though they cannot be separated as
being the only cause of cracking in certain elements of the
dam, they can be identified as the predominant cause.
Investigation of significant buttress cracks
In view of the size and noticeable horizontal differential
displacement of the cracks like the one shown in Figure 4,
it was decided to expose the reinforcing steel at one
location to assess its condition. Investigations revealed:
The intact concrete around the crack was in good
condition with no evidence of fracturing.
The reinforcing steel was in very good condition and
installed in accordance with the available drawings.
4 IPENZ Proceedings of Technical Groups 33/1 (LD)
Only minor rust stains were observed, despite the steel
being exposed in the cracks for some time.
The referenced displacement of the upper part of the
buttress at the horizontal joint was confirmed by a
kink observed in the vertical bars (see Figure 8).
Measured diameters at the kink part of the bars were
slightly less than those in the straight parts, indicating
minor yielding.
Figure 8. Kink in reinforcing steel indicating relative
displacement between concrete above and below joint
Investigation of alkali aggregate reaction
In view of the extensive map-pattern cracking typically
associated with alkali aggregate reaction, as observed on
all the exposed faces of the dam, investigations to
determine the presence of alkali aggregate reaction in the
concrete have been undertaken.
Alkali aggregate reaction is a general term including the
three types of reactions described below.
Alkali - silica reaction
Alkali - silicate/silica reaction
Alkali - carbonate reaction
Factors affecting alkali aggregate reaction
Research to date has found that concrete deterioration
from alkali aggregate reaction is due to the simultaneous
effect of several factors. The eventual manifestation of the
reaction in a particular concrete, that is the rate and extent
to which the reaction proceeds, depends on factors that
can be grouped as material properties, external influences,
and time.
Materials used at Clover Dam
Aggregate used for concrete production was obtained by
crushing gneiss, diorite and pegmatite excavated from
No. 4 Head Race and Tail Race Tunnels. A laboratory test
sheet of the concrete aggregate, dated August 1951,
shows the aggregate classified as gneiss, comprising
mainly quartz (62%), biotite (13.25%) and sillimanite
(11.3%), with other elements such as orthoclase,
plagioclase, muscovite, cordierite and chlorite in smaller
quantities. The rock was also classified as having a
medium-grained texture and faint gneissose structure.
According to Beavis in 1952, none of the minerals was
considered as potentially reactive with high alkali
cements. Quartz-bearing rocks, however, have been found
to be alkali - silicate/silica reactive, including quartzite,
quartz biotite and gneiss, with the most commonly
implicated minerals being the siliceous poly-phased
minerals and crystalline minerals like quartz and feldspar.
Furthermore, gneiss containing strained quartz as an
imperfection, as well as felspar in an altered chemical
state, was found to be reactive as well.
Therefore, based on current knowledge, the gneiss is
considered as likely alkali - silicate/silica reactive and the
necessary precaution should have been taken during
construction to limit the alkali content of the concrete.
Alkali aggregate reaction investigations
Investigations were conducted in 1997 and 1999 on
concrete cores from Clover Dam to determine whether the
cracking in the concrete was caused by alkali aggregate
reaction (Shayan 1997a, 1997b, 1999). The investigation
confirmed that the reaction was present in the concrete,
and that the amount of soluble alkali available in the
concrete appeared adequate for the reaction to continue.
External influences
The individual cracking (as opposed to map-pattern
cracking) is caused by concrete swelling as a result of
alkali aggregate reaction, and concrete failing in tension
due to restraint to expansion. The moisture availability
and high summer temperatures are other external
contributing factors.
Photographs taken at Chambon Dam in France (ICOLD
1991), which was found to be affected by alkali aggregate
reaction, show very similar deep cracks in the
longitudinal direction of the gallery roof.
Time
The literature indicates that cracks induced by alkali-
aggregate reaction may appear after varying lengths of
time. Concrete swelling may be gradual or may occur
suddenly at a later stage, and stop after some time or
continue indefinitely, depending on the type of reaction.
According to Charlwood et al. (1994) the alkali - silica
reaction occurs for about 30 +/-10 years, while the alkali -
silicate/silica reaction is slower and may continue for
greater than 50 years.
It is not known when the cracking started, but a
handwritten inspection report dated 9 February 1979
mentions that the cracking in the access tunnel was
observed in 1972, some 18 years after completion of
construction.
Cracks movement records of the last 12 years (it is not
known when crack monitoring started) show that the
cracks are gradually opening, indicating that the concrete
is still expanding, some 50 years after construction. The
late development of concrete deterioration, and
continuing expansion, suggest that the type of reaction is
alkali - silicate/silica.
Dams Securing Water for Our Future
Assessment of cracking at Clover Dam
In view of the above it was considered that alkali -
silicate/silica reaction is likely the predominant cause of
the cracking in the gravity blocks on both abutments,
including the spillway gravity blocks, as well as the minor
map-pattern cracking observed in one of the buttresses.
The individual horizontal cracks in the buttresses are
likely the cause of thermal stresses, as explained later in
this paper.
Structural assessment of slab and
buttress section
A detailed structural analysis of the slab and buttress
section of Clover Dam under flood, seismic and thermal
loading was undertaken using finite element analysis.
Finite element models
Finite element models were created using solid brick
elements to represent the buttresses, plate elements to
represent the face and spillway slabs, translational masses
to represent structural masses attached to the dam, and
non-translational masses to represent the hydrodynamic
effects. All models also contained massless brick
elements representing the foundation rock.
Since the models were not intended for non-linear
analyses, they do not simulate the actual time-dependent
behaviour of cracks, column joints or horizontal joints.
The expected behaviour of the structure was interpreted
from the exhibited linear response of the models.
Single buttress model
This model, shown in Figure 9, comprised one central
buttress, with half thickness buttresses on either side, to
facilitate modelling of the distribution of the slabs
masses and their inertial contribution. The model was
used for the normal, flood and thermal analyses.
Figure 9. Single buttress model
Figure 10 is a more detailed view of the FE modelling in
the central buttress, with the half buttresses and the slabs
not shown. The buttress comprises, in effect, three
columns, separated by inclined contraction joints.
5

Figure 10. Single buttress model showing columns
and contraction joints
Five-buttress model
Depending on the frequency content of the earthquake
and the variation in effective stiffness between buttresses,
the behaviour of the dam is expected to be variable during
cross-valley seismic excitation, ranging between the
possible limiting cases of all buttresses vibrating in phase
and all buttresses vibrating out of phase.
To effectively model this response it was necessary to
create a second finite element model of the whole dam,
including the five buttresses, the abutment gravity
sections and the face and spillway slabs.
Thermal analysis
The thermal analysis of the dam was undertaken using the
single buttress finite element model. The modelling was
undertaken in two steps.
In step 1 the effect of the column joints was ignored, that
is, full coupling of the elements on either side of the joints
was assumed. This analysis indicated that the principal
stresses along the column joint 2 (refer Figure 10)
immediately beneath the face slab were tensile and would
tend to open the joint. Figure 11 illustrates a typical
output plot for the magnitude and direction of the
principal stresses in the buttress due to temperature
differential, indicating the zone of most likely opening of
the joint. The state of stress shown in Figure 11 also
includes the effect of the gravity and hydrostatic load.
Figure 11. Magnitude and direction of the principal
stresses in the buttress due to temperature differential
6 IPENZ Proceedings of Technical Groups 33/1 (LD)
In Step 2 the opening of column joint 2 was modelled by
creating a crack in the FE model at this location, so as to
obtain a more accurate indication of the magnitude and
distribution of the stresses along the horizontal joints.
Figure 12 illustrates a typical plot of the magnitude and
distribution of vertical tensile stresses, indicating the zone
of most likely opening of the joints.
Figure 12. Magnitude of the vertical tensile stresses
during thermal loading
In general, the resulting cracking pattern from the model
matched the main cracking observed along the horizontal
joint in all buttresses at the level of the access opening.
These cracks extend along the horizontal joint up to
column joint 2 and along the latter to the upstream edge
of the buttress. It also reproduced the cracking observed
along most other horizontal joints in the buttresses at
locations adjacent to the spillway slabs.
The analysis indicated that a differential temperature of
7.5C between the upstream face slabs and the buttresses
would be sufficient to open a segment of the column joint,
and yield the vertical skin reinforcement that runs through
the horizontal joints of the buttresses. Based on available
temperature records both inside the dam and outside (data
logger measurements every 30 minutes), this temperature
differential is often exceeded.
In the thermal FE analysis perfect coupling of the plate
elements in the slabs to the brick elements in the
buttresses was assumed to take account of the frictional
strength capacity available on the contact area between
the slabs and the buttresses, augmented by the existence
of shear keys. The analysis indicated that the development
of thermal loading induced cracking in Clover Dam could
have been prevented or at least alleviated if the original
design had incorporated the use of a bituminous material
layer into the buttress/slab contact, as recommended in
USCOLD (1988).
Flood load analysis
The analysis of the dam for the spillway design flood case
was undertaken using the single buttress finite element
model. The analysis indicated that no tensile stresses were
expected along the column joints. Therefore, the complete
single buttress model was valid.
Figure 13 illustrates a typical plot showing the magnitude
of flexural moments on both the face and spillway slabs
of the dam during the design flood. The demand imposed
on all elements of Clover Dam by the flood loading case
can be safely withstood by the structure, when analysed
assuming the dam remains in an as new condition. model, but with the finite elements nulled (deleted) in the
Further assessment of the dam in its current (cracked) zones where serious damage was expected, was however
condition was held over pending the outcome of the used to assess the post-earthquake static load capacity of
earthquake analyses. the dam.

Figure 14. Maximum principal stresses

Figure 13. Flexural moments on face and spillway (MDE - upstream direction case)
slabs for flood loading

Analysis of seismic load in an upstream-

downstream direction
Spectral analysis MDE in downstream direction
The single buttress FE model was used to analyse the dam
for the maximum design earthquake where the seismic
base acceleration occurs in the downstream direction. The
analysis indicated that no tensile stresses were expected
along the column joints. Therefore, the complete single
buttress model was valid.
Figure 14 illustrates a plot of the magnitude of maximum
compressive and tensile stresses. It was found that the
dam could safely withstand the imposed demand.
Spectral analysis MDE in upstream direction
The single buttress finite element model was also initially Figure 15. Separate column models
used to analyse the dam for seismic loading in the
upstream direction. A preliminary analysis for the
maximum design earthquake indicated that tensile stresses Figure 16 illustrates a plot of the expected maximum
would develop along the column joints. Therefore, when compressive stress in column 3 and vertical stresses on
the base of the structure is accelerated in the upstream the column joint 2 (other column models not shown here).
direction during an earthquake, the inclined column joints
The analyses indicated that the dam could withstand the
would open and the buttresses would not deform
maximum design earthquake in the upstream direction
monolithically.
without collapse. Localised damage, however, is expected
Consequently, three separate finite element column to occur at the buttress/foundation interface and some
models, as shown in Figure 15, were used to assess minor damage could occur at the buttress supports for the
structural response and likely damage. The complete face slabs spanning between the bottoms of the buttresses.

Dams Securing Water for Our Future 7


Figure 16. Maximum principal and vertical stresses
(MDE - downstream direction stream case)
Analysis of seismic load in cross-valley direction
A preliminary run of the five-buttress model subjected to
cross-valley seismic loading established that the shear
demand on the seating between the face slabs and the
buttresses under moderate transverse seismic loading
greatly exceeded the expected frictional resistance to
sliding.
Employing an approach commonly adopted in the
analysis of bridge beams under seismic loading it was
assumed that there was no friction between the face slabs
and the buttresses and that each buttress was able to
deform out of plane without any force or moment restraint
acting on its upstream edge.
Under these assumed boundary conditions the degree of
coupling between buttresses was greatly reduced and it
was found that the maximum demand on any buttress
under cross-valley loading could be predicted using the
single buttress FE model.
The upstream face of the buttress was assumed free and
translational masses accounting for the inertial
contribution of the face slabs were added to the upstream
edge of the buttress. On the downstream edge of the
buttress the spillway slab connection will provide more
restraint to the buttresses than the connection between the
face slabs and the buttresses. The spillway slab was
8 IPENZ Proceedings of Technical Groups 33/1 (LD)
assumed to prevent movement of the downstream edge of
the buttress in the cross-valley direction.
In order to calculate the maximum demand in the buttress
at any time during the earthquake, an envelope of
responses was obtained using two different single buttress
models. The first model accounted for the demand on the
buttress while the simply supported walkway strut was
still in place, creating maximum demand around the
walkway opening in the buttress. The second model
accounted for the demand on the buttress once the strut
had fallen, creating maximum demand on the buttress
membrane at its approximate mid-point between the
walkway opening and the top of the buttress, due to a
larger unbraced distance.
Frequency analyses
The deformed shapes for the fundamental modes of
vibration, with and without the walkway strut, are
illustrated in Figure 17.
Figure 17. Fundamental mode of vibration (cross-
valley) with and without struts
Spectral analyses Cross valley direction
Figure 18 illustrates the expected state and magnitude of
maximum compressive, vertical and horizontal tensile
stresses in the buttress, for the maximum design
earthquake once the walkway strut has fallen.
The performance of the dam under earthquake in the
cross-valley direction was found to be unsatisfactory for
both the OBE and the MDE events. The dam would be
expected to suffer generalised minor damage and
localised severe damage during the OBE. The demand
caused by the MDE event cannot be withstood by the
structure and one or more buttresses would be likely to
collapse, leading to a complete failure of the dam. Even if
collapse did not occur, the damage in the structure for the
MDE would at the least necessitate major repair works.
 Options considered for Clover Dam
General options to address the structural deficiencies
identified at Clover Dam, comprised strengthening,
infilling and replacement. Within each of these options
are a number of sub-options. The practicability of these
options will be significantly affected by access conditions
(or rather lack thereof) into the dam where the remedial
works will be required.
Strengthening
Strengthening alternative 1, a reinforced concrete option,
consists of constructing a diaphragm wall that provides
the required additional strength to resist cross-valley
seismic loading, and a continuous corbel beam along the
upstream and downstream edges of each buttress to
address the thermal expansion problem, with the
supplementary benefit of providing additional seating
distance for the slabs.

Figure 19. Concrete strengthening

Strengthening alternative 2, a carbon-fibre-reinforced
polymer (CFRP) option, consists of the application of
layers of carbon fibre strips at specific locations on the
buttresses, oriented to provide the required additional
strength for both the seismic and thermal loading cases.

Figure 18. Maximum displacement and stresses in the

buttress for the MDE case without struts

Upgrade options
General approach
The objectives of a refurbishment program at Clover Dam
will include addressing existing damage and ageing,
solving identified structural deficiencies and a lack of
capacity for current loading, enhancing the capacity for
future loading conditions, or a combination of these. The
suitability of alternatives would depend not only on the
nature of the identified deficiencies in the dam, but also
on project constraints such as accessibility and the length
of time that the dam would have to be taken out of Figure 20. Carbon fibre strengthening
operation.
A third alternative could be a combination of the above
Alternatives to address stability and strength problems of two alternatives.
buttress dams may include external post-tensioning of the
Infilling
buttresses, increasing the cross section of the buttresses,
providing lock-up of buttress/slab connections and many This option comprises converting the slab and buttress
more. section to a concrete gravity dam. This could be achieved

Dams Securing Water for Our Future 9

by infilling the openings between the buttresses with
conventional mass concrete, or demolishing the entire
section and reconstructing it in either RCC or
conventional mass concrete.
Replacement
This option entails demolishing the entire dam and
building a replacement. In the case of Clover Dam there
were two alternatives, either a new dam at the same
location or at a new site immediately downstream of the
existing dam. The latter was considered the preferable
option, in view of reducing the impact on the operation of
the hydro scheme.
At the time of publication an options study has been
completed and strengthening alternative 2, the carbon-
fibre-reinforced polymer (CFRP) option, was being
evaluated as the preferred option, based on cost, impact
on operation and ease of construction. The gravity
sections and foundation would be stabilised by anchoring
into the foundation.
Application of developed methodology
Since slab and buttress dams are no longer economically
attractive, recent literature only touches superficially on
certain aspects of buttress dams, and very limited research
has been directed to fundamental aspects such as their
earthquake response.
The structural analyses required for the safety review of
Clover Dam led to the development of a methodology for
the assessment of slab and buttress dams (Lopez and
Bosler, 2007), which is currently being applied in the
safety review of Junction Dam (a 270 m long, 33 m high
slab and buttress dam with 19 buttresses), as well as
Rubicon Falls Dam and Royston Dams (both 6 m high
slab and buttress dams with 12 buttresses each).
References
ANCOLD 2003. Guidelines on Dam Safety Management.
Beavis, F.C. 1952. The Geology of Clover Dam. Civil
Branch Group. State Electricity Commission of Victoria.
Beavis, F.C. 1962. The Geology of the Kiewa area.
Proceedings of the Royal Society Victoria.
Charlwood, R.G.; Solymar, Z.V. 1994. A Review of
Alkali Aggregate Reaction in Dams. Dam Engineering
(5)2: 31-62.
ICOLD 1991. Alkali-Aggregate Reaction in Concrete
Dams. ICOLD Bulletin 79.
10
Lopez, F.; Bosler, J. 2007. Methodology for assessment
and refurbishment of slab and buttress dams. Paper to be
presented and published in proceedings of Hydro2007.
Shayan, A. 1997a. Report on the Inspection of Clover and
Junction Dams. ARRB Transport Research. Melbourne.
Shayan, A. 1997b. Investigation of Concrete Cores from
Junction and Clover Dams for the Identification of AAR
in the Concrete. ARRB Transport Research. Melbourne.
Shayan, A. 1999. Further Examination of Concrete Cores
from Junction and Clover Dams for the Characterisation
of AAR-Affected Concrete. ARRB Transport Research.
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