Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Jakov Vico
Terrence Smith
Richard Hunt
Paper No.
10 C3
978-1-4244-5473-0/10/$26.00 2010 IEEE
C3
Fully Utilizing the Intelligent Electronic Device Capability to
Reduce Wiring in Rural Electric Distribution Substations
C3-1
IED communications, IED to IED communications and typically shown in a point-to-point method where one
IED as breaker control) is well documented and has terminal end shows the opposite terminal end device
varying degrees of acceptance within the industry. and terminal designation as shown in Figure 3. A
significant amount of time is spent designing and then
Newer designs, which eliminate wiring, must be
drafting each termination.
evaluated to insure that the solution is reliable, secure,
and cost effective. In evaluating the cost effectiveness
of a solution the true costs of the solution must be
quantifiably measured against the true costs of the
current design. Additionally, several questions must be
considered, included among those questions are: How
and why is this saving cost? Does this solution save
cost in one category, but cause other cost to increase?
Does this solution trade one problem for another and
cause hidden costs? Is the cost savings solution based
on open standards and protocols, which will continue to
be supported at the end of life of the IEDs?
In order to answer the questions above, a thorough
knowledge of the true costs of wired terminations must
be understood. The majority of the costs associated Figure 3: Typical Point-to-Point Wiring Diagram
with wired terminations center around the labor needed
The more time spent with a particular drawing and
to install the termination rather than the material being
the higher the information density on the drawing, the
installed. Based on this cost breakdown, it is easy to
understand that the greatest potential for cost savings on more likely the drawing will have errors. In the design-
build process, the earlier an error is made and the
protection and control projects come from reducing the
longer it persists through the process, the more costly
labor necessary to implement the project. The actual
labor to implement the project centers around three the consequences of and correction for the error. This
causes the designer to insure every precaution is taken
categories: engineering, installation, and
to reduce human error. The quest to reduce error
commissioning.
introduces a check or peer review process, in which an
individual, untainted with the design process to date,
checks the complete design. The checker must review
each point of the elementary diagrams, each termination
on the wiring diagrams, and then verify the correctness
of each letter and line on the drawing. Errors
discovered by the checker, then go back to the designer
and the design goes back through the design, draft, and
Terminal Block. check process. The complete design process is shown
Point on a in Figure 4 below, with the block size representing the
Schematic Diagram
approximate time for each of the steps in the process
with the wiring design occupying the most time. Each
Figure 2: Typical Points on a Schematic Diagram step in the process requires design, drafting, and
During the engineering phase of a traditional checking as shown in the process chart to the right of
protection and control project, each wired termination Figure 4. The design process is further complicated
starts its life as a point on a schematic or elementary because the design, draft, and check process is carried
drawing as shown on Figure 2. Each point on each out by different individuals. As each individual
schematic must in some way communicate to the hands-off his work package, it must go into the next
installing wireman how this point will physically individuals work queue, which slows down the flow of
connect terminations with wires. This is typically done the process.
with wiring diagrams that are developed from the
elementary diagrams. These wiring diagrams must
show how equipment is physically wired internal to a
piece of equipment or panel and must also show all of
the wired interface cables that piece of equipment has
with the outside world. This results in the designer
developing drawings for the equipment that have
hundreds if not thousands of terminations. Wiring is
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Engineer Prepares/Recieves project management, procurement support, and
Work Scope installation support.
Engineer Table 1: Estimate of Engineering Hours for
Single Line Diagram Prepares Breaker Addition Drawings
Elementary
Diagrams Handoffs Extended Extended Extended
Number of Eng. Draft Check Engineer Draft Check
Three Line Diagram Drawing Name Drawings Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours
Drafter Single Line
Creates/ Diagram 1 8 8 4 8 8 4
Modifies Three Line
Diagram 1 8 8 4 8 8 4
Elementary Diagrams Drawing
Has Errors Schematics 6 12 16 4 72 96 24
Error Free
Wiring Diagrams
Each wire identified in the wiring diagrams is
housed in a multi-conductor cable. The wireman must
identify each cable and its route from drawings and
install those cables by pulling them from one
destination to another. At this point, a termination must
be identified from the wiring diagrams, the physical
Cable Schedules
wire located in its multi-conductor cable, and then split
out from the cable that it is housed in, terminated, and
landed on the device. Wires must then be labeled, and
trained into a neat and uniform manner to facilitate
Bill of Materials
future revision or maintenance. The majority of the
wiremans labor is consumed not in actually performing
the termination, but in preparing for the termination by
Engineer Issues reading drawings and locating the correct wire. The
Completed Package
more wires the wireman has to deal with, the more
complex his task and the longer it takes him to
Figure 4: Engineering Process, block size complete each termination. Since such a large portion
representing approximate time for each process of the wiremans time is spent deciphering the
drawings, each eliminated wiring termination simplifies
For a typical high voltage breaker, the engineer the wiremans task and pays an exponential return on
would create up to six schematic diagrams that would reducing the necessary labor to complete the entire
include: Breaker AC/DC motor control, breaker and project. If the wireman has a constant percentage of
IED alarms, breaker trips, breaker close and IED errors, each eliminated termination also reduces the
control, CT connections, and breaker failure. The total number of errors the wireman will make.
typical high voltage breaker would have eight wiring
diagrams associated with it that include: Breaker CT Additionally, each wired termination is a possible
terminations, Breaker mechanism internal wiring, point of failure. The failure point may arise from faulty
breaker mechanism external wiring, and up to five workmanship, incorrectly landing a wire, faulty
sheets of panel wiring to describe the sections of the materials or incorrect design. These possible failures
relay panel located in the control house. For a single may not manifest themselves immediately, but lay
high voltage breaker this equates to as many as fifteen dormant for years. The consequences of these failures
drawings for one breaker. The time necessary to create, have the potential to create nuisance outages or failure
draft and check these drawing can vary widely due to to properly clear a fault. These types of failures cannot
several diverse factors that range from information be tolerated on the electrical system so every precaution
density on the drawing to ability and experience of must be taken to find these points of failures and
personnel creating or modifying the drawings. Typical eliminate them prior to energization of the system. This
estimation numbers are shown in Table 1 below. This necessitates a commissioning process for the wired
estimate shows a total for design hours of five hundred protection and control system. This commissioning
and fifty two hours to create the drawings necessary to process requires that each termination be evaluated to
implement a breaker addition. This estimate would not ensure that is correct and properly performed.
include administrative costs such as scoping the project, Additionally, the protection and control system must be
functionally commissioned to ensure that each
C3-3
component of the system performs it proper functions, projects. Reducing the raceway requirements shortens
and that the system is dependable and secure. The installation time and in retrofit situations where
personnel who perform the commissioning process raceway is limited have the potential to make a project
must be capable of understanding the engineering feasible that otherwise would not be. Reducing the
design, the installation process, and protection and panel space necessary for the protection and control
control principles. This results in a need for a highly design provides the obvious benefit of needing fewer
skilled commissioning workforce resulting in high labor panels, which equates to a smaller control house. Life
rates. Energization of the completed project is usually cycle costs can also be affected by fewer wired
tied to a fixed date. Since the commissioning process terminations. IED replacement is also greatly simplified
occurs at the end of the design/installation process it when fewer wiring terminations are involved.
carries a large risk factor for project completion. Any
The following discussion describes typical
schedule overruns throughout the project effect the start
protection and control wiring practices and how those
of the commissioning process. This causes the
practices can be optimized to reduce the number of
commissioning process to be the most likely to incur
wired terminations in the design. Five case studies will
premium costs associated with overtime. The
be analyzed: a medium voltage switchgear where relay
combination of expensive labor rates and overtime
pushbuttons, internal lockouts, and SCADA
premium cause the commissioning process to have a
communications are used to simplify the trip and close
very high cost. Each wired termination that can be
circuits, a breaker and a half scheme where IED to
eliminated reduces the commissioning time not only
SCADA communications, a control IED, and IED
because there are less terminations to commission, but
pushbuttons are used to optimize the design, a
also because fewer terminations simplifies the design.
transformer alarm circuit where a control IED is used as
A simpler design makes resolution of errors quicker.
an alarm aggregator, and a process bus solution used to
Costs for an average termination can easily be eliminate copper process wiring between the IEDs and
obtained by dividing the number of terminations for a primary substation equipment
project by the total time to design and install, and then
multiplying by the loaded labor rate. This gives a II. MEDIUM VOLTAGE SWITCHGEAR
loaded labor cost. When comparing a solution to
The trip circuit of a typical medium voltage
reduce wiring, this loaded labor cost is used to compare
time and cost savings. The labor cost of a wired switchgear breaker is shown in Figure 5. The IED
termination, however, ignores several intangible associated with this switchgear is underutilized and
there are several areas where the trip circuit can be
benefits associated with reducing wiring and wiring
time. One of the unquantifiable benefits that is ignored simplified by using IED logic and communications.
is the true benefit of freeing the labor to do other The IED actual trips a lockout relay that then trips the
tasks. Electric utilities operate in a business switchgear. There are six lockout relays, a DCS
environment where the limiting factor is the number of (SCADA) contact, and a control switch that trip the
breaker. The control switch and the lockout relays can
qualified, trained humans available to perform work on
the power system. Freeing labor has the obvious be eliminated with the use of IED logic,
benefit of increasing productivity, as the same communications and pushbuttons.
personnel can complete projects faster. In this case,
there is the less obvious benefit of freeing labor from
the mundane and routine tasks of developing wiring
diagrams and terminating wires, to allow humans to do
the things that humans are good at: solving problems.
Beyond the obvious labor costs of reduced wiring
there are other intangible benefits to eliminating wired
terminations in the protection and control design.
These benefits include: reduced installation and
commissioning time, reduced engineering time, reduced
raceway requirements, reduced panel space, and lower
life cycle cost of the project. Reducing the installation
and commissioning time bring the obvious benefit of Figure 5: Switchgear Trip Circuit
reducing the outage time necessary to install and Most IEDs can now be optioned with control
commission the project. Reducing the combined pushbuttons on the IED. These pushbuttons allow the
engineering, installation, and commissioning time elimination of discrete control switches on the relay
reduces the overall project schedule from conception to panel. This saves cost by simple material reduction, as
energization, which is beneficial to fast-track well as eliminating the need to install and wire the
C3-4
switches, and from freeing up panel space. Figure 5 logical trip circuit has been designed to receive GOOSE
shows a trip circuit that can be simplified if IED messages from adjacent IEDs and to latch elements to
pushbutton control is used with internal lockout relays. create logical trip functions.
IEDs can be optioned with non-volatile latches and
mechanically latching output contacts that allow these
lockout relays to be created inside relay logic. Non-
volatile latches provide a permanent logical flag inside
the IED that is safely stored and will not reset upon
reboot of the IED. The non-volatile latch may be used
inside of IED logic such that devices that would
normally trip a lockout relay set the latch. The latch set
operand can then be paralleled with other trip functions
to create a common logical trip bus. Mechanically
latching output contacts are output contacts that are
mechanically bi-stable and controlled by two separate
coils (open and close). Mechanically latching output
contacts retain their state even when the IED is not
powered.
C3-5
This close circuit uses contacts from five lockout DCS control. The DCS output contact can be
relays wired in series with an IED contact that closes incorporated into relay logic and is shown as the second
when the sources on either side of the switchgear meet input element remote open in Figure 7. This further
synchronous conditions. This permissive string of reduces the trip circuit to only one IED contact output.
contacts is then wired to a parallel string of close The original trip circuit had eight parallel contacts and
contacts that actually serve to close the breaker. This has now been reduced to one contact with the use of
close circuit has been recreated with relay logic in communications, IED pushbuttons, and IED logic. This
Figure 9. In this logic diagram, each of the discrete has the benefit of simplifying the control circuit design
contacts that cause close have been replaced with relay and wiring, which can reduce engineering and
operands and or-ed together in the upper left corner installation time. Additionally the physical control
of the diagram. Non-volatile latches are used for each circuit can be identical for all applications. Only the
of the lockout functions and the negative logic of the logic needs to be changing for different applications. If
latch (not) is and-ed with the IED synchronism future revision is necessary, only changes to logic are
operand and the close functions to create the close required, rather than wiring changes. Commissioning
supervision. The logic of Figure 9 replaces the wired the simplified circuit can be optimized, since
contacts of Figure 8 with one output contact. The wired commissioning the IED can be performed through
contacts string requires forty-two wired terminations to bench testing the IED logic and communications. This
build the circuit while the single contact required for reduces the amount of commissioning time required in
Figure 9 requires two terminations. The installation the field after installation.
cost savings are obvious due to the reduced number of
wires, but this configuration also has the ability to C. OPTIMIZATION BENEFITS AND
reduce the engineering labor. The relay logic can be DETRIMENTS
documented by the relay setup software and eliminate
the need to document this information on schematic
The optimizations techniques discussed above have
diagrams as well as wiring diagrams. Most IEDs are
obvious benefits, including reduction in wiring and
capable of being configured with graphical based logic
design time, reduced commissioning time, and
diagrams like Figure 9 and once the relay is configured
repeatability. However, there are some potential
the logic can be printed to serve as the document of
drawbacks to consider. In the case of using IED to IED
record of the configuration.
communications, or IEDs to DCS communications, a
CONTROLPUSHBUTTON2ON
communications infrastructure is necessary. This will
AutoCloseOn(VO7) 20
OR 21 Cont Op2(H2)
require additional equipment to be purchased, designed,
22 AND
RemoteCloseOn(VI2) CloseBRKR(VO2) Operate I on
I off and installed, resulting in additional costs. These costs
Von
Seal-In
ContIp1On(H5a) Voff should be fully understood and recognized as part of the
Latch1
TRIPBUS1OP Set On 86A(VO1) overall protection and control system design. There are
CONTROLPUSHBUTTON3ON Reset Of also several operational considerations that must be
Latch2
addressed when using IED pushbuttons and internal
23
R 86TATrippedOn(RI1) Set On 86TA(VO3) lockout relays. Most operations personnel are
R 86TResetOn(RI4) Reset Of
accustomed to operating with discrete devices. The
Latch3
24
operational procedures associated with these devices
BKRFAIL1TRIPOP Set On 86BF(VO4)
are well understood and accepted. Utilization of IED
PUSHBUTTON4ON Reset Of
logic to accomplish these functions will require
R
Latch4
25
thoroughly training operations personnel in the correct
86TTrippedOn(RI3) Set On 86Tie(VO5)
R 86TResetOn(RI4) Reset Of
use of the functions, and may require rewriting
operational procedures. The effort necessary to train
R 86UTrippedOn(RI5)
Latch5
Set On 86U(VO6)
26 and rewrite must be weighed against the benefits of the
R 86UResetOn(RI6) Reset Of
simplified control circuit. Tying DCS communications
directly to IEDs for status and control simplifies
SYNC1CLSOP
physical wiring design, and also reduces the size and
cost of the RTU or communications gateway. There are
Figure 9: Internal Lockout Relays used to block some potential drawbacks in terms of operations and
close organization issues. Typically the protection and
control design groups and the DCS groups have
B. SWITCHGEAR DCS/SCADA operated independent of one another with different
COMMUNICATIONS procedures and practices. If DCS communications are
used to control the switchgear, any changes to DCS are
The simplified trip circuit of Figure 6 can be now changes to the protection and control design and
further simplified with IED communications to the must be managed as changes to the design. This means
C3-6
that protection and control practices that deal with IED is mounted either inside the switchgear or in close
design review, implementation, and configuration proximity to the switchgear. This scheme allows the
control will now apply to DCS changes, which protective IEDs to pass protection and control outputs
historically has not been the case. The DCS group will to the control IED via communications, which can
have to be organized such that it can accommodate reduce the amount of cable that is routed from the
those changes and the efforts to organize the group control house to the switchgear. A cost benefit is
must be compared with the benefits perceived from the derived from routing less cable due to the obvious cost
changes. of the cable, but also because the cable raceway may be
reduced in size. Additionally, the control IED may be
III. BREAKER / RECLOSER mounted and wired by the breaker manufacture,
meaning that the breaker and controller will arrive to
Before methods of reducing wiring for the breaker the job-site pre-wired and tested, saving the time it
and/or recloser can be analyzed, it is necessary to would normally take to wire and test these function on-
understand what must be wired and how it is typically site.
wired. If the feeder is protected by redundant
protective relaying, the process information necessary
SCADA
for one breaker / recloser would be AC currents,
breaker status, and alarms to the Relays, SCADA and Protective IED
DFR. Process control to the breaker would include Trip
Ethernet Switch
and Close from the Relays, from SCADA, and to the
Control House
DFR (status only). These process inputs can reach a
total of sixty wires for one breaker.
Most process inputs have multiple process Communication Message
passes Switchgear status,
destinations where the information is needed. Consider alarms and control from the
Control House to the
the breaker status contact 52a. This contact needs to Switchgear
pass information to each IED, and SCADA for a total Switchgear
This same method can be applied to the digital inputs Control IED
and digital output of the process information to reduce
the total number of wires. The SCADA master can
read the breaker status and alarms from the IEDs and Figure 10: Control IED used for Breaker Controller
can write control points for trip and close to the IED
using the same communications cables that the IED In a breaker and a half scheme, the control IED,
uses to read analog values from the IED. Utilizing the located at the switchgear, is tasked with control
communications between SCADA and the IED has functions of the breaker as well as passing status and
reduced the number of wires from sixty-two wires per alarm indication from the breaker to the protective IEDs
breaker to forty-eight wires per breaker. Since each or the SCADA Master. A typical breaker will be
wire has a termination on each end, this reduces the required to have control functions of trip control and
close control and will be required to send status for
number of terminations per breaker from one hundred
twenty four to ninety-six. When discrete digital process breaker status, spring alarm, breaker gas alarm,
values are needed by multiple devices, the value of maintenance mode alarm, trip coil monitor, and close
coil monitor. If this is applied to the breaker, additional
wiring those signals once and communicating them to
the rest of the devices increases as the number of wires and wired terminations can be eliminated with the
devices increases. assumption that all discrete inputs and outputs will be
passed to the protective IEDs via communications,
except the trip circuits which will still be hardwired.
A. BREAKER CONTROLLER IED
The total wired reduction using communications for
discrete inputs and outputs to SCADA and the Control
IED to IED communications protection schemes IED has reduced the total number of terminations to be
enable IED controller schemes where one IED or set of performed on-site from one hundred twenty four per
IEDs act as a protective IEDs and a separate IED acts breaker to fifty-two per breaker.
as a controller. The protective IED may be placed in
relay panels inside the control house while the control
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B. IED PUSHBUTTONS temperature trip, low oil level alarm, low oil level trip,
sudden pressure alarm, loss of cooling, and Buckholtz
alarm. If each of these alarms requires two wires, this
Typical control functions that would normally
has the potential to eliminate an eighteen-conductor
control the IED are: reclose enabled/disabled,
cable that would normally be routed from the control
local/remote, breaker maintenance, breaker trip, and
house to the transformer. The control IED could also
breaker close. Each of these control functions have the
be optioned with RTD inputs that could be wired to
ability to reduce two wired terminations at the control
transformer RTDs. Typical temperature inputs that are
switch and two more at either a terminal block for the
measured by SCADA are: winding temperature, oil
trip and close functions or at the IED in the case of the
temperature, and ambient temperature. The SCADA
IED control functions. Table below shows the potential
master poll these temperatures from the IED. The
savings associated with utilizing the control
control IED could also serve as an aggregator to other
pushbuttons of the IED. In Table 2, fourteen wires
transformer IEDs such as on-line dissolved gas
have been eliminated which eliminates twenty-eight
monitors, with alarms or analog inputs wired to the
wired terminations. For the breaker the combination of
control IED rather than running cables back to the
SCADA communications, an IED controller and
control house. Total wired savings by using a control
pushbuttons on the IED have eliminated eighty-six
IED as an alarm aggregator is shown in Table 3. In
wired terminations per breaker.
Table 3, twenty-seven wires can be eliminated causing
The real estate benefit of IED pushbuttons is fifty-four wired terminations to be eliminated.
realized by comparing the number of relays that can be
Table 3: Transformer Process Inputs/Outputs
accommodated onto a relay panel. External discrete
Showing IED Controller
control switches can take as much panel space as the
relay itself. This means that incorporating the control Sets of
switches into the relay allows twice as many relays to Sets of Wires Req.
be accommodated onto the same panel, meaning that Wires Req. at Control
half as many panels are needed and also meaning the to Hardwire House
physical size of the control building must accommodate Process Alarms and with IED
half as many panels. A smaller control building is Process Point Destination Control Controller
cheaper because it lowers cost of material, labor, and Winding High
transportation and creates a smaller footprint on the Temp. Alarm SCADA 2 0
site. Winding High
Table 2: Control Wiring Temp. Trip Alarm SCADA 2 0
Oil Temperature
Wires Req. Alarm SCADA 2 0
Wires Req. with Oil Temperature
to pushbutton Trip Alarm SCADA 2 0
Control Function Hardwire control Low Oil Level
Trip 2 0 Alarm SCADA 2 0
Close 2 0 Low Oil Level
Reclose Enabled 2 0 Trip Alarm SCADA 2 0
Reclose Disabled 2 0 Supped Pressure
Local Mode 2 0 Trip Alarm SCADA 2 0
Buckholtz Trip
Remote Mode 2 0
Alarm SCADA 2 0
Breaker Maintenance 2 0 Loss of Cooiling
Total 14 0 AC SCADA 2 0
Windind Temp.
IV. TRANSFORMER ALARM AGGREGATOR (RTD) SCADA 3 0
Control IEDs are not limited to breaker control. Oil Temperature
They may also be used as alarm and data aggregators (RTD) SCADA 3 0
for primary equipment such as transformers. In this Ambient Temp.
scenario, the IED is placed at the primary equipment (RTD) SCADA 3 0
and communicates messages back to protective IEDs or Total 27 0
the SCADA master. Typically, discrete alarms for a
transformer are: winding high temperature alarm,
winding temperature trip, oil temperature alarm, oil
C3-8
The IED controller scheme also adds benefit in that switches inside the IED can eliminate a large portion of
the controller can be mounted by either the transformer the communications cabling and simplify the routing of
manufacturer or switchgear manufacturer and wired by communication cables. This topology along with the
that manufacturer. This eliminates the construction traditional communication topology is shown in Figure
time necessary for wireman to wire these functions in 11 below. If the IEDs house Ethernet switches, a
the field. Since it can be commissioned at the complete ring topology can be created by simply
manufacturers facility, it eliminates the need to connected each IED to the IED below it in the panel
commission these functions in the field. In essence the and IEDs at the top and bottom of the panels can be
only work required when the controller arrives with the connected to the IEDs in adjacent panels. This
primary equipment is to connect the communications topology reduces the communications cabling because
cables to the controller and functionally test the external Ethernet switches are no longer necessary and
communications. This has the potential to create a the cable routing to these switches is also not necessary.
large labor savings and outage-time savings. As seen in Figure 11 the traditional communications
scheme requires two Ethernet cables to be routed from
The major challenge to implementing the IED
each IED to the Ethernet switches. The length of each
controller scheme is in the utilities interpretation of
of these cables must reach from the IED to the Ethernet
NERC CIP critical cyber asset identification. Currently
switch. The switch module communications still
NERC CIP identifies a critical cyber assets as a device
requires two Ethernet cables per IED, but since the
that communicates via a routable protocol. and as All
cables are routed to switch modules in adjacent IEDs
critical cyber assets must be maintained inside a six-
the cable runs are much shorter.
walled physical security perimeter, which would limit
the IEDs ability to be located at the primary equipment. Traditional Communications Switch Module Communications
This paper has proposed that communication from
control IEDs be carried out via IEC 61850 GOOSE
messaging, which by definition is a layer two protocol
and is non-routable. IED communicating with this
protocol would not be classified as a critical cyber Station Topology Station Topology
C3-9
the reliability of the system. However, these solutions
do not address the large number of copper wires, and
resulting copper terminations, to transmit data across
the switchyard.
The IEC 61850 communications standard provides
the framework for actual, practical process bus
solutions. IEC 61850-9-2 describes the data formats
necessary to send analog sampled values between an
interface device in the substation (known as a merging
unit) and protective relays in the control house.[4]
Functionally, this moves analog-to-digital conversion,
and analog data sampling, from protective relays to the
merging unit. IEC 61850 GOOSE messages can be
transmitted between relays and contact I/O devices in
the switchyard for control and status information.
It is typical to pull 11 multi-conductor copper
cables between the control house and the circuit
breaker. There are 67 copper wiring terminations to Figure 12: Process bus architecture
make, by hand, in the field, once the circuit breaker This allows for a simple, intuitive design, very similar
arrives on site. These same copper wires must be
to todays copper wiring. Also, such as topology is very
terminated in the control house as well. With process
flexible and scalable, is straightforward to install,
bus, it is possible to have the circuit breaker supports zones of protection as the industry understands
manufacturer install Process Interface Units (PIUs)
them, and allows simple isolation of equipment for
during their manufacturing process. A PIU consists of
testing, maintenance, and operational reasons. Similar
merging units to acquire currents and voltages, and to the breaker controller IED discussed previously,
contact inputs and outputs to provide equipment status
process bus installations may be considered a critical
and equipment control. Each PIU is wired to acquire
cyber asset, and may require additional cyber security
signals from 2 sets of CTs, and all necessary status and protection.
control points. The installation process on site then
becomes connecting fiber optic cable to the PIUs. The
VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
only field terminations necessary for the breaker are
then those for DC and AC power. Microprocessor relaying and digital
communications have lowered total installation costs
With process bus, the physical interface for
and operational costs for protection and control
protective relays is always the same: a PIU connected
systems, while increasing the overall reliability.
to a fiber optic cable. The reductions in design and
Multiple functions, including protection, control,
installation time for protection and control systems can
communication, metering, and oscillography have been
therefore be immense. In this specific example, process
converged in to the microprocessor relays. The practical
bus provides a 60% reduction in design, installation,
limit to further convergence has been the physical
and commissioning of the copper wiring across the
limitations of connecting copper wiring to each
switchyard, with some additional equipment cost.
protective relaying. Process bus allows protective relays
The IEC 61850 standard describes data message to be divorced from the physical limitations of copper
formats for transmitting data in the substation, wiring.
including analog sampled values. However, IEC 61850
One future direction that protective relaying can
does not describe architectures for communications
take is that of providing multiple zones of protection
networks. The communications network architecture is
inside of one microprocessor device. Multiple input
an especial challenge for process bus. The architecture
feeder protection and transformer protection relays
should be such that the system is robust, reliable,
already exist. Their practical application with copper
flexible, and scalable. Most importantly, it must be
wiring is limited, due to physical wiring challenges.
intuitive to design, install, and operate. There are
However, with process bus the installation becomes
commercially available process bus solutions available
simple and cost effective, as in Figure 13.
in the marketplace. These systems, to date, have chosen
to use a star (point-to-point) topology, similar to Figure
12.
C3-10
Feeder Protection Relay increasing load, aging facilities, and an aging technical
IED workforce. The solutions recommended here are all
simple suggestions that can increase the productivity of
the technical workforce at little or no cost. For your
specific rural electric distribution system it is important
to look past the tradition of designing protection and
control system, and to look at these solutions from a
business perspective. Do these solutions really require
less time to design and install? What will it take to
5 5 5 5 5 5 implement them? Are they really cost effective? It is, of
2 2 2 2 2 2
course, vital to ensure any solution will maintain or
PIU
increase the reliability of the system. But the goal is to
break system design to the most basic level. Spend your
time designing the protection and control system to
meet specific application requirements, not designing
Figure 13: Multiple feeder protection with process wiring schedules and copper terminations.
bus
REFERENCES:
However, this is only the first step. It is simple to
[1] B. Kasztenny, The Myth of Complexity -
envision a device that provides all zones of protection
Configuration Mechanisms of Modern
and control necessary for a complete distribution
Microprocessor-Based Relays, Presented to the
substation or small transmission substation. Physical
56th Annual Georgia Tech Protective Relay
design then becomes the matter of designing the
Conference, May 1-3, 2002.
process bus system. All control functions are carried
[2] J. Holbach, T. Dufaure, Comparison of IEC
out inside this substation in a box. Design then
61850 GOOSE messages and control wiring
becomes a matter of selecting the right pieces, and
between protection relays, Presented to the 62
configuration.
Annual Georgia Tech Protective Relay conference.
May 21-23, 2008.
VIII. CONCLUSION [3] D60 Line Distance Relay Instruction Manual, GE
Each step in the processes discussed above has sought Publication GEK-113519.
to further reduce wiring to as few locations as possible. [4] IEC International Standard Communication
Since some contacts must be wired, it would be networks and systems in substations - Part 9-2:
impossible to totally eliminate the copper wire for Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM)
process signals from a substation. It does leads to a Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3, IEC
protection and control rule of thumb of: wire a process Reference number IEC/TR 61850-9-2:2004(E),
value once and only once. When this rule is obeyed, IEC, Geneva, Switzerland.
all other locations that need the process value for [5] North American Electric Reliability Corporation,
protection or reporting purposes can receive the Cyber Security - Critical Cyber Asset
information from IED communications. This will Identification, Standard CIP-002-1
speed engineering, construction, and commissioning.
The second rule of thumb is: if a function does not
have to be wired, then dont. In the case of alarm and
status points these rules cause the status and alarm
points to be wired to the IED and passed via
communication to the other devices that need these
process values. The if a function does not have to be
wired, then dont rule leads to the use of pushbuttons
for control, internal lockout relays, and process bus.
Every application described in this paper is
possible today. The solutions recommended here are
non-proprietary, commercially, available, and
technically proven. The important message to take
away from this paper is this: there is no better time to
leverage the power of microprocessor relays and digital
communications than right now. The challenges facing
the rural electric distribution industry are well known:
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