SECTION 110: RECONSTITUTION OF LOST OR DESTROYED ORIGINAL OF TORRENS TITLE authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original

eof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant Petitioner subsequently moved for reconsideration attaching the copy of the original copy
to which the lost or destroyed certificate of title was issued. of the application for registration and notice of initial hearing but the trial court denied still
- allows reconstitution either judicially, in accordance with the special procedure laid down for lack of cogent or justifiable ground to reconsider.
under RA No. 26 an Act providing a Special Procedure for Reconstitution of Torrens
Certificate or Title Lost or Destroyed or administratively in accordance with RA No. 6732 Respondent’s contention:
For liens and encumbrances:
(administrative reconstitution of OCT lost or destroyed through fire, flood and other force -that the petitioner did not present its purported Torrens title to be reconstituted; that the
a) Annotations or memoranda appearing on the owner’s coowner’s mortgagee’s or
majeure). petitioner's claim was doubtful given the magnitude of 4,304,623 square meters as the land
lessee’s duplicate;
-proof required for reconstitution: area involved; and that the UP's ownership of the portion of land covered by petitioner's
b) Registered documents on file in the registry of deeds, or authenticated copies thereof
1) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; claim had long been settled by the Court in a long line of cases.
showing that the originals thereof had been registered; and
2) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to
c) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper
warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; OSG and UP’s contention:
basis for reconstituting the liens or encumbrances affecting the property covered by
3) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an interest -that petitioner had availed itself of the wrong remedies to substitute for its lost appeal;
the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
therein; that the correct recourse for the petitioner was an appeal considering that the two assailed
4) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed; and orders already finally disposed of the case; that the petitioner intended its petition for
NOTA BENE:
5) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the certiorari an d mandamus to reverse the final orders; that the petitioner had no factual and
*reconstitution denotes restoration of the lost title in its original form and condition.
same and those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title. legal bases for reconstitution due to its failure to prove the existence and validity of the
*purpose of reconstitution is to have the title reproduced in exactly the same way it is at
-sources of reconstitution: certificate of title sought to be reconstituted, in addition to the ownership of the land
the time its lost or destruction.
For judicial reconstitution is RA No. 26 Sec 2 (refers to source documents for covered by the petition for reconstitution being already settled in a long line of cases; that
*for judicial reconstitution, the reconstituted certificate of title must be in the name of the
reconstitution for original certificate) and 3 (refers to source documents for the petitioner's claim over the land was derived from the Deed of Assignment executed by
decreed owners as they appeared in the lost or destroyed certificate and no material change
reconstitution for transfer certificate) one Marcelino Tiburcio — the same person whose claim had long been settled and disposed
in the certificate must be made as not authorized under the summary proceedings for
of in Tiburcio v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the Philippines
reconstitution of RA 26. Any change that should be made in the ownership of the property
 Applies to both (Section 2 and 3) which vested title in the UP and that the Deed of Transfer and Conveyance dated November
should be subject in a separate suit.
a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title; 26, 1925 executed by Tiburcio in favor of St. Mary Village Association, Inc. was not a basis
*reconstitution is proper only when it is satisfactorily shown that the title sought to be
b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title; for the judicial reconstitution of title accepted under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 26.
reconstituted is lost or is no longer available and not in cases for the purpose of re-
c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a
registration and be issued a new certificate in lieu of the originally registered certificate in
legal custodian thereof; Petitioner’s contention:
the names of other persons or the certificate is not lost but is in the possession of another
d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant -the lower court acted in grave abuse of discretion; that the LRA report did not substantiate
person.
to which the original certificate of title was issued; the allegation of dismissal of the application for registration of Marcelino Tiburcio on
*RA 26 provides for providing a Special Procedure for Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate
e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds, by which the property, the description of which October 17, 1955, in addition to the veracity of the report being questionable by virtue of
that are missing and not fictitious title or titles which are existing.
is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy its not having been under oath.
*petition for reconstitution shall be filed by the registered owner, his assigns or any other
of said document showing that its original had been registered; and
person having an interest in the property with the RTC of province or cities where the
f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for Issues:
property is found.
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Whether or not the petitioner can apply for judicial reconstitution of title?

SAINT MARY CRUSADE VS RIEL

 Difference: Paragraph d SUPREME COURT:
Parties:
SECTION 2 SECTION 3 NO.
Petitioner: SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of (d) The deed of transfer or other  On the issue of certiorati and mandamus
BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC.,
registration document on file Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is granted only under the conditions defined by
Respondent: HON. TEODORO
or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to in the registry of deeds, containing the the Rules of Court. The conditions are that:
T. RIEL, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
which description of the
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 85, QUEZON
the original certificate of title was issued; property, or an authenticated copy 1. respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
CITY
thereof, showing that functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
its original had been registered, and abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
Facts:
pursuant to which the 2. There is no appeal,or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
The petitioner applied for the judicial reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
lost or destroyed certificate of title was course of law.
1609 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and for the issuance of a new OCT in place
issued
thereof because the original copy has been burnt and lost in the fire that gutted in the
Section 2 differs from Section 3 as follows: Grave abuse of discretion means power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
Quezon City Register of Deeds. The Acting judge herein respondent initially gave due course
a. As to applicability — Section 2 applies to original certificates of title while Section 3 reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross
to the petition but later on dismissed the petition because there is a report from the LRA
applies to transfer certificates of title; as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the
recommending that said petition be dismissed and considering the opposition made by the
b. As to (d) of both sections — While Section 2(d) requires an authenticated copy of the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Republic and UP.
decree of registration or patent, Section 3(d) requires the deed of transfer or other
document in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an In this case, there was no clear showing of such claim.

1|S e c t i o n 1 1 0 ( i n c o m p l e t e ) | | L T D | | M T C D
  On the basis of RA 26 on Judicial Reconstitution
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26, the law on the judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title,
the Regional Trial Court (as the successor of the Court of First Instance) had the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to act on the petition for judicial reconstitution of title. Hence, the RTC
neither lacked nor exceeded its authority in acting on and dismissing the petition. Nor did
respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
considering that the petition for reconstitution involved land already registered in the name
of the UP, as confirmed by the LRA. Instead, it would have been contrary to law had
respondent Judge dealt with and granted the petition for judicial reconstitution of title of
the petitioner.
Furthermore, the petitioner did not present the duplicate or certified copy of OCT No. 1609.
Thereby, it disobeyed Section 2 and Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26, the provisions that
expressly listed the acceptable based for judicial reconstitution of an existing Torrens Title.
Finally, the land covered by the petition for judicial reconstitution related to the same area
that formed the UP campus. The UP's registered ownership of the land comprising its
campus has long been settled under the law. Accordingly, the dismissal of the petition for
judicial reconstitution by respondent Judge only safeguarded the UP's registered
ownership. In so doing, respondent Judge actually heeded the clear warnings to the lower
courts and the Law Profession in general against mounting or abetting any attack against
such ownership.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition.
REPUBLIC VS SANCHEZ
Parties:
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Land
Registration Authority
Respondents: SPOUSES ROBERTO and
MARINA SANCHEZ
Facts:
On 28 May 1996, respondents filed a petition in the trial court to reconstitute the original
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 252708 covering a parcel of land measuring 2,991 square
meters ("Lot 1") contending that TCT No. 252708 was issued in the name of Marina Sanchez
("Marina") by the Register of Deeds, Quezon City; that the original of TCT No. 252708 was
among the documents destroyed by the fire which razed; that they sought for the
reconstitution
Section 3(a) Republic Act No. 26 based on Marina's duplicate title.
The trial court scheduled the case for hearing on August 15, 1996. The notice of hearing
dated 30 May 1996 was published in the 8 and 15 July 1996 issues of the Official Gazette
and posted at the main entrance of the City Hall and the Hall of Justice, Quezon City on 1
July 1996. Petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Management Section,
Surveys Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Office of
the Quezon City Prosecutor, and the Register of Deeds, Quezon City were furnished copies
of the notice of hearing.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition, noting that since the petition is
based on Section 3(a) of RA 26, the trial court should defer acting on the petition until the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) has submitted its Report on the petition as required under
Land Registration Commission (now LRA) Circular No. 35 ("Circular No. 35").
2|S e c t i o n 1 1 0 ( i n c o m p l e t e ) | | L T D | | M T C D
In response to the Solicitor General's Comment, respondents submitted a Report, dated 5
September 1996 signed by Benjamin Bustos ("Bustos"), Chief,
Reconstitution Division, LRA. The First Report, which was endorsed to the trial court in a
letter signed by Salvador L. Oriel.
Since there was no opposition filed, the trial court allowed respondents to present evidence
ex parte like the First Report, Certification from the RD of Quezon City that the original copy
of TCT was among those destroyed by fire in 1988 and certification of the last paid real
estate taxes on the subject land.
Ruling of the Trial Court (I)
-granted the reconstitution which consequently, the RD issued respondents reconstituted
TCT.
However, Oriel submitted to the trial court that the First Report was fake thus
recommending the trial court to set aside the decision it rendered or the grant of
reconstitution.
Thus, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to set aside the October 28, 1996 order
of the Trial Court.
Petitioner’s contention:-
-that considering the Second Report, respondents' petition should be considered as having
been filed under Section 3(f) of RA 26, that is, based on "any other document."; that under
Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26, the notice of a petition for reconstitution of
lost or destroyed titles based on Section 3(f) should not only be published and posted but
also served on, among others, the owners of the adjoining properties otherwise the court
will not acquire jurisdiction.
Subsequently, the heirs of Mario Uy ("Heirs"), whose predecessor-in-interest allegedly
owned Lot No. 12 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 187042, filed an "amicus
curiae" brief disclosing that they have caused the filing of criminal complaints against
respondents for Falsification and Use of Falsified Public Document. Mario Uy and Maria
Corazon Uy-Zalamea, the latter being the alleged owner of Lot No. 13 had earlier sued
respondents in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 227 for quieting of title, nullity
of recovery of possession and damages.
Ruling of the Trial Court (II):
The unscrupulous manner by which the petitioners misled the Court is glaring in two (2)
instances, to wit: 1) the petition unceremoniously omitted the names of the registered
owners of TCT Nos. 187040 and 187042; and 2) the spurious LRA Report submitted by the
petitioners; that the failure to notify the registered owners of TCT
Nos. 187040 and 187042 of the Reconstitution proceeding proved to be a mistake as
required by Section 13 of RA 26.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
-granted respondents' petition, set aside the trial court's 17 July 1998 and 4 January 1999
Resolutions, and reinstated the 28
October 1996 Order and held that notice of the petition should have been served on
adjoining landowners as one of the jurisdictional requirements, since the Authentic LRA
Report of 24 October 1997 found petitioners' title to be a fake title. However a mere LRA
Report cannot declare a certificate of title spurious without the proper court declaring its
nullity and cancellation. A certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can
be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Until
the trial court declares TCT No. 252708 to be void and orders its cancellation, it is still valid.
Respondent’s contention:
-the actual notice requirement in Section 13 does not apply to LRC Case No. Q-96-8296
because that case was based on Marina's duplicate copy of TCT No. 252708. At any rate,
respondents contended that it is the posting and publication of the notice of hearing, not
its actual service, which vests jurisdiction to the trial court.
Issue:
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction?
SUPREME COURT:
NO. The Actual Notice Requirement under Section 13 in Relation to Section 12 of RA 26
Applies in this case. The requirements under Sections 12 and 13 do not apply to all petitions
for judicial reconstitution, but only to those based on any of the sources specified in Section
12, that is, "sources enumerated in Section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f)
of this Act."
In the present case, the source of the Petition for the reconstitution of title was petitioner's
duplicate copies of the two TCTs mentioned in Section 3(a). Clearly, the Petition is governed,
not by Sections 12 and 13, but by Section 10 of RA 26. Nothing in this provision requires that
notices be sent to owners of adjoining lots. Verily, that requirement is found in Section 13,
which does not apply to petitions based on an existing owner's duplicate TCT hearing, (1) a
notice be published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette at the expense of the
petitioner, and (2) such notice be posted at the main entrances of the provincial building
and of the municipal hall where the property is located. The notice shall state the following:
(1) the number of the certificate of title, (2) the name of the registered owner, (3) the names
of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, (4) the location
of the property, and (5) the date on which all persons having an interest in the property,
must appear and file such claims as they may have.
For petitions based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c),
3(d), 3(e) and 3(f), Section 13 adds another requirement: that the notice be mailed to
occupants, owners of adjoining lots, and all other persons who may have an interest in the
property. To repeat, mailing the notice is not required for a petition based on Sections 2(a),
2(b), 3(a), 3(b) and 4(a), as in the present case.
[T]here is no question that in [petitions for] reconstitution involving Sections 12 and 13 of
RA 26], notices to adjoining owners and to the actual occupants of the land are mandatory
and jurisdictional. But in petitions for reconstitution falling under Sections 9 and 10 of RA
26 where, as in the present case, the source is the owner's duplicate copy, notices to
adjoining owners and to actual occupants of the land are not required. When the law is
clear, the mandate of the courts is simply to apply it, not to interpret or to speculate on it.
In sum, RA 26 separates petitions for reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title
into two main groups with two different requirements and procedures. Sources
enumerated in Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and 4(a) of RA 26 are lumped under one group
(Group A); and sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f)
are placed together under another group (Group B). For Group A, the requirements for
judicial reconstitution are set forth in Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of RA 26; while for
Group B, the requirements are in Sections 12 and 13 of the same law. These requirements
and procedure are mandatory. The petition for reconstitution must allege the jurisdictional
facts; the notice of hearing must also be published and posted in particular places and the
same sent to specified persons.
Lastly, Reconstitution proceedings under RA 26 has for their purpose the restoration in the
original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person
to a piece of land. Thus, reconstitution must be granted only upon clear proof that the title
sought to be restored was indeed issued to the petitioner. Strict observance of this rule is
vital to prevent parties from exploiting reconstitution proceedings as a quick but illegal way
to obtain Torrens certificates of titles over parcels of land which turn out to be already
covered by existing titles.
HEIRS OF VENTURANZA VS REPUBLIC
Parties
Petitioners: HEIRS OF GREGORIO AND MARY VENTURANZ
Respondent: AREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
Facts: The title in question — TCT No. 2574 of the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur —
was issued sometime in 1959 in the name of Gregorio Venturanza, married to Mary
Edwards- Venturanza. The memorandum of registration shows that TCT No. 2574 was
derived from TCT No. RT-40 (140), which is a reconstituted title issued to one Florencio Mora
who sold the property therein described to Gregorio Venturanza in 1956 for P107,730. 00.
The same memorandum of registration, however, does not show when the land covered
by TCT No. 2574 was originally registered and the other data were merely noted as (NA).
Gregorio Venturanza and the then Abaca Development Board entered into an agreement
for purchase and sale of the property covered by TCT No. 2574. The final sale, however, did
not materialize. It appears that in the course of the parties' negotiation for the sale of the
property covered by the title in question, the government's negotiation committee assigned
a deputy clerk of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) to verify the true copies of TCT
No. 2574 in the name of Gregorio Venturanza.
Per verification it was found, that Venturanzas' TCT, was derived from TCT No. RT-40 (140)(a
reconstituted title) in the name of one Florencio Mora (Mora) containing a combined area
of 23,944,635 square meters or 2,394 hectares, situated in the municipality of Buhi,
Camarines Sur.
 Venturanzas' TCT, No . 2574 was derived from TCT No. RT-40 in the name of
Mora
 TCT No. RT-40 (140) appears to have been reconstituted from TCT No. 140
(issued to one Sebastian Moll)
 TCT No. 140, was a transfer from Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 3480 issued
to one Casimiro Natividad.
In the report submitted by the LRC deputy clerk, there was a finding that the Venturanzas'
TCT No. 2574, a direct transfer from TCT No. RT-40 (140) which was, in turn, derived from
TCT No. 140, covers only a parcel of land with an area of 451 square meters and not
23,944,635 square meters or 2,394 hectares which practically comprise the entire
Municipality of Buhi.
OSG filed a complaint for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2574 and the
Reversion of the Land Described Therein to the Republic of the Philippines.
1 by name in the application or notice, the same being included in the general description "to
The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to such
exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the National Government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned
3|S e c t i o n 1 1 0 ( i n c o m p l e t e ) | | L T D | | M T C D
RTC: Ordered the annulment and cancellation of the Venturanza’s TCT and the reversion of
the land covered to the mass of the public domain.
REASON OF RTC: the reconstituted title issued in the name of Florencio Mora could have
been fraudulently secured, hence, does not legally exist. And since the reconstituted title
issued to Florencio Mora is a nullity, then the order for its reconstitution did not attain
finality and therefore may be attacked anytime.
CA: Affirmed the decision of RTC
Issues:
(1) W/N CA erred in affirming the decision for annulment despite the indefeasibility of
Mora’s title after the lapse of one year from the decision granting the reconstitution of the
title.
(2) W/N the reconstitution proceeding (granting the petition for reconstitution in favor of
Mora) barred the petition for cancellation of TCT by virtue of the principle of res judicata.
(3) W/N the Venturanzas were buyers in good faith and is protected by law.
Ruling (1) ISSUE ON INDEFEASIBILTY Venturanza’s cited 2nd paragraph of Sec 311 of PD 1529
on indefeasibility and that Mora’s reconstituted title have already attained finality 1 yr. after
the CA granted the reconstitution.
SC: They are wrong. Clearly, the provisions relied upon refer to original decrees of
registration and not to orders of reconstitution. As it is, the Venturanzas cannot even seek
refuge in the Land Registration Act because the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never
been brought within the operation of said law due to irregularities attending the issuance
of the reconstituted title.
 It appears from the survey plan that the land was surveyed only in 11 days,
which was quite impossible considering the rugged terrain and the
mountainous features of the area
 Area supposedly covered by TCT 2574 is within the timberland
 That Mr. Florencio Mora had never applied for original registration of title
covering a land in the municipality of Buhi, Camarines Sur
 Lots 1 and 2 was the subject of Land Registration Case with Maximina Zepeda
as applicant
 Land practically covers the Municipality of Buhi; The Venturanzas never
materially and physically occupied the property because there are actual
occupants and possessors
SC also noted the fact pointed out by the RTC: The records of the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Sur do not show how the land covered by TCT No. 140 supposedly in the name
of Florencio Mora was registered. Neither is there a decree number, when said decree was
entered, the OCT number or LRC Record Number
(2) ISSUE ON RES JUDICATA2
The judgment in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R did not operate as res judicata which would bar the
Republic's action because there was no identity of cause of action between CA-G.R. No.
20681-R and the instant case.
all whom it may concern
2 The following are the requisites of res judicata: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2)
the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a
The issue in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R was whether or not Mora's evidence in Special
Proceedings No. 674 and the procedures adopted by him for the reconstitution of
Certificate of title alleged to have been lost or destroyed were in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 26.
It was not on the question of ownership or on w/n the portion was registrable being a
timberland. Neither was it on the non-existence of the original title from which Mora's TCT
No. RT-40 (140) and petitioners' TCT No. 2574 were derived.
(3) ISSUE ON BEING A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH
Assertion such is without basis considering that Mora's reconstituted TCT No. RT-40 (140),
from where petitioners' TCT No. 2574 was derived, is void. The only way by which Mora
could have acquired ownership over the subject parcels of land and validly transfer that
ownership to the petitioners was for Mora to apply for their registration in his own name.
The land was also part timberland which was not disputed by the Venturanzas. It is, thus,
safe to conclude that the land subject of TCT No. 2574 could not have been registered in
the name of petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest for the simple reason that under
the Constitution, timberlands, which are part of the public domain, cannot be alienated.
A certificate of title covering inalienable lands of the public domain is void and can be
cancelled in whosever hand said title may be found, even if it is found in the hands of an
alleged innocent purchaser for value. Petition is DENIED
REPUBLIC VS CATTAROJA
Parties
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: APOLINARIO CATARROJA, REYNALDO CATARROJA, and ROSITA
CATARROJADISTRITO,
Facts:
Respondents filed a petition for reconstitution of lost original certificate of title covering
two lots in Zapang, Ternate, Cavite, one with an area of 269,695 square meters and the
other with an area of 546,239 square meters. They alleged that they inherited these lands
from their parents, Fermin and Sancha Catarroja, who reportedly applied for their
registration with the Court of First Instance of Cavite sometime before the last world war.
The Land Registration Authority (LRA) issued a certification and a report confirming that the
land registration court issued
Decree 749932 on May 21, 1941 covering the subject lots. A copy of this decree was,
however, no longer available in the records of the LRA. The LRA report verified as correct
the plans and technical descriptions of the subject lots which had been approved.
Respondent’s contention: pursuant to the decree, the Register of Deeds of
judgment on the merits; and (4) there is — between the first and the second actions — an
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
Cavite issued an original certificate of title to their parents but was lost due to fire that
gutted the old Cavite capitol building on June 7, 1959 and that he owner's duplicate copy of
the title had been lost while with their parents.
Ruling of the Trial Court:
Granted the respondents.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
Reversed the decision of the RTC ad held that the evidence of the Catarrojas failed to
establish any of the sources for reconstitution enumerated in Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.)
26 (An act providing a special procedure for reconstitution of Torrens certificate of title lost
or destroyed) and that respondents did not have proof that an original certificate of title
had in fact been issued covering the subject lots.
Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to grant the petition for reconstitution of title?
SUPREME COURT:
NO. R.A. 26 governs the reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens certificates of title. Its
Section 2 enumerates the following sources for the reconstitution of such titles.
In this case, respodents have been unable to present any of the documents mentioned in
paragraphs (a) to (e). Their parents allegedly lost the owner's duplicate certificate of title.
They did not have a certified copy of such certificate of title or a co-owner's, a mortgagee's,
or a lessee's duplicate of the same. The LRA itself no longer has a copy of the original decree
or an authenticated copy of it. Likewise, the
Register of Deeds did not have any document of encumbrance on file that shows the
description of the property. The only documentary evidence the Catarrojas could produce
as possible sources for the reconstitution of the lost title are those other documents
described in paragraph (f).
The principle of ejusdem generis has been applied in interpreting Section 2 (f) of R.A. 26.
"Any other document" refers to reliable documents of the kind described in the preceding
enumerations. The documents must come from official sources which recognize the
ownership of the owner and his predecessors-in-interest.
None of the documents presented in this case fit such description. The court is not
convinced that the documents presented by respondent fall under any other document and
respondents did not exert effort to look for and avail other sources in paragraph a-e before
availing f.
Furthermore, what needs to be shown before the issuance of an order for reconstitution:
(a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented
by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed
certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an
interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
The microfilm printouts of the Offcial Gazette are not proof that a certificate of title was in
fact issued in the name of the Catarrojas' parents. The publication in the
Official Gazette only proved that the couple took the initial step of publishing their claim to
the property. There was no showing, however, that the application had been granted and
that a certificate of title was issued to them. Although the LRA's certificate and its report
4|S e c t i o n 1 1 0 ( i n c o m p l e t e ) | | L T D | | M T C D
cofirmed the issuance of a decree, these documents do not sufficiently prove that a title
had in fact been issued to the parents of the Catarrojas pursuant to such decree
ESTOPPEL IN ACTION FOR CANCELLATION OF TITLE
BARSTOWE PHILS VS REPUBLIC
BARSTOWE PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, versus
REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, Respondent
FACTS
This case involves the conflicting titles to the same parcels of land (subject lots) of petitioner
Barstowe Philippines Corporation (BPC) and the respondent Republic of the Philippines
(Republic). Due to the fire that gutted the Office of the Quezon City Register of Deeds on 11
June 1988 and destroyed many certificates of title kept therein, Antonio sought the
administrative reconstitution of the original copies and owner’s duplicate copies of 2 TCTs.
The Republic applied for administrative reconstitution of the same with the LRA. It was then
that the Republic came to know that another party had applied for reconstitution which
also covered the same lots. The RTC rendered judgment declaring both BPC and Republic as
buyers in good faith. But it upheld BPC’s rights over the republic since it was registered
earlier. The Ca ruled for the Republic.
ISSUE
Who between BPC and the Republic has a better title over the subject lots?
HELD
Ultimately, this Court is called upon to determine which party now has superior title to the
subject lots: the Republic, BPC, the intervenors Abesamis, Nicolas-Agbulos, and spouses
Santiago, or Servando’s heirs?
BPC, the intervenors Abesamis, Nicolas-Agbulos, spouses Santiago, and Servando’s heirs
derived their title to the subject lots from Servando’s TCTs No. 200629 and 200630. This
Court then is compelled to look into the validity, authenticity, and existence of these two
TCTs.
However, there is an absolute dearth of information and proof as to how Servando acquired
ownership and came into possession of the subject lots.
Relying on the findings of the LRA, it was established that TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were
forged and spurious, their reconstitution was also attended with grave irregularities. BPC
was unable to attack the authenticity and validity of the titles of the Republic to the subject
lots, and could only interpose the defense that it was a buyer in good faith. It points out
that it purchased the subject lots from Servando and registered the same , way before the
titles of Servando were declared null by the RTC. Under Section 55 of the Land Registration
Act, as amended by Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, an original owner of
registered land may seek the annulment of a transfer thereof on the ground of fraud.
However, such a remedy is without prejudice to the rights of any innocent holder for value
with a certificate of title.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and pays a full and
fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.
It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when
an innocent purchaser for value intervenes. A deed of sale executed by an impostor without
the authority of the owner of the land sold is a nullity, and registration will not validate what
otherwise is an invalid document. However, where the certificate of title was already
transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger and, while it remained that way,
the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, the vendee had the right to rely
upon what appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion,
was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor
appearing on the face of said certificate.
Now the question is whether BPC qualifies as an innocent purchaser for value which
acquired valid titles to the subject lots, despite the fact that the titles of its predecessor-in-
interest were found to be forged and spurious.
This Court finds in the negative.
BPC cannot really claim that it was a purchaser in good faith which relied upon the face of
Servando’s titles. It should be recalled that the Quezon City Register of Deeds caught fire on
11 June 1988. Presumably, the original copies of TCTs were burnt in the said fire. Servando’s
heirs sought the administrative reconstitution of the TCTs. If BPC bought the subject lots
after TCTs were destroyed when the Quezon City Register of Deeds burned down, but
before the said certificates were reconstituted, then on the face of what titles did BPC rely
on before deciding to proceed with the purchase of the subject lots? There was no showing
that there were surviving owner’s duplicate copies of TCTs.
Without the original copies and owner’s duplicate copies of TCTs, BPC had to rely on the
reconstituted certificates. Under section 7 of Republic Act No. 26,57 "Reconstituted titles
shall have the same validity and legal effect as the originals thereof" unless the
reconstitution was made extrajudicially.58 In this case, TCTs were reconstituted
administratively, hence, extrajudicially. In contrast to the judicial reconstitution of a lost
certificate of title which is in rem, the administrative reconstitution is essentially ex-parte
and without notice.59 The reconstituted certificates of title do not share the same
indefeasible character of the original certificates of title for the following reason –
x x x The nature of a reconstituted Transfer Certificate Of Title of registered land is similar
to that of a second Owner's Duplicate Transfer Certificate Of Title. Both are issued, after the
proper proceedings, on the representation of the registered owner that the original of the
said TCT or the original of the Owner's Duplicate TCT, respectively, was lost and could not
be located or found despite diligent efforts exerted for that purpose. Both, therefore, are
subsequent copies of the originals thereof. A cursory examination of these subsequent
copies would show that they are not the originals. Anyone dealing with such copies are put
on notice of such fact and thus warned to be extra-careful. x x x.
The fact that the TCTs were reconstituted should have alerted BPC and its officers to
conduct an inquiry or investigation as might be necessary to acquaint themselves with the
defects in the titles of Servando. This Court cannot declare BPC an innocent purchaser for
value, and it acquired no better titles to the subject lots than its predecessors-in-interest,
Servando and Antonio.
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its
officials or agents. However, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions, viz:
"Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare
and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat
the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with
circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of
justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a
shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be
invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals."
xxxx
Significantly, the other private respondents – Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, Dela
Fuente and Madaya – bought such "expanded" lots in good faith, relying on the clean
certificates of St. Jude, which had no notice of any flaw in them either. It is only fair and
reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government
to avoid an injustice to the innocent purchasers for value.
REPUBLIC VS CA
Parties:
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the Acting Commissioner of
Land Registration)
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses CATALINO SANTOS and THELMA BARRERO
SANTOS, ST. JUDE'S ENTERPRISES, INC., Spouses DOMINGO CALAGUIAN and FELICIDAD
CALAGUIAN, VIRGINIA DELA FUENTE ALAGUIAN and FELICIDAD CALAGUIAN, VIRGINIA DELA
FUENTE and LUCY MADAYA
Facts:
Defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. is the registered owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot 865-B-1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-52368, containing an area of 40,623
square meters. It was issued TCT No. 22660 on July 25, 1966.
Sometime in March 1966 defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. subdivided Lot
No. 865-B-1 under subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 and as a result thereof the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City cancelled TCT No. 22660 and in lieu thereof issued Certificates of
Title Nos. 23967 up to 24068 inclusive, all in the name of defendant St. Jude's Enterprises,
Inc. The subdivision of lot 865-B-1 [which was] covered [by] TCT No. 22660 was later found
to have expanded and enlarged from its original area of 40,523 square meters to 42,044
square meters or an increase of 1,421 square meters. This expansion or increase in area was
confirmed by the Land Registration Commission [to have been made] on the northern
portion of Lot 865-B-1.
Subsequently, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. sold the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 24013 and 24014 to defendant Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto Santos[;]
TCT No. 24019 to defendant Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad de Jesus[;] TCT No. 24022
to defendant Virginia dela Fuente[;] and TCT No. 2402[3] to defendant Lucy Madaya.
Accordingly, these titles were cancelled and said defendants were issued new TCTs.
Petitioner’s Side:
On January 29, 1985, then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed] an action
seeking . . . the annulment and cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 24015,
24017, 24018, 24020, 24021, 24024, 24025 and 24068 issued in the name of defendants,
principally on the ground that said Certificates of Title were issued on the strength of [a] null
and void subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 which expanded the original area of TCT No.
22660 in the name of St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. from 40,623 square meters to 42,044 square
meters upon its subdivision.
Respondents’ Side:
Lot Owners’ defense: they have acquired the lots in question in good faith from
their former owner, defendant St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. and for value and that the titles
issued to the said defendants were rendered incontrovertible, conclusive and indefeasible
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after one year from the date of the issuance of the titles by the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City.
On the other hand, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. interposed defenses,
among others, that the cause of action of plaintiff is barred by prior judgment; that the
subdivision plan submitted having been approved by the LRC, the government is now in
estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan; and the plaintiff's allegation that the
area of the subdivision increased by 1,421 square meters is without any basis in fact and in
law.
Trial Court:
On April 30, 1991, the trial court dismissed the Complaint. While the plaintiff
sufficiently proved the enlargement or expansion of the area of the disputed property, it
presented no proof that Respondent St. Jude Enterprises, Inc. ("St. Jude") had committed
fraud when it submitted the subdivision plan to the Land Registration Commission (LRC) for
approval. Because the plan was presumed to have been subjected to investigation, study
and verification by the LRC, there was no one to blame for the increase in the area "but the
plaintiff for having allowed and approved the subdivision plan." Thus, the court concluded,
the government was already "in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan.”
Finding that Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, Dela Fuente and Madaya had
bought their respective lots from St. Jude for value and in good faith, the court held that
their titles could no longer be questioned, because under the Torrens system, such titles
had become absolute and irrevocable.
". . . [S]ustaining the position taken by the government would certainly lead to
disastrous consequences. Buyers in good faith would lose their titles. Adjoining owners who
were deprived of a portion of their lot would be forced to accept the portion of the property
allegedly encroached upon. Actions for recovery will be filed right and left[;] thus instead of
preserving the integrity of the Torrens System it would certainly cause chaos rather than
stability. Finally, if only to strengthen the Torrens System and in the interest of justice, the
boundaries of the affected properties of the defendants should not be disturbed and the
status quo should be maintained."
Court of Appeals:
Citing several cases upholding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the
Torrens system, the appellate court affirmed the trial court. It berated petitioner for
bringing the suit only after nineteen (19) years had passed since the issuance of St. Jude's
title and the approval of the subdivision plan.
Hence, the present review.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the government is estopped from questioning the approved
subdivision plan which expanded the areas covered by the transfer certificates
of title in question.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that
petitioner's complaint before the lower court was filed to preserve the integrity
of the Torrens System.
Held:
1. Yes, the government is estopped from questioning the approved subdivision
plan.
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors
of its officials or agents. However, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions,
viz.: “Estoppel against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in
rare and unusual circumstances and may not be invoked where they would operate to
defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be
applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the
interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to
deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a
shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be
invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals.”
The Court further declared that "(t)he real office of the equitable norm of estoppel is
limited to supply[ing] deficiency in the law, but it should not supplant positive law."
In the case at bar, for nearly twenty years (starting from the issuance of St. Jude's
titles in 1966 up to the filing of the Complaint in 1985), petitioner failed to correct and
recover the alleged increase in the land area of St. Jude. Its prolonged inaction strongly
militates against its cause, as it is tantamount to laches, which means "the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising
due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The Court notes private respondents' argument that, prior to the subdivision, the
surveyors erred in the original survey of the whole tract of land covered by TCT No. 22660,
so that less than the actual land area was indicated on the title. Otherwise, the adjoining
owners would have complained upon the partition of the land in accordance with the LRC
approved subdivision plan. As it is, Florencio Quintos, the owner of the 9,146 square-meter
Quintos Village adjoining the northern portion of St. Jude's property (the portion allegedly
"expanded"), even attested on August 16, 1973 that "there [was] no overlapping of
boundaries as per my approved plan (LRC) PSD 147766 dated September 8, 1971." None of
the other neighboring owners ever complained against St. Jude or the purchasers of its
property. It is clear, therefore, that there was no actual damage to third persons caused by
the resurvey and the subdivision.
Significantly, the other private respondents — Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian,
Dela Fuente and Madaya — bought such "expanded" lots in good faith, relying on the clean
certificates of St. Jude, which had no notice of any flaw in them either. It is only fair and
reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government
to avoid an injustice the innocent purchasers for value.
2. No, the Court of Appeals cannot adhere to the petitioner's submission that, in
filing this suit, it seeks to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system. To the
contrary, it is rather evident that petitioner's action derogates the very integrity
of the system.
True, the Torrens system is not a means of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a
system of r e g is t r a tio n of titles to lands. Consequently, land erroneously included in a
Torrens certificate of title is not necessarily acquired by the holder of such certificate.
Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on
the correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot
disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. Such cancellation would
impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property
registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the
title has been regularly issued or not. This would be contrary to the very purpose of the law,
which is to stabilize land titles. Verily, all persons dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law or the courts
do not oblige them to go behind the certificate in order to investigate again the true
condition of the property. They are only charged with notice of the liens and encumbrances
on the property that are noted on the certificate.
When private respondents-purchasers bought their lots from St. Jude, they did not
have to go behind the titles thereto to verify their contents or search for hidden defects or
inchoate rights that could defeat their rights to said lots. Although they were bound by liens
and encumbrances annotated on the titles, private respondents-purchasers could not have
had notice of defects that only an inquiry beyond the face of the titles could have satisfied:
"If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance
that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the
risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual
after all. This would not only be unfair to him….The
Government, recognizing the worthy purpose of the Torrens
System, should be the first to accept the validity of titles
issued under the conditions laid down by the law.”
On the other hand, petitioner never presented proof that the private respondents
who had bought their lots from St. Jude were buyers in bad faith. Consequently, their claim
of good faith prevails. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property
of another without notice that some other person has a right to or an interest in such
property; and who pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or
before he or she has notice of the claims or interest of some other person.
Petitioner miserably failed to prove any fraud, either on the part of Private
Respondent St. Jude or on the part of land registration officials who had approved the
subdivision plan and issued the questioned TCTs. Other than its peremptory statement in
the Complaint that the "expansion" of the area was "motivated by bad faith with intent to
defraud, to the damage and prejudice of the government and of public interest," petitioner
did not allege specifically HOW fraud was perpetrated to cause an increase in the actual
land size indicated. Nor was any evidence proffered to substantiate the allegation. That the
land registration authorities supposedly erred or committed an irregularity was merely a
conclusion drawn from the "table survey" showing that the aggregate area of the
subdivision lots exceeded the area indicated on the title of the property before its
subdivision. Fraud cannot be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats its
own cause. And because petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error that
might have been committed by its agents who had surveyed the property, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of their functions must be respected.
Furthermore, it should be stressed that the total area of forty thousand six hundred
twenty three (40,623) square meters indicated on St. Jude's original title (TCT No. 22660)
was not an exact area. Such figure was followed by the phrase "more or less." This plainly
means that the land area indicated was not precise. Atty. Antonio H. Noblejas, who became
the counsel of St. Jude subsequent to his tenure as Land Registration Commissioner, offers
a sensible explanation:
g. We respectfully submit that the area of 42, 044 sq. meters stated as the size of Lot
865-B is the more accurate area, as confirmed by the Perez report’s as per surveyor’s finding
on the ground which rectifies previous surveyor’s error in computing its area as 40, 622 sq.
meters.
The discrepancy in the figures could have been caused by the inadvertence or
the negligence of the surveyors. There is no proof, though, that the land area indicated was
intentionally and fraudulently increased. The property originally registered was the same
property that was subdivided. It is well-settled that what defines a piece of titled property
is not the numerical data indicated as the area of the land, but the boundaries or "metes
and bounds" of the property specified in its technical description as enclosing it and showing
its limits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

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