The Tradition of the Logical Topics: Aristotle to Ockham

Author(s): Otto Bird

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1962), pp. 307-323
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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 THE TRADITION OF THE LOGICAL TOPICS:
ARISTOTLE TO OCKHAM

BY OTTo BIRD

FromthetimeofAristotle untillatein theRenaissancetheTopics

occupiedan important placein thestudyoflogicandlanguage.There
are also signsthatsomething likea re-discoveryof themis occurring
in contemporary philosophicaldiscussion(cf.BIR).* Yet littleeffort
has beenmadeto analysetheirdevelopment. In thispaperI propose
to studythatdevelopment in the formit reachedin late mediaeval
logicthrough theworkofAristotle, Boethius, PeterofSpain,andOck-
a I
ham.Thisis still verylargesubject,and shallaccordingly restrict
myattention primarilyto twoaspects:(1) howAristotle's wide-rang-
ingconsideration of theTopicswas systematized in Boethiusand in
thatformtransmitted, especiallyby PeterofSpain,to thelate medi-
aeval logicians;(2) howformallogicalelementswereisolatedin the
Topicsand analysedfortheirownsake.Sincethelanguageofmodern
logicis ideallysuitedformanifesting logicalform,I shallavailmyself
ofit to showtheformalcontentoftheTopicaltradition.
The Topicsin Aristotle
The largestsingleworkamongAristotle's logicalwritings is the
one thatis devotedto theTopics.Its size is certainly due in partto
thediversity ofmaterialthatit contains, enoughin factto inspireat
leastthreedistincttreatisesin laterlogic:De praedicabilibus on the
predicables,De obligationibus dealingwiththelogicofformaldispu-
tation,De locison theTopics.In additionto theseit containsa theory
of probablereasoningand thusis the source,primarily in its intro-
ductorybook,forthe Aristotelian theoryof dialectic.Withinthe
Aristoteliantraditionit is customary to distinguish
fourdifferent con-
siderationsofthesyllogism: thatdevotedto theformalstudyof the
syllogism in the PriorAnalytics, the analysisof the necessaryand
demonstrative syllogism in the PosteriorAnalytics, of the probable
and dialecticalsyllogism in the Topics,and of the apparentbut fal-
lacioussyllogism in theSophisticalRefutations.
The topoi,whichgive theirname to the workas a whole,are
treatedin BooksII-VII, thefinalbookbeingturnedovermostlyto a
methodology ofdiscussion. The Topics,theobjectofourconcern, are
organizedaccordingto what laterare called the predicables.Thus
Books II-III treatthe Topics concernedwithAccident,Book IV
Genus,BookV Property, and BooksVI-VII Definition.
Perhapsthe shortest way of seeingwhatAristotle does withthe
Topicsis to lookat a typicaltext.ForthatpurposeI havechosenBk.
* Suchcitations
are to theworkslistedin theTable of References
at theendof
thisarticle.
307

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308 OTro BIRD

II ch. 4, 111a14-33.On a literalreadingit runsas follows(withmy

numbering oftheindividualsentences):
(1) To showthatcontrary accidentsbelong inthesamesubjectlookto
thegenus.(2) Forexample, toshowthatright andwrong applyto percep-
tionweargue:To perceive is to judge;butwejudgerightly andwrongly;
so weperceive rightly andwrongly. (3) Thisproofis from thegenusand
concerns species,sincejudging is thegenusofperceiving, foronewhoper-
ceivesjudgesinsomeway.(4) It is alsopossible toproceed from speciesto
genus, sincewhatever is inthespeciesis alsointhegenus.(5) Forexample,
ifthere is goodandbadknowledge, there is alsoa goodandbaddisposition,
sincedispositionis thegenusofknowledge.
(6) Thefirst topicis falseforconfirming, whilethesecond is true.
(7) Forit is notnecessary thatwhatever is in thegenusis alsoin the
species.Animal is flyingandquadruped, whilemanis not.
(8) Butwhatever is in thespeciesis necessarily in thegenus;thusif
manis good,thenanimalalsois good.
(9) Thefirst topicis trueforrefuting, forwhatever is notinthegenus
is notinthespecies.
(10) Thesecondtopicis falseforrefuting, forit is notnecessary that
whatis notinthespeciesis notinthegenus.
In (1) Aristotle statesthe problem, whichin thiscase concerns
accident.He immediately providesin (2) an exampleofan argument
in concreteterms.Aboutthishe notes(3) thatwe are arguingfrom
a genusto something abouta species,sincethetermsoftheexample
are related genus species.He thenobserves(4) thatwe can re-
as to
versethe orderand arguefromspeciesto genus,and forthislatter
way of arguinghe citesthe warrantor rulethatwhateveris in the
speciesis also in thegenus.For thishe givesanotherexamplein con-
creteterms(5).
Up to thispointAristotle has giventwomodesof arguingwith
examples:fromgenusto speciesand thereverse.He nowproceedsto
evaluatetheirlogicalforceaccording to theiruse in "confirming"
or
"refuting," i.e. he considersbothaffirmative and negativeformsof
thesetwomodes.Thuswe geta totaloffourformsto consider. Aris-
totle then observeswhethereach formis "necessary"or not, i.e.
whether it is logicallynecessary and therefore alwaystrueor not.In
otherwords, he is in effect
determining whether ornotwehavea logi-
cal law. It is accordingly helpfulif we put his arguments in modern
logicalnotation.'
In translating Aristotle'sexpressions intologicalnotation,
thereis
oftenan embarrassment of riches,sincethereare manyequivalent
formsforeach. In general,however, it wouldseembestto approxi-
matetheformoftheoriginalas closelyas possible.
Forthislogicaltranslation
hereandin whatfollows
I havebeenfortunate
to
havethehelpand adviceofDr. C. LejewskiofManchester
University,
Visiting
Pro-
fessor ofNotreDame 19061, whohaskindly
at theIUniversity readmymanuscript.

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 LOGICAL TOPICS: ARISTOTLE TO OCKHAM 309
Aristotlein the above text speaksof something "beingin the
genus"and givestheexampleofquadrupedandanimal(7). Withthis
as thestandard,I take 'quadrupedis in animal'or,in general,'F is
in B' thus:
(rx).xeB.Fx. .F is inB
Withthisinterpretation
Aristotle's
arguments maybe formalized
as
follows:
*A1.1 A?B.o: (F): (Vx).xeB.Fx.o. (,[x).xEA.Fx
It is notnecessary thatwhatever is in thegenusis alsoin thespecies.
'If an animalis quadruped, manis quadruped.' (7)
A1.2 AcB.o: . (F) .: (x):xeB.*.--(Fx):*: (x):xeA.*.--(Fx)
Whatever is notinthegenusis notinthespecies.(9)
A2.1 AcB.o: (F):(jx). xeA.Fx.o. (fx) .xeB.Fx
Whatever is in thespeciesis necessarily in thegenus.'If manis good,
thenanimalalsois good.'(8)
*A2.2 A O. *: . (F). : (x)::xeA.O.,-(Fx):o: (x)::xEB.0. -(Fx)
It is notnecessary thatwhatisnotinthespeciesis notinthegenus.(10)
HereI haveinterpreted thespecies-genus relation intermsofclass-
inclusion, with'c' as the signof inclusion,'A' forthe nameof the
species,'B' forthe nameof the genus.This is somewhatmisleading,
sincenoteverysub-classof a genusis a species.However,it has the
meritofmakingclearthatthetwostatements Aristotle saysareneces-
sarilytrue(i.e. A1.2 and A2.1), correspond to laws or thesesin the
logicofclasses.I haveindicatedwithan asterisk(*) thosewhichAris-
totlesaysarenotalwaystrue.I use thecustomary 'e' forclass-mem-
bership, i.e. foran individualbelonging to a class; 'o' forimplication,
the dot '.' forpropositional conjunction;'--' forpropositional nega-
tion; 'F' fora predicatevariable,so that 'Fx' maybe read 'x is F';
'(x)' fortheuniversal quantifier; '(ax)' fortheexistential orparticu-
lar quantifier. Thusin A2.1,ifwe take'A' for'man,''B' for'animal,'
and 'F' for'is good,'wemayread:
'If manis included in animal, thenif,forsomex,x is a manandx is good,
then, forsome x,x is an animal andx is good.'
Whatthen,it maybe asked,doesAristotle meanby a Topic?He
givesno definition ofthetermin theTopics. However, in theRhetoric
he describes a Topicas an "elementofan enthymeme" (1396b23)and
in his philosophical dictionary in theMetaphysics(1014bl) he refers
to elements ofdemonstrations as "theprimary demonstrations eachof
whichis contained in manydemonstrations." The examplein our (8)
is an enthymeme. Furthermore, thewarrant forit,formalized in A2.1
mightwellbe described as beingcontainedin manyarguments, since
it canserveas warrant foranysimilarargument fromspeciestogenus.

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310 O[rO BIRD

Theophrastus offered a definition of a Topic whichhas beenpre-

servedin the commentary of Alexander:"A Topic is a principle
(arche) and element(stoicheon)fromwhichwe drawpropositions
thatserveas a basisforreasonings on a proposedquestion;it is de-
terminate as to circumscription (perigraphe . . . horismenos) and un-
determined as to particularapplications(kath' hekastaaoristos)"
(AA.II proem,126'4).Someoftheobscurity ofthislast clausewould
disappearifwe takeit as referring to thewarrants, forwhichwe have
givensymbolic equivalents. Each of theseis "determinate" in thata
definiterelationis understood, in thiscase thatof species-genus laid
downin ourfirst antecedent; yetit is "undetermined" in thatthewar-
rantitselfis nottherealizationof anyparticular genus-species rela-
tion.We geta definite ordeterminate genus-species relationonlywhen
thenamesofan actualgenusandspeciesaresupplied, i.e.whenvalues
aregivento thevariables.
In the textwe have been considering Aristotle is appealingto a
Topic fromGenusin orderto analysea problemregarding accident.
However,TopicsfromGenusare not restricted to any one kindof
problem.They may servealso to analyseproblemsof genus (e.g.
121a25),of property (e.g. 132a10),or of definition (e.g. 141b28).In
otherwords,thesameTopicmaybe usedto analyseanyone ofAris-
totle'sfourkindsofproblems. Sincethisis trueofotherTopics,there
is thusconsiderable repetition. This perhapsmorethananything else
accountsforthelengthand prolixity oftheTopics.Insteadofstating
a Topicgenerally, he statesit onlywithintheparticular contextof a
problemregarding one of thepredicables. Thus thesameTopicmay
be appealedto repeatedly. Aristotle makesno attemptto classifythe
Topicsforthemselves. In fact,hismaininterest in themseemsto lie
in theiraffording a meansforanalyzing thepredicables, i.e. theysub-
servehissubject-predicate logicofterms.
of theTopicsin Boethius
Classification
According to Regis,Aristotlestatesno lessthan337Topicalrules:
103 forAccidents, 81 forGenus,69 forProperty, 84 forDefinition
(R. 147,n. 1). In theenumeration thatLuciusgivesof themin his
1619editionI count287,whileBuhlein his 1792editioncounts382.
On anycountthereare a greatmany.It is thusno surprisethatan
effortwas madeto classifytheTopicsand to reducethemto a more
manageablenumber.The mostsuccessful of theseefforts,
judgedby
itshistorical is
influence, the one in
found Boethius.
Boethiushimself claimsno creditforit,butattributesit to others
whohavefoundwhathe callsanotherwayofviewingtheTopics.He
findsthisviewexemplified in Cicero'sTopics:
callsTopicsthosepropositions
Aristotle whicharemaximal anduniversal
andeitherper se necessaryor per se probable.
But sincetherearemany

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 LOGICAL TOPICS: ARISTOTLE TO OCKHAM 311
suchpropositions, in facttheyare almostinnumerable, it is necessaryto
viewthemfroma higherperspective (ratiospeculationis).Witha careful
consideration we can investigatethedifferencesofall themaximaland uni-
versalpropositions and collecttheirinnumerable multitude intoa fewuni-
versaldifferences. Thus we may say thatsomeconsistin definition, others
in genus,and so on.Thus,forexample,all themaximalpropositions dealing
withdefinition willbe contained undertheonenameofdefinition....From
thisit is apparenthowthe Topica of Cicerodiffers fromthatof Aristotle.
For Aristotlediscoursesaboutmaximalpropositions, sincehe positsthem
as places (loci) of arguments.Cicero,however, understands by Topics,not
the maximalpropositions, but theircontaining difference.(BCT 1052BC;
1054B)
Boethius is here drawinga distinctionbetween what he calls a
Topical Maxim (maximapropositio)and a Topical Difference(differ-
entia maximaepropositionis).The Difference is in effectno morethan
the name under which a Topic is classified.Thus in Aristotle'stext
A1.1-1.2 fall underthe Topical Differenceof Genus, since theyargue
fromthe genus,whereasA2.1-2.2 fall underthe Differenceof Species
since theyargue fromthe species. The Maxims are the rules or war-
rantsforwhichwe have given formalizations. The distinctionrecalls
the definitionof a Topic givenby Theophrastus,the Differencecorre-
spondingto the "determinatecircumscription" and the Maxim to the
"undeterminedapplication."
To seek Topical Differencesis to classifythe Topics, and classifica-
tionis what Boethiusprovidesin his De differentiis topicis,whichbe-
came the sourceor auctoritasforthe doctrineof the Topics in medi-
aeval logic.In the secondof the fourbooksinto whichit is dividedhe
givesthe enumerationof Themistius,whosecommentary on Aristotle's
Topics is no longerextant.Transmittedby Peter of Spain, it became
the standardenumerationof the Topics in latermediaeval logic.
Enumerationof the Topics accordingto BDT II
I. Those drawnfromthetermsoftheQuaestio (i.e. IntrinsicTopics)
1. Definition
2. Description
3. Nominal Meaning
4. Whole:
4.1 Genus
4.2 Integral
4.3 In quantity
4.4 In mode
4.5 In time
4.6 In place
5. Part:
5.1 Species
5.2 Integral

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312 OTrO BIRD

5.3 In quantity
5.4 In mode
5.5 In time
5.6 In place
6. Cause: Efficient, Material,Final, Formal
7. Effector Generation
8. Corruption
9. Use
10. Usual concomitants
II. Those extrinsicto the termsof the Quaestio
11. Opinionor Authority
12. Similars
13. The More
14. The Less
15. Proportion
16. Opposites:
16.1 Contrary
16.2 Privative
16.3 Relative
16.4 Contradictory
17. Transumption
III. Those that are mediateor mixedfromboth I and II
18. Case or Inflexion
19. Conjugates or coordinateexpressions
20. Division
The meaningof the variousTopics and of theirdivisioninto three
groupswillbe clearerafterconsiderationof theirappropriateMaxims.
But beforethat,it willbe usefulto see how Boethiuspresentsa Topic.
For that purpose we can considerhow he analyses the Topic from
Genus (BDT 1188BC) corresponding to that in Aristotle.All that he
says about it is containedin the followingtext:
(1) The Topic fromtheWholeas Genussuppliesarguments forques-
tionsin thisway:
(2) For thequestion,whetherjusticeis useful:
(3) Make the Everyvirtueis useful,justiceis a virtue,
syllogism: there-
forejusticeis useful.
(4) The questionhereconcerns accident,whether utilityis an accident
ofjustice.
(5) The Topicis thatwhichconsistsin theMaxim:Whatever is present
in thegenusis presentin thespecies.
(6) The Topic is fromthe Whole,i.e. fromGenus,sincevirtueis the
genusofjustice.
Since an argumentis forBoethiusthe determination of a quaestio,
he formulatesa questionin concreteterms(2) as soon as he has stated

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 LOGICAL TOPICS: ARISTOTLE TO OCKHAM 313

whatTopic he is presenting (1). He thenformsan argument with

thoseterms,oftenas herein syllogisticform(3). Although he enumer-
ates theTopicswithoutmentioning thepredicables,Boethius,unlike
the mediaevallogicians,noteswhichpredicablehis questionis con-
cernedwith(4). He thencitesthe appropriate Topical Maxim (5)
and Difference
(6). SinceBoethiusnevercitesmorethanone Maxim
foranyoneTopicalDifference, it is worthnotingthatin thiscase he
givesonethatAristotlehadremarked is notalwaysvalid,namelyA1.1.
TopicalMaximsin PeterofSpain
The SummulaelogicalesofPeterofSpain (laterPope JohnXXI)
was thestandardelementary textin logicfromthelate XIIIth cen-
turyto theendoftheXVth.Of thetwelvetractatesintowhichit is
divided-thedodicilibelli,as Dante calls them(Paradiso12.135)
thefifth is devotedto theTopics.It is littlemorethana summary of
the firsthalfof BDT. The openingparagraphsgive the definitions
of thebasic termsused foranalysingarguments fromBDT I. Then
afterthedistinction betweenTopicalMaximand Difference (P 5.07)
we areprovidedwiththeenumeration oftheTopics.This is identical
withBDT II, exceptthatwhereasBoethiuscombines EffectandGen-
erationintoone,PeterofSpainseparatesthemand thusgetsa total
of 21 Topics insteadof 20; he also changesthe orderin whichhe
enumerates theExtrinsicTopics.UnlikeBoethius,however, Peterof
Spain givesconsiderable attentionto Topical Maxims.WhereasBo-
ethiuscitesonly25,PeterofSpain states,orindicateshowto formu-
late,a totalof81 Maxims.Thisincreased concern withMaximsis not
originalwiththeSummulae.It is also foundat leasta century earlier
in Abelard'streatiseon theTopicsin hisDialectica.
In analysing theTopicsPeterofSpainadoptsthefollowing proce-
dure: (1) He identifiestheTopic by nameand verybriefly describes
therelationwithwhichit is concerned. (2) He givesthe numberof
arguments andMaximsfallingundertheTopic,foreachofwhich(3)
he givesan examplein concretetermsofan argument usingtheTopic,
and (4) he statestheTopicalMaxim.In presenting hisanalysisI shall
followthesamepatternbutin abbreviated form.But since21 Topics
with81 Maximsstillexceedsthescopeofa singlearticle,I shallpass
overwithonlya briefnotetheTopicshavinglittleofformalinterest,
althoughI shallmentionall so as to providea completesurveyof
Peter'sworkon theTopics.In citingtheMaxims,I shallgivefirst my
formalization in modernnotation, followed by a literaltranslation
of
theMaximand oftheexamplegivenbyPeterofSpain.
P1. Definition
(P 5.10-5.11)
EightMaximsarecitedfordefiniensand definiendum(or fordefi-
nitioand definitum,
as theyarecalledbymediaevallogicians).These

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314 OTTO BIRD

Maxims in effectestablishthe mutual replaceabilityof the one by the

other.It is sufficientto state the fourforthe definiens,since the four
forthe definiendumcan be obtained merelyby interchangingthese
two terms.Writing'B is definedby A' as 'B = dfA'
(1) B = dfA.o: (D) :AcD .O. BcD
Whateveris predicatedof the definiens is also predicatedof the definien-
dum:'A mortalrationalanimalis running, therefore
a manis running.'
(2) B = dfA.o:(D):DcA.o.DcB
Of whatever thedefiniens so is thedefiniendum:
is predicated, 'Socratesis
a mortalrationalanimal,thereforeSocratesis a man.'
(3) B = dfA.o:(D):r--(AcD).o.t--,(BcD)
Whateveris removedfromthedefiniens is also removedfromthedefinien-
dum: 'A mortalrationalanimal is not running, a man is not
therefore
running.
(4) B = dfA.o:(D):#-.'(DcA).o.r--(DcB)
Fromwhateverthe definiens is removedthe definiendumis also removed:
'A stoneis nota mortalrationalanimal,thereforea stoneis nota man.'
The last two have negatedthe antecedentsand consequentsof the
firsttwo. I have thereforeused the same termsforformalizing(2) and
(4), even thoughthe exampleof (2) has an individualname ('Socra-
tes') while that of (4) has a generalor class name ('stone').
The Maxims forthe Topics fromDescriptionand fromNominal
Meaning (a nominisinterpretatione)are the same as these,except
that for definiems and definiendumone substitutesrespectivelyde-
scriptioand descriptum,or interpretatioand interpretatum(P 5.12-
5.13)
P2. UniversalWhole,Genus, or Superior (P 5.16)
(1) AcB.*: .(F) .: (x) :xEB.o.-,.(Fx):o: (x) :xeA..,- (Fx)
Whateveris removedfromthegenusis also removedfromthespecies:'An
animalis notrunning, therefore a manis notrunning.
(2) AcB.o:(D):r%.'(DcB).o./-.-(DcA)
Removingthe genusalso removesthe species:'A stoneis not an animal,
therefore
a stoneis nota man.'
P3. Subjective Part, Species, or Inferior(P 5.17)
(1) AcB.o : (F):(yx) .xfA.Fx.o. (Jx).xEB.Fx
Whateveris predicatedof the speciesis also predicatedof the genus: 'A
manis running, therefore an animalis running.'
(2) AcB.o:(D):DcA.o.DcB
Of whatever thespeciesis predicated thegenusis also predicated:'Socrates
is a man,therefore Socratesis an animal.'

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 LOGICAL TOPICS: ARISTOTLE TO OCKHAM 315
The consequent ofP3(2) is thelogicaltransposition oftheconse-
quentof P2(2). For thatreasonI have formulated themin thesame
terms,althougha generalname appearsin the exampleof the first
wherean individualnameappearsin the second.It mightbe noted
thatP2(1) andP3(1) areidenticalwithA1.2andA2.1,butAristotle's
othertwoTopics,whicharenotlogicaltheses,arenotmentioned. In-
steadPeterofSpainconsiders stillanotherrelationbetweengenusand
species.
OftheotherTopicsfromWholeandPartonlythosein Quantitate
and in Modo areofparticular Integralwholeis taken
logicalinterest.
in theordinary senseofphysicalwholeand part,suchas a houseand
its wallsand roof,and its Topic concerns arguingfromthe existence
of thiswholeto thatofits part,and thelogicaltransposition of this
(P 5.18). The TopicsfromWholeand Partin Place and in Timecon-
cernarguments using'everywhere,' 'nowhere,''always,''never.'The
TopicofWholein Quantity, however, providesan analogueofa basic
ruleofquantificationtheory.
P4. Wholein quantity(P 5.19)
(1) (x):xeA.o.Fx:o:yEA.
o. Fy
Whatever is predicated
ofa wholeinquantity
canalsobepredicated
ofany
ofitsparts:'Everymanruns, therefore
Socrates
runs.'
(2) (x): x6A..--(Fx):o:yd4. . -(Fy)
Whatever is removed
froma wholein quantity
is also removed
fromany
part:'No manruns,therefore
Socrates
is notrunning.'
P5. Part in quantity(P 5.20)
(1) FXI.FX2 ...Fxn.A -xl- X2 --N ** * - Xn- (y): yeA.>* Fy
Whateveris predicated
ofpartsin quantitytakentogether
is predicated
of
theirwhole:'Socrates
runs,Platoruns,
etc.,therefore
everymanruns.'
(2) --(FX1)
. -'(FX2) ...(Fxn) .A
=XI -~ X22*** 2 Xn-* (y): y-A.*j?*(Fy)
Whatever
is removedfrom partsinquantity
takentogether
is alsoremoved
fromtheirwhole:'Platodoesn'trunand thesameis trueof eachman,
hencenomanruns.'
P6. Wholein Mode and P7. Part in Mode (P 5.21)
By a Wholein Modeweareto understand a "universal
takenwith-
outdetermination." A Partin Mode is accordinglya "universal
taken
witha determination, suchas 'whiteman."'TheirMaximsaresaidto
be thesameas thoseforGenusandSpecies.If weinterpret thePartin
Mode,e.g. 'whiteman'as class-intersection,
and writeit 'A - B,' we
wouldaccordingly obtaintheappropriateMaximsbysubstituting this
for'A' in P2(1-2) and P3(1-2). PeterofSpain givesneitherMaxims
norexamplesfortheseTopics.

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316 orro BIRD

The TopicsfromCause and Effectgovernarguments fromone to

theotherand vice versa.ThosefromGeneration and Corruption gov-
ernarguments fromprocessto resultand areexemplified in: 'If what
is generated is good' (P 5.28). That from
is good,thenits generation
Use is muchthesame: 'Thatwhoseuseis goodis itselfgood'(P 5.30).
The Topic fromConcomitants concernsaccidentalqualitiesalways
foundtogether suchthatone can argue,e.g.'If oneis repentant, then
he has transgressed'
(P 5.31).
The TopicsfromOppositesgovernarguments fromone opposite
to anotherand are of thesamegeneralform,althoughfourdifferent
kindsofopposition aredistinguished.
ThatofRelativeOpposites states
a thesisin thelogicofrelationsand thatofContradictories expresses
a semantical propertywhichis in effect
a definitionof contradiction.
P8. RelativeOpposites(P 5.33)
(1) (gR)xRy:a: Qx)xED'R.o . (g/y)year'R
Positingoneoftworelatives positstheother:'A parent
is,therefore
a
childis.'
P9. Contradictory Opposites(P 5.36)
(1) T'p'i. .F'p'
Ifonecontradictory istruetheotheris false:"Socrates
sits'istrue,
there-
fore'Socratesdoesn'tsit'is false.'
The TopicsfromtheMore,theLess,theSimilar,fromProportion
and fromTransumption all involvereasoning fromanalogy.Typical
oftheirMaximsis theoneforSimilars:Aboutsimilars thereis a simi-
lar judgment(P 5.38). It is of someinterest thatBoethiusobserves
thatthewholeargument of Socratesin theRepublicexemplifies the
Topic fromTransumption, sinceit is based on justicein the state
beingmoreknownthanit is in theindividual(BDT 1192A).
The Topic fromAuthority warrantsarguments fromauthority
accordingto the Maxim: The expertis to be believedin his own
specialty(P 5.42).
The TopicsfromCase inflexion and Conjugatesare moregram-
maticalthantheothers.That ofConjugatesis exemplified in: 'If jus-
ticeis good,thenwhatis justis good';andthatfromCase inflexion in:
'If whatis justis good,thenwhatis donejustlyis donewell'(P. 5.45).
The TopicofDivisioninitsdichotomous formprovides thefollow-
inglogicallaw:
P10. Div?sion(P 5.45)
(1) A -A = V:o:xeA.o.x-e-A
If anytwodividecompletely,
positing
oneremovestheother:'Socrates
is eithermanornon-man,butheis notnon-man,therefore
heis man.'
The examplehereis JustoppositefromtheMaxim,i.e. 'non-man'
is firstremovedfrom'Socrates.'

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 LOGICAL TOPICS: ARISTOTLE TO OCKHAM 317

Ockham'sRevisionof the TopicalTradition

In Boethiusand PeterofSpain we have foundlittlemorethana
classificationand enumeration of the Topics. The Topical Maxims
seemtobe viewedprimarily as inference-warrants, i.e.as rulesforcon-
structing arguments in
oncetermsare given somerelation.Boethius,
in fact,explicitly assignsthe Topicsto the logicof discovery rather
thanto thatofproof-i.e.to inventio, notto judicium(BDT 1173C).
Theyarelookedupon,thatis,moreas a meansforfinding arguments
thanas a meansfortheiranalysis.
Whenwe turnto thelogicof Ockham,however, we findthatthe
studyoftheTopicshasbecomeabsorbedintothelargerstudyofCon-
sequencesand has beensubjectedto an intensive logicalanalysisre-
sultingin a radicalrevision.I have elsewhere madea detailedstudy
ofthisrevision(cf.BIO). I shalldrawupontheresultsofthisstudy
to indicatehowtheTopicaltradition becomesalteredin theworkof
Ockham.
Ockhamis moreradicalthansomeofhis followers in thathe not
onlychangesor dropsmanyof the traditional Topical distinctions,
buthe alsoabandonstheverynameofTopicsas designating a distinct
divisionoflogic.BothAlbertofSaxonyand Buridan,whoareusually
classedas followers of Ockham,stillretainin theirlogicsa section
devotedto theTopics,in whichtheyenumerate and analysetheBo-
ethiantradition handeddownbyPeterofSpain.In Ockham, however,
thereis sucha changethat,unlessoneknowsthecontentofthattra-
dition,he mightwellmissthefactthatmostofhistreatiseon Conse-
quencesin hisgreatlogicis a re-working oftheTopics.Yet theplace
thatthis treatise
occupies in the Summa logicacorresponds to that
occupiedbytheTopicsin thetraditional arrangement ofthebooksof
theOrganon;namely,aftertheconsideration ofdemonstration in the
PosteriorAnalyticsand beforethat of fallaciesin the Sophistical
Refutations.
The treatiseon Consequences, whichcomprises the thirdof the
thirdpartof the Summalogica,is introduced as a consideration of
"arguments and consequences whicharenotin syllogistic form,i.e. of
sucha kindas areenthymemes" (OC 3-3.1,383). Earlier,in thetrea-
tiseon propositions, it had beennotedthatthe studyof conditional
propositions wouldbe deferred to thisparton thegroundthat"a con-
ditionalis equivalentto a consequence"(OC 2.31,315). Thus,since
it is in thispartthatwe findconsideration of thetraditional Topics,
the studyof theTopicshas beenbroughtunderthe studyof condi-
tionalpropositions. Ockhamis not the firstto notethisconnection.
Abelardin factlookedupontheTopicsas important primarily fora
studyofconditionals (AB 253; cf.BIF).
A conditional propositionis definedas "composed oftwocategori-
cals connected bymeansoftheconjunctive 'if' (si) orits equivalent"

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318 OTTO BIRD

(OC 2.31, 315). Ockhamin factusually states the traditionalTopical

argumentswith the equivalent conjunctions'ergo' or 'igitur' ('there-
fore') and rarelywith 'si.' The firstpropositionof the conditionalis
called the antecedent,the secondthe consequent.Ockhammakesnine
distinctionswhichhe uses to classifythe consequences.These depend
forthe mostpart on different logicalfeaturesof antecedentand conse-
quent in a consequence.Thus they may be universalor particular,
affirmative or negative,or some combinationof these, and Ockham
systematicallyconsidersthe various combinations.
In this,however,thereis nothingpeculiar to a Topic. We finda
Topical considerationonly when we considerwhat validates the pas-
sage fromantecedentto consequent,or in Ockham'slanguage,through
what medium a consequenceholds. Accordingto Ockham, a conse-
quence holds eitherthroughan intrinsicmediumor an extrinsicme-
dium or throughboth. The text throughwhich he develops these
distinctionsreads as follows:
A consequence holdsthrough an intrinsic
medium whenit holdsbyvirtue
of someproposition formedfromthe same terms[as thosein the conse-
quence].Thusthisconsequence, "Socratesis notrunning, therefore a manis
notrunning," holdsby virtueofthismedium, "Socratesis a man"; forun-
lessthisweretrue,theconsequence wouldnotbe valid (nonvaleret).
A consequence holdsthrough an extrinsicmediumwhenit holdsthrough
somegeneralrulewhichno morerespectsthoseterms[in theconsequence]
thanany others.. . . It is through extrinsic
mediathatall syllogisms hold.
It mightbe objectedthatthepreviousconsequence, "Socratesis notrun-
ning,therefore a manis notrunning," holdsthroughthisextrinsic medium:
Fromthesingularto theindefinite and fromtheinferior to thesuperior with
a followingnegation, thereis a goodconsequence. But to thisit mustbe said
thattheconsequence holdsthrough thisextrinsic
mediummediatelyand as
it wereremotely and insufficiently,
becausein additionto thisgeneralrule
moreis required, namelythatSocratesis a man; andtherefore it holdsmore
immediately and sufficiently throughthis medium:"Socratesis a man,"
whichis an intrinsicmedium.(OC 3-3.1,383-384)
In this last distinctionOckham is in fact dealing with the tradi-
tionalTopics. That thisis so becomesevidenton consideringhis treat-
ment of the consequencethat correspondsto the Topics in Aristotle
withwhichwe began,namely,the Topic fromGenus. Since Ockham
has abandoned the traditionalclassification,
to findthe equivalentof
A1.2 we need to look in the sectiondealingwithconsequenceshaving
a negative antecedentand a negative consequence (OC 3-3.4, 390).
We findtherethe followingrule and examples:
Negativelyfroma distributed
superiorto a distributed
inferior
thereis a
simpleconsequence.
'No manis running, therefore
no whitemanis running.'
'No animalis running,
thereforeno ass is running.'

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 LOGICAL TOPICS: ARISTOTLE TO OCKHAM 319

The examplesare thesameas thosethatPeterofSpain givesfor

Wholeand Part in Mode (P6) and forthe Topic fromGenus(P2).
In factOckham'srulecouldbe formalized in the same way as the
Maximforthe Topic fromGenusP2(1) whichcorresponds to Aris-
totle'sA1.2.However,we wouldapproximate morecloselyto theway
Ockhamformulates theruleifwe droptheuniversal predicatequanti-
fierandmovethenegationto thefront, thus:
01. AcB.0: (x).,-(xeB .Fx).o . (x).,-~(xe-4.
Fx)
Ockhamhas obviouslymovedfurther thanour previousauthors
towardsan extensionalpointofview.Thisis apparentin hisusingthe
relationratherthan that of genus-species,
superior-inferior which
enableshim to consolidateunderone rule two of Peterof Spain's
Maxims.But moreimportantly, it appearsin hisexplicitreference to
bywhichhe designates
distribution thequantification relationunder-
lyingthelogicallaw. Giventhatall A's are B's, it is becauseno x is
botha B andF thatwe knowthatno x is bothan A and F.
ApplyingOckham'sdistinctions to the above rule and example,
we obtainthefollowing lay-outforhis analysisofthiskindofconse-
quence:
Consequence:'No animalis running,
therefore
noassis running.'
(x)..- (xEB .Fx) .o . (x)., (xeA .Fx)
Intrinsicmedium:'Everyass is an animal.'
AcB
Extrinsic
medium: Negativelyfrom a distributed to a distrib-
superior
thereis a simple
utedinferior consequence.
AcB.0: (x). -(xeB .Fx).0 . (x).--(xeA .Fx)
It nowbecomesevidentwhatOckhammeansby sayingthatsuch
a consequence holdsimmediately throughthe intrinsic mediumand
mediately through theextrinsic medium.The consequence as it stands
is logicallycontingent; i.e. if we consideronlyits formas manifested
in theformalization, it is obviously possibleto findvaluesforthevari-
ableswhichwillfalsify it and otherswhichwillverify it. If,however,
we consider thesemantical relationbetweentheconcrete termsin the
consequence and expressthisin theintrinsic medium, then,takingto-
gethertheintrinsic mediumand the consequence, we have a logical
law,namely,thatexpressed in theextrinsic medium.By formalizing
them,we can see at once thatthe intrinsic mediumand the conse-
quencehavethesameformas themainantecedent and consequent of
theextrinsic medium.In effect, theexpression oftheintrinsic medium
amountsto theassertion oftheantecedent oftheextrinsic mediumso
thatbyapplyingtheruleofdetachment, ormodusporene,theconse-
quentcan be assertedindependently as theconsequence.

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320 01rro BIRD

The languageOckhamuses forthesedistinctions is the same as

thatusedforthemaindivisionsoftheTopicsin Boethiusand Peter
of Spain.Sinceit preserves something ofthesamefunction, it seems
clearthatOckhamis revising thosedistinctions forhis ownpurposes.
However, thereis nolongeranyreference to TopicalMaximandTopi-
cal Difference. Whathe calls the rule (regula) expressedin the ex-
trinsic mediumobviously correspondsto theTopicalMaxim.But from
thisit doesnotfollowthattheintrinsic mediumcorresponds in every
respectto the TopicalDifference. It obviouslydoes to some extent,
sincethestatement ofit in theaboveexampleis equivalentto saying
that'animal'is superior or genusto 'ass' as inferior or species.How-
ever,Ockhamconsidersit important to distinguish the two.In the
proposition, 'Everyass is an animal,'Ockhamwouldpointout that
thesubjecttermis in personaland significative supposition, i.e. 'ass'
has its usual reference. But in theproposition, "'Ass' is a speciesof
the genus'animal',"thesubjecttermis takenin simplesupposition,
i.e. it doesnothave its usual reference, but is understood foran in-
tentiomentis, i.e. 'ass' is nowon a different semanticlevelfromwhat
it wasbefore. Thisdifference Ockhamthebasisfordistinguish-
affords
ingstillfurther amongconsequences.
However,beforeturningto that,we shouldnotethatin stating
rule01, Ockhamdeclaresthatit providesus witha "simpleconse-
quence"(consequentia simplex).Bythishemeansa conditional propo-
sitionthatis logicallytrue,or,as he says,one "in whichat no time
can theantecedent be truewithouttheconsequent" (3-3.1,383). It is
tobe distinguished froma factualconsequence (consequentia utnunc)
whichis one thatcan be falsified, i.e. one "in whichthe antecedent
can be trueat sometimewithoutthe consequent beingtrue."With
this distinction Ockhamis able to sortout the necessaryTopical
Maxims,or extrinsic media,fromthosethatare onlyprobable.Aris-
totle, as we have seen fromourfirst text,includesbothin hisanalysis
and,at leastin somecases,carefully distinguishes thetwo.Boethius
notesexplicitly the difference, but he does littleto distinguish the
necessary fromtheprobableTopics (BDT 1195AB).Peterof Spain
does not evenmentionit. Withthe singleexceptionof Abelard(cf.
BIF), I knowofno onebeforeOckhammakinga systematic effort to
distinguish thetwo.
A logicallynecessaryproposition remainstrueno matterwhat
termsit is expressed in so longas thesameformis preserved, as Ock-
hamsaysofwhathe callstheextrinsic medium.Most ofthoselisted
by Ockham,however, arein factdiscovered orintroduced through an
analysisof particular terms,suchas definiens-definiendum, superior-
inferior, whole-part-those namelyconsidered in the Topical tradi-
tion.However,in his analysisof theseOckham,likeAbelardbefore
him,discovers lawsofthelogicofpropositions. To thesehe devotesa

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 LOGICAL TOPICS: ARISTOTLE TO OCKHAM 321

(3-3.37), underthe
separatechapterin thetreatiseon consequences
titleof "GeneralRules of Consequences."In it he considerssuch
rulesas:
02. p*(-ipoq)
Fromthefalsea trueproposition
canfollow.
03. (p*q) (--qO---p)
Fromtheopposite oftheantecedent
theopposite
oftheconsequent follows.
These ruleshave been carefully studiedby Salamucha,Bochenski,
Boehner,Moodyas Ockham'spropositional logic.They differ from
whatwe maycall the Topicalconsequences in thattheydo not de-
pendfortheirforceupona term-relation-what in ourformalizations
of the Maximsis designated in the mainantecedent, e.g. 'B - dfA,'
'A c B,' etc.Thisis neededforthelogicalnecessity ofthewhole,since
withoutit theconditional proposition thatfollowsin themainconse-
quentis logicallycontingent. Suchterm-dependent consequences con-
stituteby farthe largestpartof Ockham's treatise
on consequences.
To completethe analysisof Ockham'srevisionof the Topicsone
moredistinction is needed-thatalreadyreferred to as regarding dif-
ferent kindsofsupposition. According to Ockham,we have a distinct
kindofconsequence, different
fromanywehavelookedat so far,when
thepredicateoftheconsequent is thenameofone of thepredicables
and thereby putsitssubject-term in simplesupposition (03-3.1,384).
In sucha consequence thereis theidentification ofa termwithoneof
thepredicables, or thenegationofthis.Thenin place of an extrinsic
mediumsuchas we havebeenconsidering, we havea rulesuchas the
following:
04. If a predicateis notpredicated ofa subjecttakenuniversally
that
predicateis notthegenusofthatsubject.(34.18,427)
Withthisdistinction Ockhamin effect re-uniteswhatmightbe
called the Aristotelian and the Boethiantraditions on the Topics.
Aristotleused the Topics to analyseproblemsregarding accident,
genus,species,property, definition,i.e.whatlateron arecalledthefive
predicables. WithBoethiusthisconnection withtheTopicsis all but
dropped, and in Peter of Spain it has disappearedentirely.This Bo-
ethiantradition of theTopicspredominated in mediaevallogic.The
textof Aristotle's Topics was not knownuntilafterthe mid-XIIth
century, butevenafteritsrecovery Boethiuscontinued, perhapsaided
bytheinfluence ofPeterofSpain,to be themainauthority. Ockham,
however, takesaccountofbothas involving distinctconcerns.Under
consequences whoseconsequent has its subject-termin simplesuppo-
sitionand itspredicate-term thenameofoneofthepredicables, Ock-
ham systematically analysesthe Aristotelian Topics and formulates
its rulesas devicesforidentifying and testingwhether a termis one

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322 orrO BIRD

of thepredicables.
He does thisin chapters17-30 afterhe has con-
sideredconsequencesin personalsupposition
underwhichhe includes
theBoethiantraditionoftheTopics.
Conclusion
To attemptin conclusion a synoptic view,it can be claimedthat
thestudyoftheTopics,at leastalongthelinethatwe havebeenfol-
lowing, underwent a progressive In Aristotle
formalization. theTopics
are devicesforfinding and analysinghowvariouskindsof predicates
maybe attributed to a subject.Throughthisconcernforpredicables
theyare subordinated to a subject-predicatetheoryof thoughtand
discourse.However,the languagethat Aristotleemploysin talking
abouttheTopics,evenapartfromtheexplicitconcern withquestion-
ingand answering in TopicsVIII, suggeststhathe is viewingthem
primarily withinthe contextof a theoryand methodof discussion.
One oftheveryfewhistorical studiesoftheTopics-that by Thion-
villein 1855-evengoesso faras to suggestthatthediscovery ofthe
Topicsresultedfroman effort to reduceto principlethe procedures
employed in discussion in thePlatonicdialoguesand presumably also
in theAcademy(T 75).
With Boethiusthe Topics have becomesystematically classified,
termshavebeenintroduced foranalyzingthem,and whatis ofgreat-
estlogicalsignificance in themhas beenstatedin a seriesofMaxims.
In thesummary of themin Peterof Spain theyhave beenremoved
entirely fromconcern withthepredicables. Less richand diversethan
in Aristotle, particularly in mattersof linguisticanalysis,theyhave
becomean objectof special analysis,and the othermaterialwith
whichtheywereassociatedin Aristotlehas eitherbeen droppedor
relegated to othertreatises.
From the startthe Topics had to do witharguments and the
maximsor rulesforvalidatingthem.In Ockhamtheybecomesub-
sumedunderthestudyof logicalconsequence considered firstin the
formof a conditional proposition. Theyare distinguished bothfrom
syllogisticconsequenceand froma purelyformalconditional whose
truthin no waydependsuponthetermsfromwhichit is composed.
Topical arguments or consequences are thosethat dependfortheir
validityupona semantical relationbetweentheirsignificantterms.To
thisextenttheyare notpurelyformal.However,thisis notto imply
thattheyare totallywithoutformalelements.The rule,maxim,or
extrinsic mediumthatvalidatesa Topical consequencemay consti-
tutea purelyformalrule,i.e. a logicallaw.Aristotle appreciated this,
as we have seen,and in distinguishing simplefromfactualconse-
quencesOckhamsortsout thelogicallynecessary fromtheprobable.
In thisrespecttheancientTopicalanalysismaycontribute to con-
temporary logicaldiscussion. In comparisons betweenformal logicand

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 LOGICAL TOPICS: ARISTOTLE TO OCKHAM 323

ordinarylanguageconsiderable emphasisis sometimes placed upon

the importance of non-formal procedures as somehowextra-logical.
Thusit has beenurgedthat"a typicalinstanceofa non-formal conse-
quencerelation"thatescapesformalanalysisis providedin thesen-
tence: "'x is red' implies'x is colored"' (AM 35). It is just such
sentencesas thisthatthe Topicsare devisedto analyse.In fact,we
have herea species-genus relation.This relation,it maybe claimed,
sinceit doesnotbelongto logicto knowthat'red'is a
is extra-logical,
speciesof 'color.'However,oncethisis given,theformallogiciancan
inquireinto whatit is that warrantsthe inference, and, following
Topical analysis,he can providein P3(2) a rule whichis in facta
proposition offormallogic.
UniversityofNotreDame.
TABLE OF REFERENCES
A Aristotle,
Topica,in Organum, ed. LudivicusLucius (Basel, 1619); Topica,
in OperaOmnia,ed. T. Buhle (Zweibrucken, 1792); Topica,trans.W. A.
Packard-Cambridge (Oxford,1928).
AA Alexander Aphrodisias,In Aristotelis Topicorum Librosocto Commentaria,
ed. M. Wallies(Berlin,1891).
AB Abelard,Dialectica,ed. L. M. De Rijk (Assen,1956).
AM AliceAmbrose, "The Problemof LinguisticInadequacy,"in Philosophical
Analysis,ed. M. Black (Ithaca,1950),15-37.
BCT Boethius, In TopicaCiceronis Commentaria, Migne,PatrologiaLatina,t. 64.
BDT Boethius, De DifferentiisTopicis,loc. cit.sup.
BIF OttoBird,"The Formalizing oftheTopicsin MediaevalLogic,"NotreDame
Journalof FormalLogic,I (1960), 138-149.
BIO OttoBird,"Topicand Consequence in Ockham'sLogic,"NotreDame Jour-
nal ofFormalLogic,II (1961),65-78.
BIR OttoBird,"The Re-Discovery oftheTopics: Professor Toulmin'sInference-
Warrants," Mind,LXX (1961), 534-539.
OC Ockham,SummaLogicae,ed. P. Boehner(St. Bonaventure, 1951,1954),2
vols.,continuouspagination,butstillincomplete, reachingonlythe1stofthe
3rdpart.For Pt. 3-3, I cite: Summatotiuslogicae(Oxford,1675).
P PeterofSpain,Summulaelogicales, ed. I. M. Bochenski(Rome,1947).
R L. M. Regis,L'opinionselonAristote(Ottawa,Paris,1935).
De la theoriedes lieuxcommuns
T E. Thionville, dansles Topiquesd'Aristote
et des principalesmodifications qu'elle a subiesjusqu'a nos jours (Paris,
1855).

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