WhoRulesAmerica.

net
http://whorulesamerica.net/local/new_haven.html(retrievedMarch22,2017)

WhoReallyRuledinDahl'sNewHaven?
byG.WilliamDomhoff

RobertA.Dahl'sWhoGoverns?(1961)isastudyofNewHaven,Connecticut,acoastalcitywithabout160,000
peoplein1960.Located80mileseastofNewYorkCityand47milessouthofHartford,thecityisbestknown
asthehomeofYaleUniversity.
Dahl'sstudywastheanswertoallthatsupposedlyailedthesocialsciencesinthe1960s.It
refutedHunter's(1953)claimthatarelativehandfulofbusinessleadersdominatedAtlanta,
andevenmoreimportantly,it"offeredanalogieswithnationalpoliticsthatfewothercities
couldprovide"becauseofits"highlycompetitivetwopartysystem"(Dahl,1961,pp.v
vi).TheUnitedStatesisNewHavenwritlarge.Thebookwonaprizeasthebestbookin
politicalsciencefortheyearitwaspublishedandwasoneofthemostwidelycitedbooks
inthesocialsciencesforthenext20years.
MapoftheNewYork
InDahl'sviewofNewHaveninthe1950s,thelocalupperclasswasnotbasedinthe NewHavenHartfordarea
(clicktoexpand)
businesscommunitythebusinesscommunitywaspassiveandnotveryinfluentialand
YaleUniversity,forallitswealth,wasontheperipheryoflocalpolitics.Thedowntown
businesscommunitycouldoftenblockproposalsitdislikedwhichdirectlyaffectedits
economicinterests,butitseldomtookaninitiatoryrole.Whenitcametopower,themost
importantarenainNewHavenwasthepoliticalone.Itwasthemayorandhisaideswho
initiatednewprograms,thensoldtheirprogramstothebusinesscommunity,Yale,andthe
generalpopulace.
Althoughnoonesocialclassorinterestgroupwasabletodominatethepoliticalsectoron
MapofNewHaventoday
avarietyofissues,DahlemphasizedthattherewereindeedinequalitiesinNewHaven. (clicktoexpand)
However,theywere"dispersedinequalities,"meaningthatnoonegrouphadallofthe
differenttypesofresources,suchassocialstanding,legitimacy,wealth,knowledge,andpublicoffice,thatcould
beutilizedtoexercisepower.Moreover,itwasrelatively"easy"to"penetrate"the"politicalstratum,"definedas
thesmallnumberofcitizenswhoarehighlyactiveinpolitics(Dahl,1961,pp.9193).Politiciansweretherefore
alertto"citizendesires"andwouldtrytoberesponsiveiftheycouldseean"electoralpayoff"(Dahl,1961,p.
93).Theresultofdispersedinequalities,thepermeabilityofthepoliticalstratum,andpoliticalcompetitionwasa
pluralisticdistributionofpowernotarulingclass,dominantclass,orpowerelite.

NewHaveninthe21stCentury
TheargumentaboutNewHaveninthe1950s,acityseenatthetimeasevidenceforthegreatfuturemade
possiblebyurbanrenewal,isespeciallypoignantintermsofhowthingsturnedoutthere.Itisnowoneofthe
poorestcitiesintheUnitedStates.Yaleanditsfacultymembersareislandsofincreasingprivilegeandisolation
inaseaofmisery.Here'showareporterfromManchester,England,startedastoryinTheObserverin2002:
ThenorthwindcutscoldandsuddenacrossthehistoricgreenofNewHaven.Itblowsthroughthe"tentcity"
where the homeless huddle. And it blows round the spires and quadrangles of Yale University, one of
America'srichestIvyLeaguecolleges.
Thecontrastisstark:CharleneJohnson,threemonthspregnant,emergesfromherbivouac,worryingaboutthe
winterthatliesbetweenherandherduedate.AndallaroundareYale'sstonewalls,elegantcolonialchurches
andsmartpeoplewalkingpastboutiquesandcoffeeshops,carryingtheircoursebooks.
"You know what's underneath you?" challenges Rod Cleary, who was released from prison in Los Angeles
afteraconvictionforgangfighting,foundbutlostajobinNewHaven,andhasnowbeenevicted."I'lltellya:
 bones.Thisgreenwasacemeteryonceyou'resittingonapauper'sgrave.And,man,that'swhatit'sgoingto
beagainifweain'tcareful."
ThecontrastthisreporterdrawsbetweenYaleandthepoorismorethanpoetic.AlthoughfewYaliescanbring
themselvestobelieveit,Yalecontributessignificantlytothebasicproblemscausedbydeindustrialization.It
startedtakingalargeamountofprimedowntownlandoffthetaxrolesinthe1920sand1930swhilerefusingto
giveanycompensation,justatthetimewhenNewHavenwasstartingtodeclineasamanufacturingcenter.In
addition,italwayshaspaiddirtcheapwagestoitsthousandsofstaffemployees,leadingtostrikesandtensions
inthelastfewdecades.PeterDobkinHall,ahistorianwhotaughtatYaleformanyyears,andnowteachesat
Harvard,wroteadetailedaccountin2003fortheYaleDailyNewson"HowYaleDestroyedNewHaven's
Economy."
In2005,Yaleenjoyedataxfreeendowmentofjustover$15billionaftera22.3%returnonitsinvestmentsin
2004.(Amonguniversities,onlyHarvardhasalargerendowment,atnearly$26billion.)Yalealumnicreatedthe
coreoftheendowmentingoodpartbecausegiftstouniversitiesareataxwriteoff.Theendowmentgrows
rapidlyinlargepartbecausethecapitalgainsonitsinandoutstocktradesarenottaxed(Stein,2005).(Thefact
thatYalehastheenormoussumstotakeadvantageofcompanytakeoversandprivatebuyoutsarrangedby
billionairecapitalfundsalsohelps).Sotheuniversitybenefitsintwowaysfromitstaxfreestatus,butonlyin
the1990sdiditgetaroundtogiving$2$3millioneachyearin"voluntarycontributions"tothecityforfire
services,afigurethatroseto$4.18millionin2004.(ForaJanuary2008updatebyaNewYorkTimesreporteron
thegrowingdominanceofYaleinNewHaven,clickhere.)
InthefaceofthesemeagerhandoutsandtheincreaseinunemploymentforlowincomepeopleinNewHaven's
innercityduetotheGreatRecession,gangsandgunviolencealsohaveincreased.InanApril,2010article
entitled"InTheShadowofYale,AWorldAMillionMilesAway,"theNewYorkTimesreportedthat17people
weremurderedinthiscityofjust124,000inthehalfyearbetweenOctober2009,andmidApril2010.
BylateOctober2011,thehomicideratewasthehighestithadbeensince1994,withtwomonthsremainingin
theyear.The29thmurderoftheyearoccurredablockfromtheuniversity'smainsciencecomplex,inwhatwas
consideredoneofthesafestneighborhoodsinthecity(whoseresidentsincludethepresidentoftheuniversity).
MuchofthepreviousviolentcrimehadoccurredwithinafewmilesofYale,but"thevastmajorityofthe
homicideshaveplaguedstreetsandneighborhoodsthatmostYalieshaveneverheardof,letalonevisited,"
accordingtotheYaleDailyNews.However,mostofthemurderswereknowntotheYalecommunityevenif
theydidn'tpayattentiontothelocalnewspaperortelevisionstation:studentsreceivedemailalertsaboutsome
ofthemfromtheYalepolicedepartment,andtheschool'snewspaperranseveraldetailedaccounts.Inaddition,
manyofYale'sblackstaffresideinthesameneighborhoodsinwhichahighpercentageofthemurdersoccurred
onedininghallemployeetoldareporterthatheknewamajorityofthe25youngmenwhohadbeenkilledby
latesummer.Meanwhile,Yale'spresidentearnedasalaryofover$1.5millionayearby2008,withthe605full
professors(excludingthemedicalfaculty,whichhasevenhighersalaries)averaging$177,000ayearin2011,
andthe146associateprofessorsaveraging$103,000.ForfurtherinformationanddetailonhomicidesinNew
Havenin2011,seethisstoryandtheincludedlinkstorelatedstories.
However,thereweresomeglimmersofrenewedhopein2012:ahandfulofneighborhoodinsurgents,backedby
theresourcesofUNITEHERE,anationwideunion,wonenoughseatsonthe30memberBoardofAldermento
becomethedominantpoliticalforceinthecityinearly2012.Withinaweek,thechiefofpolicehadresigned,
andneighborhoodpolicinghadbeenrestored.Thenumberofmurdersfellfrom34in2011to17in2012,and
YaleagreedtoprovidemostofthefundsforNewHavenWorks,acityprogramthattrainslocalresidentsfor
entryleveljobsthathavebeensetasideatYale,theutilitycompany,andotherfirms.Justasthegrowth
coalitionshopedinthe1950sthatNewHavenwouldbethemodelcityforurbanrenewalwhichturnedtobe
adisasterforlowincomecitizenssotooliberalsnowhopethatNewHavenwillbecomeamodelforthe
revivaloftheunionmovement.(ForadetailedaccountfromMay2013,see"TheNewNewHaven"inThe
AmericanProspect.)
InFebruary2014,theNewYorkTimesreportedthatthecityofNewHavenseemedtobeonthevergeofadeal
thatwouldpermitaCanadiandevelopertocreateamassivemixedusestructure"onwhatisnowtheedgeof
downtown."Itwouldinclude1,000rentalapartments,retailspace,officespace,ahighendhotel,andrestaurants
thatwouldserve"organicproducegrownin"rooftopgardens."Theremainingstickingpointconcernedastate
subsidy,viaabondissue,thatwouldremoveamassive,"illconceived,1950shighway"thatwallsoffthe
districtfromtherailroadstation,Yale'sextensivenearbymedicalcomplex,andaformerlyblackandethnic
neighborhoodknownasTheHill.
Thehugeironyofthisexpensivehighwayremovalisthatthehighwaywasbuiltwithstategovernmentmoneyat
theinsistenceoftheNewHavendowntowngrowthcoalitionpreciselytoprovideabarricadeagainstlow
incomeneighborhoodssuchasTheHillandtohelpclearthewayforYale'smedicalcomplex.Andtheironyof
ironies:thenewprojectwasrationalizedasonethat"wouldadvanceeffortstoknitneighborhoodsback
together."Althoughthedowntowngrowthcoalitiondestroyedtheseneighborhoodsnearly60yearsago,that's
noproblembecausememoriesareshort,andpeoplehavebetterthingstodothanreadaboutNewHaven'ssordid
history.Sothenewplanprobablyseemsentirelynewandhopefultomostcitizensespeciallythosewhoare
newtoNewHavensincethe1970s.
ThebattlebyNewHavenleaderstoobtainthestatesubsidyfortheoriginalhighway,whichwasopposedby
statehighwayofficialsbecausetheyknewitwasnotneeded,willreceivedetailedattentionthisdocument.In
onesense,thepressuretoremovethehighwaysuggeststhatthingshavecomefullcircle,exceptthatthistimeit
isbeingdoneinthenameofhelpingneighborhoodseventhoughitwillmostlybenefitbigrealestate
interests.ThewholeepisodehighlightsonceagainthatNewHavenisoneofmanyfailingcitieswhose
neighborhoodsweredestroyedovera50to60yearperiodbygreedyelitesintentonpreservingtheirland
valuesthroughtheuseofcity,state,andfederalsubsidiestobuildconventioncentersandothervenuesthatend
uplosingmoney(Sanders,2014).Thelandownersarestillrichandtheircitiesarestillpoorandtheyare
stillusingbailoutstokeeptheirgamegoing.
WithNewHaven'spovertyandYale'sdominanceasthebackdrop,IturntoDahl'sstudyanditsdeficiencies,as
shownbymylaterresearch,whichisbasedoninterviewsandtheminingofarchivesthatDahleitherignoredor
didnothaveaccesstoatthetime.ThankstoDahl'sprofessionaldecencyandcourtesy,Ialsohadaccessto
transcriptsoftheinterviewsheandhisassistantsconductedinthelate1950s.Inthecontextofmyarchival
discoveriesontheroleofaYaleUniversitytrusteeinlobbyingthefederalgovernmentforurbanrenewalfunds,
nottomentiontheevidencefortheChamberofCommerce'stotalsupportforthelocalprogram,Dahl'sown
interviewsendupassomeofthebestevidenceagainsthisargument.

Dahl'sStudyandItsFindings
Socialnotablesandeconomicnotables
Dahlbeganhisstudybyexamininglistsofwhathecalledsocialnotablesandeconomicnotables,meaning
membersofthelocalupperclassandthelocalbusinesscommunity.Hewantedtoseeiftheyoverlappedas
muchaspowerstructureanalystshadclaimed.Thesocialnotableswere231familiesthathadattendedthelocal
debutanteballattheNewHavenLawnClubineither1951,1958,or1959.Butthismeagerlisthardlygivesus
anaccuratepictureofthelocalupperclass,asshownshortly.
Asfortheeconomicnotables,whonumbered238,heincludedallthoseinthefollowingcategories:
1. ThepresidentorchairmanoftheboardofanycorporationwithpropertyinNewHavenassessedinanyof
thefiveyears19531957atavalueplacingitamongthefiftyhighestassessmentsinthecity.
2. Anyindividualorgroupofindividualswithpropertyinthecityassessedintheyears195357atavalueof
$250,000ormore.
3. Anyindividualwhowasadirectorofthreeormoreofthefollowing:afirmwithanassessedvaluationof
$250,000ormoreamanufacturingfirmwithfiftyemployeesormorearetailingfirmwith25employees
ormore.
4. AlldirectorsofNewHavenbanks.
Thisgrabbagoflargebusinesses,smallbusinesses,andindividualrealestateholderscannottellusifthereisa
cohesivedowntownbusinesscommunity,asthereinfactwasatthetime.Detailsinaminute.
Withhis231socialnotablesand238economicnotablesinhand,Dahlthencomparedthetwogroupsandfound
only24peoplewhowereinbothcategories.Thisoverlapismuchsmallerthanwhathasbeenfoundinstudiesof
largercities(Domhoff,1970Domhoff,1983).HeconcludesthatthemostimportantbusinesspeopleinNew
Havenarenotpartofthelocalsocialelite.Scoreoneforpluralism.
ButtherearemanymethodologicalflawsinDahl'squicklittlestudy,sohisconclusionsareinaccurate.Myown
analysisofthesocialupperclassandthelocalbusinesscommunityprovidesaverydifferentpicture,onethatis
consistentwithresearchstudiesofothercities.
First,theupperclassinNewHavenisbestdefinedbysocialclubs,asestablishedinaclassicstudyofthatcity
whichisalmostcompletelyignoredbyDahl,andcertainlynotutilizedtolookatclass:
Afamily'sclassstatuscanbedeterminedmostaccuratelybyitsclubmembershipsbecausetheprivateclubsof
theareaaregradedaccordingtotheprestigeoftheirmembers.Conversely,aman,woman,oranuclearfamily
is ranked by those conversant with the elite's system of values in terms of the clubs to which one belongs.
Memberships in appropriate clubs are evidence of validated status and they symbolize for the initiated "who
oneis."(Hollingshead&Redlich,1958,p.81)
Basedonthisstudy,alongwithmypriorstudiesofsocialclubsinmanydifferentcities,includingNewHaven,
andmysubsequentinterviewsinNewHaven,Ioperationallydefinedthelocalupperclassintermsof
membershipinoneormoreofthreesocialclubs:
TheNewHavenLawnClub,anintownfamilyclubwherethedebutanteballisheld
TheNewHavenCountryClub,anearbysuburbanclubwithagolfcourse
TheGraduateClub,amen'sclubintheheartofthedowntownarea

Theselectionofthesethreeclubsissupportedbythelargeoverlapamongthemintheir
membership.TheLawnClub,withabout500localmembers,andtheGraduateClub,with
alittleover400localmembers,have113membersincommon.Thecountryclub,with
some650localmembers,had76overlapswiththeLawnClub,and56withtheGraduate
Club.Inaddition,thereare17peoplewhoareinallthreeclubs.Theideathattheseclubs
aregoodindicatorsofupperclassstandingisalsosupportedbythefactthatsomeoftheir NewHavenLawnClub
(clicktoenlarge)
members,includingmanyoutoftownmembers,arealsomembersofexclusiveclubsin
largercities,whichmyearlierstudiesshowedtobeinstitutionsofthenationalupperclass(Domhoff,1970,
Chapter1Domhoff,1975).
Furthermore,thepeoplewhoattendedthedebutanteball,therebysatisfyingDahl'ssoleindicatorofupperclass
standing,wereingoodmeasuremembersofthethreeclubs.Ofthe198couplesorindividualswhoattendedthe
ballin1958and1959,theyearsforwhichIwasabletoobtainattendancelists,70percentwereinatleastoneof
thethreeclubsand29percentwereintwoormore.Thisfindingsuggeststhatthedebutanteeventisonepartof
thelocalupperclassscene.
Overall,then,IamsayingthatthesocialnotablesinNewHaveninthelate1950swereanetworkofoverlapping
socialcirclesconsistingofroughly1,350families,whomadeupabout0.8%ofthepopulationinNewHaven
County.
OnceIhadagoodfixonthesocialnotables,Inextdevelopedanetworkdefinitionofthedowntownbusiness
communitybyferretingouttheinterlockingdirectorshipsamongallbusinessesinNewHavenin1959with$1
millionormoreinassets.Ialsolookedatthelocalcorporatelawfirmstoseeiftheyinterlockedwiththebanks
andcorporations,asIexpectedtheywouldbasedonmypaststudies.Thisanalysisshowedthattherewasawell
knitdowntownbusinesscommunity.Itincluded54ofthe60milliondollarfirmsandallfivelawfirmswithfour
ormorepartners.The10mostinterconnectedfirmswereallfinancialinstitutionsandpublicutilities,withthe
exceptionofonelawfirm.Thelargestbankinthecity,theFirstNewHavenNationalBank,withhalfofall
commercialbankassets,had26connectionswithsevenoftheotherninecentralfirmsand52connectionsto28
organizationsoverallthroughits25personboardofdirectors.Itwasclearlyatthecenterofthenetwork.
Amusingly,theFirstNewHavenNationalBankwassaidtobeattheheartofthepowerstructurebyoneof
Dahl'sinformants,HaroldGrabino,agraduateofYaleLawSchoolwhoworkedfortheRedevelopmentAgency.
GrabinowastalkingtooneofDahl'sassistants,whoendedthereportbysayingthatit"Soundslikeaquotefrom
Hunter,"butofcoursetheydidnottaketheclaimsofthismemberofthemayor'sredevelopmentteamvery
seriously:
GrabinosaysthatgenerallyintheSouthCentralProjectthecitywillleasetheland,notsellit,butinthecase
oftheFirstNewHavenNationalBank,theFirstNationalBanksaiditwantedtoownthepropertyintheSouth
CentralProject,soitwillgetit.AccordingtoGrabino,nothinggetsdonewithouttheFirstNewHavenNational
Bank saying so. According to him, it is "at the top of the power structure." The First New Haven National
Bank's building is in the area which will be covered by the South Central Project. I asked him why the First
National was at the top of the power structure and he suggested it was perhaps because of its control of
investmentmoneyforredevelopment.(Then)hesaidno,thiswasnotthereasonandsaid,"Justlookatwho's
on its board of directors." "Oh," I said, "you have to get the bank's support." He said, "The bank's support is
necessaryforanythingthatisdoneinthistownincludingredevelopment."(SoundslikeaquotefromHunter.)
It'salsoimportantthatIfoundYaletobeconnectedtothisnetworkinthreeways,somethingthatwouldnotbe
expectedfromreadingDahl.First,11ofitstrustees,officersandprofessorsweredirectorsoflocalbusinesses,
providingYalewith15connectionsto13companies.Sevenoftheconnectionsarewithfiveofthemostcentral
organizations,makingYaleveryclosetothecenteroftheoverallnetwork.Forexample,theSecretaryofYale,
RubenHolden,secondonlytothepresidentinpoweronthecampus,wasadirectoroftheConnecticutSavings
Bank.TheassistanttothepresidentofYale,CharlesO'Hearn,wasontheboardoftheFirstNewHavenNational
Bank,whichofcourselinksYaledirectlytotheheartoftheNewHavenbusinesscommunity.Thefullpictureof
theinterlocksbetweenYaleandthedowntownbusinesscommunityispresentedinTable1.
Table1:YalePersonnelonLocalCorporateBoards

ReubenHolden,secretaryoftheuniversity,isontheboardofConnecticutSavingsBank.(MarriedtothedaughterofaYaletrustee,
heisintheLawnClubandtheGraduateClub.)
CharlesO'Hearn,assistanttothepresidentofYale,wasavicepresidentofFirestoneTireandRubberandapartnerintheinvestment
firmofScudder,Stevens,andClarkbeforejoiningtheuniversitystaff.HeisontheboardoftheFirstNewHavenNationalBank.(He
isalsointheNewHavenCountryClubandtheGraduateClub.)
EdwinBlair,aYaletrusteeandapartnerinalargeNewYorklawfirm,isontheboardofSecurityInsuranceCompanyofNewHaven
andT.A.D.JonesandCompany,aproducerofcoal,coke,andpetroleumproducts,aswellascorporationsoutsideofNewHaven.(He
isintheLawnClubandtheGraduateClub.)
LuciusF.Robinson,Jr.,aYaletrusteeandaHartfordlawyer,isadirectorofSouthernNewEnglandTelephone,aswellasadirector
ofseveralcompaniesinHartford.
HoraceF.Isleib,aninvestmentofficerinthetreasurer'soffice,isadirectorofConnecticutSavingsBankandC.S.Mersickand
Company.
CharlesSeymour,emerituspresidentofYale,isontheboardofNewHavenSavingsBank.(HeisintheGraduateClub.)
SamuelW.Dudley,emeritusdeanoftheengineeringschool,isontheboardoftheNationalSavingsBank.
RayB.Westerfield,emeritusprofessorofpoliticaleconomy,ischairmanoftheFirstFederalSavingsandLoanAssociationanda
directorofTradesmen'sNationalBank.(HeisintheLawnandGraduateClubs.)
FredFairchild,emeritusprofessorofpoliticaleconomy,isontheboardsofUnitedIlluminating,andConnecticutSavingsBank.(Heis
amemberoftheLawnClubandtheGraduateClub.)
KentHealy,professoroftransportation,isontheboardoftheConnecticutCompany,abuscompanyownedbytheNewYork,New
Haven,andHartfordRailroad,onwhoseboardheformerlysat.(HeisintheGraduateClub.)
HenryA.Pfisterer,professorofarchitecturalengineering,isontheboardoftheNewHavenTrapRockCompany.(Heisamemberof
theLawnClub.)

ThesecondwayYaleisconnectedtothisnetworkisthroughtwoofthemostprestigiouscorporatelawfirms,
whichYaleusedforitslegalbusiness.Third,Yaleisconnectedtotherestofthebusinessnetworkthroughthe
factthatmostofthepartnersinthefivemainlawfirmsweregraduatesofYaleLawSchoolmanyofthese
peoplecouldbecalledonforinformationortocarrymessages.
(FormoredetailontheentireNewHaveneconomicnetworkandYale'sconnectionstoit,clickhere.)
WhenitcomestoDahl'squestionabouttheoverlapofsocialandeconomicnotables,well,thedirectorsofthe
centralfirmsinthisbusinessnetworkwereverylikelytobemembersofthelocalsocialeliteasdefinedbytheir
membershipinoneormoreofthreesocialclubs.Thispointismademostsimplybyalookattheboardofthe
FirstNewHavenNationalBank24ofits25memberswereinatleastoneofthethreesocialclubs.Thirteenof
the25wereintwoofthethreeclubs,andtwoboardmemberswereamongtheseveneconomicnotableswho
wereinallthreeclubs.
Ofthe319localdirectorsandlawpartnersencompassedbytheentirenetwork,56percentwereinoneormore
ofthethreesocialclubs.Thoseindividualswithtwoormoredirectorshipswereevenmorelikelytobeinthe
socialelite.Ofthe91NewHavenresidentsontwoormoreboards,80%wereinatleastoneoftheclubs,and
40%wereintwo.Theoverlapwasgreaterforthosewhosatonseveralboards:ofthe25menwhosatonthree
boards,76%wereinatleastoneclubofthe15whosatonfourormoreboards,90%wereinoneoftheclubs.
Thesefindingsaresimilartothoseforlargercitiesandthenationallevelingeneral.Themorecentralapersonis
inthebusinessnetwork,themorecentralheistherewerezerowomeninthenetworkbacktheninthe
socialelite.
Conversely,ofthe132personsmeetingnoneoftheupperclasscriteria,42%aretreasurers,managers,andvice
presidentswhoonlysitontheboardofthecompanytheyworkfor.Theyareexecutiveswhoarepartofthelocal
businessestablishment,buttheyarenotmembersoftheupperclassasIhavedefinedit.Therearealsosmall
companiesattheperipheryofthenetworkwhosedirectorsdonothaveupperclassstanding.
AsimilarpictureofsocialandeconomiceliteoverlapemergedwhenIcomparedDahl'sownlistofeconomic
notableswithmyclubmembershiplists.Ofthe238peopleonhislist,43percentwereinoneormoreofthe
threeclubs.Ofthe139localbusinesspeoplewhowerebothonhislistandinmybusinessnetwork,70percent
wereinoneoftheclubs.So,evenhispoorlyconstructedlistofeconomicnotableshasalargeoverlapwiththe
socialelitewhenanadequateoperationaldefinitionoftheupperclassisused.
PuttingasidethefactthatDahl'stwolistswereridiculouslysmallandtotallyinadequate,whydidn'ttheyoverlap
evenmorewitheachotherandwithmylistsofsocialandeconomicnotables?
First,whenitcomestothedebutantelists,Dahlwaswrongtoassumethatpeoplefrom1951canbecompared
witheconomicnotablesfrom1958.Itignoresthefactthatsomeofthemmighthavebeenretiredordeadby
then.(ThatlisthadbeenlostandIcouldn'tcheckit.)Second,whenturningtothe1958and1959debutanteball
lists,Dahlmadenoattempttodeterminehowmanyofthepeopleonthemwerefriendsandrelativesofthe
proudparentsfromoutsidetheNewHavenarea.Ifsomewere,theycanhardlybeconsideredmembersofthe
localsocialnotables.Third,Ifoundthatalmostonethirdofthepeopleonthe1958and1959guestlistswere
Yaleadministratorsorprofessors.TheseYaliesmaywellbepartofthesocialelite,buttheycannotbe
reasonablyexpectedtobepresentinlargenumbersonalistofeconomicnotables.Inshort,thedebutantelists
thatserveasthesoleindicatorofupperclassstandinginNewHavenareevenshorterthantheyfirstappear
whenitcomestoaseriouscomparisonwitheconomicnotables.Thewholeenterpriseisstackedagainstany
appreciableoverlap.
AsfarasDahl'slistofeconomicnotables,therewereseveralproblemsintermsofacomparisonwithmylist:
1. Therewere14namesonhislistwhowouldhavebeenonmineiftheyhadnotdiedorlefttheir
directorshipsbetween1958and1959.
2. EightpeopleonDahl'slistaremajorexecutiveswithbusinesseswhoseheadquartersareinothercities.
Theyappearedonhislistbecausetheircompanieshadrealestateholdings,factories,orretailoutletsin
NewHaven.WhileitmightbepossibletoarguethatthesepeoplehavepowerinNewHaventhroughtheir
localmanagers,Idonotthinktheybelongonalistoflocaleconomicnotablesthatisbeingcomparedwith
alistoflocalsocialnotables.
3. TwentytwopeopleonDahl'slistaredirectorsoftwosmallcommercialbanksinthearea,bankswith
assetsofonly$12.9millionand$3.5million.TheyappearbecauseDahlchosetoincludeallbank
 directors,eventhoughhedidnotchoosetoincludealldirectorsofindustrialcorporations.Dahlbiasedhis
listwithbankdirectorswithoutprovidinganyrationaleforthisdecision,andtheresultisalistof
economicnotableswhichincludedsmallbankerswithnoconnectionstothedominanteconomic
institutionsortheexclusivesocialclubs.
4. Thirtypeopleonthelistarelocalpropertyownersandsmallbusinesspeople.Theirholdingsarerelatively
smallinrelationtothoseofthemajorinstitutionsinNewHaven.Theyarecardealers,motelowners,and
apartmenthouseowners.
5. Thereisanother,verydelicate,problemwithincludingtheseminorbusinessfiguresonalistofeconomic
notablesthatistobecomparedwithalistofsocialnotables.Ihavetomakethepointverycarefully
becauseDahlmisusedittotrytodiscreditmystudy.Itbeginswiththefactthatthesocialnotablesofthat
daywereantiSemitic(andmoregenerally,antiethnic)WASPs.TheydidnotallowanyJews,orvery
manyItalianAmericans,intotheirsocialclubs.Therefore,becausemanyofthesmallbankersandsmall
realestateownerswereofJewishorItalianheritage,theycouldnotpossiblyoverlapwithadebutantelist
ofWASPexclusionaryantiSemites.

YoumightwonderhowDahlcoulddistortthispoint.Itwasverysimple.HesaidthatI,nottheNewHaven
socialnotables,excludedJewsandItalians(Dahl,1979).Talkaboutblamingthemessenger.AsIlearnedtomy
amazementfromthisandmanyotherkindsofdistortions,itisnotalwayspleasanttodisagreewithpluralists,
evenwhentheyaregenerallydecentpeoplelikeDahl.Whencornered,theycangetverynasty.Inthiscase,Dahl
reliedonadraftrebuttalbyhisformerstudentandhatchetman,NelsonPolsby,wholateralteredwhathewrote
onthebasisofmycritiqueofit(Polsby,1980).Buthedidn'talertDahlthathehadchangedhisdraft.Dahl
essentiallyfollowedPolsbyinmakingthesefalseandunfairaccusations,suggestingtomethatperhapsDahl
didn'tevenreadmybookveryclosely.(IhadsentittohiminmanuscriptformandsaidIwouldbegratefulfor
comments,buthedidn'tevenanswertheletter.)However,allthatisastoryforanotherday,ifever.
Insummaryonthisissue,Dahl'sstudyoftheoverlapbetweenlocalsocialandeconomicelitesinNewHaven
haddifferentresultsfrommostotherstudiesforseveralreasons.First,hehadanarrowdefinitionofthelocal
upperclassthatmayhaveincludedoutoftownersanddeceasedpeople,makinghislistfarsmallerthanitwas
tobeginwith.Second,hisarbitrarydefinitionofeconomicnotablesinsuredthathehadmanyminorproperty
ownerswhowerenotpartoftheactualbusinesscommunity.Third,alistofsocialnotablesthathasalarge
numberofYalepersonnelcannotpossiblyhavemajoroverlapswithalistoffulltimeeconomicnotables.
Fourth,becauseofthereligiousorethnicbackgroundsofmanyofthesmallbusinesseconomicnotables,there
wasnowaytheycouldappearonalistofsocialnotablesduetotheuglyexclusionarypracticesofWASPsup
untilthe1960sand1970s,whentheyslowlybegantoopenuptheirsocialclubstosuccessfulbusinesspeople
theyhadpreviouslyconsideredtheirethnicinferiors(Baltzell,1964Zweigenhaft&Domhoff,1982).
AlthoughDahl'sresearchontheoverlapofeconomicandsocialnotableswasaninadequateandinvalid
sociologicalmishmash,thatisnottheendoftheargumentbecausehisoverlapstudywasonlyaminorpartof
hisoverallproject.Hismeageroverlapfindingsweresometimesciteduncriticallybygleefulpluralists,butnot
veryoften.Themainfocusofhisbookwasonthedegreetowhichpeopleineitherofhistwocategories
involvedthemselvesinoneormoreofthreedifferent"issueareas"thatarediscussedinthenextsection.
Involvementinthree"issueareas"
Dahl'sbigconcerninhisbook,duetohisclaimthattheonlyseriouswaytostudypoweristhrough
reconstructingdecisionstoseewhoinfluencedwhom,wasonthreedifferentissuesthathepickedina
completelyarbitraryfashionbasedontheirvisibilityandapparentimportancewithinthecityasawhole.Hedid
notbothertoaskeitherlocalbusinesselitesorknowledgeableobserversofthecityfortheiropinions,asHunter
(1953)andothersdid(Bonjean&Grimes,1974,forasummary).Thethreeissueswere:
Nominationsforofficebybothpoliticalparties
Publiceducation
Urbanrenewal
Dahl'sconclusionfromhisinvestigationofthesethreeissueareasisthatneithertypeofnotablewas
significantlyinvolvedinthedecisionmakingprocessinNewHaven.Moreover,avarietyofgroupstookpart.
Mostimportantly,hesaysthatelectedandappointedgovernmentofficials,andespeciallythemayoratthetime,
RichardC.Lee,werethekeydecisionmakers.Hisnegativeconclusionsabouttheroleoftheeconomicnotables
expresshisgeneralfindings:
To reconstruct these decisions is to leave little room for doubt that the Economic Notables, far from being a
rulinggroup,aresimplyoneofthemanygroupsoutofwhichindividualssporadicallyemergetoinfluencethe
policiesandactsofcityofficials.AlmostanythingonemightsayabouttheinfluenceoftheEconomicNotables
couldbesaidwithequaljusticeaboutahalfdozenothergroupsintheNewHavencommunity.(Dahl,1961,p.
72)
Buttheresearchthatledtothisconclusionisn'tanybetterthanhisworkontheoverlapofsocialandeconomic
elites,asIwillnowdemonstrate.
PoliticalNominations
Theareaofpoliticalnominationswaschosenbecausenominationsdeterminewhichpersonseventuallyendup
inoffice.Dahlfoundthatleaderswithinthetwopartiesdeterminemayoralcandidateswithoutthehelpofeither
socialoreconomicnotables.
Butpoliticalnominationsarenotinandofthemselvesasubstantiveissueareainthewaythatpubliceducation
andurbanrenewalare.Theyareaproceduraldevicetodeterminewhichparticularindividualswillholdspecific
positions,whichisnotthesameasaconflictoverwhichpolicieswillbecarriedout.Tomakenominations
relevant,itthereforewouldhavetobedemonstratedthatnominationsaffectpolicyoutcomesandthattheyare
relevanttothelocalbusinesscommunity.Infact,thereisnoevidencethatitmakesanydifferencewhetherone
personoranotherisnominated,especiallywhenthereisevidencethatthebusinesscommunityhadaccesstothe
DemocraticmayorthefocusofDahl'sstudythroughcampaignfinanceandpersonalcontact.
Thenominationprocessalsohadaformalbiasagainstparticipationbyeconomicandsocialnotables.Itwasa
ruleofbothpartiesthatleadershadtoliveinthecity,butmostnotableslivedinthesuburbsandwerenot
eligibleforpartyoffice.
Inshort,therewasnowaymostofthemcouldbedirectlyinvolved,butthereisevidencethattheywere
indirectlyinvolvedthroughcampaignfinanceandtalkswiththemayor,andinotherwaysaswell,asIwillshow
withthetwosubstantiveissuesDahlstudied.
PublicEducation
Dahlchosetostudytheschoolsystemingoodpartbecauseitwasthelargestiteminthecitybudget,accounting
forbetweenaquarterandathirdofallcityexpenditures.Moreover,hearguesthattheschoolsplayalargerole
inthelivesofmostcitizensatonetimeoranother.Isolatingeightdifferentdecisionsthatoccurredbetween1953
and1959,includinganeyetestingprogram,aprogramtodealwithjuveniledelinquency,newproceduresfor
teacherpromotions,andproposalstoincreaseappropriationsforschoollibraries,hefoundthatinallbutafew
instancesthesuccessfulparticipantsinthesedecisionswereofficiallyandpubliclyinvolvedintheschoolsystem
(Dahl,1961,p.151).MayorLeeandhisappointeesontheBoardofEducationwerethemostimportantofthese
officials.Noeconomicnotableshadanyrole,andonlyahandfulofsocialnotablestookpart.
ButnoneofDahl'sfindingsoneducationhasanytheoreticalrelevancebecausethereisnoevidencethatthese
minorissueswereofanyconcerntotheNewHavenpowerstructure.Infact,mostoftheeconomicandsocial
notableslivedinthesuburbs,wheretheyhadaccesstobetterschoolsystems.ThosewhodidliveinNewHaven
oftensenttheirchildrentoprivateschools.AsDahl(1961,p.70)wrote:"Mostsocialnotablesandmany
economicnotableslivinginNewHavensendtheirchildrentoprivateschoolsasaconsequence,theirinterestin
publicschoolsisordinarilyratherslight."
So,asDahlalsonotes,themainconcernofthelocalbusinessleadersvisvistheschoolsystemwasthecontrol
ofitsexpenditures.Unlikemostcitiesinmoststates,schoolfinancesinNewHavenwerecontrolledbyaBoard
ofFinanceappointedbynoneotherthanthemayor.Thismeantthatthebusinesselitescouldcontroltheschool
systemiftheywereappointedtotheBoardofFinance,andofcoursetheyweresoappointed.Infact,members
oftheBoardofFinancewereoverwhelminglyfromthebusinesscommunity.TheBoardofFinancehadtwo
mainfunctionsthatwererelevanttotheschoolsystem.ItrecommendedataxratethattheelectedBoardof
Aldermen(agaggleof33membersfromthefarflungcitywards)couldraise,butnotlower,anditprepared
budgetestimatesfordepartmentsthatthealdermencouldcut,butnotincrease.Talkaboutconstraints.Clearly,
thedowntownbusinesscommunityhadahammerlockontheschoolsystem.Therewasnothing,butnothing,
thatMayorLeecoulddofortheschoolswithouttheapprovalofthebusinesselites.Smallwonderthatlater
commentatorsrarelyinvokedDahl'sstudyoftheschoolsystemasevidenceforpluralism.
UrbanRenewal:TheBigIssue
ThethirdissuestudiedbyDahlwasurbanrenewal,thefederallyfinancedprogramthatmadeitpossiblefor
citiestobuyandclearwhateverlandthecityleadersdefinedasslumland,andthenresellittodevelopers,
businesses,anduniversities.Dahlsayshechosethisissuebecauseofthegreatamountofmoneyinvolvedand
thepotentialinterestoftheprogramtothebusinesscommunity,butitwasalsothecasethattheissuewas
receivingalargeamountofnewspaperandmagazinecoverageatthetimeDahlwasframinghisstudy.Infact,
bythetimeDahldidhisstudyNewHavenwasconsideredtobetheidealexampleofwhatispossiblethrough
urbanrenewal.
Dahlfoundthatthenumberofsocialandeconomicnotablesinvolvedinurbanrenewalwas27timesgreater
thanwouldbeexpectedbychance,particularlyasmembersofagovernmentcommitteethatwasofficiallysaid
tobeanimportantadvisorygroupfortheprogram.Buthedoesnotattachmuchweighttothisevidencefortwo
reasons.First,thenumberofnotablesinvolvedwasonly10percentofallparticipants.Second,hehadevidence
thatthecommitteeonwhichmanyofthemservedwasapassivebodythatdidthemayor'sbiddingitwas
primarilyarubberstampcommitteewithasymbolicfunction.
Thelackofinvolvementintheissueareaofurbanrenewalissurprising,foritisanareainwhichallurban
theories,includinggrowthcoalitiontheory,wouldexpectbusinessmentobeintenselyactive.However,
accordingtoDahl,NewHaven'sverylargeurbanrenewalprogramwasmadepossiblebytheeffortsofMayor
Lee,whotookofficein1954whentheprogramwasatastandstill.ThesetofadjectivesusedbyDahlto
describethemayor'seffortsborderonheroworship:
"FewaspectsoflocalpolicycouldbemoresalienttotheNotablesthaneffortstosavedowntownNewHaven,
yet the Economic Notables were able neither to agree on nor put through a program of urban redevelopment
evenunderaRepublicanmayoranxioustoretaintheirsupport.WhenredevelopmentcametoNewHaventhe
leadership for it came less from the Notables than from a Democratic mayor, whom most of them originally
opposedandwhoasmayorhadtowheedle,cajole,recruit,organize,plan,negotiate,bargain,threaten,reward,
and maneuver endlessly to get the support needed from the Notables, the small businessmen, the developers
(who came principally from outside New Haven), the federal authorities, and the electorate" (Dahl, 1961, p.
79)
Eventhelargestandmostprestigiousinstitutioninthecity,YaleUniversity,was
foundbyDahltoberelativelypowerlessascomparedwiththemayorandthecity
government.Yalewasthelargestlandownerinthecity,hadoneofthetwoorthree
largestpayrollsinthecommunity,andprovidedasignificantportionofthe
consumerspendinginthedowntownareathroughbothemployeesandwelltodo
students.Manyofthelocalbusinessleaders,andalmostallthepartnersinleading
lawfirms,weregraduatesofYale,andthemayorhadbeentheuniversity'spublic AerialviewoftheYalecampus
relationsmanfortheprevioustenyears(ofwhichmorelater).ButYalewasseenby (clicktoenlarge)

Dahlasseparatefromthelocalbusinesscommunityandatthemercyofthemayor's
wishes.Thisrelativepowerlessnesswasduetoseveralfactors:
AlthoughtheuniversityissometimesregardedbysuspiciouscitizensofNewHavenasanobscurelypowerful
forceinlocalpolitics,infactitisinaweakpoliticalposition.Likeacademicpeopleeverywhere,Yalefaculty
membersarepoliticallyheterogeneousandjealousoftheirindividualautonomytheycanbecountedontoraise
a cry for academic freedom at the first suggestion from an incautious university administration that they are
 expectedtohaveasinglepoliticallineonanything.Certainlynoadministrationinrecentyearshasevenhinted
attheexistenceofaYalepartyline.AlthoughafewindividualfacultymembersareinvolvedinNewHaven
politicsthelastthreeDemocraticaldermenfromtheFirstWardhavebeenyoungYalefacultymembers
most Yale people are much less interested in the politics of New Haven than in the politics of Yale, their
professional associations, the nation, or the international arena. And more of Yale's faculty and other
employees live outside New Haven than in the city. Finally, although the university is one of the biggest
property owners in New Haven, it also happens to be far and away the largest owner of taxfree property
henceYaleofficialsarehighlysensitivetocommunityhostilityandfearfulofanyactionthatmightembroilthe
universityinlocalcontroversy.(Dahl,1961,p.138)
Basedontheresultsofmoststudiesofurbanrenewalprogramsfortheyears1950to1970,itwouldseemthat
Dahl'sfindingsinNewHavenrepresentauniquecase.However,therearemanymajorproblemswithhis
analysis.Infact,itisallwrongexceptforonepoint:MayorLeedidhavetoselltheprogramtosmall
businesspeopleandvoters.Afterall,hewastakinglandfromthesmallbusinessesandpushingmanyordinary
peopleoutoftheirhousing,allthewhileminimizingthetaxbillthateventuallycamedueinthe1960s,whenhis
gambleforareviveddowntownfailedtopayoff.
Itsoundscrude,Iknow,andmanyreaderswillgasp,butIthinkMayorLeewascarryingwaterforthegrowth
coalitionandYaleUniversityintermsofthesubstanceoftheprogram.Yes,asregimetheoristClarenceStone
(1993,p.12)rightlysays,showingthebalanceandreasonablenessthatmakeshisviewstheleftwingofthe
possibleintheacademiccommunity,themayorreceivedwhathedesired:publicityandthehopeforhigher
office.Andtheyoungprofessionalsonhisurbanrenewalstaffhadachancetoutilizetheirskills,andthe
DemocraticPartycouldhandoutpatronageplumstolocalsupporters.ButcontrarytoStone'semphasis,byfar
thebiggestendresultwasthatYaleandthebusinesscommunityreceivedlandandpoorpeopleweremovedout
oftheirneighborhoods.IfthepoorpeoplewereAfricanAmericans,theywerejammedintopublichousingand
otherghettoizedhousingbesides.ThisoutcomeisnowadmittedanddeploredbyalaterYalepluralistwhile
acerbicallyassuringoneandallthatDahl,notme,hadtherightanalysisofhowurbanrenewalunfolded(Rae,
2003).UrbanrenewalinNewHavenisalongandimportantstory,soitdeservesaseparatesection.

UrbanRenewalinNewHaven
TherearethreekeytheoreticalquestionswhenitcomestourbanrenewalinNewHaven:
Whowerethekeymoversandshakersbehindtheprogram?
Whydidtheprogramsuddenlytakeoffin1954and1955aftermanydelays?
WhywastheNewHavenprogramthelargestinthenationby1972initspercapitagrants,receiving
$1,018foreachofitscitizenswhileitsnearestcompetitors,NewarkandBoston,wereaveragingonly
$453and$409perperson,respectively?

ForDahl,theanswertoallthreequestionsistobefoundinthespecialskillsofMayorLeeandhisaides.They
organizedanurbanrenewalcoalitioninNewHavenwhentheycameintoofficein1954andtheyconvincedthe
federalbureaucracyinWashingtontogivethemmoremoneythananyothercitybecausetheywereverygoodat
whattheydid.
Incontrasttothistypicalpluralistinterpretation,whichputsitsemphasisontheactionsandabilitiesof
individualsoperatinginthepoliticalarenaonadecisionbydecisionbasis,myrestudyoftheprogramsuggests
verydifferentanswerstoallthreequestions.
First,thedowntownbusinesscommunityandYalebackedtheprogramearlierandmoreintenselythananyone
else.Dahldidn'tunderstandthisfactforthreereasons:hedidn'thaveaccesstowrittenrecords,hedidn't
interviewwidelyenough,andheacceptedtheclaimsmadetohimininterviewswithMayorLeeandhisaides.
Second,theprogrammovedintofullgearwhenitdidbecauseoflegislative,legal,andadministrativedecisions
atthenationalandstatelevels.TheprogramdidnotadvanceinNewHavenoranywhereelseuntilthefederal
urbanrenewallawwaschangedbyRepublicansin1954,anditcouldnotgoforwardinNewHavenuntil(1)the
ConnecticutSupremeCourtofErrorsruledontheconstitutionalityofurbanrenewaland(2)thestatehighway
commissionfinallyagreedtopayfortheunjustifiablehighwaythatNewHavenwasdemandingwithoutbeing
willingtopayanyofthecost.
Third,thelargeamountofmoneythatNewHavenattractedwasduealmostentirelytoYale
University,whichsuppliedneededexpertiseandmajorfinancialbackinginavarietyof
ways,includingitspurchaseofalocalhighschoolsothelandcouldbeusedforanew
undergraduatecollege.Mostofall,Yaleprovidedacruciallinktothekeymoneydispensing
agencyinWashingtonthroughoneofitstrustees,SenatorPrescottBushofConnecticut,
whowasamemberoftheurbanrenewalcommitteeintheSenate(andyes,thefatherofone
futurepresident,GeorgeH.W.Bush,andthegrandfatherofanother,GeorgeW.Bush).
AlthoughDahlisquitewrongabouttheeagernessofthebusinesscommunity,andthe PrescottBush
reasonsfortheprogram'semergencein19541955,andthereasonsforitslargepercapita
size,heiscompletelyrightthatMayorLeeandhisaidesplayedaveryimportantroleincarryingoutthe
program.Notonlydidtheycraftawilypoliticalandfiscalstrategythatworkedverywelluntilthemid1960s,
buttheyplayedabrokeringrolewithinthegrowthcoalitionaswell.Whendifficultieswithspecificprojects
developed,seriousweaknessesinthelocalbusinesscommunitywereexposed.Itsleaderswereunabletobring
landownersandshopkeeperstogetherinsuchawaythattheycouldkeepafewdissidents,oftensmaller
businesspeoplethebigwigshadtreatedshabbily,fromhamperingtheworkoftheoutsidedevelopers.Mostof
thetopbusinessleadersendedupsittingonthesidelineswhileMayorLeeandhisaides,alongwithSenator
Bush,didtheessentialcoordinatingworkwiththefederalgovernment.
BythetimeDahlbeganhisstudyin1957,theprogramwasalmostcompletelyinthehandsoftheDemocratic
mayorandhisappointees,whoofcoursegavelittlecredittotheworkthathadbeendonebybusinessleaders
andRepublicansafewyearsbefore.Inthe1960s,theprogramwastomoveevenfurtherfromthebusiness
community,becomingforashorttimetheprovinceofastrongandrelativelywellinsulatedRedevelopment
Agency.ButIwon'tbetalkingmuchaboutthe1960swhentheprogramfacedmanyproblemsbecause
Dahldidnotstudythatera.
TheNewHavencasethereforesuggeststhatawellorganizedandhighlyskilledgovernmentadministrationmay
bethenecessaryfinalingredientforobtainingoutsidemoniesinsomecases.Butsuchanadministrationisbyno
meansthesufficientconditionimpliedbyDahl.Intherelationshipbetweenlocalpowerstructuresandcity
administrations,itismorelikelythatthepowerstructurescanfindandsupportthosewithpoliticalskillsthan
thatpoliticianscancreatepowerstructurestosupportthem.Infact,aswillbeshown,membersoftheYale
community,includingthefuturedeanofthelawschool,wereimportantbackersofLee'ssuccessfulrunfor
mayorinNovember,1953.
AquickhistoryofNewHaven,1637to1941
NewHaven,situatedonthecoastalroadbetweenNewYorkandBoston,was
foundedin1637asthecenterofalittletheocraticPuritancolonythatreluctantly
becamepartofConnecticutin1665.In1716itattractedatinycollegeestablished
elsewherein1701thatcametobeknowasYaleUniversity,whichfromthestartwas
seenasanantidotetotheliberalnonsensehappeningatHarvard(foundingdate,
1636).Inotherwords,itwasuptight,starchy,moralistic,andconservativefromthe "AViewoftheBuildingsofYale
CollegeatNewHaven"(1807)
start,anddidnotchangemuchuntilthe1960s,undertheadministrationofKingman (clicktoenlarge)
Brewster,amoderateRepublicanwhoguidedtheuniversitythroughsomevery
periloustimes,withoutanythanks,ofcourse,frommostYalegrads,knowntotheingroupasOldBlues.
However,thatgetsfaraheadofthestorybecauseYaledidnotbecomeasignificanteconomicfactorand
negativeforceinNewHavenuntilthe1930s.Still,someofthecity'slaterproblemsweresetinmotiononthat
datein1716becauseYale,likeotherprivateAmericaninstitutionsofhighereducation,wasgrantedan
exemptionfrompropertytaxes.(Inaddition,itsprofessorswereexemptedfromincometaxesandmilitary
service,buttheylostthoseprivilegesin1834.)
Taxexemptionsaresotakenforgrantedforprivateuniversitiesthattheyarenotusuallyrecognizedforwhat
theyareastatesubsidytotheuniversityanditsstudents.Suchasubsidymakesitpossibletochargelower
tuition.Thismaybeasensiblestrategyifthesubsidizedstudentsarelocalchildrenanddevelopideasandskills
attheuniversitythatlaterbenefitthecommunity.However,tothedegreethatthestudentsareeitherupperclass
orfromotherpartsofthenation,thenthelocaltaxpayersaresubsidizingthealreadyrichandpeoplefromother
locales.ThisisinfactthecurrentsituationinNewHaven.ThelocalcitizenssuffersothatYalestudentsfromall
overtheworld,manyofthemverywelltodo,canpaylowertuition.
ButallthatwasinthedistantfutureasNewHavenbecameaportcityandthenastrongindustrialcityknown
foritscoaches,carriages,watches,andtools,andlateritsfirearms.Itwasthehomeofthefirstcommercial
telephoneexchange,establishedin1879.Inthelate19thandearly20thcenturies,mirroringotherurbanareas,
therewasasmallmovetowardthesuburbsbytherich,butbyandlargetherichandthepoorlivedinreasonable
proximitytoeachotherandtheirwork,andthe100+membersoftheYalefacultylivedwithinafewblocksof
theuniversity(Rae,2003).
NewHavenwasstillprosperousin1899whencityofficialshadthetemeritytoputlandusedfordormsand
cafeteriasonthetaxassessor'slist,butYalerefusedtopayandthenwonitscasebeforetheConnecticut
SupremeCourtofErrors.Whencityleadersmadesimilarnoisesabout10yearslater,notingYalehadthebenefit
ofmanycityservices,theNo.2manintheYaleadministration,SecretaryAnsonPhelpsStokes,wroteaspirited
defensemodestlyentitled"WhatYaleDoesForNewHaven."Inadditiontonotingthehighcultureand
consumerspendingYaleprovided,StokesalsosaidthatYalesavedthecitymoneybyeducatinglocalboysthat
otherwisewouldhavetoattendstatesupportedschools.Thisargumentoverlookedthedecliningnumberoflocal
boysatYaleaswellasthefactthatthestatetaxpayers,notjustthoseinNewHaven,wouldpayiftheseboys
wentinsteadtostatesupportedschools.Thepamphletwasreissuedin1921and1929(Whitehead,1969).
However,therereallywasn'tthatmuchmoneyatstakewhentheargumentwasfirstjoinedbecauseYaleonly
encompassedtwoorthreecityblocks.Butitsgradualgrowthearlyinthe20thcentury,anditsgrowthspurtin
the1920s,raiseditstotalexemptacreageto175in1936,whichrepresentedonethirdofthetotalexemptlandin
thecity.(Yalealsohadanother630acresthatwereusedasagolfcourseandabirdsanctuary,butsincethisland
wasmostlyundeveloped,andmuchofitmarshy,thatdidnotcausequitethelossitslargesizemightsuggest.)
Cityleadersfounditespeciallyupsettingthatexemptlandworth$6.2millionwasvacant,tobeusedforlater
Yalegrowth(Whitehead,1969).
AtthesametimethatYalewasgrowing,andtakinglandoffthetaxrolls,thecityofNewHavenwasdeclining
forquiteseparatereasons.Ithadbeenbypassedasaportcitywhentherailroadsbecameascendantinthe
secondhalfofthe19thcentury,anditslowlylostitsindustrialbaseinthe20th.Thiswasparticularlythecase
withitsonceillustriouscarriagemanufacturers,destroyedbytheautomobile.Tomakemattersworse,the
middleclasses,aidedbytheautomobile,weremovingtothesuburbsandthesurroundingcountryside,which
meantthatmanydowntownretailbusinesseswerelosingcustomerstosuburbanshoppingcenters.(NewHaven
reachedapopulationof162,000in1920,thenstayedaboutthesameforthenext40yearsbeforebeginninga
declinethatbroughtitdownto123,600in2000by2012ithadcreptbackuptoanestimated130,741.)
FacedwiththeGreatDepressionatthesametimeasitwaslosingindustryandmiddle
classcitizens,NewHavenhadabudgetcrisisin1932.Thebankswouldnotlendthe
cityanymoremoneyandtheBoardofAldermanhadtoraisethetaxrate.OnlyYale's
growthprovidedanyeconomichope.Duringthe1930sitaccountedfor51%ofalllocal
construction,withnootherorganizationorsectoraccountingformorethanafew
percent.Inthatcontext,themayoraskedYaleforhelpin1932,andonceagainYale
saidno.In1937themayoraskedtheuniversitytoputvacantlandbackonthetaxrolls
andpromisenottotakeanyfurtherpropertyfor10years..ThistimeanewYale
presidentsaidhecouldnotprovideanymoneyorpromisetolimitgrowth,butthathe TaxexemptlandinNewHaven
wouldputsomeofthevacantlandbackonthetaxlist. in1936Yale'slandislightblue.
(clicktoexpand)
ThepastandfutureofNewHavenwerespelledoutin1937inaprescientbookcalledNewHaven'sProblems:
WhithertheCity?AllCities?byaYalealumnus,ArnoldDana,classof1883,whohadreturnedtothecityafter
manyyearsasabusinessreporterforseveraldifferentnewspapers.NotonlywasheaYalegraduate,hecame
fromanunbrokenlineofYalegraduateswhodatedbackto1727,andhisfatherhadbeenaYaleprofessor.Dana
cametothefollowingconclusionafteracarefulanalysisofallavailableeconomicstatistics:
The 40year comparison for the years 1936 and 1897 confirms the belief that this city is actually undergoing
radicaltransformationinmanyrespects.Halfacenturyago,asalreadynoted,therewashereanexceptionally
flourishing manufacturing and commercial shipping town, with Yale College highly important but not the
greatest of the city's establishments. Today New Haven is rapidly becoming an institutional, professional,
technical, and garmentmaking center with shipping an almost negligible issue and manufacturing interests
slowlydecreasinginimportanceasasourceofincometothecity.(Dana,asquotedinWhitehead,1969)
Afternotingthatonly7%ofYale'slivingalumniresidedinNewHaven,DanathensuggestedthatYaleprovide
financialaidtothecity,basedonthefollowingargument:
Itisopentodebatewhetheralltherightsgrantedbythetownin1792toafeeblecollegewithtwoprofessors,
andtwoacresofland,orlaterinthe1830swhenitownedeightacres,applywithequalforcetotheelaborate
servicesaffordedbyamoderncitywiththegranteebecomeanelaborategroupofinstitutions,nationalintheir
affiliationsandservices,richlyhousedandendowedandowningmorethan800acresofalittlecity'sbestland.
(Dana,asquotedinWhitehead,1969)
Dana'spleawentunanswered.Theissuewasnotraisedagainuntil1969,whenMayor'sLee'ssuccessorasked
Yaleformoneyyetagain.Yalerespondedbyhelpingconvincethestatelegislaturetoprovidemoneytocities
withuniversitiesinthem.Inotherwords,Yaledidnotprovideanymoneydirectly.Themoneythestate
legislaturegavetoNewHavenhelpedthecity,yes,butitalsoservedasacontinuingsubsidyforYale.
Universityofficialsstillcouldnotconceiveofthepossibilitythatmunicipalservices,justlikeelectricityand
janitorialservices,areacostofrunningauniversity.
TheresultisthatYalehascontributedfarmoretothedeclineofNewHaventhananyoneseemswillingto
admit,withtheexceptionofformerYalehistorianPeterDobkinHall,whoclaimsthatYaleandothertaxexempt
institutionshavedestroyedthecity'seconomy:
As a responsible corporate citizen, Yale should understand, as Harvard does, that paying living wages and
adequate pensions, curbing its physical expansion, and making contributions to municipal revenues
commensuratetothedemandsmadeonthembynontaxpayingstudents,facultyandstaff,isfarlesscostlythan
theillwillitscurrentpoliciesengender.
InamorecompleteanddetailedindictmentofYale'sroleinNewHaveninthetwentiethcentury,Hall(2002)
pointsoutthatHarvardhasbeenmakingpaymentstoCambridge,Massachusettssince1929,makingthatcity
farmorelivable.(Evenso,Cambridgecityofficialsestimatethatthe$34milliontheyhavebeenreceivingfrom
Harvardislessthan10%ofwhatitwouldbeprovidingifitpaidpropertytaxes.)Yale,foritspart,shamelessly
claimsitiscontributingtoa"renaissance"ofNewHaven,duetoitsvoluntarycontributionstothecity$4.18
millionin2004,withthepromiseofgradualincreasesoverthenextseveralyears.
ForevenmoreonYaleanditsdifficultrelationshipwithNewHaven,see"PoisonIvy"(Bowie,2009),which
examinesYale'sownviewofitscivicobligations.

Planningforurbanrenewal,1941to1953
Bytheearly1940s,itwascleartothecityplannersthatYale,forallitsunwillingnesstopaytheequivalentof
municipaltaxes,hadtobeaprimaryengineforanyfuturegrowththatmightoccur.ItwasYale'sconstruction
plans,Yale'syearlybudgetandpayroll,andtheconsumerspendingbyYalestudentsthatwouldunderpinthe
economyhenceforth.Yale'sabilitytoattractgovernmentresearchinstitutes,medicalfacilities,andsimilar
organizationswouldbecritical.However,YaledidnotshowmuchinterestinfurthergrowthuntilafterWorld
WarII.Itsbuildingboomofthe1920sand1930swasquiteenoughforthetimebeing.
EvenbeforeYalebegantogrowagaininthe1950s,however,thedowntownbusinesscommunityhadavery
greatinterestintheurbanrenewalplansandprogramsthatwerebeingdevelopedatthenationallevel.Ibasethis
claimonlocalarchivalrecordsandmyinterviewswithmanyoftheparticipantsintheurbanrenewalprogram
between1940and1957.Theofficersanddirectorsfrommanyofthemostcentralorganizationsinthebusiness
networkplayedprominentroles.QuitecontrarytoDahl'sclaimsaboutthelackofinterestandenergyonthepart
ofbusinessleaders,therecordsoftheChamberofCommerce,theCityPlanCommission,andthe
RedevelopmentAgencyshowthatbusinessleadershadalongstandinginterestinurbanrenewalandhadbeen
developingplansforitsincetheearly1940s(Domhoff,1978,pp.6373).
Everyoneofthestudiesdonebythecity,thelocalChamberofCommerce,andYaleplannersintheearly1940s
startedwiththesamekindofanalysismadebyArnoldDanainhis1937book,thenaddedfourspecificpoints.
First,itwouldbenecessarytoprovidebetterhighwayssothatsuburbanshopperscouldcometothedowntown
businessdistrict.Second,theremainingindustryshouldbemovedtocheaperlandontheoutskirtsofthecity.
Third,theportfacilitiesshouldbeimproved.Fourth,landforthegrowthofYaleandrelatedresearchinstitutions
mustbeprovided.Inkeepingwiththeserecommendations,a1943plancommissionedbythecityfromavisiting
planningprofessoratYale,MauriceRotival,suggestedthatalowincomeneighborhoodbetweenYaleandthe
medicalschoolhospitalcomplex,knownastheOakStreetarea,shouldbe"allocatedtofuturedevelopmentof
aninstitutionalnature."
Thisrecommendationwasmadeevenmoreexplicitina1944reportonhousingbya
leaderwithintheNewHavengrowthcoalition,DouglasOrr,aprominentarchitect.
OrrnumberedYale,itsmedicalschool,thehospital,andthetelephonecompany
amonghisclients.Emphasizingthatlandadjacenttothedowntown,thehospital,
andtheuniversitywastoovaluabletobeusedforhousing,herecommendedthat
housingbeeliminatedfromtheOakStreetareaandthelanddivviedupasfollows:
(1)partoftheareashouldbeputinthecentralbusinessdistrict(2)partofitshould
beutilizedforhighwaysintothecentralbusinessdistrict(3)partofitshouldbe TheOakStreetareainthe'40s,
beforeurbanrenewal
usedforprofessionalbuildingsnearthehospitaland(4)thenorthernpartofit (clicktoenlarge)

shouldbeusedforhousingprofessionalpersonsandgraduatestudentsfromthe
hospital,medicalschool,anduniversity.
(FormoredetailonplanninginNewHavenbetween1941and1945,includingtheinvolvementofYalerelated
plannersandstudents,clickhere.)
TenyearsafterOrrdeliveredhisreport,hisrecommendationswerecarriedoutexactly
inthefirsturbanrenewalproject,asIwillshowinalatersectiononthe1950s.
However,Dahlconsiderssuchplanningjustsomuchhotairbecausenothing
happeneduntil1954,whenLeebecamemayor.Morespecifically,Dahl(1961,p.116)
attributesthedelaystothreefactors:(1)theirgreatexpense(2)thelackofa"political
processthatwouldsecureagreementonastrategicplan"and(3)thepresenceof
publicofficials"whosawnoparticulargainandmuchpoliticallossiftheywereto Changesinlandusearound
OakStreet,beforeandafter
pushhardoncityplanninganddevelopment." urbanrenewal
(clicktoexpand)
Whileexpensewascertainlyamajorconsideration,andcouldonlybesolvedforNew
Havenandmostothercitiesbytheinfusionoffederalgovernmentmoney,thelackofapoliticalstrategyandthe
absenceofwillingpublicofficialswerenotmajorproblemsatall.ThoseissueswerenotevenaddressedbyNew
Havenleadersbefore1953becausetheycouldnotdeveloptheirplansfurtheruntildecisionshadbeenmade,
first,atthenationallevelaboutdeepeningtheharborand,second,atthestatelevelconcerningtheexactlocation
ofthenewshorelineConnecticutTurnpike(Route1atthetime,nowI95).Thelocationoftheturnpikehad
crucialconsequencesforfutureNewHavendevelopmentintermsofhowtrafficwouldberoutedintothe
downtownarea.Itslocationalsowoulddeterminewherethelargefoodmarketwouldberelocated,arelocation
thathadtooccurbeforetheSouthwestAreaofwhichitandOakStreetwereapartcouldberedeveloped.Thus,
thelogisticsofredevelopmentwerecloselyconnectedtopriorproblems,asthisaccountbytheUnionandNew
HavenTrustBankmakesclear:
Thismajorproject(harbordeepening)oftheChamberofCommercewascompletedin1948byArmyengineers
atacostof$3,750,000,givingtheharboradepthofthirtyfivefeet....Thisdeepeningalsoyieldedabyproduct
 ofgreatsubsequentvalue195acresofnewlandalongthewesternsideofNewHavenharboreastofthe
railroadstation.ThisfilllandprovidedaroutefortherelocationofU.S.Route1....Nowunderthemarketbill
just passed by the Legislature, the city for $70,000 will acquire from the State Highway Department, for
purposesofdevelopment,alloftheharborfilllandnotneeded.
Oncetheharborwasdeepenedandthenewlandwasavailable,chambercommitteesdevotedmuchoftheir
attentiontotheexactlocationoftheturnpikeandtoensuringthatthestatewouldmakeadjacentlandsavailable
forparks,industrialdevelopment,andthenewfoodmarket.Thesepreliminaryproblemstofurtherrenewaland
redevelopmentwerenotfinallyresolveduntilthe1950s.Atthatpoint,thefoodmarket'slandneartheOak
Streetareawasfinallyfreetoberedeveloped.
However,thechamberdidnotneglectthepoliticalaspectsofurbanrenewal.WhenthelongarguedHousingAct
finallymadeitthroughCongressin1949,withitsprovisionforurbanrenewal,theNewHavenChamberof
CommercewasoneofthefirstorganizationsinthecitytoargueforthecreationofaRedevelopmentAgency,
justasthenationallevelUrbanLandInstitutehadsuggestedcitiesdoinordertocompetewithandbypasslocal
housingagencies.ButDahlpresentsadifferentview,basedonhisinterviewwithLee.Hethinksthe
RedevelopmentAgencywasaDemocraticinitiativebyLeeandhiscolleaguestoputtheRepublicansonthe
defensive.(Forarefutationofthisclaim,clickhere.)
Whilethechamberchippedawayinthelate1940sonissuesofimmediateconcerntothedowntowngrowth
elites,Yaleturneditsattentiononceagaintoitsowngrowth,comingtoconclusionsthatdovetailedperfectly
withtheearlierrecommendationsbyRotivalandOrr.Theprocessbeganin1947whenthetrustees("theYale
Corporation")appointedatoplevelcommitteetoexploretheuniversity'sfutureneeds.Thecommitteewas
headedbyPrescottBush,atthetimeapartnerintheimportantWallStreetinvestmentfirmofBrownBrothers,
Harriman,andatrusteeoftheYaleCorporation.Bush'stiestotheuniversityweremanyandvaried.Hehad
graduatedfromYalein1917.Oneofhisbankingpartnerswasatrusteebeforehim,andhisbrotherinlawwas
tobeafellowtrusteeinthe1950s.Hisniecewasmarriedtotheuniversity'ssecretary,RuebenHolden,whowas
mentionedinthesectiononlocalsocialandeconomicelitesbecausehewasthesecondmostimportantcampus
administratorafterthepresidentandontheboardofalargesavingsbank(seeTableOne).Moreover,oneof
Bush'sformerbankingpartnerswastreasureroftheuniversityatthetime,aswellasadirectorofoneofthe
largecommercialbanksinNewHaven.
TheBushCommittee'sreport,YaleandHerNeeds,wasreleasedonJanuary4,1950.Itcalledfora10year
growthprogramthatwouldrequire$80millioningifts($645millionin2005dollars),including$20millionfor
newbuildings.Insomeways,itwastheanswertothelocalgrowthcoalition'sprayers.Althoughmostofthe
projectedbuildingsweretobeplacedwithintheexistingframeworkofthecampusoronavailableadjacentland,
thatwouldstillstimulatetheconstructionbusinessandhelpthebuildingtrades.Moreover,Yaleexpresseda
desireforoffcampushousingforstudentsinthemedicalandotherprofessionalschools,whichasI'vealready
stated,wereneartheOakStreetarea.Thereportsaid:
Becauseoftheshortageofallkindsofhousinginthecommunity,thestudentsattheuniversity'sprofessional
schoolshavetoputupwithsomedemoralizingmakeshifts.Thisisparticularlytrueofmedicalstudents,often
housedfarfromthehospitalwheretheymighthavenightduty.Otherhousingisalsoneededforstudentnurses,
marrieddivinitystudentsandtheirfamilies,andmembersofthestudentbodiesoftheSchoolsofFineArtsand
Music.
Yale'sformalacknowledgementthatitwouldneedmorehousingforitsstudentsbecameacontextforfuture
planning.WhenplannerMauriceRotivalreturnedtoNewHavenin1951attherequestoftheRedevelopment
Agencytoupdatehisearlierplans,heagainproposedthattheOakStreetareabetweenthehospitalandYalebe
consideredforthefirstproject.Hefurthersuggestedamixtureofinstitutionalusesandhighriseapartmentsfor
students.RepresentativesoftheRedevelopmentAgencythenmetwithtopYaleofficialsinOctober,1951,anda
processofcooperationwassetintomotion.ThefactthatYaleexpressedinterestintheproposalatthismeeting
wasabsolutelyessentialfromthepointofviewofthecitybecauselocalurbanrenewalagenciescouldnotmake
applicationstothefederalgovernmentforassistanceunlesstheycouldshowtherewassomeprivateinstitution
willingandabletopurchasethereclaimedland.WithoutYaleorsomeotherprivateorganization,thecitycould
notmoveahead.ThepresidentofYalefrom1950to1963,formerhistoryprofessorA.WhitneyGriswold,
explainedthispointtoDahlasfollowsinacandidinterview:
The Mayor and Logue [Lee's right hand man, and the soninlaw of a top Yale official, of whom more in a
minute] both testified publicly again and again at the Citizens Action Commission meetings and at luncheons
and elsewhere that if it hadn't been for Yale's willingness to step up as original bidders on that property the
wholeOakStreetprojectwouldhavediedaborning...youknowtherules,thelaws,thepoliciesinWashington
thatrequireafirmbidfromsomeprivateagencyinthecommunitybeforecontractsofthiskindcouldbesigned
andthewayclearedforthefinancingofthewholeproject.Well,anyhow,thisiswhatwedid.Nowhereagain
...thiswasnotsheeraltruismonYale'spart.Itwasacaseof,Ithink,trulyenlightenedselfinterest.Wewere
hardpressed,aswestillare,forhousing.
Withallduerespect,IthinkthisisasmokingguninDahl'sowndata.IthinkitcontradictshisclaimthatYale
hadlittleinterestorinvolvementinthelocalurbanrenewalprogram.
However,theinterestYaleshowedinthehousingprojectdidnotleadimmediatelytoahighleveladministrative
committeewithintheuniversity.Instead,thepresidentappointedaNewHavencorporatelawyer,MorrisTyler,
whohadgraduatedfromYaleandYaleLawSchool,toserveasaliaisonbetweentheRedevelopmentAgency
andtheuniversity.However,TylerwasnotsimplyaYalegraduateandalocalcorporatelawyer.Ashetoldme
whenIinterviewedhim,heandGriswoldhadbeenveryclosefriendssincecollege.
TherolethatTylerplayedintheurbanrenewalprogramthroughoutthe1950smakesitveryimportantto
establishhiscentralplaceintheNewHavenpowerstructureindetailbecauseheprovidedYalewithapersonal
tietotheRedevelopmentAgencyandtotheveryheartofthedowntowngrowthcoalition.First,hewasoneof
fourseniorpartnersinGumbert,Corbin,Tyler,andCooper,theonlylawfirmamongthe10mostcentralfirms
inthedowntownbusinessnetworkthatIoutlinedearlier.Second,hewasontheboardofthesecondlargest
commercialbank.Third,hislawpartnerssatontheboardsoflocalbusinesses.(Onepartnerwasadirectorof
thegoodoldFirstNewHavenNationalbankaswellasalargesavingsbankandfourotherlocalcorporations.
Anotherwasontheboardofthethirdlargestcommercialbank,thesecondlargestsavingsbank,andtwoother
localcorporations.Yetanotherpartnerwasonseveralotherboards.)Fourth,Tyler'sfirmrepresentedseveralof
themajorbanksandbusinessesinNewHavenaswellasdoingsomeworkforYale.
Inaddition,TylerwasamemberoftheLawnandGraduateClubs,andwasaguestatthecotillionballin1958
59,sohefitsDahl'sdefinitionofa"socialnotable."HealsowasthechairmanoftheRegionalPlanning
CommissionofSouthCentralConnecticut,anorganizationformedin1948attheurgingoftheChamberof
CommercetocoordinateplanningwiththesmallercitiesaroundNewHaven.
TylerdidhisworkonthehousingissuethroughacommitteeoftheAlumniCouncilcalledtheCommitteeon
GraduateandProfessionalSchools.ThiscommitteeprovidedafavorablereportontheOakStreetproposalto
thecampusspacecommitteeinOctober,1953:
AsubcommitteeonhousinghasbeenexploringthepossibilityofhavingtheUniversityactasthedeveloperof
theareawhichwillbereleasedbytheCityofNewHavenwhenitextendsCollegeStreetfromGeorgeStreet
to Congress Avenue. After two meetings with the Urban Redevelopment Unit of New Haven the proposition
looks promising. The area in question is ideally located being a twelveacre plot bounded on the north by
GeorgeStreet,southbyOakStreet.
TheimportanceofTyler'sfriendshipwithGriswoldandhisOctober,1953,reporttoYale'sspacecommittee
becomesevenmoreapparentwhenitisaddedthatheandhislawfirmbecamecounseltothecityon
redevelopmentmattersin1954andthathewasappointedtotheCitizen'sActionCommissionthatoversawthe
program.WhenIaskedLee'sRedevelopmentAdministrator,EdwardLogue,abouttheimportanceofTyler,he
repliedverysimply,"Hewasmylawyer."
TwomajorpointscontradictorytoDahl'shistoryofNewHavenurbanrenewalareestablishedbythissequence
ofeventsbetweenOctober,1951,andOctober,1953.First,thecontactbetweenYaleandthecityprecededthe
electionofLeeasmayorbytwoyears,contrarytoalmostallaccountsofNewHaven'surbanrenewalhistory,
includingDahl's.Second,Yalewasconnectedtothedowntownredevelopmenteffortsatitshighestlevelsby
Tyler,theabsenceofinterestinNewHavenonthepartofDahlandmostYalefacultynotwithstanding.
Intheend,nearlyfiveyearslater,Yaledidnotbuilditsownhousinginthearea.Instead,theopportunitywentto
alocalmemberofthegrowthcoalitionandhisfriendsoutsidethecity,whodidanendrunaroundYaleby
complainingtoregionalurbanrenewaladministratorsthatthebiddingwasrigged,atacticthatdeeply
embarrassedandangeredYaleofficials.Thisisthekindofissueinternaltothepowerstructurethatdidcause
tensionsanddelays,anddidrequireallthepatienceanddiplomacythatLeeandhisaidescouldmuster,butitis
hardlythebigtheoreticaldealthatDahlmakesofit.
(ClickhereforamoredetailedaccountofhowYalelostouttorealestatepeoplewhowerepartofthe
DemocraticParty.)
Yale'simportancetotheprogramwasincreasedevenmorein1952,withtheelectionofBushtotheU.S.Senate
asaRepublicanfromConnecticut.UponarrivalinWashington,BushwasappointedtotheBankingand
CurrencyCommittee,whichwaschairedbyhisgoodfriendandfellowYaletrustee,OhioSenatorRobertH.
Taft.Thecommitteehadoversightresponsibilitiesontheurbanrenewalprogram,andBushimmediatelybegan
totakeaninterestintheprogram.Hewasoneofthesponsorsonthe1954legislationthatmadetheprogram
moreattractivetorealestateinterests,andhebroughtrepresentativesoftheHousingandHomeFinanceAgency
toConnecticuttoexplaintherevisionsinthelawtothestate'smayorsshortlyaftertheywerepassed.Ashetold
aColumbiaUniversityoralhistorian:"IremainedontheBankingandCurrencyCommitteefortenyears,andin
thecourseofthathadagooddealtodowithpromotingthesocalledurbanredevelopmentprograms,inthestate
ofConnecticut,underthelaw."
Bush'sclaimthathedideverythinghecouldforurbanrenewalinallofConnecticutreceivesempiricalsupport
fromthecalculationsIdidonpercapitacommitmentsbystatebasedondatathrough1972.Connecticutwasat
thetopofthelistwith$175perperson.EvenwithoutNewHavenincludedinitstotal,Connecticutwassecond
at$132perperson,surpassedonlybysparselypopulatedAlaska's$166,andstillwellaheadofsuchnearbyand
similarstatesasMassachusetts($110),Pennsylvania($95),NewJersey($72),andNewYork($70).Clearly,
then,itisConnecticutthatdidwell,andnotjustNewHaven.UnlessMayorLeehadsomekindofcontagion
effect,thisfactarguesmoreinfavorofsomestatewideinfluenceonurbanrenewalinConnecticutcitiesthanit
doesfortheextraordinarypowersofonelocalmayor.
AlthoughBushwasnewtotheSenate,hispowerwasenhancedbytwofactors.First,therewasaRepublicanin
theWhiteHouseforthefirsttimesince1932,whichmeantthatthetopappointeestotheHousingandHome
FinanceAgencywereRepublicans.Second,theRepublicansalsoheldcontrolofbothhousesofCongressin
195354,whichmeantthatthebureaucracywaslikelytobeveryresponsivetorequestsfromaRepublican
Senatoronacommitteethathadsomuchinfluenceonthefateoftheagency.
DespitetheinterestinurbanrenewalonthepartofYaleandthedowntownbusinesscommunity,theprogram
nonethelessmovedalongveryslowlyintheearly1950s.AcceptingwhathewastoldbyLee,Logue,andtheir
assistants,whomheinterviewedin1957,wellaftertheeventsof1953to1956wereshroudedinthefogof
memoryandmythmaking,DahlfirstblamesthesedelaysontheRepublicanmayor,WilliamCelantano.
However,asshowninthe"PowerattheLocalLevel"articleonthisWebsite,themajorproblemwasthelackof
moneyatthenationallevelduetotheresistancetotheprogrambyleaderswithintherealestatelobby.Thefact
isthatnofederallyfundedprogramsgotoffthedrawingboardsuntiltheprogramwaschangedbythe
Republicansin1954tomeetthegrowthcoalitions'demands(seealsoDomhoff,1978,pp.7375).
Beforeconsideringtheseproblemsfurther,however,itisnecessarytotakeacloserlookatYaleemployee
RichardC.Leeandtheelectionthatbroughthimtothemayor'sofficein1953.

Theelectionsof1953
Asargumentsoverurbanrenewalatboththelocalandnationallevelswereheatingup,thetimeforthebiennial
mayor'selectionwascomingaround.ThiswastheelectionwonbyLee,whothenremainedasmayoruntil
1969,finallyretiringreluctantlyinthemidstofthemanyproblemsthatbefellthecityandhisprograms.Soitis
importanttolookatLeeandhiscareer,includinghiscloseassociationwiththebusinesscommunityandYale.
Thereisalsothematterofwhosupportedhiscandidacyin1953.
Bornin1916intoaworkingclassfamilyinNewHaven,Leetookajobwithoneofthe
twolocalnewspapers,themorningnewspapercalledtheJournalCourier,shortlyafterhe
graduatedfromhighschoolin1934.In1939,attheripeyoungageof23,hebecameacity
aldermanfromhisward,joining32otherparttimepeopleontheverylargetowncouncil
(calledthe"BoardofAldermen").Hewasslatedasacandidatebytheleadersofthe
DemocraticParty,wholikedhisoutgoingpersonalityandhispastworkfortheparty.
DuringthatsameyearLeewashiredbytheChamberofCommercetodopublicrelations
andserviceorientedwork.Forexample,heheadedthechamber'sBetterBusinessBureau
RichardLeein1966
andorganizedtheJuniorChamberofCommerceforthecity.Duetohiscombinationof (clicktoenlarge)
rolesaschamberemployeeandalderman,hewaswellawareofthechamber'sinterestin
urbanrenewal,andhewasoneofthealdermenwhourgedthecitytocreateaCityPlanCommission.Hethereby
cametoknowRotivalandtheotherearlyplannersthatIdiscussedearlier.
Leeworkedforthechamberuntil1942,whenhelefttoserveinthearmy.Whenillhealthforcedhimtoleave
theserviceshortlythereafter,hewashiredbyYaletorunitswartimenewsclippingservice.In1944Yaleasked
himtodevelopapublicrelationsoffice,euphemisticallycalledtheYaleNewsBureau,whereheremaineduntil
hewaselectedmayor.HisjobwastoconvincethepeopleofNewHaventhatYalewasavaluablepartofthe
community.
LeearrivedatYaleingoodpartthroughtheauspicesofCarlLohmann,thepowerful
SecretaryofYaleatthetime,whoservedonthechamber'sboardofdirectorsinthe
early1940sandtookLeeunderhiswing.Asallaccountsmakeclear,Lohmann,a
wealthyanderuditememberofthesocialelite,wasamentortoLee,andLee
reciprocatedbydevelopingastrongaffinityforYale,rightdowntohisstyleofdress.
HebecameoneoftherarenonYalegraduatestobeadmittedtoMory's,thefabled
Yaleeatingclub.Althoughheremainedawellgroundedmachinepoliticianwho
knewhowtotakecareofandflatterconstituents,healsobecamesomethingofa
liberalonmanyissues.RaymondWolfinger,aDahlassistantwhoworkedatcityhall
TheMory'sAssocationclubonYork
andobservedLeeforayearin19571958,saysthatLeeabsorbedYale's Street,inthe1960s
"enlightenedvalues": (clicktoenlarge)

More basically, he became familiar with and sympathetic to liberal uppermiddleclass values and ways of
lookingattheworld.Manyofhispoliciesandstrategiesasmayorseemedinfluencedbyhisknowledgeofthe
worldofideasandhisacceptanceoftheenlightenedvaluesheencounteredatYale.(Wolfinger,1973,p.168)
ForanyYaliewhothoughtaboutitforaminute,Leehadtobetheidealpersontoselltheuniversitytoacity
thatwasnotcrazyaboutit,notonlybecauseofitsstinginesswiththecity,butbecauseithadveryfewfacultyor
studentsofItalianorJewishheritageatthetime.(Asoftheearly1970s,noCatholichadeverbeenatrusteeof
YalethefirstJewishmemberjoinedtheboardintheearly1960sbypetitioninghiswayontotheballotsentto
allalumni.)Afterall,LeewasalocalworkingclassladwhostressedtheIrishpartofhismultipleheritage
background,aformeremployeeoftheChamberofCommerce,andamemberoftheBoardofAldermen.Hewas
alsopersonableandambitious(Talbot,1970).HewasperfectforYale.
Likemanybuddingpoliticians,Leealsowasajoiner.Atthetimehebecamemayorhewasontheboardsofthe
NewHavenchapteroftheAmericanRedCross,theBoyScoutsofAmerica,theFamilyServiceofNewHaven,
theNewHavenCouncilofSocialAgencies,theTuberculosisandHealthAssociationofNewHaven,andthe
NewHavenTaxpayersResearchCouncil.HewasamemberoftheRotaryClub.Foralltheseaffiliations,hewas
nonethelessbestknowntoNewHaveners,accordingtoastoryonhiscareerintheJournalCourieratthetime
ofhiselectionvictory,asthemasterofceremoniesatthesummertimePopConcerts.Talkaboutubiquitous.
Leecontinuedasanaldermanuntil1949,whenheranformayoratage33andlostbyafewhundredvotes.He
ranformayoragainin1951,losingbyonlytwovotesafterhedecidedtocutarecountshortsohewouldbe
thoughtofasastandupkindofpersonifandwhenheranagain.In1952hehelpedlocalliberals,mostofthem
inandaroundYale,intheireffortstoelectAdlaiE.Stevensontothepresidency,gainingmanynewpolitical
alliesintheprocess.
Althoughheclearlywantedtobemayor,heclaimedinearly1953thathewasnotsurehewouldrunthistime.
However,shortlythereafterhesaidthathehaddecidedtotryagainbecausepoliticalfriendshadpresentedhim
withapetitioncontainingmanyhundredsofsignaturesfrompeopleurginghimtorun.(Dahl'sfilessayLee
organizedthepetitiondrive.)Lee'spoliticalfriendsatYalethenformedacommitteecalled"Independentsfor
Lee,"whichplayedamajorroleinhiscampaign.Itsexecutivecommitteeincludedseveralwellknown
professorsandthewifeofalocallaborleader.ThreeofitsmembersEugeneV.Rostow,aprofessoratthelaw
schoolChesterKerr,thesecondincommandatYaleUniversityPress,andEdwardLogue,aYaleLawSchool
graduatemarriedtothedaughterofWilliamDeVane,deanofYaleCollegesince1938helpedfashionhis
forwardlookingplatform.
Rostow,anativeofNewHaven,andoneofthefewlocalJewishstudentstograduatefromYaleuptothattime,
hadmanyfriendsandcontactsatthestateandnationallevelsthroughhisinvolvementintheDemocraticParty.
HewasbestknowninNewHavenforhisadvocacyforimprovingthepublicschools.Hesoonbecamedeanof
theYaleLawSchoolandlaterendedupaprominentfigureintheKennedyAdministration,andthena
neoconservativewhopushedforadefensebuildupandahardlineagainsttheSovietUnioninthe1970s.
Loguewasa1942graduateofYalewhoservedintheAirForceforthreeyearsbeforereturningtoYaletoearn
hislawdegreein1947,wherehetookacourseincityplanningwithRotival,becamefriendswithRostow,and
marriedMargaretDeVane,daughteroftheaforementionedYaledean.Hethenreturnedtohisnative
Philadelphiatopracticelaw,butin1949hebecamealegaladvisortothenewlyelectedliberalgovernorof
Connecticut,ChesterBowles,whotookLoguewithhimasanadministrativeassistantwhenhewasappointedas
ambassadortoIndia.LogueandhiswifebothwantedtoreturntoNewHaven,whichtheydidin1953.Hethen
threwhimselffulltimeintotheLeecampaign.HelaterbecameamajorfigureinredevelopmentinbothBoston
andNewYork.Astherestofthisaccountshows,itwouldbehardtounderestimateLogue'srole,orhisclose
tiestoYale.
ThistimeLeewonhandilybyalittleover3,500votes.HelosttheusualproRepublican,mostlyItalian
precinctsby4,100votesandwontheusualproDemocratic,mostlyIrishprecinctsby3,200votes,thenmadeup
thedifferencebywinningbyalmost4,500votesinallotherprecincts,someofwhichwereupscaleandmiddle
class,andwithoutanystrongethnicidentification,preciselytheareasinwhichIndependentsforLeeandYale
votersprobablymadethedifference(Rae,2003,p.308).RetrospectiveaccountsoftenclaimthatLeeranan
unusuallyforwardlookingcampaignthatstressedurbanrenewalandtherebuildingofNewHaven,butIcould
findnosignofthatinthedetailedcoverageofthecampaignbytheJournalCourier.Ifanything,theincumbent
mayortalkedmoreabouttheurbanrenewalplansthecitywasdevelopingthanLeedid(Domhoff,1978,pp.86
90).
AftertheelectionLoguegraduallybecameLee'srighthandmanonmostadministrativematters,especiallyon
urbanrenewal,wherehisappointmentinFebruary,1955,asRedevelopmentAdministratorputhiminchargeof
allcitydepartmentsrelatedtothatprogram.ItwasLeeandLoguewhoweretoplaytheprimaryrolesin
orchestratingurbanrenewalfromthatpointforward,andtheywereDahl'smaininformantsforhisbook.

ReactionstoLee'svictory
ThereactionstoLee'svictoryarecriticalinrelationtoDahl'sclaimthatbusinessleadershadtobepushedinto
actiononurbanrenewalbyLee.Tothecontrary,theirmajorconcernwasthatthecontinuityoftheplanningnot
beinterruptedbythearrivalofanewmayor.ThedegreeoftheirinterestisfirstcapturedintheNewHaven
ChamberofCommerceminutesforNovember9,1953,justafewdaysaftertheelections.Theminutes,which
relatetoameetingwiththecityplanner,NorrisAndrews,alsosummarizetherealisticproblemstheprogram
faced,whichcanhardlybeattributedtotheindifferenceoftheRepublicanmayor,asDahlclaimed:
Mr.Giese,Mr.Thompson,Mr.Costello,andMr.Johnson[allleadersintheChamberofCommerce]metwith
Mr. Andrews to see if they could determine what pressure could be brought on the State Highway
Commissioner to make decisions regarding U.S. Route 1 and the Oak Street Connector. Mr. Andrews said
there were many roadblocks. One of them is a Supreme Court decision regarding the constitutionality of the
 Urban Redevelopment Act. To obtain a decision, a friendly suit has been brought by the advocates of urban
redevelopmentagainsttheCityofHartford.
Mr.AndrewsindicatedthattheUrbanRedevelopmentAgencyhadfullknowledgeoftheexactlocationofthe
Oak Street Connector. However, it was his impression that the Federal Government would not give full
approvaltoproceedingwithNumberThreeProjectuntilitisdeterminedwhethertheCityortheStatewillpay
fordevelopingtheOakStreetConnector.
Furthermore,theChamberofCommerceleadersworriedthattheymighthavetoselltheurbanrenewalprogram
toLee.OnNovember10,sevendaysafterhewaselected,theydecidedtoaskforameetingwithhimatwhich
"theentireprogramwouldbeexplainedtohimandhewouldbeurgedtogetactionstartedontheprogram."The
November19meeting,heldoverlunchattheNewHavenLawnClub,includedLeeandfivechamberofficers.
Theminutesreportthat"theentireprogramwasexplainedtoMr.Lee"andthat"Mr.Leesaidhewasinentire
agreementwithaprogramforaction."Thefinalwordsintheminutes,whichcertainlywerenotwrittenforthe
benefitoffutureresearchers,alsorevealthechamber'seagerness:"Inbringingthemeetingtoaclose,Mr.Giese
promisedMr.Leethefullcooperationofallthosepresentandassuredhimthechamberiswillingtodoanything
possibletogetactionstartedandtogetasteamshovelstartingworkontheredevelopmentprogram."
Obviously,evidencesuchasthisdoesnotprovethatthechambercausedtheprogramtohappen.However,it
doesshowthatitsleaderswereanythingbuthesitantaboutit,whichisacentralclaiminDahl'saccount.Indeed,
itisasmokinggunasfarasthataspectofhisargumentisconcerned.Otherevidence,includingtranscriptsof
Dahl'soriginalinterviews,demonstratesthechamber'sroleintheinitiationoftheprogram.Foroneexample
amongseveral,atopchamberleaderinthecity,whomDahlobviouslydidnottakeveryseriously,hadthis
interchangewithDahl:
DAHL:Yousuggestedthistothecity,didyou?
CHAMBERLEADER:Yes,we(theChamberofCommerce)hadourowntenpointprogramwhichwasincorporated
inthisphaseofit.Finally,wegotapprovaloftheplanbythecityandMayorLeetooktheballandhasbeen
throwingiteversince."
Thatlastphrase,"MayorLeetooktheballandhasbeenthrowingiteversince,"perfectlysummarizesabusiness
leader'sviewoftherelationshipbetweenbusinessandgovernment.Businessleadershandedhimtheprogram
andheexecutedit.Itwasnoteasytoexecuteit,Iagree,buttheimportantpointfornowistherelationship
betweenthechamberleaderandtheformerpublicrelationsemployeeforthechamberandYale.
Dahldoubtsevidencelikethisfortworeasons.First,LeecomplainedtoDahlthatthebusinessleaderswere
hesitanttohelphim,claiminghehadtroublefindingachairmanfortheCitizensActionCommission(CAC)that
wastoserveastheblueribbonleadershipgroup.Second,theCAC,onceappointed,didn'tseemtodomuchas
farasDahlcouldtell.ButDahl'sinterviewswithLogueandRostowshowthattheywantedtogoslowbecause
theydidn'twantthechambergrouptorunthewholeshowtheyknewtheyneeded,andtheythemselvesdesired
tohavefortheirownreasons,laborleadersandliberalsonthecommission.(Evenso,intheend10ofthe18
originalmembersoftheCACwerealsomembersoftheChamberofCommerce.)Dahl'sinterviewsalsomake
clearthattheCACwasprimarilymeanttobeapublicrelationsfrontgroup,soitishardtofaultitsmembersfor
notbeingmoreactiveinthedecisionmakingprocess.
(FordetailsontheCACbasedonDahl'sinterviews,clickhere.)

SuccessontheOakStreetproject
WhileLeewasstillsavoringhisvictory,negotiationcontinuedonthelocationandlengthofthefreewaythought
tobeessentialtothesuccessoftheOakStreetProject.Therewerethreetechnicalproblemsaswellasapolitical
issue.ThefirstproblemwasthattherouteforthelargenewConnecticutTurnpikethatwouldskirttheedgesof
NewHavenkeptshiftingclosertotheLongIslandSound,whichmadetheconnectingfreewaycalledthe"Oak
StreetConnector"(Route34onthemapofNewHaventodayshownearlier)bothlongerandmore
expensive,andmoreessentialintheviewoftheplanners.Thesecondproblemwasthattherewasnorealtraffic
justificationforthisconnectingfreewayfromthestate'spointofview.
Thethirdproblemwasthatthecitywouldnotpayonedimeofthecosts.Asone
plannerremarkedatthetime,theproblemcouldhavebeensolvedinaminuteifthe
cityhadbeenwillingtopitchin.Butofcoursethecitydidn'twanttopitchin,partly
becauseitcouldn'tafforditwithouthavingtodelaysomeotherproject,butalso
becauseitfigureditcouldgetthemoneyifityammeredatthe"highway
bureaucrats"longenough.Thisisindeedwhathappenedintheend.MayorLeeand
hisaideshadtoexpendanenormousamountofenergyjawingwiththehighway
department,andlocallawyersandbusinessleadersdidtheirpartbylobbyingthe
MayorLeeandFrankO'Brionofthe
statelegislatureinHartford,butintheendNewHavengotthefreewayitwantedfor RedevelopmentAgencyexamine
plansfortheOakStreetConnector
nothing. (clicktoenlarge)

Andthentherewasthepoliticalproblem.Thestatehighwaypeoplewerenot
politicallynaive.TheyknewthatNewHavenleaderswantedthefreewayaspartoftheirplanstosaveand
expandthedowntown.However,theydidnotbelievethiswaspossible.TheytoldlocalplannerslikeRotival
thatthecitywasmovingintheotherdirection,thatis,towarditsnorthernandnortheasternsuburbs.AsRotival
summarizedit,"TheybelievethatNewHavenisalreadymovingtotheNorthEastanddoubtifwewillbe
successfulintherehabilitationoftheSouthWest,especiallybetweentheRailroadStationandtheHospital"
(Domhoff,1978,p.91).Itthereforetookextrapoliticalworkwiththegovernor'sofficeandthestatelegislature
toovercomethisanalysis,whichprovedtobequiteaccurate.
Despitealltheseproblems,thestatehighwaycommissioneragreedonNovember24tobuildtheOakStreet
Connector.Itseemedlikethelogjamwasbroken,butLee,Logueandtheirplannerssaidthatitdidnotextend
farenough.Theythereforehadtowritenewpositionpapersandproposals,andmaketheirargumentallover
again.ThesecontinuingproblemsovertheOakStreetConnectorledtotensionsbetweentheLeegroupandthe
holdoverdirectoroftheRedevelopmentAgency.LeeandLoguedecidedhe"lackedthedriveandzealthey
wanted"(Dahl,1961,p.129).AsDahl'sinterviewswithLeeandLoguemakeabundantlyclear,theythoughthe
wasincompetent.Outhewentandincameaconsultant,anexperiencedplannerwhohadworkedforthe
HousingandHomeFinanceAgencyuntilearly1954.
Theconsultant'staskwastoseewhatneededtobedonetosolveproblemswhichweredelayingsubmissionofa
projectapplication.Hesurveyedthesituationandrecommendedthattheagencystartalloverintermsofits
applications.Shortlythereafter,RalphTaylor,amoreexperienceddirectorfromanothercity,washired,andthe
programbegantofunctionmoresmoothly.Thisseriesofevents,rootedingoodpartininteragencyconflictsand
personaldeficiencies,providesthebasisfortheincredibleassertionbyLeeinhisinterviewwithDahlthat
"RedevelopmentinNewHavenbeganinFebruaryof'55.Wehadtostartfromscratchandassembleateamand
starttofileallthepapersandgetthewholeprogramlaunched."
Butthisclaim,whichisakeystartingpointforDahl,isextremelymisleadingfromtheperspectiveofthe
program'sbasicobjectives.Infact,theRotivalChamberofCommerceplanswerebasicallyunchanged.What
changedweretheapplicationsandjustificationssenttoWashington.Therewerealsosmallchangesinwhat
buildingsweregoingtobeplacedintheproject,whichmeantmorecommercialdevelopment,rewardsfor
friendlysmallbusinessmenandpoliticians,andanadditiontothehospital.OnceitwascertainthattheOak
StreetConnectorwouldmakealargeamountoflandavailable,thetopexecutivesoftheSouthernNewEngland
TelephoneCompany,whoweresupportersofurbanrenewal,decidedtheywantedtoerectnewheadquartersin
thegeneralarea.Afteraminimumofnegotiations,thisbuildingbecameamajorpieceoftherenewalplan.
Thechangesintheplansnecessitatedbythelastminuteinclusionofthetelephonebuildingandanextensionof
thehospitalmeantthattherewouldbefurtherdelaysunlesspressurecouldbebroughtontheHousingandHome
FinanceAgency.AtthispointBushwascalledintoactiononceagain.TheissuesarereflectedinalettertoBush
datedMarch21,1955,fromtheadministratoroftheHousingandHomeFinanceAgency,inresponsetoBush's
inquiryaboutthestatusoftheNewHavenapplication.Theletteralsoreferstoanotherreasonforlastminute
changes,theneedtoaddtwoextrablocksinthenorthernareaoftheprojectinordertocompensateforthelarge
amountoflandthehighwaydepartmentinsisteduponfortheconnector:
 TwoquestionshavebeenthesubjectsofrecentdiscussionswithofficialsofNewHaven.One,thesubmission
and approval of a loan and grant application containing these two additional blocks. Under the agreed
conditions, the New Haven delegation was informed that it was legally possible to proceed in this manner.
Secondly, the question of land disposal policy was discussed. There seemed to be no obstacle for specific
purpose use in the proposed redevelopment as concerned Yale University Faculty Housing, New England
TelephoneCompanyBuildingandNewHavenHospitalextension.
Bush'sroleingainingfastfederalapprovalofthefirstprojectin1955wasespeciallyimportantbecauseitgavea
boosttoLee'sreelectioncampaign.AccordingtoapuffpieceinHarper's'Magazinebyapublicrelations
employeeoftheAmericanCounciltoImproveOurNeighborhoods(ACTION),whichisdiscussedinmyhistory
oftheurbanrenewalprogramatthenationallevel,thisquickapprovaloverwhelmedthecriticismLeewas
receivingfromthelocalpressbecauseofthepossibilityYalemightpurchaselandintheproject:
Butaweekbeforeelectionday,withanassistfromRepublicanSenatorPrescottBush,federalapprovalofthe
$7,650,000 loan and grant for Oak Street came through the announcement by Lee and Bush in a joint press
conferencefromtheMayor'sofficemadeeightcolumnheadlines.Leewasreelectedbyamarginof20,000
thelargesteverachievedbyaConnecticutMayorandthevotersalsogavehima312DemocraticBoardof
Aldermen.
It'shardformetoseehowdelayscausedbyhasslesovertheOakStreetConnector,poorpaperworkbythe
formerRedevelopmentAdministrator,andlastminuteadditionstotheprojectcontradicttheideathatthe
downtowngrowthcoalitionandYaleshapedtheprograminjustthewaymytheorymightexpect.Ihaveno
problemwithDahl'sclaimsaboutthedetailsofwhathappenedonceLeeandLoguetookover,andIagreethat
theyhadtodoagreatdealofcoordinating.Buttousethatasevidencethatthereisno"powerstructure,"and
thatpluralismreigns,istomisstheforestforthetrees.
AsfortheOakStreetConnectoritself,thestateengineerswerecorrectinpredicting
thatitwouldnevercarrythetrafficthecityclaimeditwould.Tothisdayithasnot
beenextendedmorethanthefewmilesthattakeitfromtheConnecticutTurnpiketo
acrossstreetbetweenthehospitalandYale.ThereisnowaparkinglotforYale
NewHavenhospitalpersonnelonthelandpurchasedtoextendthefreeway.The
OakStreetConnectorendedupasahugebatteringramthathelpeddestroytheOak
Streetareathathadbeendefinedasaslumtobeclearedforurbanrenewal.
TheOakStreetConnectorin1960.
Attheupperleft,thehighwaydead
Dahl'sshortsightednessandtunnelvisionarealsoapparentintheevenbiggerproject endsitstilldoestoday.
thatfollowedtheOakStreettriumph. (clicktoenlarge)

Rebuildingthedowntownbusinessdistrict,19551957
AlthoughtheOakStreetlandwasusefulforthetelephonecompany,thehospital,andYale,itwasn'ttheheartof
thematterforthedowntowngrowthelites.Forthemthebigdealwasaprojecttorebuildthemaindowntown
street,ChurchStreet.Withagrantof$13.3millionandaloanofanother$25.8millionfromthefederal
government,theplancalledforanewhotel,departmentstores,anofficebuilding,spaceforsmallmodern
shops,andalargeparkinggarage.TheideawastoluresuburbanshoppersbacktothedowntownandmakeNew
Havenacommercialcenteronceagain.
Overall,theChurchStreetProjectwasthesecondlargestredevelopmentprojectinthecountry,anditisthemain
reasonwhyACTIONadoptedNewHavenasitsposterchild.SinceACTIONwasheadedbyleadersinthe
publishingworld,thereweresoonstoriesinTime,Life,andtheSaturdayEveningPost,aswellasHarper's
Magazine,aboutthedaringandwonderfulworkthatMayorLeeandhisaidesweredoingthere.Leenow
thoughthemighthavethechancetorunforgovernorortheSenate,andhehadhundredsofcopiesofthese
articlesmailedtopotentialsupportersinsideandoutsideofConnecticut.
Asmightbeexpected,DahlgivesallthecreditfortheChurchStreetProjecttoLeeandLoguebecauseofwhat
theyhadtogothroughtobringtheprojecttogether,suchasconflictsamongmajorownersforthebestlocations,
legalchallengesbythesmallbusinessownerswhowerebeingdisplaced,andnervousnessonthepartofthe
HousingandHomeFinanceAgencyaboutthewaytheprojectstretchedtherules(ofwhichmoreinaminute).
Allofthisisverytrue,anditiswherepoliticiansandappointedofficialsearntheirkeep.Butintermsofthebig
picture,itwasonceagaintheFirstNewHavenNationalBank,Yale,andBushwhosettheparametersofthe
actionandcontrolledtheresourcesthatmadecompletionpossible.
Theinitialplansondowntownurbanrenewalinvolvedacompletelyprivateprojectbyamultimillionaire
developer,RogerStevens,knowntoLeeandLoguebecausehewasamajorDemocraticPartyfundraiserand
contributor.Whenthisplanfellthroughbecausesomelocalbusinessmenheldoutforhighpricesfortheirland
andstructures,LeeandLoguebegantothinkintermsofsmaller,federallysubsidizedprojectsthatwould
rebuildpartsofthedowntowninsmallparcelsatatime.However,whenLee'saideswenttothedirectorsatthe
FirstNewHavenNationalBankwiththeirtentativefederalproject,theyweretoldtothinkbiggerandtodoit
"right."HaroldGrabino,oneofLogue'slawyers,explainedittoaDahlassistantasfollows:
When Lee and Logue first went to talk to the people at the First National Bank with their Church Street
Project,theyhadarathermodestandundeveloped,unthoughtoutplanfortheChurchStreetProject.TheFirst
National Bank said they would support the plan if it were made into a really big thing. I asked why. Grabino
saiditwaspartlybecausetheydidn'twanttogotothetroubleofrelocatingunlesstheprojectwasreallyworth
itandpartlybecausetheywantedtoseethetowngrow.Andtorepeat:evidentlywhattheysaygoesaswitness
theviolationofpolicyinlettingthembuylandintheChurchStreetProjectratherthanrentit.
"Seethetowngrow?"Nowthere'saphrasethatringstrueforagrowthcoalitiontheorist."Whattheysaygoes?"
Thatsoundslikewhathasbeenfoundinmostcommunitypowerstudies,butitdoesn'tdrawanyattentionin
Dahl'sbook.LoguehimselftoldthestorydirectlytoDahlinthefollowingway:
Then there was another important thing that happened there when we failed (in the private redevelopment
scheme). We had another sketch made. By this time the bank was all hot about this and all for it and we got
withsixoftheminthepresident'sofficeandtheytoldustogobackandtellDickLeethattheywereinterested
onlyifwediditright,andifwedidn'twidenOrangeStreet.YougobackandtellDickLeethatifheisn'tdoing
things right, the bank isn't interested. So we said, well, you have to understand that we have to go federal
completelyinordertodothatthatdidn'tseemtobotherthemandalsothatDickcan'tcarrythiswhole
thingonhisownandhe'sgottohavestrongbusinesssupport.
Inthelightoftheseaccounts,whichshowthatLeeandhisaideshadaclearmandatefromtheheartofthepower
networktogoforbroke,itissurprisingthatDahlwouldgivesomuchcreditinhisaccounttoLogue's
"initiative"indrawinguptheplans,withoutanymentionofthemarchingordersthebankhadgivenhim:
WithChurchStreet,itwastheDevelopmentAdministratorhimself(Logue)who,aftermonthsofconsideration,
discussion, and preliminary planning, sat down late one night and drew on a city map the boundaries he then
proposedandtheMayoracceptedboundariesthatintheireconomicandsocialimplicationsseemedsobold
anddaringthatformonthstheexactnatureoftheproposalwaskeptinsecrecyastheMayor,theDevelopment
Administrator,andtheRedevelopmentDirectortesteditforfeasibilityandacceptability.(Dahl,1961,p.128)
GiventhefactsabouttheroleoftheFirstNewHavenNationalBankintheproject,thisisprobablythesingle
mostinaccurateinterpretationinDahl'sbook.Heisonceagainoperatingatthemiddlerangeofanalysis(the
policydetails)ratherthanthegeneralpowerlevelthatisreallyatissuehere(whosetstheboundaries,andfor
whatreasons).Norarehiscommentsabout"secrecy"entirelyaccurate.Itmayhavebeensecretfromthegeneral
publicandthesmallbusinesspeopleitwasgoingtouproot,butitwasnotsecretfromthemostimportant
membersofthegrowthcoalition,asDahl'sowninterviewsshow.(ClickhereformoredetailfromDahl's
interviewwithLogue.)
ButasIalreadysaid,thereweredelaysdespitethesupportfromtheFirstNationalBankofNewHaven,dueto
themaneuveringforgreateradvantageamongthreeorfourbusinessmen,nottomentiontheanguishedprotests
bysmallstoreownersandshopkeeperswhodidnotevenknowtheyweregoingtobedisplaceduntiltheyread
aboutitinthenewspapers.Thesedelayshaveonetheoreticallyrelevantaspect:theyshowagaintheimportance
ofYale.Whenthedelaysledthedevelopertowithdrawbecausehedidnotwanthismoneytiedupinan
unprofitablesituation,LeeandLoguehadtoturntoYalefora$4.5millionloanin1962.Thenthenegotiations
overtheloanbetweenLeeandYaleledtotheinvolvementofR.H.MacyandCompanyintheproject,which
becameamajorfactorinensuringitssuccess:
In the course of negotiating the loan, Lee had met with a member of the Yale Corporation who was also a
directorofR.H.MacyandCompany.ThroughhimthemayorrenewedrelationswiththeMacymanagement
 that spring and by the end of the summer Lee had negotiated an agreement for Macy's to build a $5 million
departmentstoreintheprojectarea.(Wolfinger,1973,pp.343344)
ButitwasnotjusttheFirstNewHavenNationalBankandYalethatmadetheprojectpossibleintermsof
resourcesandclout.BushandhisaidesonceagainhadtojamtheHousingandHomeFinanceAgency.They
weretheoneswhogottheprogramapprovedeventhoughitstretchedthefederalguidelinesbecauseitwasnot
reallyaboutslumclearance.TheLeeandLoguearchivesthatbecameavailableattheYaleUniversityLibraryin
the1990sarerepletewithlettersbackandforthbetweenBushandNewHavenaboutthisproject,alongwith
lettersbetweenLeeandtheHousingandHomeFinanceAgency,andbetweenBushandtheHousingandHome
FinanceAgency.
ThefollowingexcerptfromoneofDahl'sinterviewswithakeyNewHavenurbanrenewalofficial,Ralph
Taylor,makesthispointverybluntlywhileatthesametimerevealingDahl'scompletelackofinformationon
Bush'spreviousinvolvementinYale'sgrowthplans.Taylorisexplainingwhygainingapprovalfromthefederal
governmenthadbeensuchaproblem.Tomaketheredevelopmentplantechnicallylegal,andqualifyitfor
funding,LeeandLoguewereincludingfourresidentialblocksthatdidnotreallyfit.Taylorsaysthatwhatthey
weredoingwasa"perversion"oftheconceptthaturbanrenewalisforsituationswhere"theareasjustoutsideof
thecenterofthecity,wherethereisasubstantialamountofresidential'tightnoose,'wherethedeteriorationhad
progressedtothepointwhereitwasnolongerpredominantlyresidential,andwherethereusewouldbe
logicallyanextension,anexpansion,ofthecentralbusinessdistrict."Thedialoguecontinuesasfollows:
TAYLOR:Technicallyspeaking,whatwe'redoingonChurchStreetisaperversionofthatconcept.Whatwe're
doingisalanduseconcept.Wehadahelluvatime.WehadtoputpressureonBush,whowasmosthelpfulin
gettingitout.
DAHL:ThisisonethingIdidn'tquestionLogueaboutlastnightandshouldhave.Idon'treallyunderstandwhyit
isthatBushhasbeenhelpfulonthis.
TAYLOR: Bush's connections, I've never asked Logue directly why, but my own
interestfromwhatIknowgoesbacktothefactthatYalewastobethedeveloper
ontheOakStreetConnector.BushisontheYaleCorporationandthereisan....
[Here there is a blank in the transcript due to difficulties in understanding the
tape.] Also Bush is on the Banking and Currency Committee, which handles
redevelopmentlegislation.Sothathehasalogicalinterest.Alsotakingadvantage
of the Yale connection, Logue and Lee, whenever Bush comes to town, dealing
with the Yale Corporation, manage to have lunch with him at Mory's. And I've
gonetosomeofthoseluncheons.Thepreparationswhenwe'reputtingonashow
forBush,preparationforthisoneman,isquiteintensive.Weputoutpublications
limitedtohim.
DAHL:Isthatso?
WomenpicketingMory'sbecauseof
TAYLOR: Explaining what the program was, what the answers were, answers to theclub'smaleonlymembership
policy,October1970
theproblems,andwherehecouldhelpingettingthoseanswers. (clicktoenlarge)

Ithinkthisexchangeillustratesthedifferencesbetweenthepowerstructureand
pluralistperspectives.ForDahl,noonecountedexceptLee,Logue,andtheirassistants,whohadtheabilityto
organizethelocalurbanrenewalcoalitionandcutthroughredtapeinWashington.Butthisinterview,theletters
intheLeeandLoguearchivesatYale,andthearchivalmaterialconcerningtheroleofYaleandtheChamberof
CommercecombinetoshowthatitwasBushwhocutthroughtheredtapeforthebenefitofYaleandthe
downtowngrowthcoalition.

Conclusion
IhavenotpresentedeverylastdetailoneveryurbanrenewalprojectinNewHaven.Thatinformationcanbe
foundelsewhere(Powledge,1970Talbot,1970Wolfinger,1973).However,IthinkIhavesaidenoughtoshow
thatDahliswrongonthekeyissues:
1. Hesaidthesocialandeconomicelitesdon'toverlap,butIshowtheydo.
2. Hesaidthebusinessleaderswerenotinterestedinurbanrenewal,butIshowtheywere.
 3. Hesaidthebusinessleadersdidn'thaveanyimpact,butIshowtheydid.
4. HesaidYalewasuninterestedandpowerless,butIshowotherwise.
5. Hesaidtherewasnodowntownpowerstructure,buthisowninterviewsshowtheopposite.

Statedanotherway,plannersandadministratorsdrewthedesignsthatgrowthcoalitionleadersacceptedor
rejected,andpoliticiansskillfullyorchestratedthecomplexproceedingsanddealingswiththegeneralpublic
butthegoalsandbenefitswereinthehandsofthedowntownpowerstructure,representingthegeneralinterests
ofthelocalgrowthcoalitionandYaleUniversity,bothofwhichwerelookingforroomtogrow.
IalsothinkIhaveshownwhyDahlwaswrongtosaythatthe"decisionalmethod"isthebestwaytodopower
structurestudies.Tothecontrary,myanalysisofhisstudy,andmyownempiricalresearchontheissues,
convincedmethatitisrarelypossibletousethismethod,whateveritshypotheticalmerits,unlessenoughtime
haspassedforinsiderdocumentsandorganizationalrecordstobeavailable.Itmaybethatthemostserious
criticismIcanmakeofDahlisthathenevershouldhavedonethisinterviewbasedstudyinthefirstplace,forit
wasdoomedfromthestarttofallvictimtotheambitionsandplansofthepoliticians,planners,lawyers,and
businessmenthathewasinterviewing.ThiswasespeciallythecasewithRichardLee,aconsummate
charmer/politicianwhoatthetimestillhopedtobecomethegovernorofConnecticutoroneofitssenatorssome
day.
Itwasevenamistaketorelyonintervieweeswhowerenotambitiousorselfservingforinformationonthe
formativeyearsofurbanrenewalinNewHavenbetween1949and1955.ItputDahlatthemercyofhuman
memory,withallitsfrailtiesanditstendencytopersonalizeevents.Itisnotsafetoassumethatwhatpeoplesay
in1957and1958isanaccuratedescriptionofeventsthattookplaceseveralyearsearlier,evenifthereis
considerableconsensusamonginterviewees.Thepointaboutmistrustingevenaconsensusamonginterviewees
iscritical,foritalertsustothepossibilitythateveryoneinterviewedmaybeavictimoftheideological
consensusthathasslowlyformedovertheinterveningyearsandrearrangedmemoriesaboutwhatactually
happened.ThisdangerwasespeciallygreatbecauseofallthemagazinehypeandpublicityabouttheNew
Havenurbanrenewalprogram.Itisforthesereasonsthatadocumentrecordbecomesessential,butDahldidnot
havethatkindofrecord.
Withthehelpofthedocumentrecord,alongwithmyinterviewswithbusinessleadersandplanners,andDahl's
revealinginterviewswithLeeandLogue,wecanconcludethattheFirstNationalBankofNewHavenandYale
UniversityruledinNewHaven,butthatLeeandLoguegoverned.It'sanimportantdistinctionthatDahlwasnot
abletoentertaininhiszealtodiscreditHunteroranyoneelsewhoarguesthatadominanteconomicclasshas
preponderantpower.It'snotthatwayeverywhere(asourstudyofSantaCruzshowed),norateverytime(as
MichaelMann'sfournetworktheoryofpowermakesclear),butit'susuallythatwayinAmericancitiesforthe
reasonsspelledoutinthepagesonlocalpoweronthiswebsite.

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FirstpostedSeptember2005mostrecentlyupdatedApril2014

Allcontent2017G.WilliamDomhoff,unlessotherwisenoted.Unauthorizedreproductionprohibited.