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U.S.-Cuban Relations
From Revolution to Rapprochement
F O R E I G N A F F A I R S .C O M
May 2016
Introduction
Gideon Rose
April 1963
Law and the Quarantine of Cuba
Abram Chayes
Fall 1987
The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited
James G. Blight, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch
January 1967
Cuba, Castro, and the United States
Philip W. Bonsai
January 1970
Cuba Revisited After Ten Years of Castro
Viator
July 1972
The United States and Castro: Breaking the Deadlock
Edward Gonzalez
Fall 1986
Cuba in the 1980s
Jorge Domnguez
Spring 1993
Secrets of Castros Staying Power
Jorge Dominguez
March/April 1996
Eyes on Cuba
U.S. Business and the Embargo
Pamela S. Falk
March/April 1996
Cubas Long Reform
Wayne S. Smith
September/October 2003
The Crackdown in Cuba
Theresa Bond
January/February 2007
Fidels Final Victory
Julia E. Sweig
July/August 2013
Cuba After Communism
The Economic Reforms That Are Transforming the Island
Julia E. Sweig and Michael J. Bustamante
April 9, 2015
Delisted in Havana
Taking Cuba Off the State Sponsors of Terrorism List
William M. LeoGrande
April 5, 2016
Business Unusual in Cuba
Letter from Havana
Anne Nelson and Debi Spindelman
May 16, 2016
Introduction
Gideon Rose
Foreign Aairs
October 1960
Fulgencio Batista
II
III
The present situation is clear enough. Under the Castro
government, Cuba is carrying out a social revolution. In this it
had general popular sympathy in the United States and
tolerant acceptance by the United States Government. It also
chose, apparently intentionally, to become anti-American
when anti-Americanism appeared wholly unnecessary.
Pretexts given the Cuban people for this sound strange to
American ears. The Cuban people were to arm and, if need
be, die to repel a threatened American invasion which was a
pure figment of imagination. Organizing a social revolution
apparently was not good enough; it had also to be converted
into an act of hostility to the United States. Apparently, also,
Cuban politicians increasingly conceive themselves as
divinely appointed leaders to carry on anti-United States
activities throughout the entire hemisphere, and to become
spearheads in aligning Latin America with the Soviet or the
Chinese Communist bloc in a cold war aimed directly against
the national existence of the United States.
The only safety, then and now, was for the United States to
make a positive affirmation of faith and to act as a solid
intellectual and spiritual protagonist of that faith. Partly
because this is the only self-respecting position a great power
can take, and still more because of the respect Latin
Americans of all political faiths have for men who act
consistently on principle, the United States lost one of the
greatest opportunities it has had. Perhaps in Castro's
restablishment of naked dictatorship, the opportunity recurs
in another form.
IV
But our policy in Cuba gave little hint of this. The close
economic relations between Cuba and the United States and
the preferred Cuban position in American markets had
undoubtedly improved the over-all Cuban position. A little of
the benefit from it did trickle down to the Cuban campesinos.
The chief result, however, was great luxury for a relatively
small group in Havana, and a small rise above the starvation
level for the masses. The field was clear for Communist
intriguers to identify the United States with the squalid social
situation--and divert the revolution to Communist power-
political aims.
Another blank in the picture is the fact that the United States
Government communicates with governments but has evolved
no effective means of communicating with peoples.
Conceding, as we must, that an embassy's primary business is
with the palace, it must be added that a greater and more
enduring necessity is for the United States to maintain
relations with the people themselves. In practice, this means
maintaining relations with individuals in, and leaders of, the
opposition, of trade unions, of university life, as well as with
government officials and formal society. Where the
government is democratic, this can be done by a well-
organized, well-staffed and competent embassy. In a
democracy, the diplomatic official both can and is expected to
maintain as wide connections as possible. In a dictatorship, or
where opposition is violent, a non-diplomatic mechanism is
needed. For the Communist bloc, the Communist parties or
organizations supply this function. The United States would
operate rather differently, but comparable connection and
communication could be worked out. The British Foreign
Office has been past-master in doing this; there is no reason
why the United States cannot have a left as well as a right
hand where circumstances require.
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., Professor of Corporate Law, Columbia Law School; Assistant
Secretary of State, 1938-44; Ambassador to Brazil, 1945-46; author of "The 20th Century
Capitalist Revolution," "Tides of Crisis" and other works
Foreign Aairs
April 1963
II
III
IV
The Treaty provides for collective action not only in the case
of armed attack but also "if the inviolability or the integrity of
the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of
any American State should be affected . . . by any . . . fact or
situation that might endanger the peace of America. . . ." In
such cases, a special body, the Organ of Consultation, is to
"meet immediately in order to agree on the measures . . .
which must be taken for the common defense and for the
maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent." The
Organ of Consultation acts only by a two-thirds vote. The
Treaty is explicit as to the measures which may be taken "for
the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent."
The "use of armed force" is specifically authorized, though
"no State shall be required to use armed force without its
consent."
Since World War II, each of the actions to keep the peace-in
Korea, in the Middle East, in Lebanon, in the Congo and now
in Cuba-has taken a different operational form. But each of
them reflects our conviction that a breach of the peace
involves us all and that we must meet it together, through
institutions of collective security established for that purpose.
Foreign Aairs
Fall 1987
Since the Cuban missile crisis remains the only nuclear crisis
we have experienced, it remains the great laboratory in which
to study the art of crisis management. Yet there is little
agreement on the lessons it holds for us today. This
disagreement was brought into sharp focus at a recent
meeting of scholars and former members of the Executive
Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), the
group convened by President John F. Kennedy to advise him
on the matter of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Much of the
disagreement that came to light at that meeting and in a
subsequent series of interviews with key participants revolved
around two issues: the course of action that the United States
should have taken in 1962; and the relevance of that debate
25 years later.
II
III
Taylor: Not at all. Its the nature of some people [that] if they
cant have a legitimate worry, they create them. Apparently
they had some of that in the group youre speaking of.
Many in this hawkish group believe at the same time that the
crisis holds no significant lessons for today. In their view, the
reason why the Soviets capitulated, agreeing to withdraw the
missiles from Cuba, and the main reason the Soviets would
not have retaliated militarily even if the missiles had been
removed by an air strike and (if necessary) an invasion of the
island, was the overwhelming American superiority at the
strategic nuclear level. As strategic superiority is believed to
have been fundamental to the outcome of the crisis, and as it
has long since been lost, the missile crisis is thought to be no
more (or less) relevant to present concerns than, say, the
Peloponnesian Wars. For example, Douglas Dillon took a
hawkish position in 1962 when he believed there was scant
prospect of a Soviet response, but at Hawks Cay 25 years
later he argued, "Its a totally different world today, and as far
as I can see, the Cuban missile crisis has little relevance in
todays world."
It would have been perfectly natural for the hawks not to feel
this apprehension if they did not take the risks of
inadvertence seriously. But it is also interesting to note that
those who felt the fear of inadvertent nuclear war most keenly
approached the crisis not merely as advisers offering their
judgments and opinions, but as people who felt that they
shared the presidents responsibility to get the missiles out of
Cuba without humiliation or catastrophe. This sense of
responsibility, the resulting heightened sensitivity to the risks
of inadvertence, and the associated fear seem to have
reinforced each other and to have had a powerful cautionary
effect on the ExComms choices of action throughout the
crisis. Together, these considerations go a long way toward
explaining the way in which the crisis was eventually
resolved.
IV
Some, like Dean Rusk, reacted to the first letter with fear that
Khrushchev had "lost his cool," and thus might begin to think
irrationally and act impulsively in ways that would deepen the
crisis. Others, like George Ball, recall reacting to the second
letter with dismay because they feared Khrushchev might no
longer be in charge and that the Soviet military or hardliners
in the Politburo had assumed command. Finally, when the
ExComm broke up on the evening of October 27, few of those
who knew of Robert Kennedys message to Dobrynin expected
that the Soviets would agree to the American offer. Yet not
only did the Soviets agree to the American terms, they did so
immediately, enthusiastically and without reservation. From
the discovery of the missiles to the agreement securing their
removal, President Kennedy and his closest advisers found
the Soviets almost entirely inscrutable.
Whatever ones view of the past, the next crisis is not likely to
be as "easy" as the Cuban missile crisis. At the nuclear level,
we no longer have superiority (whatever difference that may
have made) and there is little prospect that the Soviets will
allow us to regain it. Our international political standing and
our ability to win the backing of the United Nations, the
Organization of American States and NATO have diminished.
Domestic politics and the role of the press have also changed.
After Vietnam and Watergate there seems slight prospect of
preserving secrecy for a week of careful consideration of the
options, as Kennedy was able to do. Moreover, the system of
nuclear deterrence has become much more complex. In some
ways the weapons are better protected than they were in
1962, but the numbers have grown and so has the complexity
of command and control systems. Finally, the Soviet Union is
changing, but we will never be sure what that means in a
crisis. In retrospect, it seems that Khrushchev was taking a
higher risk than is normal for Soviet behavior; but what will
be a "normal" level of risk in the future? And how will it vary
in the Caribbean, the Persian Gulf or Eastern Europe?
I dont think the Cuban missile crisis was unique. The Bay of
Pigs, Berlin in 61, Cuba, later events in the Middle East, in
Libya, and so onall exhibit the truth of what Ill call
"McNamaras Law," which states: "It is impossible to predict
with a high degree of confidence what the effects of the use of
military force will be because of the risks of accident,
miscalculation, misperception and inadvertence." In my
opinion, this law ought to be inscribed above all the doorways
in the White House and the Pentagon, and it is the
overwhelming lesson of the Cuban missile crisis.
James G. Blight, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch are, respectively, Executive
Director, Director, and Research Fellow of the Center for Science and International Aairs
at Harvard University. Mr. Nye is the author of Nuclear Ethics. Messrs. Blight and Welch
are currently working on a book on the Cuban missile crisis. The authors wish to express
their thanks to the Carnegie Corporation and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.
Foreign Aairs
January 1967
II
Our judgment about Grau may or may not have been sound.
When he became President a decade later, he disconcerted
both those who had believed in him and those who had feared
him in 1934. The point here, however, is that in the last year
of the Platt Amendment and only a few months after the
adoption of the Good Neighbor Policy, the United States,
through the exercise of its superior power, critically affected
the course of Cuban political life. The elimination of the
Amendment a few months later left many Cubans-even those
who favored our action-skeptical as to the completeness of
the island's independence. Our supporters appeared to owe
the defense of their interests to our intervention-an
unfortunate precedent.
III
Through all Castro's gyrations, the only constant has been his
determination to free Cuba from American influence (which
he equates with domination) even at the eventual cost of
submitting his country to the Soviet Union. It was not Castro's
predilection for Communism but his pathological hatred of
the American power structure as he believed it to be
operative in Cuba, together with his discovery of the
impotence of Cuba's supposedly influential classes, that led
him eventually into the Communist camp. Only from that
base, he thought, could he achieve his goal of eliminating
American influence.
During this period Castro must have come to realize how frail
were the obstacles to his achieving complete power in Cuba.
There were conspiracies against him, including one with
Trajillo's support; he overcame them easily. He had some
setbacks when expeditions which he organized and sent out
from Cuba to destroy the governments of the Dominican
Republic and of Nicaragua proved fiascoes involving
(particularly in the Dominican case) considerable loss of life.
But he must have been consoled in part for these failures
when he noted how gingerly his interventions were treated by
an inter-American community supposedly devoted to the
principle of nonintervention. Its attitude was symptomatic of
the state of the continent's conscience at the time-an asset for
Castro.
Early in July, while the outcome of the crude-oil crisis was still
in doubt, President Eisenhower, using the discretion granted
him by Congress, suspended the balance of the Cuban sugar
quota for the year 1960 on the basis that under prevailing
conditions Cuba was no longer a reliable supplier to the
American market. The implication was clear that as long as
conditions remained as they were Cuba would have no more
market in the United States. The Soviets took the sugar we
had refused. Cuban planters, cane-cutters, sugar-mill hands,
dock workers-all those involved in the industry-went to work
for the Russian instead of the American consumer. Castro and
Guevara doubtless were highly pleased at our decision, the
Russians perhaps less so. When my view on this decision was
sought shortly before it was made public, I opposed it as
nullifying the advantages we had derived from our previous
policy. My belief was that if we were to modify the Cuban
quota we should have done so only after negotiations with the
Cuban government which would have made clear to all
concerned the issues involved. I remain convinced that
turning over to the Soviet Union the major responsibility for
Cuba's sugar economy was a most regrettable step.
IV
Finally, when the United States and the new Cuba come to
restablish relations, they will presumably find it neither
practical nor desirable to restore the old preferential ties. The
United States will wish to recognize that the progress of the
smaller developing nations, of which Cuba can once more
become one of the most promising, depends largely on the
extent to which they are able to achieve conscious
responsibility for their own destinies. The United States and
the other industrialized powers can, through commodity
arrangements as well as assistance programs, bring about
rational and steady expansion in the economic field. It is my
conviction that the restrictions on the freedom of the smaller
nations to control their own affairs increase the anarchic
nationalism of which they are sometimes guilty. Only when
they are truly responsible for their own progress and
development can they contemplate making the reciprocal
sacrifices of sovereignty required by the regional
arrangements which are essential to progress in the modern
world.
Foreign Aairs
January 1970
Austerity then is the first thing that hits the Western visitor-
and it is a stunning blow for one who knew Havana before the
Revolution. The miniature Manhattan skyline along the
seafront is still an incomparable sight as the sun goes down;
the shabbiness fades into silhouette pricked out with lights,
and the tropical night seems full of promise. But the promise
is unlikely to be fulfilled. Behind the familiar faade the bars
and nightclubs are shuttered throughout the working week;
dimly lit shops reveal empty shelves; skeletal cars clank
homewards among the over-crowded buses. The queues are
for ice cream and cinemas. Early next morning they will form
for the necessities of life.
Food and clothing will still be rationed, but the rations will be
bigger. The housing situation will not have improved
appreciably, but there will be many more schools. In general
the standard of living will compare favorably with the Latin
American average but will be low in relation to Cuba's natural
wealth. The technical know-how thrown up by the educational
system will still be too thinly spread to compensate for the
inhibiting effect on productivity of continued reliance on
moral incentives, which are liable to grow weaker as the
Revolution fades into history. Demographically, there will
have been a slight but noticeable shift from town to country,
where new agricultural settlements of a permanent kind will
have begun to emerge; but most of the labor for short-term
agricultural operations will still be drawn from the towns and
accommodated in temporary encampments. Mechanization
will account for perhaps 50 percent of the sugar harvest, but
the remainder, with coffee and citrus, will continue to make
heavy demands on manpower and there will be no problem of
unemployment.
Foreign Aairs
July 1972
None the less, Fidel did seem to leave the door slightly ajar
for a possible modus vivendi with Washington. While on this
visit he publicly espoused a "humanist" revolution and went
so far as to condemn the repressive nature of the communist
political system. Shortly thereafter he flew to Buenos Aires
where he proposed to the OAS "Committee of 21" that the
United States fund a $30-billion development program for all
of Latin America in which, of course, Cuba would share. If
only indirectly, therefore, Castro may have been signaling the
United States to resume the courtship that had tentatively
begun with the State Department's loan overtures to Cuba,
but in a manner that would fully confirm his rgime's
independence and his own nationalist integrity.
These gestures were in the end eclipsed by Castro's ultra-
nationalist and defiant postures. The attention of Washington
and the public tended to focus on his symbolic and ideological
deviations, rather than on the more moderate course that he
in fact was still pursuing during the first half of 1959. The
abrasive fidelista style of politics, as well as the leftist drift of
developments within Cuba, left the Eisenhower
administration little disposed to test Castro's readiness to
come to terms. At the very least, such an approach would
have entailed considerably more than loan overtures because
these in themselves indicated no revision of the traditional
U.S.-Cuban client relationship. Only in a last-minute effort to
head off Cuba's turn to Moscow did Washington attempt this
policy shift. Just before the arrival of First Deputy Premier
Mikoyan in Havana, President Eisenhower publicly
announced on January 26, 1960, that the United States would
observe a policy of nonintervention, refrain from reprisals and
respect Cuba's right to undertake a social revolution. But the
die had already been cast.
For its part, the United States had fed Havana's apprehension
by its indiscriminate as well as mounting attacks on the
Cuban Revolution after early 1959. The public outcry in the
U.S. press and Congress against the fidelista rgime ranged
all the way from attacks on the latter's "revolutionary justice,"
"communist infiltration" and "threat to the Hemisphere," to its
rejection of democratic elections, its general economic
policies and its Agrarian Reform Law of May 1959. From the
viewpoint of the Castro rgime, these growing criticisms must
have appeared as a wholesale indictment of the Cuban
Revolution by influential American circles which could be won
over only by seriously compromising the revolutionary
process. Nor were there clear signals to the contrary from the
White House: both President Eisenhower and Vice President
Nixon remained steadfast in their personal opposition.[v]
Hence, Castro and his closest followers could only conclude
from these public attacks that the "Colossus of the North"
would eventually turn against the revolution as had occurred
previously in Cuba in 1933 and only four years earlier in
Guatemala.
[iv] Letter from Felipe Pazos, March 23, 1963. Pazos served
as President of the National Bank of Cuba until November
1959, and in that capacity accompanied Castro to Washington
the previous April.
Foreign Aairs
Fall 1986
In late 1984, President Castro looked around and did not like
what he saw at home. He began a reorganization of internal
affairs, dismissing many top government and party leaders
from various organizations and factions. The three key
changes have been the 1985 dismissals of the interior
minister, Ramiro Valds; the president of the Central
Planning Board, Humberto Prez; and the party secretary for
ideology, Antonio Prez Herrero. One common theme of these
dismissals is that the officials work, though on some counts
successful, displeased President Castro, as did their
conspicuous display of decision-making autonomy.
But Prez did not perform the miracles expected of him; the
Cuban economy remains troubled and dependent on external
aid. He was dismissed in July 1985 because the results were
not good enough. There was insufficient plan discipline and
too much reliance on the market, and his policies by late 1984
seemed to have led to serious balance-of-payments problems.
The new top official for the economy, Osmani Cienfuegos,
scored high on loyalty to the Castro brothers and on
organizational skills, but his main prior experience was
training insurgents for overseas revolutions in the late 1960s.
II
III
IV
In late 1984 President Castro also looked abroad and did not
like much of what he saw. To gain some political breathing
space, he decided to try to improve relations with the United
States. Prospects for improvement over Central America were
poor. He turned instead to bilateral issues and to southern
Africa. Since 1975 Cuban troops had been in Angola. In 1976
they thought they had won the war, but it has yet to end.
Cuban forces have been in Angola longer than U.S. ground
combat forces were in Vietnam, with a higher percentage of
Cubas population deployed as troops there than the United
States had deployed at the peak of its war in Vietnam.
VI
VII
Since 1959 Cuba has called on the old world to redress the
political imbalances in the new. In the early 1960s Cubas
relations with most industrial democracies (other than the
United States and West Germany) were favorable enough to
help it thwart the U.S. trade embargo. These relations
improved further in the 1970s; trade boomed with all of them
except the United States. By 1975, 36 percent of Cuban
exports and 52 percent of imports were being traded with
non-Soviet bloc countries. As Cubas economic performance
improved, it became creditworthy enough to incur debt with
Western governments and banks (except the U.S. government
and banks). Cubas debt in convertible currencies increased
tenfold between 1969 and 1982.
VIII
Does Cuba in fact have its own foreign policy, one with
autonomy from the U.S.S.R.? To be sure, the Soviet Union has
exercised its hegemony over Cuba. When Cuba crossed
boundaries that the U.S.S.R. had set, the U.S.S.R. retaliated.
In late 1967 and early 1968, the Soviet Union imposed
economic sanctions on Cuba because it opposed some Castro
policies, and the two countries disagreed on relations with
revolutionary groups and with governments. It slowed down
oil deliveries to Cuba while it increased oil exports to Cubas
Latin American adversaries; it postponed weapons deliveries
and suspended technical collaboration. Soviet government
and party officials worked with some Cubans who sought to
change their governments leadership and policies. Castro
yielded. Since then, Cuban and Soviet policies have
converged, though they are not identical. Cuba does not
publicly criticize Soviet policy even when there may be
differences. In the crunch, Cuba sides with the Soviets
without failas in voting with them at the United Nations
when the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan and in boycotting
the Olympics in Los Angeles.
Cuba led the Soviet Union into both Angola and Central
America. As Arkady N. Shevchenko, a high Soviet foreign
official who defected, described the decision to send 36,000
Cuban troops to fight in Angola in 1975-76: "[Deputy Foreign
Minister Vasily] Kuznetsov told me that the idea for the large-
scale military operation had originated in Havana, not
Moscow." General Vernon Walters, deputy director of the CIA
in 1975, concurs: "I believe that as between being a tool of
Moscow or pursuing his own aims, Castro was pursuing his
own aimswhich happened to be, in large part, convergent
with those of Moscow." Cuba had had closer relations than
the U.S.S.R. with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA). The U.S.S.R. was reluctant to intervene in
Angola when the MPLA first asked, while Cuba responded
quickly. Cuban troops were ferried to Angola on Cuban ships
and planes, and were commanded by Cuban generals. Soviet
support arrived only later.
Foreign Aairs
Summer 1990
II
This time, however, the past may not be a valid guide to the
future of Soviet policy toward Cuba. First, as the Cold War
winds down, Havana's value to Moscow has declined.
Technological advances have reduced Cuba's importance for
intelligence gathering and even as a military base. In
addition, because Gorbachev's policies no longer involve
active support of "wars of national liberation" in the Third
World, Cuba's continued support of Marxist guerrilla groups
in Central America and elsewhere directly challenges
Gorbachev and undermines his efforts to change the Soviet
Union's international image. Finally Cuba's revolutionary
foreign policy jeopardizes the growing rapprochement
between the Soviet Union and the United States, since
Washington holds Moscow accountable for Havana's
behavior. President Bush made this clear during the Malta
summit, and Secretary of State James Baker did the same,
both during his unprecedented appearance before the new
Soviet parliament and in his speech to the Organization of
American States in late 1989.
Although Soviet aid has not yet decreased, the odds are good
that it will be cut significantly in the coming years. Soviet-
Cuban economic relations are still governed by the 1986-90
Soviet Five-Year Plan. The unprecedented public discussion of
the Soviet Union's foreign aid policy, particularly with
reference to Cuba, must be evaluated in this context. The new
five-year plan is also being negotiated in the context of the
continuing deterioration of the Soviet economy, which may
account for recent reports that Moscow wants to sign an
agreement for only two years instead of five.
III
IV
VI
Under the first option, Castro would insist that Cubans ride
out the shortages of energy, food and spare parts by working
harder. Since 1986, however, the rectification campaign has
tried and failed to increase worker productivity through the
use of moral incentives. In the absence of material incentives,
the only other way to raise worker productivity would be
through increasing reliance on some form of "voluntary"
labor. Yet the degree of repression that would have to be
applied to achieve higher production levels would ultimately
provoke either a military coup or a popular revolt.
There are those who say that Castro would have nothing to
fear from such elections, that within Cuba he remains a
popular and charismatic leader who still is able to draw huge
and enthusiastic crowds. They also argue that Cuban
nationalism and Castro's historical role as a revolutionary
hero would offset any popular discontent produced by years
of economic hardship and the prospect of an even more
precarious economic future.
In the absence of free and fair elections, it is impossible to
confirm or refute this reasoning. But the erroneous press
reports prior to the Nicaraguan election regarding the
Sandinistas' popularity and the wildly inaccurate polls that
predicted a Sandinista landslide argue for extreme caution in
drawing conclusions about a leader's popularity based on the
public behavior of an unfree people.10 In the case of Cuba, it
seems reasonable to assume that, as in Nicaragua, a free and
internationally monitored election would set in motion forces
that would lead to a vote for Castro's removal.
VIII
The sense that Fidel Castro's days may be numbered has once
again focused attention on U.S. policy toward Cuba.
International developments, however, have profoundly
transformed the nature of the debate. They have weakened
the argument for normalization of relations, and the issue
now is whether to maintain the current policy or toughen it.
From this it followed that the U.S. could solve its "Cuba
problem" by lifting its economic embargo and taking steps to
normalize relations. Those who favored this policy intensified
the pressure on Washington during periods when Castro
would signal a willingness to discuss the issue with the U.S.
government. Some argued that there should be no
preconditions for normalizing relations. Others accepted the
need for quid pro quos from Cuba.
From this they concluded that it made no sense to lift the U.S.
embargo as long as Cuba remained a communist dictatorship
ruled by a rabidly anti-American leader. Its removal would
only strengthen Castro by allowing him to maintain his
strategic alliance with Moscow while providing him with
additional resources with which to buy support at home and
pursue his revolutionary policies abroad.
The embargo's original purpose was to bring about the
collapse of the Cuban economy and with it the removal from
power of Fidel Castro. That goal remained elusive as long as
Castro could count on the Soviets for trade and aid. A
succession of U.S. presidents redefined the embargo's
purpose as the isolation of Cuba. They vowed to keep the
embargo in place until Castro stopped aiding guerrillas in the
Third World, withdrew Cuban troops from Africa and allowed
free elections and respected human rights at home.
Susan Kaufman Purcell is Vice President for Latin American Aairs at the Americas
Society in New York.
Foreign Aairs
Spring 1993
Following these rules, Cuba has averted the patterns that led
to the demise of other communist regimes. One such pattern
in Europe was the emergence of reformers within the party
who ousted the old guard and then led in forming a political
opening. In East Germany the makers of the transition
wielded power only briefly before they themselves were swept
out by elections. In Hungary the process of reform occurred
over a period of years but, at the key opening, the reformers
again lost out. Another pattern evident in Poland and
Nicaragua (as well as in Pinochet's Chile and Marcos'
Philippines) might be called "spectacular leadership error":
rulers confident that they had substantial public support
called a national election, which they promptly lost.
Cuba's official media has flooded the country with the "bad
news" from Europe's old communist regimes: the breakup of
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; the
outbreak of civil wars; the increase in unemployment and
inflation; the elimination of various consumer subsidies; and
the increase of common crime. The message to ordinary
Cubans is clear: the transition to
This trend has occurred mainly in the export sector. But the
government has also liberalized regulations to permit the
private contracting of certain services. Some state enterprises
that export goods and services have been semiprivatized--that
is, they operate as private firms with the state as sole
shareholder. It would be but a small additional step to permit
their full privatization, leaving them in the hands of former
government and party cadres. This move cleverly anticipates
the do-it-yourself privatization underway in the former Soviet
Union or the last-minute reward to the faithful undertaken by
the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1990. But whatever the
motivation, these changes extend the scope of Cuba's market
economy.
The rise of the illegal market economy is more important in
understanding how ordinary citizens have adjusted to
economic adversity. The black market's present dimensions
are difficult to gauge. Some illegal markets depend on theft,
but many others represent markets at their best. For
example, state agriculture has never developed an efficient
food distribution system. Even today crops sometimes rot
unharvested in the fields. Behaving illegally but efficiently,
peasants and commercial intermediaries connect with urban
consumers to bring supply and demand into balance.
Foreign Aairs
March/April 1996
The hard line against doing any business with Cuba under
Castro is still orthodoxy for many influential Cuban exiles.
Their activism deters some businessmen, who fear domestic
retaliation, but less than in the past. Threats of boycotts or
worse by the exile community have diminished; indeed, the
embargo is broken most often by exile families sending money
to relatives. A spokesman for Radisson Hotels says that it has
not received any pressure and that Cuban Americans in Dade
County are its best customers. Benetton, the Italian
multinational clothing company, did face a protest by Cuban
exiles but claims it lasted for a day in front of their Dadeland
store and ceased once company officials met with the
protesters. "It's a paper tiger," says John Kavulich, president
of the U.S.-Cuban Trade and Economic Council. "Buyer-
beware cables and boycott threats have produced no major
obstacle to free marketeers."
A CHANGING SCENE
STEP BY STEP
Pamela S. Falk was Sta Director of the U.S. House of Representatives Western
Hemisphere Subcommittee. She is writing a book on Cuba and advises companies and
individuals about the country.
Foreign Aairs
March/April 1996
WRONG PARALLELS
The only real debate has been over how the end might come.
Would it be as in Romania, with the demise of a communist
leader at the hands of his enraged people? Or as in Poland
and the former Czechoslovakia, where dissident leaders took
over the government?
The new investment law opens the way for Cuban exiles to
return, invest, and open businesses. This is a welcome step,
but it has sparked resentment among some Cuban residents,
who question why exiles are permitted to open businesses
while they are not. They may soon get their wish. Cuban
officials have acknowledged that to rationalize the state
sector they may over time have to lay off as many as a million
state employees. Unprofitable factories must be closed and
many government agencies drastically cut back. How are
these masses of newly unemployed to be absorbed? There is
only one way: expand the private sector. Hence, a new small
business law is under discussion. When it is enacted, probably
this year, the law will allow groups of citizens, rather than
only individuals, to pool their resources and open small
private enterprises that will employ others, although it may
limit the number of employees they may hire.
POLITICAL CREEP
But the municipal councils do not deal with national, let alone
international, issues. Those are debated or, some would say,
rubber-stamped by the National Assembly. Until 1993 its
members were appointed, not elected by popular ballot. In
February of that year, the electoral law was reformed so that
citizens of each municipality could elect their National
Assembly representatives. Unfortunately, the nominating
process was tightly controlled and, worse, only one candidate
could vie for each seat. The subsequent vote may have been
meaningful as a general referendum on the Castro regime
because the high voter turnout indicated a willingness to
legitimize the government's attempts at reform. But as an
election, it was a farce.
But most Cubans see another side of the revolution, the side
that has provided free education, excellent free health care, a
high degree of equality, and, most important, a sense of
national pride. Until the economic crisis resulting from the
collapse of the Soviet Union, most Cubans seemed to feel they
had benefited from the revolution. Because of these economic
difficulties, many would now like to abandon the revolution,
as evidenced by the refugee crisis of 1994. One should not
lose sight of the fact, however, that far more Cubans are
prepared to stay and see it through, even as they grumble
over their plight. The majority of Cubans are black, and they
have benefited most from the revolution. That majority wants
to see change, but not a return to the pre-1959 situation,
which the rhetoric of the white anti-Castro exiles often seems
to threaten. Instruments such as the Helms-Burton
legislation, which is so clearly driven by those same exiles,
simply strengthens the resolve of the black majority and most
other Cubans to stick with Castro.
The rest of the world favors engagement (as does the United
States with most other authoritarian countries) and rejects
U.S. policy toward Cuba. The vote in the U.N. General
Assembly against the U.S. embargo last November was 117 to
3; in 1994 it was 101 to 2. The only countries voting with the
United States were Israel and Uzbekistan, and both trade
with Cuba. In other words, not a single government
cooperates with the U.S. embargo. Nevertheless, the Helms-
Burton legislation would have the president insist to the
Security Council that other U.N. members join the embargo.
The legislation's extraterritorial punitive measures risk major
quarrels with Canada, Mexico, Russia, and the European
Union.
Wayne S. Smith, who served in the U.S. embassy in Havana from 1958 until 1961 and as
Chief of the U.S. Interest Section there from 1979 to 1982, is a visiting professor of Latin
American studies at The Johns Hopkins University and a Senior Fellow at the Center for
International Policy. His best-known book on Cuba is The Closest of Enemies.
Foreign Aairs
September/October 2003
UNDER SIEGE
Last March, on the very day that U.S. forces entered Iraq,
Fidel Castro launched a major crackdown on peaceful Cuban
political dissidents. The Iraqi operation was a surprisingly
swift one -- and so was Castro's. Within three weeks, the
statue of the Cuban leader's old friend Saddam Hussein had
been toppled in central Baghdad; meanwhile, Castro had
summarily tried and imprisoned 75 Cubans. Their sentences --
for supposed crimes against the country's security -- averaged
20 years. A few days later, as if in an afterthought, three men
who had hijacked the Havana Bay ferry in an attempt to
escape the island were also tried. This group was even more
unlucky: they were executed by firing squad, despite the fact
that there had been no violence during their botched crime.
FIDEL'S VERSION
Prior to the arrests, the Castro regime had for several years
been lenient on dissent, luring opponents into a false sense of
safety. Activists were led to believe that they had carved out a
new space for their work and boasted to visitors that they
could now act in the open; after all, there was nothing illegal
about what they were doing. Little did they know that their
island would soon become the backdrop for Moscow-style
show trials resulting in a cumulative sentence of 1,450 years
for the 75 defendants.
TRUTH ON TRIAL
Those behind bars come from all races and walks of life:
Catholics and Freemasons, intellectuals and peasants. Some
are only in their twenties; others are in their sixties. Less than
half of the prisoners lived in Havana -- proof that their cause
represents not an elite occupation but a broader movement,
albeit one now decapitated.
At his trial, the prosecution declared that Rivero had set up "a
counterrevolutionary group" and "followed orders from the
United States government." His indictment was based more
on adjectives than on reference to law, however: he was
charged with "carrying out subversive activities," "writing
subversive articles," "launching a subversive magazine,"
working for a subversive French agency (Reporters Sans
Frontires), and sitting "on a jury that promoted a book with
subversive ideas."
AN INSIDE JOB
DARING TO DREAM
Theresa Bond is the pseudonym for a respected political analyst specializing in closed
societies.
Foreign Aairs
January/February 2007
REUTERS
The end of the Cold War seriously threatened this status quo.
The Soviet Union withdrew its $4 billion annual subsidy, and
the economy contracted by 35 percent overnight. Cuba's
political elite recognized that without Soviet support, the
survival of the revolutionary regime was in peril -- and, with
Fidel's reluctant acquiescence, fashioned a pragmatic
response to save it. Cuban officials traveling abroad started
using once-anathema terms, such as "civil society." Proposals
were circulated to include multiple candidates (although all
from the Communist Party) in National Assembly elections
and to permit small private businesses. The government
legalized self-employment in some 200 service trades,
converted state farms to collectively owned cooperatives, and
allowed the opening of small farmers' markets. At Ral's
instigation, state enterprises adopted capitalist accounting
and business practices; some managers were sent to
European business schools. As the notion of a "socialist
enterprise" became increasingly unsustainable, words like
"market," "efficiency," "ownership," "property," and
"competition" began to crop up with ever more frequency in
the state-controlled press and in public-policy debates.
Foreign investment from Europe, Latin America, Canada,
China, and Israel gave a boost to agriculture and the tourism,
mining, telecommunications, pharmaceutical, biotechnology,
and oil industries.
STRAITS JACKET
The Cuban regime responded with its own hard line. Ral,
although a leading advocate of economic reform domestically,
was an absolutist when it came to confronting the United
States. Even as some liberalization continued, and a new
Cuban constitution opened the way for a religious revival by
allowing Communist Party members to practice openly, there
was a government-wide purge of academics and intellectuals -
- many of them party loyalists -- thought to be associated with
the United States or U.S.-backed reforms. The message was
chillingly clear: given a choice between national security and
a more open society, the revolution would pick security every
time.
INFIDELITY
Since the 2003 war in Iraq, Cubans have closely observed the
effects of de-Baathification there. Like membership in Iraq's
Baath Party under Saddam Hussein, membership in the
Cuban Communist Party is a ticket to professional
advancement for devout believers and agnostic opportunists
alike. Party members include sophisticated intellectuals,
reform-minded economists, clergy, brash up-and-coming
youth leaders, scientists, professors, military officers,
bureaucrats, police officers, and businesspeople in the
"revenue-earning sectors" of the economy. In short, it is
impossible to know who among the roughly million party
members (and 500,000 members of the Union of Communist
Youth) is a real fidelista or raulista. Purging party members
would leave the country without the skilled individuals it will
need after Fidel, whatever the pace of change. And should the
United States, or a government that Washington deems
adequately transitional, ever be in a position to orchestrate
such a purge, it would then face an insurgency of highly
trained militias galvanized by anti-American nationalism.
WASHINGTON'S MOVE
Nor is Venezuela the only country that will resist U.S. efforts
to dominate post-Fidel Cuba and purge the country of Fidel's
revolutionary legacy. Latin Americans, still deeply
nationalistic, have long viewed Fidel as a force for social
justice and a necessary check on U.S. influence. As
attendance at his funeral will demonstrate, he remains an
icon. Latin Americans of diverse ideological stripes, most of
them deeply committed to democracy in their own countries,
want to see a soft landing in Cuba -- not the violence and
chaos that they believe U.S. policy will bring. Given their own
failures in the 1990s to translate engagement with Cuba into
democratization, and the United States' current credibility
problems on this score, it is unlikely that U.S. allies in Latin
America or Europe will help Washington use some sort of
international initiative to advance its desires for radical
change in Cuba.
When Fidel dies, various actors in the United States and the
international community will rush to issue and, if they get
their way, enforce a series of demands: hold a referendum
and multiparty elections, immediately release all political
prisoners, return nationalized property and compensate
former owners, rewrite the constitution, allow a free press,
privatize state companies -- in short, become a country Cuba
has never been, even before the revolution. Many of those
goals would be desirable if you were inventing a country from
scratch. Few of them are now realistic.
After Fidel's funeral, a "transition" government of the sort
Washington is hoping for will not occupy the presidential
palace in Havana. This means that the White House cannot
responsibly wait for the happy day when the outlines of its
commission reports can be put to the test. Instead, the
current administration should immediately start talking to the
senior Cuban leadership. Recognizing that Cuba and the
United States share an interest in stability on both sides of
the Florida Straits, the first priority is to coordinate efforts to
prevent a refugee crisis or unforeseen provocations by U.S.-
based exile groups eager to exploit a moment of change on
the island. Beyond crisis management, Washington and
Havana can cooperate on a host of other concerns in the
Caribbean Basin, including drug trafficking, migration,
customs and port security, terrorism, and the environmental
consequences of offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. The
two countries have successfully worked on some of these
issues in the past: each has bureaucracies staffed by
professionals who know the issues, and even know one
another. An end to Washington's travel ban, a move already
backed by bipartisan majorities in the House of
Representatives, would further open the way to a new
dynamic between the United States and Cuba. Just as the first
Bush White House formally ended covert operations on the
island, this Bush administration or its successor should also
affirmatively take regime change, long the centerpiece of
Washington's policy toward Cuba, off the table.
Julia E. Sweig is Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow and Director of Latin America
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is the author of Inside the Cuban
Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground and Friendly re: Losing Friends and
Making Enemies in the Anti-American Century.
Foreign Aairs
July/August 2013
This new moment in Cuba has arrived not with a bang but
rather on the heels of a series of cumulative measures -- most
prominent among them agricultural reform, the formalization
of a progressive tax code, and the governments highly
publicized efforts to begin shrinking the size of state payrolls
by allowing for a greater number of small businesses. The
beginnings of private credit, real estate, and wholesale
markets promise to further Cubas evolution. Still, Cuba does
not appear poised to adopt the Chinese or Vietnamese
blueprint for market liberalization anytime soon. Cubas
unique demographic, geographic, and economic realities --
particularly the islands aging population of 11 million, its
proximity to the United States, and its combination of
advanced human capital and dilapidated physical
infrastructure -- set Cuba apart from other countries that
have moved away from communism. It is perhaps
unsurprising, then, that Cubas ongoing changes do not
resemble the rapid transition scenario envisioned in the 1996
Helms-Burton legislation, which conditioned the removal of
the U.S. embargo on multiparty elections and the restitution
of private property that was nationalized in the 1960s. In this
respect, Washington remains more frozen in time than
Havana.
Even worse, the values of the CUC and the CUP are
considered equal within and between state enterprises. This
bizarre accounting practice helped insulate CUP prices from
inflation during the depths of the economic crisis that
followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, but today it makes
it difficult for analysts and investors to estimate the real costs
of doing business on the island or the value of state
companies. Economists agree that the least disruptive way to
move toward a single currency would be to gradually merge
the two exchange rates in tandem with a steady rise in GDP
and salaries overall. But in the meantime, the artificial one-to-
one ratio within the state sector has the effect of overvaluing
the CUPs international exchange rate and thus decreasing
the competiveness of domestic goods. Paradoxically, the dual-
currency regime protects imports at the expense of domestic
production.
ISLAND HOPPING
Yet it has been a long time since Cubans on the island and off
could be neatly divided between anticommunists and pro-
Castro revolutionaries. Any visit to the Miami airport today
attests to the strength of transnational ties; in peak season,
over a hundred weekly charter flights carry Cubans and
Cuban Americans between the two countries. Such travel,
allowed under some circumstances since the late 1970s, has
expanded considerably since 2009, when U.S. President
Barack Obama lifted restrictions on family visits. In 2012,
upward of 400,000 Cubans in the United States visited the
island. And this is to say nothing of the hundreds of thousands
of Cuban emigrants living across Latin America, Canada,
Europe, and beyond who also visit and support family at
home.
JULIA E. SWEIG is Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Cuba: What
Everyone Needs to Know. Follow her on Twitter @JuliaSweig. MICHAEL J.
BUSTAMANTE is a Ph.D. candidate in Latin American history at Yale University.
Foreign Aairs
December 21, 2014
Cuban Comrades
The Truth About Washington and Havana's
New Detente
Michael J. Bustamante
HOLEY ALLIANCE
NO ES FCIL
Sadly, somewhat lost in the shuffle thus far have been the
diverse reactions of Cubans in the United States and across
the island. U.S. national news channels predictably flocked to
the Little Havana restaurant Versailles, long Miamis capital
of exile political chatter and guava pastries. Outside,
defenders of the hard-line approach had gathered to express
their disapproval of Obamas treason. In neighborhoods like
Hialeah, howeverpopulated by some of the more than half
million Cubans who have arrived in the United States since
1995sentiments tended to reflect a practical concern for
loved ones on the island. This is a big step, one Facebook
commenter wrote. The people of Cuba are the only ones who
get screwed by those trying to take down the Castros from
Miami, [where exiles can] eat meat and live the good life.
Foreign Aairs
April 9, 2015
Delisted in Havana
Taking Cuba Off the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List
William M. LeoGrande
Obama has crossed that Rubicon, opening the way for a policy
based on the facts and the law rather than politics and
ideologynot only regarding state sponsors of terrorism but
also in overall U.S. relations with Cuba. With the terrorism
list resolved, the reestablishment of normal diplomatic
relations should follow quickly, along with progress on a wide
range of issues of mutual interest that have been held up by
this relic of the Cold War.
WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE is Professor of Government at American University in
Washington, D.C. and a co-author with Peter Kornbluh of the recent book Back Channel
to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana
(University of North Carolina Press, 2014).
Foreign Aairs
February 17, 2015
Havana Calling
Easing the Embargo Will Open the Cuban
Telecom Sector
DIALING ABROAD
JOSE W. FERNANDEZ is former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy,
and Business Aairs and partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. ERIC LORBER
previously worked at the Oce of Foreign Assets Control at the U.S. Department of the
Treasury and is now an associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP.
Foreign Aairs
August 19, 2015
A Cuban Conundrum
The Contradictions in Washington's Relations
With Havana
Michael J. Bustamante
Foreign Aairs
April 21, 2015
Michael J. Bustamante
Cubas leaders and hotel chains (in which the Cuban military
often has a stake), not to mention the burgeoning private
restaurants, bed-and-breakfasts, and other businesses eager
to get in on the cash flow, seem prepared to live with the
topsy-turvy symbolism of such encounters. Tourism on the
island has long profited from peddling, in part, the image of a
1950s Cuba that the revolution was supposed to have left
behind. Since December 17, that allure has only increased,
with hotels filled to capacity and everyone from Conan
OBrien to Paris Hilton dropping in for a look.
Foreign Aairs
March 18, 2016
Michael J. Bustamante
Even so, the United States can only encourage and incentivize
the shape of Cuban reform. It cannot control its course. In
that regard, one hopes that the president will also listen to
representatives of a dynamic gray zone in Cuban
societythose who identify not only as loyalists or dissidents
but as constructive critics, intellectuals, anti-imperialists,
democratic socialists, or simply small-business owners
operating under intense obstacles. One of the most important
gestures Obama can make is to acknowledge that Cuban
society is complex and that its problems do not lend
themselves to quick, imported fixes. A recent poll shows that
average Cubans overwhelmingly favor the opening of their
country to the United States. But in talking to family members
and colleagues in Havana this December, I also know many
islanders feel intense trepidation about their ability to
maintain social protections and develop their country
equitably from the ground up. Whether its writing from
within academia or in the comment boards on blogs, others
have expressed concern with the Cuban militarys large share
in the economy already or with the new free trade zone at
Mariel Harbor. They see them as cruel signs of state
capitalism on the march, not socialisms last line of defense.
Foreign Aairs
April 5, 2016
ANNE NELSON
Cuba's crumbling infrastructure.
Like the antique American cars whose worn-out engines have been
replaced by ones from Soviet Ladas, the new Cuban economy will
remain inefficient even if it acquires a shiny chassis.
Debi Spindelman
A vintage car in Cuba.
In fact, many Cubans have been voting with their feet. Almost
half a million Cubans have obtained residency in the United
States since 2000. There are almost two million Cuban-
Americans in the United States (with more in other
countries), compared to an island population of 11.2 million.
Increasing numbers of the CUC elite have turned down the
chance to emigrate, believing the opportunities will be
greater at home, but the situation looks different for Cubans
on CUP wages. The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act offered
preferential immigration requirements to Cubans, and the
1995 wet foot, dry foot policy created an incentive for
Cubans to reach U.S. soil.
ANNE NELSON
Havana, Cuba.
Foreign Aairs