Toward a Normal State-to-State

Relationship. China and the DPRK in a

Changing Northeast Asia.

Xiao Ren (Institute of International Studies, Fudan University)

This paper was compiled for the IKSU launch conference at the
University of Central Lancashire (UCLan), 15-17 October 2014

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF KOREAN STUDIES (IKSU) KOREA SECURITY CONFERENCE, 15-17 OCTOBER 2014
DRAFT

Ren Xiao
Toward a Normal State-to-State Relationship? - China and the DPRK in Changing
Northeast Asia

Working paper for the Korea Security Conference, International Institute of Korean
Studies (IKSU), University of Central Lancashire (UCLan), 15-17 October 2014

Introduction
The most conspicuous phenomenon that characterizes Northeast Asia today is
perhaps the entanglement of geo-politics and geo-economics, or, put another way, the
interactions between security and economics. On the one hand, the region can by no
means resist the dynamic forces of the twin trends of globalization and regionalization,
and detach itself from the rest of the world. On the other hand, the relics of the Cold War
remain and linger on menacingly in this part of the world. The Korean peninsula
continues to be a heavily armed area and there is a worrying trend for further
development of nuclear weapon program. The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
(DPRK, or North Korea) carried out a third test in February 2013, which followed its
provocative rocket launch in December, ignoring all the wishes and warnings from the
international community. The 9/19 joint statement that the Six-Party Talks achieved, in
which the parties agreed to take substantive steps for the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula and other related objectives, remains a good deal, yet the talks have been
stalled since the end of 2008. Pyongyangs political relations with Washington and Tokyo
are still in limbo and have yet to be normalized. Without doubt, the future of North Korea
matters considerably for the region. The current top leader, Kim Jong-un, who inherited
political power from his father, has consolidated his power base since December 2011
when he took over. Presumably, he controls the party, the army and the government. The
nature of the regime is such that the fate of the whole country is largely dependent on its
top leader. This is potentially risky.

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 As its key neighbor and nominal ally, China always hopes for the best while
preparing for the worst. It has encouraged the DPRK to take a new path of reform and
opening-up and to achieve change in a gradual and peaceful way. In essence, what is
expected is a kind of soft landing and that would be consistent with Beijings goal of
building a stable and peaceful immediate external environment. For China, the peninsula
has to be a peaceful and friendly place, divided or reunified. This is all the more so as
China strives for a real resurgence of its northeastern provinces. With a turbulent and
chaotic North Korea, it would not be possible for the reviving the northeast (zhenxing
dongbei) drive, a major initiative of the Chinese leadership, to be implemented smoothly.

The Norths provocative missile test-firings and the third nuclear test in February
2013 greatly disappointed Beijing and highlighted the limits of Chinas influence on
Pyongyang. The developments forced Beijing to rethink whether its DPRK policy
worked. The views are divided. There are people who still believe that North Korea is a
buffer zone and Pyongyang can stand sentry facing the United States and South Korea.
The minority view criticized the Chinese governments approval of the UN Security
Council (UNSC) Resolution 2094 which condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear
test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013, 1 believing it indicated that Chinas
policy was losing balance. A stronger view in this line argues China is essentially
abandoning and sacrificing the DPRK for its relations with the U.S., which should have
never happened. Yet a different school of thought contends that China must maintain its
resolute position of opposing North Koreas provocative and destabilizing acts such as
the missile firing and nuclear test, as well as of supporting UNSC resolutions, albeit after
some amendments. Obviously, North Koreas acts were a loss of face for China,
particularly when the latter was trying so hard to persuade Pyongyang not to do so, for
the resumption of Six-nation talks, and for a peaceful solution by diplomatic means. It
should have come as no surprise that China was very unhappy since North Korean
defiance ran counter to Chinas already strenuous and difficult diplomatic efforts. Beijing
had to respond to give Pyongyang a warning about its provocative behavior, and to
caution Pyongyang not to escalate but to return to the talks without any precondition.
1 Resolution 2094 (2013) Adopted by the United Nations Security Council at its 6932nd meeting, on 7 March 2013.

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This article aims to analyze the Sino-DPRK relationship after Kim Jong-ils death,
Chinas policy adjustments and their implications for building a normal state-to-state
relationship between China and the DPRK.

Post-Kim Jong Il Interactions

Geography is destiny. Since the DPRK is right on Chinas borders, Beijing always
wants to make sure there are no chaos (luan) that would potentially have adverse affects
on its Northeastern provinces. It also wants gradual changes in North Korea for reform
and opening-up. These mean peaceful transformation of the North and a non-nuclear
peninsula. Thus, when Kim Jong-il suddenly died in December 2011, an orderly
transition to a post-Kim Jong-il leadership in Pyongyang was desirable for Beijing. The
death marked the end of an era in the DPRK and the inception of the Kim Jong-un period.
Immediately following the announcement of the death, China quickly cautioned against
the relevant players not to try to take advantage of the death and act rashly. Beijing also
attempted to establish contact with the Kim Jong-un leadership sooner rather than later.
However, the face-to-face contact did not happen until July 2012 seven months after the
death - when Mr. Wang Jiarui, Director of the CCPs International Liaison Department,
traveled to Pyongyang. He was the first foreign guest whom Kim Jong-un greeted, and it
was the first high-level contact between the two countries after the transition. During
Wangs visit, China extended an invitation to Kim inviting him to visit China, which did
not happen. If it happened, the DPRKs trajectory in 2013 presumably would be different.

Though exchanges of visit are infrequent, thus far there have been two major visits
at the highest level from North Korea, and yet both floundered and culminated in the
execution of Jang Song-taek in December 2013.

In August 2012, Mr. Jang Song-taek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense

Commission and Kim Jong-uns uncle by marriage, who was widely seen as the regent
at the time, made his way to China in his capacity as Chairman of the steering committee
for the development of the two economic zones, the Rason Economic and Trade Zone
and the Hwanggumphyong and Wihwa Islands Economic Zone in the DPRK. As the first

3
high-level delegation from the DPRK since Kim Jong-ils death, the importance of the
visit far outweighed merely businesses on the two economic zones. In fact, the visit was a
contact at the highest level to exchange information and become to know each other.

A number of things happened within a year, and two major developments, contrary
to Chinas wishes, turned out to be Pyongyangs rocket launch in December 2012 and its
third nuclear test in February 2013. Clearly, both violated the UN Security Council
resolutions and caused the Security Council to impose new sanction measures. UNSC
Resolution 2094 was passed unanimously in March, with Chinas consent. Given
Pyongyangs provocative acts, China increasingly lost appetite to defend the North at the
UN Security Council. Moreover, the third nuclear test happened during the Chinese New
Year and inevitably disrupted the holiday in China, an additional reason for frustration.
After the third test, a Chinese idiom was more frequently used, i.e. siwu jidan, meaning
unscrupulously, to refer to the way North Korea behaved. Pyongyang made the move
despite China's wishes and disapproval, and ties between the two supposed allies became
strained. In response, China not only agreed to the new UN sanctions on the North but
also started to put a squeeze on North Korean banks. This indicated a significant change
in China DPRK policy, which was that it became more serious in implementing
UN-imposed sanctions. Beijing had been half-hearted before, somehow carefully
avoiding being too tough and hoping for some changes on the part of the DPRK. To
Chinas dismay, Pyongyang seemed to be moving in a different direction. On a few
occasions, China expressed its warnings by using some strong words, saying China
would not allow others to make trouble on its doorstep. This was widely seen as a
warning to Pyongyang, who lost more and gained less as China increasingly felt fed up.

The Debate was Continuing

The DPRK policy is one of a few foreign policy issues that Chinese observers have
major differences. Over the years, Chinas policy toward North Korea maintained huge
inertia. There was a clear ideological element in it seeing the DPRK as a socialist
country. In terms of approach, the Chinese used an idiom kukou poxin - basically
meaning urging somebody time and again with good intentions - to describe their way of

4
trying to persuade Pyongyang, suggesting the latter to constrain itself with respect to
nuclear development and change to take a new path of reform and opening-up.

North Koreas brazen moves repeatedly caused a policy debate in China. In the
research community, policy analysts have been debating about whether China should
change course with regard to its North Korea policy. In this context, a challenging
question whether the DPRK should be abandoned was raised. The abandonment
school basically meant that, after so many times of disappointment, China now had to use
pressure to rein in Pyongyang and not to allow it to harm Chinas security interests. By
playing brinkmanship, the DPRK has offered more than enough reasons for the U.S. to
strengthen its military presence in the region, including developing a missile defense
system, which clearly is not in the interest of China. If North Korea shows no regard
whatsoever to Chinese national interests, why should China humor Kim Jong-uns
wayward behavior? While changing policy, China should be prepared that this would risk
the deterioration of the Sino-DPRK relationship.

The opponents do not accept the phrase abandonment and see it as nave and
extreme. According to a Global Times editorial, The North has annoyed most Chinese.
Voices pushing to abandon North Korea can be heard. They have even become formal
suggestions by some strategists. There is no need to hide Chinese society's dissatisfaction
with the North, and the interests of the DPRK and China have never coincided. However,
the North remains at the forefront of China's geopolitics. The US' pivot to the Asia
Pacific has two strategic prongs, namely Japan and South Korea, and North Korea is still
a buffer closer to them. Whether there is a friendly North Korea toward China will impact
the strategic posture in Northeast Asia. The leading newspaper believed China's
policymakers will not follow the abandonment suggestion. 2 A similar viewpoint in this
line cautioned against demonizing the DPRK and the external forces driving a wedge
between China and the DPRK, and this was a simple logic.

2 Geopolitics makes abandoning NK nave, The Global Times editorial, April 12, 2013.

5
 A third view is China should make policy adjustments. It is irresponsible to be
oblivious of the current state of the Sino-DPRK relations. Those who believe that
criticizing the current state of Sino-DPRK relationship is demonizing the DPRK and
splitting China and North Korea are overly ideological. They are not looking at the
relationship from a right vantage point of nation to nation, but rather seeing the DPRK as
an ideological ally. What needs to be stressed is the relationship has to boil down to a
normal state-to-state relationship, and only on this basis can interest choices be made.
China should decide to upgrade or downgrade the level of this relationship according to
actual needs, and this has to be clear-cut rather than ambiguous or even muddled. China
can offer Pyongyang what it wants, yet in return Pyongyang has to respect Chinas
interests, given that China has given considerable resources as aids to the North. This has
played a key role for North Koreas stability and its survival. Under these circumstances,
Pyongyang has to care about Chinas interests or concerns rather than disregard them and
even kidnap or loot Chinese fishing boats and fishermen working in the adjacent seas. In
this case, to continue to maintain the current level of the Sino-DPRK relations would be
laughable and wrong, and would not win the other partys true respect. On the contrary,
China ought to be very clear and have Pyongyang to face up to Chinas national interests
by making adjustments in the state-to-state relations with the DPRK, including its respect
for the safety of the Chinese fishermen and their properties. China is bound to adjust its
North Korean policies, but it doesn't mean it will side with the US, Japan and South
Korea. Rather, it will respond to the North's extreme moves which offend China's
interests and will make the North correct its moves. 3

There is a fundamental question involved in the debate: is North Korea actually a

buffer zone or time bomb? There are still people who believe that the North is a buffer in
terms of Chinas security concern, a counterweight to the U.S.-ROK alliance, and China
should not lose it. An argument in favor of this was made in case there were to be a
contingency on the Taiwan Strait during which the United States might mobilize its
troops stationed in South Korea. A different school of thought contends that militarily, a
buffer zone like the North does not matter at all today. The North has actually become a

3 Ibid.

6
time bomb that could explode at any time. 4 Beijing must dissuade Pyongyangs
assumption that China always believes the DPRK is a buffer for Chinas security. In fact,
North Korea was oblivious of Chinas interests or concerns by making unbridled moves.
Heightened tensions on the peninsula justified the upgrade of the U.S.-ROK alliance,
providing Washington with a further reason to implement the rebalance to Asia strategy
by shifting more resources to the East Asia and Pacific region. This is not in Chinas
national interest. At the end of the day, is North Korea a strategic asset or liability? This
continues to pose a fundamental question for Beijing.

Amidst the tensions, one incident at the sea further aggravated Sino-DPRK
differences and exacerbated the bad feeling in China toward Pyongyang. On May 5, 2013,
a Chinese fishing boat from Dalian, Liaoning Province and the Chinese fishermen on it
were detained by a North Korea Peoples Army unit. The detainees were asked to pay a
fine of RMB 600,000 yuan, a large sum of money and in effect a ransom. This kind of
incident had happened before, but was becoming more frequent recently. It was not the
first time in the year either. But this time a Chinese newspaper, the Guangzhou-based
Southern Metropolis Daily, publicly reported the incident, as late as on May 19 when the
representations Chinas local authorities made had not worked. It was a long-standing
practice that the Chinese newspapers and magazines did not criticize North Korea since
otherwise the latters embassy in Beijing would go ahead with a protest, and this would
cause a diplomatic incident. A lesson had to be learned from the closedown of the
Chinese journal Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) several years before.
However, this kind of risk long reflected the abnormality of the Sino-DPRK
relationship.

When the Chinese fishing boat and its 16-man crew held for ransom by a North
Korean armed group was publicized, public outcry over the incident and resentment
toward North Korea mounted to fever pitch after the confirmation of the kidnap. Angry
Chinese netizens expressed their strong views by calling the country a pirate state.
Amid the public anger over the "kidnapping" of the Chinese fishermen, the media in

4 Authors interview with a Chinese government official on May 27, 2013.

7
China warned the North to stop detaining Chinese fishing boats. The influential Global
Times said the incident had "fuelled outrage" among the Chinese public, with internet
users venting "fury" towards North Korea, as traditionally close ties between the nations
were pushed toward greater tension. One editorial suspects that the North Korean army
used the ambiguity of maritime borders to "make a quick buck" by detaining the Chinese
crew. It stressed, If North Korea continues to go rogue, China should take actions to
push it toward a more measured response... If we don't set rules for North Korea, the
whole image of our government may be seen as being too weak to deal with maritime
issues.

On May 21, the detained Chinese fishing boat and fishermen were released without
any penalty or ransom being paid. The Chinese side demanded the North to launch
an investigation into the case, and take actions to prevent similar incidents from
happening again. For many people in China, this was not satisfying. After all, the
fishermen were detained for two weeks, and it was not the first time this kind of
kidnapping happened. Punishment should be made to those who infringe on China's
rights and interests, since compromise will only lead to similar violations in the future. 5

More broadly, for quite a few Chinese observers, since the end of the Cold War,
China has not had a clear and wise idea about its relationship with the DPRK. China did
not adjust its policies over time and its policy inertia became disconnected with the
realities of the international and bilateral relations as well as with Chinas own
development. The emergence of this situation was partially because the Cold War
legacies lingered, and partially because the DPRK policy drifted along as there was a
need for an ideological ally. As a result, China did not carry out appropriate analyses and
planning for the bilateral relationship, which was in limbo and in effect wavering
between socialist allies and normal state-to-state relationship. The adverse consequences
include the following: China being towed along by North Korea, Beijing lacking
influence over Pyongyang, and a selfish North Korea largely neglecting Chinas national

5 Released fishermen back to sea after NK kidnapping, Global Times May 22, 2013.

8
interests. The recent Chinese fishing boat incident was only the latest example of these
trends.

As the debate was going on, it was widely reported that Chinas four major
state-owned banks ended their businesses with the North Korean foreign trade banks.
Evidently, this would add further difficulties to the Norths nuclear-related activities and
beyond. Top Chinese banks halted most dealings with North Korea was an unprecedented
move to use financial leverage against Pyongyang, which reflected Beijing's exasperation
with Kim Jong-un's regime. This went beyond what Beijing had agreed to implement in
UN resolutions, with several leading banks stopping all cross-border cash transfers,
regardless of the nature of the business. A UN resolution the same year only called for
sanctions in cases where money might contribute to North Korea's nuclear and ballistic
6
missile programs. This response indicated Beijings rising resentment toward the
Norths acts, with the former being the latters main lifeline.

The Choe Visit

Consequently, the context North Korea found itself in was a changing one. After
many years of trying to persuade and induce Pyongyang to take a new path, China had
increasingly become disappointed and lost patience. Frustrated by Pyongyangs third
nuclear test, Beijing felt it no longer needed to defend for Pyongyang at the UN Security
Council, for example. On a number of occasions in the past, China has softened sanction
measures or strong rhetoric at the UNSC in order to achieve more balanced resolutions,
a kind of action Beijing increasingly found more difficult to justify.

As a result, China became more serious about carrying out UN-imposed sanctions
against the DPRK. This could have immediate and profound affects on an already tightly
bound and poor DPRK, something Pyongyang could feel concretely. When China, Russia,
and the U.S. came closer by narrowing their differences and converged at UNSC more
than before, North Korea could feel the kind of pressure that would cause grave
consequences to it over time. This could even pose a threat to Kim Jong-uns ruling

6 China banks rein in support for North Korea, Financial Times May 14, 2013.

9
statustoo high a price for Pyongyang to afford.

Amidst the tensions, on May 22, 2013, Kim Jong-un sent Vice Marshal Choe
Ryong-hae, his right-hand man who served as director of the Korean People's Armys
General Political Bureau, to China. Choe was a close confidant of Kim Jong-unoften
seen at his side when he conducted on-site inspections. Choe was also a member of the
Partys Politburo Presidium. His China trip was North Korea's first serious dabbling in
diplomacy after months of bellicose pronouncements, including threats to launch nuclear
strikes at the United States and its allies. Choe came to China in the capacity as Kim
Jong-uns special envoy. For the DPRK, this was very rare and showed that that was an
unusual mission.

Four people from the Chinese side held talks with Choe and they were Wang Jiarui,
Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and
Director of the CCPs International Liaison Department, Liu Yunshan, member of the
Politburo standing committee, Fan Changlong, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military
Commission, and eventually Xi Jinping, the number one. While meeting with the Chinese
leaders, Choe indicated that the purpose of his visit was to improve, consolidate, and
develop the DPRK-China relationship. The terms used implied a recognition that the
relationship had become strained and efforts had to be made to amend and improve it.
According to Choe, the DPRK wanted to concentrate on economic development and
improve peoples living standard, and would like to build a peaceful external
environment. Pyongyang would like to take Chinas advice to restart dialogue with the
relevant parties. 7 Those signals were familiar to Chinese ears and were welcomed
gestures on the part of the DPRK. While meeting with President Xi, Choe specifically
expressed Pyongyangs willingness to solve the problems through multiple forms of
dialogue, including Six-Party Talks. Xi stressed Chinas three insistences, namely,
insistence on the objective of denuclearization, on maintaining peace and stability on the
peninsula, and on seeking solutions through dialogue and consultation. 8

7 Renmin ribao (Peoples Daily) May 24, 2013.

8 Xi Jinping meeting with Kim Jong-uns special envoy Choe, Renmin ribao (Peoples Daily), May 25, 2013, p. 1.

10
 The main purpose of Choes visit was to mend the relationship with China and
escape further isolation. Pyongyang knew that China was unhappy toward its
provocations and the consequences were grave. The basic tone Kim Jong-un set in his
letter to President Xi was calling for clearing up misunderstandings and differences,
and not to allow the enemies to drive a wedge between the DPRK and China. Therefore,
it was a major step Pyongyang took to alleviate external pressures, especially from China,
who was for a long time reluctant to use pressure. In addition, Choe suggested to Chinese
leaders the two sides jointly commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Korean War
armistice and renovate the tomes of the dead Chinese soldiers, as if deliberately wanting
to remind China of their historical connections. The timing of the visit was before the
scheduled Xi-Obama (China-US) and Xi-Park (China-South Korea) summits in early and
late June 2013 respectively, during which the Korean situation would inevitably be a high
priority on the summit agendas. In this sense, the visit was also a preventive move.

However, while Choe gave Beijing a promise to take China's advice about coming
back to talks, there was no mention of de-nuclearization. Six-Party Talks were
specifically mentioned, but it did not necessarily mean a return to the substance of the
talks. Given North Koreas decision to promote nuclear force and economic growth in
parallel, it is hard to assume that Pyongyang would take measures to step back from
nuclear development anytime soon. Nevertheless, with Choes China visit, the situation
on the Korean peninsula was temporarily entering a short period of contact and dialogue,
as was indicated by the agreement the two Koreas reached to reopen the Kaesong
Industrial Park later.

This observation was reinforced by the Pyongyang visit made by Mr. Li Yuanchao,
Vice President of China, to mark the 60th anniversary of the armistice of the Korean War,
which ended on July 27, 1953. Li conveyed a verbal message from President Xi to Kim
Jong-un and the content of which was not made public and was likely symbolic.

During the same week, Kim Jong-un himself went to Pyongannam-do where the
largest grave of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers (CPV) is located. He laid wreath before

11
the grave and the bust of Mao Anying, Chairman Mao Zedongs son who was killed
during a US air raid targeting the CPVs headquarters in the Korean War. This move was
something his father Kim Jong-il rarely made. Kim IIIs tone was a high one. According
to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), he emphasized that the selfless assistance
the Chinese Party, Government and people offered to the DPRK and the lives the CPV
soldiers sacrificed at the time when the DPRK was undergoing a sever test should never
be forgotten. The baton of the DPRK-China friendship should be passed on firmly. 9 The
previous day, Kim also visited the old site of the CPV headquarters. The moves he made
were a further indication of Pyongyangs motive to amend its relations with China.

Stagnation
Nevertheless, North Koreas third nuclear test resulted in further consequences and
China took measures to tighten its export control to Pyongyang. Choes visit did not
reverse this. On September 23, 2013, Chinas Ministry of Commerce announced a ban on
the export of 900 items to North Korea that relate to nuclear weapons, intercontinental
ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. The list includes dual-use items
and technologies, which have both civilian and military applications. These include a
wide range of technology and items including deuterium and tritium, which can be used
to create hydrogen bombs, missile launching systems, GPS technology, stealth equipment,
genetically modified organisms and some kinds of refrigerants. It was the first time
Beijing revealed in detail items that it had prohibited to be exported to the North. If the
exports ban is enforced properly, there can be a direct impact on North Korea's capability
to develop smaller, lighter and diverse nuclear warheads and advance its long-range
missiles programs. 10

In the meantime, the amelioration of the Sino-DPRK relationship proved to be

temporary and short-lived. In December 2013, news came from Pyongyang announcing
the purge of Jang Song-taek. The North Korean regime swiftly eliminated Jang from the
earth by executing him! The news surprised everybody including Beijing. In April 2014,
9 Jin Zhengun pindiao zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun lieshi (Kim Jong-un visits the war dead of the Chinese Peoples
Volunteers), Renmin ribao (Peoples Daily) July 31, 2013.
10 China publishes export ban list for North Korea, The Joongang Daily October 17, 2013.

12
Choe Ryong-hae had reportedly been replaced by someone else as director of the Korean
People's Armys General Political Bureau. The elusiveness ignited another guessing game
about what was going on inside the country and about the possible instability of the
Kim Jong-un regime. However, in October the news report indicated that Choe was still a
member of the partys Politburo Presidium and this showed Choes status was stable. In
November, Choe was sent to Russia in the capacity of special envoy, the highest-ranking
North Korean official who traveled to Moscow since Kim Jong-un became the supreme
leader. Choes visit, as a key part of the Kim Jung-un diplomacy, was supposedly
intended to make preparations for Kims possible diplomatic debut in Russia.

However, in the North Korean system, being number two is precarious because the
number one is always determined to monoplize the supreme power and does not want
others to share at all. In the history of China, when the young emperor had grown up, he
would often get rid of the regents left over by his father or the previous emperor. This
repeatedly happened in the past. When the purge of Jang is seen from this perspective, it
is not difficult to come to the conclusion that these developments more likely reflected
the strength rather than weakness of Kim Jong-un.

The purge of Jang and others had implications for the Sino-DPRK relationship. Jang,
the high-level figure who used to be at the top North Korean leadership and who visited
China, disgracefully lost power and disappeared from the scene. When Jang was seen as
someone who knew about China and the Chinese leaders, his execution increased Chinas
aversion and sense of uncertainty. This did not help with, if not harm, the bilateral
relationship. Kim Jong-uns declining Chinas invitation for a highest-level visit was
likely a lost opportunity for Pyongyang. This became more obvious when President Xi
Jinping of China made a high profile state visit to South Korea in July 2014, who was
accompanied by as many as some 80 Chinese officials and 200 businessmen, highlighting
the promotion of South Korea in Chinas foreign affairs and the relative marginalization
of North Korea in Chinas foreign affairs under Xi.

Throughout 2014, the Sino-DPRK relationship remained lukewarm. No exchange of

13
high-level visit happened. The aftershock of the third nuclear test lingered. Yet toward the
end of the year, on the occasion of the third anniversary of Kim Jong-ils death, Liu
Yunshan, a member of the CCP Central Politburo Standing Committee, visited the DPRK
Embassy in Beijing. This was a delicate gesture to indicate that China attached
importance to its relationship with North Korea. Basically, this was a politically driven
move to maintain certain level of relationship. The new bridge over the Yalu River was
completed with Chinese funds but no corresponding road construction on the DPRK side
was carried out for the new bridge to be effectively used. Economically, bilateral trade
with the DPRK was merely 0.16 percent of Chinas foreign trade in 2013. Diplomatically,
for Pyongyang to move China, it had to do some things and play the Russia card which
was a longstanding tactics. Given that 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the end of
World War II, Russia extended an invitation for Kim Jong-un to attend the 70th
anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany celebrations in Moscow, and there is a
possibility for Kims diplomatic debut to happen in Russia.

China and the DPRK in Peace Regime Building in Northeast Asia

Given all the problems, how likely is it for a peace and security regime to be created
in Northeast Asia? This is an often-asked question, while Pyongyang has been repeatedly
calling for turning the armistice regime into a peace regime. As a key player, Washington,
seeing the North Korean nuclear program as a threat, lacked effective means to deal with
Pyongyang alone and thus tried to work with other nations to form a united front in the
region. Earlier, the George W. Bush Administration drew a lesson from the failure of
the 1994 Agreed Framework and wanted to avoid negotiating with Pyongyang bilaterally
but instead multilaterally. The Obama Administration has rather adopted a strategic
patience approach to the DPRK. For Beijing, it is definitely desirable to see a Korean
peninsula not armed with any nuclear weapons. On the objective of denuclearization, the
national interests of the United States and China to a large extent overlap and converge.
In the meantime, they diverge on some other issues such as how to achieve the goal of
denuclearization and how to bring about changes to the peninsula. 11 Both may have
some suspicions about the others possibly assuming too dominant a role in Northeast
11For a good analysis see Bonnie S. Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean
Peninsula (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2012).

14
Asia and beyond. Therefore, the formation of any security architecture very much
depends on a strategic acquiescence between the U.S. and China, and whether they can
work together in the years ahead.

A distinction can be made that, among the four major powers in Northeast Asia, the
U.S. and China are the first echelon while Japan and Russia are at the secondary level in
terms of their influence. While the U.S. continues to be a key Pacific power and China is
increasingly playing a significant role in the region, the U.S.-China cooperation and
synergy is essential if any Northeast Asian security architecture is to emerge. Should the
Korean nuclear issue be eventually resolved successfully through the Six-Party Talks
process, a rough Northeast Asian security architecture would somehow take shape and
could be further employed to deal with other regional issues as well. Therefore, whether
such a regime will arise to a great extent depends on whether the Six-Party framework
will succeed or not.

Apparently, difficulties and hopes coexist and time and patience are needed for the
talks to make progress. The key questions seem to be as follows: First, will the six-party
talks end up like the four-party talks of 1997-99 and how could that be avoided? Past
experience shows that when the DPRK was defiant, it was not likely that a multilateral
process on the nuclear issue would succeed. How to overcome the hurdle and move the
process forward? Will a strategic decision have to be made by both Washington and
Pyongyang? Second, it is in the interest of the U.S., without doubt, to solve the nuclear
issue by diplomatic means, yet to what extent is Washington interested in
institutionalizing the Six-Party process and turning it into a peace and security
mechanism? From the U.S. perspective, what kind of security regime does it desire for
Northeast Asia and will such a regime complement or conflict with its interests in Asia
and its alliances with Japan and South Korea, and how does Washington perceive its own
role? Third, will a new security framework be able to help solve other regional problems
in addition to the nuclear one, such as regional economic cooperation and environmental
issues? Granted that they seem distant right now, I try to address some of these questions
below.

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 Some Chinese researchers tend to advocate the following principles and approaches
for the Northeast Asian peace and security regime building. First, within the regime,
parties should nurture equal, friendly, and non-adversarial relationships. They seek
common ground and mutual understanding while respecting differences. They do not
form core groups against any particular country. Second, the countries should start from
the easier issues and gradually expand to more difficult ones. For example, they can
begin with the non-conventional security issues which are less sensitive to carry out in
order to build consensus and increase common interests among them. When they have
accumulated a certain degree of trust, they can expand to more traditional areas,
including military. Third, the regimes working mechanism should be consensus-based.
Members try to reach consensus or agreement through consultations on important
security-related issues, and then they implement what they agree upon.

A different view argues that the concerned parties should not stick to one pattern but
rather remain fully flexible regarding three approaches. First, they should be flexible on
proceeding in either a multilateral or bilateral way. Whichever applies, it is adopted.
When no appropriate form of multilateralism can be found, efforts can be made for
bilateral relationship to be improved and therefore the multilateral process is advanced.
Second, they should remain flexible enough regarding priority areas. They can move on
in whatever realms when possible, be it economic, societal, or in security affairs. Third,
they should be flexible in terms of putting priority on institutional arrangements or
advancing cooperation in functional areas. Generally, the latter is easier than the former
to be carried out and it is reasonable to start from functional cooperation. However, that is
not always the case. For instance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization from its very
beginning has been an institution, although the member states have pursued collaboration
in functional areas as well as respective reduction of armed forces in the border region. In
a word, all can move ahead in parallel and it is not necessary to prioritize the various
tasks.

There is a puzzle as to how institutions and norms come into being and how this

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relates to major powers. I argue that cooperative major power relationships can be the key
to the formation of a security mechanism. Without major power cooperation or
coordination as such, the possibility would not be very high for a security regime to grow
and succeed. The failure of the four-way talks in 1997-99 was a revealing example. This
is more so in highly political areas, in which the formation of a regional security regime
has to include core states or core bilateral relationships as an anchor. Thus major power
cooperation is a necessary prerequisite. In the case of Northeast Asia, if China and the
U.S. do not cooperate, the opportunity for a security regime to grow would be slim.

It appeared that the Obama Administration and the Park government were giving the
idea of setting up China-US-ROK trilateral talks a serious consideration but facing two
major difficulties. One, China is concerned with how Pyongyang would perceive the
trilateral talks. For China, the priority is always to resume Six-Party Talks since it was
China who initiated it and served as chair until 2008 when the six nations last met.
Pyongyang publicly expressed its position that it had no precondition to return to the talks,
while the US and ROK, who want to see beforehand, as a premise, real possibilities of
making progress in the direction of denuclearization. Another obstacle is a concern for
the US and ROK that Japan may feel being left out. In fact, if Japan wants to discuss the
abduction issue, its top preoccupation, it is also possible to happen within the Six-Party
framework, and by doing so, Japan can avoid skepticism or criticism from Washington
and Seoul.

One commentator made an argument that it would be delusional to expect Beijing to

sit by while the ROK (with or without the US) moved to occupy and administer a
"collapsed" Kim regime. If the ROK wants to secure full Chinese cooperation, Beijing
has to be persuaded or reassured that a unified Korea dominated by the South would not
harm Chinas national interests. Until then, China will continue to be cautious and
hesitant, wanting North Korea to change peacefully with watchful eyes on the U.S.
Because of the sensitivity, Beijing was and still is reluctant to discuss with the US and/or
ROK the intriguing issue of any contingency.

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Conclusion
Over the past years, numerous discussions were conducted in China regarding its
relations with the DPRK. What sprang from these deliberations was a mainstream view
which held that this relationship had to become a normal state-to-state relationship. This
may have rich meanings and sufficient space for imagination, which implies that the
relationship in the past was abnormal and thus has to be adjusted. The adjustment is a
long ongoing process and has undergone many twists and turns. First, a normal
state-to-state relationship means a less ideological Chinese policy toward the DPRK. For
decades, seeing the DPRK as a socialist country long constrained the Chinese thinking
on its policies. The geographical lips and teeth relationship considerably impacted on
Chinas general approach to its often difficult neighbor. However, over the past two
decades, the ideological factor in Chinas DPRK policy has been decreasing steadily, and
aversion to its prickly neighbor is growing.

Second, a normal state-to-state relationship means Chinas DPRK policy needs to

become more pragmatic. As time goes by, more and more Chinese observers tend to
believe that North Korea was spoiled for too long and China should avoid standing
together with a country with such a bad record. Pyongyang can and should be criticized
when it deserves. Economically, in bilateral trade, for example, there should be no more
friendly price, which unilaterally giving favor to North Korea. At the UN Security
Council, China no longer instinctively defends the DPRK, who was condemned when it
violated UNSC resolutions. On the contrary, China endorsed a number of UNSC
resolutions in relation to the DPRK and became more serious in enforcing them. For the
first time China published a list of banned items for possible nuclear use to the DPRK
and this may stall the latters further bid for arms.

Third, for China, a normal state-to-state relationship with Pyongyang also means to
learn how to be a great power (da guo). Being bullied and humiliated by Western powers
and Japan in modern history, China has long held a victim complex and attached much
importance to state sovereignty. This has a deep-seated impact on its policy and behavior.
Having grown to a great-power status, China is expected to play a larger and more

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proactive role in the world. Clearly, there is no consensus in the world on how a great
power should behave and China has its own principles. However, being a great power
may mean to criticize, veto, and even intervene when proper, provided that this is utterly
necessary and also has international legitimacy.

Overall, Chinas DPRK policy is undergoing a generational change. The baton was
passed to a new generation of Chinese leaders. They can be less burdened by history and
are more prone to a new thinking in terms of approach, granted that Chinas fundamental
interests remain unchanged and therefore an about-face is not likely.

(revised 6 March 2015)

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