EVIDENCE CASES

Celestino Marturillas, Petitioner versus People of the , The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. [6]
Respondent

G.R. No. 163217 | 2006-04-18
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
Well-rooted is the principle that factual findings of trial courts,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are generally binding
on the Supreme Court. In convicting the accused in the present case,
the Court not merely relied on this doctrine, but also meticulously
reviewed the evidence on record. It has come to the inevitable
conclusion that petitioner is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the November 28, 2003 Decision [2] and
the March 10, 2004 Resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR CR No. 25401. The CA affirmed, with modifications as to the
award of damages, the Decision [4] of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Davao City. The RTC had found Celestino Marturillas
guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 42091-98. The assailed CA
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, subject to the modification thus indicated, the
judgment appealed from must be, as it hereby is, AFFIRMED. With
the costs of this instance to be assessed against the accused-
appellant." [5]
Petitioner was charged with homicide in an Information [7] dated
November 5, 1998, worded as follows:
"[T]hat on or about November 4 1998, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, armed with a gun, and with intent to kill,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot one Artemio Pantinople,
thereby inflicting fatal wound upon the latter which caused his
death." [8]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the People's
version of the facts:
"4. The prosecution presented Lito Santos, Ernita Pantinople, PO2
Mariano Operario, Alicia Pantinople and Dr. Danilo Ledesma as its
witnesses from whose testimonies, the following facts were
established.
"Lito Santos, a forty-three-year old farmer and resident of Barangay
Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City, testified that about 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon of November 4, 1998, he saw his neighbor
and 'kumpare' Artemio Pantinople arrive on board a jeepney from
Bunawan, Davao City. Artemio was carrying a truck battery, some
corn bran and rice. They talked for a while concerning their livelihood
afterwhich, Artemio proceeded to connect the battery to the
fluorescent lamps in his store. Artemio's store was located about five
(5) meters away from Lito's house.
"After installing the battery to the fluorescent lamps, Artemio sat for
a while on a bench located in front of his store. Then, Cecilia Santos,

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Lito's wife, called him and Artemio for supper. Artemio obliged. Lito,
opting to eat later, served Artemio and Cecilia the food. After eating,
Artemio returned to the bench and sat on it again together with his
tree (3) children, namely: Janice, Saysay and Pitpit.
"Lito was eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a gunshot.
From a distance of about ten (10) meters, he also noticed smoke and
fire coming from the muzzle of a big gun. Moments later, he saw
Artemio clasping his chest and staggering backwards to the direction
of his (Lito's) kitchen. Artemio shouted to him, 'Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil
ko ni kapitan,' meaning 'Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.'
However, Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting
incident because Cecilia warned him that he might also be shot.
"Lito did not see the person who shot Artemio because his attention
was then focused on Artemio.
"Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from
her house towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the
ground. Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, 'Kapitan, bakit
mo binaril and aking asawa.' She also repeatedly cried for help.
"Lito then went out of their house and approached Artemio who was
lying dead near a banana trunk more than five (5) meters from his
house. Some of their neighbors, namely: Antenero, Loloy Libre and
Lapis answered Ernita's call for help and approached them.
"When the shooting incident happened about 7:30 in the evening of
November 4, 1998, Lito's house was illumined by a lamp. Their
kitchen has no walls. It is an open-type kitchen giving him an
unobstructed view of Artemio who was about five (5) meters away
from where he was positioned at that time. Although there was
a gemilina tree growing in the space in between his house and the
store of Artemio, the same did not block his view of Artemio. Likewise,
the coconut trees and young banana plants growing at the scene of
the crime did not affect his view.
"At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing
milk for her baby. Her baby was then lying on the floor of their
kitchen. When she was about to put the bottle into the baby's mouth,
she suddenly heard the sound of a gunburst followed by a
shout, 'Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain.' She immediately
pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw appellant wearing
a black jacket and camouflage pants running towards the direction of
the back portion of Lito's house. From there, appellant crossed the
street and disappeared.
"Ernita saw appellant carrying with him a long firearm which looked
like an M-14 rifle. Ernita also sensed that appellant had some
companions with him because she heard the crackling sound of the
dried leaves around the place. Ernita had a clear view of appellant at
that time because their place was well-illumined by the full moon
that night and by the two (2) fluorescent lamps in their store which
were switched on at the time of the incident.
"Ernita immediately went out of their house and ran towards
Artemio. Artemio tried to speak to her but he could not do so because
his mouth was full of blood. Upon seeing the pitiful sight of her
husband, Ernita shouted several times, 'Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay
and akong bana.' She also repeatedly called her neighbors for help
but only Lito Santos, Eufemio Antenero, Norman Libre and some
residents of Poblacion Gatungan responded to her calls and
approached them. She noted that no member of the CFO and CAFGU
came to help them. Also, no barangay tanod came to offer them to
help.
"While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemio's body to
be touched by anybody. After more than two (2) hours, the police
arrived, together with a photographer by the name of Fe Mendez of
Bunawan District, Davao City who took pictures of the crime scene.
"PO2 Mariano Operario, Investigation Officer of the Investigation
Section of the Bunawan Police Station, Philippine National Police,
Davao City, testified that about 9:05 in the evening of November 4,
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1998, he received a report of an alleged shooting incident at Barangay
Gatungan, Bunawan District in Davao City. Together with SPO1 Rodel
C. Estrellan and a member of the mobile police patrol on board their
mobile car, PO2 Operario proceeded immediately to the crime scene.
They reached the crime scene about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of
the same date. They found the lifeless body of Artemio sprawled on
the ground. Ernita and Lito then approached PO2 Operario and
informed him that appellant was the one responsible for the
shooting.
"PO2 Operario stayed at the crime scene for about one (1) hour and
waited for the funeral vehicle to pick up the body of Artemio. When
the funeral hearse arrived, PO2 Operario told the crew to load
Artemio's body into the vehicle. Thereafter, he then boarded again
their mobile car together with Lito Santos.
"Armed with the information that appellant was the one responsible
for the shooting of Artemio, PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of
appellant and informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of
Artemio. He then invited appellant to go with him to the police station
and also to bring along with him his M-14 rifle. Appellant did not say
anything. He just got his M-14 rifle and went with the police to the
police station where he was detained the whole night of November 4,
1998. Appellant did not also give any statement to anybody about the
incident. The following day, appellant was transferred by the police to
Tibungco Police Station where he was detained.
"Alicia Pantinople, the 44-year old sister of Artemio, testified that on
the night of November 4, 1998, she was at home watching television.
She heard a gunshot but did not mind it because she was already
used to hearing the sound of guns fired indiscriminately in their
place.
"After a few minutes, Junjun, a child and resident of Sitio Centro,
Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City came knocking at
their door. Junjun informed them that: 'Yoyo, Uncle Titing was shot,'
referring to Artemio.
"Upon hearing the report, Alicia looked for some money thinking that
it might be needed for Artemio's hospitalization because she expected
Artemio to be still alive. Artemio's two (2) children, namely: Jonel and
Genesis who were staying with her hurriedly left. She then ran to the
place where her brother was shot and found Artemio's dead body on
the ground surrounded by his four (4) children.
"At the Bunawan Police Station, Alicia was informed by the police
that appellant was at Tibungco Police Station. She sent her male
cousin to proceed to Tibungco Police Station to find out if appellant
was indeed in the said place. However, her cousin immediately
returned and informed her that appellant was not in Tibungco Police
Station. She then went around the Bunawan Police Station and
noticed a locked door. When she peeped through the hole of the said
door, she saw appellant reclining on a bench about two and a half (2
) meters away from the door. Appellant's left leg was on top of the
bench while his right leg was on the ground. Appellant was wearing a
brown shirt, black jacket and a pair of camouflage pants. He was also
wearing brown shoes but he had no socks on his feet.
"At the police station, Alicia confronted appellant: 'Nong Listing I
know that you can recognize my voice. It is me. Why did you kill my
brother? What has he done wrong to you?'
"Appellant did not answer her. Nevertheless, she was sure that
appellant was awake because he was tapping the floor with his right
foot.
"Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer of the Davao City Health
Department, conducted an autopsy on Artemio's cadaver about 9:30
in the morning of November 5, 1998 at the Rivera Funeral Homes
located at Licanan, Lasang. His findings are summarized in his
Necropsy Report No. 76:
'POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
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'Pallor, marked generalized.
'Body in rigor mortis.
'Wound, gunshot, ENTRANCE, 0.9 x 0.8 cm. Ovaloid located at the
anterior chestwall, rightside, 1.0 cm; from the anterior median line,
at the level of the third (3rd) intercoastal space and 131.0 cms. above
the right heel, directed backwards, upwards, medially crossing the
midline from the right to left, involving the soft tissues, perforating
the body of the sternum, into the pericardial cavity, perforating the
heart into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the heart into the left
thoracic cavity, perforating the upper lobe of the left lung, forming an
irregular EXIT, 1.5 x 1.1 cms. at the posterior chest wall left side,
13.0 cms. from the posterior median line and 139.0 cms. above the
left heel.
'Hemopericadium, 300 ml.
'Hemothorax, left, 1,000 ml.
'Stomach, filled with partially digested food particles.
'Other visceral organs, pale.
'CAUSE OF DEATH: Gunshot wound of the chest.
Signed by: DANILO P. LEDESMA
Medico-Legal Officer IV'
"During the trial, Dr. Ledesma explained that Artemio died of a
gunshot wound, 0.9 x 0.8 centimeters in size located about one (1)
inch away from the centerline of Artemio's Adam's apple down to his
navel and about 1:00 o'clock from his right nipple.
"The trajectory of the bullet passing through Artemio's body indicates
that his assailant was in a lower position than Artemio when the gun
was fired. Dr. Ledesma also found the wound of Artemio negative of
powder burns indicating that the assailant was at a distance of more
than twenty-four (24) inches when he fired his gun at Artemio. He did
not also find any bullet slug inside the body of Artemio indicating
that the bullet went through Artemio's body. Artemio's heart and
lungs were lacerated and his stomach contained partially digested
food particles indicating that he had just eaten his meal when he was
shot.
"In the certificate of death of Artemio, Dr. Ledesma indicated that the
cause of his death was a gunshot wound on the chest.
"5. After the defense presented its evidence, the case was submitted
for decision."[9]
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, petitioner presented the following statement of
facts:
"9. This is a criminal case for Homicide originally lodged before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Davao City against herein
Petitioner Celestino Marturillas, former Barangay Captain of
Gatungan, Bunawan District[,] Davao City and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 42,091-98. The criminal charge against Petitioner was the
result of a shooting incident in Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan
District, Davao City which resulted in the slaying of Artemio
Pantinople while the latter was on his way home in the evening of
November 4, 1998.
"10. On that same evening at around 8:30 p.m. herein Petitioner
former Barangay Captain Celestino Marturillas was roused from his
sleep at his house in Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao
City by his wife since Kagawads Jimmy Balugo and Norman Libre
(Barangay Kagawads of Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City)
wanted to see him. Dazed after just having risen from bed, Petitioner
was rubbing his eyes when he met the two Kagawads inside his
house. He was informed that a resident of his barangay, Artemio
Pantinople, had just been shot. Petitioner at once ordered his
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Kagawads to assemble the members of the SCAA (Special Civilian
Armed [Auxiliary]) so that they could be escorted to the crime scene
some 250 meters away. As soon as the SCAA's were contacted, they
(Petitioner, Kagawads Libre and Balugo including Wiliam Gabas,
Eddie Loyahan and Junior Marturillas - the last three being SCAA
members) then proceeded to the crime scene to determine what
assistance they could render.
"11. While approaching the store owned by the Pantinople's and not
very far from where the deceased lay sprawled, Petitioner was met by
Ernita Pantinople (wife of the deceased-Artemio Pantinople) who was
very mad and belligerent. She immediately accused Petitioner of
having shot her husband instead of Lito Santos who was his enemy.
Petitioner was taken aback by the instant accusation against him. He
explained that he just came from his house where he was roused by
his Kagawads from his sleep. Not being able to talk sense with Ernita
Pantinople, Petitioner and his companions backed off to avoid a
heated confrontation. Petitioner instead decided to go back to his
house along with his companions.
"12. Upon reaching his house, Petitioner instructed Kagawad Jimmy
Balugo to contact the Bunawan Police Station and inform them what
transpired. Not knowing the radio frequency of the local police,
Kagawad Balugo instead radioed officials of nearby Barangay San
Isidro requesting them to contact the Bunawan PNP for police
assistance since someone was shot in their locality.
"13. Moments later, PO2 Mariano Operario and another police officer
arrived at the house of Petitioner and when confronted by the latter,
he was informed by PO2 Operario that he was the principal suspect
in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople. Upon their invitation, Petitioner
immediately went with the said police officers for questioning at the
Bunawan Police Station. He also took with him his government-
issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition which
Petitioner turned over for safe keeping with the Bunawan PNP. The
police blotter showed that Petitioner surrendered his M-14 rifle with
live ammunition to SPO1 Estrellan and PO3 Sendrijas of the
Bunawan PNP at around 10:45 p.m. of November 4, 1998.
"14. When the shooting incident was first recorded in the Daily
Record of Events of the Bunawan PNP it was indicated therein that
deceased may have been shot by unidentified armed men viz:
'Entry No. Date Time Incident/Events
2289 110498 2105H SHOOTING INCIDENT-
'One Dominador Lopez 43 years old, married, farmer and a resident
of Puro[k] 5, Barangay Gatungan, Davao City appeared at this
Precinct and reported that shortly before this writing, one ARTEMIO
PANTINOPLE, former barangay kagawad of Barangay Gatungan was
allegedly shot to death by an unidentified armed men at the
aforementioned Barangay. x x x.'
"15. The extract from the police blotter prepared by SPO2 Dario B.
Undo dated November 9, 1998 already had a little modification
indicating therein that deceased was shot by an unidentified armed
man and the following entry was made.
'2105H: Shooting Incident: One Dominador Lopez, 43 years old,
married, farmer and a resident of Purok 5, Barangay Gatungan
Bunawan District, Davao City appeared at this Police Precinct and
reported that prior to these writing, one Artemio Pantinople, former
Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Gatungan was allegedly shot to death
by unidentified armed man at the aforementioned barangay. x x x.'
"16. On November 5, 1998 at around 7:15 a.m. PO2 Mariano
Operario indorsed with the Bunawan PNP an empty shell fired from a
carbine rifle which was recovered by the said police officer from the
crime scene in the night of the incident. Owing to his pre-occupation
in organizing and preparing the affidavits of the Complainant and her
witnesses the previous evening, he was only able to indorse the same
the following morning. At the same time, P/Chief Insp. Julito M.
Diray, Station Commander of the Bunawan PNP made a written
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request addressed to the District Commander of the PNP Crime
Laboratory requesting that a paraffin test be conducted on Petitioner
and that a ballistics examination be made on the M-14 rifle which he
surrendered to Bunawan PNP.
"17. At around 9:30 a.m. of November 5, 1998, Dr. Danilo P.
Ledesma, M.D., Medico-Legal Officer for Davao City conducted an
autopsy on the cadaver of deceased and made the following Post-
Mortem Findings contained in Necropsy Report No. 76 dated
November 6, 1998, viz:
'Pallor, marked, generalized
'Body in rigor mortis
'Wound, gunshot, ENTRANCE, 0.9-0.8 cm. ovaloid located at the
anterior chest wall, right side, .0 cm. from the anterior median line,
at the level of the third (3rd) intercostal space and 131.0 cms. above
the right neck, directed backwards, upwards, medially, crossing the
midline from the right to left, involving the soft tissues, perforating
the body of the sternum into the pericardial cavity, perforating the
heart into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the upper lobe of the
left lung forming an irregular EXIT, 1.5x1.1 cms. at the posterior
chest wall, left side, 13.0 cms. from the posterior median line and
139.0 cms. above the left neck.
'Hemopericadium, 300 ml.
'Hemothorax, left 1,000 ml.
'Stomach filled with partially digested food particles.
'Other visceral organs, pale
'CAUSE OF DEATH: Gunshot wound of the chest.'
"18. After the fatal shooting of deceased, Celestino Marturillas was
subjected to paraffin testing by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Davao
City at 10:30 a.m. November 5, 1998. The next day, November 6,
1998, the PNP Crime Laboratory released Physical Sciences Report
No. C-074-98 regarding the paraffin test results which found
Petitioner NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates based on the following
findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory:
'FINDINGS:
'Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned
specimen gave NEGATIVE result to the test for the presence of
gunpowder nitrates. x x x
'CONCLUSION:
'Both hands of Celestino Marturillas do not contain gunpowder
nitrates[.]'
"19. After preparing all the affidavits of Ernita Pantinople and her
witnesses PO2 Mariano R. Operario Jr., the police officer as[s]igned to
investigate the shooting of the deceased, prepared and transmitted,
on November 5, 1998, a Complaint to the City Prosecution Office
recommending that Petitioner be indicted for Murder, attaching
therewith the Sworn Affidavits of Ernita O. Pantinople (Complainant),
Lito D. Santos (witness) and the Sworn Joint Affidavit of SPO1 Rodel
Estrellan and PO2 Mariano R. Operario Jr. of the PNP.
"20. The following is the Affidavit-Complaint of Ernita Pantinople as
well as the supporting affidavits of her witnesses all of which are
quoted in full hereunder:
'Ernita Pantinople's Affidavit-Complaint dated November 5, 1998:
'That last November 4, 1998 at about 7:30 in the evening, I was
attending and caring my baby boy at that time to let him sleep and
that moment I heard first one gun shot burst after then somebody
shouting seeking for help in Visayan words 'tabangi ko Pre gipusil ko
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ni Kapitan' I estimated a distance to more or less ten (10) meters
away from my house;
'That I immediately peep at the windows, wherein I very saw a person
of Brgy. Capt. Celestino Marturillas of Brgy. Gatungan, Bunawan
District, Davao City, wearing black jacket and camouflage pants
carrying his M-14 rifle running to the direction to the left side
portion of the house of Lito Santos who was my neighbor
respectively;
'That I hurriedly go down from my house and proceeded to the
victims body, wherein when I came nearer I got surprised for the
victim was my beloved husband;
'That I was always shouting in visayan words 'kapitan nganong imo
mang gipatay and akong bana';
'That I let my husband body still at that placed until the police
officers will arrived and investigate the incident;
'That I know personally Brgy. Capt. Celestino Marturillas for he is my
nearby neighbor at that placed;
'That I am executing this affidavit to apprise the authorities concern
of the truthfulness of the foregoing and my desire to file necessary
charges against Celestino Marturillas.'
'Witness-Affidavit of Lito Santos dated November 5, 1998 reads:
'I, LITO D. SANTOS, 43 yrs. old, married, farmer, a resident of Purok
5, Brgy. Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City after having been
duly sworn to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say:
'That last November 4, 1998 at about 7:30 in the evening I was taking
my dinner at the kitchen of my house and after finished eating I
stood up then got a glass of water and at that time I heard one gun
shot burst estimated to more or less ten (10) meters from my
possession then followed somebody shouting seeking for help in
Visayan words 'tabangi ko pre gipusil ko ni Kapitan';
'That I really saw the victim moving backward to more or less five (5)
meters away from where he was shot then and there the victim
slumped at the grassy area;
'That I immediately go out from my house and proceeded to the
victims body, wherein, when I came nearer I found and identified the
victim one Artemio Pantinople who was my nearby neighbor sprawled
on his own blood at the grassy area;
'That no other person named by the victim other than Brgy. Capt.
Celestino Marturillas of Brgy. Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao
City;
'That I am executing this affidavit to apprised the authorities concern
of the true facts and circumstances that surrounds the incident.'
"21. Based on the Affidavits executed by Ernita Pantinople and Lito
Santos, then 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Raul B. Bendigo issued a
Resolution on November 5, 1998 finding sufficient evidence to indict
Appellant for the crime of Homicide and not Murder as alleged in
Private Complainant's Affidavit Complaint. The Information states:
'Above-mentioned Accused, armed with a gun, and with intent to kill,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot one Artemio Pantinople,
thereby inflicting fatal wound upon the latter which caused his
death.
'CONTRARY TO LAW.'
xxxxxxxxx
"23. The theory of the Defense was anchored on the testimony of the
following individuals:
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'23.1 Jimmy Balugo, was one of the Barangay Kagawads who went to
the house of Petitioner after receiving a radio message from Brgy.
Kagawad Glenda Lascua that a shooting incident took place in their
barangay. He also testified that together with Kagawad Norberto
Libre, he proceeded to the house of Petitioner to inform him of the
shooting incident involving a certain Artemio 'Titing' Pantinople. After
informing Petitioner about what happened, the latter instructed him
and Norberto Libre to gather the SCAA's and to accompany them to
the crime scene. He also narrated to the court that Petitioner and
their group were not able to render any assistance at the crime scene
since the widow and the relatives of deceased were already
belligerent. As a result of which, the group of Petitioner including
himself, went back to the former's house where he asked Petitioner if
it would be alright to contact the police and request for assistance.
He claimed that he was able to contact the Bunawan PNP with the
help of the Barangay Police of Barangay San Isidro.
'23.2) Norberto Libre testified that in the evening of November 4,
1998, he heard a gunburst which resembled a firecracker and after a
few minutes Barangay Kagawad Jimmy Balugo went to his house and
informed him that their neighbor Titing Pantinople was shot.
Kagawad Balugo requested him to accompany the former to go to the
house of then Barangay Captain Celestino Marturillas; that he and
Kagawad Balugo proceeded to the house of Petitioner and shouted to
awaken the latter; that Barangay Captain Marturillas went out
rubbing his eyes awakened from his sleep and was informed of the
killing of Artemio Pantinople; that Petitioner immediately instructed
them to fetch the SCAA and thereafter their group went to the crime
scene.
'23.3) Ronito Bedero testified that he was in his house on the night
Artemio Pantinop[l]e was shot. The material point raised by this
witness in his testimony was the fact that he saw an unidentified
armed man flee from the crime scene who later joined two other
armed men near a nangka tree not far from where deceased was shot.
All three later fled on foot towards the direction of the Purok Center
in Barangay Gatungan. This witness noticed that one of the three
men was armed with a rifle but could not make out their identities
since the area where the three men converged was a very dark place.
After the three men disappeared, he saw from the opposite direction
Petitioner, Barangay Kagawad Jimmy Balugo and three (3) SCAA
members going to the scene of the crime but they did not reach the
crime scene. A little later, he saw the group of Petitioner return to
where they came from.
'23.4) Police C/Insp. Noemi Austero, Forensic Chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, testified that she conducted a paraffin test on both
hands of Petitioner on November 5, 1999 at around 10:30 a.m. She
also testified that Petitioner tested NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates
indicating that he never fired a weapon at any time between 7:30
p.m. of November 4, 1999 until the next day, November 5, 1999. She
also testified that as a matter of procedure at the PNP Crime
Laboratory, they do not conduct paraffin testing on a crime suspect
seventy two (72) hours after an alleged shooting incident. She also
testified that based on her experience she is not aware of any
chemical that could extract gunpowder nitrates from the hands of a
person who had just fired his weapon.
'23.5) Dominador Lapiz testified that he lived on the land of the
victim, Artemio Pantinople for ten (10) years. He was one of the first
persons who went to the crime scene where he personally saw the
body of deceased lying at a very dark portion some distance from the
victim's house and that those with him at that time even had to light
the place with a lamp so that they could clearly see the deceased. He
also testified that there were many coconut and other trees and
bananas in the crime scene. He also testified that the house of Lito
Santos was only about four (4) meters from the crime scene, while
the house of victim-Artemio Pantinople was about FIFTY (50) meters
away. He testified that there was no lighted fluorescent at the store of
deceased at the time of the shooting. He was also the one who
informed Kagawad Glenda Lascuna about the shooting of Artemio
Pantinople. His testimony also revealed that when the responding
policemen arrived, Lito Santos immediately approached the
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policemen, volunteered himself as a witness and even declared that
he would testify that it was Petitioner who shot Artemio Pantinople.
'On cross-examination, this witness declared that the crime scene
was very dark and one cannot see the body of the victim without
light. On cross-examination, this witness also testified that Lito
Santos approached the service vehicle of the responding policemen
and volunteered to be a witness that Petitioner was the assailant of
the victim, Artemio Pantinople. This witness further testified that
immediately after he went to the crime scene, the widow of the victim
and the children were merely shouting and crying and it was only
after the policemen arrived that the widow uttered in a loud voice,
'Kapitan nganong gipatay mo and akong bana?'
'23.6) Celestino Marturillas, former Barangay Captain of Barangay
Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City testified that he learned of
Pantinople's killing two hours later through information personally
relayed to him by Kagawads Jimmy Balugo and Norberto Libre. He
intimated to the Court that he did try to extend some assistance to
the family of the deceased but was prevented from so doing since the
wife of deceased herself and her relatives were already hostile with
him when he was about to approach the crime scene. He also
testified that he voluntarily went with the police officers who arrested
him at his residence on the same evening after the victim was shot.
He also turned over to police custody the M-14 rifle issued to him
and voluntarily submitted himself to paraffin testing a few hours
after he was taken in for questioning by the Bunawan PNP. Petitioner,
during the trial consistently maintained that he is innocent of the
charge against him.'" [10]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC that the guilt of petitioner
had been established beyond reasonable doubt. According to the
appellate court, he was positively identified as the one running away
from the crime scene immediately after the gunshot. This fact,
together with the declaration of the victim himself that he had been
shot by the captain, clearly established the latter's complicity in the
crime.
No ill motive could be ascribed by the CA to the prosecution
witnesses. Thus, their positive, credible and unequivocal testimonies
were accepted as sufficient to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, the CA also rejected his defenses of denial and
alibi. It held that they were necessarily suspect, especially when
established by friends or relatives, and should thus be subjected to
the strictest scrutiny. At any rate, his alibi and denial cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses found to be
more credible.
The appellate court upheld petitioner's conviction, as well as the
award of damages. In addition, it awarded actual damages
representing unearned income.
Hence, this Petition. [11]
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the
Court's consideration:
"I
The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave
credence to the claim of the solicitor general that the prosecution's
witnesses positively identified petitioner as the alleged triggerman
"II
The Court of Appeals was in serious error when it affirmed the trial
court's blunder in literally passing the blame on petitioner for the
9
EVIDENCE CASES
lapses in the investigation conducted by the police thereby shifting on
him the burden of proving his innocence
"III
The Court of Appeals committed a serious and palpable error when it
failed to consider that the deceased was cut off by death before he
could convey a complete or sensible communication to whoever heard
such declaration assuming there was any
"IV
Petit[i]oner's alibi assumed significance considering that evidence and
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses arrayed against petitioner
failed to prove that he was responsible for the commission of the
crime." [12]
In sum, petitioner raises two main issues: 1) whether the
prosecution's evidence is credible; and 2) whether it is sufficient to
convict him of homicide. Under the first main issue, he questions the
positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses; the alleged
inconsistencies between their Affidavits and court testimonies; and
the plausibility of the allegation that the victim had uttered, "Tabangi
ko p're, gipusil ko ni kapitan" ("Help me p're, I was shot by the
captain"), which was considered by the two lower courts either as his
dying declaration or as part of res gestae.
Under the second main issue, petitioner contends that the burden of
proof was erroneously shifted to him; that there should have been no
finding of guilt because of the negative results of the paraffin test;
and that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the type of gun
used in the commission of the crime.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
First Main Issue:
Credibility of the Prosecution Evidence
According to petitioner, the charge of homicide should be dismissed,
because the inherent weakness of the prosecution's case against him
was revealed by the evidence presented. He submits that any doubt
as to who really perpetrated the crime should be resolved in his
favor.
We do not agree. This Court has judiciously reviewed the findings and
records of this case and finds no reversible error in the CA's ruling
affirming petitioner's conviction for homicide.
Basic is the rule that this Court accords great weight and a high
degree of respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, as in the present case. [13] Here, the RTC was
unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was clothed with the power to
review whether the trial court's conclusions were in accord with the
facts and the relevant laws. [14] Indeed, the findings of the trial court
are not to be disturbed on appeal, unless it has overlooked or
misinterpreted some facts or circumstances of weight and substance.
[15] Although there are recognized exceptions[16] to the
conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the trial and the appellate
courts, petitioner has not convinced this Court of the existence of
any.
Having laid that basic premise, the Court disposes seriatim the
arguments proffered by petitioner under the first main issue.
Positive Identification
Petitioner contends that it was inconceivable for Prosecution Witness
Ernita Pantinople -- the victim's wife -- to have identified him as the
assassin. According to him, her house was "a good fifty (50) meters
away from the crime scene," [17] which was "enveloped in pitch
darkness." [18] Because of the alleged improbability, he insists that
her testimony materially contradicted her Affidavit. The Affidavit
10
EVIDENCE CASES
supposedly proved that she had not recognized her husband from
where she was standing during the shooting. If she had failed to
identify the victim, petitioner asks, "how was it possible for her to
conclude that it was [p]etitioner whom she claims she saw fleeing
from the scene?" [19]
All these doubts raised by petitioner are sufficiently addressed by the
clear, direct and convincing testimony of the witness. She positively
identified him as the one "running away" immediately after the sound
of a gunshot. Certain that she had seen him, she even described
what he was wearing, the firearm he was carrying, and the direction
towards which he was running. She also clarified that she had heard
the statement, "Help me p're, I was shot by the captain," uttered after
the shooting incident. Accepting her testimony, the CA ruled thus:
"Ernita's testimony that she saw [petitioner] at the crime scene is
credible because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters
away from her house. Undoubtedly, Ernita is familiar with
[petitioner], who is her neighbor, and a long-time barangay captain of
Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City when the incident
took place. Ernita was also able to see his face while he was running
away from the crime scene. The identification of a person can be
established through familiarity with one's physical features. Once a
person has gained familiarity with one another, identification
becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance.
Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural
communities generally know each other both by face and name, and
can be expected to know each other's distinct and particular features
and characteristics." [20]
This holding confirms the findings of fact of the RTC. Settled is the
rule that on questions of the credibility of witnesses and the veracity
of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest
degree of respect. [21] It was the trial court that had the opportunity
to observe the manner in which the witnesses had testified; as well as
their furtive glances, calmness, sighs, and scant or full realization of
their oaths. [22] It had the better opportunity to observe them
firsthand; and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under
grueling examination. [23]
Petitioner doubts whether Ernita could have accurately identified him
at the scene of the crime, considering that it was dark at that time;
that there were trees obstructing her view; and that her house was
fifty (50) meters away from where the crime was committed.
These assertions are easily belied by the findings of the courts below,
as borne by the records. Ernita testified on the crime scene
conditions that had enabled her to make a positive identification of
petitioner. Her testimony was even corroborated by other prosecution
witnesses, who bolstered the truth and veracity of those declarations.
Consequently, the CA ruled as follows:
"x x x Ernita's recognition of the assailant was made possible by the
lighted two fluorescent lamps in their store and by the full moon. x x
x. In corroboration, Lito testified that the place where the shooting
occurred was bright.
"The trees and plants growing in between Ernita's house and the
place where Artemio was shot to death did not impede her view of the
assailant. To be sure, the prosecution presented photographs of the
scene of the crime and its immediate vicinities. These photographs
gave a clear picture of the place where Artemio was shot. Admittedly,
there are some trees and plants growing in between the place where
the house of Ernita was located and the spot where Artemio was
shot. Notably, however, there is only one gemilina tree, some coconut
trees and young banana plants growing in the place where Artemio
was shot. The trees and banana plants have slender trunks which
could not have posed an obstacle to Ernita's view of the crime scene
from the kitchen window of her house especially so that she was in
an elevated position." [24]
This Court has consistently held that -- given the proper conditions --
the illumination produced by a kerosene lamp, a flashlight, a wick
lamp, moonlight, or starlight is considered sufficient to allow the
11
EVIDENCE CASES
identification of persons. [25] In this case, the full moon and the light
coming from two fluorescent lamps of a nearby store were sufficient
to illumine the place where petitioner was; and to enable the
eyewitness to identify him as the person who was present at the
crime scene. Settled is the rule that when conditions of visibility are
favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their
assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted. [26]
But even where the circumstances were less favorable, the familiarity
of Ernita with the face of petitioner considerably reduced any error in
her identification of him. [27] Since the circumstances in this case
were reasonably sufficient for the identification of persons, this fact of
her familiarity with him erases any doubt that she could have erred
in identifying him. Those related to the victim of a crime have a
natural tendency to remember the faces of those involved in it. These
relatives, more than anybody else, would be concerned with seeking
justice for the victim and bringing the malefactor before the law. [28]
Neither was there any indication that Ernita was impelled by ill
motives in positively identifying petitioner. The CA was correct in
observing that it would be "unnatural for a relative who is interested
in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody else other than the real
culprit. For her to do so is to let the guilty go free." [29] Where there
is nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by improper
motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations made under
solemn oath deserve full faith and credence. [30]
Inconsistency Between
Affidavit and Testimony
Petitioner contends that the testimony of Ernita materially
contradicted her Affidavit. According to him, she said in her
testimony that she had immediately recognized her husband as the
victim of the shooting; but in her Affidavit she stated that it was only
when she had approached the body that she came to know that he
was the victim.
We find no inconsistency. Although Ernita stated in her testimony
that she had recognized the victim as her husband through his voice,
it cannot necessarily be inferred that she did not see him. Although
she recognized him as the victim, she was still hoping that it was not
really he. Thus, the statement in her Affidavit that she was surprised
to see that her husband was the victim of the shooting.
To be sure, ex parte affidavits are usually incomplete, as these are
frequently prepared by administering officers and cast in their
language and understanding of what affiants have said. [31] Almost
always, the latter would simply sign the documents after being read
to them. Basic is the rule that, taken ex parte, affidavits are
considered incomplete and often inaccurate. They are products
sometimes of partial suggestions and at other times of want of
suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which witnesses may be
unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for accurate
recollection. [32]
Nevertheless, the alleged inconsistency is inconsequential to the
ascertainment of the presence of petitioner at the crime scene. Ruled
the CA:
"x x x. They referred only to that point wherein Ernita x x x
ascertained the identity of Artemio as the victim. They did not relate
to Ernita's identification of [petitioner] as the person running away from
the crime scene immediately after she heard a gunshot." [33]
Statements Uttered
Contemporaneous with the Crime
Ernita positively testified that immediately after the shooting, she had
heard her husband say, "Help me p're, I was shot by the captain."
This statement was corroborated by another witness, Lito Santos,
who testified on the events immediately preceding and subsequent to
the shooting.
12
EVIDENCE CASES
It should be clear that Santos never testified that petitioner was the
one who had actually shot the victim. Still, the testimony of this
witness is valuable, because it validates the statements made by
Ernita. He confirms that after hearing the gunshot, he saw the victim
and heard the latter cry out those same words.
Petitioner insinuates that it was incredible for Santos to have seen
the victim, but not the assailant. The CA dismissed this argument
thus:
"x x x. The natural reaction of a person who hears a loud or startling
command is to turn towards the speaker. Moreover, witnessing a
crime is an unusual experience that elicits different reactions from
witnesses, for which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be
prescribed. Lito's reaction is not unnatural. He was more concerned
about Artemio's condition than the need to ascertain the identity of
Artemio's assailant." [34]
It was to be expected that, after seeing the victim stagger and hearing
the cry for help, Santos would shift his attention to the person who
had uttered the plea quoted earlier. A shift in his focus of attention
would sufficiently explain why Santos was not able to see the
assailant. Petitioner then accuses this witness of harboring "a deep-
seated grudge," [35] which would explain why the latter allegedly
fabricated a serious accusation.
This contention obviously has no basis. No serious accusation
against petitioner was ever made by Santos. What the latter did was
merely to recount what he heard the victim utter immediately after
the shooting. Santos never pointed to petitioner as the perpetrator of
the crime. The statements of the former corroborated those of Ernita
and therefore simply added credence to the prosecution's version of
the facts. If it were true that he had an ulterior motive, it would have
been very easy for him to say that he had seen petitioner shoot the
victim.
The two witnesses unequivocally declared and corroborated each
other on the fact that the plea, "Help me p're, I was shot by the
captain," had been uttered by the victim. Nevertheless, petitioner
contends that it was highly probable that the deceased died instantly
and was consequently unable to shout for help. We do not discount
this possibility, which petitioner himself admits to be a probability. In
the face of the positive declaration of two witnesses that the words
were actually uttered, we need not concern ourselves with
speculations, probabilities or possibilities. Said the CA:
"x x x. Thus, as between the positive and categorical declarations of
the prosecution witnesses and the mere opinion of the medical
doctor, the former must necessarily prevail.
"Moreover, it must be stressed that the post-mortem examination of
the cadaver of Artemio was conducted by Dr. Ledesma only about
9:30 in the morning of November 5, 1998 or the day following the
fatal shooting of Artemio. Evidently, several hours had elapsed prior
to the examination. Thus, Dr. Ledesma could not have determined
Artemio's physical condition a few seconds after the man was shot."
[36]
Dying Declaration
Having established that the victim indeed uttered those words, the
question to be resolved is whether they can be considered as part of
the dying declaration of the victim.
Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is
the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death."
Generally, witnesses can testify only to those facts derived from their
own perception. A recognized exception, though, is a report in open
13
EVIDENCE CASES
court of a dying person's declaration made under the consciousness
of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case. [37]
Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the
verge of death, are entitled to the highest degree of credence and
respect. [38] Persons aware of an impending death have been known
to be genuinely truthful in their words and extremely scrupulous in
their accusations. [39] The dying declaration is given credence, on the
premise that no one who knows of one's impending death will make a
careless and false accusation. [40] Hence, not infrequently,
pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the dying
declaration of the deceased victim. [41]
To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and
circumstances surrounding the declarant's death; 2) be made under
the consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and
voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper influence; 4)
be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is
the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant
competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon
to testify. [42]
The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and
circumstances surrounding his death. He pointed to the person who
had shot him. As established by the prosecution, petitioner was the
only person referred to as kapitan in their place. [43] It was also
established that the declarant, at the time he had given the dying
declaration, was under a consciousness of his impending death.
True, he made no express statement showing that he was conscious
of his impending death. The law, however, does not require the
declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death.
[44] The perception may be established from surrounding
circumstances, such as the nature of the declarant's injury and
conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a
consciousness of impending death. [45] Even if the declarant did not
make an explicit statement of that realization, the degree and
seriousness of the words and the fact that death occurred shortly
afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the
declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of being
in a dying condition. [46]
Also, the statement was made freely and voluntarily, without coercion
or suggestion, and was offered as evidence in a criminal case for
homicide. In this case, the declarant was the victim who, at the time
he uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a witness.
As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete,
as it was "a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying
his meaning. It [was] complete and [was] not merely fragmentary."
[47] Testified to by his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was
not only admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule,
but was also a weighty and telling piece of evidence.
Res Gestae
The fact that the victim's statement constituted a dying declaration
does not preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if
the elements of both are present. [48]
Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae."
Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the
victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or
after its commission. [49] These statements are a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion,
without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false
14
EVIDENCE CASES
statement. [50] An important consideration is whether there
intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any
circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the
mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for
deliberation. 51]
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, when the following
requisites concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
[52]
All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the
shooting, was a startling occurrence. Immediately after, while he was
still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, the
victim made the declaration without any prior opportunity to contrive
a story implicating petitioner. Also, the declaration concerned the one
who shot the victim. Thus, the latter's statement was correctly
appreciated as part of the res gestae.
Aside from the victim's statement, which is part of the res gestae,
that of Ernita -- "Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana?"
("Captain, why did you shoot my husband?") -- may be considered to
be in the same category. Her statement was about the same startling
occurrence; it was uttered spontaneously, right after the shooting,
while she had no opportunity to concoct a story against petitioner;
and it related to the circumstances of the shooting.
Second Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
Having established the evidence for the prosecution, we now address
the argument of petitioner that the appellate court had effectively
shifted the burden of proof to him. He asserts that the prosecution
should never rely on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength
of its evidence, implying that there was no sufficient evidence to
convict him.
We disagree. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution
is sufficient to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The dying
declaration made by the victim immediately prior to his death
constitutes evidence of the highest order as to the cause of his death
and of the identity of the assailant. 53] This damning evidence,
coupled with the proven facts presented by the prosecution, leads to
the logical conclusion that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged.
The following circumstances proven by the prosecution produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt:
First. Santos testified that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke
coming from the muzzle of a gun, as well as the victim staggering
backwards while shouting, "Help me p're, I was shot by the captain."
This statement was duly established, and the testimony of Santos
confirmed the events that had occurred. It should be understandable
that "p're" referred to Santos, considering that he and the victim were
conversing just before the shooting took place. It was also established
that the two called each other "p're," because Santos was the
godfather of the victim's child. [54]
Second. Ernita testified that she had heard a gunshot and her
husband's utterance, "Help me p're, I was shot by the captain," then
saw petitioner in a black jacket and camouflage pants running away
from the crime scene while carrying a firearm.
Third. Ernita's statement, "Captain, why did you shoot my husband?"
was established as part of the res gestae.
Fourth. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply
implausible. As the incumbent barangay captain, it should have been
his responsibility to go immediately to the crime scene and
investigate the shooting. Instead, he avers that when he went to the
situs of the crime, the wife of the victim was already shouting and
15
EVIDENCE CASES
accusing him of being the assailant, so he just left. This reaction was
very unlikely of an innocent barangay captain, who would simply
want to investigate a crime. Often have we ruled that the first impulse
of innocent persons when accused of wrongdoing is to express their
innocence at the first opportune time. [55]
Fifth. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of
petitioner. The victim's wife positively testified that prior to the
shooting, her husband was trying to close a real estate transaction
which petitioner tried to block. This showed petitioner's antagonism
towards the victim. [56]
These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it
was petitioner who shot and killed the victim. This Court has
consistently held that, where an eyewitness saw the accused with a
gun seconds after the gunshot and the victim's fall, the reasonable
conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim. [57] Further
establishing petitioner's guilt was the definitive statement of the
victim that he had been shot by the barangay captain.
Clearly, petitioner's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.
To be sure, conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of
proof that, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. [58] Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof
that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. [59]
That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are circumstantial
does not diminish the fact that they are of a nature that would lead
the mind intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, toward
the conviction of petitioner. [60] Circumstantial, vis--
vis direct, evidence is not necessarily weaker. [61] Moreover, the
circumstantial evidence described above satisfies the requirements of
the Rules of Court, which we quote:
"SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -- Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt." [62]
Paraffin Test
Petitioner takes issue with the negative results of the paraffin test
done on him. While they were negative, that fact alone did not ipso
facto prove that he was innocent. Time and time again, this Court
has held that a negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof
that a person has not fired a gun. [63] In other words, it is possible to
fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when culprits wear
gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration.
[64] Besides, the prosecution was able to establish the events during
the shooting, including the presence of petitioner at the scene of the
crime. Hence, all other matters, such as the negative paraffin test
result, are of lesser probative value.
Corpus Delicti
Petitioner then argues that the prosecution miserably failed to
establish the type of gun used in the shooting. Suffice it to say that
this contention hardly dents the latter's case. As correctly found by
the appellate court, the prosecution was able to give sufficient proof
of the corpus delicti -- the fact that a crime had actually been
committed. Ruled this Court in another case:
"[Corpus delicti] is the fact of the commission of the crime that may
be proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus
delicti does not necessarily refer to the body of the person
murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide with the use of
unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping
for ransom, or x x x to the seized contraband cigarettes." [65]
16
EVIDENCE CASES
To undermine the case of the prosecution against him, petitioner
depends heavily on its failure to present the gun used in the shooting
and on the negative paraffin test result. These pieces of evidence
alone, according to him, should exculpate him from the crime. His
reliance on them is definitely misplaced, however. In a similar case,
this Court has ruled as follows:
"Petitioner likewise harps on the prosecution's failure to present the
records from the Firearms and Explosives Department of the
Philippine National Police at Camp Crame of the .45 caliber
Remington pistol owned by petitioner for comparison with the
specimen found at the crime scene with the hope that it would
exculpate him from the trouble he is in. Unfortunately for petitioner,
we have previously held that 'the choice of what evidence to present,
or who should testify as a witness is within the discretionary power of
the prosecutor and definitely not of the courts to dictate.'
"Anent the failure of the investigators to conduct a paraffin test on
petitioner, this Court has time and again held that such failure is not
fatal to the case of the prosecution as scientific experts agree that the
paraffin test is extremely unreliable and it is not conclusive as to an
accused's complicity in the crime committed." [66]
Finally, as regards petitioner's alibi, we need not belabor the point. It
was easily, and correctly, dismissed by the CA thus:
"[Petitioner's] alibi is utterly untenable. For alibi to prosper, it must be
shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Here, the
locus criminis was only several meters away from [petitioner's] home.
In any event, this defense cannot be given credence in the face of the
credible and positive identification made by Ernita." [67]
Third Issue:
Damages
An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review. It then becomes the duty of this Court to correct any error in
the appealed judgment, whether or not included in the assignment of
error. [68] The CA upheld the RTC in the latter's award of damages,
with the modification that unearned income be added.
We uphold the award of P50,000 indemnity ex delicto [69] to the heirs
of the victim. When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of
the deceased are entitled to this amount as indemnity for the death,
without need of any evidence or proof of damages. [70] As to actual
damages, we note that the prosecution was able to establish
sufficiently only P22,200 for funeral and burial costs. The rest of the
expenses, although presented, were not duly receipted. We cannot
simply accept them as credible evidence. This Court has already
ruled, though, that when actual damages proven by receipts during
the trial amount to less than P25,000, the award of P25,000 for
temperate damages is justified, in lieu of the actual damages of a
lesser amount. [71] In effect, the award granted by the lower court is
upheld.
As to the award of moral damages, the P500,000 given by the RTC
and upheld by the CA should be reduced to P50,000, consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence.[72] We also affirm the award of loss of
earning capacity [73] in the amount of P312,000; attorney's fees of
P20,000; and payment of the costs.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED, subject to the modification in the award
of damages set forth here. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
17
EVIDENCE CASES
was the one who threw the pillbox[2] that caused the explosion,
petitioner and his companions also went after him.

On reaching Baaga's house, petitioner, Cabisudo and Amante

knocked on the door. When no one answered, they decided to hide
JULIUS AMANQUITON, Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE some distance away. After five minutes, Baaga came out of the
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. house. At this juncture, petitioner and his companions immediately
apprehended him. Baaga's aunt, Marilyn Alimpuyo, followed them to
G.R. No. 186080 | 2009-08-14
the barangay hall.
Tagged under keywords
Baaga was later brought to the police station. On the way to the
police station, Gepulane suddenly appeared from nowhere and boxed
Baaga in the face. This caused petitioner to order Gepulane's
Discussions citing this case or law are available.
apprehension along with Baaga. An incident report was made.[3]
Pro reo doctrine (or in dubio pro reo)
Equipoise Rule During the investigation, petitioner learned Baaga had been
Republic Act No. 7610, Child Abuse previously mauled by a group made up of a certain Raul, Boyet and
Cris but failed to identify two others. The mauling was the result of
DECISION
gang trouble in a certain residental compound in Taguig City.
Baaga's mauling was recorded in a barangay blotter which read:
CORONA, J.:

10-30-201
Petitioner Julius Amanquiton was a purok leader of Barangay
Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. As a purok leader and
Time: 10-15 p.m.
barangay tanod, he was responsible for the maintenance of
cleanliness, peace and order of the community.
RECORD purposes

At 10:45 p.m. on October 30, 2001, petitioner heard an explosion.

Dumating dito sa Barangay Head Quarters si Dossen[4] Baaga is
He, together with two auxiliary tanod, Dominador Amante[1] and a
Alimpuyo 16 years old student nakatira sa 10 B Kalachuchi St.
certain Cabisudo, proceeded to Sambong Street where the explosion
M.B.T. M.M.
took place. Thereafter, they saw complainant Leoselie John Baaga
being chased by a certain Gil Gepulane. Upon learning that Baaga
Upang ireklamo yong sumapak sa akin sina Raul[,] Boyet [at] Cris at
18
EVIDENCE CASES
yong dalawang sumapak ay hindi ko kilala. Nang yari ito kaninang
10:p.m. araw ng [M]artes taong kasalukuyan at yong labi ko On arraignment, petitioner and Amante both pleaded not guilty.
pumutok at yong kabilang mata ko ay namaga sa bandang kanan. Gepulane remains at-large.
Ang iyong kaliwang mukha at pati yong likod ko ay may tama sa
sapak. During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Dr. Paulito Cruz, medico-legal officer of the Taguig-Pateros District
Patunay dito ang aking lagda. Hospital who attended to Baaga on October 30, 2001, Baaga
himself, Alimpuyo and Rachelle Baaga (complainant's mother).
Dossen Banaga (sgd.)
The defense presented the testimonies of petitioner, Amante and
Briccio Cuyos, then deputy chief barangay tanod of the same
Thereafter, an Information for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI,
barangay. Cuyos testified that the blotter notation entered by
RA[5] 7160[6] in relation to Section 5 (j) of R.A. 8369 was filed against
Gepulane and Baaga was signed in his presence and that they read
petitioner, Amante and Gepulane. The Information read:
the contents thereof before affixing their signatures.

The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Julius

On May 10, 2005, the RTC found petitioner and Amante guilty
Amanquiton, Dominador Amante and Gil Gepulane of the crime of
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.[7] The dispositive
Violations of Section 10 (a) Article VI, Republic Act No. 7610 in
portion of the RTC decision read:
relation to Section 5 (j) of R.A. No. 8369 committed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused

That on the 30th day of October, 2001, in the Municipality of Taguig,
JULIUS AMANQUITON and DOMINADOR AMANTE "GUILTY" beyond
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
reasonable doubt for violation of Article VI Sec. 10 (a) of Republic Act
Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with one
7610 in relation to Section 3 (j) of Republic Act 8369, hereby
another, armed with nightstick, did then and there willfully,
sentences accused JULIUS AMANQUITON and DOMINADOR
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence,
AMANTE a straight penalty of thirty (30) days of Arresto Menor.
a form of physical abuse, upon the person of Leoselie John A.
[Baaga], seventeen (17) years old, a minor, by then and there
manhandling him and hitting him with their nightsticks, thus, Both accused Julius Amanquiton and Dominador Amante are hereby
constituting other acts of child abuse, which is inimical or prejudicial directed to pay Leoselie John A. Banaga the following:
to child's development, in violation of the above-mentioned law.
1. Actual damages in the amount of P5,000.00;
CONTRARY TO LAW.
19
EVIDENCE CASES
2. Moral Damages in the amount of P 30,000.00; and Hence, this petition. Petitioner principally argues that the facts of the
case as established did not constitute a violation of Section 10 (a),
3. Exemplary damages in the amount of P 20,000.00. Article VI of RA 7160 and definitely did not prove the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.

The case against the accused Gil Gepulane is hereby sent to the
The Constitution itself provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
ARCHIVES to be revived upon the arrest of the accused. Let [a]
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.[11]
warrant of arrest be issued against him.
An accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt.[12] It is the primordial duty of the
SO ORDERED.
prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with

Amanquiton's motion for reconsideration was denied.[8] moral certainty.[13]

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was given due course. On The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt was discussed in

August 28, 2008, the CA rendered a decision[9] which affirmed the People v. Berroya:[14]

conviction but increased the penalty. The dispositive portion of the

assailed CA decision read:
[Proof beyond reasonable doubt] lies in the fact that in a criminal
prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Decision appealed from is contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accused-appellant is sentenced means of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity,

to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day who are regarded as public officers, as therefore as speaking semi-

of prision correccional maximum up to eight (8) years of prision judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking

mayor minimum as maximum. In addition to the damages already contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting

awarded, a fine of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) is hereby struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of position, the

solidarily imposed the proceeds of which shall be administered as a law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction where

cash fund by the DSWD. there is reasonable doubt of guilt. However, proof beyond reasonable
doubt requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof which

IT IS SO ORDERED. produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.[10] The RTC and CA hinged their finding of petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt (of the crime of child abuse) solely on the supposed
20
EVIDENCE CASES
positive identification by the complainant and his witness (Alimpuyo) importantly, Alimpuyo stated that she was told by Baaga that, while
of petitioner and his co-accused as the perpetrators of the crime. he was allegedly being held by the neck by petitioner, others were
hitting him. Alimpuyo was obviously testifying not on what she
We note Baaga's statement that, when he was apprehended by personally saw but on what Baaga told her.
petitioner and Amante, there were many people around.[15] Yet, the
prosecution presented only Baaga and his aunt, Alimpuyo, as While we ordinarily do not interfere with the findings of the lower
witnesses to the mauling incident itself. Where were the other people courts on the trustworthiness of witnesses, when there appear in the
who could have testified, in an unbiased manner, on the alleged records facts and circumstances of real weight which might have
mauling of Baaga by petitioner and Amante, as supposedly been overlooked or misapprehended, this Court cannot shirk from its
witnessed by Alimpuyo?[16] The testimonies of the two other duty to sift fact from fiction.
prosecution witnesses, Dr. Paulito Cruz and Rachelle Baaga, did not
fortify Baaga's claim that petitioner mauled him, for the following We apply the pro reo principle and the equipoise rule in this case.
reasons: Dr. Cruz merely attended to Baaga's injuries, while Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in question or there is doubt
Rachelle testified that she saw Baaga only after the injuries have on which side the evidence weighs, the doubt should be resolved in
been inflicted on him. favor of the accused.[18] If inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the
We note furthermore that, Baaga failed to controvert the validity of innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
the barangay blotter he signed regarding the mauling incident which then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and will
happened prior to his apprehension by petitioner. Neither did he ever not justify a conviction.[19]
deny the allegation that he figured in a prior battery by gang
members. Time and again, we have held that:

All this raises serious doubt on whether Baaga's injuries were really
Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the
inflicted by petitioner, et al., to the exclusion of other people. In fact,
implementation of a national comprehensive program for the survival
petitioner testified clearly that Gepulane, who had been harboring a
of the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino
grudge against Baaga, came out of nowhere and punched Baaga
children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article
while the latter was being brought to the police station. Gepulane,
XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of
not petitioner, could very well have caused Baaga's injuries.
the children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
Alimpuyo admitted that she did not see who actually caused the
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."
bloodied condition of Baaga's face because she had to first put down
This piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws
the baby she was then carrying when the melee started.[17] More
treating crimes committed against children, namely, the Revised
21
EVIDENCE CASES
Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth ends.
Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong
deterrence against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, We reiterate our ruling in People v. Mamalias:[21]
the law has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by
which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized.
We emphasize that the great goal of our criminal law and procedure
Also, the definition of child abuse is expanded to encompass not only
is not to send people to the gaol but to do justice. The prosecution's
those specific acts of child abuse under existing laws but includes
job is to prove that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
also "other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other
Conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not
conditions prejudicial to the child's development."[20]
on the weakness of the defense. Thus, when the evidence of the
prosecution is not enough to sustain a conviction, it must be rejected
However, this noble statute should not be used as a sharp sword, and the accused absolved and released at once.
ready to be brandished against an accused even if there is a patent
lack of proof to convict him of the crime. The right of an accused to
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 28, 2008
liberty is as important as a minor's right not to be subjected to any
decision and January 15, 2009 resolution of Court of Appeals are
form of abuse. Both are enshrined in the Constitution. One need not
reversed and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Julius Amanquiton is
be sacrificed for the other.
hereby ACQUITTED of violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA
7160.
There is no dearth of law, rules and regulations protecting a child
from any and all forms of abuse. While unfortunately, incidents of
SO ORDERED.
maltreatment of children abound amidst social ills, care has to be
likewise taken that wayward youths should not be cuddled by a
misapplication of the law. Society, through its laws, should correct
the deviant conduct of the youth rather than take the cudgels for
them. Lest we regress to a culture of juvenile delinquency and errant
behavior, laws for the protection of children against abuse should be
applied only and strictly to actual abusers.

The objective of this seemingly catch-all provision on abuses against

children will be best achieved if parameters are set in the law itself, if
only to prevent baseless accusations against innocent individuals.
Perhaps the time has come for Congress to review this matter and
institute the safeguards necessary for the attainment of its laudable
22
EVIDENCE CASES

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,vs.SPOUSES

RODOLFO T. TIU AND VICTORIA N. TIU, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 173090-91 | 2011-09-07

Tagged under keywords

FIRST DIVISION

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse the Joint

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated February 21, 2006 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 00190 and CA-G.R. SP No. 00253, as well as the
Resolution[2] dated June 1, 2006 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

23
EVIDENCE CASES
On November 21, 1995, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines 87/97/761 60,000.00 09/26/97
(Union Bank) and respondent spouses Rodolfo T. Tiu and Victoria N.
Tiu (the spouses Tiu) entered into a Credit Line Agreement (CLA) 87/97/768 30,000.00 09/29/97
whereby Union Bank agreed to make available to the spouses Tiu
credit facilities in such amounts as may be approved.[3] From 87/97/767 180,000.00 09/29/97
September 22, 1997 to March 26, 1998, the spouses Tiu took out
various loans pursuant to this CLA in the total amount of three 87/97/970 110,000.00 12/29/97
million six hundred thirty-two thousand dollars (US$3,632,000.00),
as evidenced by promissory notes: 87/97/747 50,000.00 09/22/97

87/96/944 605,000.00 12/19/97

PN No. Amount in US$ Date Granted
87/98/191 470,000.00 03/16/98
87/98/111 72,000.00 02/16/98
87/98/198 505,000.00 03/19/98
87/98/108 84,000.00 02/13/98
87/98/090 449,000.00 02/09/98
87/98/152 320,000.00 03/02/98
US$3,632,000.00[4]
87/98/075 150,000.00 01/30/98

87/98/211 32,000.00 03/26/98

87/98/071 110,000.00 01/29/98 On June 23, 1998, Union Bank advised the spouses Tiu through a
letter[5] that, in view of the existing currency risks, the loans shall be
87/98/107 135,000.00 02/13//98 redenominated to their equivalent Philippine peso amount on July
15, 1998. On July 3, 1998, the spouses Tiu wrote to Union Bank
87/98/100 75,000.00 02/12/98 authorizing the latter to redenominate the loans at the rate of
US$1=P41.40[6] with interest of 19% for one year.[7]
87/98/197 195,000.00 03/19/98

24
EVIDENCE CASES
On December 21, 1999, Union Bank and the spouses Tiu entered
into a Restructuring Agreement.[8] The Restructuring Agreement
contains a clause wherein the spouses Tiu confirmed their debt and
waived any action on account thereof. To quote said clause:
1. Confirmation of Debt The BORROWER hereby confirms and
accepts that as of December 8, 1999, its outstanding principal
indebtedness to the BANK under the Agreement and the Notes
amount to ONE HUNDRED FIFTY[-]FIVE MILLION THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY[-]FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS
(PHP 155,364,800.00) exclusive of interests, service and penalty
charges (the Indebtedness) and further confirms the correctness,
legality, collectability and enforceability of the Indebtedness. The
BORROWER unconditionally waives any action, demand or claim that
they may otherwise have to dispute the amount of the Indebtedness
as of the date specified in this Section, or the collectability and
enforceability thereof. It is the understanding of the parties that the
BORROWERs acknowledgment, affirmation, and waiver herein are
material considerations for the BANKs agreeing to restructure the
Indebtedness which would have already become due and payable as
of the above date under the terms of the Agreement and the Notes.[9]
The restructured amount (P155,364,800.00) is the sum of the
following figures: (1) P150,364,800.00, which is the value of the
US$3,632,000.00 loan as redenominated under the above-mentioned
exchange rate of US$1=P41.40; and (2) P5,000,000.00, an additional
loan given to the spouses Tiu to update their interest payments.[10]
Under the same Restructuring Agreement, the parties declared that
the loan obligation to be restructured (after deducting the dacion
price of properties ceded by the Tiu spouses and adding: [1] the
taxes, registration fees and other expenses advanced by Union Bank
in registering the Deeds of Dation in Payment; and [2] other fees and
charges incurred by the Indebtedness) is one hundred four million six
hundred sixty-eight thousand seven hundred forty-one pesos
(P104,668,741.00) (total restructured amount).[11] The Deeds of
Dation in Payment referred to are the following:
1. Dation of the Labangon properties Deed executed by Juanita
Tiu, the mother of respondent Rodolfo Tiu, involving ten parcels of
land with improvements located in Labangon, Cebu City and with a
total land area of 3,344 square meters, for the amount of
P25,130,000.00. The Deed states that these properties shall be
leased to the Tiu spouses at a monthly rate of P98,000.00 for a
period of two years.[12]
2. Dation of the Mandaue property Deed executed by the spouses
Tiu involving one parcel of land with improvements located in A.S.
Fortuna St., Mandaue City, covered by TCT No. T-31604 and with a
land area of 2,960 square meters, for the amount of P36,080,000.00.
The Deed states that said property shall be leased to the Tiu spouses
at a monthly rate of P150,000.00 for a period of two years.[13]
As likewise provided in the Restructuring Agreement, the spouses Tiu
executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Union Bank over their
residential property inclusive of lot and improvements located at P.
25
EVIDENCE CASES
Burgos St., Mandaue City, covered by TCT No. T-11951 with an area enjoined from proceeding with the auction sale; (3) that Union Bank
of 3,096 square meters.[14] be ordered to return to the spouses Tiu their properties as listed in
the Complaint; (4) that Union Bank be ordered to pay the plaintiffs
the sum of P10,000,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000,000.00 as

The spouses Tiu undertook to pay the total restructured amount exemplary damages, P3,000,000.00 as attorneys fees and

(P104,668,741.00) via three loan facilities (payment schemes). P500,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and (5) a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the
public auction sale to be held on July 18, 2002.[17]

The spouses Tiu claim to have made the following payments: (1)
P15,000,000.00 on August 3, 1999; and (2) another P13,197,546.79
as of May 8, 2001. Adding the amounts paid under the Deeds of The spouses Tiu claim that from the beginning the loans were in

Dation in Payment, the spouses Tiu postulate that their payments pesos, not in dollars. Their office clerk, Lilia Gutierrez, testified that

added up to P89,407,546.79.[15] the spouses Tiu merely received the peso equivalent of their
US$3,632,000.00 loan at the rate of US$1=P26.00. The spouses Tiu
further claim that they were merely forced to sign the Restructuring
Agreement and take up an additional loan of P5,000,000.00, the
Asserting that the spouses Tiu failed to comply with the payment
proceeds of which they never saw because this amount was
schemes set up in the Restructuring Agreement, Union Bank
immediately applied by Union Bank to interest payments.[18]
initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the residential
property of the spouses Tiu, covered by TCT No. T-11951. The
property was to be sold at public auction on July 18, 2002.
The spouses Tiu allege that the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
properties was invalid, as the loans have already been fully paid.
They also allege that they are not the owners of the improvements
The spouses Tiu, together with Juanita T. Tiu, Rosalinda T. King,
constructed on the lot because the real owners thereof are their co-
Rufino T. Tiu, Rosalie T. Young and Rosenda T. Tiu, filed with the
petitioners, Juanita T. Tiu, Rosalinda T. King, Rufino T. Tiu, Rosalie T.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint seeking to
Young and Rosenda T. Tiu.[19]
have the Extrajudicial Foreclosure declared null and void. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-4363.[16] Named as defendants
were Union Bank and Sheriff IV Veronico C. Ouano (Sheriff Oano) of
Branch 55, RTC, Mandaue City. Complainants therein prayed for the The spouses Tiu further claim that prior to the signing of the

following: (1) that the spouses Tiu be declared to have fully paid their Restructuring Agreement, they entered into a Memorandum of

obligation to Union Bank; (2) that defendants be permanently Agreement with Union Bank whereby the former deposited with the

26
EVIDENCE CASES
latter several certificates of shares of stock of various companies and
four certificates of title of various parcels of land located in Cebu.
The spouses Tiu claim that these properties have not been subjected
to any lien in favor of Union Bank, yet the latter continues to hold on
to these properties and has not returned the same to the former.[20]
On the other hand, Union Bank claims that the Restructuring
Agreement was voluntarily and validly entered into by both parties.
Presenting as evidence the Warranties embodied in the Real Estate
Mortgage, Union Bank contends that the foreclosure of the mortgage
on the residential property of the spouses Tiu was valid and that the
improvements thereon were absolutely owned by them. Union Bank
denies receiving certificates of shares of stock of various companies
or the four certificates of title of various parcels of land from the
spouses Tiu. However, Union Bank also alleges that even if said
certificates were in its possession it is authorized under the
Restructuring Agreement to retain any and all properties of the
debtor as security for the loan.[21]
The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order[22] and, eventually, a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction[23] preventing the sale of the
residential property of the spouses Tiu. [24]
On December 16, 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision[25] in Civil
Case No. MAN-4363 in favor of Union Bank. The dispositive portion of
the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the Complaint and lifting and setting aside the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. No pronouncement as to damages, attorneys
fees and costs of suit.[26]
In upholding the validity of the Restructuring Agreement, the RTC
held that the spouses Tiu failed to present any evidence to prove
either fraud or intimidation or any other act vitiating their consent to
the same. The exact obligation of the spouses Tiu to Union Bank is
therefore P104,668,741.00, as agreed upon by the parties in the
Restructuring Agreement. As regards the contention of the spouses
Tiu that they have fully paid their indebtedness, the RTC noted that
they could not present any detailed accounting as to the total amount
they have paid after the execution of the Restructuring Agreement.
[27]
On January 4, 2005, Union Bank filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration,[28] protesting the finding in the body of the
December 16, 2004 Decision that the residential house on Lot No.
639 is not owned by the spouses Tiu and therefore should be
excluded from the real properties covered by the real estate mortgage.
On January 6, 2005, the spouses Tiu filed their own Motion for
Partial Reconsideration and/or New Trial.[29] They alleged that the
trial court failed to rule on their fourth cause of action wherein they
mentioned that they turned over the following titles to Union Bank:
TCT Nos. 30271, 116287 and 116288 and OCT No. 0-3538. They
also prayed for a partial new trial and for a declaration that they have
fully paid their obligation to Union Bank.[30]
27
EVIDENCE CASES
On January 11, 2005, the spouses Tiu received from Sheriff Oano a
Second Notice of Extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale of Lot No. 639 to be
held on February 3, 2005. To prevent the same, the Tiu spouses filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction
with Application for TRO/Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[31]
The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00253. The Court of
Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order on January 27, 2005.
[32]
On January 19, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Union
Banks Motion for Partial Reconsideration and the Tiu spouses
Motion for Partial Reconsideration and/or New Trial.[33]
Both the spouses Tiu and Union Bank appealed the case to the Court
of Appeals.[34] The two appeals were given a single docket number,
CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00190. Acting on a motion filed by the spouses
Tiu, the Court of Appeals consolidated CA-G.R. SP No. 00253 with
CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00190.[35]
On April 19, 2005, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution finding
that there was no need for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction as the judgment of the lower court has been stayed by the
perfection of the appeal therefrom.[36]
On May 9, 2005, Sheriff Oano proceeded to conduct the extrajudicial
sale. Union Bank submitted the lone bid of P18,576,000.00.[37] On
June 14, 2005, Union Bank filed a motion with the Court of Appeals
praying that Sheriff Oano be ordered to issue a definite and regular
Certificate of Sale.[38] On July 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals issued
a Resolution denying the Motion and suspending the auction sale at
whatever stage, pending resolution of the appeal and conditioned
upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P18,000,000.00 by the Tiu
spouses.[39] The Tiu spouses failed to file said bond.[40]
On February 21, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Joint Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 00190 and CA-G.R. SP No. 00253.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Prohibition, CA-G.R.
SP No. 00253, on the ground that the proper venue for the same is
with the RTC.[41]
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the spouses
Tiu in CA-G.R. CV No. 00190. The Court of Appeals held that the
loan transactions were in pesos, since there was supposedly no
stipulation the loans will be paid in dollars and since no dollars ever
exchanged hands. Considering that the loans were in pesos from the
beginning, the Court of Appeals reasoned that there is no need to
convert the same. By making it appear that the loans were originally
in dollars, Union Bank overstepped its rights as creditor, and made
unwarranted interpretations of the original loan agreement.
According to the Court of Appeals, the Restructuring Agreement,
which purportedly attempts to create a novation of the original loan,
was not clearly authorized by the debtors and was not supported by
any cause or consideration. Since the Restructuring Agreement is
void, the original loan of P94,432,000.00 (representing the amount
28
EVIDENCE CASES
received by the spouses Tiu of US$3,632,000.00 using the
US$1=P26.00 exchange rate) should subsist. The Court of Appeals
likewise invalidated (1) the P5,000,000.00 charge for interest in the
Restructuring Agreement, for having been unilaterally imposed by
Union Bank; and (2) the lease of the properties conveyed in dacion en
pago, for being against public policy. [42]
In sum, the Court of Appeals found Union Bank liable to the spouses
Tiu in the amount of P927,546.79. For convenient reference, we
quote relevant portion of the Court of Appeals Decision here:
To summarize the obligation of the Tiu spouses, they owe Union Bank
P94,432,000.00. The Tiu spouses had already paid Union Bank the
amount of P89,407,546.79. On the other hand, Union Bank must
return to the Tiu spouses the illegally collected rentals in the amount
of P5,952,000.00. Given these findings, the obligation of the Tiu
spouses has already been fully paid. In fact, it is the Union Bank
that must return to the Tiu spouses the amount of NINE HUNDRED
TWENTY[-]SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY[-]SIX PESOS
AND SEVENTY[-]NINE CENTAVOS (P927,546.79).[43
With regard to the ownership of the improvements on the subject
mortgaged property, the Court of Appeals ruled that it belonged to
respondent Rodolfo Tius father, Jose Tiu, since 1981. According to
the Court of Appeals, Union Bank should not have relied on
warranties made by debtors that they are the owners of the property.
The appellate court went on to permanently enjoin Union Bank from
foreclosing the mortgage not only of the property covered by TCT No.
T-11951, but also any other mortgage over any other property of the
spouses Tiu.[44]
The Court of Appeals likewise found Union Bank liable to return the
certificates of stocks and titles to real properties of the spouses Tiu in
its possession. The appellate court held that Union Bank made
judicial admissions of such possession in its Reply to Plaintiffs
Request for Admission.[45] In the event that Union Bank can no
longer return these certificates and titles, it was mandated to
shoulder the cost for their replacement.[46]
Finally, the Court of Appeals took judicial notice that before or during
the financial crisis, banks actively convinced debtors to make dollar
loans in the guise of benevolence, saddling borrowers with loans that
ballooned twice or thrice their original loans. The Court of Appeals,
noting the cavalier way with which banks exploited and manipulated
the situation,[47] held Union Bank liable to the spouses Tiu for
P100,000.00 in moral damages, P100,000.00 in exemplary damages,
and P50,000.00 in attorneys fees.[48]
The Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us permanently enjoining Union Bank from foreclosing
the mortgage of the residential property of the Tiu spouses which is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11951 and from pursuing
other foreclosure of mortgages over any other properties of the Tiu
29
EVIDENCE CASES
spouses for the above-litigated debt that has already been fully paid. SPOUSES FROM UNION BANK DESPITE [THE] CLEAR ADMISSION
If a foreclosure sale has already been made over such properties, this OF INDEBTEDNESS BY THE BORROWER-MORTGAGOR TIU
Court orders the cancellation of such foreclosure sale and the SPOUSES.
Certificate of Sale thereof if any has been issued. This Court orders
Union Bank to return to the Tiu spouses the amount of NINE
HUNDRED TWENTY[-]SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
FORTY[-]SIX PESOS AND SEVENTY[-]NINE CENTAVOS GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT NULLIFIED THE
(P927,546.79) representing illegally collected rentals. This Court also RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT BETWEEN TIU SPOUSES AND
orders Union Bank to return to the Tiu spouses all the certificates of UNION BANK FOR LACK OF CAUSE OR CONSIDERATION DESPITE
shares of stocks and titles to real properties of the Tiu spouses that THE ADMISSION OF THE BORROWER-MORTGAGOR TIU SPOUSES
were deposited to it or, in lieu thereof, to pay the cost for the OF THE DUE AND VOLUNTARY EXECUTION OF SAID
replacement and issuance of new certificates and new titles over the RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT.
said properties. This Court finally orders Union Bank to pay the Tiu
spouses ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) in moral
damages, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) in
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
exemplary damages, FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) in
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT PERMANENTLY
attorneys fees and cost, both in the lower court and in this Court.
ENJOINED UNION BANK FROM FORECLOSING THE MORTGAGE
[49]
ON THE RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY OF THE TIU SPOUSES DESPITE
THE ADMISSION OF NON-PAYMENT OF THEIR OUTSTANDING
LOAN TO THE BANK BY THE BORROWER-MORTGAGOR TIU
On June 1, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed SPOUSES;
Resolution denying Union Banks Motion for Reconsideration.

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, wherein Union Bank
submits the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT
THERE WERE NO DOLLAR LOANS OBTAINED BY [THE] TIU
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FIXED THE AMOUNT
OF THE OBLIGATION OF RESPONDENT SPOUSES CONTRARY TO
THE PROVISIONS OF THE PROMISSORY NOTES, RESTRUCTURING
AGREEMENT AND [THE] VOLUNTARY ADMISSIONS BY BORROWER-
MORTGAGOR TIU SPOUSES;

30
EVIDENCE CASES
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED ON THE
ALLEGED RENTALS PAID BY RESPONDENT SPOUSES WITHOUT
ANY FACTUAL BASIS;
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HELD WITHOUT ANY
FACTUAL BASIS THAT THE LOAN OBLIGATION OF TIU SPOUSES
HAS BEEN FULLY PAID;
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HELD WITHOUT ANY
FACTUAL BASIS THAT THE HOUSE INCLUDED IN THE REAL
ESTATE MORTGAGE DID NOT BELONG TO THE TIU SPOUSES.
8. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING UNION BANK TO
RETURN THE CERTIFICATES OF SHARES OF STOCK AND TITLES
TO REAL PROPERTIES OF TIU SPOUSES ALLEGEDLY IN THE
POSSESSION OF UNION BANK.
9. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE
DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES ON APPELLATE JURISDICTION.
10. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING DAMAGES
AGAINST UNION BANK.[50]
Validity of the Restructuring Agreement
As previously discussed, the Court of Appeals declared that the
Restructuring Agreement is void on account of its being a failed
novation of the original loan agreements. The Court of Appeals
explained that since there was no stipulation that the loans will be
paid in dollars, and since no dollars ever exchanged hands, the
original loan transactions were in pesos.[51] Proceeding from this
premise, the Court of Appeals held that the Restructuring
Agreement, which was meant to convert the loans into pesos, was
unwarranted. Thus, the Court of Appeals reasoned that:
Be that as it may, however, since the loans of the Tiu spouses from
Union Bank were peso loans from the very beginning, there is no
need for conversion thereof. A Restructuring Agreement should
merely confirm the loans, not add thereto. By making it appear in
the Restructuring Agreement that the loans were originally dollar
loans, Union Bank overstepped its rights as a creditor and made
unwarranted interpretations of the original loan agreement. This
Court is not bound by such interpretations made by Union Bank.
When one party makes an interpretation of a contract, he makes it
at his own risk, subject to a subsequent challenge by the other party
and a modification by the courts. In this case, that party making the
interpretation is not just any party, but a well entrenched and highly
31
EVIDENCE CASES
respected bank. The matter that was being interpreted was also a
financial matter that is within the profound expertise of the bank. A
normal person who does not possess the same financial proficiency
or acumen as that of a bank will most likely defer to the latters
esteemed opinion, representations and interpretations. It has been
often stated in our jurisprudence that banks have a fiduciary duty to
their depositors. According to the case of Bank of the Philippine
Islands vs. IAC (G.R. No. 69162, February 21, 1992), as a business
affected with public interest and because of the nature of its
functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary
nature of their relationship. Such fiduciary relationship should also
extend to the banks borrowers who, more often than not, are also
depositors of the bank. Banks are in the business of lending while
most borrowers hardly know the basics of such business. When
transacting with a bank, most borrowers concede to the expertise of
the bank and consider their procedures, pronouncements and
representations as unassailable, whether such be true or not.
Therefore, when there is a doubtful banking transaction, this Court
will tip the scales in favor of the borrower.
Given the above ruling, the Restructuring Agreement, therefore,
between the Tiu spouses and Union Bank does not operate to
supersede all previous loan documents, as claimed by Union Bank.
But the said Restructuring Agreement, as it was crafted by Union
Bank, does not merely confirm the original loan of the Tiu spouses
but attempts to create a novation of the said original loan that is not
clearly authorized by the debtors and that is not supported by any
cause or consideration. According to Article 1292 of the New Civil
Code, in order that an obligation may by extinguished by another
which substitutes the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in
unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be on
every point incompatible with each other. Such is not the case in this
instance. No valid novation of the original obligation took place.
Even granting arguendo that there was a novation, the sudden
change in the original amount of the loan to the new amount
declared in the Restructuring Agreement is not supported by any
cause or consideration. Under Article 1352 of the Civil Code,
contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect
whatever. A contract whose cause did not exist at the time of the
transaction is void. Accordingly, Article 1297 of the New Civil Code
mandates that, if the new obligation is void, the original one shall
subsist, unless the parties intended that the former relation should
be extinguished at any event. Since the Restructuring Agreement is
void and since there was no intention to extinguish the original loan,
the original loan shall subsist.[52]
Union Bank does not dispute that the spouses Tiu received the
loaned amount of US$3,632,000.00 in Philippine pesos, not dollars,
at the prevailing exchange rate of US$1=P26.[53] However, Union
Bank claims that this does not change the true nature of the loan as
a foreign currency loan,[54] and proceeded to illustrate in its
Memorandum that the spouses Tiu obtained favorable interest rates
by opting to borrow in dollars (but receiving the equivalent peso
amount) as opposed to borrowing in pesos.[55]
We agree with Union Bank on this point. Although indeed, the
spouses Tiu received peso equivalents of the borrowed amounts, the
loan documents presented as evidence, i.e., the promissory notes,[56]
expressed the amount of the loans in US dollars and not in any other
currency. This clearly indicates that the spouses Tiu were bound to
32
EVIDENCE CASES
pay Union Bank in dollars, the amount stipulated in said loan
documents. Thus, before the Restructuring Agreement, the spouses
Tiu were bound to pay Union Bank the amount of US$3,632,000.00
plus the interest stipulated in the promissory notes, without
converting the same to pesos. The spouses Tiu, who are in the
construction business and appear to be dealing primarily in
Philippine currency, should therefore purchase the necessary amount
of dollars to pay Union Bank, who could have justly refused payment
in any currency other than that which was stipulated in the
promissory notes.
We disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
testimony of Lila Gutierrez, which merely attests to the fact that the
spouses Tiu received the peso equivalent of their dollar loan, proves
the intention of the parties that such loans should be paid in pesos.
If such had been the intention of the parties, the promissory notes
could have easily indicated the same.
Such stipulation of payment in dollars is not prohibited by any
prevailing law or jurisprudence at the time the loans were taken. In
this regard, Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1249. The payment of debts in money shall be made in the
currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency,
then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.
Although the Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950,
jurisprudence had upheld[57] the continued effectivity of Republic
Act No. 529, which took effect earlier on June 16, 1950. Pursuant to
Section 1[58] of Republic Act No. 529, any agreement to pay an
obligation in a currency other than the Philippine currency is void;
the most that could be demanded is to pay said obligation in
Philippine currency to be measured in the prevailing rate of exchange
at the time the obligation was incurred.[59] On June 19, 1964,
Republic Act No. 4100 took effect, modifying Republic Act No. 529 by
providing for several exceptions to the nullity of agreements to pay in
foreign currency.[60]
On April 13, 1993, Central Bank Circular No. 1389[61] was issued,
lifting foreign exchange restrictions and liberalizing trade in foreign
currency. In cases of foreign borrowings and foreign currency loans,
however, prior Bangko Sentral approval was required. On July 5,
1996, Republic Act No. 8183 took effect,[62] expressly repealing
Republic Act No. 529 in Section 2[63] thereof. The same statute
also explicitly provided that parties may agree that the obligation or
transaction shall be settled in a currency other than Philippine
currency at the time of payment.[64]
Although the Credit Line Agreement between the spouses Tiu and
Union Bank was entered into on November 21, 1995,[65] when the
agreement to pay in foreign currency was still considered void under
Republic Act No. 529, the actual loans,[66] as shown in the
promissory notes, were taken out from September 22, 1997 to March
26, 1998, during which time Republic Act No. 8183 was already in
effect. In United Coconut Planters Bank v. Beluso,[67] we held that:
33
EVIDENCE CASES
[O]pening a credit line does not create a credit transaction of loan or
mutuum, since the former is merely a preparatory contract to the
contract of loan or mutuum. Under such credit line, the bank is
merely obliged, for the considerations specified therefor, to lend to the
other party amounts not exceeding the limit provided. The credit
transaction thus occurred not when the credit line was opened, but
rather when the credit line was availed of. x x x.[68]
Having established that Union Bank and the spouses Tiu validly
entered into dollar loans, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that
there were no dollar loans to novate into peso loans must necessarily
fail.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals pronouncement that the novation was
not supported by any cause or consideration is likewise incorrect.
This conclusion suggests that when the parties signed the
Restructuring Agreement, Union Bank got something out of nothing
or that the spouses Tiu received no benefit from the restructuring of
their existing loan and was merely taken advantage of by the bank. It
is important to note at this point that in the determination of the
nullity of a contract based on the lack of consideration, the debtor
has the burden to prove the same. Article 1354 of the Civil Code
provides that [a]though the cause is not stated in the contract, it is
presumed that it exists and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the
contrary.
In the case at bar, the Restructuring Agreement was signed at the
height of the financial crisis when the Philippine peso was rapidly
depreciating. Since the spouses Tiu were bound to pay their debt in
dollars, the cost of purchasing the required currency was likewise
swiftly increasing. If the parties did not enter into the Restructuring
Agreement in December 1999 and the peso continued to deteriorate,
the ability of the spouses Tiu to pay and the ability of Union Bank to
collect would both have immensely suffered. As shown by the
evidence presented by Union Bank, the peso indeed continued to
deteriorate, climbing to US$1=P50.01 on December 2000.[69] Hence,
in order to ensure the stability of the loan agreement, Union Bank
and the spouses Tiu agreed in the Restructuring Agreement to peg
the principal loan at P150,364,800.00 and the unpaid interest at
P5,000,000.00.
Before this Court, the spouses Tiu belatedly argue that their consent
to the Restructuring Agreement was vitiated by fraud and mistake,
alleging that (1) the Restructuring Agreement did not take into
consideration their substantial payment in the amount of
P40,447,185.60 before its execution; and (2) the dollar loans had
already been redenominated in 1997 at the rate of US$1=P26.34.[70]
We have painstakingly perused over the records of this case, but
failed to find any documentary evidence of the alleged payment of
P40,447,185.60 before the execution of the Restructuring Agreement.
In paragraph 16 of their Amended Complaint, the spouses Tiu
alleged payment of P40,447,185.60 for interests before the conversion
of the dollar loan.[71] This was specifically denied by Union Bank in
paragraph 5 of its Answer with Counterclaim.[72] Respondent
Rodolfo Tiu testified that they made 50 million plus in cash
34
EVIDENCE CASES
payment plus other monthly interest payments,[73] and identified a A: I think it was on the year 1997.
computation of payments dated July 17, 2002 signed by himself.[74]
Such computation, however, was never formally offered in evidence
and was in any event, wholly self-serving. Q: Could [you] still remember what was then the prevailing exchange
rate between the dollar and the peso at that year 1997?

As regards the alleged redenomination of the same dollar loans in

1997 at the rate of US$1=P26.34, the spouses Tiu merely relied on A: Yes. I have here the list of the dollar exchange rate from January
the following direct testimony of Herbert Hojas, one of the witnesses 1987 (sic). It was P26.34 per dollar.[75]
of Union Bank:

Neither party presented any documentary evidence of the alleged

Q: Could you please describe what kind of loan was the loan of the redenomination in 1997. Respondent Rodolfo Tiu did not even
spouses Rodolfo Tiu, the plaintiffs in this case? mention it in his testimony. Furthermore, Hojas was obviously
uncertain in his statement that said redenomination was made in
1997.
A: It was originally an FCDU, meaning a dollar loan.

As pointed out by the trial court, the Restructuring Agreement, being

Q: What happened to this FCDU loan or dollar loan? notarized, is a public document enjoying a prima facie presumption
of authenticity and due execution. Clear and convincing evidence
must be presented to overcome such legal presumption.[76] The

A: The dollar loan was re-denominated in view of the very unstable spouses Tiu, who attested before the notary public that the

exchange of the dollar and the peso at that time, Restructuring Agreement is their own free and voluntary act and
deed,[77] failed to present sufficient evidence to prove otherwise. It
is difficult to believe that the spouses Tiu, veteran businessmen who
operate a multi-million peso company, would sign a very important
Q: Could you still remember what year this account was re-
document without fully understanding its contents and
denominated from dollar to peso?
consequences.

35
EVIDENCE CASES
This Court therefore rules that the Restructuring Agreement is valid
and, as such, a valid and binding novation of loans of the spouses
Tiu entered into from September 22, 1997 to March 26, 1998 which
had a total amount of US$3,632,000.00.
Validity of the Foreclosure of Mortgage
The spouses Tiu challenge the validity of the foreclosure of the
mortgage on two grounds, claiming that: (1) the debt had already
been fully paid; and (2) they are not the owners of the improvements
on the mortgaged property.
(1) Allegation of full payment of the mortgage debt
In the preceding discussion, we have ruled that the Restructuring
Agreement is a valid and binding novation of loans of the spouses Tiu
entered into from September 22, 1997 to March 26, 1998 in the total
amount of US$3,632,000.00. Thus, in order that the spouses Tiu
can be held to have fully paid their loan obligation, they should
present evidence showing their payment of the total restructured
amount under the Restructuring Agreement which was
P104,668,741.00. As we have discussed above, however, while
respondent Rodolfo Tiu appeared to have identified during his
testimony a computation dated July 17, 2002 of the alleged payments
made to Union Bank,[78] the same was not formally offered in
evidence. Applying Section 34, Rule 132[79] of the Rules of Court,
such computation cannot be considered by this Court. We have held
that a formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest
their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. It has several functions:
(1) to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for
which the proponent is presenting the evidence; (2) to allow opposing
parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility; and (3)
to facilitate review by the appellate court, which will not be required
to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.[80]
Moreover, even if such computation were admitted in evidence, the
same is self-serving and cannot be given probative weight. In the
case at bar, the records do not contain even a single receipt
evidencing payment to Union Bank.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that several payments made by
the spouses Tiu had been admitted by Union Bank. Indeed, Section
11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that an allegation not
specifically denied is deemed admitted. In such a case, no further
evidence would be required to prove the antecedent facts. We should
therefore examine which of the payments specified by the spouses
Tiu in their Amended Complaint[81] were not specifically denied by
Union Bank.
The allegations of payment are made in paragraphs 16 to 21 of the
Amended Complaint:
16. Before conversion of the dollar loan into a peso loan[,] the
spouses Tiu had already paid the defendant bank the amount of
P40,447,185.60 for interests;
36
EVIDENCE CASES
17. On August 3, 1999 and August 12, 1999, plaintiffs made
payments in the amount of P15,000,000.00;
18. In order to lessen the obligation of plaintiffs, the mother of
plaintiff Rodolfo T. Tiu, plaintiff Juanita T. Tiu, executed a deed of
dacion in payment in favor of defendant involving her 10 parcels of
land located in Labangon, Cebu City for the amount
P25,130,000.00. Copy of the deed was attached to the original
complaint as Annex C;
19. For the same purpose, plaintiffs spouses Tiu also executed a deed
of dacion in payment of their property located at A.S. Fortuna St.,
Mandaue City for the amount of P36,080,000.00. Copy of the deed
was attached to the original complaint as Annex D;
20. The total amount of the two dacions in payment made by the
plaintiffs was P61,210,000.00;
21. Plaintiffs spouses Tiu also made other payment of the amount of
P13,197,546.79 as of May 8, 2001;[82]
In paragraphs 4 and 5 of their Answer with Counterclaim,[83] Union
Bank specifically denied the allegation in paragraph 9 of the
Complaint, but admitted the allegations in paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20
and 21 thereof. Paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 allege the two deeds of
dacion. However, these instruments were already incorporated in the
computation of the outstanding debt (i.e., subtracted from the
confirmed debt of P155,364,800.00), as can be gleaned from the
following provisions in the Restructuring Agreement:
a.) The loan obligation to the BANK to be restructured herein after
deducting from the Indebtedness of the BORROWER the dacion price
of
of the properties subject of the Deeds of Dacion and adding to the
Indebtedness all the taxes, registration fees and other expenses
advanced by the bank in registering the Deeds of Dacion, and also
adding to the Indebtedness the interest, and other fees and charges
incurred by the Indebtedness, amounts to ONE HUNDRED FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY-ONE PESOS (PHP104,668,741.00) (the TOTAL
RESTRUCTURED AMOUNT).[84]
As regards the allegations of cash payments in paragraphs 17 and 21
of the Amended Complaint, the date of the alleged payment is critical
as to whether they were included in the Restructuring Agreement.
The payment of P15,000,000.00 alleged in paragraph 17 of the
Amended Complaint was supposedly made on August 3 and 12,
1999. This payment was before the date of execution of the
Restructuring Agreement on December 21, 1999, and is therefore
already factored into the restructured obligation of the spouses.[85]
On the other hand, the payment of P13,197,546.79 alleged in
paragraph 21 of the Amended Complaint was dated May, 8, 2001.
Said payment cannot be deemed included in the computation of the
spouses Tius debt in the Restructuring Agreement, which was
assented to more than a year earlier. This amount (P13,197,546.79)
37
EVIDENCE CASES
is even absent[86] in the computation of Union Bank of the
outstanding debt, in contrast with the P15,000,000.00 payment
which is included[87] therein. Union Bank did not explain this
discrepancy and merely relied on the spouses Tius failure to formally
offer supporting evidence. Since this payment of P13,197,546.79 on
May 8, 2001 was admitted by Union Bank in their Answer with
Counterclaim, there was no need on the part of the spouses Tiu to
present evidence on the same. Nonetheless, if we subtract this figure
from the total restructured amount (P104,668,741.00) in the
Restructuring Agreement, the result is that the spouses Tiu still owe
Union Bank P91,471,194.21.
(2) Allegation of third party ownership of the improvements on the
mortgaged lot
The Court of Appeals, taking into consideration its earlier ruling that
the loan was already fully paid, permanently enjoined Union Bank
from foreclosing the mortgage on the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 11951 (Lot No. 639) and from pursuing other
foreclosure of mortgages over any other properties of the spouses Tiu.
The Court of Appeals ruled:
The prayer, therefore, of the Tiu spouses to enjoin the foreclosure of
the real estate mortgage over their residential property has merit.
The loan has already been fully paid. It should also be noted that
the house constructed on the residential property of the Tiu spouses
is not registered in the name of the Tiu spouses, but in the name of
Jose Tiu (Records, pp. 127-132), the father of appellant and
petitioner Rodolfo Tiu, since 1981. It had been alleged by the Tiu
spouses that Jose Tiu died on December 18, 1983, and, that
consequently upon his death, Juanita T. Tiu, Rosalinda T. King,
Rufino T. Tiu, Rosalie T. Young and Rosenda T. Tiu became owners of
the house (Records, p. 116). This allegation has not been
substantially denied by Union Bank. All that the Union Bank
presented to refute this allegation are a Transfer Certificate of Title
and a couple of Tax Declarations which do not indicate that a
residential house is titled in the name of the Tiu spouses. In fact, in
one of the Tax Declarations, the market value of the improvements is
worth only P3,630.00. Certainly, Union Bank should have been
aware that this Tax Declaration did not cover the residential house.
Union Bank should also not rely on warranties made by debtors that
they are the owners of the property. They should investigate such
representations. The courts have made consistent rulings that a
bank, being in the business of lending, is obligated to verify the true
ownership of the properties mortgaged to them. Consequently, this
Court permanently enjoins Union Bank from foreclosing the mortgage
of the residential property of the Tiu spouses which is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11951 and from pursuing other
foreclosure of mortgages over any other properties of the Tiu spouses.
If a foreclosure sale has already been made over such properties, this
Court orders the cancellation of such foreclosure sale and the
Certificate of Sale thereof if any has been issued, and the return of
the title to the Tiu spouses.[88]
We disagree. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the
burden to prove the spouses Tius allegation that they do not own
the improvements on Lot No. 639, despite having such improvements
included in the mortgage is on the spouses Tiu themselves. The
fundamental rule is that he who alleges must prove.[89] The
38
EVIDENCE CASES
allegations of the spouses Tiu on this matter, which are found in
paragraphs 35 to 39[90] of their Amended Complaint, were
specifically denied in paragraph 9 of Union Banks Answer with
Counterclaim.[91]
Upon careful examination of the evidence, we find that the spouses
Tiu failed to prove that the improvements on Lot No. 639 were owned
by third persons. In fact, the evidence presented by the spouses Tiu
merely attempt to prove that the improvements on Lot No. 639 were
declared for taxes in the name of respondent Rodolfo Tius father,
Jose Tiu, who allegedly died on December 18, 1983. There was no
effort to show how their co-plaintiffs in the original complaint,
namely Juanita T. Tiu, Rosalinda T. King, Rufino T. Tiu, Rosalie T.
Young and Rosenda T. Tiu, became co-owners of the house. The
spouses Tiu did not present evidence as to (1) who the heirs of Jose
Tiu are; (2) if Juanita T. Tiu, Rosalinda T. King, Rufino T. Tiu, Rosalie
T. Young and Rosenda T. Tiu are indeed included as heirs; and (3)
why petitioner Rodolfo Tiu is not included as an heir despite being
the son of Jose Tiu. No birth certificate of the alleged heirs, will of
the deceased, or any other piece of evidence showing judicial or
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Jose Tiu was presented.
In light of the foregoing, this Court therefore sets aside the ruling of
the Court of Appeals permanently enjoining Union Bank from
foreclosing the mortgage on Lot No. 639, including the improvements
thereon.
Validity of Alleged Rental Payments on the Properties Conveyed to
the Bank via Dacion en Pago
The Court of Appeals found the lease contracts over the properties
conveyed to Union Bank via dacion en pago to be void for being
against public policy. The appellate court held that since the General
Banking Law of 2000[92] mandates banks to immediately dispose of
real estate properties that are not necessary for its own use in the
conduct of its business, banks should not enter into two-year
contracts of lease over properties paid to them through dacion.[93]
The Court of Appeals thus ordered Union Bank to return the rentals
it collected. To determine the amount of rentals paid by the spouses
Tiu to Union Bank, the Court of Appeals simply multiplied the
monthly rental stipulated in the Restructuring Agreement by the
stipulated period of the lease agreement:
For the Labangon property, the Tiu spouses paid rentals in the
amount of P98,000.00 per month for two years, or a total amount of
P2,352,000.00. For the A.S. Fortuna property, the Tiu spouses paid
rentals in the amount of P150,000.00 per month for two years, or a
total amount of P3,600,000.00. The total amount in rentals paid by
the Tiu spouses to Union Bank is FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED
FIFTY- TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P5,952,000.00). This Court finds
that the return of this amount to the Tiu spouses is called for since it
will better serve public policy. These properties that were given by
the Tiu spouses to Union Bank as payment should not be used by the
latter to extract more money from the former. This situation is
analogous to having a debtor pay interest for a debt already paid.
Instead of leasing the properties, Union Bank should have instructed
39
EVIDENCE CASES
the Tiu spouses to vacate the said properties so that it could dispose considered as part of the bank's total investment in real estate,
of them.[94] unless otherwise provided by the Monetary Board.

The Court of Appeals committed a serious error in this regard. As
pointed out by petitioner Union Bank, the spouses Tiu did not
present any proof of the alleged rental payments. Not a single receipt
was formally offered in evidence. The mere stipulation in a contract
of the monthly rent to be paid by the lessee is certainly not evidence
that the same has been paid. Since the spouses Tiu failed to prove
their payment to Union Bank of the amount of P5,952,000.00, we are
constrained to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals ordering its
return.
SECTION 52. Acquisition of Real Estate by Way of Satisfaction of
Claims. Notwithstanding the limitations of the preceding Section, a
bank may acquire, hold or convey real property under the following
circumstances:
52.1. Such as shall be mortgaged to it in good faith by way of
security for debts;

52.2. Such as shall be conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts

Even assuming arguendo that the spouses Tiu had duly proven that previously contracted in the course of its dealings; or
it had paid rent to Union Bank, we nevertheless disagree with the
finding of the Court of Appeals that it is against public policy for
banks to enter into two-year contracts of lease of properties ceded to
52.3. Such as it shall purchase at sales under judgments, decrees,
them through dacion en pago. The provisions of law cited by the
mortgages, or trust deeds held by it and such as it shall purchase to
Court of Appeals, namely Sections 51 and 52 of the General Banking
secure debts due it.
Law of 2000, merely provide:

Any real property acquired or held under the circumstances

SECTION 51. Ceiling on Investments in Certain Assets. Any bank
enumerated in the above paragraph shall be disposed of by the bank
may acquire real estate as shall be necessary for its own use in the
within a period of five (5) years or as may be prescribed by the
conduct of its business: Provided, however, That the total investment
Monetary Board: Provided, however, That the bank may, after said
in such real estate and improvements thereof, including bank
period, continue to hold the property for its own use, subject to the
equipment, shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of combined capital
limitations of the preceding Section.
accounts: Provided, further, That the equity investment of a bank in
another corporation engaged primarily in real estate shall be

40
EVIDENCE CASES
Section 52.2 contemplates a dacion en pago. Thus, Section 52
undeniably gives banks five years to dispose of properties conveyed to
them in satisfaction of debts previously contracted in the course of its
dealings, unless another period is prescribed by the Monetary Board.
Furthermore, there appears to be no legal impediment for a bank to
lease the real properties it has received in satisfaction of debts,
within the five-year period that such bank is allowed to hold the
acquired realty.
We do not dispute the interpretation of the Court of Appeals that the
purpose of the law is to prevent the concentration of land holdings in
a few hands, and that banks should not be allowed to hold on to the
properties contemplated in Section 52 beyond the five-year period
unless such bank has exerted its best efforts to dispose of the
property in good faith but failed. However, inquiries as to whether
the banks exerted best efforts to dispose of the property can only be
done if said banks fail to dispose of the same within the period
provided. Such inquiry is furthermore irrelevant to the issues in the
case at bar.
Order to Return Certificates Allegedly in Union Banks Possession
In the Amended Complaint, the spouses Tiu alleged[95] that they
delivered several certificates and titles to Union Bank pursuant to a
Memorandum of Agreement. These certificates and titles were not
subjected to any lien in favor of Union Bank, but the latter allegedly
continued to hold on to said properties.
The RTC failed to rule on this issue. The Court of Appeals, tackling
this issue for the first time, ruled in favor of the Tiu spouses and
ordered the return of these certificates and titles. The appellate court
added that if Union Bank can no longer return these certificates or
titles, it should shoulder the cost for their replacement.[96]
Union Bank, asserting that the Memorandum of Agreement did not,
in fact, push through, denies having received the subject certificates
and titles. Union Bank added that even assuming arguendo that it is
in possession of said documents, the Restructuring Agreement itself
allows such possession.[97]
The evidence on hand lends credibility to the allegation of Union
Bank that the Memorandum of Agreement did not push through.
The copy of the Memorandum of Agreement attached by the spouses
Tiu themselves to their original complaint did not bear the signature
of any representative from Union Bank and was not notarized.[98]
We, however, agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that
despite the failure of the Memorandum of Agreement to push
through, the certificates and titles mentioned therein do appear to be
in the possession of Union Bank. As held by the Court of Appeals:
Lastly, this Court will order, as it hereby orders, Union Bank to
return to the Tiu spouses all the certificates of shares of stocks and
titles to real properties of the Tiu spouses in its possession. Union
Bank cannot deny possession of these items since it had made
41
EVIDENCE CASES
judicial admissions of such possession in their document entitled
Reply to Plaintiffs request for Admission (records, pp. 216-217).
While in that document, Union Bank only admitted to the possession
of four real estate titles, this Court is convinced that all the
certificates and titles mentioned in the unconsummated
Memorandum of Agreement (Records, pp. 211-213) were given by the
Tiu spouses to Union Bank for appraisal. This finding is further
bolstered by the admission of the Union Bank that it kept the titles
for safekeeping after it rejected the Memorandum of Agreement.
Since Union Bank rejected these certificates and titles of property, it
should return the said items to the Tiu spouses. If Union Bank can
no longer return these certificates and titles or if it has misplaced
them, it shall shoulder the cost for the replacement and issuance of
new certificates and new titles over the said properties.[99]
As regards Union Banks argument that it has the right to retain said
documents pursuant to the Restructuring Agreement, it is referring
to paragraph 11(b), which provides that:
11. Effects of Default When the BORROWER is in default, such
default shall have the following effects, alternative, concurrent and
cumulative with each other:
xxxx
(b) The BANK shall be entitled to all the remedies provided for and
further shall have the right to effect or apply against the partial or
full payment of any and all obligations of the BORROWER under this
Restructuring Agreement any and all moneys or other properties of
the BORROWER which, for any reason, are or may hereafter come
into the possession of the Bank or the Banks agent. All such
moneys or properties shall be deemed in the BANKs possession as
soon as put in transit to the BANK by mail or carrier.[100]
In the first place, notwithstanding the foregoing provision, there is no
clear intention on the part of the spouses Tiu to deliver the
certificates over certain shares of stock and real properties as
security for their debt. From the terms of the Memorandum of
Agreement, these certificates were surrendered to Union Bank in
order that the said properties described therein be given their
corresponding loan values required for the restructuring of the
spouses Tius outstanding obligations. However, in the event the
parties fail to agree on the valuation of the subject properties, Union
Bank agrees to release the same.[101] As Union Bank itself
vehemently alleges, the Memorandum of Agreement was not
consummated. Moreover, despite the fact that the Bank was aware, or
in possession, of these certificates,[102] at the time of execution of
the Restructuring Agreement, only the mortgage over the real
property covered by TCT No. T-11951 was expressly mentioned as a
security in the Restructuring Agreement. In fact, in its Reply to
Request for Admission,[103] Union Bank admitted that (1) the titles
to the real properties were submitted to it for appraisal but were
subsequently rejected, and (2) no real estate mortgages were executed
over the said properties. There being no agreement that these
properties shall secure respondents obligation, Union Bank has no
right to retain said certificates.
42
EVIDENCE CASES
Assuming arguendo that paragraph 11(b) of the Restructuring lieu thereof, to pay the cost for the replacement and issuance of new
Agreement indeed allows the retention of the certificates (submitted certificates and new titles over the said properties.
to the Bank ostensibly for safekeeping and appraisal) as security for
spouses Tius debt, Union Banks position still cannot be upheld.
Insofar as said provision permits Union Bank to apply properties of Validity of the Award of Damages
the spouses Tiu in its possession to the full or partial payment of the
latters obligations, the same appears to impliedly allow Union Bank
to appropriate these properties for such purpose. However, said
The Court of Appeals awarded damages in favor of the spouses Tiu
provision cannot be validly applied to the subject certificates and
based on its taking judicial notice of the alleged exploitation by many
titles without violating the prohibition against pactum commissorium
banks of the Asian financial crisis, as well as the foreclosure of the
contained in Article 2088 of the Civil Code, to the effect that [t]he
mortgage of the home of the spouses Tiu despite the alleged full
creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or
payment by the latter. As regards the alleged manipulation of the
mortgage, or dispose of them[;] [a]ny stipulation to the contrary is
financial crisis, the Court of Appeals held:
null and void. Applicable by analogy to the present case is our
ruling in Nakpil v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[104] wherein
property held in trust was ceded to the trustee upon failure of the
beneficiary to answer for the amounts owed to the former, to wit: As a final note, this Court observes the irregularity in the
circumstances [surrounding] dollar loans granted by banks right
before or during the Asian financial crisis. It is of common
knowledge that many banks, around that time, actively pursued and
For, there was to be automatic appropriation of the property by
convinced debtors to make dollar loans or to convert their peso loans
Valdes in the event of failure of petitioner to pay the value of the
to dollar loans allegedly because of the lower interest rate of dollar
advances. Thus, contrary to respondent's manifestations, all the
loans. This is a highly suspect behavior on the part of the banks
elements of a pactum commissorium were present: there was a
because it is irrational for the banks to voluntarily and actively
creditor-debtor relationship between the parties; the property was
proffer a conversion that would give them substantially less income.
used as security for the loan; and, there was automatic appropriation
In the guise of benevolence, many banks were able to convince
by respondent of Pulong Maulap in case of default of petitioner.[105]
borrowers to make dollar loans or to convert their peso loans to dollar
(Emphases supplied.)
loans. Soon thereafter, the Asian financial crisis hit, and many
borrowers were saddled with loans that ballooned to twice or thrice
the amount of their original loans. This court takes judicial notice of
This Court therefore affirms the order of the Court of Appeals for these events or matters which are of public knowledge. It is
Union Bank to return to the spouses Tiu all the certificates of shares inconceivable that the banks were unaware of the looming Asian
of stock and titles to real properties that were submitted to it or, in
43
EVIDENCE CASES
financial crisis. Being in the forefront of the financial world and
having access to financial data that were not available to the average
borrower, the banks were in such a position that they had a higher
vantage point with respect to the financial landscape over their
average clients. The cavalier way with which banks exploited and
manipulated the situation is almost too palpable that they openly
and unabashedly struck heavy blows on the Philippine economy,
industries and businesses. The banks have a fiduciary duty to their
clients and to the Filipino people to be transparent in their dealings
and to make sure that the latters interest are not prejudiced by the
formers interest. Article 1339 of the New Civil Code provides that
the failure to disclose facts, when there is a duty to reveal them, as
when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes
fraud. Undoubtedly, the banks and their clients are bound by
confidential relations. The almost perfect timing of the banks in
convincing their clients to shift to dollar loans just when the Asian
financial crisis struck indicates that the banks not only failed to
disclose facts to their clients of the looming crisis, but also suggests
of the insidious design to take advantage of these undisclosed facts.
[106]
We have already held that the foreclosure of the mortgage was
warranted under the circumstances. As regards the alleged
exploitation by many banks of the Asian financial crisis, this Court
rules that the generalization made by the appellate court is
unfounded and cannot be the subject of judicial notice. It is
axiomatic that good faith is always presumed unless convincing
evidence to the contrary is adduced. It is incumbent upon the party
alleging bad faith to sufficiently prove such allegation. Absent
enough proof thereof, the presumption of good faith prevails.[107]
The alleged insidious design of many banks to betray their clients
during the Asian financial crisis is certainly not of public knowledge.
The deletion of the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor
of the spouses Tiu is therefore in order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Joint
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00190 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 00253 dated February 21, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED
insofar as it ordered petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines to
return to the respondent spouses Rodolfo T. Tiu and Victoria N. Tiu
all the certificates of shares of stock and titles to real properties that
were submitted to it or, in lieu thereof, to pay the cost for the
replacement and issuance of new certificates and new titles over the
said properties. The foregoing Joint Decision is hereby SET ASIDE:
(1) insofar as it permanently enjoined Union Bank of the Philippines
from foreclosing the mortgage of the residential property of
respondent spouses Rodolfo T. Tiu and Victoria N. Tiu which is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11951; (2) insofar as it
ordered Union Bank of the Philippines to return to the respondent
spouses Rodolfo T. Tiu and Victoria N. Tiu the amount of
P927,546.79 representing illegally collected rentals; and (3) insofar as
it ordered Union Bank of the Philippines to pay the respondent
spouses Rodolfo T. Tiu and Victoria N. Tiu P100,000.00 in moral
damages, P100,000.00 in exemplary damages, P50,000.00 in
attorneys fees and cost, both in the lower court and in this Court.
No further pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
44
EVIDENCE CASES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee,

-versus-
GILBERT REYES WAGAS, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 157943 | 2013-09-04

FIRST DIVISION

DECISION
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EVIDENCE CASES
BERSAMIN, J.: That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime
prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,

The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be with deliberate intent, with intent to gain and by means of false

presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to overcome pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with

the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce the commission of the fraud, to wit: knowing that he did not have

against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of Philippine Islands, and

proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in without informing Alberto Ligaray of that circumstance, with intent to

relation to the identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to defraud the latter, did then and there issue Bank of the Philippine

discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the Islands Check No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the amount of

accused to be freed, it becomes the Courts constitutional duty P200,000.00, which check was issued in payment of an obligation,

to acquit him. but which check when presented for encashrnent with the bank, was
dishonored for the reason drawn against insufficient funds
and inspite of notice and several demands made upon said accused
to make good said check or replace the same with cash, he had failed
The Case
and refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of Alberto Ligaray in the amount
aforestated.
Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the
decision rendered on July 1 1, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 58, in Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the indeterminate
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 30 years
of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.

After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty, 2 the pre-trial was

held, during which the Defense admitted that the check alleged in the
Antecedents
information had been dishonored due to insufficient funds. 3 On its
part, the Prosecution made no admission. 4

Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:

At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray

as its lone witness. Ligaray testified that on April 30, 1997, Wagas

46
EVIDENCE CASES
placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he and
his wife would not agree at first to the proposed payment of the order
by postdated check, but because of Wagas assurance that he would
not disappoint them and that he had the means to pay them because
he had a lending business and money in the bank, they relented and
accepted the order; that he released the goods to Wagas on April 30,
1997 and at the same time received Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) Check No. 0011003 for P200,000.00 payable to cash and
postdated May 8, 1997; that he later deposited the check with
Solid Bank, his depository bank, but the check was dishonored due
to insufficiency of funds; 5 that he called Wagas about the matter,
and the latter told him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu;
and that despite repeated demands, Wagas did not pay him. 6
On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not
personally meet Wagas because they transacted through telephone
only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert Canada,
the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon
receiving the rice. 7
After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the following:
(a) BPI Check No. 0011003 in the amount of P200,000.00 payable
to cash; (b) the return slip dated May 13, 1997 issued by
Solid Bank; (c) Ligarays affidavit; and (d) the delivery receipt signed
by Canada. After the RTC admitted the exhibits, the Prosecution then
rested its case. 8
In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having
issued BPI Check No. 0011003 to Canada, his brother-in-law, not to
Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings
with Ligaray. He explained that the check was intended as payment
for a portion of Canadas property that he wanted to buy, but when
the sale did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check. 9
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a
letter dated July 3, 1997 apparently signed by him and addressed to
Ligarays counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray P200,000.00 for
goods received, to wit:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 23,
1997 which is selfexplanatory. It is worthy also to discuss with you
the environmental facts of the case for your consideration, to wit:
1. It is true that I obtained goods from your client worth P200,000.00
and I promised to settle the same last May 10, 1997, but to no avail.
On this point, let me inform you that I sold my real property to a
buyer in Manila, and promised to pay the consideration on the same
date as I promised with your client. Unfortunately, said buyer likewise
failed to make good with such obligation. Hence, I failed to fulfill
my promise resultant thereof. (sic)
2. Again, I made another promise to settle said obligation on or before
June 15, 1997, but still to no avail attributable to the same reason as
aforementioned. (sic)
47
EVIDENCE CASES
declared that Canada, a seafarer, was then out of the country; that
he signed the letter only to accommodate the pleas of his sister and
3. To arrest this problem, we decided to source some funds using the
Canada, and to avoid jeopardizing Canadas application for overseas
subject property as collateral. This other means is resorted to for the
employment. 12 The Prosecution subsequently offered and the RTC
purpose of settling the herein obligation. And as to its status, said
admitted the letter as rebuttal evidence. 13
funds will be rele[a]sed within thirty (30) days from today.

Decision of the RTC

In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and promise to settle
said obligation on or before August 15, 1997.

As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002, viz:

Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away

from any financial obligation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged and he is
hereby sentenced as follows:
xxxx

1. To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve (12) years

Respectfully yours,
of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30) years of
reclusion perpetua as maximum;

(SGD.)

GILBERT R. WAGAS 10 2. To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in the sum of

P200,000.00;

Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Canada who
had transacted with Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter only 3. To pay said complainant the sum of 30,000.00 by way

because his sister and her husband (Canada) had begged him to of attorneys fees; and

assume the responsibility. 11 On redirect examination, Wagas

48
EVIDENCE CASES
4. the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 14
The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements constituting the crime ofestafa,
namely: (a) that Wagas issued the postdated check as payment for an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (b) that he
failed to deposit an amount sufficient to cover the check despite
having been informed that the check had been dishonored; and (c)
that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt of the postdated check
and upon Wagas assurance that the check would be funded on its
date.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, 15
arguing that the Prosecution did not establish that it was he who had
transacted with Ligaray and who had negotiated the check to the
latter; that the records showed that Ligaray did not meet him at any
time; and that Ligarays testimony on their alleged telephone
conversation was not reliable because it was not shown that Ligaray
had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also sought the reopening of
the case based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the
testimony of Canada who could not testify during the trial because he
was then out of the country, and (b) Ligarays testimony given against
Wagas in another criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22.
On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial
and/or reconsideration, opining that the evidence Wagas desired to
present at a new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and that
there was no compelling ground to reverse its decision. 16
Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal. 17
Prior to the elevation of the records to the Court, Wagas filed
a petition for admission to bail pending appeal. The RTC granted the
petition and fixed Wagas bond at P40,000.00. 18 Wagas then posted
bail for his provisional liberty pending appeal. 19
The resolution of this appeal was delayed by incidents bearing on
the grant of Wagas application for bail. On November 17, 2003, the
Court required the RTC Judge to explain why Wagas was out on bail.
20 On January 15, 2004, the RTC Judge submitted to the Court a
so-called manifestation and compliance which the Court referred to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report,
and recommendation. 21 On July 5, 2005, the Court, upon the OCAs
recommendation, directed the filing of an administrative complaint
for simple ignorance of the law against the RTC Judge. 22 On
September 12, 2006, the Court directed the OCA to comply with its
July 5, 2005 directive, and to cause the filing of the
administrative complaint against the RTC Judge. The Court also
directed Wagas to explain why his bail should not be cancelled for
having been erroneously granted. 23 Finally, in its memorandum
dated September 27, 2006, the OCA manifested to the Court that it
49
EVIDENCE CASES
had meanwhile filed the administrative complaint against the RTC
Judge. 24
The appeal is meritorious.

Issues
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides:

In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither

friends nor personally known to one other; that it was highly
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall
incredible that Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered into a
defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
transaction with him involving a huge amount of money only over the
punished by:
telephone; that on the contrary, the evidence pointed to Canada as
the person with whom Ligaray had transacted, considering that the
delivery receipt, which had been signed by Canada, indicated that the
goods had been Ordered by ROBERT CANADA, that the goods had XXXX
been received by Canada in good order and condition, and that there
was no showing that Canada had been acting on behalf of Wagas;
that he had issued the check to Canada upon a different transaction; 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
that Canada had negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
the element of deceit had not been established because it had not fraud:
been proved with certainty that it was him who had transacted with
Ligaray over the telephone.

XXXX

The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution

establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements of
the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime?
Ruling
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of
an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has
50
EVIDENCE CASES
been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 28 In that regard, the Prosecution did not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had

In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.

postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be

the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender
must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet
reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In the person with whom he was transacting over the telephone, thus:
other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the
check was delivered would not have parted with his money or
property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender. 25 Q: On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with
the accused in this case?

The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check
is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the A: Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from me.
time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the
check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. 26 It is the criminal fraud
or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-
Q: How did this purchase of rice transaction started? (sic)
payment of a debt. 27 Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law
upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the
notice of dishonor. A: He talked with me over the phone and told me that he would like
to purchase two hundred bags of rice and he will just issue a
check. 29

The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods

to Canada because of the postdated check the latter had given to
him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment
because of the insufficiency of funds.
Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally
see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made
the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over
the telephone, to wit:

51
EVIDENCE CASES

Q: After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next? It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as
charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the
complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the

A: I made a demand on them. mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty
of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud
Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been
Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of
Q: How did you make a demand?
the check.

A: I called him over the phone.

Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Canada who received
the rice from him and who delivered the check to him.
Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that
Q: Who is that him that you are referring to? Canada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no
factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Canada
had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal bases
for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Canadas
A: Gilbert Wagas. 30
brother-in-law.

Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to

Finally, Ligarays declaration that it was Wagas who had
cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was
transacted with him over the telephone was not reliable because he
payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery
did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he
without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable
had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had not
that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else
yet met or known before then. We deem it essential for purposes of
like Canada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray.
reliability and trustworthiness that a telephone conversation like that
Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet
one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be first
Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly
authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among
stated that the person who signed for and received the stocks
others, the person with whom the witness conversed by telephone
of rice was Canada. should be first satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any

52
EVIDENCE CASES
other means. 32 Without the authentication, incriminating another weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, and
person just by adverting to the telephone conversation with him the responsibility lies in the first instance with the district court
would be all too easy. In this respect, an identification based on to determine within its sound discretion whether the threshold
familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly of admissibility has been met. 35 (Bold emphasis supplied)
recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed. 33
The identity of the caller could also be established by the callers
self- identification, coupled with additional evidence, like the context Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer
and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the statement any proof to definitely establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray
challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, had conversed with on the telephone. The Prosecution did not show
and disclosure of knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller. 34 through Ligaray during the trial as to how he had determined that
his caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit from
him was whether he had known and why he had known Wagas, and
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before he answered as follows:
a telephone communication is accorded probative weight. The identity
of the caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence.
According to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court: Q: Do you know the accused in this case?

Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they A: Yes, sir.

are relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is
governed by the same rules of evidence concerning facetoface
conversations except the party against whom the conversations are
Q: If he is present inside the courtroom [. . .]
sought to be used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary
that the witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify
the person with whom the conversation was had, provided
subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial A: No, sir. He is not around.
evidence somewhere in the development of the case. The mere
statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient
proof of such identity, in the absence of corroborating circumstances Q: Why do you know him?
so as to render the conversation admissible. However, circumstances
preceding or following the conversation may serve to sufficiently
identify the caller. The completeness of the identification goes to the
53
EVIDENCE CASES
A: I know him as a resident of Compostela because he is an ex-mayor A: No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.
of Compostela. 36

Q: But still through the telephone?

During cross-examination, Ligaray was allowed another
opportunity to show how he had determined that his caller was
Wagas, but he still failed to provide a satisfactory showing, to wit: A: Yes, sir.

Q: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused entered Q: There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see
into [a] transaction of rice selling, particularly with these 200 sacks you personally regarding the 200 bags rice transaction?
of rice subject of this case, through telephone conversation?

A: No. It was through telephone only.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice
Q: But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you through the accused himself?
are talking with?

A: Yes. It was through Robert.

A: I know it was him because I know him.

Q: So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of rice
Q: Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you had through somebody other than the accused?
a transaction with the accused through telephone conversation, and
as a consequence of that alleged conversation with the accused
through telephone he issued a check in your favor?
A: Yes, sir. 37

54
EVIDENCE CASES
Ligarays statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who
had ordered the rice because he know[s] him was still vague and
unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the identification, and
should not support a finding of Ligarays familiarity with Wagas as
the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligarays answers that
Wagas was not even an acquaintance of Ligarays prior to the
transaction. Thus, the RTCs conclusion that Ligaray had transacted
with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC
was speculating on a matter as decisive as the identification of
the buyer to be Wagas.
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was
the person who had conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the
order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the States
rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of
entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could
be considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law
of evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose
for which it is offered, 38 not for any other purpose. 39 Fairness to
the adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high
plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter
only because his sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do
so could not be taken for granted.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries
the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit
probation, qui dicit, non qui negat,which means that he who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove, 40 and as a means of respecting the
presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock
for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show:
(1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the
actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of
the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond
reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without
solace from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the
accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first place,
the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and
culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the
Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to
establish innocence. 41 Indeed, the accused, being presumed
innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this
reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but
to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the commission of the
crime can be established, without competent proof of the identity of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction. 42
There is no question that an identification that does not preclude
a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any
evidentiary force. 43 Thus, considering that the circumstances of the
identification of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did
not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did
not measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt
demanded in criminal cases. Perforce, the accuseds constitutional
right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not
overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, 44 even though his
innocence may be doubted. 45
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be
held civilly liable where the preponderance of the established facts so
55
EVIDENCE CASES
warrants. 46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was legally
liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course. 47
Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the
amount of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per
annum from the finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision

rendered on July 1 1, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the crime
of estafa on the ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay
Alberto Ligaray the amount of P200,000.00 as actual damages, plus
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.

No pronouncement on costs ofsuit.

SO ORDERED.

MEL CARPIZO CANDELARIA, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 209386 | 2014-12-08

FIRST DIVISION

56
EVIDENCE CASES
DECISION

Thereafter, or at around 6 oclock in the evening of the same day,

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Romano returned alone to Unioils office and reported that
Candelaria poked a balisong at him, prompting Lao to report the
incident to the Anti-Carnapping Section of the Manila Police District
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
(MPD), as well as to Camp Crame.7
Decision2 dated January 31, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated
September 3, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 34470 which affirmed the conviction of petitioner for the
After a few days, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents
crime of Qualified Theft.
found the abandoned lorry truck in Calamba, Laguna, emptied of the
diesel fuel.8 Under the foregoing premises, Lao filed a complaint for
The Facts Qualified Theft against Candelaria, docketed as Crim. Case No. 08-
259004.9

In the morning of August 23, 2006, Viron Transit Corporation (Viron)

ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel (diesel fuel) allegedly worth
P497,000.00 from United Oil Petroleum Phils. (Unioil), a company
owned by private complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao (Lao).4 Petitioner
Mel Carpizo Candelaria (Candelaria), a truck driver employed by Lao,
was dispatched to deliver the diesel fuel in Laon Laan, Manila.5
Lita Valera (Valera), Laos mother, and Jimmy Magtabo10 Claro
(Claro), employed as dispatcher and driver of Unioil, corroborated
Laos allegations on material points. More specifically, Claro verified
that it was Candelaria who was tasked to deliver the diesel fuel to
Viron on August 23, 2006, which likewise happened to be
Candelarias last trip. 11

However, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, Viron

informed Lao through a phone call that it had not yet received its In his defense, Candelaria demurred to the prosecutions
order. Upon inquiry, Lao discovered that Candelaria, together with his evidence,12 arguing that there was no direct evidence that linked him
helper Mario Romano (Romano), also an employee of Unioil, left the to the commission of the crime, as Lao had no personal knowledge as
company premises at 12:50 in the afternoon of the same day on to what actually happened to the diesel fuel.13 Moreover, the
board a lorry truck with plate number PTA-945 to deliver Virons information relayed by Romano is considered hearsay due to his
diesel fuel order. When Lao called Candelaria on his mobile phone, untimely demise.14
she did not receive any response.6

57
EVIDENCE CASES
temporal, as maximum, and ordered him to indemnify Lao the
The RTC Ruling amount of P497,000.00 as the value of the stolen diesel fuel, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.18

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (RTC)

convicted Candelaria of Qualified Theft in a Decision15 dated June Dissatisfied, Candelaria elevated his conviction to the CA.19
21, 2011, having found a confluence of all the elements constituting
the above said crime, to wit: (a) there was a taking of personal
The CA Ruling
property; (b) said property belonged to another; (c) the taking was
done with intent to gain; (d) the taking was done without the consent
of the owner; (e) the taking was accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things; and In a Decision20 dated January 31, 2013, the CA affirmed
(f) the theft was committed by a domestic servant with abuse of Candelarias conviction, ruling that a finding of guilt need not always
confidence.16 be based on direct evidence, but may also be based on circumstantial
evidence, or evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from
which the facts in issue may be established by inference.21 In this
regard, and considering that the crime of theft in this case was
In convicting Candelaria, the RTC took the following circumstances
qualified due to grave abuse of confidence, as Candelaria took
into consideration: (a) on August 23, 2006, Candelaria was the driver
advantage of his work, knowing that Lao trusted him to deliver the
of the truck with plate number PTA-945, loaded with 14,000 liters of
diesel fuel to Viron,22 the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Citing
diesel fuel valued at P497,000.00, for delivery to Viron in Laon Laan,
jurisprudence,23 it observed that theft by a truck driver who takes
Manila; (b) Viron did not receive the diesel fuel; (c) Lao reported the
the load of his truck belonging to his employer is guilty of Qualified
incident to Camp Crame and the MPD; and (d) the following day,
Theft.24
August 24, 2006, the same truck was found abandoned and emptied
of its load in Calamba, Laguna.17 On the basis of the foregoing, the
RTC concluded that Candelaria was guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged. However, while the CA affirmed Candelarias conviction as well as the
prison sentence imposed by the RTC, it modified the amount which
he was directed to indemnify Lao, fixing the same at P14,000.00 in
the absence of any supporting documents to prove that the diesel fuel
Consequently, it sentenced Candelaria to suffer the indeterminate
was indeed worth P497,000.00.25
penalty of fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion

58
EVIDENCE CASES
Aggrieved, Candelaria filed a motion for reconsideration26 which was
eventually denied in a Resolution27 dated September 3, 2013, hence,
this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly found Candelaria guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft on
the basis of circumstantial evidence.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under Article 31028 in
relation to Article 30929 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said
property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to
gain; (d) it be done without the owners consent; (e) it be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave
abuse of confidence.30
In this case, there is a confluence of all the foregoing elements.
Through the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, it was
sufficiently established that the 14,000 liters of diesel fuel loaded into
the lorry truck with plate number PTA-945 driven by Candelaria for
delivery to Viron on August 23, 2006 was taken by him, without the
authority and consent of Lao, the owner of the diesel fuel, and that
Candelaria abused the confidence reposed upon him by Lao, as his
employer.
Candelaria maintains that he should be acquitted considering that
his conviction was based merely on circumstantial evidence, as well
as on hearsay evidence, i.e., Laos testimony with regard to the
allegation of the deceased helper Romano that Candelaria poked a
balisong at him on August 23, 2006.31
The Court is not convinced.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.32 Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only
if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at the same time,
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary
thereto, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude
each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence.33
59
EVIDENCE CASES
which, as case law holds, is an inherently weak defense due to the
ease by which it can be concocted.35 With these, and, moreover, the
Here, the RTC, as correctly affirmed by the CA, found that the
tell-tale fact that Candelaria has not returned or reported back to
attendant circumstances in this case, as duly established by the
work at Unioil since the incident, the Court draws no other
prosecutions evidence, amply justify the conviction of Candelaria
reasonable inference other than that which points to his guilt. Verily,
under the evidentiary threshold of proof of guilt beyond reasonable
while it is true that flight per se is not synonymous with
doubt. These circumstances are: (a) on August 23, 2006, Viron
guilt,36 unexplained flight nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the
ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from Laos Unioil; (b) as driver of
existence of a guilty conscience,37 especially when taken together
Unioil, Candelaria was given the task of delivering the same to Viron
with all the other circumstantial evidence attendant in this case.
in Laon Laan, Manila; (c) Candelaria and his helper Romano left the
Thus, all things considered, Candelarias conviction for the crime of
company premises on the same day on board the lorry truck bearing
Qualified Theft stands.
plate number PTA-945 containing the diesel fuel; (d) at around 5
oclock in the afternoon of the same day, Viron informed Lao that its
order had not yet been delivered; (e) Candelaria failed to reply to Laos
The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft depends upon
phone calls; (f) later in the day, Romano returned to the Unioil office
the value of the thing stolen. To prove the value of the stolen property
sans Candelaria and reported that the latter threatened him with a
for purposes of fixing the imposable penalty under Articles 309 and
weapon; (g) Lao reported the incident to the MPD and Camp Crame;
310 of the RPC, as amended, the Court explained in People v.
(h) the missing lorry truck was subsequently found in Laguna, devoid
Anabe38 that the prosecution must present more than a mere
of its contents; and (i) Candelaria had not reported back to Unioil
uncorroborated estimate.39 In the absence of independent and
since then.34
reliable corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either apply
the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the
property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the
Threading these circumstances together, the Court perceives a
case.40 In Merida v. People (Merida),41 which applied the doctrine
congruent picture that the crime of Qualified Theft had been
enunciated in People v. Dator (Dator),42 the Court deemed it
committed and that Candelaria had perpetrated the same. To be
improper to take judicial notice of the selling price of narra at the
sure, this determination is not sullied by the fact that Candelarias
time of the commission of its theft, as such evidence would be
companion, Romano, had died before he could testify as to the truth
unreliable and inconclusive considering the lack of independent and
of his allegation that the former had threatened him with a balisong
competent source of such information.43
on August 23, 2006. It is a gaping hole in the defense that the diesel
fuel was admittedly placed under Candelarias custody and remains
unaccounted for. Candelaria did not proffer any persuasive reason to
However, in the more recent case of Lozano v. People (Lozano),44 the
explain the loss of said goods and merely banked on a general denial,
Court fixed the value of the stolen mag wheels at P12,000.00 as the
60
EVIDENCE CASES
reasonable allowable limit under the August 2006 (i.e., the time of the commission of the crime) is within
circumstances,45 notwithstanding the uncorroborated testimony of the range of P37.60 to P37.86 per liter51 nonetheless remains
the private complainant therein. Lozano cited, among others, the satisfied that such amount must be sustained. As the value of the
case of Francisco v. People46 (Francisco) where the Court ruled that goods may independently and competently be ascertained from the
the trial court can only take judicial notice of the value of goods DOEs price publication, adding too that the defense had not
which are matters of public knowledge or are capable of presented any evidence to contradict said finding nor cross-examined
unquestionable demonstration,47 further explaining that the value Lao anent her proffered valuation, the Court, notwithstanding the
of jewelry, the stolen items in the said case, is neither a matter of solitary evidence of the prosecution, makes this determination
public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable following the second prong set by case law and that is, to fix the
demonstration.48 value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of
the case. Verily, such circumstances militate against applying the
alternative of imposing a minimum penalty and, more so, the CAs

In this case, Candelaria has been found guilty of stealing diesel fuel. arbitrary valuation of P14,000.00, since the basis for which was not

Unlike in Francisco, where the Court had no reference to ascertain explained. Therefore, for purposes of fixing the proper penalty for

the price of the stolen jewelry, or in Merida and Dator, where the Qualified Theft in this case, the value of the stolen property

Court refused to take judicial notice of the selling price of lumber amounting to P497,000.00 must be considered. Conformably with

and/or narra for lack of independent and competent source of the the provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the proper penalty

necessary information at the time of the commission of the theft, the to be imposed upon Candelaria is reclusion perpetua, 52 without

value of diesel fuel in this case may be readily gathered from price eligibility for parole,53 to conform with prevailing law and

lists published by the Department of Energy (DOE). In this regard, jurisprudence.54

the value of diesel fuel involved herein may then be considered as a

matter of public knowledge which falls within the purview of the rules
on discretionary judicial notice.49 To note, judicial [notice], which is
based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace[s]
evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which
the evidence is intended to achieve.50
A final word. Courts dealing with theft, as well as estafa cases, would
do well to be mindful of the significance of determining the value of
the goods involved, or the amounts embezzled in said cases as they
do not only entail the proper resolution of the accuseds civil liability
(if the civil aspect has been so integrated) but also delimit the proper
penalty to be imposed. These matters, through the trial courts

While it is true that the prosecution had only presented the judicious direction, should be sufficiently passed upon during trial
uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant, Lao, to prove and its finding thereon be amply explained in its verdict. Although an

that the value of the diesel fuel stolen is P497,000.00, the Court appeal of a criminal case throws the entire case up for review,55 the

taking judicial notice of the fact that the pump price of diesel fuel in ends of justice, both in its criminal and civil senses, demand nothing
61
EVIDENCE CASES
less but complete and thorough adjudication in the judicial systems Tagged under keywords
every level. Truth be told, the peculiar nature of these cases provides
View Summary
a distinctive opportunity for this ideal to be subserved.

FIRST DIVISION
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January
31, 2013 and the Resolution dated September 3, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 34470 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that petitioner Mel DECISION
Carpizo Candelaria is: (a) sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole; and (b) ordered to indemnify
private complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao the amount of ?497,000.00
representing the value of the stolen property.
BERSAMIN, J.:

SO ORDERED.
In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the States
evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidenceadheres to the
basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of
the crime charged upon such evidence. Nothing less is demanded of
the judge; otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is
nullified.The accused need notadduceanythingto rebut evidence that
is discredited for failing the test.Acquittal should then follow.

Antecedents

ANNA LERIMA PATULA, Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner was charged withestafaunder an informationfiled in
Respondent. the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in DumagueteCitythat averred:

G.R. No. 164457 | 2012-04-11

62
EVIDENCE CASES
That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20,
1997 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Dumaguete,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of
Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total
sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company under
the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and
deliver the collection to the said company, but far from complying
with her obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite
repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud the said
company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail
to deliver the said collection to the said company but instead, did,
then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company in the
aforesaid amount ofP131,286.97.
Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.[1]
Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the information. At
pre-trial, no stipulation of factswas had, and petitioner did not avail
herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that
he was the branch manager of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.
(Footluckers) in Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994; that
petitioner was an employee of Footluckers, starting as a saleslady in
1996 until she became a sales representative; that as a sales
representative she was authorized to take orders from wholesale
customers coming from different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita,
Valencia, Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor),
and to collect payments from them; that she could issue and sign
official receipts of Footluckers for the payments, which she would
then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the payments
for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was
quite high, but later on dropped, leading him to confront her; that
she responded that business was slow; that he summoned the
accounting clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk discovered
erasures on some collection receipts; that he decided to subject her to
an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned from
a customer of petitioners that the customers outstanding balance
had already been fully paid although that balance appeared unpaid
in Footluckers records; and that one night later on, petitioner and
her parents went to his house to deny having misappropriated any
money of Footluckers and to plead for him not to push through with
a case against her, promising to settle her account on a monthly
basis; and that she did not settle after that, but stopped reporting to
work.[2]
On March 7, 2002, Gos cross examination, re-direct examination
and re-crossexamination were completed.
The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan,
whomFootluckers employed as its store auditor since November 16,
1995 until her resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go
had requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told
him that they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger
63
EVIDENCE CASES
had still reflected outstandingbalances for them; that she first
conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from
Mabinay to Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor;
thatshe discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts
appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of
around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the
duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that
upon completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written report
denominated as List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA
PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March
16-20, 1997 marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report,
petitioner had misappropriated the total amount ofP131,286.92.[3]
testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove
falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.
TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary exhibits,
including Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives (like the originals and
duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and issued by
petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in
auditing the accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencans so-
called Summary (Final Report) of Discrepancies.[5]

After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a
demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the intention to do
During Guivencans stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the so, and instead rested itscase.The Prosecution and Defense submitted
ledgers of petitioners various customers allegedly with discrepancies their respective memoranda, and submitted the case for decision.[6]
as Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive. Each of the
ledgers had a first column that contained the dates of the entries, a
second that identified the invoices by the number, a third that
On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner
statedthe debit, a fourth that noted the credit (or the amounts paid),
had opted not to present evidence for her defense the Prosecutions
and a fifth that summed the balances (debit minus credit).Only 49 of
evidence remained unrefuted and uncontroverted,[7]rendered its
theledgerswere formally offered and admitted by the RTC because the
decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:
50thledger could no longer be found.

Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the

In the course of Guivencansdirect-examination,petitioners counsel
Court finds ANNA LERIMA PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the
the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code
figuresentered in Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive,
and accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an
were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were
INDETERMINATE PENALTY of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of
not themselves presented in court.[4]With that, petitioners counsel
prision mayor as minimum to 18 years and 4 months of reclusion
did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her
temporal as maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by

64
EVIDENCE CASES
law and to indemnify private complainant the amount of P131,286.92 on Evidence, petitioner has directly appealed to the
with interest at 12% per annum until fully paid and to pay the costs. Court via petition for review on certiorari, positing the following
issues, to wit:

Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, the cash bail put up by the accused shall be effective only 1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR THAT
until the promulgation of this judgment. MATTER , CHARGED OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE CONVICTED UPON OR BY
EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT ALLEGED

SO ORDERED.[8] IN THE INFORMATION.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied the 2. WHETHER THE ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL AND

motion on May 7, 2004.[9] STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND

CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER WAS VIOLATED WHEN
SHE WAS CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION
CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST HER
Issues
IS ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1
(B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

Insisting that the RTCs judgment grossly violated [her]

Constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
cause of the accusation against her because, while the charge against
EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS B TO YY-YY-2, ALL PRIVATE
her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the
DOCUMENTS, THE DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF
evidence presented against her and upon which her conviction was
WHICH WERE NOT PROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 20, RULE
based, was falsification, an offense not alleged or included in the
132 OF THE SAID REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM
Information under which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty,
THE FACT THAT SAID EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE FALSIFICATION
and that said judgment likewise blatantly ignored and manifestly
BY THE ACCUSED, A CRIME NEITHER CHARGED NOR ALLEGED IN
disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in that the
THE INFORMATION.
documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all private
documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not
proved in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
65
EVIDENCE CASES
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
THE TESTIMONY OF KAREN GUIVENCAN DESPITE THE
The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:
OBJECTION THAT SAID TESTIMONY WHICH TRIED TO PROVE
THAT THE ACCUSED FALSIFIED EXHIBITS B TO YY-YY-
2INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE 1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege
ACCUSATION AGAINST HER, FOR BEING IRRELEVANT AND the falsification of the duplicate receipts issued by petitioner to her
IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE ACCUSED customersviolated petitioners right to be informed of the nature and
IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL cause of the accusation;
CODE.

2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting evidence of

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING the falsification of the duplicate receiptsdespite the information not
THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION REMAINS alleging the falsification;
UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED DESPITE ACCUSEDS
OBJECTION THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS IMMATERIAL AND
IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME CHARGED. 3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and
their derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioners
guilt for estafaas chargeddespite their not being duly
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES NOT CROSS-EXAMINING authenticated;and
KAREN GUIVENCAN FOR THE REASON THAT HER TESTIMONY IS
IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED TO PROVE AN
OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN INFORMATION RESULTED IN THE 4. Whether or not Guivencanstestimony onthe ledgers and receipts
ADMISSION OF SAID TESTIMONY AS BEING UNREFUTED AND (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioners
UNCONTROVERTED, AND WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES misappropriation or conversion wasinadmissible for being hearsay.
OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED WAIVED IF THE
DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMINED SAID WITNESS.

7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT

EXHIBIT A, WHICH IS THE LIST OF CUSTOMERS COVERED BY
Ruling
SALESWOMAN LERIMA PATULA WITH DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS
NOT HEARSAY AND SELF-SERVING.[10]
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EVIDENCE CASES
The petition is meritorious.
I
Failure of information to allege falsification
did not violate petitioners right to be informed
of thenatureand cause of the accusation
Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her Constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation when:
(a) it held that the information did not have to allege her falsification
of the duplicate receipts, and (b) when it convicted her of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Codeby relying on
the evidence on falsification.
The contentionof petitioner cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights guaranteessome rightsto every person accused of a
crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation, viz:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect when
the information was filed in the RTC, contained the following
provisions on the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of
the accusation in the information, to wit:
Section 8.Designation of the offense. Whenever possible, a complaint
or information should state the designation given to the offense by
the statute, besides the statement of the acts or omissions
constituting the same, and if there is no such designation, reference
should be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing
it. (7)
Section 9.Cause of accusation. The acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the
statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
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EVIDENCE CASES
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
judgment. (8) mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and

cause of the accusation in the informationshould never be taken for
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
granted by the State. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense
periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not
that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict
exceed 12,000 pesos;
him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or
information would be violative of the Constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.[11] Indeed, the
accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless 3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos
against him. but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

The crime of estafacharged against petitioner was defined and 4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does
penalized by Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code, viz: not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the
fraud be committed by any of the following means:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud

another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be xxx
punished by:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
xxx
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender
68
EVIDENCE CASES
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed
by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
xxx
According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner
misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her customers, and
later falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning such
duplicates to her employer to show that the customers had paid less
than the amounts actually reflected on the original receipts.
Obviously, she committed the falsification in order to conceal her
misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the falsificationwas

The elements of the offense charged were as follows:
(a) That the offender received money, goods or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return, the same;
not an offense separate and distinct from the estafacharged against
her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts of falsification
as its means of establishing her misappropriation or conversion as an
essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In
that manner, her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her was not infringed or denied to her.

We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein

completely pleaded the estafa defined and penalized under Article
(b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such money,
315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Codewithin the context of the
goods or other personal property, or denied his part in its receipt;
substantive lawand the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for the
information to allege the acts of falsification by petitioner because
falsification was not an element of the estafacharged.
(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the
prejudice of another; and

Not surprisingly,the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with

petitioners concern thuswise:
(d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender for the
delivery or return of such money, goods or other personal property.
[12]

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EVIDENCE CASES
In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that [the]
prosecutions evidence utterly fails to prove the crime charged.
According to the defense, the essence of Karen Guivencans testimony
is that the accused falsified the receipts issued to the customers
served by her by changing or altering the amounts in the duplicates
of the receipts and therefore, her testimony is immaterial and
irrelevant as the charge is misappropriation under Art. 315,
paragraph (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation
whatsoever of any falsification or alteration of amounts in the
[i]nformation under which the accused was arraigned and pleaded
NOT GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that the testimony of Karen
Guivencan should therefore not be considered at all as it tended to
prove an offense not charged or included in the [i]nformation and
would violate [the] accuseds constitutional and statutory right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. The
Court is not in accord with such posture of the accused.
It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the crime
charged in the [i]nformation is merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru
[f]alsification of documents, the prosecution could not prove
falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since the
information charges accused only of misappropriation pursuant to
Art. 315, par. (1b) of the Revised [P]enal Code, the Court holds that
there is no necessity of alleging the falsification in the Information as
it is not an element of the crime charged.
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and
Falsification will constitute as one complex crime and when they are
considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime of Estafa
Through Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to
falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods from
another person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means
of committing estafa. However, if the falsification is committed to
conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and
falsification are committed. In the instant case, when accused
collected payments from the customers, said collection which was in
her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or erroneous entries
which she made on the duplicate copies of the receipts were contrived
to conceal some amount of her collection which she did not remit to
the company xxx.[13]
II
Testimonial and documentary evidence,being hearsay,
did not prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the
burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove
each and every element of the crime charged in the information to
warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime
necessarily included therein.[14] The Prosecution must further prove
the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense.
[15]In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the
evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the
Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed.
70
EVIDENCE CASES
[16]Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of
proof,[17]that he must then be acquitted and set free should the
Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his
favor.In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the
accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the
Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the
commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as
the malefactor responsible for it.
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the information?
To establish the elements of estafaearlier mentioned, the Prosecution
presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various
documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner
to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing
the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding
notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the
confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself.[18]The
ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B
to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various
duties of petitioner as Footluckers sales representative. On her part,
Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts
actually received by petitioner from the customersor remitted by
petitioner to Footluckers.This means that persons other than
Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives,
inclusive,and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries
found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the
ledgers held by Footluckers corresponding to each customer, as well
as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers. Accordingly,
her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively
deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test
the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners
misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by
petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered theentire proof of
misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and
untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable
and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is
made toSection 36 of Rule 130,Rules of Court, a rule that states that
a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The
personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. A witness bereft ofpersonal knowledge of the disputed
fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony
derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness
presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the
extrajudicial source of her information.
71
EVIDENCE CASES
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard
another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom
the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in
court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The
weight of such testimony thendepends not upon theveracity of the
witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the
information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be
tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness
andcannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged
to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any
difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain
obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches
herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the
burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.[19] Thus, the rule
against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was
no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.[20] The testimony
may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it
is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-
examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.[21]
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human
utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the
credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore,
the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the
witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an
extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the
matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter
asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander
case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say
that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to
prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that
the accused uttered those words.[22] This kind of utterance ishearsay
in character but is not legal hearsay.[23]The distinction is, therefore,
between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the
hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in
the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.[24]
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the
only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be
excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve
any the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the originaldeclarant
claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.
[25]If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the
declarant is not in court.[26]It is then to be stressed that the right to
cross-examine the adverse partys witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as
evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguardinga
partys right to cross-examine her adversarys witness,the Rules of
Court offers two solutions. The firstsolution is to require that allthe
witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in
courtunder oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court formalizes this solution,viz:
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EVIDENCE CASES
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based
upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination
of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn
of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open
affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination
court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon
answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a)
whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.[27]

The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses besubject to the

Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencans testimony as well
cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of
as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely
the Rules of Courtensuresthis solutionthusly:
rejected as proof of petitioners misappropriation or conversion.

Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the

III
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-
examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct Lack of their proper authentication rendered
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts inadmissible as judicial evidence
bearing upon the issue. (8a)

Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional

precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as
the 1987 Constitution,which guarantees that: In all criminal evidence Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite
prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the their being private documents that were not duly authenticated as
witnesses face to face xxx, the rule requiring the cross-examination required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.

73
EVIDENCE CASES
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a
public document and a private document for the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, viz:
Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills
and testaments, and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how
the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public
document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it
has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will)
or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or
because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is
self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to
be presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a private document is
any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person
without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set
forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public
document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document
requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of
Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of
authentication of a private document is excused only in four
instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one
within the context of Section 21,[28] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court;
(b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document
have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;[29]
(c) when thegenuineness and authenticity of the document
have been admitted;[30] or (d) when the document is not being
offered as genuine.[31]
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were
private documents because private individuals executed or generated
them for private or business purposes or uses. Considering that none
of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not
be presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the
Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the manner
provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz:
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EVIDENCE CASES

Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private (Next Page)
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:

ATTY ABIERA (continuing):

Honorable Court that you will be able to present those

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
receipts?

A. Yes.
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the accused in this
handwriting of the maker.
case, Anna Lerima Patula?

A. Yes.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused in this
claimed to be.
case?

A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the receipts

The Prosecutionattempted to have Go authenticate the signature of also.
petitioner in various receipts, to wit:
Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would
present this,or offer the same as soon as the original receipts can be
presented, but for purposes only of your testimony, Im going to point
ATTY. ABIERA:
to you a certain signature over this receipt number FLDT96 20441, a

Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally receipt from Cirila Askin, kindly go over the signature and tell the

with the original receipts, do you have copies of these receipts? Honorable Court whether you are familiar with the signature?

A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but its not now in my A. Yes, that is her signature.

possession.
INTERPRETER:

Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this

Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word
Honorable Court, can you assure this
collector.
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EVIDENCE CASES

(Next Page) (Next Page)

ATTY. ABIERA: COURT:

Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. A-1. What is the
rather, of the accused in this case appears? number of that receipt?

A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.

ATTY. ABIERA:

In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting

the original receipts Your Honor, because its quite voluminous, so we
will just forego with the testimony of the witness but we will just
present the same using the testimony of another witness, for
purposes of identifying the signature of the accused. We will request
that this signature which has been identified to by the witness in this ATTY. ABIERA:
case be marked, Your Honor, with the reservation to present the
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that:
original copy and present the same to offer as our exhibits but for the
received from Cirila Askin.[32]
meantime, this is only for the purposes of recording, Your Honor,
which we request the same, the receipt which has just been identified xxx
awhile ago be marked as our Exhibit A You Honor.

COURT:
As the excerpts indicate, Gos attempt at authentication of the
Mark the receipt as Exhibit A. signature of petitioner on the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No.
20441 (a document that was marked as Exhibit A, while the
ATTY. ABIERA:
purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1)
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit A- immediately fizzled out after the Prosecution admitted that the
1. document was a meremachinecopy, not the original. Thereafter, as if
to soften its failed attempt, the Prosecution expressly promised to

76
EVIDENCE CASES
produce at a later date the originalsof the receipt with serial number petitioners signature on the receipts either because she lacked
FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts. But that promise was not even familiarity with such signature, or because she had not seen
true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution offered to petitioner affix her signature on the receipts, as the following excerpts
authenticate the signature of petitioner on the receiptsthrougha from her testimony bear out:
different witness (though then still unnamed). As matters turned out
in the end, the effort to have Go authenticate both themachinecopy of
the receiptwith serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
of petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the machine copy
was inexplicablyforgotten and was no longer evenincluded in the Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the
Prosecutions Offer of Documentary Evidence. confirmation sheet, will you go over these Miss witness?

A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the

customer. The other receipt is the one showing her payment prior to
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number the last payment.
FLDT96 No. 20441was subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough
Guivencan. However,the Prosecution did not establishthat the COURT:
signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
had earliersought to identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit
A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact A. From the customer.
that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the marking
nomenclature for the machine copyof the receipt bearing serial Q. And who issued those receipts?
number FLDT96 No. 20441 for all intents and purposes of this case,
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
and used the same nomenclature to referinstead toan entirely
differentdocument entitled List of Customers covered by ANA ATTY. ZERNA:
LERIMA PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified
March 16-20, 1997. We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as
Exhibit B-3, receipt number 20441.

In her case, Guivencans identification of petitioners signature on two

receipts based alone on the fact that the signatures contained the (Next Page)
legible family name of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet
another deep flaw infecting the documentary evidence against
petitioner. Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly identify
77
EVIDENCE CASES
COURT: COURT:

Mark it. Mark it.[33]

ATTY. ZERNA:

The signature of the collector be marked as xxx

Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the

collector, are your familiar with that signature? (shown to witness)
ATTY. ZERNA:
A. Yes.
Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 issued
Q. Whose signature is that? to one Divina Cadilig. Will you please identify this receipt if this is the
receipt of your office?
A. Miss Patula.
A.Yes.
Q. How do you know?
Q.There is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula.
signature is this?

Q. Are you familiar with her signature?

A.Ms. Patula.

A. Yes.
Q.How do you know that this is her signature?

ATTY. ZERNA:
A.Because we can read the Patula.[34]

We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as

Exhibit B-3-a
We also have similar impressions of lack of proper
COURT:
authentication as to the ledgers the Prosecution presented to prove

Mark it. the discrepancies between the amountspetitioner hadallegedly

received from the customers and the amounts she had actually
ATTY. ZERNA: remitted to Footluckers. Guivencanexclusively relied on the entries of
the unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit report on
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit B-4
petitioners supposed misappropriation or conversion, revealing her
and the signature as Exhibit B-4-a.

78
EVIDENCE CASES
lack of independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the WITNESS:
following excerpts of her testimony show:
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a
balance of P10,971.75.

ATTY. ZERNA to witness: ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records showed Q. Do you have a-whats the basis of saying that the balance of
that this Cecilia Askin has an account of P10,791.75? this customer is still P10,971.75

ATTY. DIEZ:

The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, (Next Page)
office record.

COURT:
ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):
Let the witness answer.
[i]n your office?
WITNESS:
COURT:
A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that
That was already answered paero, the office has a ledger.
and showed it to the customers for confirmation.

Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you?

A. No, Maam.[35]
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. What about the receipts?

(Continuation of the Direct Examination of

COURT:

Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002)

Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you
copied that amount in the ledger and you had it confirmed by the
customers, what was the result when you had it confirmed by the
customers? ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

79
EVIDENCE CASES
Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original The confirmation sheet ---
and the duplicate, will you please enlighten the Honorable Court on
that discrepancy which you said?

A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully

paid. Her ledger shows a zero balance she has fully paid while in the COURT:
original
The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the
receipt in your earlier testimony? Is that what you referred to as the
receipts, the original receipts?
(Next page)

A. This is what I copied from the ledger.

Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed

WITNESS (continuing):
that that particular customer still has a balance of Ten Thousand
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred something?
Ninety-one Pesos and Seventy-five Centavos (10,791.75).
A. The receipt is no longer here.
COURT:
Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in the
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated ledger?
there?

A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already

A. Yes.[36]
forwarded to the Manila Office.

Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing

that it has already a zero balance?

A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions
original receipt she has still a balance. evidence, it should come as no surprise that petitioners counsel
interposed timely objections. Yet, the RTC mysteriously overruled the
xxx
objections and allowedthe Prosecutionto present the unauthenticated
ATTY. ZERNA: ledgers, as follows:

80
EVIDENCE CASES
Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I
think they were already duly identified by this witness. As a matter of
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of
fact, it was she who brought them to court

Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)

(Next Page)

ATTY. ZERNA:

COURT (cont.):

CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION
because these were the ledgers on file in their office.

ATTY. DIEZ

Q Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several

That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the
ledgers. Where is it now?
entries is not this witness, Your Honor. How do we know that the

A It is here. entries there is (sic) correct on the receipts submitted to their office.

Q Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how COURT:

much is her account in your office?

Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that.

ATTY. DIEZ: Let the witness answer.

Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer WITNESS:

the question, let me interpose our objection on the ground that this
A Its the office clerk in-charge.
ledger has not been duly identified to by the person who made the
same. This witness will be testifying on hearsay matters because the COURT:
supposed ledger was not identified to by the person who made the
The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
same.

ATTY. ZERNA:
COURT:

She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and

she is the auditor of Footluckers.

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EVIDENCE CASES
COURT: (Next Page)

I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified

where those entries were taken. So, you answer the query of counsel.
ATTY. ZERNA:
xxx
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of
business. So, exempt from the hearsay rule.

ATTY. DIEZ: COURT:

Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a Okey(sic), proceed.[37]

continuing objection to the questions profounded(sic) on those
ledgers on the ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay.

The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions

COURT:
flawed presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted. instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how to
prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as

Q (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who follows:

prepared the entries on those ledgers, is she still connected with

Footluckers?
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it

A She is no longer connected now, Your Honor, to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person
write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge
of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the
COURT:
handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness
Alright proceed. or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases supplied)
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EVIDENCE CASES
delivered to and received by the importer, namely the respondent.
Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondents
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen
importations, including their insurance coverage, has personal
the execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely did
knowledge of the volume of steel billets being imported, and therefore
not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably
competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay, as this
with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their
doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as
Court.However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the
evidence. That was the onlyfair and just result, as the Court held
delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not have personal
in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires
knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though she
Corporation:[38]
prepared the summary of the received steel billets, she based the
summary only on the receipts prepared by other persons. Her
testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has no probative
On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends value even if not objected to at the trial.
that Jeanne Kings testimony was hearsay because she had no
personal knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting
respondents cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice,
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly
packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo
authenticate respondents documentary evidence. Under Section 20,
Policy. Petitioner avers that even though King was personally
Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in
assigned to handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed
and Wires Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated
it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any
with personal knowledge of the facts which gave rise to respondents
person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its
cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even though she
execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to
personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets received by
whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed
respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of the weight of
execution thereof. In this case,respondent admits that King was
steel billets actually shipped and delivered.
none of the aforementioned persons. She merely made the summary
of the weight of steel billets based on the unauthenticated bill of
lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel billets
At the outset, we must stress that respondents cause of action is actually received had no proven real basis, and Kings testimony on
founded on breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting of this point could not be taken at face value.
imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to
prove, first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets
valued at P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets
83
EVIDENCE CASES
xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or
private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the
enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Section
20of the same law, in turn, provides that before any private document
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written,
or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker. Here, respondents documentary exhibits are private
documents. They are not among those enumerated in Section 19,
thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved before
they can be admitted in evidence.With the exception concerning the
summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent
presented no supporting evidence concerning their authenticity.
Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured
cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum,
we find no sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioners liability.
That the Prosecutions evidence was left uncontested because
petitioner decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination,
and did not tender her contrary evidencewas inconsequential.
Although the trial court had overruled the seasonable objections to
Guivencans testimony bypetitioners counsel due to the hearsay
character, it could not be denied thathearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, had no probative value.[39]Verily, the flaws of the
Prosecutions evidence were fundamental and substantive, not merely
technical and procedural, and were defects that the adverse partys
waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould not set right
or cure. Nor did the trial courts overruling of petitioners objections
imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and value.
Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the
application of the hearsay rule by also terselystating that the ledgers
were prepared in the regular course of business.[40]Seemingly, the
RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or
near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping
mannerof justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable
due to the need to show the concurrence of the several requisites
before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the
hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows:
(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer;
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;
84
EVIDENCE CASES
indemnify Footluckers in the amount ofP131,286.92 with interest of
12% per annum until fully paid was not yet shown to be factually
(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
founded. Yet, she cannot now be absolved of civil liability on that
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or religious;
basis. Heracquittal has to bedeclared as without prejudice to the
filing of a civil action against her for the recovery of any amount that
she may still owe to Footluckers.
(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.[41]

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE ANDREVERSESthe decision

convicting ANNA LERIMA PATULAof estafa as charged,
and ACQUITS her for failure of the Prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action brought
against her for
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the
trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the States the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of Footluckers Chain of
evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the Stores, Inc.
basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of
the crime charged upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to do
so herein nullified the guarantee of due of process of law in favor of No pronouncement on costs of suit.
the accused, who had no obligation to prove her innocence.
Heracquittal should follow.

SO ORDERED.

IV

No reliable evidence on damage

Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the Court

declares that the disposition by the RTC ordering petitioner to

85
EVIDENCE CASES

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 133026 February 20, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias
TOTO, accused.
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

YIELDING to man's brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with

the aid of Gerry Galgarin alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the
presence of a lady whose love they once shared.1wphi1.nt

On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October

1991, an emboldened Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward
Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis and
stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas

86
EVIDENCE CASES
who was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to
Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to
free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the
nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of
nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis
staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the
airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside
the Elohim Store where he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for
breath and near death. Clara with the help of some onlookers took
him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could receive
medical attention. According to the autopsy report of Dr. Josephine
Goh-Cruz, cause of death was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to
hypovolemic shock secondary to a stab wound which penetrated the
heart."1
On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino
was filed against Edward Endino and accused-appellant Gerry
Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both
accused remained at large, the trial court issued on 26 December
1991 an order putting the case in the archives without prejudice to
its reinstatement upon their apprehension.
On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the
combined efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house
in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into
temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the
following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3
Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police
force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television
station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video
footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his
guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman.
According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas,
Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was
waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They
took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and
proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him heading for
Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the
authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news
program TV Patrol.
The case against accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was established
through the testimony of Clara Agagas who said that she was with
the victim Dennis Aquino standing outside the Soundlab Recording
Studio, a barhouse owned by him, when Galgarin suddenly
approached them and without any prior warning stabbed Dennis.
Dennis tried to run away, but Edward, a spurned lover who harbored
ill-feelings towards her and Dennis, shot Dennis. She recognized
Edward and Gerry because the street was sufficiently lighted.2
The testimony of Clara Agagas was corroborated by Anita Leong,
next-door neighbor of Dennis, who testified that a little past six
o'clock in the evening of 16 October 1991 Gerry Galgarin together
with a companion went to her house looking for Dennis. She
instructed them to proceed to the Soundlab Recording Studio as
Dennis might still be there. But a few minutes later she heard a
Instinctively, she instructed her two (2) young daughters to duck for
cover while she anxiously waited for her seven (7)-year old daughter
Josephine who was out of the house for an errand for her. Soon
enough she heard Josephine knocking at their door. She was crying
because she said her Kuya Dennis had been shot and stabbed.3
87
EVIDENCE CASES
Josephine confirmed her mother's testimony and even said that she
had seen Gerry Galgarin stab her KuyaDennis and she could
remember Gerry very well because of the mole below his nose.4
For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having
taking part in the slaying of Dennis. Gerry asserted that on 14
October 1991 he was in Antipolo to help his common-law wife Maria
Marasigan give birth to their first born. He stayed with her until the
16th of October when she was discharged from the Pedragoza
Maternity Clinic.5
Clarita Florentino Pedragoza, the midwife who delivered his son,
supported the alibi of accused-appellant. However, she admitted that
when she registered the child's birth on 13 December 1993 or more
than two (2) years after the delivery, she informed the civil registrar
that the child's father was "unknown."6 His story was also confirmed
by Dolores Arciaga and Maria Tomenio, his co-workers at the Kainan
sa Kubo Sing Along Restaurant, who testified that accused-appellant
was fetched by a neighbor from the restaurant in the early afternoon
of 14 October with the news that his wife was having labor pains.7
Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV
Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting
police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was
constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary
rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution.8
The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of
the testimony of the police officers that no force or compulsion was
exerted on accused-appellant and upon a finding that his confession
was made before a group of newsmen that could have dissipated any
semblance of hostility towards him. The court gave credence to the
arresting officers' assertion that it was even accused-appellant who
pleaded with them that he be allowed to air his appeal on national
television for Edward to surrender.
The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no
convincing evidence to support his allegation that he was not at
the locus criminis on the evening of 16 October 1991. Accordingly,
accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was convicted of murder qualified
by treachery9 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Additionally, he
was ordered to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages. The case
against his nephew and co-accused Edward Endino remained in the
archives without prejudice to its reinstatement as soon as he could
be arrested.10
In his Appellant's Brief, Gerry Galgarin assails the trial court for
rejecting his alibi and admitting his videotaped confession as
evidence against him.
The argument that accused-appellant could not be at the scene of the
crime on 16 October 1991 as he was in Antipolo assisting his wife
who was giving birth on the 14th of that month, is not persuasive.
Alibi is a weak defense. The testimony of Cornelio Tejero
Jr.,11 Philippine Airlines Load Controller of the Puerto Princesa City,
that the name of "Gerry Galgarin" did not appear on their passenger
manifest for the 16 October 1991 Manila-Puerto Princesa flight, could
not be relied upon inasmuch as he himself admitted that they could
not be sure of their passengers' real identities. The testimonies of
accused-appellant's co-workers that he was in Antipolo on 14
October 1991 did not fortify his defense either since these witnesses
did not categorically state that they saw him in Antipolo in the
evening of 16 October 1991.
With accused-appellant having been positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as the one who stabbed Dennis, his bare
88
EVIDENCE CASES
denial proves futile and unavailing. Josephine Leong's identification
of accused-appellant was given in a very categorical and spontaneous
manner. Her confidence as to the attacker's identity was clearly
shown by her vivid recollection of him having a mole below his nose,
which is correct. Moreover, it is inconceivable for Josephine and Anita
to implicate accused-appellant, a complete stranger to them, if there
was no truth to their assertion. As for Clara, her naming of accused-
appellant as her boyfriend's assailant was not done out of spite, but
was impelled by her desire to seek justice for Dennis.
Corroborating further accused-appellant's guilt, probably with
intense incriminating effect, were his immediate flight after the
slaying, and his attempt at jailbreak12 revealing a guilty conscience,
hence, his persistent effort to evade the clutches of the law.
Apropos the court a quo's admission of accused-appellant's
videotaped confession, we find such admission proper. The interview
was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening
his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen.
Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it
was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to
elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had
indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought
succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been
symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its Decision13 -
Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted
that he had stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had
shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of accused
was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the
truth of his statements therein.
We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of
television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence
of this phenomenon in several cases,14 it is prudent that trial courts
are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further
admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with
the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to
legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond
the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on
television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed
rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice
system.1wphi1.nt
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media
men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of
police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and
invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw,
particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp
judgments in determining whether a confession was given under
coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume
that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely
given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore
should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced
confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts
to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating
polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to
be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.
With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the
question that next presents itself is whether the trial court correctly
denominated the crime as murder qualified by treachery. Doubtless,
the crime committed is one of murder considering that the victim was
stabbed while he was simply standing on the pavement with his
89
EVIDENCE CASES
girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully oblivious of the accused's
criminal design. The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting
victim, without the slightest provocation from him who had no
opportunity to parry the attack, certainly qualifies the killing to
murder.15

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-

appellant GERRY GALGARIN alias Toto guilty of Murder qualified by
Treachery, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is
further ordered to compensate the decedent's heirs P50,000.00 as
moral damages for their emotional and mental anguish. Costs against
accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

90
EVIDENCE CASES
of Imus, Cavite, were shaded. The guideline in the appreciation of
ballots with overvoting is embodied in Guideline No. 5 used by the
COMELEC. Thus:

5. On over-voting. It has been the position of the Commission

that over-voting in a certain position will make the vote cast for that
position STRAY but will not invalidate the entire ballot, so IN CASE
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, petlttoner OF OVERVOTING FOR TilE CONTESTED POSITION, SUCH VOTE
vs. SHALL BE CONSIDERED STRAY AND WILL NOT BE CREDITED TO
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HOMER T SAQUILAYAN, ANY OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES. (Emphasis supplied)
respondent.
[Concurring Opinion J. Perez]

G.R. No. 203302 | 2013-04-11 There is a correlated guideline, Guideline No. 2, in the sense that
both guidelines refer to instances of shading. However, as regards the
CONCURRING OPINION covered matter and the consequence, the two rules are hugely
different. Guideline No. 2 is about an entire ballot that is claimed to
have been shaded by two or more persons, and it states:
PEREZ, J.;

On ballots claimed to have been shaded by two or more persons.

The issue as basic as due process of law and the opinion of as many
as seven of us who saw that petitioner was deprived of the
fundamental right highlights my duty to join the discussion. With the
present motion for reconsideration providing the oppmiunity to look
into the reasons that divided the Court, I do so.
1. The electoral contest is all about over-voting. Simply, it means that
in the contested ballots both the slots separately for petitioner
Maliksi and respondent Saquilayan who vied for the position of Mayor
-Unlike in manual elections where it is easy to identify if a ballot has
been written by two persons, in case of an automated election, it
would be very hard if not impossible to identify if two persons shaded
a single ballot. The best way to identify if a ballot has been tampered
is to go to the digital image of the ballot as the PCOS machine was
able to capture such when the ballot was Jed by the voter into the
machine when he cast his vote. In the absence of any circumstance
showing that the ballot was shaded by persons other than the voter,
the ballots should not be rejected to give effect to the voter's intent.
91
EVIDENCE CASES
Clearly, in case of a ballot claimed to have been shaded by two
or more persons, there is an inquiry to determine whether or not the
ballot was shaded by person/s, other than the voter. The Guideline
implies a presumption in favor of shading by the voter whose ballot
should be rejected only if there is "any circumstance" showing
shading by somebody else.
On the contrary, in case of over-voting which is the case at
hand, Guideline No. 5 outrightly provides the consequence that the
vote shall be considered stray and will not be credited to any of the
contending parties.
The reason behind the significant variance in the consequences of
the two kinds of shading can be debated endlessly. The obviousness
of the difference outlined by the COMELEC, which is the sole judge of
an election contest, forecloses such a debate. What the obviousness
brings about, as it is my intention, is the grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC disobeyed its own rule that over-voting results in
a stray vote. Relying on "allegations of ballot and ballot box
tampering," which allegations are without proof from the proponent,
the COMELEC nonetheless favors the allegations through its own
inspection of the ballot boxes to support its conclusion that "it is
apparent that the integrity of the ballots had been compromised."
That was done on the first review of the appealed decision. On second
review, the COMELEC resorted to the observation of "unprecedented
number of double-votes" which left it "with no other option but to
dispense with the physical ballots and resort to their digital image."
The grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is clear from its
own words describing what it did in this case.
It can be implied from its own decision on first review that
the COMELEC agrees that before the physical ballots can be
disregarded and the digital image favored, the tampering of the ballot
box must be primly proven. It had to allude to ballot box tampering
because without the defect, the integrity of the ballots is
unassailable. No proof of tampering came from the contestants in
this case. The COMELEC relied on its observations. And it did not
even detail the circumstances of the inspection it made and the facts
that make tampering "apparent."
Indeed, the over-voting itself cannot be the proof of
ballot tampering.Even if we go by the Guideline on the claim of ballot
shading by two or more persons, the presumption is that the ballot
was shaded only by the voter, and this presumption prevails absent
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EVIDENCE CASES
any circumstance showing that the ballot was shaded by persons
other than the voter. Plainly, in the instant case, there is no
2. I concur with the ponencia of Justice Bersamin. I discussed
circumstance independent of the fact of shading that such shading
the lack of factual and legal premise for the decryption done by the
was done by someone other than the voter. Its odd reliance on
COMELEC to punctuate its grave abuse of discretion that even went
the over-voting itself underscores the applicability of the presumption
further and similarly characterized the process of decryption itself.
that, in this case, the voter himself/herself did the shadings.

I thus join Justice Bersamin in the remand of this case to

The fact is that petitioner has in his Election Protest, come
the COMELEC for immediate cleansing of the process, which after all,
forward with an explanation about over-voting. Thus:
kindred to the purpose of Justice Bersamin, is the object of my
participation in the resolution of this contest, not the pleasure of
anyone of the contestants.
4.A.6. In Official Sample Ballot with Voters Information Sheet
(VIS) issued by the Commission on Elections, the number four
candidate for Mayor of lmus, Cavite is Emmanuel L. Maliksi which
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
appears on the first row, third column in the said COMELEC official
sample ballot, x x x. Ilowever, in the Official Ballot, the name of Associate Justice
Emmanuel L. Maliksi appears on the second row, second column as
number four candidate and the name of the fiHh candidate Homer T.
Saquilayan was moved fi-om the first row fourth column to first row
third column where the name of Emmanuel L. Maliksi was originally
located on the sample ballot, x x x. This evidently resulted in the
confusion and mistake in the shading of the proper space for
mayoralty candidate Emmanuel L. Maliksi.

This proposition was evidently found tenable by the trial court

which, upon the opening of the ballot boxes and ballots, applied the
guideline that the over-votes are stray votes. That proposition based
on facts reached the COMELEC via appeal. It should have at least
merited a discussion.

93
EVIDENCE CASES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CHARVE

JOHN LAGAHIT, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

G.R. No. 200877 | 2014-11-12

FIRST DIVISION

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal is the Decision[1] dated 17 March 2011 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC. No. 000867 affirming the
Decision[2] dated 21 June 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-67096 and CBU-
67097 finding herein appellant Charve John Lagahit guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs) and 11 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Two separate Informations,[3] both dated 1 September 2003, were

filed against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
94
EVIDENCE CASES
Republic Act No. 9165, for allegedly (a) selling 0.49 gram of
marijuana; and (b) being in illegal possession of 0.88 gram of
marijuana.
The offense involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-67096 for violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, was allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 2003, at about 8:45 P.M., in
the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said [herein appellant], with deliberate intent,
and without authority of law, did then and there sell, deliver or give
away to a poseur-buyer:
Four (4) sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarette[s] having a total net
weight 0.49 gram
x x x, a dangerous drug/s.[4] (Emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, the Information pertaining to Criminal Case No.
CBU-67097 for violation of Section 11, Article II of the same law,
reads:
That on or about the 29th day of August 2003, at about 8:45 P.M., in
the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said [appellant], with deliberate intent, did then
and there have in [his] possession and under [his] control the
following:
B- Eight (8) sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarette[s] having total
net weight of 0.88 gram:
a dangerous drug, without being authorized by law.[5] (Emphasis
supplied).
When arraigned, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to both charges.
[6] Pre-trial was conducted. Trial on the merits followed.
The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely: Police Officer 3
Arturo B. Lawas, Jr. (PO3 Lawas, Jr.), the arresting officer assigned
at Station 4 of the Mabolo Police Station; and Police Senior Inspector
Mutchit Salinas (P/S. Insp. Salinas), Forensic Chemical Officer,
Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory Office 7,
Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. The testimony,
however, of this forensic chemist was later on dispensed with per
agreement of the parties.[7]
The prosecution presented its case as follows:
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EVIDENCE CASES
Based on the reports of some teachers of Barangay Lahug
Elementary School in Cebu City, and on the information gathered by
the trusted informant who is a resident of the place, regarding the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs in the area and that the appellant was
among the perpetrators, PO3 Lawas, Jr., being the community cop of
Barangay Lahug, Cebu City, together with two barangay tanod,
namely: Celso Nicor (Nicor) and Reuben Laping, was instructed to
closely monitor the said illegal activities. PO3 Lawas, Jr. then
conducted surveillance. As a result, PO3 Lawas, Jr. confirmed that,
indeed, the appellant plies his illegal drug trade in Barangay Lahug,
particularly near the stairway of the flyover, which is also in close
proximity to the barangay hall. Worse, most of his clients are the
students of the night high school of the said barangay.[8]
A week after the surveillance, or on 29 August 2003, at around 8:45
p.m., PO3 Lawas, Jr. formed a buy-bust team to conduct a buy-bust
operation against the appellant. PO3 Lawas, Jr., the team leader,
designated his trusted informant to act as the poseur-buyer while he
and the two barangay tanod were to serve as back-ups. A P20.00
peso bill buy-bust money with markings ABL, representing the
initials of PO3 Lawas, Jr., was given to the trusted informant. The
buy-bust team agreed to the pre-arranged signal that the trusted
informant will take off his bull cap upon consummation of the sale
transaction. Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target
area of its buy-bust operation, i.e., near the stairway of the flyover
that is close to the barangay hall of Barangay Lahug.[9]
At the target area, PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay tanod
positioned themselves on the opposite side of the road near the
barangay hall. On the other hand, the trusted informant, who is the
designated poseur-buyer, immediately approached the appellant upon
seeing the latter. The trusted informant handed the P20.00 peso bill
marked money to the appellant and the latter, in turn, gave four
sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes to the former. From his
position, PO3 Lawas, Jr. can vividly see the ongoing sale transaction
between the trusted informant and the appellant, as there was a
lamppost of the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) one meter away
right below the flyover of Barangay Lahug. Upon the consummation
of the sale, the trusted informant executed at once their pre-arranged
signal by taking off his bull cap. Without ado, PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the
two barangay tanod crossed the road to apprehend the appellant.
But, before they could do so, another person approached the
appellant and walked with him towards the opposite side of the road.
Nonetheless, PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay tanod followed
them until they apprehended the appellant. Appellants companion,
on the other hand, managed to escape. After the appellant was
handcuffed, PO3 Lawas, Jr. recovered from the pocket of the former
eight more sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes. The P20.00 peso
bill marked money and the cash money amounting to P90.00,
consisting of three pieces P20.00 peso bills and six pieces P5.00 peso
coins, believed to be proceeds of appellants illegal activities, were also
recovered from the latters possession.[10]
The appellant was, thereafter, brought to the barangay hall and was
later transferred to the Mabolo Police Station. All the seized items
remained with PO3 Lawas, Jr. until they reached the police station.
Upon arrival thereat, Barangay Tanod Nicor marked the four sticks of
handrolled marijuana cigarettes, which were the subject of the sale
96
EVIDENCE CASES
transaction, with BBCJLR 08292003. While the other eight sticks of After hearing both parties, the trial court rendered a Decision dated
handrolled marijuana cigarettes, which were recovered from the 21 June 2007, finding the appellant guilty of the offenses charged.
possession of the appellant during his arrest, were marked by PO3 The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
Lawas, Jr. with CJLR-08292003-18. Afterwards, all the marked
pieces of evidence, together with a Request for Laboratory
Examination of the same, were brought by PO3 Lawas, Jr. to the PNP WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding [herein
Crime Laboratory, where P/S. Insp. Salinas, the forensic chemist, appellant] CHARVE JOHN LAGAHIT GUILTY beyond reasonable
conducted qualitative examination on the specimens.[11] Per doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II, [Republic Act
Chemistry Report No. D-1561-2003 dated 30 August 2003, all No. 9165] and sentences him to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, plus fine in
specimens yielded positive result for the presence of marijuana, a the amount of Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos; and
dangerous drug.[12] [i]n CBU-67097, the court also finds him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 11, Article II, [Republic Act
No. 9165], and sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to TWENTY
lone testimony of the appellant, who interposed denial and suggested (20) YEARS, as maximum, plus fine in the amount of Two Hundred
a frame-up for his exculpation. Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.

Appellant claimed that on 29 August 2003, at around 8:45 p.m., he The four hand rolled marijuana sticks in CBU-67096 and the eight
was beside the barangay hall of Barangay Lahug waiting for his friend rolled marijuana sticks in CBU-67097 are hereby confiscated in favor
named Roy, a driver of a public utility vehicle, as he would clean the of the government and destroyed pursuant to law.
vehicle of the former. However, he was not able to do so as three men
went near him and arrested him for no apparent reason. As he tried
to resist the arrest, one of the men poked a Magnum .357 at the back With cost against the [appellant].[14]
of his head. He was then brought to the barangay hall of Barangay
Lahug, where the arresting officers told him that they had found
something, which looks like a cigarette, inside his pocket. He, in turn,
The trial court found that the elements for the crimes of illegal sale
told the arresting officers that those were not his. Thereafter, he was
and illegal possession of marijuana were sufficiently established by
transferred to the Mabolo Police Station, where he first knew the two
the evidence of the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The trial
charges filed against him.[13]
court held that appellants weak testimony cannot prevail over the
straightforward, frank, and honest testimony of PO3 Lawas, Jr., a

97
EVIDENCE CASES
police officer, who was just doing his duty. In the same manner, the
trial court stated that PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay tanod,
Appellant further argues that there was non-compliance with the
who participated in the buy-bust operation, were properly performing
requirements set forth in Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No.
their duties as they were not inspired by any improper motive.
9165, i.e., the physical inventory and the taking of photographs of
the seized items.

On appeal,[15] the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 17 March

2011, affirmed the guilty verdict and the sentence imposed by the
Appellant also believes that the non-presentation of the police officers
trial court.
who conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs
is fatal to the prosecutions case as a crucial link in the chain of
custody of the illegal drugs was not established by such omission.
Hence, the instant recourse raising this lone assignment of error:

Simply put, the issue for resolution is whether there is sufficient

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [HEREIN
evidence to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
APPELLANT] OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
crimes charged.
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[16]

This Court rules in the negative.

Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of

the corpus delicti as its sole witness never testified as to how he was
The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
able to recover the four sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes,
is guaranteed under Section 14(2), Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
which are the corpus delicti of the crime of illegal sale of marijuana
1987 Philippine Constitution. This fundamental right of the accused
from the possession of the poseur-buyer. This failure leaves lingering
is also embodied under Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
doubt if indeed the marijuana was sold by the appellant to the
[17] which specifically states that in a criminal case, the accused is
poseur-buyer. Appellant posits that the four sticks of handrolled
entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is proved beyond reasonable
marijuana cigarettes submitted by the prosecution could be objects
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree
totally different from that which was allegedly, or was not that which
of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
was actually seized during the buy-bust operation.

98
EVIDENCE CASES
Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Time and again, this Court held that in every prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, like marijuana, the following essential
elements must be duly established: (1) the identities of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment for it.[18] Similarly, it is essential that the
transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled
with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti, that is,
the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.
[19]
On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.[20]
The prohibited drug is an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs; proof
of its identity, existence, and presentation in court is crucial. A
conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the
identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be
established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the
elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established
with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty
verdict.[21] The chain of custody requirement performs this function
in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed.[22]
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of
2002, that implements the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, defines chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements
and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources
of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in
the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.[23]
In People v. Gatlabayan[24] citing People v. Kamad,[25] this Court
enumerated the links that the prosecution must establish in the
chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
99
EVIDENCE CASES
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the
forensic chemist to the court.
A careful perusal of the records shows that while the identities of the
seller and the buyer and the consummation of the transaction
involving the sale of illegal drug on 29 August 2003 have been proven
by the prosecution through the testimony of PO3 Lawas, Jr., this
Court, nonetheless, finds the prosecution evidence to be deficient for
failure to adequately show the essential links in the chain of custody,
particularly how the four sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes
subject of the sale transaction came into the hands of PO3 Lawas, Jr.
from the trusted informant, who was the designated poseur-buyer.
To note, after the exchange of the buy-bust money and the four sticks
of handrolled marijuana cigarettes between the trusted informant and
the appellant, the former gave the pre-arranged signal to PO3 Lawas,
Jr. and the two barangay tanod by taking off his bull cap.
Immediately, thereafter, PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay tanod,
who were positioned on the opposite side of the street, moved towards
the other side, where the appellant and the trusted informant were,
in order to apprehend the former. But, before they could do so,
another person already approached the appellant and walked with
him towards the opposite side of the road. PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the
two barangay tanod then followed them until they apprehended the
appellant and whose companion managed to escape. PO3 Lawas, Jr.
handcuffed the appellant and bodily searched him leading to the
recovery of the following: (1) eight more sticks of handrolled
marijuana cigarettes from the latters pocket; (2) P20.00 peso bill
marked money; and (3) cash money amounting to P90.00, believed to
be proceeds of his illegal activities. Thereafter, the appellant was
brought to the barangay hall and was later transferred to the Mabolo
Police Station. All the seized items remained with PO3 Lawas, Jr.
until they reached the police station. Upon arrival thereat, Barangay
Tanod Nicor marked the four sticks of handrolled marijuana
cigarettes subject of the sale transaction, while the other eight sticks
of handrolled marijuana cigarettes recovered from the possession of
the appellant during his arrest were marked by PO3 Lawas, Jr. These
marked pieces of evidence, together with a Request for Laboratory
Examination of the same, were brought by PO3 Lawas, Jr. to the PNP
Crime Laboratory.[26] The qualitative examination conducted on the
specimens yielded positive result for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
[27]
From the foregoing set of facts, there was no mention how the four
sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes, which were the subject of
the sale transaction, came into the hands of PO3 Lawas, Jr. from the
trusted informant. PO3 Lawas, Jr.s testimony was lacking as to
when, where and how the said four sticks of handrolled marijuana
cigarettes sold by the appellant to the trusted informant were turned
over to him by the latter. In the same manner, PO3 Lawas, Jr. failed
to state that he actually seized the sold four sticks of handrolled
marijuana cigarettes. Considering that PO3 Lawas, Jr. was not the
poseur-buyer and he was not even with the poseur-buyer during the
sale transaction as he was on the opposite side of the road, the
turning over to him by the trusted informant of the four sticks of
handrolled marijuana cigarettes sold by the appellant was the
supposed first link in the chain of custody. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to establish the same. This Court cannot overlook
this evidentiary gap as it involves the identification of the sold four
sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes. In the absence of the
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EVIDENCE CASES
aforesaid link in the chain of custody, doubt arises if, indeed, the
recovered four sticks of hand rolled marijuana cigarettes that PO3
Lawas, Jr. brought to the barangay hall and then to the Mabolo Police
Station; subsequently marked by Barangay Tanod Nicor; later
brought to the crime laboratory; and examined by the forensic
chemist, which yielded positive for marijuana, were the same drugs
actually sold by the appellant to the trusted informant.
Given the foregoing circumstances, it is beyond any cavil of doubt
that the prosecution miserably failed to specifically identify the four
sticks of hand rolled marijuana cigarettes that were actually sold at
the buy-bust as among those that were presented in court. This
evidentiary situation effectively translates to the absence of proof of
corpus delicti, and cannot but lead this Court to conclude that no
valid conviction for the crime of illegal sale of marijuana can result.
[28]
Now, going to the crime of illegal possession of marijuana, there is
also no doubt that the prosecution was able to fully satisfy all the
elements of the crime. The prosecution, however, failed to show that
the apprehending team complied with the required procedure for the
custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered
dangerous drugs set forth in Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165.
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided
under Section 21(a), paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
thus:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied).
The specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs
have been laid down under the Implementing Rules and Regulations
for Republic Act No. 9165, particularly Section 21(a), Article II
thereof, and it is the prosecutions burden to adduce evidence that
these procedures have been complied with in proving the elements of
the offense.[29] The said Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
101
EVIDENCE CASES
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; Provided, further that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.(Emphasis supplied).
In the present case, the records are bereft of any indication that
would show that the prosecution was able to establish the
apprehending teams compliance with the above procedural
safeguards. The records similarly do not contain any physical
inventory report or photograph of the confiscated items. Even the
lone prosecution witness never stated in his testimony that he or any
member of the buy-bust team had conducted a physical inventory or
taken pictures of the items. Although PO3 Lawas, Jr. testified that
the seized drugs subject of the illegal possession case had been
marked, nowhere can it be found that the marking thereof was done
in the presence of the appellant or any of the above-mentioned third-
party representatives.
While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust
team with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal as long as
there is a justifiable ground therefor, for and as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending team, these conditions, however, were not met in
the present case.[30] Despite of all the aforesaid major lapses, the
prosecution neither offered any explanation why the procedure was
not followed nor mentioned any justifiable ground for failing to
observe the rule. In People v. Ancheta,[31] this Court pronounced
that when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards set
forth in Republic Act No. 9165, serious uncertainty is generated as to
the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in
evidence. Such doubt cannot be remedied by merely invoking the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties for a
gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural
safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of
official duties.[32] Also in People v. Ancheta, this Court explained
that:
Indeed, it is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items that is of utmost importance in determining the
admissibility of the evidence presented in court, especially in cases of
buy-bust operations. That is why Congress saw fit to fashion a
detailed procedure in order to ensure that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items would not be
compromised. The marking of the seized items was only a piece in a
detailed set of procedural safeguards embodied in [Republic Act No.
9165]. If the arresting officers were unable to comply with the other
requirements, they were under obligation to explain why the
procedure was not followed and prove that the reason provided a
justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law would
merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by
the arresting officers at their own convenience.[33] (Emphasis
supplied).
In view of the foregoing, serious doubt exists whether the drugs
subject of the illegal possession case presented in court were the
same as those recovered from the appellant. Thus, the prosecution
likewise failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the
corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
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EVIDENCE CASES
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the element of corpus
delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated.
prosecution of both sale and possession of prohibited drugs, thus, no
This, however, cannot be used to advance the cause of the
valid conviction for the crimes charged can result.
prosecution as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense. Moreover, when the circumstances are
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17
capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, such that one of
March 2011 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC. No. 000867, is
which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant CHARVE JOHN
is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail
LAGAHIT is hereby ACQUITTEDbased on reasonable doubt, and is
and the court must acquit.[34]
ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is
confined for any other lawful cause.

It is truly distressing how courts are constrained to make acquittals,

dismissals, or reversals by reason of the inadvertent failure of the
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of
arresting officers and the prosecution to establish compliance or
Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The
justify non-compliance with a statutory procedure. It is even more
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this
troubling when those cases involve apparently known or long-
Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he
suspected drug pushers. Congress was clear in its declaration on the
has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director General,
eradication of the drug menace plaguing our country. Yet, also firm
Philippine National Police, and the Director General, Philippine Drug
and stringent is its mandate to observe the legal safeguards provided
Enforcement Agency, for their information.
for under Republic Act No. 9165. This is the reason why this Court
has emphasized countless times that courts must remain vigilant in
their disposition of cases related to dangerous drugs. Also, this Court
has already called on the police, the Philippine Drug Enforcement SO ORDERED.
Agency, and the prosecution to reinforce and review the conduct of
buy-bust operations and the presentation of evidence.[35]

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANECITO

ESTIBAL Y CALUNGSAG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

G.R. No. 208749 | 2014-11-26

THIRD DIVISION

DECISION

REYES, J.:

For automatic review is the Decision1 dated March 25, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05374, which upheld
the Decision2 dated November 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City (stationed in Taguig City), Branch 69, in Criminal
Case No. 139521, convicting Anecito Estibal y Calungsag (accused-
appellant) of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A(2), in relation to

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Article 266-B(5)(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by minor at the time of the commission of the crime, which is
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 83533 and in further relation to Section 5(a) aggravated by the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
of R.A. No. 8369.4 The fallo of the RTC decision reads: dwelling, all to the damage and prejudice of the said victim [AAA].

WHEREFORE, finding accused Anecito Estibal y Calungsag guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of Rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu
of the death penalty; and to pay AAA5 the amount of PhP 75,000.00
as civil indemnity; PhP 75,000.00 as moral damages, and PhP
25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.6 (Citation omitted)
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The accused-appellant, 43 years old, pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment on March 9, 2009. But during the pre-trial, BBB, wife of
the accused-appellant and mother of AAA, the minor victim,
disclaimed any further interest to pursue the case. Her reasons were
that she pitied the accused-appellant and, according to her, AAA had
already forgiven her father. But having entered the accused-
appellants plea, the trial court refused to entertain their desistance.9

Antecedent Facts

At the trial, four witnesses came forward to testify for the

prosecution. The testimony of the first witness, Dr. Jesille Baluyot
The accusatory portion of the Information7 for rape against the
(Dr. Baluyot) who conducted the medicolegal examination on AAA,
accused-appellant filed on February 6, 2009 reads:
was stipulated by the prosecution and the defense, as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of February, 2009 in the City of Taguig,
1. That she is a Police Chief Inspector of the PNP particularly
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
assigned at the PNP Crime Laboratory as Medico Legal Examiner;
above-named accused, while taking advantage of his moral authority
and ascendancy and with his intention to gratify his sexual desire
upon his daughter [AAA], by means of force, violence and intimidation 2. That she was the one who conducted the medico-legal examination
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in on the minor victim on February 5, 2009;
having sexual intercourse with the latter against her will and
consent, the said crime having been attended by the qualifying
3. That she reduced her examination into writing and issued the
circumstances of relationship and minority, as the said accused
Initial Medico Legal Report Case No. R09-288 which Anogenital
being the natural father of the victim, a thirteen (13)[-]year[-]old, a
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EVIDENCE CASES
findings are diagnostic of previous blunt force or penetrating trauma
(to the hymen); 5. That they have no personal knowledge as to the incident.11

4. And that she also issued other documents in relation to the
examination.10
The parties also agreed to stipulate on the testimonies of Michael
Estudillo (Estudillo) and Ronillo Perlas (Perlas), members of the
Barangay Security Force (BSF) who arrested the accused-appellant as
he was coming home from work at 6:00 p.m. on February 5, 2009, to
wit:
1. That BSF Michael Estudillo and BSF Ronilo Perlas are members of
the Barangay Security Force x x x;
Concerning AAA and BBB, several subpoenas were sent to their
address for the taking of their testimonies, but they never appeared.
On April 13, 2010, it was reported to the court that they had moved
out of their house, and subsequent subpoenas were returned
unserved.12
The prosecutions last witness, Police Officer 3 Fretzie S. Cobardo
(PO3 Cobardo), was the officer assigned at the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Women and Children Protection Center of Taguig City. It
was she who investigated the above incident and took down the
sworn statement of AAA late in the evening of February 5, 2009. Her
testimony was also stipulated, as follows:

2. That in the evening of February 5, 2009 while they were on duty at

x x x, the minor victim and her mother appeared at their office and 1. that she is a member of the PNP assigned at the Women and
reported that the victim was molested or sexually abused by the Children Protection Desk, Taguig City Police Station;
accused; and that based on this report, they proceeded to the house 2. that she was the investigating officer at the time the accused was
of the perpetrator; brought to the police station;
3. that she personally encountered the private offended party and the
accused;
3. That while on their way, they met the accused and informed him
4. that she brought the private offended party to the PNP Crime
about the complaint of the minor victim and eventually arrested him
Laboratory for Genito Physical Examination;
without the corresponding warrant of arrest and brought to their
5. that she was present at the time the private offended party
office;
executed an affidavit complaint;
6. that she was the one who brought the private offended party and

4. That based on the incident, they referred the case to the Taguig the accused for inquest proceedings;

City Police Station for proper disposition; and 7. that she has no personal knowledge as to the incident which gave
rise to this case;
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EVIDENCE CASES
8. that Exhibit A was the same document executed by the mother of
the victim as well as the victim herself before her;
9. that Exhibit G was the same Medico Legal Report that was
transmitted to her by the PNP Crime Laboratory;
10. that she was the one who received the Initial Medico-Legal
Report.13
On clarificatory questioning by the court, PO3 Cobardo narrated how
she was trained to prepare for her assignment as desk officer at the
PNP Women and Children Protection Center; that during her
investigation of AAA and BBB, they were both crying; that without
being asked leading questions and without being coached by her
mother, AAA, 13 years old and a first-year high school student,
revealed in detail how the accused-appellant abused her for several
years and how he raped her that morning of February 5, 2009; that
AAA told that the first time she was raped by her father was when
she was in Grade III, but this was the first time she was telling
anyone about the rapes; that BBB told PO3 Cobardo that she could
not imagine how her husband could commit such an outrage against
their own daughter; that from her own observations of AAAs
demeanor, PO3 Cobardo was convinced that she was telling the
truth.14
The accused-appellants defense consisted mainly of denial. From his
testimony, the court learned that the accused-appellant, his wife BBB
and their two children, AAA and CCC, lived in a one-room house in
Taguig City; that he and his wife were employed as security guards in
Taguig City; that on February 4, 2009, his wife was on night duty and
came home the next morning; that on the night of the alleged rape,
he and his two children retired for the night at around midnight, and
thus, he could not have sexually abused his daughter AAA between
1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on February 5, 2009; that he and his wife
used to fight about her brothers Romulo and Rey Santos, whom he
now suspected of influencing AAA to file the complaint for rape
against him, although he treated them as his own brothers; that he
was arrested by the Barangay Tanod at 6:00 p.m. on February 5,
2009 as he was coming from work.15
Relying on PO3 Cobardos testimony of what AAA narrated to her, the
RTC considered the spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA as
confirmed by PO3 Cobardo as part of the res gestae, and convicted
the accused-appellant. The court said:
Thus, the court considers the spontaneity of the declarations made
by AAA as confirmed by PO3 Cobardo. Moreover, there is nothing on
record that would compel the court to believe that said prosecution
witness has improper motive to falsely testify against the accused-
appellant. Accordingly, it shall uphold the presumption of regularity
in the performance of her duties.
Further, the testimony of PO3 Cobardo was corroborated by the
findings of Dr. Jesille Baluyot of a shallow healed lacerations at 4 and
8 oclock and deep healed laceration at 5 oclock positions in the
hymen of AAA which Anogenital findings are diagnostic of previous
blunt force or penetrating trauma.16 (Citations omitted)
Below is the pertinent portion of PO3 Cobardos testimony cited by
the RTC:
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EVIDENCE CASES
Q How did you ask the victim? Was it in a question and answer
COURT where first you will ask the victim to narrate the incident?
Some questions from the Court. A Yes[,] Your Honor. First I asked the victim to narrate the incident.

Q PO3 Cobardo[,] you were the one who investigated the minor Q And then you propounded question in the question and answer
victim in this case? form?
A Yes[,] Your Honor. A Yes[,] Your Honor.

Q Could you tell the Court what is the appearance of the victim at Q After obtaining all the facts relative to the incident?
the time of the investigation? A Yes[,] Your Honor.
A At that time Your Honor the victim was together with her mother,
they were crying. Q And you found out that, was that the first time that the incident
happened or several times already?
Q Both were crying? A During that interview[,] Your Honor[,] I found out that the victim
A Yes[,] Your Honor. was sexually abused by her father several times when she was in
Grade III.
Q When you conducted the investigation[,] the mother was present?
A Yes[,] Your Honor, the mother was present. Q You mentioned that the victim and her mother during your
investigation were both crying?
Q You were aware of course when you inquired the age of the A Yes[,] Your Honor[.]
minor?
A Yes[,] Your Honor. Q Did you inquire why?
A The mother told me that she could not imagine that her husband
Q When she narrated the incident[,] was she coached by the molested their daughter.
mother?
A No[,] Your Honor, the victim was not coached by the mother. It Q How about the daughter? Did you inquire? Did you allow her
was the victim who stated all the incident. some time to rest?
A She was crying[,] Your Honor[,] since it was her first time to
Q Did you make, did you use leading questions in conducting, reveal the incident.
propounding the questions?
A No[,] Your Honor. Q So you asked her why she was crying?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.

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EVIDENCE CASES

Q Because, I notice, actually I noticed in the preliminary question x x x x17

you stated hindi ako magagalit, kahit ano ang sasabihin mo sa akin,
naiintindihan mo ba lahat ng sinabi ko. It may be a preliminary
Significantly, it appears from the sworn statement,18 executed by
question because you have attended seminars on this. Is that right?
AAA before PO3 Cobardo, that she first revealed her ordeal to her
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
cousin DDD that same afternoon of February 5, 2009. With DDDs
help, BBB confronted her daughter AAA, who told her that the
COURT
accused-appellant did not only rape her that morning, but had
So judging from the preliminary question[,] I know that you had
sexually abused her several times since she was in Grade III.
undergone seminars on how to conduct questions on child abuse
cases.

Appeal to the CA
WITNESS
Yes[,] Your Honor.

On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant maintained that due to

COURT
the absence of AAAs testimony, the prosecution failed to establish the
circumstances proving beyond reasonable doubt that he raped his
Q Are you convinced that the victim is telling the truth?
daughter; that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses PO3
A Yes[,] Your Honor, I am convinced.
Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas, not being themselves victims
or witnesses to the startling occurrence of rape, cannot create the
Q Why are you convinced? Convinced based on your questions that
hearsay exception of res gestae [literally, things done]; and, that the
you propounded, why are you convinced?
medical findings of Dr. Baluyot do not prove that he had carnal
A Because for a father and daughter relationship its not good, its
knowledge of AAA but only that she had had sexual relations.
not easy to accused [sic] your father of sexual abuse.

Q So judging from the appearance of the minor she would be able

to tell the Court that she is telling the truth? In its appellees brief, the Office of Solicitor General (OSG) asserted
A Yes[,] Your Honor. that although AAA did not personally testify, and none of the
prosecution witnesses had any direct knowledge of the sexual
Q How many seminars have you attended relative to on how to molestation of AAA by the accused-appellant, his guilt was fully
conduct examination on child abuse? established by circumstantial evidence. In particular, the OSG argued
A Many times already[,] Your Honor. that the testimony of PO3 Cobardo concerning what AAA narrated to

109
EVIDENCE CASES
her during her investigation was part of the res gestae pursuant to
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The OSG reasoned that AAA had just
undergone a startling occurrence at the time she told PO3 Cobardo
that she had been raped by her father that morning, a statement
which PO3 Cobardo found spontaneous and credible; that the gap
between the sexual assault and the time when AAA made her
narration to PO3 Cobardo was too short to permit fabrication by AAA
of such a serious accusation against her own father; and, that AAA
made the charge in the presence of her mother could only have lent
credence to her claim. Moreover, the claim of rape by AAA is
corroborated by Dr. Baluyots finding that she has genital lacerations,
in contrast to the accused-appellants only defense of a general and
uncorroborated denial.
The appellate court agreed with the RTC and the OSG that the
testimonies of the three prosecution witnesses, PO3 Cobardo, BSF
Estudillo and BSF Perlas, form part of the res gestae, although none
of them was a participant, victim or spectator to the crime. According
to the CA, they heard what [AAA] said when she reported the sexual
abuse committed against her by accused-appellant Estibal.19 To
further quote the CA:
Thus, in this case, even if prosecution witnesses BSF Estudillo, BSF
Perlas and PO3 Cobardo were not present during the startling
occurrence experienced by AAA, they heard what she said when she
reported the sexual abuse committed against her by accused-
appellant Estibal. There is no merit to the argument of accused-
appellant Estibal that, since prosecution witnesses BSF Estudillo,
BSF Perlas and PO3 Cobardo were neither participants or victims or
spectators to the crime of rape being charged against the accused-
appellant their testimonies could not be considered as part of the res
gestae.
The testimonies of said prosecution witnesses comply with the above-
mentioned requisites, viz., there is no question that the sexual abuse
committed by accused-appellant Estibal against her daughter AAA
was a startling occurrence and a traumatic experience, at that; she
had no opportunity to contrive or devise falsehood when she reported
the crime to BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas and narrated the incident
to PO3 Cobardo hours after the incident; and, the statements she
made was relative to her sexual abuse by accused-appellant Estibal
and its attending circumstances.
There might be an intervening period between the time the crime of
rape was committed and the first time it was reported by AAA to the
prosecution witnesses. However, said intervening period of less than
twenty-four (24) hours is so short a time for AAA to fully recover
physically and emotionally from such a traumatic and harrowing
experience, considering her tender age of only thirteen (13) years and
the fact that her abuser is her own biological father.
Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the
victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or
after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any
opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An
important consideration is whether there intervened, between the
occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert
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EVIDENCE CASES
the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and
afford an opportunity for deliberation.
Indeed, the statements made by AAA before BSF Estudillo, BSF
Perlas and PO3 Cobardo were spontaneous and her utterances were
inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity
to fabricate a false statement.
There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may
be determined although a number of factors have been considered,
including, but not always confined to: (1) the time that has lapsed
between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of
the statement, (2) the place where the statement is made, (3) the
condition of the declarant when the utterance is given, (4) the
presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence
and the statement relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the
circumstances of the statement itself. The Supreme Court, in People
v. Manhuyod, has explained the import of the first four factors; thus:
x x x (C)ases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should
separate the occurrence of the startling event and the making of the
declaration. What is important is that the declarations were
voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as
to be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate or
explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to
exclude the ideas of design or deliberation.
As to the second factor, it may be stressed that a statement made, or
an act done, at a place some distance from the place where the
principal transaction occurred will not ordinarily possess such
spontaneity as would render it admissible.
Anent the third factor, [a] statement will ordinarily be deemed
spontaneous if, at the time when it was made, the conditions of the
declarant was such as to raise an inference that the effect of the
occurrence on his mind still continued, as where he had just received
a serious injury, was suffering severe pain, or was under intense
excitement. Conversely, a lack of spontaneity may be inferred from
the cool demeanor of declarant, his consciousness of the absence of
all danger, his delay in making a statement until witnesses can be
procured, or from the fact that he made a different statement prior to
the one which is offered in evidence.
With regard to the fourth factor, what is to be considered is whether
there intervened between the event or transaction and the making of
the statement relative thereto, any circumstance calculated to divert
the mind of the declarant which would thus restore his mental
balance and afford opportunity for deliberation.20 (Citations
omitted)
Automatic review by the Supreme Court
Without the res gestae exception, the evidence of the prosecution
would consist mainly of hearsay statements by PO3 Cobardo, BSF
Estudillo and BSF Perlas all reiterating what AAA allegedly told them.
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EVIDENCE CASES
The same question, whether res gestae as an exception to the hearsay
rule must be appreciated from the factual circumstances of the case,
is now before this Court in this automatic review.
To pardon her father, AAA chose to ignore the trial courts subpoenas
to testify in her rape complaint, thus leaving missing a vital
component in the prosecutions case, her eyewitness account. But in
itself, her pardon would not have worked the dismissal of the rape
case since it was given after the complaint was filed in court.
AAA never appeared at the trial proper despite several subpoenas for
her to testify, and subsequent subpoenas could not be served after
her family moved to a new but unknown address on April 13, 2010.
Recall that at the pre-trial, BBB told the court that she was no longer
interested in pursuing the case against the accused-appellant since
her daughter had already pardoned him. It has, however, been held
that even if it is construed as a pardon, AAAs desistance is not by
itself a ground to dismiss the complaint for rape against the accused-
appellant once the complaint has been instituted in court.21
In People v. Bonaagua,22 the accused tried to invoke the affidavit of
desistance executed by the minor victims mother stating that they
would no longer pursue the rape cases against him. But the high
court pointed out that since R.A. No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law,
took effect in 1997, rape is no longer considered a crime against
chastity. Having been reclassified as a crime against persons, it is no
longer considered a private crime, or one which cannot be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Thus, pardon by
the offended party of the offender will not extinguish his criminal
liability.
As a rule, a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with
suspicion and reservation. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded
such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily be
secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through
intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always
the probability that it would later on be repudiated, and criminal
prosecution would thus be interminable.23
The gravity of the crime of rape and its imposable penalty, vis--vis
the ease with which a charge of rape can be made, compels the
Supreme Court to conduct a thorough review of rape every
conviction.
A charge of rape by its very nature often must be resolved by giving
primordial consideration to the credibility of the victims
testimony.24 Because conviction may rest solely thereon, the victims
testimony must be credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things,25 it must be
scrutinized with utmost caution, and unavoidably, the victims
credibility must be put on trial as well.26
But if for some reason the complainant fails or refuses to testify, as in
this case, then the court must consider the adequacy of the
circumstantial evidence established by the prosecution. In People v.
Canlas,27 the Court said:
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EVIDENCE CASES
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that, in the nature of things,
Where the court relies solely on circumstantial evidence, the only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the
combined effect of the pieces of circumstantial evidence must testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme care;
inexorably lead to the conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must succeed or fail on its
reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral own merits, and cannot be allowed to derive strength from the
certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial weakness of the evidence for the defense.30
evidence.28

In essence, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that
xxxx the declarations must have been voluntarily and spontaneously
made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the
transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were made under

x x x Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or

series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by deliberation.

inference. It is founded on experience, observed facts and

coincidences establishing a connection between the known and
proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. Conviction may be
warranted on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken
chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of others, as
person.29 (Citations omitted)
The Court is called upon to review the verdict of conviction below,
keeping in mind the following principles as guidance: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility, while the accusation is
difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, albeit
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except
as otherwise provided in these rules. Res gestae, one of eleven (11)
exceptions to the hearsay rule, is found in Section 42 of Rule 130,
thus:
Sec. 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a
the guilty
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance may be received as part of the res gestae.
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EVIDENCE CASES
In People v. Ner,31 this Court elaborated on Section 36 of Rule 130 as
follows:
[T]hat declarations which are the natural emanations or outgrowths
of the act or occurrence in litigation, although not precisely
concurrent in point of time, if they were yet voluntarily and
spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the
presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and
were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the
idea of design or deliberation, must, upon the clearest principles of
justice, be admissible as part of the act or transaction
itself.32 (Italics in the original)
The Court enumerated three essential requisites for the admissibility
of a given statement as part of res gestae, to wit:
All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part
of res gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a startling
event witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he
had time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a
falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue
influence in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in question
or its immediate attending circum[s]tances.33 (Citations omitted)
There are then three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of
the res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that
the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances.34
In People v. Dianos,35 the Court acknowledged that there are no hard
and fast rules in determining the spontaneity of a declaration, but at
least five factors have been considered:
By res gestae, exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime, immediately before,
during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements constitute nothing but
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion there being no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement become admissible in evidence
against the otherwise hearsay rule of inadmissibility. x x x.
There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may
be determined although a number of factors have been considered,
including, but not always confined to, (1) the time that has lapsed
between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of
the statement, (2) the place where the statement is made, (3) the
condition of the declarant when the utterance is given, (4) the
presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence
and the statement relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the
circumstances of the statement itself. x x x.36 (Citations omitted and
italics in the original)
In People v. Jorolan,37 the Court emphasized that there must be no
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EVIDENCE CASES
intervening circumstances between the res gestae occurrence and the during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
time the statement was made as could have afforded the declarant an circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
opportunity for deliberation or reflection; in other words, the spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
statement was unreflected and instinctive: occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act,
An important consideration is whether there intervened between the
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected
occurrence and the statement any circumstance calculated to divert
with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded
the mind of the declarant, and thus restore his mental balance and
as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
afford opportunity for deliberation. His statement then cannot be
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
regarded as unreflected and instinctive, and is not admissible as part
testimony.40 (Citations omitted, emphasis ours and italics in the
of the res gestae. An example is where he had been talking about
original)
matters other than the occurrence in question or directed his
attention to other matters.38 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
By way of illustration, in People v. Villarama,41 the 4-year-old rape
victim did not testify, but the accused, an uncle of the victim, was
In People v. Salafranca,39 the Court cited two tests in applying the
convicted on the basis of what the child told her mother. The Court
res gestae rule: a) the act, declaration or exclamation is so intimately
said:
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself; and
b) the said evidence clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to The critical factor is the ability or chance to invent a story of rape. At
manufacture testimony. her age, the victim could not have had the sophistication, let alone
the malice, to tell her mother that her uncle made her lie down, took
off her panties and inserted his penis inside her vagina.
The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which
are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which
are admissible when illustrative of such act. In a general way, res
The shock of an unwelcome genital penetration on a woman is
gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow
unimaginable, more so to a four-year-old child. Such a brutal
out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
experience constituted unspeakable trauma. The fact that Elizabeth
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude
was still crying when her parents arrived reinforces the conclusion
the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae
that she was still in a traumatic state when she made the statements
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
pointing to appellant.
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,

115
EVIDENCE CASES
admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had
been thus uttered.
xxxx

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless

x x x [I]n Contreras, the victims statement that she had been
of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made
sexually molested by the accused was not received under the res
is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are
gestae exception to the hearsay rule, because her statement did not
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement
refer to the incident witnessed by Nelene but to a general pattern of
is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute
molestation of her and her companions by the accused. In contrast,
a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
Elizabeths declaration to her mother regarding the then just
such a fact.45 (Citation omitted)
concluded assault were so full of details specific to the incident that
there could be no doubt she was referring to the same incident
witnessed by Ricardo Tumulak.42 In People v. Lupac,46 the Court accepted as part of res gestae the 10-
year-old victims denunciation of her uncle to a neighbor whom she
met soon after she managed to get away from her uncle after the
In People v. Velasquez,43 the 2-year-old rape victim told her mother
rape, uttering the words hindot and inano ako ni Kuya Ega.47
the following: a) Si Tatang kakayan na ku pu. (Tatang has been
doing something to me.); and b) I-tatang kasi, kinayi ne pu ing
pekpek ku kaya masakit ya. (Because Tatang has been doing
In People v. Moreno,48 shortly after the three accused left the house
something to my private part, that is why it hurts.) The girl then
where the complaining victims worked as maids, the maids told their
showed her mother her private part, which was swollen and oozing
employers, who had just arrived, that they had been raped. The
with pus, and then she gestured by slightly opening or raising her
employers testified in court on these statements. The Court held that
right foot, and using her right finger, to show what the accused had
the maids statements were part of res gestae since they were
done to it.44 The Court ruled:
spontaneously made as soon as the victims had opportunity to make
them without threat to their lives. The Court said:
We hold, therefore, that Airas statements and acts constitute res
gestae, as it was made immediately subsequent to a startling
This exception is based on the belief that such statements are
occurrence, uttered shortly thereafter by her with spontaneity,
trustworthy because made instinctively, while the declarants mental
without prior opportunity to contrive the same. Regails account of
powers for deliberation are controlled and stilled by the shocking
Airas words and, more importantly, Airas gestures, constitutes
influence of a startling occurrence, so that all his utterances at the
independently relevant statements distinct from hearsay and
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EVIDENCE CASES
time are the reflex products of immediate sensual impressions,
unaided by retrospective mental action. Said natural and
spontaneous utterances are perceived to be more convincing than the
testimony of the same person on the witness stand.49 (Citations
omitted)
But in People v. Contreras,50 the accused was acquitted in one of
several statutory rape charges because, among other things, the
prosecution failed to present the victim, a 6-year-old girl, and the
court found that her alleged res gestae statement referred not to the
incident or circumstance testified to by the witness but rather to a
general pattern of molestation which she and her companions had
endured for some time already.
AAAs statements to the barangay tanod and the police do not qualify
as part of res gestae in view of the missing element of spontaneity
and the lapse of an appreciable time between the rape and the
declarations which afforded her sufficient opportunity for reflection.
In People v. Manhuyod, Jr.,51 the Court stressed that in appreciating
res gestae the element of spontaneity is critical. Although it was
acknowledged that there is no hard and fast rule to establish it, the
Court cited a number of factors to consider, already mentioned in
Dianos. The review of the facts below constrains this Court to take a
view opposite that of the RTC and the CA.
It is of particular significance to note that in her sworn statement to
the police, AAA admitted that she first revealed her ordeal of sexual
abuse to her cousin DDD in the afternoon of February 5, 2009,
although her mother BBB had returned from her overnight guard
duty that morning. Shocked by what AAA told him, DDD relayed to
BBB na may problema [si AAA]. BBB thus confronted her, and AAA
in her own words narrated that, kaya kinausap na po ako ni Mama
kung ano ang problema ko kaya sinabi ko na po ang ginawa sa akin
ni Papa ko po kaya nalaman na lahat ni Mama ang panggagahasa sa
akin ni Papa.52
After an anguished silence of five years, finally AAA found the courage
to reveal to her mother her heart-rending saga of sexual abuse by her
own father. Emboldened by her cousin DDDs moral support, AAA
told her mother that she had been hiding her dark secret since Grade
III. But as soon as BBB learned, events quickly took their logical
course. With BBB now leading the way, BBB and AAA sought the
help of the barangay tanod that same day between 5:00 p.m. and
6:00 p.m. to have the accused-appellant arrested. At around 6:00
p.m., they were able to arrest him as he was coming home. Later that
night, AAA accompanied by BBB gave her statement to PO3 Cobardo
of the PNP womens desk.
AAAs revelation to DDD and BBB set off an inexorable chain of
events that led to the arrest of the accused-appellant. There is no
doubt, however, that there was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or
instinctive about the declarations which AAA made to the barangay
tanod and later that night to the police. Her statements were in fact a
re-telling of what she had already confessed to her mother earlier that
afternoon; this time however, her story to the tanods and the police
was in clear, conscious pursuit of a newly formed resolve, exhorted by
her mother, to see her father finally exposed and put behind bars.
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EVIDENCE CASES
AAA made her declarations to the authorities precisely because she
was seeking their help to punish the accused-appellant. There was
then nothing spontaneous about her so-called res gestae narrations,
even as it is remarkable to note that while AAA was giving her said
statements to the police, her father was already being held in
detention, and the investigation was conducted exactly to determine if
there was a basis to hold him for trial for rape.
Res gestae speaks of a quick continuum of related happenings,
starting with the occurrence of a startling event which triggered it
and including any spontaneous declaration made by a witness,
participant or spectator relative to the said occurrence. The cases
this Court has cited invariably reiterate that the statement must be
an unreflected reaction of the declarant, undesigned and free of
deliberation. In other words, the declarant is spontaneously moved
merely to express his instinctive reaction concerning the startling
occurrence, and not to pursue a purpose or design already formed in
his mind. In People v. Sanchez,53 the Court belabored to explain that
startling events speak for themselves, giving out their fullest
meaning through the unprompted language of the participants:54
Res gestae means the things done. It refers to those exclamations
and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after
the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that
the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement. A spontaneous exclamation is defined as a statement or
exclamation made immediately after some exciting occasion by a
participant or spectator and asserting the circumstances of that
occasion as it is observed by him. The admissibility of such
exclamation is based on our experience that, under certain external
circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous
excitement may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective
faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then
occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual
sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock.
Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled
domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and
during the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not
have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as
expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed
by him. In a manner of speaking, the spontaneity of the declaration
is such that the declaration itself may be regarded as the event
speaking through the declarant rather than the declarant speaking
for himself. Or, stated differently, x x x the events speak for
themselves, giving out their fullest meaning through the unprompted
language of the participants. The spontaneous character of the
language is assumed to preclude the probability of its premeditation
or fabrication. Its utterance on the spur of the moment is regarded,
with a good deal of reason, as a guarantee of its truth.55 (Citations
omitted)
The RTC and the CA held that the inculpatory statements of AAA to
the barangay tanod and the police are part of the res gestae
occurrence of the rape. This is error. It is obvious that AAA had by
then undergone a serious deliberation, prodded by her mother, whose
own outrage as the betrayed wife and grieving mother so emboldened
AAA that she finally resolved to emerge from her fear of her father.
Here then lies the crux of the matter: AAA had clearly ceased to act
unthinkingly under the immediate influence of her shocking rape by
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EVIDENCE CASES
her father, and was now led by another powerful compulsion, a new-
found resolve to punish her father.
Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that
the original declarant was not placed under oath or affirmation, nor
subjected to cross-examination by the defense, except in a few
instances as where the statement is considered part of the res gestae.
This Court has a situation where the incriminatory statements
allegedly made by AAA were conveyed to the trial court not by AAA
herself but by PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas. In
particular, PO3 Cobardo made a summation of what she claims was
AAAs narration of her ordeal, along with her own observations of her
demeanor during the investigation. But unless the prosecution
succeeded in invoking res gestae, their testimonies must be
dismissed as hearsay, since AAAs statements were not subjected to
cross-examination consistent with the constitutional right of the
accused-appellant to confront the evidence against him.
Hearsay testimony is devoid of probative value, and unless it is part
of res gestae, the appealed decision runs contrary to the well-settled
rule against admitting hearsay evidence, aptly described as evidence
not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from
others.56 The hearsay rule puts in issue the trustworthiness and
reliability of hearsay evidence, since the statement testified to was not
given under oath or solemn affirmation, and more compellingly, the
declarant was not subjected to cross examination by the opposing
party to test his perception, memory, veracity and articulateness, on
whose reliability the entire worth of the out-of-court statement
depends.57 It is an immemorial rule that a witness can testify only
as to his own personal perception or knowledge of the actual facts or
events. His testimony cannot be proof as to the truth of what he
learned or heard from others.58 But equally important, Section 14(2)
of the Bill of Rights guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to meet the witnesses
face to face x x x. By allowing the accused to test the perception,
memory, and veracity of the witness, the trial court is able to weigh
the trustworthiness and reliability of his testimony. There is no
gainsaying that the right to confront a witness applies with particular
urgency in criminal proceedings, for at stake is a mans personal
liberty, universally cherished among all human rights.
In Patula v. People,59 the Court rendered a helpful disquisition on
hearsay evidence, why it must be rejected and treated as
inadmissible, and how it can be avoided:
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable
and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is
made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states
that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The
personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed
fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony
derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness
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EVIDENCE CASES
presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the
extrajudicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard
another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom
the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in
court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The
weight of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the
witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the
information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be
tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness
and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged
to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any
difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain
obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches
herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the
burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. Thus, the rule
against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was
no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may
have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is
offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-
examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human
utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the
credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore,
the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the
witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an
extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the
matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter
asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander
case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say
that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to
prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that
the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in
character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore,
between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the
hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in
the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the
only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be
any excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve
the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original
declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or
occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied
because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that
the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness, being the only
means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is
essential to the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as
evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a
partys right to cross-examine her adversarys witness, the Rules of
Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require that all the
witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court
120
EVIDENCE CASES
under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
formalizes this solution, viz.:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court.The examination
of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open
court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of
answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the
cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court ensures this solution thusly:
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent.Upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-
examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and
freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts
bearing upon the issue.
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional
precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of
the 1987 Constitution, which guarantees that: In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to meet the
witnesses face to face x x x, the rule requiring the cross-examination
by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based
upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of
hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn
affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination
by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose
reliability the worth of the out of-court statement
depends.60 (Citations omitted, emphasis ours and italics in the
original)
When inculpatory facts are susceptible of two or more
interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral
certainty required for conviction.
It is well-settled, to the point of being elementary, that when
inculpatory facts are susceptible to two or more interpretations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the
evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty required
for conviction.61 A forced application of the res gestae exception
below results if the Court says that AAAs incriminatory statements
were spontaneous and thus part of a startling occurrence. It
produces an outright denial of the right of the accused-appellant to
be presumed innocent unless proven guilty, not to mention that he
was also denied his right to confront the complainant. As the Court
held in People v. Ganguso:62
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the
Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt
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EVIDENCE CASES
standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution
which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and
unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer
evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of
proof as excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience
must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense
charged.63 (Citations omitted)
This Courts views are not a condonation of the bestiality of the
accused-appellant but only indicate that there is reasonable doubt as
to his guilt entitling him to acquittal. As the Court stated in People v.
Ladrillo:64
It needs no elaboration that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the defense.66 [T]he burden of proof
rests on the [S]tate. The accused, if he so chooses, need not present
evidence. He merely has to raise a reasonable doubt and whittle away
from the case of the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of
innocence demands no less,67 even as it also demands no less than
a moral certainty of his guilt.68
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Anecito Estibal y Calungsag is
hereby ACQUITTED. His immediate RELEASE from detention is
hereby ORDERED, unless he is being held for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation, who
is then directed to report to this Court the action he has taken within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.

Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it

are categorical: sympathy for the victim and admiration for her in SO ORDERED.
publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous misfortune, and
condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law
and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without
those proclivities and deal with it with extreme caution and
circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency
to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been
sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While
they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape
victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally
bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the
law.65 (Citation omitted)
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CAPITAL SHOES FACTORY, LTD., PETITIONER, VS. TRAVELER

KIDS, INC., RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 200065 | 2014-09-24

SECOND DIVISION

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Questioned in this petition is the October 5, 2011 Decision1 of the

Court of Appeals (CA), and its January 16, 2012 Resolution,2 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 120413, which affirmed with modification the May 13,
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EVIDENCE CASES
20113 and June 23, 20114 Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 170, Malabon City (RTC), regarding the admissibility of
duplicate originals as evidence in an action for sum of money and
damages.
The Facts
Sometime in 2000, petitioner Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL), a
foreign corporation engaged in the manufacturing and trading of
children's shoes and similar products, and respondent Traveller Kids,
Inc. (TKI), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing, importing and distributing shoes, sandals and other
footwear entered into an agreement, wherein they agreed that TKI
would import the shoes and sandals made by CSFL from its China
factory. After TKI placed numerous purchase orders, CSFL began
manufacturing the goods pursuant to the special designs and
specifications of TKI. CSFL then shipped the goods to TKI.
It was their arrangement that TKI would pay thirty (30%) percent of
the purchase price of the goods by way of letters of credit, and the
balance of seventy (70%) percent by way of telegraphic transfer, thirty
(30) days from the date of delivery of the goods.
For the first three years, TKI was able to pay its purchase orders and
the shipments made by CSFL. In 2004, however, TKI started to
default in its payments. CSFL granted numerous concessions and
extensions to TKI. Thereafter, TKI was able to make a partial payment
on its unpaid accounts.
As of July 10, 2005, the total unpaid accounts of TKI amounted to
U.S. $325,451.39, exclusive of the interest accruing thereto. In
addition, CSFL also manufactured $92,000.00 worth of children's
shoes and sandals pursuant to the design and specifications of TKI in
its purchase orders.
Both verbal and written demand letters were made by CSFL to TKI for
the payment of its unpaid accounts, but to no avail.
To protect its interest, CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money and damages against TKI before the RTC. During the trial,
CSFL, through its witness, identified several sales invoices and order
slips it issued as evidence of its transactions with TKI. The latter
objected to the identification pointing out that the documents being
presented were mere photocopies. TKI also objected to the evidence
presented by CSFL to prove the amount of attorneys fees on the
ground that it was not an issue raised during the pre-trial. The RTC
noted the objections.
After the presentation of its last witness, CSFL filed its Formal Offer
of Exhibits5 seeking the admission of, among others, the sales
invoices and order slips earlier objected to by TKI. The latter objected
to the admission of the documents offered, contending that several of
the sales invoices and order slips should not be admitted because
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EVIDENCE CASES
they were merely photocopies. TKI also objected to the admission of
documents by which CSFL sought to prove its claim for attorneys
fees.6
On May 13, 2011, the RTC issued the Order7 admitting all the
exhibits offered by CFSL. The Order reads:
ORDER
Acting on Plaintiffs Formal Offer of Exhibits as well as Defendants
Comment/Opposition on/thereto and finding the said offer to be
well-taken and in order despite the objections made to the
admission of said exhibits by defendant, Exhibits A to ZZZ-1-A,
inclusive, are all admitted for the purposes for which the same are
offered and as part of the testimony of the witness who testified
thereon.
Let the presentation of defendants evidence commence on May 25,
2011 at 8:30 oclock in the morning, as previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED. [Emphasis supplied]
Not in conformity, TKI filed a motion for reconsideration8 arguing
that the exhibits formally offered by CSFL were inadmissible in
evidence for being mere photocopies. TKI also argued that the
evidence relating to the claimed legal fees were erroneously
admitted because the matter was not raised as an issue during the
pre-trial.
On June 23, 2011, the RTC issued the order9 denying TKIs motion
for reconsideration, ruling that the sales invoices and order slips
could be admitted because the duplicate originals of the invoices were
already sufficiently established by the testimony of CSFLs officer and
principal witness, Ms. Susan Chiu (Chiu). Regarding the documents
offered by CSFL to prove its claim for attorneys fees, the RTC stated
that the demand for attorneys fees was impliedly included in the
issue of whether or not TKI was liable to CSFL for the entire amount
claimed.
Instead of presenting evidence, TKI opted to file a petition for
certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order(TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the CA in which it reiterated its
argument regarding the inadmissibility of the photocopied evidence
and the erroneous inclusion of those documents proving entitlement
to attorneys fees which matter was not raised during the pre-trial.
As there was no injunction order issued by the CA, the RTC
continued the proceedings and directed TKI to present evidence. TKI
refused, citing the petition for certiorari it filed with the CA. Because
of its refusal, the RTC considered TKIs right to adduce countervailing
evidence as waived and ordered CSFL to submit its memorandum.10
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EVIDENCE CASES
On October 5, 2011, the CA rendered a decision partially granting CSFL filed a motion for partial reconsideration, but it was denied by
TKIs petition. The dispositive portion of which reads: the CA in its Resolution, dated January 16, 2012.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is

Hence, this petition.
PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Orders dated May
13, 2011 and June 23, 2011 of public respondent judge are
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that Exhibits D to GG-1 GROUND
and HH to KK-1 should be denied admission for being merely
photocopies. As such, they are inadmissible for failure of private
respondent to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3,
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DELVING INTO THE
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
LOWER COURTS EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL
FINDINGS SINCE IT IS BEYOND THE VERY LIMITED
JURISDICTIONAL PARAMETERS OF A CERTIORARI PROCEEDING,
SO ORDERED.11 THAT IS, THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION.14

[Underscoring supplied]
Stripped of non-essentials, the only issue to be resolved is whether or
not the CA correctly modified the RTC order admitting the exhibits
offered by CSFL. 15
Applying Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,12 the CA
explained that while it was true that the original copies of the sales
invoices were the best evidence to prove TKIs obligation, CSFL merely
presented photocopies of the questioned exhibits. It stated that Chius CSFL basically argues that the excluded documents are admissible in
testimony merely established the existence or due execution of the evidence because it was duly established during the trial that the
original invoices. CSFL, however, did not present the original invoices, said documents were duplicate originals, and not mere photocopies,
only the photocopies, contrary to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of considering that they were prepared at the same time as the
Court.13 Nonetheless, the CA agreed with the RTCs admission of originals.
CSFLs evidence proving attorneys fees, quoting verbatim its logic and
reasoning.

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EVIDENCE CASES
On the other hand, TKI counters that CSFLs claim that the
photocopied documents were duplicate originals was just a unilateral
and self-serving statement without any supportive evidence.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition.
After a review of the RTC and the CA records, which were ordered
elevated, the Court is of the considered view that the CA erred in not
admitting the invoices and order slips denominated as Exhibits D to
GG-1 and HH to KK-1, which were duplicate originals. Section
4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4 . Original of document.
xxxx
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about
the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally
regarded as originals.
xxxx
In Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies v. The Court of Appeals and
Associated Bank,16 it was stressed that duplicate originals were
admissible as evidence. Pertinent portions of the said decision read:
Respondent court is of the view that the above provision must be
construed to mean the original copy of the document evidencing the
credit and not its duplicate, thus:
. . . [W]hen the law speaks of the delivery of the private document
evidencing a credit, it must be construed as referring to the original.
In this case, appellees (Trans-Pacific) presented, not the originals but
the duplicates of the three promissory notes." (Rollo, p. 42)
The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly
groundless. It is undisputed that the documents presented were
duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as evidence. Further,
it must be noted that respondent bank itself did not bother to
challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by
petitioner. In People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]), we said:
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of
writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside
sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby,
produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being
thus reproduced by the same stroke of pen which made the surface
or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as
duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence
as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.
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[Emphases supplied]
Records reveal that Chiu, CSFLs principal witness, was able to
satisfactorily explain that Exhibits D to GG-1 and HH to KK-1 [Emphases supplied]
were duplicate originals of invoices and order slips, and not mere
photocopies. She testified as follows:
Atty. Fernandez:
Q The documents that you have brought today, to what records do
they belong?
A Those originals are from our company because one copy was
sent to the customer and one we keep in our company, Sir.
Q When you prepare a particular invoice pertaining to a particular
transaction Miss Witness, how many copies do you prepare for that
invoice? How many copies of the invoice will you prepare?
A Two sets of invoice, one to the customer and one for our office
sir.
Q And the copies that you brought today, are those the ones that
were retained to you in your office, the copies you brought to court?
A Yes sir.17
The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that Chiu
convincingly explained that CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of
invoices for a particular transaction, giving one copy to a client and
retaining the other copy. The Court combed through her testimony
and found nothing that would indicate that the documents offered
were mere photocopies. She remained firm and consistent with her
statement that the subject invoices were duplicate originals as they
were prepared at the same time. The Court sees no reason why
Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court should not apply. At any
rate, those exhibits can be admitted as part of the testimony of Chiu.
The Court went over the RTC records and the TSNs and found that,
contrary to the assertion of TKI, the duplicate originals were
produced in court and compared with their photocopies during the
hearing before the trial court. The transcripts bare all of these but
were missed by the appellate court, which believed the assertion of
TKI that what were produced in court and offered in evidence were
mere photocopies. The TSNs further reveal that after the
comparison, the photocopies were the ones retained in the records.18
The Court notes that this case involves a foreign entity and has been
pending since October 6, 2005.19 It is about time that this case be
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EVIDENCE CASES
decided on the merits. At this juncture, the Court reminds counsel decision to the appropriate appellate court. Moreover, under Rule 45
for TKI of his duty, as an officer of the court, to see to it that the of the Rules of Court, as amended, only questions of law may be
orderly administration of justice be not unduly impeded. properly raised.

[Emphases supplied]
After the admission of CSFLs exhibits as evidence, TKI should have
let trial proceed in due course instead of immediately resorting to
certiorari, by presenting its own testimonial and documentary
WHEREFORE, the October 5, 2011 Decision and the January 16,
evidence and in case of an unfavourable decision, appeal the same in
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120413,
accordance with law. After all, the RTC stated that, granting that the
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the exclusion of
questioned exhibits were not admissible, there still remained enough
Exhibits D to GG-1 and HH to KK-1 are concerned. The May
evidence to substantiate plaintiffs claim on which the Court can
13, 2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon
validly render judgment upon application of the pertinent law and/or
City, is REINSTATED.
jurisprudence.20 In the case of Johnson Lee v. People of the
Philippines,21 it was written:

The pertinent records of the case are hereby ordered remanded to the
In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction over Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, for appropriate
the cases filed by the public respondent against the petitioner for proceedings.
estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the photocopies of the
charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise of
its jurisdiction. Even if erroneous, the same is a mere error of
The trial court is directed to give priority to this case and act on it
judgment and not of jurisdiction. Additionally, the admission of
with dispatch.
secondary evidence in lieu of the original copies predicated on proof
of the offeror of the conditions sine qua non to the admission of the
said evidence is a factual issue addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess SO ORDERED.
or lack of jurisdiction is shown to have been committed by the trial
court, the resolution of the trial court admitting secondary evidence
must be sustained. The remedy of the petitioner, after the admission
of the photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to
adduce his evidence, and if after trial, he is convicted, to appeal the

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THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 192274 February 8, 2012

NORBERTO LEE, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALLIED BANK, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Through this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, petitioner Norberto Lee (Lee)assails the October 26,
2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
106247, which dismissed his petition for certiorari under Rule 65
and affirmed the two (2) questioned interlocutory orders2 of the
public respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City
(RTC), in Criminal Case Nos. 00-1809 to 00-1816.

In the questioned interlocutory orders, the RTC denied Lees Motion

for Document and Handwriting Examination by the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) and his subsequent motion for the
reconsideration of the denial.

The Facts

Lee was the New Account Service Representative of Managers Check

and Gift Check Processor at the Cash Department of Allied Banking
Corporation (Allied Bank). The bank filed a complaint against him
alleging that, on several occasions, he forged the signatures of
responsible bank officers in several managers checks causing
damage and prejudice to it.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
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EVIDENCE CASES
After the requisite preliminary investigation, he was charged with
Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents which were
committed on separate dates involving separate instruments in eight
(8) Informations.3Except for the details, the Informations were
uniformly worded as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of May 1999, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused [petitioner], being then
the New Account Service Representative of Managers Check and Gift
Check Processor at Cash Department of complainant Allied Banking
Corporation, herein represented by Ketty Uy and taking advantage of
his position, by means of deceit and false pretenses and fraudulent
acts, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
said complainant in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
forged and falsified the signatures of Ketty Uy, Tess Chiong, Manuel
Fronda, the approving officers of complainant of the Man[a]gers
Check No. MC 0000473205 in the amount of P200,500.00 dated May
20, 1999 payable to Noli Baldonado which was issued
complainant-bank in favor of Filway Marketing, Inc., which is a
commercial document, by then and there making it appear that the
approving officers of complainant-bank had signed and approved the
said Managers Check when in truth and in fact said accused knew,
that the approving officers had not participated or intervened in the
signing of said managers check, thereafter the accused encashed the
said Managers Check and represented himself as the payee thereto
and received the amount of P 200,500.00 from complainant-bank
and then and there misappropriate, misapply and convert the same
to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
complainant Allied Banking Corporation, herein represented by Ketty
Uy in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On February 12, 2007, after the trial had started, Lee filed his Motion
for Document and Handwriting Examination by the NBI.5 In his
motion, he claimed, among others, that:
1. The record of the preliminary investigation of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati shows that Document Report No. 065-2000,
dated 16 June 2000, prepared by the officials of the Crime
Laboratory of the National Headquarters of the Philippine National
Police at Camp Came, Quezon City, excluded and failed to examine
the questioned and standard signatures of the accused in relation to
the questioned and standard documents and signatures of the other
signatories of the subject Allied Bank checks, application forms and
related documents.
xxxx
6. The accused [petitioner] is suspicious of the credibility, neutrality
and sincerity of the PNP Crime Laboratory examiners who had
submitted the Report because they seemed to have been prevailed
by upon and influenced by the officers of the Bank to conduct the
partial, biased and prejudiced examination without the participation
of and said notice to the accused.
7. In the interest of justice and fair play, there is a need for the
forensic laboratory of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct a new, confirmatory and independent document and
handwriting signature examination of the questioned and standard
documents and signatures of the concerned officers and staff of the
Bank and the Filway Marketing Inc., on one hand, and of the
accused, on the other, in a manner that is complete, comprehensive,
fair, neutral, transparent and credible.6
On August 22, 2007, the RTC, presided by Judge Tranquil P.
Salvador, Jr., denied Lees motion, stating that:
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EVIDENCE CASES
After due assessment of the assertions of the contending counsels, In his petition before the CA, Lee raised the sole issue of whether or
the Court is disinclined to grant instant motion. First, the trial of the not the two questioned interlocutory orders should be nullified for
case is already on-going and the accused has the option to utilize the having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
concerned NBI intended witness during the presentation of defense or excess of jurisdiction and in the interest of fair play, justice, due
evidence. And second, the Court is called upon to conduct its own process, and equal protection of the law.
evaluation of the questioned signature even with the opinion on the
Without disputing the late filing of his motion for reconsideration, Lee
matter coming from an NBI expert. For this purpose, the Court may
sought the CAs liberal interpretation of the rules and the need to
utilize, among others, the provisions of Sections 20 and 22, Rules of
decide his case on the merits. He insisted that it was legally and
Court, on the rules in authentication of private documents [Rule
physically impossible for him to secure an NBI witness without a
132].
compulsory judicial process or order.
"It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting
In the assailed October 26, 2009 decision, the CA dismissed Lees
experts, even those from the NBI and the PC, are not binding upon
petition and affirmed the RTC orders. It stated that procedural rules
[the] courts.
are not stringently applied when an imperative exists and a grave
Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged injustice may be committed if applied otherwise. Since, however, no
Documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing such imperative and grave injustice appeared in the case, the RTC
them. But resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable clearly did not gravely abuse its discretion on this point.
to the examination or the comparison of handwriting (Heirs of Severa
The CA further stated that the RTC did not err in denying petitioners
P. Gregorio vs. CA, 300 SCRA, December 1998) A finding of forgery
motion for document and handwriting examination by the NBI, as
does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts,
said motion was intended only to dispute the examination of
because the judge must conduct an independent examination on the
documents and handwritings conducted by the PNP Crime
questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as
Laboratory, which was a matter that may be exercised during the
to its authenticity. (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal
presentation of defense evidence.
Code, 2004 Ed., p. 428)."

The CA added that Lee could not claim deprivation of his life, liberty
Accordingly, defense motion for document and handwriting
and property with the denial of his motion as both Article III, Section
examination by the NBI is hereby DENIED.7
14(2) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 115(g) of the Rules of Court
Undaunted, Lee filed his Motion for Reconsideration8 on September guarantee his right to the courts compulsory processes to ensure the
26, 2007, or two (2) days after the reglementary period of 15 days. attendance of his witnesses and the production of evidence in his
For Lees failure to comply with the rules, the RTC, through Presiding behalf.
Judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, denied his motion for
reconsideration.
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EVIDENCE CASES
Lastly, the CA stated that the trial court did not err, much less
gravely, when it denied Lees motion for consideration because it was
filed out of time.
Persistent, Lee interposed this petition for review on certiorari raising
the following:
ISSUES9
1. Whether or not the RTC and the CA gravely erred in ignoring the
traditional "doctrine of liberality" in the interpretation and application
of mechanical rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not the petitioner was legally entitled to a new and
credible NBI document and handwriting examination of all the
relevant and material documents relative to the allegedly falsified
bank documents and checks with his full participation and
submissions, as part of his right to constitutional due process and
equal protection rights.
3. Did the RTC and CA gravely err in denying the petitioners motion
for a credible NBI document and handwriting examination?
4. Whether or not the RTC and the CA gravely erred in concluding
that the two (2) questioned interlocutory orders had attained
"finality," as if they partook of the legal nature of a "final and
executory judgment" or of a "final order."
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that the RTC
did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying the subject
motion and that the CA was correct in affirming the denial. The RTC
did not err either in turning down Lees motion for reconsideration for
being filed two days late.
Contrary to the claim of Lee, the RTC and the CA did not "ignore" the
traditional "doctrine of liberality" but merely relied upon the
guidelines as to when it is applicable and, after being so guided,
chose not to apply it under the existing circumstances. It is true that
rules of procedure may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure for persuasive and weights reasons. Concomitant to a
liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure, however, there should
be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately
explain his failure to abide by the rules.10 In this case, however, Lee
did not bother to offer any convincing reason for this Court to relax
the rules and just plainly sought its liberal interpretation. The Court,
in Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc v. Alberto J. Raza,11 stated:
To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made
without any valid reasons proffered for or underpinning it. To merit
liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its non-
compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the
outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of
substantive justice.12 Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly
rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal
construction.13 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june
2009/181688.htm - _ftn
At any rate, the Court does not perceive any injustice in the denial of
Lees motion. In fact, the RTC wrote that "the accused has the option
to utilize the concerned NBI intended witness during the presentation
of defense evidence."14 When his time comes to present evidence, Lee
can utilize the NBI by availing of the coercive power of the court.
The Court had the occasion to rule on an almost similar issue in Joey
P. Marquez v. Sandiganbayan,15 where the Court ordered the
Sandiganbayan to act favorably on the motion of the accused therein
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EVIDENCE CASES
to cause the NBI to examine the documents already submitted to the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization
court. In said case, the Court wrote: requests by the NBI from the beginning. Records of the case showed
that right upon his alleged discovery of the forged signatures, while
In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that
the case was still with the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), the
his signatures in the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
accused already sought referral of the disbursement vouchers,
authorizations were forged. It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery
purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI for
cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
examination. At that stage, OSP denied his plea. In the case at
convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
bench, the trial had already started and, worse, the accuseds motion
forgery.
for reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period.

Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the

At any rate, as earlier pointed out, the denial of his motion was
fact that his signatures were indeed forged. In order to be able to
without prejudice as the RTC stated that he could utilize the
discharge his burden, he must be afforded reasonable opportunity to
concerned NBI intended witness during the presentation of defense
present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the
evidence.
actual examination of the signatures he is questioning by no less
than the countrys premier investigative force the NBI. If he is WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 26, 2009
denied such opportunity, his only evidence on this matter is negative Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 106247 is
testimonial evidence which is generally considered as weak. And, he AFFIRMED.
cannot submit any other examination result because the signatures
SO ORDERED.
are on the original documents which are in the control of either the
prosecution or the graft court.

At any rate, any finding of the NBI will not be binding on the graft
court.1wphi1 It will still be subject to its scrutiny and evaluation in
line with Section 22 of Rule 132. Nevertheless, Marquez should not
be deprived of his right to present his own defense. How the
prosecution, or even the court, perceives his defense to be is
irrelevant. To them, his defense may seem feeble and his strategy
frivolous, but he should be allowed to adduce evidence of his own
choice. The court should not control how he will defend himself as
long as the steps to be taken will not be in violation of the rules.

The Marquez ruling, however, cannot be applied in this case. In

Marquez, the accused had requested for the examination of the
134