DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY

2017-18

Final Draft

Distinguish between De facto and De jure

recognition
Submitted to: Submitted by:

Mr.Manwendra kumar Tiwari Animesh Tiwari

Assistant Professor ( Law ) Roll No. 17, Semester-IV

RMLNLU Section - A
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I express my gratitude and deep regards to my teacher Mr.Manwendra Kumar Tiwari

for giving me such a challenging topic and also for his exemplary guidance, monitoring and
constant encouragement throughout the course of this thesis.

I also take this opportunity to express a deep sense of gratitude to my seniors in the college
for their cordial support, valuable information and guidance, which helped me in completing
this task through various stages.

I am obliged to the staff members of the Madhu Limaye Library, for the timely and valuable
information provided by them in their respective fields. I am grateful for their cooperation
during the period of my assignment.

Lastly, I thank almighty, my family and friends for their constant encouragement without
which this assignment would not have been possible.
 INDEX

INTRODUCTION
RECOGNITION
DE-FACTO RECOGNITION
DE-JURE RECOGNITION
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DE-FCTO
AND DE- JURE RECOGNITION
CONCLUSION
BIBLOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION:-
Recognition of a state is the act by which another state acknowledges that the political entity
recognized possesses the attributes of statehood. Fenwick also subscribes to the view that
through recognition the members of the international community acknowledge that a new state
has acquired international personality.According to kelsen, a state to be recognized must have
(1) The community must be politically organized

(2) It should have control over a definite territory.

(3) The community must be independent.

Recognition is more a question of policy rather than law e.g Recognition of Israel and P.R.China.
The great powers recognized Israel while its boundaries were not yet fully determined. The
Peoples Republic of China was not recognized by several states for several years although many
states had granted recognition to red China. Recognition once given cannot be withdrawn.
Recognition might be given individually by different states or by some collective international
act. Recognition of a country is not affected by change of govt.

Modes of Recognition:-
Recognition may be of two kinds- De facto and De jure. The practice of states shows that in the
first stage the state generally gives de facto recognition. Later on, when they are satisfied that the
recognized state is capable of fulfilling international obligation, they counter de recognition on it.
That is why, it is sometimes said, de facto recognition of state is a step towards de jure
recognition.1

De Facto Recognition-:
It means that state recognized posses the essential elements of statehood and is fit to be a subject
of International law .The provisionally grant; that is subject to fulfillment of all the attributes of
statehood of recognition to a new state which has acquired sufficient territory and control over
the same but the recognizing states consider it non stable it said to be de facto
recognition.According to Prof. G. Schwarzenberger, When a state wants to delay the de jure
recognition of any state, it may, in the first stage grant de facto recognition The reason for
granting de facto recognition is that it is doubted that the state recognized may be stable or it
may be able and willing to fulfill its obligation under international law. Besides this, it is also
possible that the state recognized may refuse to solve its main problems. De facto recognition

1 Dr.S.K.kapoor, International Law and Human Rights, Central Law Agency ed 2016,161.
means that the state recognized possesses the essential elements of statehood and is fit to be a
subject of international law. However, the effects of de jure recognition are more far reaching. In
the words of Oppenheim , The de facto recognition of a state or government takes place when,
in the view of the recognizing state the new authority actually although independent and
wielding effective power in the territory under its control, has not acquired sufficient stability or
does not yet offer prospects of complying other requirements of recognition such as, willingness
or ability to fulfill international obligations. In the view of Judge Lauterpacht, de facto
recognition shows that the recognizing state wants to establish its relations with the recognized
state without establishing diplomatic relations.

De Jure Recognition-:
De jure recognition is granted when in the opinion of recognizing state, the recognized state or
its Government possesses all the essentials requirement of statehood, and it is capable of being a
member of the international community. As pointed out by Prof.H.A. Smith, the British practice
shows that the three conditions precedents are required for the grant of de jure recognition of a
new state or new government. The three conditions are as (1) A reasonable assurance of stability
and permanence; (2) The Government should command the general support of the population;
and (3) It should be able and willing to fulfill its international obligations. Further Recognition
de jure results from an expressed declaration or from a positive act indicating clearly the
intention to grant this recognition such as the establishment of diplomatic relations. De jure
recognition is final, and once given cannot be withdrawn. As pointed out earlier, for de jure
recognition and the intention to establish diplomatic relations are necessary.2

Difference between De facto and de jure recognition:-

De facto recognition of states, rather than de jure, is rare. De jure recognition is stronger,
while de facto recognition is more tentative and recognizes only that a government
exercises control over a territory. example is the state of Israel in 1948, whose government

2 Dr.S.K.kapoor, International Law and Human Rights, Central Law Agency ed 2016,161.
was immediately recognized de facto by the United States and three days later by Soviet de
jure recognition. Also, the Republic of China, commonly known as "Taiwan", is generally
recognized as de facto independent and sovereign, but is not universally recognized as de
jure independent due to the complex political status of Taiwan related to the United
Nation's de-recognization of it in favor of the People's Republic of China in 1971.3

Further stated by Miss Marjorie Whiteman, the assistant legal advisor state in her volume II of
her work, of a difference in the character of recognition, i.e., de facto and de jure recognition.

According to her the terms de facto and de jure refer only the character of the government and
not to the character of recognition. 4 This view disagrees with the position that different legal and
political consequences flow from de facto and de jure recognition by denying the latter
distinction. Mr. Leonard Meeker, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, in an interview
with the author in March, 1966, said that he was "not sure" if there was a difference between de
facto and de jure recognition. Mr. Meeker then cited the case of the recognition of Israel in 1948
as an example of an instance when, for a time, "something less than de jure recognition might
have been in- tended.'" The significance of the case of Israel to the discussion necessitates a brief
review of the situation. The British Mandate over the area that was to become the Jewish state of
Israel was to end on May 14, 1948. That morning the Provisional Government of Israel sent a
note to President Truman assuring him that the government had been "charged to assume the
rights and duties of government" for that state and to discharge its international obligations.
President Truman replied to the note that same day announcing that: This country recognizes the
Provisional Government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel. When a permanent
government is elected in Israel it will promptly be given de jure recognition. The statement
definitely appears to indicate something less than the traditional concept of "de jure recognition."
However, Philip Jessup, the Deputy United States Representative in the Security Council said in
December, 1948, "the United States extended immediate and full recognition to the state of Israel

3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomatic_recognition.para4.

4 Whiteman, Digest International law .source The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Apr.,
1968), pp. 457-460
Published by: American Society of International Law.jstor
as a de facto authority of the new state.", The extension of "full recognition" indicates the
traditional concept of "de jure recognition," while de facto authority describes the type of power
the government enjoyed. Further uncertainty was caused by a White House Press Release which
announced that "de jure recognition" had been extended as of January 31 5. The release read: On
October 24, 1948, the President stated that when a permanent government was elected in Israel,
it would promptly be given de jure recognition. Elections for such a government were held on
January 25. . . . The United States Government is therefore pleased to extend de jure recognition
to the Government of Israel as of January 31.9 Miss Whiteman includes a description of the case
of Israel in Volume II of her Digest, but does not interpret it in the light of her statement that
recognition is granted per se. In reply to a private letter of inquiry regarding this case, Miss
Whiteman wrote: . . . in the instance of Israel, U. S. officials repeatedly stated that the United
States "recognizes" the provisional government as the "de facto authority" of Israel. The note of
May 14, 1948 so stated, and it was followed by at least two other statements to the same effect....
The implication of the wording of the White House Press Release . . . was confusing. The May
1948 "recognition" had not been de- scribed as "de facto recognition." . . . I feel that a lot of
people have been using "de facto" recognition when what they were referring to was recognition
of a "de facto government." This is clearly a denial that the recognition of Israel was ever
anything less than full and complete recognition. Most authoritative writers on the subject would
tend to agree with Miss Whiteman that there is no difference in legal effect between recognition
which is labeled "de jure recognition" and recognition which is labeled "de facto recognition."
Indeed there is little evidence to support the position that there is a legal difference. Some
writers, however, maintain that de facto and de jure recognition are distinct legal acts justifiable
under different circumstances and producing different legal results. Proponents of this distinction
maintain that de jure recognition allows a government to "represent the State in matters of State
succession and otherwise," while de facto recognition does not.' This does not appear to be the
case, though, as the Soviet Government's contention in 1922 that it could not be held liable for
the debts of its predecessors until it had been extended de jure recognition was not accepted by
the other world Powers at the time.' But since the succession to liabilities is the same, whether de
facto or de jure recognition is extended, it cannot be argued consistently that a difference arises
5 Whiteman, Digest 169. Referred The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Apr., 1968), pp.
457-460 Published by: American Society of International Law.
in the succession to rights. It has also been held by this school of thought that "de facto
recognition" is provisional while "de jure recognition" is not. However, the position of the State
Department at the First Meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists at Rio de Janeiro in
1950 was that recognition is irrevocable, and the severance of diplomatic relations after
recognition has been granted does not constitute revocation. The binding effect of recognition
may be terminated only if the community recognized ceases to fulfill the requirements for
recognition as a state (or government) in international law, or by the recognition of a successor to
the previously recognized entity. Many authorities have held that if the legal differences are open
to question, there are political differences. The most important political dif- ference between de
facto and de jure recognition, they contend, is that it denotes the status of political relations
between the parties involved. De jure recognition reflects an intimate relationship between the
Powers, while de facto recognition lacks this intimacy. This argument seems to miss the point,
since the relations between communities are determined by the circumstances peculiar to their
relationship, not by the character of recognition. For example, the United States may have
serious misgivings concerning the manner in which a government has come to power, as well as
its foreign policy; nevertheless our interests may best be served by recognizing it and entering
intimate relations with it. The recognition in itself should not be considered either approval or
disapproval of the government. Whatever the merits of the arguments for or against the
distinction between de facto and de jure recognition, it is clear that the difference, if any, is
becoming less clear. Research by the writer has shown that nothing less than full recognition has
been extended to states and governments since the questionable case of Israel. The existence of
de facto recognition is becoming a moribund issue simply by not being raised as a possibility by
the government. 6

The familiar and confusing distinction between de facto and de jure recognition is made even
more confusing in a recent British decision, The Arantzazu Mendi. The failure to understand the
distinction between de facto recognition of a new state or government and de jure recognition,
has been in part caused by a careless use of terms. "The subject has been unduly complicated,"
writes Borchard, "by the chameleonic uses of the term de facto, which has been applied

6 The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Apr., 1968), pp. 457-460Published by: American
Society of International Law.
promiscuously to de facto authorities in the field, to governments not established by
constitutional methods, and as an adjective to qualify recognition. In The Arantzazu Mendi we
find Slesser, L. J., for the Court of Appeal, quoting Bankes, L. J., in Luther v. Sagor, who quoted
Montague Bernard that "A de jure government is one which, in the opinion of the person using
the phrase, ought to possess the powers of sovereignty, though at the time it may be deprived of
them. A de facto government is one which is really in possession of them, although the
possession may be wrong- full or precarious.7. The de facto or de jure character of a government
depends exclusively upon the constitutional law of the state concerned. As far as international
law and the recognizing state are concerned, a de facto government is a de jure government.
Foreign offices and diplomats frequently employ the terms de facto and de jure to describe the
nature of the recognition accorded to foreign states and governments. The formula frequently
used is that a particular government is "recognized as the de facto government of X." A survey
of state practice shows clearly that when for reasons of policy-e.g., doubt as to the stability of a
de facto regime, fear of resentment by the former regime or the mother country, or dislike of the
political ideology of the de facto regime-the chancelleries recognize a regime "as the de facto
government of X" they really intend to qualify recognition. "De facto recognition" appears to be
a phrase coined by international lawyers to refer to a diplomatic procedure in which, for political
reasons, recognition of a new state or government is regarded as qualified. The expressions in the
question posed above are thus largely interchangeable. Granting the political or diplomatic
advantages of a distinction between de facto and de jure recognition, it appears, nevertheless,
that the legal consequences of de facto and de jure recognition are essentially the same. The
distinction is thus properly a political rather than a juridical distinction, for example, refers to the
distinction as "diplomatic," and adds that "there is no legal difference between these two forms."
Erich terms de facto recognition "a purely political expedient" which takes into consideration
the possible reestablishment of the status quo ante and is thus "imperfect, incomplete, and
conditional." Strupp adds that de facto recognition is "provisional" and "limited." Raestad,' after
defining de jure recognition as full recognition, distinguishes at least two forms of de facto
recognition, one of which is full recognition, but provisional only and, therefore, de facto; and
the other, though not provisional in the former sense, is nevertheless limited in scope to certain
juridical relationships. Sir John Fischer Williamss states: "The words de jure add nothing in
7 Public international law by Alina kacorowska, old balley press,page 81
practice to recognition itself, except as a courtesy with perhaps an assurance that recognition will
not be withdrawn." Similarly, Erich writes that by international custom de facto and de jure
recognition have the same juridical consequences. Salvioli states that "even de facto recognition
is strictly recognition de jure, since juridical consequences flow even from de facto recognition."
Of the same opinion are such otherwise divergent scholars as Baty,' who writes that "de facto
recognition is properly the full and complete recognition of a state or government de facto (and,
therefore, de jure) independent and supreme within an ascertained area," and Scelle, who states
that "it is not recognition which is de facto or de jure. Recognition is always de jure and always
attests a juridical competence: it is the government which is de facto or de jure and one can only
recognize its restricted or plenary competence." For many years British courts have refused to
admit that de facto and de jure recognition differ in legal consequences. For example, in Luther
v. Sagor, Bankes, L. J., specifically rejected a contention by counsel that al- though de jure
recognition was retroactive in effect, de facto recognition was not. "For some purposes," he said,
"no doubt a distinction can be drawn between the effect of the recognition by a sovereign state of
the one form of government or of the other, but for the present purpose in my opinion no
distinction can be drawn." The British Government had informed the court "that His Majesty's
Government recognize the Soviet Government as the de facto Government of Russia" and
Bankes concluded that, therefore, "the acts of that [Soviet] Government must be treated by the
courts of this country with all the respect due to the acts of a duly recognized foreign sovereign
state." In the same case, Warrington, L. J., was of the opinion that "there is no difference for the
present purpose between a government recognized as such de jure and one recognized de facto.
In the latter case, as well as in the former, the government in question acquires the right to be
treated by the recognizing state as an independent sovereign state, and none the less that our
Government does not pretend to express any opinion on the legality or otherwise of the means by
which its power has been obtained." In the light of the foregoing discussion, the case of The
Arantzazu Mendi will now be examined. The material facts may be summarized as follows: The
Arantzazu Mendi, a privately owned Spanish ship registered at Bilbao, was requisitioned by a
decree of the Spanish Government on June 28, 1937. On that date Bilbao was in the hands of the
Franco insurgents and the vessel was on the high seas. On August 11, 1937, the vessel arrived in
London, her owners issued a writ in rem for possession, and the Admiralty marshal arrested the
ship on August 24, 1937. To this writ the Spanish Government entered a conditional appearance.
On April 5, 1938, the Franco agent in London served notice on the owners that the vessel was
requisitioned by the Franco insurgents. Her owners and master chose to recognize the Franco
requisition, consented to it in notarial declarations, and the owners' possession action was
discontinued. The vessel remained under arrest. The same day, April 13, 1938, the Spanish
Government issued a writ in rem to have possession of the Arantzazu Mendi8 adjudged to them.
The Franco insurgents-called "the Nationalist Government of Spain" by the court- entered a
conditional appearance to set the writ aside on the ground that it impleaded a foreign sovereign
state which was unwilling to submit to the jurisdiction of the court. The hearing came before
Bucknill, J., of the Probate Division, who directed an enquiry to the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs in the following terms: "whether the Nationalist Government of Spain is
recognised by His Majesty's Government as a foreign sovereign state." The reply of the Foreign
Office, by direction of Viscount Halifax, and under date of May 28, 1938, was as follows:

(1) His Majesty's Government recognise Spain as a foreign sovereign state. (2) His Majesty's
Government recognises the Government of the Spanish Republic now having its seat in
Barcelona as the de jure Government of Spain. (3) No Government other than that referred
to in the preceding sub- paragraph is recognised by His Majesty's Government as the de jure
Government of Spain or any part thereof.(4) The Nationalist Government of Spain is a
Government in conflict with the Government of the Spanish Republic established at Barce-
lona. It claims to be the Government of Spain and is seeking to overthrow the Government
of the Spanish Republic and to establish its authority over the whole of Spain. (5) His
Majesty's Government recognises the Nationalist Government as a Government which at
present exercises de facto administrative control over the larger portion of Spain. (6) His
Majesty's Government recognise that the Nationalist Government now exercises effective
administrative control over all the Basque Provinces of Spain. (7) His Majesty's Government
have not accorded any other recognition to the Nationalist Government. (8) The Nationalist
Government is not a Government subordinate to any other Government in Spain. (9) The
question whether the Nationalist Government is to be regarded as that of a foreign sovereign

8 24 The Arantzazu Mendi, [1938] P. 233; affirmed by Court of Appeal, [1939] P. 37; affirmed
by House of Lords, [19391 A. C. 256, this JOURNAL, Vol. 33 (1939 referred The American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Oct., 1939), pp. 689-699
Published by: American Society of International Law
 state appears to be a question of law to be answered in the light of the preceding statements
and having regard to the particular issue with respect to which the question is raised.
Confronted with this remarkable document, Mr. Justice Bucknill proceeded to accept
without question the implication found in paragraph (9) of the Foreign Office reply that
whether Great Britain had recognized the Franco insurgents as the government of a foreign
state was a question of law rather than a question of fact. After this admission it is not,
perhaps, surprising to find him implying that whether a particular regime is the government
of a foreign state is a question of English law. The "question of law" before the court, he
said, was "whether these facts as proved by the letter from the Foreign Office of May 28
constitute, according to English law, the Nationalist Government as a foreign sovereign
state." The court admitted that the position of the British Foreign Office was somewhat
unneutral ; and it did seem "a contradiction in terms that there should be two sovereign
governments in Spain, where formerly there was only one such state," but, concluded
Bucknill, J., "I think that there may be, in the eyes of the law, two sovereigns, one de facto
and one de jure, in the same country. It seems to me that the law, based on the reality of facts
material to the particular case, must regard as having the essentials of sovereignty a
government in effective administrative control over the territory in question and not
subordinate to any other government, because their decrees are the only legal authority
which governs the area to which the subject matter of the dispute belongs." The decision
reached by the court-"that the Nationalist Government of Spain in law is for the purposes of
this case a foreign sovereign state" was based on two points: a reciprocity argument, and a
quotation from the Banco de Bilbao case. The reciprocity argument was that since the
Franco regime had the "sole administrative and judicial control in its own territory" and "is
able to extend reciprocal immunity from legal process in its Courts to the property of
another sovereign state," therefore it must be an independent state "in law." In the Banco de
Bilbao9 case, the issue, so far as here relevant, was as to the effect to be given in an English
court to certain decrees of the Spanish Government with reference to the Bank of Bilbao, at
a time when Bilbao was in the hands of the Franco insurgents. In that case also the British

9 Banco de Bilbao v. Sancha; Same v. Rey, [1938] 2 K. B. 176. Refferd The American Journal
of International Law, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Oct., 1939), pp. 689-699
Published by: American Society of International Law
 Foreign Office had informed the court that "His Majesty's Government recognize the
Spanish Republican Government with its seat in Valencia or Barcelona as the de jure
Government of the whole of Spain, but at the same time recognize the insurgent
Government of General Franco as the Government de facto of the area in which Bilbao is
situate." In deciding the Banco de Bilbao case for the Court of Appeal, Clauson, L. J., said
in part: . . . this court is bound to treat the acts of the government which His Majesty's
Government recognize as the de facto government of the area in question as acts which
cannot be impugned as the acts of an usurping government, and conversely the court must
be bound to treat the acts of a rival government claiming jurisdiction over the same area,
even if the latter government be recognized by His Majesty's Government as the de jure
government of the area, as a mere nullity, and as matters which cannot be taken into account
in any way in any of His Majesty's courts. The confusion of "state," "government On appeal
to the Court of Appeal the judgment of Bucknill, J., was affirmed. Slesser, L. J., was a purist,
and he regretted that the court be- low, and even the Foreign Office, had fallen into the "evil
practice" of saying loosely that "the Foreign Office, or the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, recognises, or does not recognise," when "it is, of course, clear . . . that the
recognition rests with His Majesty, and with His Majesty alone." How- ever, that did not
"impeach the validity of the answer which was received from the Foreign Office" and on
this point Slesser, L. J., thought that "the answers require this court to say that His Majesty
has recognised the Nationalist Government of Spain as the government of a foreign
sovereign state." Whatever doubts there may formerly have been on this point were
determined by Luther v. Sagor10 and the Banco de Bilbao case. Counsel challenged the
applicability of these cases, however, and Slesser said (though not in crystal-clear phrases) :
Even if there was no authority to that effect, I should myself un- hesitatingly take the view
that, once it is found as a fact that within certain boundaries, whatever they may be-and here
we are told that they at least include the whole of the Basque Provinces-that there was a de
facto government, the mere fact that there was another government, claiming to be the de
jure government, in that area, in the unit which is called Spain, if it be a unit, would not

10 1921 kb (C.A)REFERRED The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Oct.,
1939), pp. 689-699
Published by: American Society of International Law
deprive the court of the duty of finding, on that statement, that that de facto government
which points to some orderly and organised institution-is so organised in that area, although
fluctuating, as to possess the powers of a state. In those circumstances, I think that it is a
proper conclusion that the Spanish Nationalist Government has been recognised by His
Majesty de facto, and must be regarded by the court as a sovereign state. In concurring
opinions, Finlay and Goddard, L.JJ., were of the same opinion, but Goddard added that it
would be nice "where a court propounds a question of this sort to the Secretary of State " if a
" clear answer " could be given, whereas in this case "the answer was given in nine
paragraphs." However; he continued, "we are informed . . . with sufficient clearness, though
I could wish with a little more directness, that there is a de facto Government in the
Nationalist Government of Spain, and, accordingly, we are bound by authority to hold that
for all purposes the consequences are the same as they would be if the government were a de
jure government." An appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed in February, 1939, and
the previous decisions were affirmed.' Mr. G. St. C. Pilcher contended for the appellants that
the reply of the Foreign Office did not establish that the Franco regime was a foreign
sovereign state; the Foreign Office regarded Spain as one state; sovereignty pertains to a
state, not to a government, and the Foreign Office reply should be interpreted with this in
mind; "the letter to the Foreign Office invited a plain answer to a plain question, but the
answer given is the reverse of plain; . . . if the answer is ambiguous, it should be referred
back, or the House should say that recognition has not been established." These arguments
evidently failed to impress Lord Atkin, who wrote the opinion for the House of Lords. He
felt that paragraphs 5, 6, and 8 of the Foreign Office reply "dispose of the controversy," and
added: By " exercising de facto administrative control " or " exercising effective
administrative control," I understand exercising all the functions of a sovereign government,
in maintaining law and order, instituting and maintaining courts of justice, adopting or
imposing laws regulating the relations of the inhabitants of the territory to one another and
to the government. . . . In those circumstances it seems to me that the recognition of a
government as possessing all those attributes in a territory while not subordinate to any other
government in that territory is to recognize it as sovereign, and for the purposes of inter-
national law as a foreign sovereign state. He concluded, therefore: There is ample authority
for the proposition that there is no difference for the present purposes between recognition
of a state de facto as opposed to de jure. The House of Lords abandoned the attempts of the
lower courts to stretch The Gagara, Luther v. Sagor, or Banco de Bilbao v. Sancha to cover
the decisions in this case, and decided on the basis of their interpretation of the Foreign
Office letter. They apparently regarded the Foreign Office as saying: "His Majesty's
Government has recognized something called the Nationalist Government of Spain as a
government which exercises de facto administrative control over the larger portion of Spain
and which is not in fact subordinate to any other government in Spain. Whether what we've
recognized is the government of a state is for you to decide: it's a question of law." How did
the court decide this "question of law?" They said, in effect: A government which is
recognized as having as much power as the Foreign Office letter attributes to the Nationalist
Government, must be a state; therefore we must grant this recognized de facto government
the same immunities we should grant a recognized de jure government; and, besides, it can
grant us reciprocal immunity; and if we take jurisdiction over Franco's property he may have
a "feeling of injured pride" and may attack us. Leaving aside the purely extraneous-and
highly improper-considerations of reciprocity of immunity, "injured pride," and "risk of
belligerent action, " it would seem to the writer that the correct interpretation of the Foreign
Office letter would be that Spain had been recognized by His Miajesty's Government as a
sovereign state and the government having its seat at Barcelona had been recognized as the
de jure government of that state, i.e., its government had been recognized de jure. This
would seem to dispose of the issue. If the de jure government was recognized as the
Government of Spain, the Franco r6gime did not represent a state recognized by Great
Britain. The remaining portions of the Foreign Office letter would merely indicate to the
court the following facts: that a rather successful revolt against the recognized Government
of Spain was taking place; that H. M. Government recognized that a rival government had
displaced the recognized government in that portion of Spain it held by force of arms; that
H. M. Government recognized the rival government as a government which in fact exercised
administrative control over most of Spain, including Bilbao; but that whether this rival
government is, or is recognized by H. M. Gov- The court should, therefore, have said that
the recognition of the Franco regime as the government of a state had not been established,
and paragraphs (1) and (2) seemed to establish the contrary. This may be a matter of opinion.
On one point, however, the court was on firm ground, viz., in its refusal to distinguish
 between the legal effects of de facto and de jure recognition. If, indeed, the British
Government had recognized the Franco regime as the de facto government of the sovereign
state of Spain, the de facto government-i.e., Spain-would be entitled to the immunity
claimed in a British court. The disturbing feature of this case, however, was that the
precedents which refused to distinguish between the legal consequences of de facto and de
jure recognition envisaged a situation in which the de jure, or alternatively, the de facto,
government was recognized as the sole government of the particular state recognized.

CONCLUSION:-
In legal point of view there is hardly any difference between de jure and de facto recognition
of state ,for the retroactivity of de jure recognition dates back to its de facto recognition and
also depend on the recognizing state means can say that sate which has power or on their
interest. De facto recognition can be withdrawn and there is no exchange of diplomatic
relation but in de jure recognition it cant be withdrawn. De jure recognition is final whereas
de facto is provisional.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:-
 Public international law by Alina kaczorowska, old balley press
International law and human rights by Dr. S.K. Kapoor, central law agency

Journal:-

The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Apr., 1968), pp.
457-460 JSTOR Author Charles L. Cochran
The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Oct., 1939), pp.
689-699 JSTOR Author(s): Herbert W. Briggs

Other resource :-

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomatic_recognition.