XXXVIII

THE BLOOD TEST

HE New Year's light of 1916 rising upon a frantic and miserable
world revealed in its full extent the immense battlefield to which
liurope was reduced and on which the noblest nations of Christendom
rrringled in murderous confusion. It was now certain that the struggle
wruld be prolonged to an annihilating conclusion. The enormous forces
,u either side were so well matched that the injuries they must suffer
rrnd inflict in their struggles were immeasurable. There was no escape.
All the combatants in both combinations were gripped in a vice from
which no single State could extricate itself.
The northern Provinces of France, invaded and in German occupa-
lion, inspired the French people with a cornmanding impulse to drive the
cnemy from their soil. The trench lines on which the armies were in
rlcadlock ran-not along the frontiers, where perhaps parley would not
Itave been impossible-but through the heart of France. The appeal to
clear the national territory from foreign oppression went home to every
cottage and steeled every heart. Germany on the other hand, while her
armies stood almost everywhere on conquered territory, could not in the
full flush of her strength yield what she had gained with so much blood,
nor pay forfeit for her original miscalculations, nor make reparation for
the wrong she had done. Any German Dynasty or Government which
had proposed so wise and righteous a course would have been torn to
pieces. The French losses and the German conquests of territory thus
crlually compelled a continuance of the struggle by both nations. A
sinrilar incentive operated upon Russia; and in addition the belief that
rlefeat meant revolution hardened all governing resolves. In Britain
obligations of honour to her sufrering Allies, and particularly to Belgium,
forbade the slightest suggestion of slackening or withdrawal. And behind
this decisive claim of honour there welled up from the heart of the island
race a fierce suppressed passion and resolve for victory at all costs and at
all risks, latent since the downfall of Napoleon.
Not less peremptory were the forces dominating the other parties to
the struggle. Italy had newly entered the war upon promises which
offerecl her a dazzling reward. These promises were embodied in the pact
557
r 558 THE WORLD CRISIS
of London. They involved conditions to which Austria-Hungary could
never submit without final ruin as a great power. The acceptance by
Britain and France of the Russian claim to constantinople condemnoi
Turkey to a similar fate. Failure meant therefore to both the Austria[
and the Turkish Empires not only defeat but dissolution. As for Bul.
garia, she could only expect from the victory of the Allies the dirc
measure she had meted to Serbia.
Thus in every quarter the stakes were desperate or even mortar; and
each of the vast confederacies was riveted together within itself and each
part chained to its respective foe by bonds which only the furnace of wa!
could fuse or blast away.
*****
Itis necessary in this chapter to ask the reader, before the campaigfl
of 1916 begins, to take a somewhat statistical view of the whole war in
the west, and to examine its main episodes in their character, proportiofl
and relation.
Germany and France rushed upon each other, grappled furiously, breik
apart for a brief space, endeavoured vainly to outflank each other, closecl
again in desperate conflict, broke apart once more, and then from tho
taneously engaged as in r9t4 in a decisive struggre. rn short, the war in
the west resolved itself into two periods of supreme battle, dividecl from
each other by a three-years' siege.
t.-
The scale and intensity of the First Shock in rgr4 has not been fully
realised even by the well-instructed French public, and is not at all
uncler.
stood in England. At the beginning all totals of casualties were slrp.
pressed in every combatant country by a vigorous censorship. Latcr on
in the war when more was known, no one had time to rook back iu tlto
midst of new perils to the early days; and since the war no true imlrrel.
sion has ever reached the public. British eyes have been fixcd .,pori tho
vivid pictures of Lidge, Mons and Le Cateau, that part of thc Bittle eif
THE BLOOD TEST 559
the Marne which occurred near Paris, and the desperate struggle round
Ypres. The rest lies in a dark background, which it is now possible to
illuminate.
In the first three months of actual fighting from the last week in
August to the end of November, when the German drive against the
Channel ports had come to an end and the first great invasion was defi-
nitely arrested, the French lost in killed, prisoners and wounded 854,ooo'
rnen. fn the same period the small British Army, about one-seventh of
the French fighting strength, lost 85,ooo' men, making a total Allied loss
of 939,ooo. Against this, in the same period, the Germans lost 677,ooo."
The fact that the Germans, although invading and presumably attacking,
inflicted greater slaughter than they suffered, is due to the grave errors in
doctrine, training and tactics of the French army and to the unsound
strategic dispositions of General Joffre. But more than four-fifths of the
French losses were sustained in the trirst Shock. In the fighting from
August 2r, when the main collision occurred, down to September rz,
when the victory of the Marne was definitely accomplished (a period of
scarcely three weeks), the French armies lost nearly 33o,ooo men killed
or prisoners, of more than one-sixth of their total loss in killed or pris-
oners during the whole fifty-two months of the war. To these permanent
losses should be added about z8o,ooo wounded, making a total for this
brief period of over 6o0,ooo casualties to the French armies alone; and
of this terrific total three-fourths of the loss was inflicted from August
2r to 24, and from September 5 to 9, that is to say, in a period of less
than eight days.
Nothing comparable to this concentrated slaughter was sustained by
any combatant in so short a time, not even excluding the first Russian
disasters, nor the final phase on the Western Front in r9r8. That the
French Army should have survived this frightful butchery, the glaring
miscalculations which caused it, and the long and harassed retreats by
which it was attended, and yet should have retained the fighting qualities
which rendered a sublime recovery possible, is the greatest proof of their
martial fortitude and devotion which History will record. Had this
heroic army been handled in the First Shock with prudence, on a wise
strategic scheme, and with practical knowledge of the effects of modern
firearms and the use of barbed wire and entrenchments, there is no reason
to doubt that the German invasion could have been brought to a stand-
still after suffering enormous losses within from thirty to fifty kilometres
of the French frontiers. Instead, as events were cast, the French Army
a
Journal Off.ciel Documen Mars zg, tgao.
'Military Effort ol the Br nthlv Returns.
I German Federal Archives
56o THE WORLD CRISIS
in the first few weeks of the war received wounds which were nearly
fata7, and never curable.
of these the gravest was the loss of regular regimental officers, who
sacrificed themselves with unbounded devotion. In many battalions only
two or three officers survived the opening battres. The cadres of tho
whole French Army were seriously injured by the wholesale destruction
of the trained professional element. The losses which the French suffered
in the years which followed were undoubtedly aggravated by this im.
poverishment of military knowledge in the fighting units. Although the
Germans are accustomed to bewail their own heavy losses of officers in
the opening battles, their injury was not so deep, and until after the
Ludendorfr offensives they always possessed the necessary professional
staff to teach and handle successive intakes of recruits.
After the situation was stabilised at the end of November, the long
period of Siege warfare on the \Mestern Front began. The Germans
fortified themselves on French and Belgian soil, along a line chosen for
its superior railway network, and the Allies for more than three years
endeavoured, with unvarying failure, to break their front and force them
to retreat.
In all, five great Allied assaults were made.
(i) By the French in Champagne and Artois, in the spring and early
summer of r9r5.
(ii) By the French in Champagne during the late autumn ancl
winter of r9rg, and by the British simultaneously at Loos.
(iii) By the British and French on the Somme from July to october,
r9r6.
(i") By the British at Arras and by the French on the Aisne, fronr
April to luly, r9t7, and
(") By the British virtually alone at passchendaele in the autumn
and winter ol ryr7.
In these siege-offensives which occupied the years r9r5, 1916 and
r9r7 the French and British Armies consumed themselves in vain, and
suffered as will be seen nearly double the casualties inflicted on the
Germans. In this same period the Germans made only one great counter.
offensive stroke: Falkenhayn's prolonged attack on verdun in the spring
o'f 1916. The special features which this operation presented will bi
related in their place.
These sanguinary prodigious struggles, extending over many months,
are often loosely described as 'Battles.' Judging by the number of men
who took their turn in the fighting at different times, by the immense
quantities of guns and shells employed, and by the hideous casualty totals,
THE BLOOD TEST 56r
they certainly rank, taken each as a whole, among the largest events of
rnilitary history. But we must not be misled by terminology. If to call
them 'battles' were merely a method of presenting a general view of an
otherwise confusing picture, it might well pass unchallenged. But an
attempt has been made by military Commanders and by a whole school
of writers to represent these prolonged operations, as events comparablc
to the decisive battles of the past, only larger and more important. To
yield to this specious argument is to be drawn into a wholly wrol1g
impression, both of military science and of what actually took place irr
the Great War.
What is a battle? I wrote on March 5, r9r8:'War between equals in
power should be a succession of climaxes on which everything is
staked, towards which everything tends and from which permanent
decisions are obtained. These climaxes have usually been called battles.
A battle means that the whole of the resources on either side that can
be brought to bear are, during the course of a single episode, concentrated
upon the enemy.' The scale of a battle must bear due proportion to the
whole fighting strength of the armies. Five divisions engaged out of an
army of seven may fight a battle. But the same operation in an army
of seventy divisions, although the suffering and slaughter are equal,
sinks to the rank of a petty combat. A succession of such combats aug-
ments the losses without raising the scale of events.
t
fro
sffiffiffirTiffito attack the exposed flank or rear of his centre; or
by piercing his centre we gain the possibility of rolling up his flanks; or
by capturing a certain hill we command his lines of communication. But
none of these consequential advantages will be gained, if the time taken
in the preliminary operations is so long that the enemy can make new
dispositions-if, for instance, he can bend back his lines on each side of
the rupture and fortify them, or if he can withdraw his army before tl-re
hill is taken which would command his communications. If he has timc
to take such measures effectively, the first battle is over; and the second
stage involves a second battle. Now the amount of tirne required l:y the
cnemy is not indefinite. One night is enough to enable a new positiorr to
be entrenched and organised. In forty-eight hours the railways can bring
large reinforcements of men and guns to any threatened point. l.hg
 THE WORLD CRISIS THE BLOOD TEST 563
s6z
consisting of detached episodes extending over months and divided by succession of attacks delivered only by from 5 to 15 British divi-
intervals during which a series of entirely new situations are created, how' sions.
ever great their scale, cannot be compared-to take some modern instanceg I wrote in October, r9r7: 'success will only be achieved by the scale
Blenheim, Rossbach, Austerlitz, \Materloo, Gettysburg, Sedan,
-with
the Marne, or Tannenberg.
The real Battle crises of the Great War stand out from the long seriet
of partial, though costly, operations, not only by the casualties but by thc
number of divisions simultaneously engaged on both sides. In r9t4,
during the four days from August 2r to 24 inclusive, 8o German divi.
sions were engaged with 6z French, 4 British and 6 Belgian divisions,
The four decisive days of the Marne, September 6 to g inclusive, involved
approximately the same numbers. Practically all the reserves were throwft
in on both sides, and the whole strength of the armies utilised to the
utmost. The operations in Artois in the spring of r9r5, which lasted
three months and cost the French 45o,ooo men,' never presented a single
occasion where more than r 5 divisions were simultaneously engaged on
either side. The Battle of Loos-Champagne, beginning on September 2Sl
r9r5, comprised an attack by ++ French and r5 British divisions (total
g9) upon approximately 3o German divisions. But within three days tho
decisive battle-period may be said to have passed, and the numbers en.
gaged on the Anglo-French side were reduced rapidly. r916 was occupied
by Verdun and the Somme. In this year of almost continuous fighting,
in which more than two and a half million British, French and German
soldiers were killed or wounded, there is only one single day, July r, on
the Somme, where as many as zz Allied divisions were engaged simul.
taneously. The rest of the Somme with all its slaughter contained no
operations involving more than r8 Allied divisions, and in most cases thc
time was occupied by combats between 3 or 4 British or French divisions at last a decision was reached'
with less than half that number of the enemy. In the whole of the so.
called 'Battle of Verdun'there were never engaged on any single day more
than 14 French and German divisions, and the really critical opening
attack by which the fate of the Fortress was so nearly sealed was con.
ducted by not more than 6 German divisions against 2 or 3 French. Itt
t9r7, with the accession of General Nivelle to the French command, afl
attempt was made to launch a decisive operation, and the French engaged
in a single day, though with disastrous results, as many as z8 divisiong,
Thereafter the operations dwindled again into sanguinary insignificance,
The autumn fighting in Flanders by the British Army produced a long
I This figure and other similar figures include the normal wastage of trench warfaro
on the quiet portions of the Iront. The official statistics do not enable me to distingulch
between the actual battle Iront and the ordinary front. A unilorm deduction of one. 328 between March zr
eighth would probably be sufficiently correct in all cases. Witll Ludenclorff in IgIB we reach the figure of
 s6q THE WORLD CRISIS THE BLOOD TEST s6s

and 28. All through the summer of rgr8 the weeks repeatedly show 3oo B. IPSSES ON THE \ryESTERN FRONTJ
in los?ibt, missitg, ptisn*s aill uutilctl' incluiling offu\l
entries by divisions of all the armies into battle: and finally, Foch's gen- lKilkd, aiq,
eral advance, August, September and October, attained the maximum
intensity of 554 divisional engagements a week and maintained an aver-
age weekly intensity in the fiercest month of over 4oo.
Battle of tie Frontie6 (Aug. GSept' 5) ud Battle
- oi il" wt*" (Sept. 6-t3). Tbe race to the sea
yPr's 938,575
uuttt" u eitoi", theYser). Btitish: rst
[i"i 71t,163 t00,000
z7t$2t
During the war it was the custom of the British and tr'rench staffs to Dec-Jan., r9r5 Stabilization
iJose.site oI rgr5 (tst batUe oI ChamPaStrc) ' ' 27tJ1a 96,002 18,490
Feb,-Marcb . 568,557 l9ol/|2o 13,086
declare that in their offensives they were inflicting far heavier losses on April-Juoe . 2ndbattleoIAttois. British: zndYptes''' 223,9O2 66,745 ll.6u
July-Atgust. Stabilizatio!
the Germans than they themselves suffered. Similar claims were advanced Spt.-Nov. . inJos"t.i"" ot rgr5 (2nd battle oI ChaEIEtDe' 3rd
3O\747 ts4,r39 32,O1.'
battte of Artois). Bratish: Loos 28,933 10.769
100,092
by the enemy. Ludendorff shared the professional outlook of the British Stabilizatio!
660,992 27A,739 55,50'
Delensive battle of Verdus 338!Oll 199,908
794?38
and French High Commands. Even after the war was over, with all the Battle oI the SomEe .
rst ofiensive battle of Vetdun . 153,0111 s6$17 36,2?6
n5afi 30,r84 35,198
facts in his mind or at his disposal had he cared to seek them, we find him Tbe Cetman retreat
(Chemin-des'Damcs, and
og"nii"" oi dhe Aisne 631828 238.310 l75tnL
battle oI the Mounts). Itiris, .' I ndt' M'ssints
Aig.-Dec Mi*r oo"mtions (Flandes, right batrk oI the
Meuse,-the Malmaisoo). British : Pasaicnda'le' 167,381 2tr,tN6
676,64s
,oo,,,*!;,1*T;R,.,".I,.11f,"F,P,H,I13)I;,go*us.l Canbt oi
73,853 t2,?30 lr,83l
J6!.-Feb., tgt8 . Stabilization
851,37[ 25t,2O1 135,13'
DeleDsive caDPaiSE ol t9t8. Itili5l.' MaTcl 2t' Lys
Md,-JuBe 9,12'636 4tl,6t7 37r,1 r6
July-No% Ofleasive @IEigB ol tgrE
D{ioi!l D*ipdoe
by cBaxNs. BErlsE-

Aug,-Nov., !9r4 . . Battle ol thc Froutles (Aug. 6ept. 5) aod Battle

o! the MarEo (Sept. 6-13). Tbe reo to the ea Nol itcluded obow'
(rst battle oI Artoie, tJro Yser), British : ,sl yptcs 677,44O 85,1,000 Aroistice aad aot
Additional British antl Gerom losses reported alter
81,376:.
D., rgt4-ran., r9r5 Stabilizatioo t7o$25 254,000 t7 $21 52,000
Feb.-Mu., t9t5 . . rlt ofieDsive ofr9r5 (rst battle ol Champagne) 114,492 240,000 33,67E 36,000
Apr.-JuEe, t9r5 . . znd battle ol Artoic. Bti isl : znd y?res 233,506 449,000 lr9,E$l 302,000
July-Arg., t9t5 . . Stabilizatio! 78$02 I93,000 30,902 93,000
Scpt.-Nov., t9r5 zad oflensivo ol r9r5 (zuti battle of Champagac,
3rd bsttle oI Attois. Btiliah : L@s. . . . . t86,r88 4t0,000 94,78'
Dc., r9t5-Ju., 1916 Stabilizatioo 39,702 78,000 22,O92 t Aurtoliri6 dedudtor u 6 eETLB.la"ibh6 (or r[ose inf,ided by t!. Bdtist on tte Turtr
hdidcd b, if,c CqE@ oo the REias; oor
aDd
Feb.-Ju!., 19!6 . . DcfeBivc batuc of VerdE . . . 334,246 142,OOO tr8,99A ' No furc E i4cludcd for tlc eDo@

Juty&,, t9r6 " . Battlc of the SoEEc . . . 537,9r9 34t,000 453,238

Nov,-Dw., 1916 . . rst ofiensive battle ofVerdun . 92273 93,00o 60,0{l
Ju.-Mr,, tgr? . . Thecernaurckert. . . . 65,3Ill t08,000 67 ?lt
Apr.-JoIy, ,gt? . . Ofeosive oI thc Aisne (ChemiaJes-Dame, ud
battle oI tho MouEts). Bilish: Atos, M.ssan.s 1t{,o71 279,OOO 455,92E
Aug.-Dcc., tgt7. . M.inot olEEtios (Fl,andffi, right bank of the Meu*.
tho Malmairco). B'i,tish: P$alanttoelo, Combtoi 104,51' t82,O0O 394,6{3
Jar.-Fob., r9t8. Stabili zatiotr 24,061 5t,00o 22,ASt
Md.-Juoe, r9!8. Defemlve campaigu ol ,9r8. Blitish, MNch 2r, Lli 68B,341 .t33,000 418,?71
July-Nov., r9r8. 7A5,733 63r,000 4tI1636
soldiers.
TfiE. 4806,000r 4938,000! 2,700,00d Since the Armistice the facts afe knowfl; but before proceeding to
rletailed figures it will be well to take a general survey'
397,(mO 52,000
The Germans, out of a population of under 7o millions, mobilised
Cuualties tao,000
lrwh of 36

5,383,000. 487+000 2,758,mor

Ehlch (o) Dqths (ldIcd, died ln hopital, pmueotly mising) . . 1r493r000' 1,432,000 684,000
(D) Non-Iatsl sualtis . . 3,E9o,ooo 3,506,000 2,07{,000
Ratiq of (a) to (6) 1to960 I to 9.46 I to 8,0!t

stantial proportion of African troops outside the French population basis'

r ucbattt+Imntrlocnttrpelo4.
of these approximately 5 millions became casualties, of whom rl mil-
ah pcriod ro lltor aq r ry tlwul[, | trltt War Memorics,I-udendorff. Vol' II'
@di
,.o8o,@. ot whlcb Dat![ r.@e ,'ii,,tiri'wirn'iir'liii',,,t-.-iii. nerr. is also givcn by the Frcrrch rnilitary historian,
i p' 4t3'
Licut,-Cr-rl. Corda, La Guure LIorudialc,
 THE WORLD CRISIS THE BLOOD TEST s67
566
,, of British 'Other Ranks' compared to German about 3
lions lost their lives. The British Empire, out of a white population of S* and
6o millions, mobilised nearly 9l million persons and sustained over to show the losses
'ro^r^rative tables are given in the same work which
3 million casualties, including nearly a million deaths.
The British totals are not directly comparable with those of France of both side. in the various offensive periods''
BRITiSH OFFENSIVES OF 1916 AND r9t7
and Germany. The proportion of coloured troops is greater. The num-
t916 ' Orsnn ReNrs
bers who fell in theatres other than the Western, and those employed on Orrrcens
British German
July-December
British German
naval service, are both much larger. 2r,g74 4,879, 459,868 23r315,
The French and German figures are however capable of very closel TnB SoutuB
over 4-I about z-r
comparison. Both the French and German armies fought v,,ith their whole
strength from the beginning to the end of the war. Each nation made the r9r7
-[anuary-June
utmost possible demand upon its population. In these circumstances it ir* r5,r98 3,953 2g5,8o3 t72,962,
Annes and MBssrNes
not surprising that the officiatr tr'rench and German figures tally with con- about 5-3
about 4-r
siderable exactness. The Germans mobilised 19 per cent of their entire
population, and the French, with their important African additions, zr T9T7
per cent. Making allowance for the African factor it would appear that July-December 22,316 6,9t3 4z6,z98 263,797
PesscrrENDAELE and CaMsner
in the life-and-death struggle both countries put an equal strain upon about 3-r about 5-3
their manhood. If this basis is sound-and it certainly appears reason* r,r8r,969 668,o74
t5'745
able-the proportion of French and German casualties to persons mobil- Torer-s Fg'488 ,
about 4-r nearly z-t
ised displays an erren more remarkable concordance. The proportion of
German casualties to total mobilised is ro out of every 19, and that of
Thereisnoreasontodoubtthesubstantialaccuracyoftheseauthori-
the French ro out of every 16. The ratios of deaths to woundings in
tative and ofEcial calculations, nor t
Germany and France are almost exactly equal, viz. 2 to S. Finally these
But since r9r8 supplementary casual
figures yield a division of German losses between the Western and all
other fronts of approximately 3 to r both in deaths and casualties. All
the calculations which follow are upon the basis of the tables which yield
these authoritative and harmonious general proportions.
The British War Office published in March, rgzz, its Stati,stics of
combatants on the Western Front' It would not be right to claim for
the Military Effort of tke British Erupire during tke Great War.' A sec. an
;; ;il;trte of fig""t built up. under such varying circumstallces
set
tion of this massive compilation records the comparative figures of Brit. for the use
Cxact and -ati.rrtor, u"(cy,t'o' i' such exactness necessary
ish and German casualties on the British sector of the Western Front The authority for every set of
account'
to which the figures are put in this
from February, rerS, to October, 19r8, inclusive. The British figurea "tt which are required have been made'
[igures is given. e[if-'"'"'"Jifications of f act'
are compiled from the official records of the War Office. The Germatt a sound and correct presentation
figures have been obtained from the Federal Archives Office at Potsdam, and in the result r mii.r" it to be
4****
The result of the calculation is summed up as follows: The total number which emerge from the
of British 'Officer' casualties was rrS,74r and of German 'Officer' casual. Let us now proceed to draw the conclusions
at all appreciated even in the
ties 47,256. The total number of British 'Other Ranks' casualties w&t figures. They do ,";;p;t'; to have. been
2,325,932 and of German 'Other Ranks' casualties r,633,r4o. The casual. ,i.t .*p.rt .ir.l",' f ti't" them in their simplest form'
ties among British 'Offrcers' compared to German were therefore about :4iZ{!;!X13f,'JkJt#td"#;"' ress numerous per unit than in the British
1 Hereafter referred to
as The Military Effort. Scrvice.
 57r
57.U^ THE WORLD CRISIS THE BLOOD TE,ST
occurred'
wounded. on this basis the total permanent German loss
was not until r9l8 that
the change fatal for Germany
in the west It and Germans in
during the three years of siege wariare \ryas as follows warfare between the British
:_ There was one p"tioa i" tt'e is not' as
relative 1"';;' ;" strikingly reversed'
*h.""..our troops '*
I9I5 which the gaining ground'
were '-tl,:,1
1916 ' 337,ooo
the casual reader might expec!'
. . 54g,ooo
trench linei p rlverising
fortified village
I917 . 5 ro,ooo ;;;;;
and the grislY sPoils of
Total . r,396,o0o, external, was eagerlY Pro
conditions the losses of the Germans
,ooo a year. Their annual intake of
l;J:ii-'};J;;:1Jh*
of
days Gerr
the greatest
Ty:::::
rst
Fr'n'f'
'fhe
grievous British re-
up was over 8oo,ooo. But, in their
,",,",.Fo,th"r,.tff
Cour of their young men, they heavily
anticipated their annual hatvests. From May, ih" ,r"or*al
;:#._tHI':lTffi:1";;T;lm',i;',':j
offr.",., in killed and wounded,
conscription, losses in men and
month, to the end of r9r5, they drew r,o7o,ooo men towered up above those
to the Colours., In above all in offrcers killed'
the similar period of. 1916 they overdrew no less than and whom we
T-hu;, in r9r7 they could call up only 6zz,0oo.
r,443,ooo men. ifr.y-,fr*gf't they were defeating'
Nevertheless, the least
of these figures far exceeded the attriiion value of the Alied u*LtX that consummated their ruin'
It was not until r9r8 that the intake of availabre Germans feil offensives.,i ff[t;;;*"#ffh", n9l ou.rs,
Haig' but by Luden-
It would probably, if the nationar resistance had not coflapsed,to 4o5,ooo. *o" ao*'i^;;;y'Joff1e' Nivelle and
have risen'
They were
dorff. See again;;';;t";tt"
ng""t from March zt' r9t8' to the
in rgr9, the ample crops of German youth were stead^iry th" G"'*t"s suffered against the
^for
ward at 8oo,ooo ""ri"s';;r end of June.' m t""jy ir""" "'orrtht casualties among the
a year. The figures of German loss and intake for the ulor. r6,oJ;-;fi*' casualties *d 4'9'ooo
British
three Siege years are therefore u1 foilo*r,_
other ranks' Tht;j;; i' 'l*o't
th".;;;; ltti"-a' against thetheBritish
Brit-
.lone,3,86o omttJ'ffiil;;"t"a*itr-, i'47'a omtttlkilled bv
years' A"gtinst the French in
Loss in the Total Balance for the same
West Intake all fronts ish in the whole preceding two lost 253'ooo
I9I5 . three monthr, o"'-lt"i, i""
ir'" r*t.n'" *t"kt' the Germans amounted
337,ooo r,o7o,ooo weeks
r916 . 733,ooo
officers and men' A; tot'l c"ualties in only thirteen
in the short time that was left
549,ooo I,443,OOO 894,ooo ever re-
to 688,ooo, ,"'y i"* of *i'o*
I917 . 6zz,ooo
5IO,OOO I r2,ooo to
turned to the f'o"tl"'f'-tftit
p"'iod their intake was reduced 4o5'ooo
Totals Therefore they con-
. r,396,ooo 3,r35,ooo t13gpoo that the war lasted'
for the nin. *o"i' J;; yJ" intake
where then in mere attrition was the end to be, discerned ? sumed nearly 7oo'ooo men
in.a time when their corresponding coming
which'
on the <lid not exceed r5o,ooo'
Here then was the wearing down
|erm.s 9f
r9r5, 1916 and r9r7 the German man power was sufficient national spirit was enfeebled by its
to
last indefinitely. rn fact in the three years of
the Allied offensives on the irt the moment when the German
Western-front they gained actually tl the extent of r,7g9,ooo cxertionsduringfouryearsandbythec'*'l'ti'"effectsoftheblockade' failure to make
men more the W"'tt"' Front; to the
than their losses. We were in fact, as I wrote riy"ii lccl to the German"
, March, r9rg, '"ti"^ton A"t*"'plMeuse line with all the bargaining
'merely exchanging lives upon a ale at once more frightfur an effective *ithJr"w"l to the of German
than any. tf i' and to the sudden final collapse
thing that has been witnessed bef : in the world,
and to; modest to pro. lnssibilities tf''t 'fforded'
duce a decision.' i'csistance in Novembe there is
attrition is not the only test'
t No allowance is
made in.these figures for the supprementary tf'" *iff Power of an enemy who is
since th-ese could at most vary.tti-t"i"i.'i" German casuerticr, he loses prisoners'
include .rit
tfre-extent of g per cent.
*ourd*ru#H;;;;"'*rJ'l'i,a cked. He has to yield irouttd;
,"or.,ILr." 'gures men combed from cluiet month of July'
"rd ^
ar 'Including the
 /.
572 THE WORLD CRISIS THE BLOOD TEST 5/ 3

go so
guns' the trophies;he sees the strongest defences stormed; his battle line
What positive courses should have been adopted? No onc ucctl
is constantly receding. It is this experience which wears him out in spite far as to say that every Allied offensive could have been avoidccl.
lntlccd,
of the fact that he is killing two or often three assailants for each of his there were at least fivL e*amples of short sudden 'set piece'
211.1c115-1hg
own men slain. It may be conceded that the orcleal of the clefending opening of the battle of Arras, the capture of the Messines Ridge, the
troops in modern warfare is no less trying than that of the attacker. But F."r.h-r".rptures of Fort Douaumont and of Malmaison' and thc first
after all there is no greater stimulus to the soldier in his agony than the day,s battle of cu-b.ni-which in themselves wefe brilliant
events' A11
knowledge of the loss he is inflicting on his foe. crouched u! uis machine
of these, if they hacl ended with the fruits of the initial surprise, would
gun amid the awful bombarclment he sees long ri,es mowed dorvn, wave Germans than
have been more costly in men as well as in repute to the
after wave, in hundreds and in thousands. rre knows how few and far to the Allies. It is inieed by such episodes that the prestige
of an 'active
between are the defenders, he sees how many are their targets. with
clefensive, might have been maintained. But the cluestion
is whether it
every attack repulsed he gains fresh confidence, and when at last he is on the largest
rvas wise policy to seek and pursue prolonged offensives
overwhelmed there are others behind him who know what is happening by attrition; whether instead of
scale in order to wear clown ih"
and which side is suffering most. "tt",,,y both British and French ought
seeking the offensive ourselves in France,
But let us test the theory of moral attrition also by the facts. can it the enemy
not consistentiy on all occasions to have endeavottred to compel
be disputed that the confide,ce of the German armies rvas increased as directed to that end,
to attack. If our whole strategy ancl tactics had been
well as their relative numerical strength by the repulse of the British and lvould not the final victory have been sooner won?
French at Loos and champagne in i9l5? Did these battles i,cluce them we could have exacted a
Once the enemy was co-tt'itted to the attack
to weaken in any way their pressure upon Russia? was it during these
cruelforfeit.Itwouldhavebeenhispart,notours'tocrunchthebarbed
very battles that German divisions conquered Serbia and overran the
*i.",,-,dgorgemachinegunswiththenoblestsacrificesofyouth..A**
Balkans ? was not the German High commancl at the height of force for the waging of war
the rreecl the tale have ended' th",.? The use of
Somme offensive able to withdraw more than a d,ozen divisions frorn
the aracter and text-book maxims'
various fronts to strike down Roumania ? which army exultecl over the thc verities, not onlY local bul ] 1
great Nivelle offensive in r9r7 ? who emerged with the greatest confi- all of these on the grand scale j I
dence from the prolonged fighting which followecl the Battle of Arras t armies.
?
what were the relative positions of the British and Gcrman Armies at
Supposewe-botlrFrenchanclBritish-havetrainedourarmiesbe-
he end of Passchendaele-the British exhausted, shot to pieces, every divi_ manceuvring effrciency;
lrind the trench line to a high standard of flexible
sion having to be reduced from thirteen to ten battalions; the Germans concrete and everl' modern
suppose we have p.r,,,'-t"itly fortified with
training, resting, gathering their reinforcements from Russia for a greater suppose we
.l"r'i.. those portions of the front where rve cannot retreat;
effort than any they had yet made ? those portions where we could
have long selected and shrewdly weakened
It is certai,, surveying the war as a whore, that the Germans werc rfford to give 20 or 30 kilometres of ground; suppose we lure the enemy
strengthened relatively by every Allied offensive-British or lirench_ in a thin and yielding
to attack there and niake great pockets and bulges
launched against them, until the summer of r9rB. Had they not squarr_ himselfprelt'.t;::"i:lTlJt1:JJ'.t::i};
f ront, and then, just a, ht t"hi'-'k'
dered their strength in Ludendorff's supreme offe,sive ir. r9iB, there
w:ts
no reason why they should not have maintained their front in Frar.rct, trench line, but at the flanl<s of a
practically unaltered during the whole of the year, ancl retreated at thcir there not combinations here wbich
leisure during the winter no farther than the Meuse.
But, it will be said, if the conditions over a prolongecl period arc srrclr 'J"l,fi ,':#:#1,:i::l Jil JI il
that all offensives are equally injurious to the attackcr, horv thcrr is r,y;rr-
rlcrr ancl glorious victorY?
to be waged? Are both sicles to sit down witrr enormous arrrrils yr.ar. rrlrr.r.
Arrcl-wl1y shorrlcl thc view be limitecl to
the theatre in r'vhicli thc: lrcst
year looking at each other, each convirrced that whor.vcr:rll;Lclrs rvill othcr? Sc:r l)c)wcr' r:Lilway cotlt-
Irr. ;uttl 1:irgcst,,r,,,it'' 1r:rllpctr to Iacc clLclr
tltc loscr? Ts this thc slqril('r.:o1rql115i1y11 to wlriclr tlrt.:l,grrrrrt.rrl tcrrtlsI ,,,,,,,ia,,1i,,,,r, I()rt.i1,rr 1',,',t;,y,1rt'cst'rtt [1tt'tltt';tlts
ol lirrtlirrr-; trtrv ll:lttlis ottt-
)
 574 THE WORLD CRISIS THE BLOOD TEST 5/5
side the area of deadlock. Mechanical science offers on the ground, in the It willbe said-What of the Allies-what of Russia-what of Italy,
air, on every coast, from the forge or from the laboratory, boundress would they have endured so long, while France and Britain perfected their
possibilities of novelty and surprise. Suppose for instance the war power plans and accumulated their power? But if direct aid had come to
represented by the 45o,ooo French and Britis casualties in the cham- Russia through the destruction of Turkey, and to Italy through the mar-
pagne-Loos battle of r9r5 had been used to force the Dardanelles or to shalling of the Balkans against Austria, might not both these states have
combine the Balkan States ! been spared the disasters to which they were in f act exposed ? And is
Let us, to cultivate a sense of proportion, digress for a moment from there any use in fighting a prolonged offensive in which the attacker suf-
the western Front to the 'side-shows' of the war-many of them in fers without strategic gain nearly double the loss of the defenders ? How
themselves ill-judged-in order to measure the distribution of our total does the doing of an unwise, costly and weakening act help an Ally? Is
war power. A calculation has been made by the war office and published not any temporary relief to him of pfessure at the moment paid for by
in Tke Military Effort ' on the basis, not of course of casualties, but of him with compound interest in the long run? What is the sense of attack-
the men employed in any theatre multiplied by the number of days so ing only to be defeated: or of being worn
employed' From this the following proportions are derived, taking the down more than twice as fast momerltE--m
effort at the Dardanelles as the unit. o dershiP among Allies, the tides of
national passion, nearly always force improvident action upon Govern-
MeN-Deys
ments or Commanders. Allowance must be made for the limits of their
(Oficers Ercluded.)
knowledge and power. The British commanders were throughout deeply
Dardanelles r.oo
Salonika influenced by the French mood and situation. But do not let us obscure
6.4o
North Russia .og the truth. Do not found conclusions upon error. Do not proclaim its
Palestine . r2.2o melancholy consequences as the perfect model of the art of war or as the
Mesopotamia r r.go triumphant consummation of a great design.
East Africa g.zo
France Z3.oo

And is there not also a virtue in 'saving up'? we never gave our-
selves the chance. we had to improvise our armies in face of the enemy.
The flower of the nation, its manhood, its enterprise, its brains were all
freely given. But there never was found the time to train and organise
these elements before they were consumed. From the priceless metal suc-
cessive half-sharpened half-tempered weapons were made, were
used and
broken as soon as they were fashioned, and then replaced by others simi-
larly unperfected. The front had to be defended, the war hai to be waged,
but there was surely no policy in eagerly seebing offensives with imma-
ture formations or during periods when no answer to the machine gun
existed. Suppose that the British Army sacrificed upon the Somme, the
finest we ever had, had been preserved, trained and developed to its full
strength till the summer of rgr7, till perhaps
3,ooo tanks were ready, till
an overwhelming artillery was prepared, till a scientific method of con-
tinuous advance had been devised, tilr the apparatus was comprete, might
not a decisive result have been achieved at one supreme stroke?
a
Pp. 742 et seq,