G.R No.

L-64261 December 26, 1984

Jose Burgos, Sr., Jose Burgos Jr., Bayani Soriano and J. Burgos Media Services Inc.,
petitioners,

Vs.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, The Chief, Philippine Constabulary,
The Chief, Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, The Judge Advocate General, et
al., respondents.

Facts:

Two search warrants namely search warrant nos. 20-82a and 20-82b were issued by
Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano against petitioners Jose Burgos for the search on the premises of
Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been
used in subversive activities. Petitioners Jose Burgos prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be
enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner. Petitioners Jose
Burgos also questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants
issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the
warrant were real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Ruling:

The court ruled that, the search warrants nos. 20-82a and 20-82b issued by respondent
Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano on December 7,1982 are hereby declared null and void and are
accordingly set aside because the documents could not provide sufficient basis for the finding of
a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance whit Section 3, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides that: no search warrants or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized. Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the
return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby
ordered released to petitioners. No cost.
CHANDLER et al. v. MILLER, GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA, et al.

No. 96-126. Argued January 14, 1997 -- Decided April 15, 1997

[G.R. No. 128222. June 17, 1999]

Facts:

A Georgia statute requires candidates for designated state offices to certify that they have
taken a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to qualifying for nomination or election and that
the test result must be negative. The petitioners, which are the Libertarian Party nominees for
state offices subject to the statute's requirements, filed this action in the District Court about one
month before the deadline for submission of the certificates. Petitioners argued that the drug tests
violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. The District Court denied petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction and later
entered final judgment for respondents. The court accepted as settled law that the tests were
searches, but reasoned that, as was true of the drug testing programs, the statute served special
needs, interests other than the ordinary needs of law enforcement.

Issue:
Whether the searches are reasonable?

Held:
In balancing the individual's privacy expectations against the State's interest in the drug
testing program, Georgia's requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test does not
fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches. It
is uncontested that Georgia's drug testing requirement, imposed by law and enforced by state
officials, effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. To be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing. But particularized exceptions to the main rule are sometimes warranted
based on "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." When such "special
needs" are alleged, courts must undertake a context specific inquiry, examining closely the
competing private and public interests advanced by the parties
In the case at bar, a drug testing statute is a measure plainly not tied to individualized suspicion,
Georgia has failed to show a special need that is substantial important enough to override the
individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's
normal requirement of individualized suspicion. Georgia's certification requirement is not well
designed to identify candidates who violate antidrug laws and is not a credible means to deter
illicit drug users from seeking state office. The test date is selected by the candidate, and thus all
but the prohibitively addicted could abstain for a pretest period sufficient to avoid detection.
After close review of Georgia's scheme, the State seeks to display its commitment to the struggle
against drug abuse. But Georgia asserts no evidence of a drug problem among the State's elected
officials, those officials typically do not perform high risk, safety sensitive tasks, and the
required certification immediately aids no interdiction effort. The need revealed is symbolic, not
"special."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO

SAN, accused-appellant.

Facts:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police
Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline
with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio
call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao
requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted.
According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of
the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1
Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with Almoite.
Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger, who was later identified as
Chua Ho San. When the speed boat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored
strawbag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man changed
direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced
themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what theyre saying. And by
resorting of sign language, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man
acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics containing
yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was
provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers
constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.
Ruling:
The Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a
person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid
search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules. However, warrantless searches may be
permitted in the following cases: first, search of moving vehicles, second, seizure in plain view,
third, customs searches, fourth, waiver or consent searches, fifth, stop and frisk situations and
lastly, search incidental to a lawful arrest. It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the
arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances convincingly
indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause means a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case
at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's
participation in ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from
conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer
or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing
boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense.
With these, the Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. Furthermore, the Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the
Prosecution that there was a waiver or consented search. If CHUA could not understand what
was orally articulated to him, how could he understand the police's "sign language?" More
importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language"
that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive
search. Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be
inadmissible in evidence. Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.