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at War
F O R E I G N A F F A I R S .C O M
November 2016
November 2016
Introduction
Gideon Rose
April 1935
The Expansion of Japanese Rule
Edgar Packard Dean
January 1937
The Jews of Eastern Europe [Excerpt]
Desider Kiss
April 1938
America Rearms [Excerpt]
Hanson W. Baldwin
January 1939
Armistice at Munich [Excerpt]
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
January 1940
Blitzkreig [Excerpt]
Henry J. Reilly
October 1940
The Downfall of France [Excerpt]
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
October 1941
Anglo-American Pitfalls [Excerpt]
Geoffrey Crowther
October 1941
Let Japan Choose [Excerpt]
Eugene Staley
Winter 1991/92
Pearl Harbor: Documents: The Rising Sun in the Pacific
Samuel Eliot Morison
April 1942
America at War: Three Bad Months [Excerpt]
Hanson W. Baldwin
July 1942
Hitlers Transfers of Population in Eastern Europe [Excerpt]
Hedwig Wachenheim
October 1942
The Spirit of Resistance [Excerpt]
Victor Vinde
January 1943
America at War: The First Year [Excerpt]
Hanson W Baldwin
October 1943
Datum Point
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
January 1944
America at War: The End of the Second Year [Excerpt]
Hanson W. Baldwin
October 1944
America at War: The End Begins [Excerpt]
Hanson W. Baldwin
July 1945
America at War: Victory in Europe [Excerpt]
Hanson W. Baldwin
October 1945
America at War: Victory in the Pacific [Excerpt]
Hanson W. Baldwin
January 1946
America at War: The Triumph of the Machine [Excerpt]
Hanson W. Baldwin
January/February 1995
The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered
Barton J. Bernstein
November/December 2003
That Was Then: Allen W. Dulles on the Occupation of Germany
[Excerpt]
Allen W. Dulles
January 1947
The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law [Excerpt]
Henry L. Stimson
July 1947
The Sources of Soviet Conduct [Excerpt]
X (George F. Kennan)
October 1948
The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker [Excerpt]
Bernard Brodie
April 1949
The Illusion of World Government [Excerpt]
Reinhold Niebuhr
May/June 1996
The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos [Excerpt]
G. John Ikenberry
November 14, 2016
Introduction
Gideon Rose
REUTERS
The attack on Pearl Harbor.
Foreign Aairs
April 1935
EDGAR PACKARD DEAN, of the Research Sta of the Council on Foreign Relations
Foreign Aairs
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FINANCIAL TIMES
REUTERS
Thus in less than 90 days the strategic picture of the war had
been considerably altered. The United Nations had suffered
their worst defeats since the fall of France. As spring
approached, the short-range prospects were grim. From the
long-range viewpoint, however, the basic factors which have
been the strength as well as the weakness of the United
States have not in every case been modified by the events of
its first three months of participation in a shooting war. We
still possess many advantages.
Hong Kong, it had been hoped, could hold out for months
rather than days. Its quick fall was followed by an amazingly
rapid Japanese advance down the Malay peninsula. The
subsequent fall of Singapore, with the capture of something
over 70,000 British troops and much equipment, was the
greatest single British defeat of the war. These were shocking
blows to the strategy of the United Nations in the
southwestern Pacific. They were accompanied by a Japanese
penetration of Burma, followed soon by a break-through
against the British line on the Salween River. At the same
time another Japanese claw was reaching out toward the
Netherlands East Indies. Following the same pattern of
conquest which had given victory to the Germans --
establishment of air superiority -- Japan seized airfields at a
series of strategic points and soon brought under her control
nearly all the approaches to Singapore and all the entries into
the South China Sea. Her amphibian operations were
conducted with great skill and were carefully cordinated to
air power. The underestimated Japanese airmen, too, did not
restrict the demonstration of their capacity solely to Pearl
Harbor, but also sank the British Prince of
Wales and Repulse.
HANSON W. BALDWIN, military and naval correspondent of the New York Times; author
of "The Caissons Roll," "United We Stand!" and other works
Foreign Aairs
July 1945
The exact date of the ending of the war against Germany may
long be a matter of debate among historians. The first
surrender agreement was signed at Reims, France, on May 7;
this was "countersigned" in Berlin May 8-9, and all hostilities
were scheduled to end 12:01 a.m. May 9. Actually some
German troops were still fighting the Russians on May 13. But
for all intents and purposes the war ended in April with the
great American sweep to the Elbe and the Russian drive into
Berlin. At that time, there seemed a real possibility that the
German resistance in pockets throughout Europe from the
gean Islands to Norway might be bitter and perhaps
protracted; indeed, this was expected, for high SHAEF
officials had told correspondents that the "campaign of the
pockets" might continue throughout the summer. German
fanaticism and will to fight had already extended the war --
despite the hopelessness of the German position and the
tremendous superiority of the Allies -- long beyond the
expected ending. In the spring of 1945, then, the Allies
tended to be justifiably cautious in their predictions. But the
sweep to the Elbe, the drive into Berlin, and, above all, the
Nazi announcement of Adolf Hitler's death on May 1 snapped
the thread of German morale. Wholesale surrenders were also
touched off by the Nazi collapse in Italy. The "campaign of the
pockets" was never fought.
II
More important, the First Army and the Ninth Army had
linked at Paderborn, so that the Ruhr, last of Germany's great
industrial areas, was encircled. This, like the forging of the
Remagen bridgehead, was a decisive stroke. General Smith
called the Ruhr encirclement the "largest double envelopment
of military history," and while this may be a slight
exaggeration, it was certainly the greatest single pocket ever
created by American troops. Some 317,000 Germans were
captured by April 19, when the Ruhr pocket was finally wiped
out, and the greater part of two to three German armies were
destroyed. From then on, there was never a continuous front
in the west: the fighting was fluid, a battle of "pockets"
against isolated German elements, some dispirited, some
fanatical.
HANSON W. BALDWIN, military and naval correspondent of the New York Times; author
of "The Caissons Roll," "Strategy for Victory" and other works
Foreign Aairs
October 1945
II
But for men of the United States Navy on every sea the peak
of satisfaction was derived from the great two-day raids made
by Halsey's carriers against Japan's naval dockyards on the
Inland Sea in late July. These raids sank or damaged about 20
Japanese men-of-war and left the remnants of the Japanese
Fleet broken and burning. When the smoke cleared away, the
Japanese Navy had perhaps one battleship, the Nagato, still
afloat but damaged, two aircraft carriers still afloat but
damaged, and a handful of cruisers, destroyers and
submarines. Such was the end, in the Inland Sea, far from
open water, of what had once been the world's third largest
fleet. Pearl Harbor was avenged.
While the Third Fleet was continuing to strike Japan with all
its tremendous power, small surface units and planes several
times reconnoitered and attacked the Kurile Islands north of
Japan and even penetrated into the Sea of Okhotsk. Further
south in the Pacific, the enemy-held islands which had been
by-passed were attacked regularly by air and occasionally by
sea. These attacks kept them thoroughly neutralized, and at
the last some of the enemy garrisons -- notably that on Wake -
- began to run short of food.
In addition to these great undertakings, the Navy's Fleet Air
Wings, aided by submarines, instituted far-flung blockade
operations which in the final phases of the war penetrated the
Sea of Japan. Land planes and flying boats, operating from
the Ryukyus and the Marianas, swept the East China Sea and
the Yellow Sea practically clean of enemy shipping. They
made long patrols daily over the coast of China from Formosa
to Tsushima, and even penetrated inland and attacked
Japanese land communications on the Asiatic mainland. Most
important in the blockade, however, was the partial severance
of the enemy's lifeline across the Straits of Tsushima.
Probably the route was never completely closed, but the
waters became hazardous for enemy shipping.
Japan, then, was subjected during June, July and early August
to the gathering might of one of the most tremendous air
assaults ever launched against a nation -- strategic mass
attacks by the B-29's and tactical attacks upon specific
targets by carrier aircraft of the Fleet and by the land-based
fighters, medium bombers, and four-engined "light-heavies"
based on Okinawa and Iwo, plus the blockade operations by
the Navy's Fleet Air Wings and aerial mining. There is no
doubt that even by the middle of July Japan was in a much
weakened state. Her air and maritime power were dwindling
and some of her raw material shortages were. becoming
serious.
To Japan's other troubles were added major troubles in China
and southeast Asia. Early in the summer it became apparent
that the British Southeast Asia Command was preparing (with
considerable American supply help and some staff assistance)
an assault upon Malaya as soon as the monsoon season was
over, with Singapore as the objective. In the spring the
Japanese had been forced to begin withdrawing men from
parts of China in order to provide more troops for their "inner
defense zone" -- the main Japanese islands, Korea, Manchuria
and north China. This movement now became pronounced.
China's fighting strength meanwhile increased steadily as
supplies poured in by air "over the Hump" and by the Stilwell
Road. The Chinese Combat Command, reorganized by
Lieutenant-General Albert C. Wedemeyer after General
Stilwell's departure, trained, stiffened and greatly aided the
Chinese troops. By the summer of 1945, perhaps 15 to 20
Chinese divisions were equipped with all types of arms up to
and including artillery, though not with tanks, and an equal or
greater number were partially equipped.[v] The Chinese-
American composite wings of the Air Force, largely manned
by Chinese trained in the United States, were also functioning
well. Meanwhile, American air power in China was being
reorganized and strengthened, though the old veteran, Major-
General Claire L. Chennault, resigned just before the end.
Until the summer of 1945, most of the battle "victories" won
in China were actually the result of deliberate Japanese
withdrawals. Only then did our prodigious efforts to supply
China commence to bring their reward. But the full reward
was not to be reaped.
IV
The greatest war in which the United States ever fought came
to an end as suddenly as it began, and with stunning surprise.
It had cost us over a million casualties -- dead, missing and
wounded -- and 300 billion dollars in money. But it left the
United States incomparably the world's most powerful nation
-- with or without the atomic bomb. Upon American shoulders
lies the terrible responsibility of that power. . . . [Full Article]
HANSON W. BALDWIN, military and naval correspondent of the New York Times; author
of "The Caissons Roll," "Strategy for Victory" and other works
Foreign Aairs