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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC


95 SCRA 392
L-52245
January 22, 1980

Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva


Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position
of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and
contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution which provides that .Any retired elective provincial
city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who
shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run
for the same elective local office from which he has retired. He
likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against
him, and is based on purely arbitrary grounds, therefore, class
legislation.

Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.

Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has
retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for
new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for
government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is
that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of
a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal
protection, neither does it permit of such denial.

The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification.
What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a
reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where
the classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies
to all those belonging to the same class.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa


Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.

PHILCONSA VS. VILLAREAL G.R. No. L-33517 March 29, 1974

FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Constitution Association, joined by


other petitioners, all delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, suing in their capacity as such as well as citizens and
taxpayers, filed this mandamus proceeding on May 15, 1971
praying that a writ be issued ordering respondents Cornelio T.
Villareal, in his capacity as Speaker of the then House of
Representatives, the Chief Accountant thereof, as well as its
Auditor, to inspect and examine the books, records, vouchers and
other supporting papers of the House of Representatives that have
relevance to the alleged transfer of P26.2 million from various
executive offices to the House of Representatives as well as its
books, records, vouchers and other supporting papers dealing with
the original outlay of the P39 million as appropriated for the 1969-
1970 fiscal year.

ISSUE: Whether or not The petition is moot and academic.

HELD: Yes, the petition is already moot and academic. The Supreme
Court held that there is no need to pass on the merits of the
various legal issues raised as in accordance with the ruling in
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez, promulgated
on February 28, 1974, a suit of this character has become moot
and academic with the effectivity of the 1971 Constitution and the
consequent abolition of the House of Representatives.

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY Question on CFI's Jurisdiction) 33


SCRA 29

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (33 SCRA 29)


(Question on Court of First Instance's* Jurisdiction)
Digested Case

FACTS:
Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from
Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs,
a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants
moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted.
Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA
without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.

CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to


Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in
view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the
filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not
exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier
decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive
jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior
court is in issue.

ISSUE:
WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.

HELD:
YES, SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed
its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for
the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a
question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak
of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier -
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting
a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower
court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution
because the same was issued without the summary hearing -
Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal
manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792).
It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with
dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary
legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is
essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear
and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to
interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights
of the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of
the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same
would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel
was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon
his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days
within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse
without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now,
therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

The orders appealed from are affirmed.


ZANDUETA V. DELA COSTA
November 28, 1938 G.R. No. L-46267

NATURE
This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable
Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to
obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be
illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting
him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to
continue occupying the office in question by placing him in
possession thereof, with costs to said respondent

FACTS
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No.145, the
petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the
office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising
solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of
the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim
appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor
on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly-On November 7, 1936, the
date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the
Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from
the President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment
as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District,
with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila
and Palawan-The National Assembly adjourned without its
Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim
appointment-Another ad interim appointment to the same office
was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a
new oath-After his appointment and qualification as judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as
executive judge, performed several executive acts-On May 19, 1938,
the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly
disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner-
On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the
herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside
over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was
approved by the Commission on Appointments
ISSUE
WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act
No. 145 to entitle him to repossess the office occupied by him prior
to the appointment issued in his favor by virtue of the assailed
statute

HELD
When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of
First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid
appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same
branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another
court of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial
district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to
the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new
office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old
office and cannot claim to repossess it or question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment
has been issued.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a
public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly
created or reorganized by law, which new office is incompatible
with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the
discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and
enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent
in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the
corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the
office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment
(46Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he cannot question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed
(11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121;id., 767, par. 123). He is
excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new
appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to
accept it by reason of legal exigencies. In the case under
consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim
appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his
favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. If the
petitioner believed that Commonwealth Act No.145 is
unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment
offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation,
had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled
him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the
final determination of the question whether a law is
unconstitutional or not.-The petitioner, being aware of his
constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of
the law(art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office and entered into the
performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the
necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he
voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would
later be stopped from questioning the validity of said appointment
by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was
issued, is unconstitutional. The petition for quo warranto instituted
is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.

Zandueta VS Dela Costa

Facts:
Francis Zandueta was presiding over a 5 th Branch of Courts of
First Instance of Manila
He received a new ad interim appointment issued
(Commonwealth Act No. 145) to discharge the Office of Judge
in the Court of First Instance of the 4 th Judicial District with
the authority to preside over the Court of First Instance of
Manila and Palawan
The ad interim appointment of the petitioner was disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
The President of the Philippines appointed Sixto Dela Costa
(respondent), judge of 4th Judicial District, with authority to
preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan
Dela Costas appointment was approved by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly
Petitioner questioned the validity of the appointment alleging
that C.A. No. 145 is unconstitutional

Issue:
Whether or not Zandueta may question the constitutionality of C.A.
No. 145 by which the new ad interim appointment of judge of first
instance of the 4th Judicial District, to preside over the Court of
First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor

Held:
No. Zandueta is estopped by his own act questioning the
constitutionality of C.A. No. 145. He should know that his ad
interim appointment was subject to approval by the
Commission on Appointments. If the said commission
disapproved, it would become ineffective and would cease him
discharging the office. Zandueta is free from to accept or not
the ad interim appointment issued by the President of the
Commonwealth. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so.
When a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to
an office newly created or reorganized by law qualifies for the
discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary
oath, enters in the performance of his duties by executing acts
inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and
receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to
have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of
appointment, and he cannot question the constitutionality
of the law by which he was last appointed.
He is exempted from the said rule if he did not accept the new
appointment or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of
legal exigencies.

99 PHIL 738

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9396 August 16, 1956

MANILA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
MANUEL T. FLORES, defendant-appellant.

Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for appellant.


Zafra, Lara, De Leon and Veneracion for appellee.

BENGZON, J.:

In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the Municipal Court of


Manila a complaint to recover from Manuel T. Flores the amount of
P1,047.98 as chattel mortgage installments which fell due in
September 1941. Defendant pleaded prescription: 1941 to 1954.
The complaint was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of First
Instance saw differently, sustaining plaintiff's contention that the
moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period, and that deducting the time during which said laws were in
operation three years and eight months 1 the ten year term had
not yet elapsed when complainant sued for collection in May 1954.
Wherefore said court ordered the return of the case to the
municipal judge for trial on the merits.

Defendant appealed, arguing principally that the moratorium laws


did not have the effect of suspending the period of limitations,
because they were unconstitutional, as declared by this court in
Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz. (5) 1807. He cites jurisprudence
holding that when a statute is adjudged unconstitutional it is as
inoperative as if it had never been passed, and no rights can be
built upon it.2

Some members expressed doubts as to whether the order of the


lower court was appealable in nature; but we agreed not to discuss
the point, inasmuch as the question submitted by appellant could
speedily be disposed of. InMontilla vs. Pacific Commercial3 we held
that the moratorium laws suspended the period of prescription.
That was rendered after the Rutter-Esteban decision. It should be
stated however, in fairness to appellant, that the Montilla decision
came down after he had submitted his brief. And in answer to his
main contention, the following portion is quoted from a resolution of
this Court4

2. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may be construed to mean


that at the of the decision the Moratorium law could no longer
be validly applied because of the prevailing circumstances. At
any rate, although the general rule is that an unconstitutional
statute

"confers no right, create no office, affords no protection and


justifies no acts performed under it." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828,
829.)

there are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have


relaxed its operation (cf. notes in Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations 8th ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or
qualified its effects "since the actual existence of a statute
prior to such declaration is an operative fact, and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored (Chicot
County vs. Baster, 308 U. S., 371) and a realistic approach is
eroding the general doctrine (Warring vs. Colpoys, 136 Am.
Law Rep., 1025, 1030).
Judgment affirmed, without costs.

120 SCRA 337

Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada vs Commission on Elections


120 SCRA 337 Political Law Vacancy in the Legislature

Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed a petition
for mandamus compelling the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim
Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Section
5 (2), Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen


months or more before a regular election, the Commission on
Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days
after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired
term.

COMELEC opposed the petition alleging that 1) petitioners lack


standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper
parties to institute the action; 2) the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII
of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan
Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a


special election to fill vacancies in the legislature.

HELD: No. The SCs jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to


review by certiorari the latters decision, orders or rulings. This is as
clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution
which reads:

Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to


the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC
which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari
jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is
the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the
Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional


districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of
money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary
appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither
be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC
compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role
BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to
appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that
the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the
COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not
IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative
of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled
through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of
Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to
vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

25. Serrano de Agbayani vs. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (Effects of


Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a statute)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971

FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
OF PANGASINAN, defendants, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, defendant-appellant.

Dionisio E. Moya for plaintiff-appellee.

Ramon B. de los Reyes for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:

A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if


any, to be attached to a statute subsequently adjudged invalid, is
decisive of this appeal from a lower court decision. Plaintiff
Francisco Serrano de Agbayani, now appellee, was able to obtain a
favorable judgment in her suit against defendant, now appellant
Philippine National Bank, permanently enjoining the other
defendant, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan, from proceeding
with an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land belonging to plaintiff
mortgaged to appellant Bank to secure a loan declared no longer
enforceable, the prescriptive period having lapsed. There was thus a
failure to sustain the defense raised by appellant that if the
moratorium under an Executive Order and later an Act
subsequently found unconstitutional were to be counted in the
computation, then the right to foreclose the mortgage was still
subsisting. In arriving at such a conclusion, the lower court
manifested a tenacious adherence to the inflexible view that an
unconstitutional act is not a law, creating no rights and imposing
no duties, and thus as inoperative as if it had never been. It was
oblivious to the force of the principle adopted by this Court that
while a statute's repugnancy to the fundamental law deprives it of
its character as a juridical norm, its having been operative prior to
its being nullified is a fact that is not devoid of legal consequences.
As will hereafter be explained, such a failing of the lower court
resulted in an erroneous decision. We find for appellant Philippine
National Bank, and we reverse.

There is no dispute as to the facts. Plaintiff obtained the loan in the


amount of P450.00 from defendant Bank dated July 19, 1939,
maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage duly
registered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of the
province of Pangasinan. As of November 27, 1959, the balance due
on said loan was in the amount of P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of
the same year, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of
Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining
unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both defendants on
August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the mortgage
sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having
elapsed from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944. She sought and
was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against
defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was made permanent in the
decision now on appeal. Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for
the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own theory the
defense of prescription would not be available if the period from
March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July
26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period
of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the
computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps
for the recovery of the loan. As noted, the lower court did not find
such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.

Hence this appeal, which, as made clear at the outset, possesses


merit, there being a failure on the part of the lower court to adhere
to the applicable constitutional doctrine as to the effect to be given
to a statute subsequently declared invalid.

1. The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an


unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a
municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot
be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any
official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law
once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and
purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it:
"When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the
Constitution. 3 It is understandable why it should be so, the
Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or
executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of


simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not
admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such
challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and
had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience
and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed
their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a
subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while
such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to
be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to
its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with.
This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on
whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of
time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be
no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." 4 This
language has been quoted with approval in a resolution inAraneta v.
Hill 5 and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. 6 An even
more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for
the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. 7

2. Such an approach all the more commends itself whenever police


power legislation intended to promote public welfare but adversely
affecting property rights is involved. While subject to be assailed on
due process, equal protection and non-impairment grounds, all that
is required to avoid the corrosion of invalidity is that the rational
basis or reasonableness test is satisfied. The legislature on the
whole is not likely to allow an enactment suffering, to paraphrase
Cardozo, from the infirmity of out running the bounds of reason
and resulting in sheer oppression. It may be of course that if
challenged, an adverse judgment could be the result, as its running
counter to the Constitution could still be shown. In the meanwhile
though, in the normal course of things, it has been acted upon by
the public and accepted as valid. To ignore such a fact would indeed
be the fruitful parent of injustice. Moreover, as its constitutionality
is conditioned on its being fair or reasonable, which in turn is
dependent on the actual situation, never static but subject to
change, a measure valid when enacted may subsequently, due to
altered circumstances, be stricken down.

That is precisely what happened in connection with Republic Act


No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive
Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmea, suspending
the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary
obligations payable by war sufferers. So it was explicitly held
in Rutter v. Esteban 8where such enactment was considered in 1953
"unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a
minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and
void and without effect." 9 At the time of the issuance of the above
Executive Order in 1945 and of the passage of such Act in 1948,
there was a factual justification for the moratorium. The Philippines
was confronted with an emergency of impressive magnitude at the
time of her liberation from the Japanese military forces in 1945.
Business was at a standstill. Her economy lay prostrate. Measures,
radical measures, were then devised to tide her over until some
semblance of normalcy could be restored and an improvement in
her economy noted. No wonder then that the suspension of
enforcement of payment of the obligations then existing was
declared first by executive order and then by legislation. The
Supreme Court was right therefore in rejecting the contention that
on its face, the Moratorium Law was unconstitutional, amounting
as it did to the impairment of the obligation of contracts.
Considering the circumstances confronting the legitimate
government upon its return to the Philippines, some such remedial
device was needed and badly so. An unyielding insistence then on
the rights to property on the part of the creditors was not likely to
meet with judicial sympathy. Time passed however, and conditions
did change.

When the legislation was before this Court in 1953, the question
before it was its satisfying the rational basis test, not as of the time
of its enactment but as of such date. Clearly, if then it were found
unreasonable, the right to non-impairment of contractual
obligations must prevail over the assertion of community power to
remedy an existing evil. The Supreme Court was convinced that
such indeed was the case. As stated in the opinion of Justice
Bautista Angelo: "But we should not lose sight of the fact that these
obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance
of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic
Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the
eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language
means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least
twelve (12) years before they could affect a liquidation of their
investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to us
unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is
plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works
injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the
debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote,
more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more
patent when, under the law the debtor is not even required to pay
interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in
10
the United States. The conclusion to which the foregoing
considerations inevitably led was that as of the time of adjudication,
it was apparent that Republic Act No. 342 could not survive the test
of validity. Executive Order No. 32 should likewise be nullified. That
before the decision they were not constitutionally infirm was
admitted expressly. There is all the more reason then to yield assent
to the now prevailing principle that the existence of a statute or
executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact
to which legal consequences are attached.

3. Precisely though because of the judicial recognition that


moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the
debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view
in a series of cases impressive in their number and unanimity that
during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run. So it
has been held from Day v. Court of First
11 12
Instance, decided in 1954, to Republic v. Hernaez, handed down
only last year. What is deplorable is that as of the time of the lower
court decision on January 27, 1960, at least eight decisions had left
no doubt as to the prescriptive period being tolled in the meanwhile
13
prior to such adjudication of invalidity. Speaking of the opposite
view entertained by the lower court, the present Chief Justice,
14
in Liboro v. Finance and Mining Investments Corp. has categorized
it as having been "explicitly and consistently rejected by this
15
Court."

The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff's suit is thus


manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13,
1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by
appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen
years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10,
1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953,
when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering
eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously then, when
resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage
obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be
availed of as a defense.

WHEREFORE, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the


suit of plaintiff filed August 10, 1959 dismissed. No costs.

De Agbayani vs PNB, 38 SCRA 429

The Supreme Court declared the moratorium law unconstitutional


but it did not allow to toll the prescriptive period of the right to
foreclose the mortgage. The court adopted the view that before an
act is declared unconstitutional it is an operative fact which can be
the source of rights and duties.

OPOSA vs. FACTORAN G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993. (Digested)

OPOSA vs. FACTORAN G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993 - -


Digested Case

LANDMARK CASE: In 1990, 44 children, through their parents,


sought to make the DENR Secretary stop issuing licenses to cut
timber, invoking their right to a healthful environment. They brought
the case in the name of all the children in the Philippines and in the
name of the generations yet unborn!
FACTS:

The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to
order the respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing
Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in the
country is causing vast abuses on rain-forest.They further asserted
that the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations
yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. Plaintiffs further
assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued
and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence
in the course of the trial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.

HELD:

The SC decided in the affirmative. Locus standi means the right of


the litigant to act or to be heard.Under Section 16, Article II of the
1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners,
minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can,
for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature
means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys
forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present
as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has
a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come. This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because
the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

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