LIBI VS IAC

G.R. No. 70890 September 18 1992

FACTS:
Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both minors, before he turned the firearm on
himself. As a result, the parents of Julie Ann filed against Wendell's parents to recover
damages. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious liability.

RULING:
Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their minor children is imposed
by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which covers obligations arising from both quasi-
delicts and criminal offenses. The parents' liability as being primary and not subsidiary and
liability shall ceased if the parents can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good
father to prevent damage.

In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in supervising the activities of their
son. It was only at the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was
drug informant of CANU and that the gun used in the shooting incident was missing from the
safety deposit box. Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell from having access
to said gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of
said minor who was living in their company.

Maria Teresa Cuadra vs Alfonso Monfort

G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970

Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in Mabini Elementary
School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned the class to weed the school
premises. While they were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and she jokingly
shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter tossed it at MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye.
MT Cuadras eye got infected. She was brought to the hospital; her eyes were attempted to
be surgically repaired but she nevertheless got blind in her right eye. MT Cuadras parents
sued Alfonso Monfort (MT Monforts dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower
court ruled that Monfort should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral
damages and attorneys fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180.

HELD: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the
mother, is responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which
is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption
is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference
that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso Monfort could
have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way
remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act
which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her
and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision
of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an
innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful,
would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners,

vs.
RODRIGO APOSTOL

G.R. No. 163609 [November 27, 2008]

FACTS:

Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck
driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up
truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the
possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to
bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the
National Highway in South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some 50
meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a
very high speed at the time of the accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries.
Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.

ISSUE:
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver
assigned to him
MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee.

RULING:

1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he

was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no
moment. The Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozanos employer
notwithstanding Lozanos assignment to Mayor Miguel. Even assuming arguendo that
Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still cannot
be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere
giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over
the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver.
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozanos employer nor the vehicles registered owner. There
existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will
make him accountable for Marvins death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the
time of the accident.
2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in
governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held that municipal
corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be
sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be
sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not
acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes
under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer.
Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable
with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as
a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles.
Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to
be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is
directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident to its operation.
The petition is DENIED.
 Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Lucita Suyom, Marissa Enano, Myrna Tamayo and
Felix Oledan
GR 143360 September 5, 2002

FACTS:

A tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into a house-cum-store in Tondo, Manila. Part of the
house was destroyed. Two people died and four were injured. Tutor was convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries.Verification with the
Land Transportation Office revealed that the registered owner of the tractor was Equitable
Leasing Corporation who leased it to Edwin Lim. The relatives of the victims filed a civil case
for damages.The Regional Trial Court ruled against Equitable and ordered it to pay damages to
the victims relatives. Upon Equitables appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC.
Equitable filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Equitable Leasing is liable for damages

RULING:
Yes, Equitable Leasing is liable. The petition is denied and the CA decision is
affirmed.As the registered owner of the tractor, Equitable Leasing is liable for the acts of Raul
Tutor even if he was actually the employee of Equitables former lessee, Ecatine Corporation,
who became the actual owner of the tractor by virtue of a deed of sale not registered with the
LTO.
Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator
insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences of its operation. In the eyes of the law, the owner/operator of
record is the employer of the driver, the actual owner/operator being considered as merely the
agent of the registered owner/operator. The principle applies even if the registered owner of any
vehicle does not use it for public service.The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify
the owner so that if any accident happens, or any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle,
responsibility can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Failure to register the
deed of sale should not prejudice victims, who have the right to rely on the principle that the
registered owner is liable for damages caused by the negligence of the driver.
Equitable Leasing cant hide behind the allegation that Tutor was Ecatine Corps
employee, because it will prevent victims from recovering their loss on the basis of Equitables
inaction in failing to register the sale. The non-registration is Equitables fault, which should face
the legal consequences thereof.

SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMAN, digested

GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law Government Agency, Proprietary Functions)
FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for damages resulting to the
death of the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency.
NIA maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not perform primarily proprietorship
functions but governmental functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.

HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government,
because its community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus,
making it an agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their
employees.

City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA

G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
Concepcion, J.:

Facts: Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and
unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed,
and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos
Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City
which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.

Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for
the damages suffered by Teotico.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.

In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been
constantly kept in good conditionand manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers
concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control
and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said
street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."
Guilatco v. City of Dagupan

G.R. No. 61516 Mar 21, 1989

FACTS:

Florentina Guilatco was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez

Blvd. (a national road) when she accidentally fell into an open manhole. Her right
leg was fractured, resulting in her hospitalization and continuing difficulty in
locomotion. Because of her accident, Guilatco was unable to go to work, thereby
losing her income. She also lost weight, and she is now no longer her former jovial
self since she is unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities. She
filed an action for damages against the City of Dagupan. The City of Dagupan
denied liability on the ground that the manhole was located on a national road,
which was not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan.

ISSUE:

Whether the City of Dagupan is liable to Guilatco.

HELD:

Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article 2189 to apply, it is not necessary for
the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality. The
article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective
road or street. In this case, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter
of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer, whose duties include the
care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers. The charter of
Dagupan provides that the laying out, construction, and improvement of streets,
avenues, and alleys and sidewalks and the regulation of the use thereof may be
legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus, the charter clearly indicates that the city
indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole
is located.

Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme, No. L-52179, April 8, 1991

FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including
Laureano Bania Sr. died. The heirs of Bania filed a complaint for damages against the owner
and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint against the Municipality and
its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of non-
suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality
and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Bania.

ISSUES:

1. Are municipal corporations suable?

2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions?

HELD:

1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are
engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from
suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because
their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.

2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue
and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that
they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State
merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to
the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal
streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of
official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office.

Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any
liability. (Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme, No. L-52179, April 8, 1991)

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA

G.R. No. 82465 Feb 25, 1991

FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school
picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short
notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic,
with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the
teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was
apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it
was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against petitioner
and some of their teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaint against the school.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.

RULING: Petition granted.

RATIO: Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission
which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned
tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned
tasks. What was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which did not have permit from the school since
it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal of the planning of the
picnic does not in any way consent to the holding of the same.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the
respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and
exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the
students who joined the picnic.
JOSEPH SALUDAGA vs. FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY

G.R. NO. 179337 (April 30, 2008)

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern
University when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security guards on duty
at the school premises on August 18, 1996. He was rushed to the hospital due to the wound he
sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained that the
shooting was accidental.

Salduga thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that
they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment
and an atmosphere conducive to learning.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied hence, the instant petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the school is liable for breach of contract?

HELD: YES, It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the
contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of
relief. In the instant case, we find that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus by
no less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is
a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with the defense of Caso
Fortuito cannot be sustained. After a thorough review of the records, we find that
respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in
providing a safe learning environment for their students. They failed to prove that they
ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the requirements stipulated in the
Security Service Agreement. also failed to show that they understood steps to ascertain and
confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifications required in
the Security Service Agreement. Consequently, respondents' defense of force majeure must
fail. In order for force majeure to be considered, respondents must show that no negligence
or misconduct was committed that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot
be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible
adverse consequences of such a loss. One's negligence may have concurred with an act
of God in producing damage and injury to another.