MARIKINA

VALLEY DEVELOPMENT COURT V FLOJO

FACTS:
1. Jose Reyes filed a complaint for reconveyance of land situated in Espana,
Manila against Markina Valley and Milagros Liamzon.
2. It was alleged that Reyes entrusted some funds to Liamzon, sister in law of
his wife Aurelia Liamzon, in order to purchase the Espana property for them.
3. Liamzon, however, in alleged violation of such trust, purchased the property
in her own name and had the title registered in her own name. Liamzon then
transferred the title of said property to Markina Valley, a close property
owned by the Liamzon family.
4. In the petitioners answer, they denied the allegations of Reyes. Instead, they
contended that Milagros purchased the property in her own name with funds
coming from the Markina Valley and that Reyes waived their right to buy the
property in question to Milagros.
5. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered the petitioner to execute
a Deed of Conveyance in favor of respondents. (11 October 1991)
6. Marikina Valley received a copy of the decision of the trial court in October
28, 1991. They filed a MFR on November 7, 1991.
o Insufficiency of evidence
7. Private respondents opposed the MFR on the ground that it was pro forma.
They contend that they allegations of insufficiency of evidence were couched
in very general terms, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 37.
8. TC denied the MFR. The order was received by the petitioners on 22
November 1991. On November 25, 1991, they filed a notice of appeal with
the TC. On the other hand, private respondents moved for the execution of
the (October) decision. They insisted that the petitioners had failed to
perfect an appeal within the reglementary period.
9. RTC ruling:
o The Notice of Appeal was denied on the ground of failure to filed
within the reglementary to period.
o The trial judge reasoned that petitioners motion for reconsideration
was pro forma and hence did not stop the running of the reglementary
period. Thereupon the trial judge granted private respondents
motions for execution.
10. Upon appeal, CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and injunction. MFR
was indeed pro forma.
o Where a MFR merely submits, reiterates, repleads, repeats or
reaffirms the same arguments that had been previously considered
and resolved in decision, it is pro forma.
o Thus, the pro forma decision did not toll the running of the period to
perfect an appeal and that, accordingly, the judgment had become
final and executory.
11. Hence, this petition.
o MFR was sufficient in form and substance and had effectively
suspended the running of the reglementary period and that their
 notice of appeal filed 3 days from receipt of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration had been filed within the remaining
period of perfecting an appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the MFR was pro forma and should not toll the running of the
reglementary period.

HELD: NO. The MFR was not pro forma.
1. Under Rule 37, an aggrieved party may file a MFR on the ground of (1)
Excessive damages; (2) Insufficiency of evidence ; (3) Void decision.
o A MFR based on 2 and 3 must point out specifically the findings and
conclusions of judgment which are not supported by evidence or
which are contrary to law, making express reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provision of law
alleged to be contrary to such findings and conclusions.
2. A MFR which satisfies the requirement under Rule 37, Section 2 interrupts
the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
3. A MFR which does not satisfy the requirements are to be treated as pro
forma, intended merely to delay the proceedings. And as such, will not
suspend the reglementary period.The net result will be the dismissal of the
appeal for having been unseasonably filed.
o Where a MFR merely submits, reiterates, repleads, repeats or
reaffirms the same arguments that had been previously considered
and resolved in decision, it is pro forma.
o It should, however, be noted that the circumstance that a motion for
reconsideration deals with the same issues and arguments posed and
resolved by the trial court in its decision does not necessarily mean
that the motion must be characterized as merely pro forma.
o One example of a pro forma MFR is when it alleged the ff: (1) Order is
contrary to law; (2) The the order is contrary to the facts of the case.
The movant fails to make reference to the testimonial and
documentary evidence on record or the provisions of law said
to be contrary to the trial courts conclusions. In other words,
the movant is also required to point out succinctly why
reconsideration is warranted.
It is not enough that a motion for reconsideration should state
what part of the decision is contrary to law or the evidence; it
should also point out why it is so. Failure to explain why will
render the MFR pro forma.
o Where a substantial bonafide effort is made to explain where and
why the trial court should be regarded as having erred in its main
decision, the fact that the trial court thereafter found such argument
unmeritorious or as inadequate to warrant modification or reversal
of the main decision, does not, of course, mean that the motion for
reconsideration should have been regarded, or was properly
regarded, as merely pro forma
 o Where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part
of the movant merely to delay the proceedings, our Court has refused
to characterize the motion as simply pro forma.
4. APPLICATION IN THE CASE AT BAR
o In the case at bar, plaintiffs MFR pointed out each and every error the
TC committed and which they did not discuss that will warrant the
reversal of the decision of the case. They pointed out which
circumstances which was not sufficiently proved by evidence.
o However, it should not be inferred from the decision of the SC
regarding the MFR as not a pro forma one, that the motion was
meritorious. The SC remanded the case and give due course to the
petitioners appeal.
5. The doctrine relating to pro forma motions for reconsideration impacts upon
the reality and substance of the statutory right of appeal, that doctrine should
be applied reasonably, rather than literally. The right to appeal, where it
exists, is an important and valuable right. Public policy would be better
served by according the appellate court an effective opportunity to review
the decision of the trial court on the merits, rather than by aborting the right
to appeal by a literal application of the procedural rule relating to pro forma
motions for reconsideration.