Labor Standard klasmates dis is our asynment cases:

1. Maternity Childrens' Hospital v. Sec. of Labor

2. Rance v. NLRC
3. Bondoc v. People's Bank & Trust Company
4. Asian Transmission Corp. v. CA
5. Ditan v. POEA
6. Rubber World v. NLRC
7. IBAAEU v. Inciong
8. SSS Employees' Association, et. al. v. CA
9. Nat'l. Service Corp. v. NLRC
10. Land Housing Dev't. Corp. v. Esquillo
11. Phil. Nat'l. Cons't. Corp. v. NLRC

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68147 June 30, 1988

AMADA RANCE, MERCEDES LACUESTA, MELBA GUTIERREZ, ESTER FELONGCO, CATALINO ARAGONES,
CONSOLACION DE LA ROSA, AMANCIA GAY, EDUARDO MENDOZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, POLYBAG MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, VIRGINIA
MALLARI, JOHNNY LEE, ROMAS VILLAMIN, POLYBAG WORKERS UNION, PONCIANO FERNANDEZ, AND
ANTONIO ANTIQUERA, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

A review of the records shows that a Collective Bargaining Agreement was entered into on April 30, 1981 by and
between respondents Polybag Manufacturing Corporation and Polybag Workers Union which provides among others:

ARTICLE V

UNION SECURITY

Any employee within the bargaining agreement who is a member of the union at the time of the
effectivity of this agreement or becomes a member of the UNION thereafter, shall during the term
thereof or any extention, continue to be a member in good standing of the UNION as a condition of
continued employment in the COMPANY.

Any employee hired during the effectivity of this agreement shall, within 30 days after becoming
regular join the UNION and continue to be a member in good standing thereof as a condition of
continued employment in the COMPANY.

On the basis of a board resolution of the UNION, the COMPANY shall dismiss from the service any
member of the UNION who loses his membership in good standing either by resignation therefrom
or expulsion therefrom for any of the following causes:
 1. Disloyalty to the UNION;

2. Commission of acts inimical to the interest of the UNION;

3. Failure and refusal to pay UNION dues and other assessments;

4. Conviction for any offense or crime; or

5. Organizing and/or joining another labor organization claiming jurisdiction similar to that of the
UNION.

Provided, however, that in case expulsion proceedings are instituted against any member of the
UNION, pending such proceedings, the COMPANY, on the basis of a board resolution of the
UNION, shall suspend the member concerned; and provided further, that the UNION, jointly and
severally with the officers and members of the board voting for the dismissal or suspension, shall
hold and render the COMPANY, its executive, owners, and officers free from any and all claims and
liabilities. (Rollo, p. 64).

Petitioners herein were among the members of the respondent union who were expelled by the latter for disloyaltyin
that they allegedly joined the NAFLU a large federation. Because of the expulsion, petitioners were dismissed by
respondent Corporation. Petitioners sued for reinstatement and backwages stating their dismissal was without due
process. Losing both in the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), they
elevated their cause to the Supreme Court.

Respondent Polybag Workers Union as already stated expelled 125 members on the ground of disloyalty and acts
inimical to the interests of the Union (Resolution No. 84, series of 1982, Rollo, p. 16) based on the findings and
recommendations of the panel of investigators. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and the "Union Security Clause" valid and considered the termination of the petitioners justified
thereunder, for having committed an act of disloyalty to the Polybag Workers Union by having affiliated with and
having joined the NAFLU, another labor union claiming jurisdiction similar to the former, while still members of
respondent union (Rollo, pp. 45-46).

Among the disputed portions of the NLRC decision is its finding that it has been substantially proven that the
petitioners committed acts of disloyalty to their union as a consequence of the filing by NAFLU for and in their behalf
of the complaint in question (Rollo, p. 46).

Petitioners insist that their expulsion from the Union and consequent dismissal from employment have no basis
whether factual or legal, because they did not in fact affiliate themselves with another Union, the NAFLU. On the
contrary, they claim that there is a connivance between respondents Company and Union in their illegal dismissal in
order to avoid the payment of separation pay by respondent company.

Petitioners' contention that they did not authorize NAFLU to file NLRC-AB Case No. 6-4275-82 for them is borne out
by the records which show that they did not sign the complaint, neither did they sign any document of membership
application with NAFLU (Rollo, p. 323). Significantly, none of private respondents was able to present any evidence to
the contrary except for one employee who admitted having authorized NAFLU to file the complaint but only for the
purpose of questioning the funds of the Union (Rollo, p. 216).

Placed in proper perspective, the mere act of seeking help from the NAFLU cannot constitute disloyalty as
contemplated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. At most it was an act of self-preservation of workers who,
driven to desperation found shelter in the NAFLU who took the cudgel for them.
It will be recalled that 460 employees were temporarily laid off; some were laid-off as early as March 22, 1982
although the actual official announcement and notice of the intended shutdown was made only on May 27, 1982
(Rollo, p. 151). The laid-off employees did not receive any separation pay because as alleged by respondent
company their dismissal was due to serious business reverses suffered by it. The only aid offered by the company
which was offered when the disgruntled employees began to discuss among themselves their plight, was a 1/2 sack
of rice monthly and P 50.00 weekly. Most of the employees did not avail themselves of the aid as those who did were
allegedly made to sign blank papers. To aggravate matters, petitioners complained that their pleas for their union
officers to fight for their right to reinstatement, fell on deaf ears. Their union leaders continued working and were not
among those laid-off, which explains the lack of positive action on the part of the latter to help or even sympathize
with the plight of the members. All they could offer was a statement "marunong pa kayo sa may-ari ng kumpanya"
("you know more than the company owners") (Rollo, p. 80). Under the circumutances, petitioners cannot be blamed
for seeking help wherever it could be found.

In fact even assuming that petitioners did authorize NAFLU to file the action for them, it would have been pointless
because NAFLU cannot file an action for members of another union. The proper remedy would be to drop the union
as party to the action and place the names of the employees instead (Lakas v. Marcelo Enterprises, 118 SCRA 422
[1982]) as what appears to have been done in this case before the Court.

Petitioners claim that the NLRC erred in ruling that the expulsion proceeding conducted by the Union was in
accordance with its by-laws. Respondent Union had notified and summoned herein petitioners to appear and explain
why they should not be expelled from the union for having joined and affiliated with NAFLU.

Petitioners contend that the requisites of due process were not complied with in that, there was no impartial tribunal
or union body vested with authority to conduct the disciplinary proceeding under the union constitution and by-laws,
and, that complainants were not furnished notice of the charge against them, nor timely notices of the hearings on the
same (Rollo, p. 48).

According to the minutes of the special meeting of the Board of Directors of respondent Union held on September 14,
1982, the Chairman of the Board of Directors showed the members of the board, copies of the minutes of the
investigation proceedings of each individual member, together with a consolidated list of Union members found guilty
as charged and recommended for expulsion as members of the respondent Union. The Board members examined
the minutes and the list (Rollo, p. 219).

It is to be noted, however, that only two (2) of the expelled petitioners appeared before the investigation panel (Rollo,
pp. 203, 235). Most of the petitioners boycotted the investigation proceedings. They alleged that most of them did not
receive the notice of summons from respondent Union because they were in the provinces. This fact was not
disproved by private respondents who were able to present only a sample copy of proof of service, Annex "14" (Rollo,
p. 215). Petitioners further claim that they had no Idea that they were charged with disloyalty; those who came were
not only threatened with persecution but also made to write the answers to questions as dictated to them by the
Union and company representatives. These untoward incidents prompted petitioners to request for a general
investigation with all the petitioners present but their request was ignored by the panel of investigators (Rollo, pp.
280, 307). Again, these allegations were not denied by private respondents.

In any event, even if petitioners who were complainants in NLRC-AB Case No. 6-4275-82 appeared in the supposed
investigation proceedings to answer the charge of disloyalty against them, it could not have altered the fact that the
proceedings were violative of the elementary rule of justice and fair play. The Board of Directors of respondent union
would have acted as prosecutor, investigator and judge at the same time. The proceeding would have been a farce
under the circumstances (Lit Employees Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, 116 SCRA 459 [1982] citing
Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. Rafael Hernandez, 20 SCRA 109). The filing of the charge of disloyalty
against petitioners was instigated by the Chairman of the Board of Directors and Acting Union President, Ponciano
Fernandez, in the special meeting of the members of the Board of Directors as convened by the Union President on
August 16, 1982 (Rollo, p. 213). The Panel of Investigators created under the Board's Resolution No. 83, s. 1982 was
composed of the Chairman of the Board, Ponciano Fernandez, and two (2) members of the Board, Samson Yap and
Carmen Garcia (Rollo, p. 214). It is the same Board that expelled its 125 members in its Resolution No. 84, s. of 1982
(Rollo, p. 219).

All told, it is obvious, that in the absence of any full blown investigation of the expelled members of the Union by an
impartial body, there is no basis for respondent Union's accusations.

It is the policy of the state to assure the right of workers to "security of tenure" (Article XIII, Sec. 3 of the New
Constitution, Section 9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution). The guarantee is an act of social justice. When a person
has no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood. Therefore, he should be
protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his job. Article 280 of the Labor Code has construed security of tenure
as meaning that "the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by" the code (Bundoc v. People's Bank and Trust Company, 103 SCRA 599 [1981]). Dismissal is not
justified for being arbitrary where the workers were denied due process (Reyes v. Philippine Duplicators, Inc., 109
SCRA 489 [1981] and a clear denial of due process, or constitutional right must be safeguarded against at all times,
(De Leon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 100 SCRA 691 [1980]). This is especially true in the case at bar
where there were 125 workers mostly heads or sole breadwinners of their respective families.

Time and again, this Court has reminded employers that while the power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the
employer, the same is not without limitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of
his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, as in the instant case. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed in
dismissing an employee because it affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood. Employers should,
therefore, respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to labor (Liberty Cotton Mills
Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 90 SCRA 393 [1979], Resolution).

In the case at bar, the scandalous haste with which respondent corporation dismissed 125 employees lends credence
to the claim that there was connivance between respondent corporation and respondent Union. It is evident that
private respondents were in bad faith in dismissing petitioners. They, the private respondents, are guilty of unfair
labor practice.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC-NCR-11-
6881-82 dated April 26, 1984 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) respondent corporation is ordered: (1) to
reinstate petitioners to their former positions without reduction in rank, seniority and salary; (b) to pay petitioners
three-year backwages, without any reduction or qualification, jointly and solidarily with respondent Union; and (c) to
pay petitioners exemplary damages of P500.00 each. Where reinstatement is no longer feasible, respondent
corporation and respondent union are solidarily ordered to pay, considering their length of service their corresponding
separation pay and other benefits to which they are entitled under the law.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-43835 March 31, 1981

DOMINGO F. BONDOC, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE'S BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS (Surviving Bank) and
JACOBO C. CLAVE (as Presidential Executive Assitant), respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
This certiorari case involves the issue of whether respondent Presidential Executive Assistant committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in confirming the abolition of petitioner's position as a department
manager in a bank and the payment to him of separation pay instead of reinstating him with backwages.

Domingo F. Bondoc, who used to be an assistant of Jaime C. Velazquez in the Ayala Secutrities Corporation (p. 116,
Rollo), joined the People's Bank and Trust Company on October 1, 1966 upon the recommendation of Velazquez, a
director, to Roman Azanza, the bank president (p. 35, Rollo).

He replaced Ariston Estrada, Jr. (p. 37, Rollo). Bondoc was chosen by the bank's board of directors on February 21,
1967 as the first manager of the bank's department of economic research and statistics which was organized in
January, 1967 (Exh. 4 and 5).

That department had only four employees: a stenographer and three clerks who were formerly employed in the
comtroller's office, accounting department and office of the corporate secretary (p. 117-118, Rollo).

Every year, from 1968 to 1973, Bondoc was elected to the position of department manager and assistant vice-
president by the bank's board of directors at its annual organizational meeting (Exh. 1-B to 1-F).

On May 15, 1973, Bondoc reported in writing to Manuel Chuidian, a bank director, certain anomalies committed by
the officers of the bank. The Central Bank found that some officers of the bank utilized its found for their own
interests. Because of those anomalies, the Monetary Board suspendedBenito R. Araneta, a director and vice-
president, and reprimanded the other officers involved, namely, Severino Coronacion, Nicanor O. Corpus, Guillermo
D. Teodoro, Feldres G. San Pedro, Carlos Villaluz, Godofredo Galindez, Fernando Macalanlayand Manuel P. Elepao
(pp. 6-8 Rollo).

On September 19, 1973, the board of directors of the People's Bank, in the course of its deliberation on the bank's
projected merger with the Bank of the Philippine islands, resolved to abolish itts department of economic research
and statistics which, as already noted, was headed by Bondoc (p. 35, Rollo).

The board regarded the said department as a rededant unit whose functions could be performed by other
departments. The Bank of P.I., like twenty-three other commercial banks, has no such department (p. 117, Rollo).
Bondoc's four subordinates were absorbed by the accounting department.

Bondoc was advised of the abolition ofhis department in the later part of September, 1973. He asked the personnel
manager to compute his separations pay. Bondoc was told that his separation pay was equivalent to seventy-five
percent of his salary for every year of service. It amounted to P10,481.33 under its car finacing plan. (p. 118, Rollo).

Bondoc allegedly told the personnel manager that he would use his separation pay to liquidate his debt and issue a
check for P3,012.08 to cover the balance of his debt. He requested the personnel manager to expedite the
preparation of the bill of sale for the Toyota car so that he could get the document on the following day. But he did not
show up that day (p. 118, Rollo).

It is relevant to state that the merger of the two banks was effected in accompliance with the Central Bank's
requirement that commercial banks should increase their capital stock to a minimum of one hundred million pesos
through mergers and consolidations or other lawful means. The merger was approved by the Monetary Board and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The merger agreement was signed in January, 1974. It was consummated on
June 1, 1974.

On November 2, 1973, the People's Bank, pursuant to section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 21 (creating the ad hoc
National Labor Relations Commission), applied with the Secretary of Labor for clearnce to terminate Bondoc's
services effective on November 5 (p. 35, Rollo).
He lost no time in filing with the NLRC his opposition to the termination his services. He alleged in his opposition that
he was dismissed without cause (p. 114, Rollo).

As all efforts for the amicable settlement of the case were fruitless, it was submitted for compulsory arbitration.

During the hearing, Bondoc tried to prove that the abolition of his position was a reprisal for his aforementioned
exposure of some anomalies in the bank which resulted in the suspension or reprimand by the Monetary Board of
certain senior officers of the bank headed by Benito R. Araneta, a nephew of J. Antonio Araneta, the chairman of the
board (p. 48, Rollo).

After hearing, the NLRC arbitrator recommended to the Secretary of Labor the denial of the application to terminate
Bondoc's employment and ordered the People's Bank to reinstate him with backwages from November 16, 1973 and
with allowances and other benefits guaranteed by law and without loss of status and seniority rights (pp. 42-43,
Rollo).

On appeal, the NLRC (Commissioners Castro, Borromeo ans Seno) in its decision of January 21, 1975 reversed the
decision of the arbitrartor, approved the clearance for Bondoc's dismissal and ordered the People's Bank to pay him
seventy five percent (75%) of his monthly salary for every year of service in lieu of one-half month salary for every
year of service fixed in the Termination Pay Law, Republic Act No. 1052, as amended by Republic Act no. 1787 (p.
45, Rollo).

The NLRC adduced as reason to justify the abolition of Bondoc's position (1) the fact that his position as manager
being confidential in character, the bank had the rperogative to terminate his employment anytimel (2) Bondoc's
department was nolonger necessary to the efficient operation of the bank in view of the merger; (3) the management
is not precluded from undertakings a reorganization or making changes to meet the demands of the present and (4)
in case of mergers, departments or position may be abolished or new ones created, as the necessity for them
requires (p. 44-45, Rollo).

Bondoc appealed tot he Secretary of Labor. That high official in the resolution of September 29, 1975 reversed the
NLRC's decision on the grounds that the motivation for the termination of Bondoc's services was not taken into
account by the NLRC and that the People's Bank should not have abolished Bondoc's department without prior
clearance. He denied the application for clearance to dismiss Bondocs (p. 50, Rollo).

He ordered the People's Bank to reinstate Bondoc to his former position or any substantially equivalent position with
backwages equivalent to his salary for six months, it being undrstood that the Bank of the P.I. has assumred all the
liabilities and obligations of the People's Bank. The Secretary denied the application for clearance to dismiss Bondoc.
(pp. 48-50, Rollo).

From the resolution, the Bank of P.I., as successor of the People's Bank, appealed tot he president of the Philippines.

One the grounds relied upon in that appeal was that Bondoc was convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral
turpitude (Criminal Case No. 7185, Manila CFI, Exh. 1).

The Bank of P.I. cited Central Bank Circular No. 356, which disqualifies a person convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude from becoming an officer of a bank (pp. 213-4, Rollo).

In a decision dated May 17, 1976, Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave set aside the decisions of the
arbitrator and the Secretary and confirmed in toto the NLRC's decision (p. Rollo).

The office of the President held that under the Termination Pay Law an employment without a definite period may be
terminated with or without a cause, thatthe abolition of Bondoc's position was a necesary incident of the merger of the
two banks and that his services were no longer indispensable to them. hence, the clearance for his removal was
authorized for his removal was authorized (pp. 52-54, Rollo).

The review of the Presidential decision was sought by Bondoc in the petition which he filed in this Courton May 27,
1976. This is the fifth decision to be rendered in this case.

We hold that under the peculiar or particular facts of this case the termination of bondoc's employment was lawful and
justified and that no grave abuse of discretion was lawful and justified and that no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction was committed by the Presidential Executive Assistant in affirming the NLRC's
decision sustaining ther termination of his employment.

Bondoc was not employed for a fixed period. He held his position of department manager at the pleasure of the
bank's board of directors. He occupied a managerial position and his stay in therein depended on his retention of the
trust and confidence of the management and whether there was any need for his services.

Although some vindictive motivation might have impelled the aboliton of his position, yet, it is undeniable that the
bank's board of directors possessed the power to remove him and to determine whether the interest of the bank
justified the existence of his department.

Under the old Termination Pay Law, it was held that in the absence of a contract of employment for a specific period
the employer has the right to dismiss his employees at anytime with or without just cause (De Dios vs. Bristol
Laboratories (Phils.), Inc., L-25530, January 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 349, 358; Jaguar Transportation Co., Inc. vs.
Cornista, L-32959, May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA 77).

It may be noted that under Policy Instructions No. 8 of the Secretary of Labor "the employer is not required to obtain a
previous written clearnace to terminate managerial employees in order to enable him to manage effectively". (SEe
Associated Citizens Bank vs. Ople, L-48896, February 24, 1981.)

The petitioner invokes the policy of the State to assure the right of "workers" to security of tenure (Sec. 9, Art. II,
Constitution).

That guarantee is an act of social justice. When a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only
possession or means of livelihood. Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary and unjust deprivation of
his job.

Article 280 of the Labor Code has construed security of tenure as referring to regular employment and as meaning
that "the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by" the
Code.

As already noted above, the facts of this case do not warrant the conclusion that Bondoc's right to security of tenure
was oppressively abridged. He knew all along that his tenure as a department manager rested in the discretion of the
bank's board of directors and that at anytime his services might be dispensed with or his position might be abolished.

On equitable considerations, we hold that Bondoc should be paid as separation pay his salary and allowances, if any,
for seven months.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Presidential Executive Assistant is affirmed with the modification that the
Bank of the P.I. should pay to the petitioner separation pay equivalent to his salary and allowances (if any) for seven
months. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 144664 March 15, 2004

ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
The Hon. COURT OF APPEALS, Thirteenth Division, HON. FROILAN M. BACUNGAN as Voluntary Arbitrator,
KISHIN A. LALWANI, Union, Union representative to the Panel Arbitrators; BISIG NG ASIAN TRANSMISSION
LABOR UNION (BATLU); HON. BIENVENIDO T. LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and
Employment; and DIRECTOR CHITA G. CILINDRO in her capacity as Director of Bureau of Working
Conditions, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Petitioner, Asian Transmission Corporation, seeks via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1995 Rules of Civil
Procedure the nullification of the March 28, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals denying its petition to annul 1) the
March 11, 1993 "Explanatory Bulletin"2 of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) entitled "Workers
Entitlement to Holiday Pay on April 9, 1993, Araw ng Kagitingan and Good Friday", which bulletin the DOLE
reproduced on January 23, 1998, 2) the July 31, 1998 Decision3 of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators ruling that the
said explanatory bulletin applied as well to April 9, 1998, and 3) the September 18, 19984 Resolution of the Panel of
Voluntary Arbitration denying its Motion for Reconsideration.

The following facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are undisputed:

The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, issued an
Explanatory Bulletin dated March 11, 1993 wherein it clarified, inter alia, that employees are entitled to 200% of their
basic wage on April 9, 1993, whether unworked, which[,] apart from being Good Friday [and, therefore, a legal
holiday], is also Araw ng Kagitingan [which is also a legal holiday]. The bulletin reads:

"On the correct payment of holiday compensation on April 9, 1993 which apart from being Good Friday is alsoAraw
ng Kagitingan, i.e., two regular holidays falling on the same day, this Department is of the view that the covered
employees are entitled to at least two hundred percent (200%) of their basic wage even if said holiday is unworked.
The first 100% represents the payment of holiday pay on April 9, 1993 as Good Friday and the second 100% is the
payment of holiday pay for the same date as Araw ng Kagitingan.

Said bulletin was reproduced on January 23, 1998, when April 9, 1998 was both Maundy Thursday and Araw ng
Kagitingan x x x x

Despite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner [Asian Transmission Corporation] opted to pay its daily paid employees
only 100% of their basic pay on April 9, 1998. Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU)
protested.

In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existing between
petitioner and BATLU, the controversy was submitted for voluntary arbitration. x x x x On July 31, 1998,the Office of
the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision directing petitioner to pay its covered employees "200% and not just
100% of their regular daily wages for the unworked April 9, 1998 which covers two regular holidays, namely, Araw ng
Kagitignan and Maundy Thursday." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Subject of interpretation in the case at bar is Article 94 of the Labor Code which reads:

ART. 94. Right to holiday pay. - (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except
in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;

(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a
compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate; and

(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Years Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of
April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and
thirtieth of December and the day designated by law for holding a general election,

which was amended by Executive Order No. 203 issued on June 30, 1987, such that the regular holidays are now:

1. New Years Day January 1

2. Maundy Thursday Movable Date

3. Good Friday Movable Date

4. Araw ng Kagitingan April 9 (Bataan and Corregidor Day)

5. Labor Day May 1

6. Independence Day June 12

7. National Heroes Day Last Sunday of August

8. Bonifacio Day November 30

9. Christmas Day December 25

10. Rizal Day December 30

In deciding in favor of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU), the Voluntary Arbitrator held that Article
94 of the Labor Code provides for holiday pay for every regular holiday, the computation of which is determined by a
legal formula which is not changed by the fact that there are two holidays falling on one day, like on April 9, 1998
when it was Araw ng Kagitingan and at the same time was Maundy Thursday; and that that the law, as amended,
enumerates ten regular holidays for every year should not be interpreted as authorizing a reduction to nine the
number of paid regular holidays "just because April 9 (Araw ng Kagitingan) in certain years, like 1993 and 1998, is
also Holy Friday or Maundy Thursday."

In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, holding that the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner and BATLU, the law governing the relations between
them, clearly recognizes their intent to consider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday, on whatever date they
may fall in any calendar year, as paid legal holidays during the effectivity of the CBA and that "[t]here is no condition,
qualification or exception for any variance from the clear intent that all holidays shall be compensated."5
The Court of Appeals further held that "in the absence of an explicit provision in law which provides for [a] reduction
of holiday pay if two holidays happen to fall on the same day, any doubt in the interpretation and implementation of
the Labor Code provisions on holiday pay must be resolved in favor of labor."

By the present petition, petitioners raise the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETING THE TERMS OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PARTIES AND SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN JUDGMENT IN PLACE OF THE AGREEMENTS MADE BY THE
PARTIES THEMSELVES

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT ANY DOUBTS ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THE POLICIES ENUNCIATED IN THE EXPLANATORY
BULLETIN WAS LAID TO REST BY THE REISSUANCE OF THE SAID EXPLANATORY BULLETIN

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE EXPLANATORY BULLETIN EVEN WHILE ADMITTING THAT THE SAID
BULLEITN WAS NOT AN EXAMPLE OF A JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL, OR ONE OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS THAT [Department of Labor and Employment] DOLE MAY PROMULGATE

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) BY
ISSUING EXPLANATORY BULLETIN DATED MARCH 11, 1993, IN THE GUISE OF PROVIDING GUIDELINES ON
ART. 94 OF THE LABOR CODE, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS IT LEGISLATED AND
INTERPRETED LEGAL PROVISIONS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO CREATE OBLIGATIONS WHERE NONE ARE
INTENDED BY THE LAW

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
SUSTAINING THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR IN REITERATING ITS EXPLANATORY
BULLETIN DATED MARCH 11, 1993 AND IN ORDERING THAT THE SAME POLICY OBTAINED FOR APRIL 9,
1998 DESPITE THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT TO THE CONTRARY

VI

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ACTS WILL DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS BY THE "EXPLANATORY BULLETIN" AS WELL AS EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

The petition is devoid of merit.

At the outset, it bears noting that instead of assailing the Court of Appeals Decision by petition for review
oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner lodged the present petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
[S]ince the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65, any alleged errors committed by it in the
exercise of its jurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special
civil action of certiorari. If the aggrieved party fails to do so within the reglementary period, and the decision
accordingly becomes final and executory, he cannot avail himself of the writ of certiorari, his predicament being the
effect of his deliberate inaction.

The appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, now Rule 45 and Rule 65, respectively, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 45 is clear that the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e.,
regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for
review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Under Rule 45 the
reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration.

xxx

For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered
"plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the
acts of the lower court or agency. In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate
remedy.6

The records of the case show that following petitioners receipt on August 18, 2000 of a copy of the August 10, 2000
Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying its Motion for Reconsideration, it filed the present petition for certiorari on
September 15, 2000, at which time the Court of Appeals decision had become final and executory, the 15-day period
to appeal it under Rule 45 having expired.

Technicality aside, this Court finds no ground to disturb the assailed decision.

Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford
protection to labor.7 Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the workers on account
of work interruptions. In other words, although the worker is forced to take a rest, he earns what he should earn, that
is, his holiday pay."8 It is also intended to enable the worker to participate in the national celebrations held during the
days identified as with great historical and cultural significance.

Independence Day (June 12), Araw ng Kagitingan (April 9), National Heroes Day (last Sunday of August), Bonifacio
Day (November 30) and Rizal Day (December 30) were declared national holidays to afford Filipinos with a recurring
opportunity to commemorate the heroism of the Filipino people, promote national identity, and deepen the spirit of
patriotism. Labor Day (May 1) is a day traditionally reserved to celebrate the contributions of the working class to the
development of the nation, while the religious holidays designated in Executive Order No. 203 allow the worker to
celebrate his faith with his family.

As reflected above, Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular
holidays.9 The provision is mandatory,10 regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly or daily
basis.11Unlike a bonus, which is a management prerogative,12 holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the
law. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on the same
date should not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive.

It is elementary, under the rules of statutory construction, that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal,
the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.13 In the case at bar, there is nothing in the law which provides or
indicates that the entitlement to ten days of holiday pay shall be reduced to nine when two holidays fall on the same
day.
Petitioners assertion that Wellington v. Trajano14 has "overruled" the DOLE March 11, 1993 Explanatory Bulletin does
not lie. In Wellington, the issue was whether monthly-paid employees are entitled to an additional days pay if a
holiday falls on a Sunday. This Court, in answering the issue in the negative, observed that in fixing the monthly
salary of its employees, Wellington took into account "every working day of the year including the holidays specified
by law and excluding only Sunday." In the instant case, the issue is whether daily-paid employees are entitled to be
paid for two regular holidays which fall on the same day.15

In any event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its
provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. For the working mans
welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.16

Moreover, Sec. 11, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules to Implement the Labor Code provides that "Nothing in the
law or the rules shall justify an employer in withdrawing or reducing any benefits, supplements or payments for
unworked regular holidays as provided in existing individual or collective agreement or employer practice or policy."17

From the pertinent provisions of the CBA entered into by the parties, petitioner had obligated itself to pay for the legal
holidays as required by law. Thus, the 1997-1998 CBA incorporates the following provision:

ARTICLE XIV
PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS

The following legal holidays shall be paid by the COMPANY as required by law:

1. New Years Day (January 1st)

2. Holy Thursday (moveable)

3. Good Friday (moveable)

4. Araw ng Kagitingan (April 9th)

5. Labor Day (May 1st)

6. Independence Day (June 12th)

7. Bonifacio Day [November 30]

8. Christmas Day (December 25th)

9. Rizal Day (December 30th)

10. General Election designated by law, if declared public non-working holiday

11. National Heroes Day (Last Sunday of August)

Only an employee who works on the day immediately preceding or after a regular holiday shall be entitled to the
holiday pay.

A paid legal holiday occurring during the scheduled vacation leave will result in holiday payment in addition to normal
vacation pay but will not entitle the employee to another vacation leave.
Under similar circumstances, the COMPANY will give a days wage for November 1st and December 31st whenever
declared a holiday. When required to work on said days, the employee will be paid according to Art. VI, Sec. 3B
hereof.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!

DITAN V. POEA ADMINISTRATOR

JURISDICTION OF NLRC

ANDRES E. DITAN, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ASIAWORLD RECRUITMENT, INC., AND/OR INTRACO SALES CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 79560

December 3, 1990

Facts:

Andres E. Ditan was recruited by private respondent Intraco Sales Corporation, through its local agent, Asia World, the other private
respondent, to work in Angola as a welding supervisor. The contract was for nine months, at a monthly salary of US$1,100.00 or US$275.00
weekly, and contained the required standard stipulations for the protection of our overseas workers.

Arriving on November 30, 1984, in Luanda, capital of Angola, the petitioner was assigned as an ordinary welder in the INTRACO central
maintenance shop from December 2 to 25, 1984. On December 26, 1984, he was informed, to his distress that would be transferred to
Kafunfo, some 350 kilometers east of Luanda. This was the place where, earlier that year, the rebels had attacked and kidnapped expatriate
workers, killing two Filipinos in the raid. Naturally, Ditan was reluctant to go. However, he was assured by the INTRACO manager that
Kafunfo was safe and adequately protected by government troops; moreover and this was more persuasive he was told he would be
sent home if he refused the new assignment. In the end, with much misgiving, he relented and agreed.

On December 29, 1984, his fears were confirmed. The Unita rebels attacked the diamond mining site where Ditan was working and took him
and sixteen other Filipino hostages, along with other foreign workers. The rebels and their captives walked through jungle terrain for 31 days
to the Unita stronghold near the Namibian border.

They trekked for almost a thousand kilometers. They subsisted on meager fare. Some of them had diarrhea. Their feet were blistered. It was
only on March 16, 1985, that the hostages were finally released after the intercession of their governments and the International Red Cross.
Six days later, Ditan and the other Filipino hostages were back in the Philippines.

The repatriated workers had been assured by INTRACO that they would be given priority in re-employment abroad, and eventually eleven of
them were taken back. Ditan having been excluded, he filed in June 1985 a complaint against the private respondents for breach of contract
and various other claims. Specifically, he sought the amount of US$4,675.00, representing his salaries for the unexpired 17 weeks of his
contract; US$25,000.00 as war risk bonus; US$2,196.50 as the value of his lost belongings; US$1,100 for unpaid vacation leave; and moral
and exemplary damages in the sum of US$50,000.00, plus attorney's fees.

All these claims were dismissed by POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso in a decision dated January 27, 1987. 2 This was affirmed in
toto by respondent NLRC in a resolution dated July 14, 1987, 3 which is now being challenged in this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Ditan is entitled to any relief and his case is under the jurisdiction of NLRC?

Held:

Yes. The fact that stands out most prominently in the record is the risk to which the petitioner was subjected when he was assigned, after his
reluctant consent, to the rebel-infested region of Kafunfo. This was a dangerous area.

The petitioner had gone to that foreign land in search of a better life that he could share with his loved ones after his stint abroad. That choice
would have required him to come home empty-handed to the disappointment of an expectant family.
It is not explained why the petitioner was not paid for the unexpired portion of his contract which had 17 more weeks to go. The hostages
were immediately repatriated after their release, presumably so they could recover from their ordeal. The promise of INTRACO was that they
would be given priority in re-employment should their services be needed. In the particular case of the petitioner, the promise was not
fulfilled. It would seem that his work was terminated, and not again required, because it was really intended all along to assign him only to
Kafunfo.

The private respondents stress that the contract Ditan entered into called for his employment in Angola, without indication of any particular
place of assignment in the country. This meant he agreed to be assigned to work anywhere in that country, including Kafunfo. When
INTRACO assigned Ditan to that place in the regular course of its business, it was merely exercising its rights under the employment contract
that Ditan had freely entered into. Hence, it is argued, he cannot now complain that there was a breach of that contract for which he is
entitled to monetary redress.

The private respondents also reject the claim for war risk bonus and point out that POEA Memorandum Circular No. 4, issued pursuant to the
mandatory war risk coverage provision in Section 2, Rule VI, of the POEA Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, categorizing
Angola as a war risk took effect only on February 6, 1985"after the petitioner's deployment to Angola on November 27, 1984." Consequently,
the stipulation could not be applied to the petitioner as it was not supposed to have a retroactive effect.

The paramount duty of this Court is to render justice through law. The law in this case allows two opposite interpretations, one strictly in favor
of the employers and the other liberally in favor of the worker. The choice is obvious. We find, considering the totality of the circumstances
attending this case, that the petitioner is entitled to relief. The petitioner went to Angola prepared to work as he had promised in accordance
with the employment contract he had entered into in good faith with the private respondents. Over his objection, he was sent to a dangerous
assignment and as he feared was taken hostage in a rebel attack that prevented him from fulfilling his contract while in captivity. Upon his
release, he was immediately sent home and was not paid the salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. He was
immediately repatriated with the promise that he would be given priority in re-employment, which never came. To rub salt on the wound,
many of his co-hostages were re-employed as promised. The petitioner was left only with a bleak experience and nothing to show for it
except dashed hopes and a sense of rejection.

Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
justification that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law.

WHEREFORE, the challenged resolution of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED. The private respondents are hereby DIRECTED jointly and
severally to pay the petitioner: a) the current equivalent in Philippine pesos of US$4,675.00, representing his unpaid salaries for the balance
of the contract term; b) nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00; and c) 10% attorney's fees. No costs.

[G.R. No. 126773. April 14, 1999]

RUBBERWORLD (PHILS.), INC., or JULIE YAP ONG, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, MARILYN F. ARELLANO, EMILY S. LEGASPI, MYRNA S.
GALGANA, MERCEDITA R. SONGCO, WILFREDO V. SANTOS, JOSEPHINE S.
RAMOS, REDENTOR G. HONA, LUZ B. HONA, ROLANDO B. CRUZ, GUILLERMA R.
MUZONES, CARMELITA V. HALILI, SUSAN A. REYES, EMILY A. ROBILLOS,
PLACIDO REYES, MANOLITO DELA CRUZ, VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, ROGER B.
MARIAS, VIOLETA ALEJO, RICARDO T. TORRES, EMMA DELA TORRE, PERLA N.
MANZANERO, FRANCISCO D. SERDONCILLO, LUISITO P. HERNANDEZ,
RAYMOND PEREA, EDITHA A. SERDONCILLO, FRANCISCO GENER, MARIO B.
REYES, VALERIANO A. HERRERA, JORGE S. SEERES, ELENA S. IGNACIO,
EMERITA S. CACHERO, NERIZA G. ENRIQUEZ, LOLITA M. FABULAR, NORMITA M.
HERNANDEZ, DOMINADOR P. ENRIQUEZ, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended, provides that "upon the appointment of a
management committee, rehabilitation receiver board or body pursuant to this Decree,
all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships, or associations under
management or receivership pending, before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be
suspended accordingly." Such suspension is intended to give enough breathing space
for the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to make the business viable
again, without having to divert attention and resources to litigations in various fora.
Among, the actions suspended are those for money claims before labor tribunals, like
the National Labor Relation Commission (NLRC) and the Labor arbiters.

Statement of the Case

The foregoing Summarizes this Court's grant of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 26, 1996 Resolution promulgate by the NLRC
which upheld the labor arbiter's refusal to suspend proceedings involving, monetary
claims of the petitioner's employees.

Petitioner likewise assails the June 20, 1996 NLRC Resolution which denied its Motion
for Reconsideration.

On November 20, 1996, this Court issued a temporary restraining order signed by then
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, "restraining the public respondents from further
conducting proceedings in the aforesaid cases effective immediately xxx."

The Facts

The facts are undisputed. They are narrated by the Office of the Solicitor General as
follows:

"Petitioner xxx is a domestic corporation which used to be in the business of

manufacturing footwear, bags and garments. It filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on November 24, 1994 a petition for suspension of payments praying that
it be declared in a state of suspension of payments and that the SEC accordingly issue
an order restraining its creditors from enforcing their claims against petitioner
corporation. It further prayed for the creation of a management committee as well as for
the approval of the proposed rehabilitation plan and memorandum of agreement
between petitioner corporation and its creditors.

"In an order dated December 28, 1994, the SEC favorably ruled on the petition for
suspension of payments thusly:
'Accordingly, with the creation of the Management Committee, all actions for claims
against Rubberworld Philippines, Inc. pending before any court, tribunal, office, board,
body Commission of Sheriff are hereby deemed SUSPENDED.

'Consequently, all pending incidents for preliminary injunctions, writ of attachments (sic),
foreclosures' and the like are hereby rendered moot and academic.'

"Private respondents, who claim to be employees of petitioner corporation, filed against

petitioners [from] April to July 1995 their respective complaints for illegal dismissal,
unfair labor practice, damages and payment of separation pay, retirement benefits, 13th
month pay and service incentive pay.

"Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings in the above labor cases on the strength
of the SEC Order dated December 28, 1994. Likewise, petitioners cited the rulings of
BF Homes vs. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 262), Alemar's Sibal & Sons, Inc. vs.
Elbinias (186 SCRA 94) and Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals (229 SCRA
223) to support their motion to suspend the proceedings in the labor cases.

"In an Order dated September 25, 1995, the Labor Arbiter denied the aforesaid motion
holding that the injunction contained in the SEC Order applied only to the enforcement
of established rights and did not include the suspension of proceedings involving claims
against petitioner which have yet to be ascertained. The Labor Arbiter further held that
the order of the SEC suspending all actions for claims against petitioners does not
cover the claims of private respondents in the labor cases because said claims and the
concomitant liability of petitioners still had to be determined, thus carrying no dissipation
of the assets of petitioners.

"Petitioners appealed the adverse order of the Labor Arbiter to public respondent which,
in a Resolution dated April 26, 1996, dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and, instead,
sustained the rulings of the Labor Arbiter.

"The motion for reconsideration of petitioners fared no better and was denied by public
respondent in a Resolution dated June 20, 1996."

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

Petitioner raises only one issue:

"Whether or not the Respondent NLRC acted without or in excess of Jurisdiction or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the order
 of Labor Arbiter Voltaire A. Balitaan denying petitioners' motion to suspend
proceedings despite the Order of the Securities and Exchange Commission under
Sec. 6 (c) of P.D. 902-A directing the suspension of all actions against a company
under the first stages of insolvency proceedings."

This Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Sole Issue:

Suspension Proceedings

Jurisprudence teaches us:

"xxx where the petition filed is one for declaration of a state of suspension of payments
due to a recognition of the inability to pay one's debts and liabilities, and where the
petitioning corporation either: (a) has sufficient property to cover all its debts but
foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they fall due (solvent but illiquid) or (b)
has no sufficient property (insolvent) but is under the management of a rehabilitation
receiver or a management committee, the applicable law is P.D. 902-A pursuant to Sec.
5 par. (d) thereof. However, if the petitioning corporation has no sufficient assets to
cover its liabilities and is not under a rehabilitation receiver or a management committee
created under P.D. 902-A and does not seek merely to have the payments of its debts
suspended, but seeks a declaration of insolvency xxx the applicable law is Act 1956
[The Insolvency Law] on voluntary insolvency, xxx."

In the case at bar, Petitioner Rubberworld filed before the SEC a Petition for Declaration
of Suspension of Payments, as well as a propose rehabilitation plan. On December 28,
1994, the SEC ordered the creation of a management committee and the suspension of
all actions for claim against Rubberworld. Clearly, the applicable law is PD 902-A, as
amended, the relevant provision of which read:

"SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory adjudicative functions of the Securities and

Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations
registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

xxx xxx xxx

d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the state of

suspension of payments in cases where the corporation, partnership or association
possesses sufficient property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of
meeting them when they respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation,
partnership or association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the
management of a rehabilitation receiver or management committee created pursuant to
this Decree.

SECTION 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall

possess the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real or personal, which is the
subject of the action pending before the Commission in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to
preserve the rights of the parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing
public and creditors: x x x Provided finally, That upon appointment of a management
committee, the rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions
for claims against corporations, partnerships, or associations under management or
receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended
accordingly."

It is plain from the foregoing provisions of law that "upon the appointment [by, the SEC]
of a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver," all actions for claims against
the corporation pending before any court, tribunal or board shall ipso jure be
suspended. The justification for the automatic stay of all pending actions for claims "is to
enable the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise
its/his powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly
hinder or prevent the 'rescue' of the debtor company. To allow such other actions to
continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation
receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against
the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation."

Parenthetically, the rehabilitation of a financially distressed corporation benefits its

employees, creditors, stockholders and, in a larger sense, the general public. And in
considering whether to rehabilitate or not, the SEC gives preference to the interest of
creditors, including employees. The reason that shareholders can recover their
investments only upon liquidation of' the corporation, and only if there are assets
remaining after all corporate creditors ire paid.

Labor Claims Included in Suspension Order

The solicitor general, representing Public Respondent NLRC, argues that the rationale
for an automatic stay will not be frustrated even if the NLRC proceeds with the
disposition of these labor cases, because any favorable judgment obtained by the
private respondents would only establish their rights as creditors. The solicitor general
also contends that the assailed Resolutions of the NLRC will not result in an undue
preference for the assets of Rubberworld, as the private respondents will still present
their claims before the management committee.

We disagree. The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the
appointment of rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions "shall be suspended
accordingly." No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. Since the
law makes no distinction or exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemos. Allowing labor cases to proceed clearly defeats the
purpose of the automatic stay and severely encumbers the management committee's
time and resources. The said committee would need to defend against these suits, to
the detriment of its primary and urgent duty to work towards rehabilitating the
corporation and making it viable again. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to
other similarly situated claimants and forestall if not defeat the rescue efforts. Besides,
even if the NLRC awards the claims of private respondents, as it did, its ruling could not
be enforced as long as the petitioner is under the management committee.

In Chua v. National Labor Relation Commission, we ruled that labor claims cannot
proceed independently of a bankruptcy liquidation proceeding, since these claims
"would spawn needless controversy, delays, and confusion." With more reason, allowing
labor claims to continue in spite of a SEC suspension order in rehabilitation case would
merely lead to such results.

The solicitor general insists that since Article 217 of the Labor Code vested public
respondent with jurisdiction to hear and decide these labor cases, the NLRC did not
exceed its jurisdiction when it refused to suspend the proceedings therein. The Court is
not persuaded.

Article 217 of the Labor Code should be construed not in isolation but in harmony with
PD 902-A, according to the basic rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are
not favored. Indeed, it is axiomatic that each and every statute must be construed in a
way that would avoid conflict with existing laws. True, the NLRC has the power to hear
and decide labor disputes, but such authority is deemed suspended when PD 902-A is
put into effect by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Preference in Favor of Workers in Case of Bankruptcy or Liquidation

The private respondents contend that automatic stay under PD 902-A is not applicable
to the instant case; otherwise, the preference granted to workers by Article 110 of the
Labor Code would be rendered ineffective. This contention is misleading.

The preferential right of workers and employees under Article 110 of the Labor Code
may be invoked only upon the institution of insolvency or judicial liquidation proceeding.
Indeed, it is well-settled that "a declaration of bankruptcy or a judicial liquidation must be
present before preferences over various money claims may be enforced." But debtors
resort to preference of credit -- giving preferred creditors the right to have their claims
paid ahead of those of other claimants -- only when their assets are insufficient to pay
their debts fully. The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is precisely to enable the
company to gain a new lease on life and thereby allow creditors to be paid their claims
from its earnings. In insolvency proceedings, on the other hand, the company stops
operating, and the claims of creditors are satisfied from the assets of the insolvent
corporation. The present case involves the rehabilitation, not the liquidation, of
petitioner-corporation. Hence, the preference of credit granted to workers or
employees under Article 110 of the Labor Code is not applicable.

Duration of Automatic Stay Under PD 902-A

Finally, private respondents posit that under Section 6 of the Insolvency Law, the
December 28, 1994 Order of the SEC suspending all actions for claims against
Rubberworld should have expired after three months, in the absence of an agreement
between the company and the corporate creditors. Private respondents also accuse the
SEC of abusing its power by "allowing said suspension order to remain pending for
many years without resolving and approving any rehabilitation plan." They contend that
"[t]his is fatal to the instant petition for it had been a party to the abuse by the SEC of its
suspension order."

This Court notes that PD 902-A itself does not provide for the duration of the automatic
stay. Neither does the Order of the SEC. Hence, the suspensive effect has no time
limit and remains in force as long as reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose
of the Order. On the other hand, the attack against the SEC's alleged "abuse of power"
is misplaced. Under review in this Petition for Certiorari are Resolutions of the NLRC,
not of the SEC. The scope of this review is thus limited to whether the NLRC gravely
abused or exceeded its jurisdiction in refusing to heed the SEC Order of Suspension
and in issuing its challenged Resolutions. In any event, the bare allegation of inaction is
insufficient to condemn the Securities and Exchange Commission and the management
committee where, it should be noted, all affected parties, including, the labor union in
the company, are represented.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
NLRC dated April 26, 1996, and June 20, 1996, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-52415 October 23, 1984

INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES' UNION (IBAAEU),

petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor and INSULAR
BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA, respondents.

Sisenando R. Villaluz, Jr. for petitioner.

Abdulmaid Kiram Muin colloborating counsel for petitioner.

The Solicitor General Caparas, Tabios, Ilagan Alcantara & Gatmaytan Law Office and
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez Law Office for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:+.wph!1

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order dated November 10, 1979, of
respondent Deputy Minister of Labor, Amado G. Inciong, in NLRC case No. RB-IV-1561-
76 entitled "Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (complainant-
appellee), vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America" (respondent-appellant), the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en banc of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated 20 June 1978 be, as it is hereby, set aside
and a new judgment. promulgated dismissing the instant case for lack of merit (p. 109
rec.).

The antecedent facts culled from the records are as follows:

On June 20, 1975, petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent bank for the
payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations
Commission, Regional Office No. IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the
request of both parties, the case was certified for arbitration on July 7, 1975 (p. 18,
NLRC rec.

On August 25, 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-
entitled case, granting petitioner's complaint for payment of holiday pay. Pertinent
portions of the decision read: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

The records disclosed that employees of respondent bank were not paid their wages on
unworked regular holidays as mandated by the Code, particularly Article 208, to wit: t.
hqw

Art. 208. Right to holiday pay.

(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular
holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing
less than 10 workers.

(b) The term "holiday" as used in this chapter, shall include: New Year's
Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April the first of May,
the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the
twenty-fifth and the thirtieth of December and the day designated by law
for holding a general election.

xxx xxx xxx

This conclusion is deduced from the fact that the daily rate of pay of the bank employees
was computed in the past with the unworked regular holidays as excluded for purposes
of determining the deductible amount for absences incurred Thus, if the employer uses
the factor 303 days as a divisor in determining the daily rate of monthly paid employee,
this gives rise to a presumption that the monthly rate does not include payments for
unworked regular holidays. The use of the factor 303 indicates the number of ordinary
working days in a year (which normally has 365 calendar days), excluding the 52
Sundays and the 10 regular holidays. The use of 251 as a factor (365 calendar days less
52 Saturdays, 52 Sundays, and 10 regular holidays) gives rise likewise to the same
presumption that the unworked Saturdays, Sundays and regular holidays are unpaid.
This being the case, it is not amiss to state with certainty that the instant claim for wages
on regular unworked holidays is found to be tenable and meritorious.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) xxx xxxx xxx

 (b) Ordering respondent to pay wages to all its employees for all regular h(olidays since
November 1, 1974 (pp. 97-99, rec., underscoring supplied).

Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the
order of Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano by paying their holiday pay up to and including
January, 1976.

On December 16, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 850 was promulgated amending,
among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay to read as
follows: t.hqw

Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wages
during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing
less than ten (10) workers;

(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee
shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate and

(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes New Year's Day, Maundy Thursday, Good
Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth
of November, the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth of December, and the day designated by
law for holding a general election.

Accordingly, on February 16, 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the
Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and regulations for
the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof reads: t.
hqw

Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid by
the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less
than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days
in the month whether worked or not.

For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory
minimum wage multiplied by 365 days divided by twelve" (italics supplied).

On April 23, 1976, Policy Instruction No. 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor
(now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule, pertinent portions of which read: t.
hqw

xxx xxx xxx

The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily
employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include
payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit.
 Under the rules implementing P.D. 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate
controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid employees, The new determining rule is
this: If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly
minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is
presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are
made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then
he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. ..." (emphasis supplied).

Respondent bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the aforecited rule implementing
Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy Instruction No. 9, stopped the payment of
holiday pay to an its employees.

On August 30, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the
arbiter's decision of August 25, 1975, whereby the respondent bank was ordered to pay
its employees their daily wage for the unworked regular holidays.

On September 10, 1975, respondent bank filed an opposition to the motion for a writ of
execution alleging, among others, that: (a) its refusal to pay the corresponding
unworked holiday pay in accordance with the award of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano
dated August 25, 1975, is based on and justified by Policy Instruction No. 9 which
interpreted the rules implementing P. D. 850; and (b) that the said award is already
repealed by P.D. 850 which took effect on December 16, 1975, and by said Policy
Instruction No. 9 of the Department of Labor, considering that its monthly paid
employees are not receiving less than P240.00 and their monthly pay is uniform from
January to December, and that no deductions are made from the monthly salaries of its
employees on account of holidays in months where they occur (pp. 64-65, NLRC rec.).

On October 18, 1976, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano, instead of issuing a writ of
execution, issued an order enjoining the respondent bank to continue paying its
employees their regular holiday pay on the following grounds: (a) that the judgment is
already final and the findings which is found in the body of the decision as well as the
dispositive portion thereof is res judicata or is the law of the case between the parties;
and (b) that since the decision had been partially implemented by the respondent bank,
appeal from the said decision is no longer available (pp. 100-103, rec.).

On November 17, 1976, respondent bank appealed from the above-cited order of Labor
Arbiter Soriano to the National Labor Relations Commission, reiterating therein its
contentions averred in its opposition to the motion for writ of execution. Respondent
bank further alleged for the first time that the questioned order is not supported by
evidence insofar as it finds that respondent bank discontinued payment of holiday pay
beginning January, 1976 (p. 84, NLRC rec.).
On June 20, 1978, the National Labor Relations Commission promulgated its resolution
en banc dismissing respondent bank's appeal, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows: t.hqw

In view of the foregoing, we hereby resolve to dismiss, as we hereby dismiss,

respondent's appeal; to set aside Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano's order of 18 October
1976 and, as prayed for by complainant, to order the issuance of the proper writ of
execution (p. 244, NLRC rec.).

Copies of the above resolution were served on the petitioner only on February 9, 1979
or almost eight. (8) months after it was promulgated, while copies were served on the
respondent bank on February 13, 1979.

On February 21, 1979, respondent bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a
motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay execution, alleging therein
the following: (a) that there is prima facie evidence of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the National Labor Relations
Commission, in dismissing the respondent's appeal on pure technicalities without
passing upon the merits of the appeal and (b) that the resolution appealed from is
contrary to the law and jurisprudence (pp. 260-274, NLRC rec.).

On March 19, 1979, petitioner filed its opposition to the respondent bank's appeal and
alleged the following grounds: (a) that the office of the Minister of Labor has no
jurisdiction to entertain the instant appeal pursuant to the provisions of P. D. 1391; (b)
that the labor arbiter's decision being final, executory and unappealable, execution is a
matter of right for the petitioner; and (c) that the decision of the labor arbiter dated
August 25, 1975 is supported by the law and the evidence in the case (p. 364, NLRC
rec.).

On July 30, 1979, petitioner filed a second motion for execution pending appeal, praying
that a writ of execution be issued by the National Labor Relations Commission pending
appeal of the case with the Office of the Minister of Labor. Respondent bank filed its
opposition thereto on August 8, 1979.

On August 13, 1979, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order which
states: t.hqw

The Chief, Research and Information Division of this Commission is hereby directed to
designate a Socio-Economic Analyst to compute the holiday pay of the employees of the
Insular Bank of Asia and America from April 1976 to the present, in accordance with the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated August 25, 1975" (p. 80, rec.).
On November 10, 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister
Amado G. Inciong, issued an order, the dispositive portion of which states: t.hqw

ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en banc of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated 20 June 1978 be, as it is hereby, set aside
and a new judgment promulgated dismissing the instant case for lack of merit (p. 436,
NLRC rec.).

Hence, this petition for certiorari charging public respondent Amado G. Inciong with
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The issue in this case is: whether or not the decision of a Labor Arbiter awarding
payment of regular holiday pay can still be set aside on appeal by the Deputy Minister of
Labor even though it has already become final and had been partially executed, the
finality of which was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission sitting en
banc, on the basis of an Implementing Rule and Policy Instruction promulgated by the
Ministry of Labor long after the said decision had become final and executory.

WE find for the petitioner.

WE agree with the petitioner's contention that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the
implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor
are null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code's provisions on holiday
pay, they in effect amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion (p. 1 1, rec.).

Article 94 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 850, provides: t.hqw

Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage
during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing
less than ten (10) workers. ...

The coverage and scope of exclusion of the Labor Code's holiday pay provisions is
spelled out under Article 82 thereof which reads: t.hqw

Art. 82. Coverage. The provision of this Title shall apply to employees in all
establishments and undertakings, whether for profit or not, but not to government
employees, managerial employees, field personnel members of the family of the
employer who are dependent on him for support domestic helpers, persons in the
personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by the
Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.

... (emphasis supplied).

From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not
excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday
pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from
the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section
2, which provides that: "employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of
the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or
established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month
whether worked or not. "

Public respondent maintains that "(T)he rules implementing P. D. 850 and Policy
Instruction No. 9 were issued to clarify the policy in the implementation of the ten (10)
paid legal holidays. As interpreted, 'unworked' legal holidays are deemed paid insofar as
monthly paid employees are concerned if (a) they are receiving not less than the
statutory minimum wage, (b) their monthly pay is uniform from January to December,
and (c) no deduction is made from their monthly salary on account of holidays in months
where they occur. As explained in Policy Instruction No, 9, 'The ten (10) paid legal
holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily paid employees. In case
of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10)
paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit' " (pp. 340-341, rec.). This contention is
untenable.

It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law
is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case
at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay
are clear and explicit - it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the
benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to
categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when
the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This is a
flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which states
that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor."
Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and
permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its language permits
(Orlosky vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112.)

Obviously, the Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority
granted by Article 5 of the Labor Code authorizing him to promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations.

Public respondent vehemently argues that the intent and spirit of the holiday pay law, as
expressed by the Secretary of Labor in the case of Chartered Bank Employees
Association v. The Chartered Bank (NLRC Case No. RB-1789-75, March 24, 1976), is
to correct the disadvantages inherent in the daily compensation system of employment
holiday pay is primarily intended to benefit the daily paid workers whose employment
and income are circumscribed by the principle of "no work, no pay." This argument may
sound meritorious; but, until the provisions of the Labor Code on holiday pay is
amended by another law, monthly paid employees are definitely included in the benefits
of regular holiday pay. As earlier stated, the presumption is always in favor of law,
negatively put, the Labor Code is always strictly construed against management.

While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by

executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts,
still if such construction is so erroneous, as in the instant case, the same must be
declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary,
correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of
the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency
of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of
governmental power (The Supreme Court in Modern Role, C. B. Swisher 1958, p. 36).

Thus. in the case of Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations
Commission (106 SCRA 444, July 31, 1981) where the Secretary of Labor enlarged the
scope of exemption from the coverage of a Presidential Decree granting increase in
emergency allowance, this Court ruled that: t.hqw

... the Secretary of Labor has exceeded his authority when he included paragraph (k) in
Section 1 of the Rules implementing P. D. 1 1 23.

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory authority granted to the
Secretary of Labor, and the same is therefore void, as ruled by this Court in a long line of
cases . . . .. t.hqw

The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate

rules in the administration of the statute, necessarily limited to what is
provided for in the legislative enactment, may be found in the early case
of United States vs. Barrios decided in 1908. Then came in a 1914
decision, United States vs. Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119) delineation of the
scope of such competence. Thus: "Of course the regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony
with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to
carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." In 1936, in
People vs. Santos, this Court expressed its disapproval of an
 administrative order that would amount to an excess of the regulatory
power vested in an administrative official We reaffirmed such a doctrine
in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear that where an
administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the
provisions of the Act, 'the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be
followed. Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court in Victorias Milling inc.
vs. Social Security Commission, citing Parker as well as Davis did tersely
sum up the matter thus: "A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the
procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the
statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. ... On the
other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine chat the law means."

"It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the

President, in whom all executive power resides, to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative executive office or
agency then can, contrary to the express language of the Constitution
assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to
observe the constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with
the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed the statute requires
adherence to, not departure from its provisions. No deviation is
allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an
administrative agency "cannot amend an act of Congress." Respondents
can be sustained, therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and
regulations promulgated by them were in accordance with what the
Veterans Bill of Rights provides" (Phil. Apparel Workers Union vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, supra, 463, 464, citing Teozon vs.
Members of the Board of Administrators, PVA 33 SCRA 585; see also
Santos vs. Hon. Estenzo, et al, 109 Phil. 419; Hilado vs. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 100 Phil. 295; Sy Man vs. Jacinto & Fabros, 93 Phil.
1093; Olsen & Co., Inc. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil. 259).

This ruling of the Court was recently reiterated in the case of American Wire & Cable
Workers Union (TUPAS) vs. The National Labor Relations Commission and American
Wire & Cable Co., Inc., G.R. No. 53337, promulgated on June 29, 1984.

In view of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor
Code and Policy instruction No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor must be
declared null and void. Accordingly, public respondent Deputy Minister of Labor Amado
G. Inciong had no basis at all to deny the members of petitioner union their regular
holiday pay as directed by the Labor Code.

II
It is not disputed that the decision of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated August 25,
1975, had already become final, and was, in fact, partially executed by the respondent
bank.

However, public respondent maintains that on the authority of De Luna vs. Kayanan, 61
SCRA 49, November 13, 1974, he can annul the final decision of Labor Arbiter Soriano
since the ensuing promulgation of the integrated implementing rules of the Labor Code
pursuant to P.D. 850 on February 16, 1976, and the issuance of Policy Instruction No. 9
on April 23, 1976 by the then Secretary of Labor are facts and circumstances that
transpired subsequent to the promulgation of the decision of the labor arbiter, which
renders the execution of the said decision impossible and unjust on the part of herein
respondent bank (pp. 342-343, rec.).

This contention is untenable.

To start with, unlike the instant case, the case of De Luna relied upon by the public
respondent is not a labor case wherein the express mandate of the Constitution on the
protection to labor is applied. Thus Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that, "All doubts
in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor and Article 1702
of the Civil Code provides that, " In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

Consequently, contrary to public respondent's allegations, it is patently unjust to deprive

the members of petitioner union of their vested right acquired by virtue of a final
judgment on the basis of a labor statute promulgated following the acquisition of the
"right".

On the question of whether or not a law or statute can annul or modify a judicial order
issued prior to its promulgation, this Court, through Associate Justice Claro M. Recto,
said: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

We are decidedly of the opinion that they did not. Said order, being unappealable,
became final on the date of its issuance and the parties who acquired rights thereunder
cannot be deprived thereof by a constitutional provision enacted or promulgated
subsequent thereto. Neither the Constitution nor the statutes, except penal laws
favorable to the accused, have retroactive effect in the sense of annulling or modifying
vested rights, or altering contractual obligations" (China Ins. & Surety Co. vs. Judge of
First Instance of Manila, 63 Phil. 324, emphasis supplied).
In the case of In re: Cunanan, et al., 19 Phil. 585, March 18, 1954, this Court said: "...
when a court renders a decision or promulgates a resolution or order on the basis of
and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment
or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution
already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect."
Thus, the amendatory rule (Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code)
cannot be given retroactive effect as to modify final judgments. Not even a law can
validly annul final decisions (In re: Cunanan, et al., Ibid).

Furthermore, the facts of the case relied upon by the public respondent are not
analogous to that of the case at bar. The case of De Luna speaks of final and executory
judgment, while iii the instant case, the final judgment is partially executed. just as the
court is ousted of its jurisdiction to annul or modify a judgment the moment it becomes
final, the court also loses its jurisdiction to annul or modify a writ of execution upon its
service or execution; for, otherwise, we will have a situation wherein a final and
executed judgment can still be annulled or modified by the court upon mere motion of a
panty This would certainly result in endless litigations thereby rendering inutile the rule
of law.

Respondent bank counters with the argument that its partial compliance was involuntary
because it did so under pain of levy and execution of its assets (p. 138, rec.). WE find
no merit in this argument. Respondent bank clearly manifested its voluntariness in
complying with the decision of the labor arbiter by not appealing to the National Labor
Relations Commission as provided for under the Labor Code under Article 223. A party
who waives his right to appeal is deemed to have accepted the judgment, adverse or
not, as correct, especially if such party readily acquiesced in the judgment by starting to
execute said judgment even before a writ of execution was issued, as in this case.
Under these circumstances, to permit a party to appeal from the said partially executed
final judgment would make a mockery of the doctrine of finality of judgments long
enshrined in this jurisdiction.

Section I of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "... execution shall
issue as a matter of right upon the expiration of the period to appeal ... or if no appeal
has been duly perfected." This rule applies to decisions or orders of labor arbiters who
are exercising quasi-judicial functions since "... the rule of execution of judgments under
the rules should govern all kinds of execution of judgment, unless it is otherwise
provided in other laws" Sagucio vs. Bulos 5 SCRA 803) and Article 223 of the Labor
Code provides that "... decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter or compulsory
arbitrators are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of
the parties within ten (10) days from receipt of such awards, orders, or decisions. ..."
Thus, under the aforecited rule, the lapse of the appeal period deprives the courts of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment and the judgment becomes final ipso jure (Vega
vs. WCC, 89 SCRA 143, citing Cruz vs. WCC, 2 PHILAJUR 436, 440, January 31,
1978; see also Soliven vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 621; Carrero vs. WCC and Regala vs. WCC,
decided jointly, 77 SCRA 297; Vitug vs. Republic, 75 SCRA 436; Ramos vs. Republic,
69 SCRA 576).

In Galvez vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 3 SCRA 422, 423, October 31,
1961, where the lower court modified a final order, this Court ruled thus: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

The lower court was thus aware of the fact that it was thereby altering or modifying its
order of January 8, 1959. Regardless of the excellence of the motive for acting as it did,
we are constrained to hold however, that the lower court had no authorities to make said
alteration or modification. ...

xxx xxx xxx

The equitable considerations that led the lower court to take the action complained of
cannot offset the dem ands of public policy and public interest which are also
responsive to the tenets of equity requiring that an issues passed upon in decisions or
final orders that have become executory, be deemed conclusively disposed of and
definitely closed for, otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting at naught
the main role of courts of justice, which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law
and the maintenance of peace and order, by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

xxx xxx xxx

In the recent case of Gabaya vs. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 405, 406, March 30, 1982, this
Court said: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

In Marasigan vs. Ronquillo (94 Phil. 237), it was categorically stated that the rule is
absolute that after a judgment becomes final by the expiration of the period provided by
the rules within which it so becomes, no further amendment or correction can be made by
the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. And such final judgment is conclusive not
only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or
demand but as to any other admissible matter which must have been offered for that
purpose (L-7044, 96 Phil. 526). In the earlier case of Contreras and Ginco vs. Felix and
China Banking Corp., Inc. (44 O.G. 4306), it was stated that the rule must be adhered to
regardless of any possible injustice in a particular case for (W)e have to subordinate the
equity of a particular situation to the over-mastering need of certainty and immutability of
judicial pronouncements
 xxx xxx xxx

III

The despotic manner by which public respondent Amado G. Inciong divested the
members of the petitioner union of their rights acquired by virtue of a final judgment is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law Public respondent
completely ignored the rights of the petitioner union's members in dismissing their
complaint since he knew for a fact that the judgment of the labor arbiter had long
become final and was even partially executed by the respondent bank.

A final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected by law
under the due process clause of the Constitution (China Ins. & Surety Co. vs. Judge of
First Instance of Manila, 63 Phil. 324). A final judgment is "a vested interest which it is
right and equitable that the government should recognize and protect, and of which the
individual could no. be deprived arbitrarily without injustice" (Rookledge v. Garwood, 65
N.W. 2d 785, 791).

lt is by this guiding principle that the due process clause is interpreted. Thus, in the pithy
language of then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion "... acts of Congress, as well
as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity, and judicial
proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the same sanction, any
statutory provision to the contrary notwithstanding (Vda. de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de
Sengbengco 110 Phil. 118, emphasis supplied), And "(I)t has been likewise established
that a violation of a constitutional right divested the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights" (Phil. Blooming Mills
Employees Organization vs. Phil. Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 211, June 5, 1973).

Tested by and pitted against this broad concept of the constitutional guarantee of due
process, the action of public respondent Amado G. Inciong is a clear example of
deprivation of property without due process of law and constituted grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated
November 10, 1979.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC

RESPONDENT IS SET ASIDE, AND THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER RICARTE
T. SORIANO DATED AUGUST 25, 1975, IS HEREBY REINSTATED.

COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA

SO ORDERED.1wph1.t