QUESTION:

Tarara Singh entered into an agreement to lease a land from Lallu Dass for a period of 20 years
which was registered in accordance with Land Ordinance as required by the law. The lease
agreement did not provided for the possibility of renewal. When ask to surrender the land after
expiry of the lease Tarara Singh alleged subsequent oral

The parol evidence rule is a substantive common law rule in contract cases that prevents a party to a
written contract from presenting extrinsic evidence that discloses an ambiguity and clarifies it or adds,
subtract, contradicting or vary to the written terms of the contract that appears to be whole. The term of
art parol means "oral" and comes from Anglo-French, Anglo-Norman, or Legal French.

As to the general principle for this rule is that since the contracting parties have reduced their agreement
to a single and final writing, extrinsic evidence of past agreements or terms should not be considered
when interpreting that writing, as the parties had decided to ultimately leave them out of the contract. In
other words, one may not use evidence made prior to the written contract to contradict the writing.

It was first established during the case of Goss v Lord Nugent (1833) and it was concisely stated by Innes
J in Mercantile Bank of Sydney v Taylor (1891). The rule prohibits the parties from amending the
meaning of the written document through the use of previous oral declarations that are not stated in the
document itself. When parties had discussed and negotiated the terms of a contract, this process means
that they have integrated the contract.

Section 92 of the Evidence Act 1950 provides exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule. Section 92 (d)
provides that extrinsic evidence can be used to show that the contract has been varied or rescinded by
subsequent oral agreement. This proviso provides proof of distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind
or modify any contract except where it is required by law to be in writing or has been registered. In other
words, it provides for the evidence of a later change in a written contract.

In Teo Siew Peng v Guok Sing Ong [1983] 1 MLJ 132, the court has laid down the principle that where
the terms of an instrument are required by law to be reduced into writing then no evidence of any oral
agreement can be admitted in evidence.
In the case of Voo Min En & Ors v Leong Chung Fatt the respondent was the lessee of premises in
Kota Kinabalu. The lease was in writing and registered in accordance with section 104 of the Sabah
Land Ordinance. It provided for the possibility of renewal by written request. The lease was for a
period of 16 years commencing on January 16, 1965. On the expiration of the lease the respondent only
delivered part of the premises to the appellant and retained the ground floor. The appellant claimed
possession of the ground floor and in his defence the respondent alleged that there was an oral
agreement for a new lease. The appellant applied for final judgment but this was refused as the learned
trial judge held that there was a triable issue. The appellants appealed. The Court held that as the lease
in this case was required to be in writing by virtue of section 104 of the Sabah Land Ordinance and has
been registered in accordance with the Ordinance, there is no way in which the respondent's alleged
agreement could be proved under proviso (d) to section 92 of the Evidence Act.
In the current case, it can be distinguished from Voo Min Ens case because the lease agreement did not
provide for the possibility of the renewal thought Taara Singh alleged that there exist subsequent oral
agreement. Apart from that, the written agreement between Taara Singh and Lallu Dass was registered in
accordance with the Land Ordinance. Assuming that the Land Ordinance required the renewal in writing,
therefore, oral agreement will be null and not enforceable.