DEPLETED URANIUM FACT SHEET

What is depleted uranium?

Depleted uranium is what is left over when most of the highly radioactive types
(isotopes) of uranium are removed for use as nuclear fuel or nuclear weapons. The
depleted uranium used in armor-piercing munitions and in enhanced armor
protection for some Abrams tanks is also used in civilian industry, primarily for
stabilizers in airplanes and boats.

What makes depleted uranium a potential hazard?

Depleted uranium is a heavy metal that is also slightly radioactive. Heavy metals
(uranium, lead, tungsten, etc.) have chemical toxicity properties that, in high doses,
can cause adverse health effects. Depleted uranium that remains outside the body
can not harm you.

A common misconception is that radiation is depleted uranium's primary hazard.

This is not the case under most battlefield exposure scenarios. Depleted uranium is
approximately 40 percent less radioactive than natural uranium. Depleted uranium
emits alpha and beta particles, and gamma rays. Alpha particles, the primary
radiation type produced by depleted uranium, are blocked by skin, while beta
particles are blocked by the boots and battle dress utility uniform (BDUs) typically
worn by service members. While gamma rays are a form of highly-penetrating
energy , the amount of gamma radiation emitted by depleted uranium is very low.
Thus, depleted uranium does not significantly add to the background radiation that
we encounter every day.

When fired, or after "cooking off" in fires or explosions, the exposed depleted
uranium rod poses an extremely low radiological threat as long as it remains
outside the body. Taken into the body via metal fragments or dust-like particles,
depleted uranium may pose a long-term health hazard to personnel if the amount is
large. However, the amount which remains in the body depends on a number of
factors, including the amount inhaled or ingested, the particle size and the ability of
the particles to dissolve in body fluids.

Were any studies on the health effects of depleted uranium ever conducted prior
to the onset of the Gulf War? What were the findings of those studies?

The health effects of uranium have been studied extensively for over 50 years. In
September 1999 the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry published
a Toxicological Profile for Uranium, an update to the original profile published in
May 1989. While natural and depleted uranium are considered chemically toxic,
they are not considered a radiation hazard.
The environmental effects of depleted uranium have been studied comprehensively
by a wide range of governmental and non-governmental bodies both before and
after the Gulf War. Burn tests and other evaluations performed under simulated
battlefield conditions indicated that the health risks associated with the battlefield
use of depleted uranium were minimal and even those could be reduced even more
by simple, field-expedient measures, especially, avoidance of depleted uranium-
contaminated vehicles and sites. During and after the Gulf War, personnel
awareness of the hazards posed by battlefield depleted uranium contamination was
generally low. As a result, many personnel did not practice field-expedient
measures that would have prevented or mitigated possible exposures.

The two main areas that were not adequately addressed before the Gulf War were:

The medical implications of embedded fragments and

Exposure estimates for friendly fire incidents, recovery activities, and

incidental contact scenarios.

These are weaknesses that we have recognized and are addressing. The December
19, 2000 Environmental Exposure Report, Depleted Uranium in the Gulf
(II) includes the Army's latest health risk exposure estimates for various Gulf War
exposure scenarios. Health risk estimates for DU-contaminated vehicle recovery
and incidental contact scenarios indicate that these exposures were well within
safety standards. Because of gaps in data pertaining to uranium oxide dust levels
inside DU-struck vehicles, exposure estimates for personnel inside DU-struck
vehicles at the time of impact, or immediately afterwards, were based on
conservative assumptions. These estimates for this highest exposed group indicated
that medical follow-up was warranted. DOD is currently in the process of
conducting additional live-fire testing in order to further refine the exposure
estimates for those troops in or around vehicles when they were hit by DU
munitions. It is important to note that over 60 friendly-fire victims have been
evaluated by the voluntary VA DU Medical Follow-up Program. Aside from the
problems associated with their traumatic injuries, to date, this follow-up program
has attributed no illness or other harmful effects in the evaluated veterans to DU.

The voluntary Veterans Affairs DU Medical Follow-up Program was begun in

1993-1994 with the medical evaluations of 33 friendly-fire DU-exposed veterans,
many with embedded DU fragments. An additional 29 of the friendly-fire victims
were later added to the surveillance program in 1999. In 1998, the program was
enlarged to assess the wider Gulf War veteran community's exposure to DU
through close contact with DU munitions, inhalation of smoke containing DU
particulate during a fire at the Doha depot or while entering or salvaging vehicles
or bunkers that were hit with DU projectiles. The published results of these
medical evaluations conclude that the presence of retained DU fragments is the
only scenario predictive of a high urine uranium value, and those with retained DU
fragments continue to have elevated urine uranium levels nine years after the
incident. It is unlikely that an individual would have an elevated urine uranium
result, and consequently any uranium-related health effects, in the absence of
retained DU fragments. Those individuals with normal urine uranium levels now
are unlikely to develop any uranium-related toxicity in the future, regardless of
what their DU exposure may have been in the Gulf War. Those DU-exposed
friendly fire individuals with elevated levels of urinary uranium nine years after the
Gulf War have not developed kidney abnormalities, leukemia, bone or lung cancer,
or any classical uranium-related adverse outcome. The DU Medical Follow-up
Program will continue to evaluate these individuals with elevated urine uranium
levels to enable early detection of potential untoward health effects in the future
due to their continued chronic exposure to DU.

There are reports from the Balkans and Iraq of individuals recovering the DU
penetrators. Are these hazardous?

Depleted uranium penetrators are only one of many possible hazards on the
battlefield. Civilians and soldiers are strongly discouraged from recovering
souvenirs from the battlefield or climbing on or around damaged equipment. For
example, some Eastern Bloc equipment also contains other more highly radioactive
sources such as radium dials as well as asbestos. There is also a possible problem
with unexploded munitions. As stated before, DU is only mildly radioactive.
Depleted uranium emits alpha and beta particles, and gamma rays. Alpha particles,
the primary radiation type produced by depleted uranium, are blocked by skin,
while beta particles are blocked by the boots and battle dress utility uniform
(BDUs) typically worn by service members. While gamma rays are a form of
highly-penetrating energy, the amount of gamma radiation emitted by depleted
uranium is very low. The threat of chemical toxicity would also be minimal
because there is little likelihood that sufficient quantities of DU could be inhaled or
ingested to cause a heavy metal concern.

What has the Defense Department done to protect future generations of service
members from accidental exposure to depleted uranium?

The Department of Defense is fully aware of its responsibility for the safe use of
depleted uranium. Since the Gulf War, the DoD has dramatically stepped up its
emphasis on increasing soldier and leader awareness of the hazards associated with
the battlefield use of depleted uranium. The U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine
Command published Training Support Packages for respective training schools in
September 1997. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has ordered the Service Chiefs
to ensure that DU awareness training is incorporated into the general military
training program. Implementation of the various training programs is underway.
The Office of the Special Assistant will continue to monitor the status of the
Services' depleted uranium training efforts.
In what way has the DoD attempted to track service members exposed to
depleted uranium during the Gulf War?

We have categorized the exposure scenarios into three levels based on their relative
exposures. Level I is the highest exposure group, including 102 soldiers who were
in, on, or near combat vehicles at the time they were struck by depleted uranium
rounds, and an estimated 30 to 60 soldiers who entered these vehicles immediately
afterwards to perform combat rescue. Depleted uranium metal fragments struck a
number of soldiers, and some of these still retain embedded depleted uranium
fragments. Others inhaled or ingested depleted uranium particles, or had depleted
uranium contaminate their wounds. The U.S. Army's Center for Health Promotion
and Preventive Medicine preliminary estimate of the highest exposure level were
based on test data that assumed two depleted uranium rounds impacted and
penetrated the depleted uranium armor of an Abram's heavy armor model tank. The
estimated radiation dose was less than the 5 rem per year limit for workers. The
theoretical kidney concentration could have exceeded the maximum permissible
concentration guideline of 3 g of uranium per gram of kidney. However, it is
unlikely. These highest exposure estimates were based on two perforations of DU
armor by 120mm DU rounds. The Department of Defense used the DU on DU
exposure data because it had no exposure data on DU rounds penetrating non-DU
armor. It should be noted that there were no penetrations of DU armor during the
Gulf War and only two Abrams tanks were actually penetrated by two DU
penetrators. In addition, the amount of DU aerosol generated by a DU round
penetrating a Bradley Fighting Vehicle would be much less than that produced by a
DU round penetrating an Abrams tank because the armor of the Abrams tank is
harder to penetrate than the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The Department of Defense
used the DU-on-DU exposure data because it had no exposure data on DU rounds
penetrating non-DU armor.

The voluntary Veterans Affairs DU Medical Follow-up program remains the most
important source for identifying potential untoward health effects in those friendly-
fire victims who have retained DU fragments. About a quarter of the over 60 Level
I exposed individuals who have been evaluated still carry DU fragments in their
bodies, and they have elevated levels of urinary uranium nine years after the Gulf
War. The present health status of this cohort shows they have not developed kidney
abnormalities, leukemia, bone or lung cancer, or any classical uranium-related
adverse outcome.

Level II exposures comprise around 200 soldiers who worked in and around
combat vehicles (mainly U.S. friendly fire vehicles) struck by depleted uranium
and as many as 600 personnel who took part in the clean up after the fire at Camp
Doha. These exposures resulted in significantly lower estimated intakes of depleted
uranium than the Level I exposures. The radiation estimates were less than the 0.1
rem per year guideline for members of the general public and much less than the 5
rem per year limit for workers. The chemical exposure estimates were also well
below the chemical toxicity guidelines. Therefore, no adverse health effects are
expected from the Level II exposures.

Level III is an "all others" category for personnel whose contacts with depleted
uranium were very brief and are highly unlikely to have resulted in any medically
significant exposure taking place. This group includes curious personnel who
entered Iraqi equipment or personnel down wind from vehicles that burned after
being struck by depleted uranium rounds. This groups estimated exposures were
minimal.

What are the health effects of contact with unfired depleted uranium munitions
or unperforated (intact) armor on the various weapons systems, such as the
Abrams Heavy Tank?

Unfired depleted uranium munitions are encased in thin metal jackets that seal in
alpha and beta particles, and allow only extremely slight gamma emissions which
fall well below regulatory health and safety limits. Similarly, depleted uranium
panels used in tank armor pose no health risk because the depleted uranium is
sealed inside several inches of regular steel armor. Alpha radiation, which is the
major concern for internalized depleted uranium, is not an external concern
because alpha radiation does not penetrate the outer layers of skin. The second
source of radiation is from the depleted uranium rounds stored on board the tank.
While soldiers are exposed to an increased level of radiation from the stored
munitions, the cumulative exposure levels for tank crewmembers are within
applicable guidelines. Since depleted uranium munitions are only used in combat,
only forward-deployed vehicles are routinely uploaded with depleted uranium
munitions.

While it is impossible to evaluate all potential exposure scenarios, each of the

major weapon systems have been fully evaluated and all of the routine exposures
are well within exposure guidelines. In fact, radiation levels measured inside the
turret of an Abrams Heavy Armor Tank are below background levels measured
outside the turret because armor shields the tank occupants from cosmic and
terrestrial radiation sources. Crewmembers have their overall radiation exposure
reduced by working inside the tank.

The most frequently cited example of radiation exposure is holding a bare

penetrator rod, which is impossible as long as the rounds are intact. The penetrator
rods in the 120mm, 105mm and 30mm rounds are shielded which prevents direct
contact with the actual penetrator rod. But even when holding a bare penetrator
rod, an individual could hold the rod for 250 hours before reaching the extremity or
skin limit of 50 rem. Contrary to some claims, the appropriate criteria is 50 rem
rather than 5 rem because the exposure is to the extremity (hand) or to the skin and
not to the whole body.
The European press in particular has been raising concerns of increased rates
of leukemia in European troops that have been stationed in the Balkans. Can
exposure to DU be the cause of these cases of leukemia?

It is highly unlikely that exposure to DU ammunition would cause leukemia. The

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services stated in its Toxicological Profile for Uranium, "[n]o
human cancer of any type has ever been seen as a result of exposure to natural or
depleted uranium." A 1999 RAND study concluded, "there are no peer-reviewed
published reports of detectable increases of cancer or other negative health effects
from radiation exposure to inhaled or ingested natural uranium at levels far
exceeding those likely in the Gulf." Exposures in the Balkans should be no more
than those in the Gulf.

Excess leukemia incidence among those exposed to radiation (atomic bomb

survivors) has been recognized only with doses in the range of 1 Sievert (100 rem)
or more to the bone marrow. In the body, uranium concentrates on the bone surface
rather than in bone marrow. Under these conditions irradiation of bone marrow by
uraniums alpha particles would be almost impossible. The scenarios for the
highest potential exposure to DU in the Gulf War (friendly fire incidents, Level I)
had estimated doses in the range of 0.05 Sv (5 rem). Incidental or casual exposures
(Levels II and III) are estimated to be orders of magnitude less. To the extent that
NATO forces in the Balkans had any exposure to DU, it is difficult to imagine
exposure greater than Level II exposure scenarios.

For male, active duty military personnel in the U.S. military, the average
frequencies of hospitalization for malignant disease are:

Leukemia (all types) two per 100,000 per year

All Cancer - 60 per 100,000 per year

Depending upon how many NATO forces deployed to Bosnia and how many years
have passed since their return, it should be possible to calculate the expected
frequency of leukemia among these troops. News accounts state that approximately
60,000 Italian troops and 15,000 civilians have served in the Balkans since 1995.
One could project that this group of 75,000 adults would have experienced seven
to ten cases of leukemia during the six years since 1995. Similarly, one could
project several hundred cases of cancer of all types.

Leukemias following high doses of radiation peak in frequency five to seven years
after exposure. Media accounts of leukemia cases and deaths within months of
return from the Balkans are not consistent with current scientific understanding of
the time course of radiation-induced leukemia.
Press accounts have indicated the presence of trace levels of plutonium and
other contaminants in DU that are indicative of recycled nuclear fuel. Is this
true? How did these contaminants get in the DU and does it change your
evaluation of the health hazards associated with DU exposure?

The Department of Energy operated three gaseous diffusion plants (Paducah,

Kentucky; Portsmouth, Ohio; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee) where they enriched
uranium for nuclear weapons and power plants; creating depleted uranium as a by-
product. Some or all of these plants received uranium extracted from spent nuclear
fuels for recycling in the '50s, '60s, '70s, and '80s. Uranium extracted from spent
nuclear fuels included low levels of transuranics (americium, neptunium, and
plutonium), technetium-99, and uranium-236. The gaseous diffusion process
concentrates these contaminants in the enriched uranium and decreases the levels
in the depleted uranium so that only trace quantities remain. The DoE plants have
established maximum allowable levels for radioactive contaminants in the enriched
uranium extracted from recycled nuclear fuel. Routine monitoring has documented
contaminant levels below these allowable levels in post-1980 sampling. DoEs
plant at Fernald has received and/or shipped loads from almost all of the DU
produced by the gaseous diffusion plants and tested subsets. These data, included
in a draft DoE report dated June, 2000, indicate that radioactive contaminants
increase the radiation dose from the DU itself by less than 1 percent. This result
agrees with the U.S. Army's testing of the DU used in its armor plate for the
Abrams Heavy Tank.

Department of Energy staff have indicated that their testing is representative of all
DoD DU applications. The testing being performed by the United Nations
Environmental Programme (UNEP) team is not a simple task. The contaminant
levels are in the part per billion range. A part per billion is approximately
equivalent to one second in 31.7 years.

With all of the medical and environmental concerns over DU, why hasn't DOD
found a substitute for DU?

Each weapon system that uses DU has undergone extensive developmental testing
and evaluation. As part of that process, DOD evaluates possible alternative metal
alloys considering operational requirements and medical/environmental impacts.
As improvements have been made in the "hardness" of armored vehicles, tests
have demonstrated that DU offers superior performance to all other alloys.

DOD must also evaluate the environmental and medical consequences of exposure
to any new alloy. Uranium has an advantage in this arena over several candidate
materials because of the extensive database on uranium. While some candidate
replacement alloys may not be radioactive, they are not necessarily less toxic to
humans.