9090 Ijbas Ijens

International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 5
Tribe and Transition in Nigeria: The Role of

Ethno-Political Organizations in The Transition
from Military Rule to Democracy, 1993 1998
Okechukwu Ibeanu*
Abstract-- This essay analyzes the role of ethno-political communities and clans of their members. Recognizing their
organizations in Nigeria's quest for democracy. It inquires into incipient political aspirations, a 1935 Colonial Report
how their interaction in the recent transition to democracy described them as young men's clubs of a semi-political
curtailed and/or exacerbated politically pertinent conflicts among nature.[2 ] By the middle years of colonialism in Nigeria,
ethnic groups. It is argued that the salience of ethno-political
these young men's clubs were speedily coalescing into pan -
organizations in Nigeria's recent transition rests, first, on the
historical process of state making in Nigeria, specifically on the ethnic organizations like the Igbo State Union, the Hausa-
insertion of ethnic groups in the structure of that state with Fulani Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa and the Yoruba Egbe Omo
pertinent effects. S econd, military rule and absence of democratic Oduduwa. These pan-ethnic organizations were to become
political structures created "mobilizational gaps" that ethnic important actors in the democratic struggles of Nigerian
organizations filled. Both factors are germane to a "conflict peoples against colonial rule, which culminated in
dynamic" among ethnic groups at the political level of structures. independence in 1960. The salutary roles they played in this
Ethno-political organizations purvey such conflicts. Two factors first wave of democratization in Nigeria, including the
shaped the general role of ethno-political organizations in the dynamics of their relations with the colonialists and one
transition: (a) the importance of various phases of the transition
another, has been articulated by some studies.[3 ] Nevertheless,
programme to power sharing among the ethnic leaders; and (b)
divisions between ethnic group(s) associated with the incumbent the precipitate decline of Nigeria into authoritarian rule a few
authoritarian regime (in-group) and other ethnic groups (out- years after independence, characterized by nearly three
group). Both factors made for conflictive ethnic alliances. S till, decades of military rule, has also been blamed on the political
individual interests and maneuvers of civilian and military intervention of these ethnic organizations.[4 ] Consequently,
politicians alike, who led the ethnic alliances thrown up by the when the military seized power and banned all political parties
transition, underlined the specific character of conflicts. in 1966, at least 26 tribal and cultural associations were also
Index Term-- Ethno-political organizations, transition, banned.[5 ]
authoritarianism, marginalization, conflict. Still, ethno-political organizations remain central in Nigerian
politics generally, and in the recent process of ending
I. INTRODUCTION authoritarian rule in particular. Some of the organizations that
In this essay, we examine the relationship between ethno- emerged in this process include the Egbe Afenifere, literally
political organizations and the transition from military rule to meaning persons wishing to protect their interests in
civilian rule (democracy?) in Nigeria between 1993 and 1998. association with others and Egbe Ilosiwaju Yoruba
We inquire into both how ethno-political organizations (Association of Yoruba Progressives) claiming to represent
affected the process of democratization and how the process, Yoruba interests, the Mkpoko Igbo (Union of Igbos) for the
in turn, influenced their role(s) in politics generally, and in Igbo, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
exacerbating or ameliorating political conflicts. (MOSOP) for the minority Ogonis, and the Northern Elders
Ethno-political organizations are pan-ethnic formations Forum representing or perceived to represent Hausa-Fulani
serving, or purporting to serve, the political interests of their interests. Some of them have coalesced into larger inter-ethnic
members, their co-ethnics and ethnic homelands. They could and regional ensembles like the Southern Mandate Group
be issue-specific movements or organizations pursuing more which purports to represent all ethnic interests in the south of
diffuse and generalized ethnic interests. The political role of the country. The primary objective of this essay is to explain
ethnic organizations has been well documented by observers the role(s) of ethno-political organizations in the transition to
of Nigerian politics.[1 ] In fact, by the 1920s southern Nigeria democracy in Nigeria which began in 1986, when the then
was awash with such organizations with immediate and military government of General Babangida announced its
remote political aims, taking their names from respective transition programme. That attempt was botched, perhaps
temporarily, with the annulment of the Presidential election in
August, 1993. Three months later, the military led by General
Sanni Abacha, a prominent member of the Babangida
Okechukwu Ibeanu is Professor of Political Science at the University of government, seized power and promised to return the country
Nigeria, Nsukka and former visiting Professor at Kings College London. He to democratic government in 1998.
was also the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the adverse effects of toxic
wastes on the enjoyment of human rights.
121406-9090- IJBAS-IJENS @ December 2012 IJENS IJENS

II. A CADEM IC SIGNIFICANCE democratization process. For instance, it will be important to
Various studies have examined transitions to democracy in know if ethno-political organizations are more active in some
Africa, often situating them within the context of the so-called phases of the process than in others. In addition, there is need
third wave of democracy,[6 ] which refers to the recent to analyze the dynamics of their interactions, the character of
experiences of eastern European, Latin American and African alliances and counter-alliances among them, as well as the
countries.[7 ] factors determining the patterns of interaction.
Although there are still many dissenting voices calling for Discussions of ethnic identity and its interface with politics in
more rigorous examination of the concept of demo cracy[8 ], Nigeria is a long-standing one dating to the works of
the dominant attitude is that the democracy on offer is settled, anthropologists who worked in the country during the colonial
namely liberal/multi-party democracy. This attitude, in most period.[14 ] Many of these studies tended to romanticize ethnic
cases, is both a reflection and a result of the renaissance and identities and the cultural, social and political systems of the
resurgence of Tocquevillean and Schumpeterian notions of various ethnic groups. Colonial administrators often drew the
democracy as institutional political arrangements and practices flak for being insensitive to the culture, history and language
of the West, and democratization as the spread of those of the local people.[15 ] Increased autonomy for colonized
institutions and practices to societies unfamiliar with them. peoples, especially in the cultural sphere, was widely
This process is also seen as ineluctable.[9 ] Contrary to this advocated. In time, it was accepted in colonial circles that
position, however, the originality of Africa's transitions is colonial rule by proxy, that is indirect rule through local
undeniable.[10 ] Surely, extra-African influences have impacted Chiefs, was not only cheap and effective, but also good for the
on Africa's transition, but democracy is not the preserve of any colonized.[16 ] It has been noted that this policy contributed
nation or group of nations to be spread by proselytizing others. immensely to the emergence of ethnic politics in Nigeria.[17 ]
To be sure, the reversals already being experienced in The next generation of studies emphasized the political-
democratic transitions in some African countries and recline mobilization role of ethnicity in Nigeria's march to
into authoritarian rule in others, suggest to us the need for a nationhood. Nigerian nationalists and expatriate writers
re-examination of the democratic content of African influenced by them came to emphasize the positive
transitions. One factor that many will agree is central to such a contributions of the various ethnic identities to the
re-examination is ethnicity. The interface between ethnicity independence movement and the social and political
and democracy has been a prominent theme in extant development of Nigeria.[18 ] This went against the grain of
literature. Studies have focused on the reciprocal impact of mainstream modernization school that was dominant among
ethnicity and multi-party democracy.[11 ] While some argue a Anglo-American writers in the 1950s and 1960s, which
negative impact of ethnicity on democracy[12 ], others argue a viewed communalism (religious and ethnic) as a pre-modern
positive (or potentially positive) link. What is still lacking, phenomenon that is bound to decline with technological and
however, are in-depth studies of the concrete experiences of economic development. However, the persistence of
multi-ethnic African societies in the light of transitions to communalism in modernizing societies like Nigeria led later
democracy. That is the major concern of this study. In doing modernization writers to suggest that communalism may not
this, we must realize that the political intervention of ethnic be transitory and anachronistic, but a permanent feature of
groups in politics is not spontaneous. Ethnic groups act in social change in Africa.[19 ] What is put forward is an
politics through their organizations. In fact, we know that inevitability thesis linking communalism and politics in
ethnic organizations sometimes help to invent ethnic identities modernizing societies. According to Melson and Wolpe, in a
in the first place. Such organizations as they functioned in culturally heterogeneous society, the competition arising from
Nigeria's transition to democratic rule between 1993 and 1998 social mobilization will tend to be defined in communal
constitute the focus of our analysis. terms.[20 ] What is then needed is a political strategy for
Although the role of ethnic organizations in Nigerian politics managing conflicts arising from communalism.[21 ]
has been long recognized by various studies, extant literature Later studies challenged this portrayal of ethnicity and
only provides general treatments of this role.[13 ] There communalism as inherent and permanent in the African way
remains a paucity of in-depth studies of the political role of of life. From the early 1980s, a near consensus was emerging
ethnic organizations, particularly in relation to party politics. that ethnicity is a historically contingent, fluid and flexible
Moreover, existing studies concentrate on the period of social form, which was manufactured or invented by
colonial rule and nationalist struggles. There is an urgent need colonial administrators and cons tantly reinvented by the post-
to update our knowledge in this regard. This means that the colonial African elite to serve political purposes.[22 ]
level of existing knowledge about the role of ethno -political Specifically, writers on the Left of the ideological spectrum
organizations in party politics is still largely incomplete. More saw ethnicity as the creature of the exploitative project of
so, there is the specific need to explain the role(s) of ethno - colonialism and the manipulative politics of the petty
political organizations in the recent transition to democratic bourgeoisie. In both cases, ethnicity serves a class project.[23 ]
government in Nigeria. This study proceeds from a perceived It is its class purpose that assures the persistent politicization
need to examine why ethno-political organizations are active of ethnicity in Nigeria.[24 ]
in transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule in Nigeria,
and what their roles are at different phases of the

Apart from the general link between ethnicity and politics, the The most important significance of this study is that even in
more specific interface between ethnicity and democracy has the context of the liberal democratic project, what remains
also been a prominent theme in the research literature. Studies largely lacking in existing studies is analysis of the specificity
have focused principally on the reciprocal impact of ethnicity of ethnicity in on-going democratic transitions in Africa.
and multi-party democracy.[25 ] Some argue that multi-party There is need to analyze the impact of ethnicity not only on
democracy reinforces ethnicity, and therefore there is a the overall process of transition, but also its different
negative impact of multi-partism on ethnicity.[26 ] But others phases.[31 ] There is yet a dearth of in-depth studies focusing
insist that ethnicity has a positive link with multi-party on the role of ethno-political organizations in Nigerian politics
democracy, and that democracy offers an auspicious context generally, and in the recent transition to democracy in
for the management of ethnicity, particularly through a policy particular. To be sure, a number of studies have recorded the
of equalitarian pluralism. These differences suggest a social and political roles played by ethnic associations in
divergence of theoretical orientations.[27 ] Still, perhaps as many West African cities.[32 ] Likewise, the role of ethnic
crucial, they point to the need to study the link between associations in important political developments in Nigeria,
ethnicity and democracy concretely, based on the historical especially in the colonial period, has been noted by various
experiences of multi-ethnic societies. It is by so doing that we studies.[33 ] These associations, which arose in the colonial
can understand the seeming Janiform association between urban setting, provided a network of communication for
democracy and ethnicity, whereby their reciprocal impact is information flow between the urban and rural areas [34 ], which
sometimes salutary and at other times debilitating. has been very essential in maintaining ethnic solidarity and
Still, discussions of the link between democracy and ethnicity giving ethno-political organizations a high profile in national
only make sense in their conceptual contextualization of politics.
democracy. Egwu points out that most analysts do not The growth of ethnic associations has been linked to the
seriously address the kind of democracy that transitions character of the colonial urban setting. It has been argued that
produce.[28 ] The tendency is to assume democracy as a settled the high incidence of socio-economic frustration is a central
matter, namely its liberal/multi-party form. Certainly, the element in the motivational complex that leads to ethnic
dominant inclination among academics, policy-makers and the identity.[35 ] Moreover, competition for scarce resources and
general public in Nigeria is to think of democracy in terms of opportunities among people of different ethnic identities in a
its multi-party form. Thus, implicitly and explicitly democracy contact situation is at the heart of ethnic conflicts.[36 ] Above
is portrayed as a once-for-all thing, having to do with setting- all, the pattern of spatial concentration of ethnic groups in a
up and operating those institutions of governance associated contact situation has a profound bearing on not only ethnic
with developed capitalist countries. This outlook has a lot to conflicts but also the emergence of ethnic associations. It has
do with the resurgence since the end of the cold war of been shown, for instance, that the segregation of blacks in
Tocquevillean and Schumpeterian notions that associate American urban areas was important in the rise of the Black
democracy with institutional political arrangements Power Movement.[37 ]
originating from the West and spreading to the rest of the The colonial urban centres of Nigeria were, therefore, the
world.[29 ] cradle of ethnic associations. First, they offered little socio -
It is not difficult to see that this is a re-incarnation of economic security to the teeming population that migrated
modernization. But more importantly, this conception of from the rural areas.[38 ] In addition, the scarcity that
democracy is predominantly institutional. It only tangentially characterized life in the colonial urban setting led to fierce
recognizes the actions of social forces in the constitution and socio-economic competition. According to Nnoli,
operation of democratic institutions. When Western The net effect of the intense socio-economic competition
democratic institutions are merely transplanted into Africa, a arising from scarcity and inequality in colonialNigeria,
dangerous gap often develops between these institutions and was the insecurity of individuals regarding their outcome.
the democratic struggles of the people. This gap is often filled First, there was insecurity resulting from the search for
by various undemocratic and anti-democratic forces, such as limited job opportunities and social services. . . . Once the
ethnic, religious and other millenarian and pseudo- political members of a particular group gained access to the best
organizations that manipulate and feed on the fears and jobs and other resources, they used their positions to find
deprivations of the people. In time, the democratic jobs for others or at least to pass on news of job
institutions become distorted and converted into instruments opportunities to them. The repercussions were felt in
of authoritarianism. The recent case of Zambia, where unequal levels of unemployment, income and in differing
President Chiluba has detained opponents and barred his degrees of social status among the communal groups.
closest challenger for the Presidency, former President Attempts by each group to escape the negative
Kaunda, from contesting the next election, is instructive. consequences of this phenomenon led to the further
However, this is not an acceptance of the opposing argument strengthening of communal associations.[39 ]
that cultural and civilizational traits of non-Western societies Second, the character of ethnic residential settlement in
make Western values like democracy a source of conflict, both Nigeria's colonial urban centres fostered ethnic associations. A
within such societies and between them and the West.[30 ] policy of keeping the ethnic groups divided and separated
became a hallmark of colonial administration. The emergence

46
of sabon garis (strangers quarters) in the colonial urban possible.[ ] Such parties tend to favour indirect membership
centres of Northern Nigeria, ostensibly to protect through other primary organizations, even though direct
Hausa- Fulani culture from the destabilizing incursions of membership is not abandoned, while nation-wide branches
other tribes epitomized this policy.[40 ] replace the caucuses. Zucarelli has shown the emphasis on
The net effect of these two conditions is the burgeoning of collective party membership to be true also for Senegal, noting
ethnic associations. For one thing, these associations provided that collective membership continues to be a feature of
co-ethnics the much needed social security and welfare political life in this country, as has R. Molteno for
services, and equipped them to compete with members of Zambia.[47 ] In fact, Gonidec generalizes indirect party
other ethnic groups. In this regard, education was particularly membership to the whole of Africa:
important, and both Coleman and Sklar, among others, have . . . as in the case of elections, membership is rarely an
recorded in details the commitment of ethnic associations to individual act, maturely deliberated. Allowance must be made
providing education for young Nigerians from the 1940s.[41 ] for the structures of African societies, particularly in the
For another thing, segregated residential areas assured ethnic traditional environment, which is quantitatively the most
associations a recruitment and power base. In time, the rapid important. As in the past, the social group in which the
growth in the membership and activities of these associations individual is most closely integrated, that is to say the family,
made it possible for them to coalesce into pan-ethnic, national the ethnic group, sometimes the religious organization, plays a
organizations such as the Igbo Federal Union (later Igbo State role of capital importance and exerts a pressure on those who
Union), Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Organization of the might be tempted to adopt a political standpoint different from
descendants of Oduduwa, the mythical founder of the Yoruba that of the group. In fact, it is the group much more than the
nation) and Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa (Northern Congress), individual which belongs to the party. . . . To a certain extent,
and as such into potential political actors. we may even say that African politicians favour this tendency,
The politicization of ethnicity and of pan-ethnic organizations because it allows a manipulation of votes destined to facilitate
has been explained in terms of rivalries, sometimes personal their political ascension.[48 ]
rivalries, among the emergent elites of Nigeria's ethnic groups, This is a rather sweeping generalization. Still, it raises a very
especially the three dominant ethnic groups - Hausa-Fulani, important issue that is germane to understanding the link
Igbo and Yoruba from the 1940s.[42 ] However, individual between ethnicity and democratization in Africa, namely the
rivalries for political power are too superficial and voluntary relationship between the individual and the community,
to explain the insertion of ethnic organizations into politics. especially the ethnic group, in African politics. Often the issue
For one thing, such rivalries did not always run along ethnic is posed as one of either or - either the individual or the
lines. For another, it cannot explain the persistence and community. We think that it is more correctly a question of
importance of ethno-political organizations in Nigerian which is dominant. Without doubt, the individual is dominant
politics. More fundamental explanations attribute the in the liberal democracies of the West, while the community
politicization of ethnicity and pan-ethnic organizations to class tends to be dominant in Africa.
factionalism within the petty bourgeoisie and comprador At least two strands of explanation have been adduced for this.
bourgeoisie in struggles to control production,[43 ] and the First, some observers attribute it to the limited penetration of
character of Nigerias post-colonial, capitalist state.[44 ] commodity (capitalist) relations, leading to the persisten ce of
The strongest expression of the politicization of ethnic attachments to pre-capitalist formations like ethnic group, and
organizations in Nigeria is to be found in party formation. a concomitant non-appearance of the atomized, formally free
Most studies have argued the point that in an attempt by the individual.[49 ] However, if this is the explanation, it should be
various ethnic elites/petty bourgeois and comprador factions expected that ethnicity would be higher where there is less
to take over political power, they transformed ethnic commoditization in Africa. In that case, the rural areas of
organizations into political parties, converted ethnic Africa should experience more ethnicity than urban areas. We
organizations into a recruitment base for party loyalists, and know that this is not the case. Instead, there is a wide
split existing nationalist parties into ethnic factions. The consensus that urban ethnicity is the dominant manifestation
histories of the three dominant political parties in Nigerian in Africa. Rural ethnicity appears as a very recent
politics in the 1950s and 1960s namely, the Northern Peoples phenomenon.
Congress (NPC), National Council of Nigerian Citizens The second explanation attributes the dominance of the
(NCNC) and Action Group (AG) are particularly community and ethnic group over the individual to the
illustrative.[45 ] instrumentalist role of ethnicity to the acquisition and
Nonetheless, what is always left out in these studies is the maintenance of power in Africa is widely argued on both the
place of structure and type of parties in understanding the link Left and Right of the ideological spectrum. It is the
between ethnic organizations and Nigerian political parties. manipulation and use of ethnicity in pursuit of class, elite or
We think that this dimension is very important. It seems that individual interests that accounts for the prominence and
the tradition of Nigerian political parties, which is not persistence of ethnicity in African politics. While this is not
unconnected with their early beginnings, is that of mass, necessarily wrong, for there is clear evidence that politicians
Socialist parties of the continental European-type, which is often make political capital out of the ethnic identities of their
directed to organizing as large a proportion of the masses as

people, we still think that this instrumentalist explanation is colonial era it passed into the hands of a pseudo-bourgeoisie
too voluntary to be fundamental. (petty and comprador bourgeoisie), fervently desirous to
We argue that ethnic groups are inserted into the state in become economically dominant, this state became for its
Africa with pertinent effects.[50 ] Therefore, their role is not controllers a powerful instrument for acquiring private wealth;
reducible to the mere will of politicians. Nor can we reduce it a monstrous instrument in the hands of individuals and their
to the extent of penetration of commodity relations. We think co-ethnics for pursuing private welfare to the exclusion of
that the state in Africa, or more correctly the peripheral others.
capitalist state, is a specific form of the capitalist state. We Two things emerge logically from the above points. One, the
also think that the dominance of the community (clan, state in Nigeria principally deals with its members as social
ethnicity, religion, etc.,) over the individual is written into the agents of ethnic groups (not as free, individual and equal
very genetic material of this kind of state. It is in fact in the citizens), and the power of that state exists as prebends
character of this state that the interface between ethnicity and parceled out to ethnic groups instead of a unified, objective
democracy, as well as the salience of ethno-political and independent entity standing above society and expressing
organizations in Nigeria's recent transition are to be found. the corporate existence of the people-nation. Two, being the
exclusive tool of those in power (who are agents of ethnic
ETHNO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND groups), defending their prebends becomes a very
DEMOCRATIZATION: A THEORETICAL fundamental and charged issue; politics becomes an
APPROACH overriding and war-like exercise waged among ethnic groups.
We think that the most important gap in existing knowledge Ethno-political organizations are the phalanxes in this war.
about the link between ethnicity and democracy, as well as the There is a second, but less fundamental explanation for the
importance of ethno-political organizations in Nigeria's recent importance of ethno-political organizations in the recent
transition is the under-articulation of the character of the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Nigeria.
Nigerian state. The salience of ethno-political organizations in Authoritarian rule is marked by many years of ban on political
the recent transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in parties and muzzling of independent organizations and power
Nigeria has to be located at two levels: one remote, centres in society. This state of affairs leaves ethno-political
fundamental and primary, and the other immediate, exterior organizations as the most potentially effective organizations
and secondary. that could emerge quickly and with minimal prompting as
The fundamental explanation has to be sought in the character political liberalization is embarked on by an authoritarian
of the peripheral capitalist state, which is how we characterize regime. This is so for two reasons. For one thing, their
the Nigerian state. First, this state has to be understood in recruitment base exists, fixed and exclusive to them. For
terms of the genealogy of capital accumulation world wide. another thing, the catalyst for them to emerge is readily
This state emerged at the stage of extensive (rather than present namely, elites preying on the fears and anxieties of
intensive) growth of capital. This is the stage of ordinary people to mobilize them for political ends by raising
internationalization of capital. At this stage, there is really no the spectre of ethnic domination.
need for the complete dissolution of pre-capitalist social The role of ethno-political organizations varies with different
forces, symbols and institutions as in the stage of intensive phases of the transition process. Nnoli identifies four phases in
growth of capital.[51 ] Consequently, there was a great deal of the contemporary wave of transition to democracy in Africa,
preservation effect on these social forces, symbols and and analyzes the character, dynamics and significance of
institutions in a new symbiosis with capitalism, especially ethnic conflicts during each of the phases. The phases are: (1)
where they made it possible for capital accumulation to the phase of pressure on authoritarian regime by pro-
proceed without hindrance. As a result, the emergence and democracy forces; (2) phase of formulating a programme of
hegemony of the market-oriented, formally free and transition to democracy; (3) phase of implementation of the
autonomous individual as the subject of economic and programme; and (4) phase of institutionalization of
political organization was either blocked or only partially democracy, including the first post-transition election.
actualized. The net effect of this is that the vast majority of According to him, at each of these phases the character of
Nigerians, whether in the urban or rural areas, still exist as ethnic conflicts differs.[53 ] And so also, we think, the role of
agents of pre-capitalist social forces, principally, but not ethno-political organizations, which are major purveyors of
exclusively, ethnic groups. ethnic interests. Even in the same phase, their role could differ
Second, resulting from the history of its constitution as a depending on the course of events. For instance, Nnoli notes
specific moment of global capital, we see that this type of state that at the phase of formulating the transition programme,
is not an objective force standing above society and holding its their importance depends on whether the option of
antagonisms in a balance, like the state that emerged from the constitutional conference or that of sovereign national
establishment of capitalism in Europe.[52 ] Rather, it is a state conference is adopted.[54 ]
constituted principally for conquering and holding down the We propose that in line with the character of the post-colonial
peoples of Nigeria. As such, ab initio there was no question of state and the role of ethnicity in its politics, ethno-political
evolving and routinizing principles for the non-arbitrary use of organizations will be most active at phases involving power
that state by those that control it. And when in the p ost- sharing. At such phases, the attention of ethno -political

organizations turns from the authoritarian regime (its phases of the transition process, the targets of their activities
overthrow or maintenance) to one another. Once the in order of importance are likely to be as follows:
democratization process moves into phases involving the Phase I: The government/regime, pro-democracy
sharing of economic and, particularly, political power among organizations, other ethno-political organizations and co-
ethnic groups, ethno-political organizations are bound to ethnics outside and inside the ethnic homeland.
become very active, raising the tempo of both conflicts and Phase II: Members of the constitutional conference, other
cooperation among them. These are most likely to be the ethno-political organizations; pro-democracy organizations,
phases of formulation and implementation of a transition and co-ethnics outside and inside the ethnic homeland.
programme. If those phases dovetail into periods of national Phase III: Political parties and candidates, co-ethnics inside
economic difficulties, the activities of ethno-political and outside ethnic homeland; other ethno-political
organizations will be even more marked because of scarcity organizations, members of adjacent ethnic homelands and
and consequent competition. members of non-adjacent ethnic homelands.
Two factors govern the interaction among ethno -political
organizations in the process of transition to democracy. First ETHNO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NIGERIA:
at the phase of pressure, i.e. phase 1, the critical factor is the AN ETHNO-REGIONAL PROFILE
ethnic character of the authoritarian regime, that is the ethnic The basis of communalism in Nigeria is often unstable and
group or groups from which the regime draws support. The mercurial. The critical defining factors may be clan, ethnic
battle line is most likely to be drawn between ethno-political group, state, region or religion. However, ethnic identity
organizations of the regime and those of the opposition. remains the most politically important factor in communalism.
Secondly, at the phases of formulation and implementation of Thus, Nigeria's approximately 250 distinct ethnic groups
the transition programme, an added factor intervenes to articulate their interests and attempt to fill them politically.
determine the character of alliances and counter-alliances. Still, often, ethnic identity exists in complex relationships with
That is, the history of inter-ethnic relations in the country.[55 ] other factors in defining communalism in Nigeria. Sometimes
That is to say, an ethno-political movement is likely to take communalism is defined along the lines of ethno -regional
into consideration past political interactions between its ethnic identity, as in the case of the North, South and Middle Belt. At
group and other ethnic groups as a basis for cooperation. other times it is defined in terms of ethno-religious groupings
However, this factor is less important than the need to capture as in the Moslem North and Christian South. Other defining
or retain power. In other words, it is a movement's assessment factors include minority versus majority ethnic groups, and
of its chances in the power play, rather than fixed notions of numerous sub-ethnic identities like the Ika Igbo, Egba Yoruba,
its relationship with other ethnic groups and their etc. Ethno-political organizations in the recent transition to
organizations, that is crucial. democracy reflect this multi-faceted character of
Finally, in pursuing its objectives, the activities of ethno - communalism. Table 1 shows a vast array of ethno-political
political organizations and the targets of such activities will organizations. The most important factor defining them is
vary with different phases of the transition to democracy. At clearly ethnic identity. But in some cases, sub-ethnic and
the pressure phase, their activities will be essentially that of regional factors come into play. For example, there is the Ika
sensitization and awareness cultivation, aimed at either National Summit and the Ondo Central Forum representing
pressuring the authoritarian regime to democratize or to sub-ethnic interests of the Ika Igbo and Ondo Yoruba
sustain the regime. At the phase of formulating the transition respectively. At another level, unlike the southern parts of the
programme, activities of ethno-political organizations country, most ethno-political organizations in the north tend to
continue to emphasize sensitization of the public to the need to represent the interest of the entire region, rather than the
protect the interests of the ethnic homeland. At the phase of interest of specific ethnic groups, even if the Hausa-Fulani are
implementing the programme, particularly during elections, principal actors in these organizations. Indeed, Sklar has
their activities tend to emphasize mobilization. The message is rightly noted that among the major Nigerian ethnic groups,
usually the need to vote massively for the chosen party and only the Hausa do not as a rule form tribal unions, which may
candidates that will protect the interests of members of the reflect the primacy of Islam as an integrative factor in Hausa
ethnic group and the ethnic homeland. society.56 In fact, Islam constitutes a powerful integrative
Concomitantly, the targets of their activities, that is the social factor not only in Hausa society, but also in the north as a
groups or political structures that form the focus of the whole. The dual character of communalism in the North,
pressure applied by ethno-political organizations, also vary which involves both ethnic and religious identities, has had the
with different phases of transition. Generally, their targets will effect on how both the North and other parts of the country
include the following: (a) The government/ regime; (b) other define the region as an ethno-political grouping. Sometimes,
ethno-political organizations; (c) pro-democracy the North is defined as the Hausa-Fulani, at other times it is all
organizations; (d) members of the constitutional conference; the ethnic groups living in areas above the Middle-Belt, and
(e) co-ethnics in the ethnic homeland; (f) co-ethnics outside still at other times the North is used in reference to the old
the ethnic homeland; (g) members of adjacent ethnic Northern Region, which includes the Middle-Belt (Figs. 2 and
homelands; (h) members of non-adjacent ethnic homelands; 3).
(i) political parties and candidates for elections. At the various

Another important but more recent factor in defining of origin could, and does become, an important factor in
communalism in Nigeria is State of origin. States are political- understanding the activities of ethno-political organizations.
administrative units that replaced the erstwhile Regions from For instance, during the Babangida transition, among the four
1967. In that year, 12 States were created out of the four Igbo States of Abia, Anambra, Enugu and Imo, only Anambra
Regions. Since then, the number has risen to 36 with the State consistently voted for the Social Democratic Party. The
creation of six new States in 1996. State identities interlock other three States supported the National Republican
with ethnic identities in the political arena. As a result, State Convention (see Figs. 4 and 5).
T ABLE I
SOME RECENT ETHNO -P OLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NIGERIA
Organization Interest
1. Anioma Forum Western Igbo
2. Atunluse Yoruba
3. Committee for Unity and Understanding South
4. Eastern Mandate Union South East
5. Egbe Afenifere Yoruba
6. Egbe Ilosiwaju Yoruba Yoruba
7. Egbe Omo Yoruba Yoruba
8. Esan Forum Esan
9. Idoma National Forum Idoma
10. Igbo Elders Forum Igbo
11. Ijaw Nationality Protection Organization Ijaw
12. Ijaw National Congress Ijaw
13. Ika National Summit Ika-Igbo
14. Ire-Akari Yoruba
15. Izu Umunna Igbo
16. Lagos Democratic Forum Lagos Yoruba
17. Middle Belt Congress Middle Belt
18. Mkpoko Igbo Igbo
19. Movt. for the Survival of Ogoni People Ogoni
20. New Dimension Yoruba
21. Nigerian Peoples' Movement South-East
22. Northern Committee of Elders North/Hausa-Fulani
23. Northern Consultative Group North/Hausa-Fulani
24. Northern Elders Forum North/Hausa-Fulani
25. Oha-na-eze Igbo
26. Ondo Central Forum Ondo Yoruba
27. Southern Mandate Group South
28. Southern Minorities Group Southern Minorities
29. Yoruba Obas and Leaders of Thought Yoruba
Fig. 1. Principal ethnic groups in Nigeria Fig. 2. Different Perceptions of the North Old Northern Region

depending on the course of events. Certainly, the phase of
political liberalization by the military is conducive to the
emergence of ethno-political organizations. The many years of
ban on political parties and muzzling of organized opposition
by the military encouraged the prompt emergence of pan -
ethnic organizations during the transition (Table 1). During
the General Babangida transition, as soon as the ban on
political activities was lifted on 3rd May, 1989, about forty
political associations emerged. Most of them were linked to
existing ethnic organizations. Out of this number, however,
only 13 sought registration with the National Electoral
Commission (NEC) as political parties later that year.
The breakneck speed at which these associations emerged had
convinced many observers of the activities of ethnic
organizations prior to May, 1989. Indeed, in refusing
recognition to all the 13 Associations that applied for
Fig. 3. Different Perceptions of the North Excluding the Middle Belt registration as political parties, Babangida, the then military
Head of State, accused them of operating underground prior
to the lifting of the ban on politics, and of relapse into ethnic
cleavages. According to him,
Some of the most disturbing aspects of the political process
during the pre-registration period were indeed sonorous
echoes of our historical experience. Old lines of cleavage-
ethnic, geopolitical, religious and class- surfaced in bold relief
in the new political associations. These "new breed"
associations, which were expected to transcend those lines of
cleavage and promote issue-based politics, instead relapsed
into debilitating in-fighting, each group within itself.[57 ]
However, it should be pointed out right away that even though
the ethnic factor remained strong in the emerging parties
during the Babangida transition, many discerning observers
believe that he only used it as an excuse to pursue his hidden
Fig. 4. States of Nigeria: Ethnic Distribution transition programme, which was his self succession in
office.
Nnoli has noted that at the phase of formulating the transition
programme their importance depends on whether the option of
constitutional conference or that of sovereign national
conference is adopted.[58 ] Indeed, the Nigerian experience
strongly suggests that the constitutional conference approach
to transition in Africa, more than the sovereign national
conference, is very conducive to the activities of pan -ethnic
organizations and ethnic conflicts. The National Constitutional
Conference (NCC) set up by the Abacha government in 1994
quickly adopted an ethnic character as the leaders of various
ethnic groups and other constructed ethno -geographic
groupings (Southern Minorities, Southeastern Minorities,
South, Middle Belt, Far North, etc.) formulated their platforms
for the conference. The bulk of the Yoruba elite represented
by the Egbe-Afenifere and Egbe-Ilosiwaju Yoruba, called for
a boycott of the NCC on account of the annulment of the Jun e
Fig. 5. Ethnic support for the SDP and NRC in the 1993 Presidential election 12 Presidential election won by Chief Abiola. In April 1994,
the Conference of Yoruba Obas (Yoruba traditional rulers)
III. ETHNO -POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PHASES and Leaders of Thought met in Ibadan under the chairmanship
OF TRANSITION of Oba S. K. Adetona, Awujale of Ijebuland (ruler of Ijebu
The role of pan-ethnic organizations in the transition is Yorubas). The conference was attended by twenty-four other
contextualized by the different phases of the transition Obas and representatives of Egbe-Afenifere, Egbe-Ilosiwaju
process. Even in the same phase, their role could differ Yoruba, Lagos Democratic Forum, Ire-Akari and other ethnic

organizations in Yorubaland. The communiqu from the authoritarian regime (its overthrow or maintenance) to one
meeting insisted that the June 12 1993 election should be another. Once the democratization process moves into phases
declared, and the winner of that election sworn in; it is only involving the sharing of economic and, particularly, political
after that has been done that the Yoruba race will participate power among ethnic groups, pan-ethnic organizations are
in any conference; The Yoruba race should present a single bound to become very active, raising the tempo of both
memorandum to such constitutional conference.[59 ] The conflicts and cooperation among them. By Nnoli's taxonomy,
Ibadan conference also set up a committee of 18 persons, with these are most likely to be the second and third phases during
Professor Adebayo Adedeji, the former Head of the Economic which a transition programme is formulated and implemented.
Commission for Africa, as Chairman, to harmonize the In the period leading up to the 1993 Presidential election,
positions of the various Yoruba groups. there were strong indications that an alliance between Igbos
At about the same time, Igbos were also articulating their and Yorubas would emerge to challenge the Hausa-Fulani.
position on the Constitutional Conference through two Calls for a handshake across the Niger were widely made by
umbrella organizations - Mkpoko Igbo (Igbo Assembly) and both Igbo and Yoruba ethnic leaders. This led to the formation
Oha- na-eze (People's Assembly). Although there were calls of the Committee for Unity and Understanding (CUU).
for Igbos to boycott the Constitutional Conference in Associated with this Committee were such names as the
deference to June 12, most of the political big-wigs opted for veteran politician and nationalist Mokwugo Okoye, Chief C.
participation and submitted an Igbo memorandum to the C. Onoh, former Governor of Anambra State, Major General
National Constitutional Conference Committee (NCCC). At (Retired) David Jemibewon, former military governor of Oyo
the end of a pre-conference seminar held in Enugu, Mkpoko State, Chief Bola Ige, former governor of Oyo State, Chief
Igbo resolved to end Igbo marginalization. It also suggested Michael Ajasin, former governor of Ondo State, among many
the continuation of Nigeria as a federal system, but to be others. But in 1992, as the Presidential election approached,
reorganized along a six-region structure, reduction of the the Babangida government banned the CUU because, as many
powers and responsibilities of the federal government, review Southerners believed, it posed a danger to the political
of revenue allocation in favour of derivation and the hegemony of the Hausa-Fulani. However, with later
restructuring of the armed forces into regional commands. developments in the transition process, notably the National
Supposedly, these are the areas that would hit the Constitutional Conference, attempts were made to revive the
Hausa- Fulani hardest. Those who attended the conference CUU. Other attempts were made to renew the trans -Niger
included Chief Ojukwu, veteran politician Sam Ikoku, Dr. handshake, such as the meetings sponsored by General
Alex Ekwueme and Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Ogoni rights Obasanjo, the former Head of State, and Chief Sam Mbakwe,
crusader and leader of the Movement for Survival of Ogoni former governor of Imo State. The strongest move in that
People (MOSOP). The same general tone characterized the direction, however, is the Southern Solidarity at the National
position of the minority ethnic groups, especially in the South: Constitutional Conference, which was able to force through
end to marginalization, revenue allocation based on deriv ation the principle of rotational Presidency against strong opposition
and an ethnic minority Presidency. by Northern delegates.
A sole agenda did not emerge from Northern or Hausa-Fulani In pursuing their objectives, the activities of pan -ethnic
ethic organizations. Its position tended to be reactive to those organizations and their targets vary with different phases of
of other ethnic organizations. The main reason for this appears the transition to democracy. At the pressure phase, their
to be the fluidity of the North as an ethno-geographical area. activities will be essentially that of sensitization and
Sometimes it is seen as conterminous with the former awareness cultivation, aimed at either pressuring the
Northern Region, which includes the entire Middle Belt. At authoritarian regime to democratize or to sustain the regime.
other times, it is used to refer to the old Northern Region but At the phase of formulating the transition programme,
excluding the Belt (See Figs. 2 and 3). Even more fluid is activities of ethnic organizations continue to emphasize
identification of Northerners with the North. Sometimes, sensitization of co-ethnics to the need to protect the interests
non-Hausa-Fulani ethnic organizations accept a one-North of the ethnic homeland. At the phase of implementing the
(the so-called Arewa) classification. But at other times, they programme, particularly during elections, their activities tend
are vehemently opposed to it. This appears to support Nnoli's to emphasize mobilization. The message is usually the need to
finding about the fluidity of ethnic boundaries and the vote solidly for the chosen party and candidates that will
instrumentalist role of ethnic identity by individuals.[60 ] Still, protect the interests of the ethnic group.
pan-ethnic organizations from the North, such as the so-called Concomitantly, the targets of their activities, that is the social
Kaduna Mafia, remain very active in the transition process, groups or political structures that form the focus of the
sometimes working for Northern solidarity and at other times pressure applied by ethnic organizations, also vary with
pursuing separate, ethnic-specific agendas. different phases of transition. Generally, their targets will
It seems clear to us that in line with the character of the post- include the following: (a) The government/ regime; (b) other
colonial state and the role of ethnicity in its politics, pan - ethno-political organizations; (c) pro-democracy
ethnic organizations are most active at the phases of transition organizations; (d) members of the constitutional conference;
to democracy involving power sharing. At such phases, the (e) co-ethnics in the ethnic homeland; (f) co-ethnics outside
attention of pan-ethnic organizations turns from the the ethnic homeland; (g) members of adjacent ethnic

homelands; (h) members of non-adjacent ethnic homelands; called on him to hand over to Abiola. At that point, the
(i) political parties and candidates for elections. These country was at the threshold of an ethnic civil war.
propositions are partly demonstrated by the character of party A critical factor that governs the interaction among pan-ethnic
support during the Presidential election of 1993. As Fig. 5 organizations in the transition process is the ethnic character
clearly shows, Hausa-Fulani North voted solidly for the NRC of the authoritarian regime, that is the ethnic group(s) from
and Bashir Tofa, while the Yoruba West voted massively for which the regime draws (or is perceived to draw) its major
Moshood Abiola. There is a strong suggestion therefore that officials and support. The battle line is most likely to be drawn
the candidates ventured into other ethnic homelands only between pan-ethnic organizations of the regime and those of
when they have consolidated their control of their ethnic the other ethnic groups, reflecting the inherent tendency for
bases. The slight discrepancy appears to be the victory of ethnic competition to be defined in terms of in-groups and out-
Abiola in Tofa's home State of Kano. However, Tofa's loss of groups. The aversion of a civil war over the annulment of the
Kano went side-by-side his almost total control of the Hausa- June 12 election is not unconnected with the inclusion of
Fulani States including Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina and Bauchi. many Yorubas, including number two man Diya, Ministers
Moreover, the radical politics of both Kano (and Jigawa) and Jakande, Onagoruwa, Awolowo, etc., in the Abacha regime.
Kaduna States is well-known. In fact, we can say that the Later changes in the ethnic composition of the regime, which
States voted for the ideological Left of Centre Social saw the exit of many Southerners, particularly Yorubas, led to
Democratic Party and not for Chief Abiola as a candidate. even greater anti-North cooperation among Southern ethnic
organizations and to what the North sees as a gang up
IV. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION A M ONG ETHNO - against it. Since Southerners see the North, in particular the
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS Hausa-Fulani, as having controlled successive military
An important consequence of the character of the Nigerian governments in the country, many leaders of ethnic
state is that politics is a primal, war-like exercise among organizations in the South saw the transition to democracy in
ethnic groups, using pan-ethnic organizations. The inability of Nigeria as entailing wresting power from the North/Hausa-
the state to build consensus and the pervasiveness of state Fulani.
violence and insecurity deepen the siege mentality among pan - Ending marginalization by the military, and by extension the
ethnic organizations. In fact, the language of their leaders has North, became the clarion call of ethno-political organizations
had a tendency to be bellicose. For example, in August 1994 in the South. Their goal, they claimed, was to end the
Mr. Forster Ogala representing Ekeremor, Sagbama and exclusion of co-ethnics and ethnic homeland(s) in the scheme
Southern Ijaw Local Government Areas of Rivers State in the of things in the country. To illustrate, the Eastern Mandate
National Constitutional Conference (NCC) organized by the Union claimed that its goal was to address the . . . perennial
Abacha government to draft a new constitution in 1994, issue of marginalization and the unjust character of the polity
warned that Ijaws, according to him the fourth largest ethnic which sets different standards for different peoples, depending
group in Nigeria, would go to war if their pleas for justice on their geo-political and ethno-cultural axis.[62 ] The same
went unheeded by the Federal Government.[61 ] In like manner, sentiment was expressed by Mkpoko Igbo (Igbo Assembly) in
the leaders of the oil-rich Ogoni communities in Rivers State the aftermath of the removal of Rear Admiral Allison
threatened to secede from the country on account of the Madueke as Chief of Naval Staff and member of the
exploitation and ecological damage that oil exploration has Provisional Ruling Council. He was, prior to his removal, the
visited on the ethnic group. And in the crisis that followed the only Igbo member of the Council. The Mkpoko Igbo regretted
annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election, which the marginalization of the Igbo, one of the three major
was won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola, a Yoruba, many leaders of ethnic groups in the country.
that ethnic group threatened to go to war if Chief Abiola was Obviously, for ethno-political organizations of the South
not allowed to exercise his mandate. Even the appointment of ending marginalization became the euphemism and metaphor
Chief Ernest Shonekan, also a Yoruba, as Head of an Interim for winning and sharing political power. It is interesting that
National Government (ING) in August, 1993 did not assuage marginalization is not posed as the marginalization of civil
the Yorubas. Their Leaders of Thought met in Ibadan on society by authoritarian military regimes. Instead, it is posed
August 31, 1993, declared the Shonekan government as the marginalization of ethnic groups. This is a clear
illegitimate and reaffirmed their support for the result of the evidence of the importance of ethnic organizations in the
June 12 Presidential election. Four days later, Egba national transition. In fact, the transition is only minimally seen as one
rulers met under the Chairmanship of the Olumo of Egbaland from the military to civilians, or from authoritarian rule to
(Traditional ruler of the Egba Yoruba) and called on democracy. Instead, it is seen predominantly as formulating
Shonekan, who incidentally is an Egba, to resign and hand new plans for sharing power among ethnic groups. Here the
over to Chief Abiola. Later in September, Chief Shonekan Presidency is the prized trophy. Often, the target of the
requested and got an audience with the Oba (traditional ruler) animosity is the North as a geo-political entity, and the Hausa-
of Lagos at which he canvassed the support of Yorubas for the Fulani as an ethnic group. They are accused of having
ING. The Oba did not as much as give a reply to Shonekan's dominated the country politically for a very long time, and of
address. Instead he handed him a written reply in which he being unwilling to give others a go. Thus, of the twenty -nine
pan-ethnic organizations we have identified (Table 1), twenty-

six claimed to oppose the political domination of the Hausa- former Representative at the United Nations and a prominent
Fulani. It is usually argued that of ten Heads of State and Hausa-Fulani leader, provides a rather curious theory of the
Government that the country has had since independence, perceived Hausa-Fulani domination of Nigerian politics.
seven are Northerners, five of them coming from the Hausa- According to him, God, by a supreme design gave the Hausa-
Fulani ethnic group. That ethnic group as a collective is said to Fulani the gift of leadership; the Yorubaman diplomacy and
have been at the apex of political power for about twenty-two the Igboman trade.[64 ] Another Northern leader, Ango
of the country's 35 years of independence. Still, they hold Abdullahi, a Professor and former Vice-Chancellor of
tenaciously on power as shown by the annulment of the June Ahmadu Bello University, attributed the North's domination
12 Presidential election won by a non-Hausa-Fulani. to its numerical strength and countered calls on the North to
Other evidence put forward by politicians from the South to relinquish power by arguing that Northerners whose only
buttress their claim of Northern/Hausa-Fulani domination remaining asset is their numerical abundance are being
included the character of the military regimes organizing the blackmailed to accept political arrangements which would
transitions (Appendix 1). Nigerians from outside the North further weaken their relevance in their own country and their
believe that the North too visibly dominates these regimes. own territories. This obviously should not be acceptable.[65 ]
For instance, in April, 1996, over two hundred Northerners The ethnic domination thesis, which is generally subs cribed to
were said to be in very top positions in the military regime, by pan-ethnic organizations, culminated in the decision of the
including Directors General, Managing Directors of Federal National Constitutional Conference to enshrine the principle
parastatals, Ministers, senior military commanders and the that the Presidency would rotate between the North and South
Head of State himself. In addition, even in the emergent in the new Constitution after an acrimonious debate that
political parties during the long process of transition that pitched the North against the South. The initial proposal,
began in 1986, the North has always sought to corner the sponsored by Southern Delegates to the Constitutional
crucial positions. Most of the frontrunners in the Presidential Conference, notably Dr. Alex Ekwueme, former Vice-
election primaries that was nullified by Babangida in 1992 President to Shehu Shagari, was to divide the country into six
were Northerners/Hausa-Fulani. They include Umaru ethno-geographical zones, and for the Presidency to move
Shinkafi, Adamu Ciroma, Shehu Yar'adua, Jerry Gana and around among them.
Mahmood Tukur. As if to confirm these claims, of the five Apparently bowing to ethno-political pressures, General Sani
political parties recognized by the Abacha government on Abacha in his Independence Day speech on October 1, 1995,
September 30, 1996, three are led by Northerners. They are accepted the principle of rotation for not only the Presidency
the United Nigerian Congress Party (Isa Mohammed), but also five other national offices namely, Vice-President,
Democratic Party of Nigeria (Sule Ahmed) and Grass Roots Prime Minister, Deputy-Prime Minister, Senate President and
Democratic Movement (Gambo Lawan). The other two Speaker of the House of Representatives. The country has also
parties, the Committee for National Consensus and the been divided into six zones for that purpose to wit, North East,
National Centre Party of Nigeria are led by elements from North West, Middle Belt, South West, South East and
Southern minority ethnic groups, namely Dr. Abel Ubeku and Southern Minorities. The issue however remains which zone
Chief Don Etiebet respectively. should be the first to produce the president. This sentiment,
However, the other ethnic groups are far from agreed on which was relatively subdued during the Presidential elections
which should take over from the Hausa-Fulani. Consequently, of 1993 because of disagreements between the Igbos and
Chief Emeka Ojukwu, ex-leader of the Biafran secession Yorubas in the SDP over the Abiola ticket, became very
attempt (1967-1970), argued that it was the turn of the East to strong in the aftermath of the annulment of the Abiola victory.
produce a President because both the North and West have That singular act of annulment by the Babangida regime had
had their fair shares of the nation's Presidency and it was just convinced many Southerners, including Igbos, that ending
fair that the East should be allowed to produce the next authoritarian rule must necessarily involve wresting power
President. On their part, the Southern minorities, an ethno - from the North. The feeling was that Abiola, a Yoruba
geographic group recently reinvented from the Willink Moslem with strong, long-lasting business and political ties
Commission's Special Development Areas, think that it is time with the North, was denied victory simply because he was not
for them to wrest power from the three major ethnic groups. from the North. At least this is what many southern ethno-
But, in the southeast the group is split on how to relate to the political leaders made their co-ethnic believe. Still, what
Igbo. While the Akobo-led group wants nothing to do with the remained unclear was whether Babangida was pursuing a
Igbo, the Lulu Briggs Group thought otherwise. According to North/Hausa-Fulani agenda or a Babangida one. This is even
Briggs, the (civil) war came, we thought the Igbo were ou r more important when we remember that Babangida also
mortal enemies. We have now seen the Hausa-Fulani and the disqualified a number of Northern/Hausa-Fulani Presidential
Yoruba and we now know the difference.[63 ] On their part, candidates who were poised to secure the nominations of both
many Yorubas insist that nothing else is feasible until Chief the SDP and NRC in 1992. Also, pleas from many eminent
Abiola is allowed to exercise his June 12 mandate. Northern leaders for Abiola to be sworn in as President at the
Hausa-Fulani leaders rationalize their political dominance as height of the June, 12 crisis fell on deaf ears in Aso Rock.
necessary to balance the domination of the economy and There is a second factor that intervenes to determine the
bureaucracy by the South. Alhaji Maitama Sule, Nigeria's character of alliances and counter alliances among ethno -

political organizations, especially in the phases of formulation Perhaps, it also explains the crosscutting ethnic membership
and implementation of the transition programme. That is the of many political parties in the transition process. For
history of inter-ethnic relations in the country.[66 ] This means instance, notwithstanding that many Nigerians perceived the
that past interaction among ethnic groups determines whether NRC to be a predominantly Hausa-Fulani party, the party
the relation between ethno- political organizations in the on- counted many Southerners, including the party chairman,
going transition will be marked by cooperation or conflict. A Chief Tom Ikimi, among its fold. The same was true of the
relationship of conflict and/or suspicion is likely to arise if in SDP, which was perceived as having a strong southern
the past conflict among two ethnic groups crossed a threshold inclination. There, Babagana Kingibe, a Northerner, though
of irreversibility.[67 ] For instance, the threshold was crossed in not of the Hausa-Fulani stock, was so important that within a
Igbo-Yoruba relations in 1941 over the crisis in the Nigerian space of one year he progressed from party chairman to a
Youth Movement (NYM) involving Nnamdi Azikiwe, presidential candidate, and having been defeated in the
Obafemi Awolowo, Ernest Ikoli and Akinsanya. Akinsanya, primaries, was still able to become Chief Abiolas running
an Ijebu-Yoruba backed by Azikiwe and Igbos, lost out in a mate.
power struggle to get on the Governors Executive Council to Since it is in elections that power sharing is settled in the
Ernest Ikoli, an Ijaw supported by Awolowo and other transition process, ethnic organizations see elections as
Yorubas.[68 ] principal to the survival of the ethnic group. It is important
The relationship between Igbo and Yoruba ethno -political that candidates sponsored by ethnic organization s garner as
organizations in the transition process clearly demonstrates many votes as possible in the ethnic homeland. This not only
this point. In spite of calls for a common agenda in the spirit ensures the solidarity of the ethnic group, it is also important
of the handshake across the Niger, there is still a strong in post-election struggles for power and spoils within the
mutual suspicion between them. Indeed, there is an Igbo party. It is not therefore surprising that ethnic bloc voting
saying that when a handshake gets to the elbow, it becomes a appears to persist in Nigeria's transitional elections. During the
wrestling match. And so it did. When it came to sharing Babangida transition programme (1986-93), in spite of the
offices on the Abiola ticket, the trans -Niger handshake turned two-party system ethnic voting was still clearly discernible.
into a wrestling match for spoils of office. Thus, some Igbo For instance, Hausa-Fulani States tended to support Bashir
leaders, notably Chief Emeka Ojukwu and Chief Arthur Tofa in the Presidential election of 1993, while Yoruba States
Nzeribe, both Social Democratic Party (SDP) members during supported Abiola en bloc. Of eight Hausa-Fulani States, Tofa
Babangida's botched transition programme, withdrew their came first in 5 (62.5%), while Abiola was first in three. In the
support for Abiola's candidacy in the run up to the 1993 Yoruba States, Abiola came out tops in all five States. On the
Presidential election, ostensibly because Abiola did not choose other hand, both the Northern and Southern minorities where
an Igbo as his running mate. They criticized the Abiola- mainly in support of the SDP, though support for the party
Kingibe ticket as Moslem-Moslem, and urged Igbos to support was stronger among the minorities of the North. The Igbos,
Alhaji Tofa who chose an Igbo, Sylvester Ugoh, to be his the only one of the three major ethnic group that had no
Vice-Presidential candidate. Chief Abiola tried to mollify this Presidential candidate, were mainly in support of the NRC
sentiment by his promise to appoint an Igbo to the post of which chose an Igbo, Dr. Sylvester Ugoh, as its Vice-
Secretary to Government of the Federation, should he be Presidential candidate.
elected President. But Chief Ojukwu mocked this by saying
V. CONCLUSIONS
that a Secretary is one who serves tea at meetings. More
To summarize, this paper has argued a number of points about
recently at the pre-NCC seminar organized by Mkpoko Igbo
the role of pan-ethnic organizations in the recent transition to
in March, 1994, the Izu Umunna (Kindred Meeting), one of
democracy in Nigeria. First, the post-colonial character of the
the organizations affiliated to Mkpoko Igbo, circulated a
Nigerian state and the centrality of ethnicity to this state
document titled What Ndigbo must know about Southern
explain the prominence of pan-ethnic organizations in
Solidarity and a United Nigeria. In it they dismissed the idea
transition to democracy in Nigeria. Second, in Nigeria's
of southern solidarity, arguing that the Yorubas have always
transition to democracy, pan-ethnic organizations were most
betrayed the Igbos. It continued: While Ndigbo studiously
active at the stages involving the power distribution. That
laboured to build this country, the Yorubas like termites
means the stages of drawing up and implementing the
secretly, silently and consis tently at the foundation of this
transition programme. Third, because the Hausa-Fulani of the
country, (sic) claimed Igbo prizes under southern
North are perceived to be the ethnic group of the military
solidarity.[69 ]
regime in power, and by extension beneficiaries of power,
However, the history of inter-ethnic relations between the two
alliances tend to be formed between pan-ethnic organizations
ethnic groups is less important than the need to wrest power
of the Yoruba and Igbo against them, notwithstanding the
from the North and to retain same. In other words, it is a
problematic history of relations between the Yoruba and Igbo.
movement's assessment of its chances in the power play,
Finally, behind the front of solidarity and common interests of
rather than fixed notions of its relationship with other ethnic
the ethnic homeland that Nigerian pan-ethnic organizations
groups and their organizations, that is determinant. This
put up, class and personal political calculations are central to
probably explains the strong solidarity between Yoru bas and
their raison d'etre.
Igbos at the National Constitutional Conference (NCC).

In conclusion, pan-ethnic organizations as they operated in is suggested is that the dominant form of their struggle is the
Nigeria's transition distorted the democratization process, and pursuit of the interests of ethnic leaders, deflected as the
this effect is still being felt in the persistence of ethnic general interests of the ethnic homeland. In the final analysis,
alliances and agitations against ethnic marginalization. By what we call for are two fold. First, there is need for a clear-
professing and pursuing the bogus interests of ethnic groups, cut ethnic policy for Nigeria based on equity and equality of
they mask the personal interests of their leaders and distort the ethnic groups. And second, there is need to address and
profoundly exploitative character of social relations in redress class inequalities across ethnic boundaries. These are
Nigeria, not only among ethnic groups but also among classes. the fundamentals of true democratization in a multiethnic
This is not to suggest that the struggle of pan -ethnic society like Nigeria.
organizations is always devoid of social justice. Rather, what
Appendix
Northerners holding prominent positions in the Abacha government, April, 1996
NAME POSITION
General Sani Abacha (Kano) Head of State, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and
Defence Minister (Northerners have been occupying this post from
Ribadu to Abacha)
Maj. Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar (Niger) Chief of Defence Staff
Maj. Gen. Alwali Kazir (Borno) Chief of Army Staff
Vice-Marshal Femi John Femi (Kogi) Chief of Air Staff
Ibrahim Coomasie (Katsina) Inspector General of Police
Justice Muhammadu Uwais (Kaduna) Chief Justice of Nigeria
Justice Babatunde Belgore (Kwara) Chief Judge of the Federal High Court
Muktar Mohammed Dodo Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court
Dr. A. Yadudu (Kano) Special Adviser to the Head of State on legal matters
Adamu Mohammed (Bauchi) Special Adviser on Drugs and Fraud Control
Babagana Kingibe (Borno) Minister of Internal Affairs
Ismaila Gwarzo (Kano) National Security Adviser
Zakar Ibrahim (Katsina) Director-General, National Intelligence Agency (NIA)
Air Vice-Marshal Idi Musa Director-General, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Brig. Gen. Ahmed Abdullahi (Kano) General Officer Commanding 1st Mechanized Division, Nigerian
Army, Kaduna
Col. M.B. Kwuembe (Benue) Principal Staff Officer to the Head of State
Col. A.M. Jibrin Aide de Camp (ADC) to the Head of State
Maj. Hamza M. Mustapha (Borno) Chief Security Officer to the Head of State
Dr. Sadiqque Wali Personal Physician to the Head of State
Maj. Gen. L.A. Onoja (Benue) General Officer Commanding 3rd Amoured Division
Brig. Gen. S.V.L. Malu General Officer Commanding 82 Division, Enugu (now
Commander of ECOMOG Forces in Liberia)
Col. Ibrahim Sabo Director of Military Intellegence
David Attah (Benue) Chief Press Secretary to the Head of State
Hajiya Maryam Abacha (Kano) Head of the Family Support Programme (FSP)
Nuhu Aliyu Deputy Inspector General of Police Operations
Umar Faruk Abdullahi Head of Corporate Affairs Commission
Gidado Idris (Kaduna) Secretary to the Government of the Federation
Dr. Hamza Zayyad (Katsina) Chief Executive, Bureau of Public Enterprises
Shaibu Kazaure Head of Public Service Commission
Lt. Gen. Mohammed Haladu (Kano) Minister of Industries
Hassan Adamu (Adamawa) President, Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN)
Kabir Chafe Minister of State for Petroleum Resources
Dalhatu Bayero (Kano) Group Managing Director, Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC)
Kashim Hashim (Kano) Director-General, Ministry of Petroleum Resources
Yusuf Ali Managing Director, UNIPETROL (a petroleum company)
Abba Gana (Borno) Managing Director, African Petroleum (former British Petroleum)

Gen. Yakubu Gowon (Plateau) Chairman, National Oil Company (Nolchem)
Mainasara Sada Director-General, Federal Ministry of Finance
Uba Ahmed (Bauchi) Minister of Labour
Ahmed Gusau (Sokoto) Sole Administrator, Nigeria Labour Congress
Dr. Mohammed Abba Ayi Managing Director, National Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF)
Sahabu Dange Comptroller General, Immigration Service
Garba Abass Comptroller General, Prisons Service
Brig. Gen. Sam Ango Sole Administrator, Customs Service
Musa Umar Area Comptroller of Customs, Idiroko Border Post in Ogun State
Abubakar Nasiru Comptroller of Customs, Tin Can Island Port (Nigeria's largest
Port)
Mohammed Abubakar Police Area Commander, Murtala Mohammed International Airport
(Nigeria's largest airport)
Group Captain Ibrahim Kefas (Taraba) Military Administrator, Delta State
Air Vice-Marshal G.Y. Kontagora Air Officer Commanding, Training Command
(Niger)
Air Vice-Marshal A. Daggash Commandant, Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA)
Maj. Gen. T.M. Shelpidi (Bauchi) Defence Headquarders Representative on the Provisional Ruling
Council (PRC)
Col. Dauda Komo Military Administrator, Rivers State
Col. Yakubu Bako Military Administrator, Akwa-Ibom State
Col. Ahmed A. Usman Military Administrator of Ondo State
Col. A. Muazu Military Administrator, Sokoto State
Col. M. Attah Military Administrator, Anambra State
** The Military Administrators of all oil producing States are
Northerners. The Police Commiss ioners of Lagos, Ogun, Delta,
Anambra, Rivers, Ondo and Akwa-Ibom States are Northerners for
strategic reasons
Maj. Gen. Musa Bamaiyi (Kebbi) Chief Executive Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency
(NDLEA)
Maj. Gen. Ishaya Bamaiyi (Kebbi) Commandant, Lagos Garrison Command
Prof. Ignatius Ayua (Benue) Director-General, Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies
Mohammed Gambo Jimeta Minister of Agriculture
Maj. Gen. Muhamadu Buhari Chief Executive, Petroleum Trust Fund
Dr. Mohammed Liman Minister of Education
Lt. Gen. J. Useni Minister, Federal Capital Territory
Maj. Gen. A.K. Adisa (Kwara) Minister of Works and Housing
Hamza Ibrahim Minister of Power and Steel
Kaloma Ali Minister of Solid Minerals
Jidith Attah Minister of Women Affairs
Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Gumel (Jigawa) Minister of Transport
Rilwanu Lukman (Kaduna) Secretary General, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC)
Source: The News, 8th April, 1996
Background to Nationalism, Berkeley: University of California Press;

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T imes Publications, p. 20. [26] Parenti, 1967, op. cit.
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P. (eds) (1986) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore: John C. Rosberg (eds) Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical
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(1993) Reflections on African Politics: Prospero, Ariel and Caliban, Muller, p. 87.
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Professor Okwudiba Nnoli, Nsukka, University of Nigeria (11 April). [37] Carmichael, S. and Hamilton, C. (1968) Black Power,
[9] Modelski, G. (1992) Democratization, in M. Hawkesworth and M. Hammondsworth, England: Penguin Books.
Kogan (eds) Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, Vol. 2, London: [38] Nnoli, 1978, op. cit., pp. 72; and Furnivall, J.S. (1942) Colonial Policy
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Democracy in America, ed. J.P. Meyer, NY: Anchor Books/Doubleday. 116.
[10] Anyang' Nyong'o, P. (ed) (1988) Popular Struggles for Democracy in [41] Coleman (1958) and Sklar (1963)
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[11] Nnoli, O. (1992) Reflections on Ethnicity and Multiparty Democracy 93.
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[13] Coleman, 1958, op cit.; Okafor, 1981, op cit; and Nnoli, 1978, op cit. [46] Duverger, M. (1964) Political Parties, 3/e London: Methuen.
[14] Perham, M. (1937) Native Administration in Nigeria, London: Oxford [47] Cited in Gonidec, P. (1981) African Politics, T he Hague: Martinus
University Press; Green, M. M. (1948) Ibo Village Affairs, London: Nijhoff.
Sidgwick and Jackson; Smith, M. G. (1965) T he Hausa of Northern [48] Ibid, p. 187.
Nigeria, in J. L. Gibbs (ed) People of Africa, NY: Holt, Rinehart and [49] Ake, 1985a, op. cit.; 1985b, op. cit.
Winston; Smith, M. G. (1960) Government in Zazzau, London: Oxford [50] Ibeanu, 1993, op. cit., p. 129
University Press; Meek, C. K. (1937) Law and Authority in a Nigerian [51] Zolberg, A. (1985) T he Formation of New States as a Refugee-
Tribe, London: Oxford University Press; Lloyd, P.C. (1960) Sacred Generating Process, in E. Ferris (ed) Refugees and World Politics, NY:
Kingship and Government Among the Yoruba, Africa, Vol. 30; Lloyd, Preager; and Ibeanu, 1993, op. cit.
P.C. (1965) T he Yoruba of Nigeria, in J. L. Gibbs (ed) People of [52] Ibeanu, ibid.
Africa, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston; and Forde, D. and Jones, G. I. [53] Nnoli, 1995a, op. cit.
(1950) The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples of Southeastern Nigeria, [54] Ibid.
London: International African Institute. [55] Nnoli, 1992, op. cit.; 1995a, op. cit.
[15] Perham, 1937, ibid [56] Sklar, 1963, op. cit., p. 65
[16] Lugard, F. (1929) The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 4th [57] Babangida, I. (1989) The Dawn of a New Socio-political Order: an
ed. London: William Blackwood. address to the nation on the occasion of the registration of two political
[17] Nnoli, O. (1995b) Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria, Aldershot, parties, Lagos: Federal Government Printer, p. 5.
England: UNRISD and Avebury, pp. 45 47. [58] Nnoli, op. cit., 1995.
[18] Awolowo, O. (1947) Path to Nigerian Freedom , London: Faber; [59] Daily T imes Newspaper, 28th April 1994.
LeVine, R. (1971) Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in [60] Nnoli, op. cit., 1995.
Nigeria, in R. Melson and H. Wolpe (eds) Nigeria: Modernization and [61] Sunday Star, Newspaper, 7th August 1994.
the Politics of Communalism , Michigan: Michigan State University; [62] Guardian Newspaper, 30th May 1994.
Coleman, 1958, op cit; and Sklar, 1960, op cit. [63] Newswatch Magazine 28th February 1994.
[19] Melson, R. and Wolpe, H. (1971) Modernization and the Politics of [64] City News, Magazine 10th December 1993.
Communalism, in R. Melson and H. Wolpe (eds) Nigeria: [65] National Concord Newspaper 15th February 1994.
Modernization and the Politics of Communalism , Michigan: Michigan [66] Nnoli, 1992, op. cit.
State University, p. 1. [67] Nnoli, 1995, op. cit., pp. 26 -27)
[20] Ibid, p. 5. [68] Nnoli, 1995, op. cit., pp. 28-29; Coleman, 1958, op. cit., p. 227.
[21] Smock, D. and Smock, A. (1975) The Politics of Pluralism: A [69] T he News Magazine 4th April 1994.
Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana , NY: Elsevier.
[22] Doornbos, M. (1982) Ugandan Society and Politics: A Background',
in G.N. Uzoigwe (ed) Uganda: The Dilemma of Nationhood, NY: NOK.

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International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS Vol:12 No:06 5

Tribe and Transition in Nigeria: The Role of

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Background to Nationalism, Berkeley: University of California Press;

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