Afghanistan Drawdown:Implications on US and Pakistan and way fwd

Updated from Press Review and article

The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan describes the planned draw down of
United States Armed Forces in the Afghanistan. This effects the regional security having
impact on Pakistan and Afghanistan. There is a need to evaluate the pro and cons with
the requirement for objective input by both the ctys overlooked/facilitated by US and
China in order to improve the regional security and ward off any threats from ISIS
eruption.
Implications on US and Pakistan
Aside from the humanitarian implications of a precipitous U.S. withdrawal, the United
States has three important national interests at stake in the country.
1. First, Afghanistan possesses bases that are critical to U.S counterterrorism
operations. Although the United States could launch these operations from
alternative sites, the alternatives come with substantial drawbacks that would
severely hinder U.S. intelligence and military activities.
2. Second, a reasonably stable Afghanistan is important for Pakistans
stability. Pakistani officials worry that Afghanistan will increasingly be used as a
sanctuary for militants fighting the Pakistani state, and they worry that a
collapsing Afghanistan would unleash a wave of refugees that would
further destabilize the region.
3. Finally,Afghanistan represents a critical investment for the NATO alliance.
Abandoning Afghanistan would weaken NATOs reputation for resolve. None of
these interests is critical, which means an open-ended commitment to
Afghanistan is inadvisable.
But all three are important and warrant acontinued investment in Afghanistans
stability.

Positive indicators/Optimist apch

The Afghan political system may beflawed, but it has absorbed many struggles
for powerones that in a previous era would have been settled by violence. The
establishment of the Ghani-Abdullah unity government is a premierexample
of Afghan politicians reaching across ethnic and factional divides to achieve
consensus.

Furthermore, neither the government nor the Taliban have cast the conflict
as an ethnic or sectarian war, and both have generally refrained from engaging
in indiscriminate attacks , thoughtthat may change if militants affiliated with the
Islamic State gain ground. For now, the tradition of pragmatism in Afghan politics,
the current governments broad support base, and a relative absence of
communal violence all help prevent the conflict from escalating, and could
eventually ease acceptance of a negotiated settlement.
Negatives
The odds of the Afghan government actually winning an outright military
victory are remote, notbecause military victories in insurgencies are never
possible, but because this particulargovernment is too weak to do so.
In the coming years, as the U.S. drawdown proceeds, the ANSF is likely to lose
control of several peripheral areas such as portions of Zabul, Helmand, or
Kunar provinces.
Low state capacity and a mix of autocratic and weak democratic
institutions.(According to RAND research). Not likely even in continued
international assistance.

The chances for a peace deal are poor in the short to medium term.

Violence has increased as the U.S. withdrawal has proceeded, with civilian
deaths increasing from the rate of approximately 3,000 per year (the average
from 2010 to 2013) to approximately 3,700 in 2014.

Negotiated settlements typically require two preconditions:

1. Agreement between the warring parties on the balance of power between
them.
2. Mechanisms to ensure all parties to a peace deal live up to their
commitments.

Neither of these conditions is present in Afghanistanbecoz.

1. No one is certain how the ANSF will perform as the U.S. and international
drawdown proceeds. The Taliban and other militants will likely want to test the
Afghan government, probing to see if it will collapse or at least weaken
enough to improve the insurgents negotiating position.
2. The government in Kabul has yet to demonstrate its ability to commit to
political compromises. Example: Karzais governmentcredibility badly damaged
in the years after U.S. invasion on exploitation efforts. (The new administration
led by President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah will need to
demonstrate an ability to commit tocompromises with dissident groupsa
reputation that can normally only be earned over timebefore a peace deal
can be reached).

Way Fwd for US

1. The US/international partners must prevent the collapse of the ANSF or the
loss of truly crucial cities or lines of communication.
2. Ltd airstrikes and presence of advisory staff.
3. Sufficient intldevasst be maint to prevent a fiscal crisis or rapid economic
contraction.(rather than spendingonforeign contractors) This should help to
make a reduced aid allocation go farther.
 4. Con corruption and prevent backtracking on political power-sharing
arrangements thus encouraging outreach to critical leaders, armed opposition
and populations that have largely been left out of political life.

5. If neither victory nor a political settlement are likely in the short term, and if
completewithdrawal is unpalatable, then the United States must ensure that its
support of Afghanistan remains politically sustainable.The United States is
currently deploying over 3,000 military personnel in Iraq to perform a similar
mission as the one envisioned here for Afghanistan.

Stephen Watts
Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation
Sean Mann
Research Assistant, RAND Corporation

Extracts from days to Kandahar

1. CIA covert op instlKarzais regime.

2. CIAs negotiation with Mullah Omer and former Taliban dy foreign minister Mullah Jalil.
Comm with sat phones also.
3. Fear of Afgh pub backlash in handing over top Al qaedaldr.
4. The fighters melted away in pop and took sanctuaries across border in Pakistan with
pakhtunbrethren.most of the ldr survived the offn and moved to pak.
5. It took 2 yrsfr Taliban ldrship to recover and rebuild its structure. In june 2003 10
member ldrshipshura council was formed an dgivenresp to formulate a political
and mil strat for resistence, hence 2003-2005 was the turingpt for consolidation
and incactivities.This resurgence aided by strat mistake made by US was
reempower warlords/former strong men which

Pak Afgh Talks

America is encouraging Pakistan and China to sppresGhanis reconciliation efforts.

Obamas spec envoy ,Daniel F Feldmanheld important talks on visit to Isb. Efforts
being made to hold them in Kabul (other venus proposed- Isb, Dubai and Beijing) to
show that process is afghan-led and afg owned.
First rd focused on striking a deal for cease fire.
Pak Afg agreed to set up jt committee to work out mech for documentation of
unregistered Afg nationals inside Pakistan.
Taliban likely demands on peace talks
1. Imedwdr of all foreign forces.
2. Release of all Taliban prisoners.
3. Anticipated demand for harsh sharia law implementation will be outrightly denied
by Ghanis govt.

Under prevailent conditions

Pakistan shift in state policy towards militancy after school attack. No distinction
between good and bad Taliban.

Key Issues
Border mgmt..2 official xingpts and plenty informal ones.
Abetting each othersTs. Going after Haqqani network.Mistrust. (not updated)

Way fwd for Pakistan

a. Pakistan to have a sound Afg policy.
b. Taliban, irrespective of their different names, follow the same extremist
ideology.
c. Not to sp Taliban way of govtinAfgjust like in Pakistan opposes the same for
own cty.
d. A beningn policy towardsAfg like china towards pak.
e. Befriend Afg and not befriend certain gps.
f. American wdr, Chinese assertiveness, growing tension b/w sunni shia sects in
middle east and rise of Islamic state has created a need for strong multi hub
state.Kabul and Isbmust work to provide it.
g. Address the poor security situation in both ctys with a plan fol a timeline.
h. A starting pt can be appt of non-contravesial Taliban ldrs as provincial
governors an also giving them compatible ministerial appts.
i. Taliban to be encouraged to incoop flex in their rigid stance of constitution
and wdr of forces as a pre requsite for talks.
j. Time is ripe for mob robust guarantors, China is emerging to be one.
k. Afg apch toward rights of Pashtuns should not be dictated on Pakistan.
l. Policy on only restricting Indias apchin Afg is a neg apch which will only limit
Isbs options and creates terrible backlash in terms of hatred, bordering on
hostility.
m. Pak to keep options open for enlarging with inclusion of ctys such as Iran and
Turkey for obvious approval at regional level and improving intl sp.
n. A change in the sys of governance is needed, instead of shuffling ministeries.
o. To nurture the process, the Obama adm will have to alter a pol motivated
calendar for pull out from Afg which still has a long and hard road ahead.
Doha talks (facilitated by Canadian non govt forum Pugwash
Presence of US forces in Afgneg impact on talks.
Taliban demands-US forces wdr.Sanctions hurdles for peace talks.
20 member delegation afg govt (High Peace Counsel)
2 member team hizb e islami(gulbudin hikmatyar) also attended. 2nd largest
resistence gp after Taliban.also attended the talks.
Significant dev as Taliban had prev refused for intr afghan dialogue.

Talks
Both ctys agreed to eradicate the sanctuaries and start a coord effort across
both sides of Durand Line.
 Chudhry termed Afg transit trade through Pakistan as an obligation rather than a
favor.Peshawar-Kabul motorway and to complete the dev projects worth 500 mln
USD donated by Pakistan.
DG ISI and DG NDS signed MOU to ensure border security.
Talks in May (PM visit to Afg)
Three principles outlined by PM on recent May 12 visit to afg.
o We will Strictly adhere to the policy of non-interference.
o We will not allow respective territories to be used against the other.
o Afg enemies will be treated as Pak enemies and vice versa.
Ecoconnectivity in the heart of Asia region was discussed as a top priority for
regional prosperity and long term stability and security. Projs to be incooperated.
Afghan govt has taken positive steps to reverse the India Only apch
forgetting mil eqpt and training of AFNS personnel. (our demand)
Pakf is spafg peace process by facilitating Afg and resistant gps peace talks.

Latest
Pakistan denounced pub Spring Offn and urged to sieze hostilities and start
peace negotiations with afg govt.
ISIS factor worries Taliban because it would be at the cost of Taliban.
Last two rds held in Norway and China.
US and China participation added significance (China has eco sig in Afg
stability). + also wants to protect its investments in copper mining in Logar
province and oil/gas in northern afg.
Taliban demnands: release of prisoners from Guantanamao bay and
scrapping of black list that bans the ldr from movement.Vac of all mil bases
currently in con of US forces.
Heart of Asia process sch in Dec Islamabad.
Karzai trying to reset power calculus by posn himself as savior of the cty
appointed by Loya Jirga.
Taliban internal differences and growing sp among afg militants for self styles
IS and daesh affects their bargaining posn.IS, IMU and ETIM making
inroads
The real en of peace talks lies in the divisions with in Taliban.
The difference b/w Pol Wing of Taliban and b fd comds is more and more
visible.
Recent announcement by Hizb-i-islami Afg head Gulbudin Hikmatyar
announced his sp to IS .It appears that he didnt get the desired posn in Taliban-
led negotiation team.
Pakistan facing prob in using influence on Quetta Shoura due to their internal
difference aming Taliban comds.