[G.R. Nos. 112429-30. July 23, 1997.
] SYLLABUS
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. MICHAEL NUEZ y
SEVILLA, Accused, RODOLFO CAYETANO y
PANGILINAN, Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Roberto B. Salcedo for Accused-Appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Accused-appellant Rodolfo Cayetano, together with
his co-accused Michael Nuez and Ismael Santos
were charged with the crimes of kidnapping for
ransom and kidnapping with Murder in the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon. During the trial, Accused-
appellant denied the accusation against him and
claimed that he is an imbecile and possesses a very
low level of intelligence. In proving this, he cited his
act of cutting grass when he should be guarding his
victim. In addition, Accused-appellant averred that his
co-accused Nuez poked a gun at and threatened him
with death if he will not follow orders. The lower
court, in a joint decision, convicted both accused and
accused-appellant of Kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced both to reclusion perpetua. Both were also
found to have committed the complex crime of
Kidnapping with Murder and sentenced each to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Supreme Court held that the defense counsels
attribution of imbecility is not supported by evidence.
Accused-appellants act of cutting grass rather than
guarding his victim could hardly be indicative of
imbecility. Rather, it may be considered as negligence
but definitely not childishness or even that of one
completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will. Moreover, assuming arguendo
that accused-appellant is an imbecile or a
feebleminded person, it will not exonerate him
because feeblemindedness is not exempting. Anent
the other issue, the Court held that his allegation of
fear or duress is incredible because assuming that
accused-appellant was forced to do what he did on
account of fear due to the threat made by his co-
accused, testimonial evidence show that he had at
least four opportunities to escape and yet, he had not
taken advantage of any of these. In view of this, the
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
to defend himself in equal combat, testimonial
1. CRIMINAL LAW; REVISED PENAL CODE; EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCES; IMBECILITY, MEANING OF.
Imbecility, one of the exempting circumstances under
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, is defined as
feeblemindedness or a mental condition approaching
that of one who is insane. It is analogous to
childishness and dotage. An imbecile, within the
meaning of Article 12, is one who must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of
will at the time of committing the crime. He is one
who, while advanced in age, has a mental
development comparable to that of children between
two and seven years of age.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACT OF ACCUSED INDICATIVE OF
NEGLIGENCE, NOT IMBECILITY, IN CASE AT BAR.
Accused-appellants act of cutting grass rather than
guarding his victim could hardly be indicative of
imbecility. Rather, it may be considered as negligence
but definitely not childishness or even that of one
completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will. In fact, Accused-appellant
admitted on cross-examination that he can tell what
is right and what is wrong. Assuming arguendo that
accused-appellant is an imbecile or a feebleminded
person, in the case of People v. Formigones, it was
held that feeblemindedness is not exempting,
because the offender could distinguish right from
wrong. An imbecile or an insane cannot. In any case,
Article 800 of the Civil Code provides that "the law
presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary." The allegation of
insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved.
Moreover, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary.
It is improper to presume that acts were executed
unconsciously."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTING ON ACCOUNT OF FEAR,
DURESS OR INTIMIDATION; NOT CREDIBLE WHERE
ACCUSED HAD FOUR CHANCES OF ESCAPE; CASE AT
BAR. Neither will this Court subscribe to accused-
appellants third submission that he was prompted to
act the way he did due to uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury. Accused-appellants claim that
accused Nuez poked a gun at him and threatened
him with death is belied by testimonial evidence.
Granting that accused-appellant was forced to do
what he did on account of fear, duress or intimidation
such that he could not possibly have any opportunity
evidence show that he had at least four opportunities
to escape. The first was when accused Nuez
allegedly brought the two victims to the river while he
remained on the rice paddy. The second was when
accused Nuez and the victim Joseph Rivera were
sleeping in the nipa hut. The third was when accused
Nuez asked him to look for the necklace of Neil
Patrick Quillosa on the river bank while the former
was in the nipa hut together with the victim Joseph
Rivera. The fourth was when accused Nuez left him
and the victim the following morning to deliver the
taped or recorded ransom demand to the victims
family. Accused-appellant could have easily taken
advantage of any of these opportunities considering
that only accused Nuez threatened him. By not
availing of these chances to escape, his allegation of
fear or duress becomes incredible under the
circumstances.
4. ID.; ID.; CONSPIRACY; ACTS OF ACCUSED SHOW
PRESENCE OF CONSPIRACY; CASE AT BAR.
Accused-appellants knowledge of what is right or
wrong, as well as his failure to escape bolsters the
prosecutions evidence that he conspired with
accused Nuez to commit the crimes being charged
against them, contrary to the formers second
submission. The records show the presence of
conspiracy. First, when accused-appellant arrived at
the hut where the victims were being held, the first
thing he did was to check if the victims were securely
tied. Second, Accused-appellant carried the victim
Neil Patrick Quillosa to the river. Third, Accused-
appellant kicked the victim Joseph Rivera when the
latter was ordered to go to the river. It may be
deduced from those acts by accused-appellant that
he conspired with accused Nuez to commit the
crimes. While it is true that a finding of criminal
conspiracy must be supported by evidence
constituting proof beyond reasonable doubt, it is
equally true that such evidence need not be direct
evidence. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated. The
conditions attending its commission and the acts
executed may be indicative of the common design to
accomplish a criminal purpose and objective. If there
is a chain of circumstances to that effect, then,
conspiracy has been established. To exempt himself
from criminal liability, the conspirator must have
performed an overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the unlawful plan to commit the felony.
Nowhere in the records does it show that accused-
appellant ever did anything to dissuade accused
Nuez from killing Neil Patrick Quillosa or to escape in
order to report the crime despite at least four
opportunities to do so.
5. ID.; ID.; KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM; ELEMENTS
THEREOF; COMMITTED IN CASE AT BAR. This Court
fully agrees with the lower court that Kidnapping for
Ransom was committed against Joseph Rivera, as the
essential element that the victim must have been
restrained or deprived of his liberty was present when
both victims were tied and when the gun was
brandished and fired to intimidate them. In
addition, Accused Nuez and accused-appellant
recorded a ransom demand with the intention of
sending it to Riveras parents. The records indicate
that accused Nuez and accused-appellant intended
to detain only Rivera and hold him for ransom as he
was the son of a gasoline owner having a net income
of P24,000.00 a month and owning several
properties.
6. ID.; ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES;
TREACHERY, PRESENT WHERE VICTIMS WERE PLACED
IN HELPLESS CONDITION; CASE AT BAR. Treachery
should be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. Article 14, Paragraph 16 of the Revised
Penal Code, states that there is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might
make. In the instant case, treachery was evident
when the accused Nuez led the victims to believe
that it was necessary for them to be blindfolded and
tied first with wires and a rope before a certain Ka
Tony would agree to meet them. Having thus placed
the victims, particularly Quillosa, in a helpless
condition, Accused Nuez and accused-appellant
were able to carry out with ease their common design
to kill Quillosa without any risk to themselves arising
from any struggle the boy might make.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CRAFT; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR."
Craft should also be appreciated as aggravating the
crime of homicide since it was shown that the
victims, particularly the unsuspecting Quillosa, were
lured by the accused into coming with them on the
pretext that the former would only accompany Rivera
to accept the proceeds of the sale of a gun.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Stealing with intent to gain, from being a
simple, uncomplicated act in times past,
albeit unlawful, has evolved into more
elaborate schemes guaranteed to filch
money from a person with the least risk of
being caught on the part of the felon.
Those with grandiose designs of victimizing
the wealthy have, with alarming frequency,
resorted to kidnapping, snatching not only
their intended victims, but the families of
the latter, as well. Within the past few
years, so steep has been the incidence in
the crime of kidnapping for ransom
that on December 31, 1993, Republic
Act No. 7659 went into effect,
categorizing the same as a heinous
crime punishable by death. 1
In the instant case which occurred before
said law was passed, two high school lads
were duped by the accused into going with
him. One was to be used for purposes of
extricating ransom from his businessman
father. But the other, the son of
impecunious parents, was subsequently
bound hands and feet, gagged and drowned
in a river like a rat, with absolutely no
chance of survival.
The facts of this shocking case are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Accused-appellant Rodolfo Cayetano,
together with his co-accused Michael Nuez
(Nuez) and Ismael Santos alias "Ka Tony,"
were charged with the crimes of Kidnapping
for Ransom (Criminal Case No. 12778-MN) 2
and Kidnapping with Murder (Criminal Case
No. 12779-MN). 3 Only accused-appellant
and Nuez were convicted and accordingly
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay
damages. Accused Santos remains at large.
The prosecution was able to establish that
at around 1:15 in the afternoon of January
21, 1993 inside the compound of
Immaculate Concepcion Parochial
School, Accused Nuez persuaded the
victim, fourteen-year old high school
student Joseph Rivera, to go with him on
the pretext that he would turn over the
proceeds of the sale of a gun to the latters
father. He was likewise able to persuade
Joseph Rivera to bring along the latters
classmate, another fourteen year-old
student Neil Patrick Quillosa on the pretext
that Neil would be Josephs companion in
going home later.
The two boys were brought to a nipa hut in
the middle of a fishpond in Dampalit,
Malabon to await a certain "Ka Tony." As the
two boys attempted to go home, they were
told to go back as "Ka Tony" was coming.
When they were asked in jest about their
preference if they were to be killed either
with a knife or with a gun, Neil answered
that he would prefer a gun pointed at his
head.
Thereafter, Accused Nuez told them that
"Ka Tony" would not enter the hut unless
they were blindfolded and tied. They
protested but were assured by accused
Nuez that they would not be harmed. Both
victims hands and feet were tied with wire
and rope.
Accused-appellant came and checked if the
two victims were tied securely, after
which, Accused Nuez played a tape
demanding three million pesos in five
hundred and one thousand peso bills from
the parents of Rivera in exchange for his
release. Rivera was likewise made to record
his own voice pleading to his parents to pay
the ransom demanded.
Thereafter, Accused Nuez, who was then
in possession of a gun, fired the same
towards the window, hitting the casette
recorder.
The victims were then brought to the river
by accused and Accused-Appellant.
Accused Nuez dragged Neil by the neck
towards the middle of the river and left him
there to drown while accused-appellant
stood guard over Rivera. Quillosas cries for
help and Riveras pleas for their captors to
save Quillosa went unheeded.
In the nipa hut, Rivera was made to record
his own voice saying, "Mommy, Daddy, para
makilala ninyo na sanay silang pumatay,
pinatay na nila si Neil." Thereafter, he
managed to untie his feet and asked
accused-appellant to remove the wire
around his hands on the assurance that he
would not escape. The following
morning, Accused Nuez went to deliver the
tape to Riveras house.
While accused-appellant was busy cutting
grass near the river, Rivera escaped and
proceeded to the house of accused Nuez
where he called up his grandmother.
Thereupon, he was fetched by his
grandmother and with his father, they
proceeded to the Malabon Police Station
and reported the kidnapping. The
policemen who responded recovered the
casette recorder from the nipa hut but
failed to find both accused and Accused-
Appellant.
Neil Patrick Quillosas body was recovered
on January 23, 1993 at Chungkang River,
Malabon with both hands and feet still
bound with wires and his mouth gagged. Dr.
Juanito Sacdalan testified that the cause of
death was asphyxia due to strangulation
and that the wire tied around the hands of
the victim was the same wire tied around
the neck.
Accused-appellant, however, denied the
accusation against him claiming that on the
day he arrived at the nipa
hut, Accused Nuez poked a gun at him and
threatened to kill him if he squeals. He also
claimed that accused Nuez recorded
something on a casette and he saw two
children with him whose hands and feet
were tied with wires.
Thereafter, Accused Nuez instructed one
of the children, whom he came to know
during the trial of this case to be Joseph
Rivera, to record something which he did
not hear as accused Nuez ordered him to
keep his distance. He averred that when
Nuez brought the children to the river, he
was just watching and following them; that
from his position atop the paddy, he saw
accused Nuez in the middle of the river
release one of the children, whom he came
to know during the trial to be Neil Patrick
Quillosa, as a result of which the latter
drowned.
The following morning, Accused Nuez told
him to guard Rivera after which the former
left. However, he claimed that he left Rivera
inside the nipa hut to cut grass around the
fishpond. When accused Nuez returned
and learned from him that Rivera had left,
the former likewise disappeared. Moments
later, Accused Nuez father arrived and
told him that he would get the casette. He
was likewise told to leave as policemen will
be coming. As a result, he left and went to
his grandmothers place, after which he was
surrendered by his uncle to Vice President
Joseph Estrada. He likewise claims that he
does not know how to read and that he can
write only his name and count up to fifty
only. He claims to know Michael Nuez as
he usually sees him when he buys
"kakanin" from the latters family.
The lower court in a joint decision 4
convicted both accused and accused-
appellant with Kidnapping for Ransom and
accordingly sentenced both to reclusion
perpetua. Both were also found to have
committed the complex crime of
Kidnapping with Murder and sentenced
each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. They were also
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victims in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay
actual damages in the amount of
P41,700.00 and the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages, as well as the costs of the
suit.
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant
claims that the lower court
erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. In not finding that accused-appellants
low level of intelligence/state of imbecility
exempts him from any criminal liability.

2. In not finding that the records of the case
are not sufficient to hold a finding of
conspiracy against the Accused-Appellant.
3. In not acquitting the accused by reason
of an exempting circumstance of
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury.
In the first submission of error, Accused-
appellant claims that he possesses a very
low level of intelligence as revealed in his
direct testimony and cross-examination,
indicating a mental age of between six (6)
to ten (10) years of age. To prove his
imbecility, he cited his act of cutting grass
when he should be guarding his victim. As
such, he should be exempted from criminal
liability under the Revised Penal Code. Even
assuming that he is liable, the lower court
should have proceeded against him
pursuant to the Child and Youth Welfare
Code.
In his second submission, Accused-
appellant declares that he could not have
conspired with accused Nuez for the
following reasons: (1) accused-appellant
would rather cut grass than guard his
victim, as indicative of his low mental age;
(2) the act of kidnapping itself was already
executed and perfected by accused Nuez
when the accused-appellant arrived in the
nipa hut several hours after the kidnapping;
(3) the testimonies of private complainant
Joseph Rivera and the accused-appellant
were consistent with the fact that accused-
appellant was nowhere near accused Nuez
when he was recording the alleged demand
for payment.
In his third submission, Accused-appellant
testified that accused Nuez poked a gun at
him and threatened him with death; so he
had no alternative but to follow the orders
of accused Nuez, specially considering his
mental capacity.
The Court is not persuaded by such
remonstrations. The defense counsels
attribution of imbecility is not supported by
evidence. Imbecility, one of the exempting
circumstances under Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code, is defined as
feeblemindedness or a mental condition
approaching that of one who is insane. It is
analogous to childishness and dotage. An
imbecile, within the meaning of Article 12,
is one who must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment and freedom of will
at the time of committing the crime. 5 He is
one who, while advanced in age, has a
mental development comparable to that of
children between two and seven years of
age. 6 allegedly brought the two victims to the
Accused-appellants act of cutting grass
rather than guarding his victim could hardly
be indicative of imbecility. Rather, it may be
considered as negligence but definitely not
childishness or even that of one completely
deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will. In fact, Accused-
appellant admitted on cross-examination
that he can tell what is right and what is
wrong. 7 Assuming arguendo that accused-
appellant is an imbecile or a feebleminded
person, in the case of People v. Formigones,
8 it was held that feeblemindedness is not
exempting, because the offender could
distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile or
an insane cannot. In any case, Article 800
of the Civil Code provides that "the law
presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof to the
contrary." The allegation of insanity or
imbecility must be clearly proved.
Moreover, the law presumes all acts to be
voluntary. It is improper to presume that
acts were executed unconsciously." 9
Neither will this Court subscribe to accused-
appellants third submission that he was
prompted to act the way he did due to
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury. Accused-appellants claim that
accused Nuez poked a gun at him and
threatened him with death is belied by
testimonial evidence. Granting that
accused-appellant was forced to do what he
did on account of fear, duress or
intimidation such that he could not possibly
have any opportunity to defend himself in
equal combat, testimonial evidence show
that he had at least four opportunities to
escape. The first was when accused Nuez
river while he remained on the rice paddy.
10 The second was when accused Nuez
and the victim Joseph Rivera were sleeping
in the nipa hut. 11 The third was when
accused Nuez asked him to look for the
necklace of Neil Patrick Quillosa on the river
bank while the former was in the nipa hut
together with the victim Joseph Rivera. 12
The fourth was when accused Nuez left
him and the victim the following morning to
deliver the taped or recorded ransom
demand to the victims family. 13 Accused-
appellant could have easily taken
advantage of any of these opportunities
considering that only accused Nuez
threatened him. By not availing of these
chances to escape, his allegation of fear or
duress becomes incredible under the
circumstances.
In People v. Villanueva, 14 this Court stated
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be
available as a defense, must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act is not done. A threat of
future injury is not enough. (16 C.J., 91).
To be available as a defense, the fear must
be well-founded, an immediate and actual
danger of death or great bodily harm must
be present and the compulsion must be of
such a character as to leave no opportunity
to accused for escape or self-defense in
equal combat. It would be a most
dangerous rule if a defendant could shield
himself from prosecution for crime by
merely setting up a fear from or because of
a threat of a third person. (Whartons
Criminal Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 384).
Fear as an excuse for crime has never been
received by the law. No man, from fear or
circumstances to himself has the right to
make himself a party to committing
mischief upon mankind. (Lord Denman in
Reg. v. Tyler, 8 Car. and P. [Eng.] 616, v.
Duddely, L.R. 14, Q.B. Div. [Eng.]
273)."cralaw virtua1aw library
Accused-appellants knowledge of what is
right or wrong, as well as his failure to
escape bolsters the prosecutions evidence
that he conspired with accused Nuez to
commit the crimes being charged against
them, contrary to the formers second
submission. The records show the presence
of conspiracy. First, when accused-appellant
arrived at the hut where the victims were
being held, the first thing he did was to
check if the victims were securely tied. 15
Second, Accused-appellant carried the
victim Neil Patrick Quillosa to the river. 16
Third, Accused-appellant kicked the victim
Joseph Rivera when the latter was ordered
to go to the river. 17 It may be deduced
from those acts by accused-appellant that
he conspired with accused Nuez to commit
the crimes. While it is true that a finding of
criminal conspiracy must be supported by
evidence constituting proof beyond
reasonable doubt, it is equally true that
such evidence need not be direct evidence.
It may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was
perpetrated. The conditions attending its
commission and the acts executed may be
indicative of the common design to
accomplish a criminal purpose and
objective. If there is a chain of
circumstances to that effect, then,
conspiracy has been established.
18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To exempt himself from criminal liability,
the conspirator must have performed an
overt act to dissociate or detach himself
from the unlawful plan to commit the
felony. 19 Nowhere in the records does it
show that accused-appellant ever did
anything to dissuade accused Nuez from
killing Neil Patrick Quillosa or to escape in
order to report the crime despite at least
four opportunities to do so.
This Court fully agrees with the lower court
that Kidnapping for Ransom was committed
against Joseph Rivera, as the essential
element that the victim must have been
restrained or deprived of his liberty was
present when both victims were tied and
when the gun was brandished and fired to
intimidate them. 20 In
addition, Accused Nuez and accused-
appellant recorded a ransom demand with
the intention of sending it to Riveras
parents. 21 The records indicate that
accused Nuez and accused-appellant
intended to detain only Rivera and hold him
for ransom as he was the son of a gasoline
owner having a net income of P24,000.00 a
month and owning several properties. 22
The same, however, cannot be said of Neil
Patrick Quillosa. The records show that the
intent of accused Nuez and that of
accused-appellant was to kill Quillosa and
not to detain him for ransom. Quillosa was a
stranger to them and they merely
persuaded Rivera to take him along so he
could have a companion in going home. 23
In any case, they could not have possibly
intended to detain Quillosa and hold him for
ransom as he was only a son of a jeepney
driver. 24
Thus, the crime committed by accused
Nuez and accused-appellant with respect
to the victim Quillosa should be Homicide
and not Kidnapping with Murder since they
never intended to hold Quillosa for ransom.
Nuez query as to Quillosas preference on
the manner of his death shows the formers
intention to kill the latter. As treachery was
not alleged in the information, then it could
not have qualified the crime to murder.
However, treachery should be appreciated
as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Article 14, Paragraph 16 of the Revised
Penal Code states that there is treachery
when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. In the instant case,
treachery was evident when the accused
Nuez led the victims to believe that it was
necessary for them to be blindfolded and
tied first with wires and a rope before a
certain Ka Tony would agree to meet them.
Having thus placed the victims, particularly
Quillosa, in a helpless
condition, Accused Nuez and accused-
appellant were able to carry out with ease
their common design to kill Quillosa without
any risk to themselves arising from any
struggle the boy might make.
Craft should also be appreciated as
aggravating the crime of homicide since it
was shown that the victims, particularly the
unsuspecting Quillosa, were lured by the
accused into coming with them on the
pretext that the former would only
accompany Rivera to accept the proceeds
of the sale of a gun.
With respect to accused-appellant, the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should be appreciated in his
favor.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 12778-
MN, the decision of the trial court is
AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. 12779-MN,
the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED in
that accused-appellant Rodolfo Cayetano y
Pangilinan is CONVICTED of the crime of
homicide and IMPOSING upon him the
prison term ranging from 10 years and 1
day to 12 years, prision mayor maximum,
as minimum up to 18 years, 6 months and
1 day of reclusion temporal maximum, as
maximum.
Costs against Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.
Endnotes:
1. The prefatory paragraph of Republic Act No. 7659
provides: "WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death
under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious
and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. "That during the period beginning 1:15 oclock in
the afternoon of January 21, 1993 and ending the
morning of the following day, in the Municipality of
Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, confederating and conspiring with each
other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously kidnap and detain one Joseph Rivera, a
minor, for the purpose of extorting ransom of P3
million from the victim and his father.
CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. "That on or about 1:15 oclock in the afternoon of
the 21st day of January 1993 at Poblacion Malabon,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
confederating and conspiring with each other, did
then and there kidnap and detain one Neil Patrick
Quillosa, a minor, for the purpose of extorting ransom
of P3 million and in connection therewith, tie both his
hands and feet with wire, and in the evening of said
date and in such defenseless situation, did then and
there strangle and drown said Neil Patrick in the river
of Dampalit, Malabon, Metro Manila, resulting in the
death of said victim, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs in the following amounts:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
P50,000.00 as indemnity for death;
100,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
100,000.00 as moral damages;
30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. Rollo, p. 29.
5. People v. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.
6. Reyes, I THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 215 (Twelfth
Edition, 1981).
7. TSN, June 17, 1993, p. 328.
8. People v. Formigones, supra.
9. Supra.
10. TSN, June 17, 1993, p. 308.
11. TSN, May 24, 1993, p. 242 and June 17, 1993, p.
309.
12. TSN, May 24, 1993, p. 242.
13. Supra.
14. 104 Phil. 450 (1958).
15. TSN, May 25, 1993, p. 211.
16. Supra, p. 214.
17. Supra, p. 215.
18. People v. Caranzo, 209 SCRA 232 (1992).
19. People v. De los Reyes, 215 SCRA 63 (1992).
20. TSN, May 24, 1993, pp. 261-263.
21. Supra, pp. 261-262.
22. TSN, May 31, 1993, p. 277.

23. TSN, May 24, 1993, p. 255.

24. TSN, May 24, 1993, p. 265; June 1, 1993, p. 296.

[G.R. No. 45130. February 17, 1937.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. CELESTINO BONOAN Y of a particular and isolated attack, beginning with the
CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio
Garcia for Appellant.
Undersecretary of Justice Melencio
for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; INSANITY, AS A DEFENSE.
In the Philippines, the burden, to be sure, in on the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime, but sanity is
presumed, and." . . when a defendant in a criminal
case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the
burden of establishing that fact rests upon him . . . ."
(U. S. v. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S.
v. Hontiveros Carmona [1910], 18 Phil., 62; People v.
Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204.) We affirm and reiterate
this doctrine.
2. ID.; ID.; ID. In order to ascertain a persons
mental condition at the time of the act, it is
permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his
mind a reasonable period both before and after that
time. Direct testimony is not required (Wharton,
Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State v. Wright, 135 Mo.,
404; 35 S. W., 1145; State v. Simms, 68 M., 205;
Rinkard v. State, 157 Ind., 234; 62 N. E., 14; People v.
Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific
acts of derangement essential (People v. Tripler,
supra) to establish insanity as a defense.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. Mind can only be known by outward
acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and
emotions of a person and come to determine whether
his acts conform to the practice of people of sound
mind. To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial
evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice (People v.
Bascos, supra).
4. ID.; ID. Courts should be careful to distinguish
insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental
weakness or mere depression resulting from physical
ailment. The State should guard against sane
murderers escaping punishment through a general
plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are
not concerned with connecting two or more attacks of
insanity to show the continuance thereof during the
intervening period or periods but with the continuity
demonstration of symptoms thereof prior to the
commission of the crime charged, and ending with a
positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following
the commission of the act complained of.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION. To prove motive and premeditation
and, indirectly, mental normalcy of the accused at the
time of the commission of the crime, the prosecution
called on policeman D. A. who testified as to certain
statements made to him by the defendant-appellant
after his arrest. A detective corroborated the
policemans testimony. That such kind of evidence is
not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused
during the commission of the offense, is clear from
what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic
Medicine, University of Edinburgh, said in his work on
Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in
the type of dementia praecox "the crime is usually
preceded by much complaining and planning. In
these people, homicidal attacks are common,
because of delusions that they are being interfered
with sexually or that their property is being taken."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the
City of Manila filed an information charging Celestino
Bonoan, the defendant- appellant herein, with the
crime of murder, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in
the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said
accused, with evident premeditation and treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without any justifiable motive and with
the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack,
assault and stab the said Carlos Guison on the
different parts of his body with a knife, thereby
inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit.
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region
penetrating one cm. into the superior surface of the
right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab
wounds located respectively at the posterior and
lateral lumbar region, and left elbow, which directly
caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days
afterwards."cralaw virtua1aw library
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the
arraignment of the accused. The defense counsel
forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground
that the defendant was mentally deranged and was
at the time confined in the Psychopathic Hospital. The
court thereupon issued an order requiring the
Director of the Hospital to render a report on the
mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr.
Toribio Joson, assistant alienist, rendered his report,
Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23,
1935, the case was again called for the arraignment
of the accused, but in view of the objection of the
fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the
doctor of the Psychopathic Hospital who examined
the defendant to appear and produce the complete
record pertaining to the mental condition of the said
defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson
appeared before the court on March 26, 1935 for the
necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the
defense asked the court to summon the other doctors
of the hospital for questioning as to the mental
condition of the accused, or to place the latter under
a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial
court then issued an order directing that the accused
be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant
alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital for his personal
observation and the subsequent submission of a
report as to the true mental condition of the patient.
Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the
Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit 5,
on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was
called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court
and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the
accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In
view thereof, the case was suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Fernandez reported to the
court that the defendant could be discharged from
the hospital and appear for trial, as he was
"considered a recovered case." Summoned by the
court, Dr. Fernandez, appeared and testified that the
accused "had recovered from the disease." On
February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned,
pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.

After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty
of the offense charged in the information above-
quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his
counsel makes the following assignment of
errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence
establishes that the accused has had dementia only
occasionally and intermittently and has not had it
immediately prior to the commission of the offense.
"B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence
in this case further shows that during and
immediately after the commission of the offense, the
accused did not show any kind of abnormality either
in behavior, language and appearance, or any kind of
action showing that he was mentally deranged.
"C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the
circumstances the burden was on the defense to
show that the accused was mentally deranged at the
time of the commission of the offense, and that the
defense did not establish any evidence to this effect.
"D. The court a quo erred in finding the accused
guilty of the offense charged and in not acquitting
him thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934,
the defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now
deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a
barbershop close to Toms Dixie Kitchen. Francisco
Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop, heard
the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech
turned around and saw the accused withdrawing his
right hand, which held a knife, from the side of
Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you", but
Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then
stabbed Guison thrice on the left side. The assault
was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who
rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took
possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken
to the Philippine General Hospital where he died two
day later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy
performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los
Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-
appellant is admitted, it does not seen necessary to
indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of
the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up
being that of insanity, the only question to be
determined in this appeal is whether or not the
defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the
commission of the crime charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in
criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the
legal presumption and the kind and quantum of
evidence required, theories abound and authorities
are in sharp conflict. Stated generally, courts in the
United States proceed upon three different theories.
(See Herzog, Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931],
sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity
in Criminal Case, p. 11 et seq.) The first view is that
insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance
and as such must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. When the commission of a crime is
established, and the defense of insanity is not made
out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In
other words, proof of insanity at the time of
committing the criminal act should be clear and
satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the
ground of insanity (Hornblower, C.J., in State v.
Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an
affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by a
preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity
is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th
ed., vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule in England (Reg.
v. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. v. Higginson, 1 Car.
& K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and
West Virginia. The third view is that the prosecution
must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Davis
v. United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16
Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema v. United States, 186 U.
S., 413; 46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895;
United States v. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No.
15,555; United States v. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This
liberal view is premised on the proposition that while
it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at the
outset, the prosecution affirms every essential
ingredients of the crime charged, and hence affirms
sanity as one of such essential ingredients, and that a
fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to
prove insanity it becomes the duty of the State to
prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and
stricter view (People v. Boscos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime, but sanity is presumed, and." . .
when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the
defense of mental incapacity, the burden of
establishing that fact rests upon him . . . ." (U. S. v.
Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. v.
Hontiveros Carmona [1910], 18 Phil., 62; People v.
Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that
the defendant was insane at the time he killed the
deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative
allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in
fine distinctions as to the character and degree of
evidence that must be presented, the primary inquiry
here is: Has there been presented sufficiently
convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a
degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the
accused was insane at the time of the perpetration of
the offense? I order to ascertain a persons mental
condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to
receive evidence of the condition of his mind a
reasonable period both before and after that time.
Direct testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal
Evidence, p. 684; State v. Wright, 134 Mo. 404; 35 S.
W. 1145; State v. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard v.
State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E. 14; People v. Tripler, I
Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of
derangement essential (People v. Tripler, supra) to
establish insanity as a defense. Mind can only be
known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the
thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and
come to determine whether this acts conform to the
practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity,
therefore, circumstantial evidence, if clear and
convincing, suffice (People v. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil.,
204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the
defendant was not insane at the time of the
commission of the act for which he was prosecuted
on the theory that the insanity was only occasional or
intermittent and not permanent or continuous (32
C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are apprised of the danger
of indulging in the presumption of continuity
in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity. We
appreciate the reason for the contrary rule. To be
sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity
in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness
or mere depression resulting from physical ailment.
The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of
insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not
concerned with connecting two or more attacks of
insanity to show the continuance thereof during the
intervening period or periods but with the continuity
of a particular and isolated attack, beginning with the
demonstration of symptoms thereof prior to the
commission of the crime charged, and ending with a
positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following
the commission of the act complained of. Upon the
other hand, there are facts and circumstances of
record which can not be overlooked. The following
considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds
of the majority of this court in arriving at a conclusion
different from that reached by the court
below:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense,
uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears that
the herein defendant-appellant, during the periods
from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to
January 10, 1926, was confined in the insane
department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from
a disease diagnosed as dementia praecox. His
confinement during these periods, it is true was long
before the commission of the offense on December
12, 1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to
show that the recurrence of the ailment at the time of
the occurrence of the crime is not entirely lacking of
any rational or scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia praecox are
clearly to be regarded as having mental disease to a
degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility
for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico- Legal
Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines
and Webster, Legal Medicine Toxicology, vol. I, p.
613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of
the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of
dementia praecox, in certain periods of excitement,
are similar to those of manic depressive psychosis (p.
19, t. s. n.) and, in either case, the mind appears
"deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes
affected by this kind of disease, either dementia
praecox or manic depressive psychosis, during the
period of excitement, he has no control whatever of
his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under the
general medico-legal classification of manic
depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the
question of irresistible impulse that forensic relations
of manic actions will have to be considered. There is
in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal
inhibitions and the case with which impulses may
lead to actions impairs deliberations and the use of
normal checks to motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines
and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxicology [2d ed.,
1926], vol. I, p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr.
Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an intern at San
Lazaro Hospital, for four (4) days immediately
preceding December 12, 1934 the date when the
crime was committed the defendant and appellant
had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of the
symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia praecox
(Exhibit 3, defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S.
Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.) . during some of the intervals he displayed impulsive
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been
arrested and taken to the police station on the very
same day of the perpetration of the crime, and
although attempts were made by detectives to secure
a statement from him (see Exhibits B and D and
testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was
sent by the police department to the Psychopathic
Hospital the day following the commission of the
crime. This is an indication that the police authorities
themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the
accused, which doubt found confirmation in the
official reports submitted by the specialists of the San
Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in
charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report was made
within the first month of treatment, the defendant
was suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic
depressive psychosis. We quote the report in
full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"INSULAR PSYCHOPATHIC HOSPITAL
"MANDALUYONG, RIZAL.
"January 15, 1935.
"MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chief Alienist, Insular
Psychopathic Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
"SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male, Filipino, 30
years old, sent by the Secret Service of the City of
Manila for mental examination.
"I. MENTAL STATUS:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) General behavior. The patient is underactive,
staying most of the time in his bed with his eyes
closed and practically totally motionless. At other
times, however, but on very rare occasions and at
short intervals he apparently wakes up and then he
walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic
movements with the extremities and other parts of
the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he
refuses to take even the food offered by his mother or
sister, so that there have been days in the hospital
when he did not take any nourishment. On several
occasions he refused to have the bath, or to have his
hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy.
He would also sometimes refuse his medicine, and
acts, such as striking his chest or other parts of the
body with his fists and at one time after a short
interview, he struck strongly with his fist the door of
the nurses office without apparent motivation. He
also sometimes laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands
strongly without provocation.
"(b) Stream of talk. Usually the patient is
speechless, cant be persuaded to speak, and would
not answer in any form the questions propounded to
him. Very often he is seen with his eyes closed
apparently praying as he was mumbling words but
would not answer at all when talked to. At one time
he was seen in this condition with a cross made of
small pieces of stick in his hand. He at times during
the interviews recited passages in the literature as for
example the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera
nobleza del hombre. (Truthfulness, honesty and
loyalty are among the attributes of a dependable
character.)
"At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud
voice in the hospital.
"(c) Mood. Patient is usually apathetic and
indifferent, but at times he looks anxious and rather
irritable. He himself states that he often feels sad in
the hospital.
"(d) Orientation. During the periods that he was
accessible he was found oriented as to place and
person but he did not know the day or the date.
"(e) Illusion and hallucination. The patient states
that during the nights that he could not sleep he
could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for
example, told him that he would be killed, people
were against him and that he should escape. That he
was going to be killed because he was benevolent.
That he could sometimes see the shadow of his
former sweetheart in the hospital. There are times
however when he could not hear or see at all
anything.
"(f) Delusion and misinterpretation. On one
occasion he told the examiner that he could not talk
in his first day in the hospital because of a mass he
felt he had in his throat. He sometimes thinks that he
is already dead and already buried in the La Loma
Cemetery.
"(g) Compulsive phenomena. None.
"(h) Memory. The patient has a fairly good memory
for remote events, but his memory for recent events
or for example, for events that took place during his
stay in the hospital he has no recollection at all.
"(i) Grasp of general information. He has a fairly
good grasp of general information. He could not,
however, do simple numerical tests as the 100 7
test.
"(j) Insight and judgment. At his fairly clear periods
he stated that he might have been insane during his
first days in the hospital, but just during the interview
on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and
judgment were, of course, nil during his stuporous
condition. During the last two days he has shown
marked improvement in his behavior as to be
cooperative, and coherent in his speech.
"2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The patient during his confinement in the hospital
has been found suffering from a form of psychosis,
called Manic depressive psychosis.
(Sgd.) "TORIBIO JOSON, M. D,
"Assistant Alienist"
property is being taken."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935
(Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that
assistant alienist in the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the defendant-appellant was demented at the time
the following conclusion was he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the
reached:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph information and that consequently he is exempt from
criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the
"I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-
He is suffering from the Manic Depressive form of appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio in both
psychosis. It might be premature to state before the instances. In conformity with paragraph 1 of article
court has decided this case, but I believe it a duty to 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the defendant shall be
state, that this person is not safe to be at large. He kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or
has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality such other hospital for the insane as many be
lacking in control, overtly serious in his dealings with designated by the Director of the Philippine Health
the every day events of this earthly world, taking Service, there to remain confined until the Court of
justice with his own hands and many times executing First Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or
it in an impulsive manner as to make his action decree. So ordered.
overproportionate beyond normal acceptance. He
is sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic has taste Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ.,
and desires as to make him queer before the average concur.
conception of an earthly man.
"He will always have troubles and difficulties with this
world of realities.
(Sgd.) "J. A. FERNANDEZ, M. D,
"Assistant Alienist"
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly,
mental normalcy of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime, the prosecution called on
policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon
arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from
the latter for the reason for the assault and the
defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison
owed him P55 and would not pay; that appellant
bought the knife, Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora
Street and that for two days he had been watching
for Guison in order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.) .
Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and
corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That
such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of the
sanity of the accused during the commission of the
offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius
Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of
Edinburgh, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d
ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia
praecox, "the crime is usually preceded by much
complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal
attacks are common, because of delusions that they
are being interfered with sexually or that their
[G.R. No. L-52688. October 17, 1980.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. HONORATO AMBAL, Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
Honorato ambal appealed from the decision of the
Court First Instance of Camiguin convicting him of
parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay an indemnity of twelve thousand
pesos to the heirs of his deceased wife, Felicula
Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No. 155-C).
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay
captain found under some flowering plants near the
house of Honorato Ambal located in Barrio Balbagon,
Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula Vicente-Ambal, 48,
mortally wounded. She asked for drinking water and
medical assistance.
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts
of her body. She was placed in an improvised
hammock and brought to the hospital where she died
forty minutes after arrival thereat (Exh. B and G).
On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of
Felicula, after entrusting his child to a neighbor, went
to the house of the barangay captain and informed
the latters spouse that he (Honorato) had killed his
wife Feling. After making that oral confession, Ambal
took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and
surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the
latter that he had liquidated his wife.
The policeman confiscated Ambals long bolo the tip
of which was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was bespattered
with blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to be
weak.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old
marriage featured by quarrels and bickerings which
were exacerbated by the fact that the sometimes did
not stay in the conjugal abode and chose to spend
the night in the poblacion of Mambajao. The couple
had eight children.
The immediate provocation for the assault was a
quarrel induced by Feliculas failure to buy medicine
for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two
engaged in a heated altercation. Felicula told her
husband that it would be better if he were dead ("Mas
maayo ka pang mamatay"). That remark infuriated
Ambal and impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).
On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged
Ambal with parricide in the municipal court. After a
preliminary examination, the case was elevated to
the Court of First Instance where on march 4, 1977
the fiscal filed against Ambal an information for
parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.
After the prosecution had presented its
evidence, Accuseds counsel de oficio manifested that
the defense of Ambal was insanity.
The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977
directed the municipal health officer, Doctor
Maximino R. Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate who
had undergone a six-month training in psychiatry in
the National Mental Hospital, to examine Ambal and
to submit within one month a report on the latters
mental condition (p. 65, Record).
Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977
found that Ambal was a "passive-aggressive,
emotionally unstable, explosive or inadequate
personality" (Exh. 1).
Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form
February 1 (twelve days after the killing) to November
3, 1977, when he placed Ambal under observation,
the latter did not show any mental defect and was
normal (44-46 tsn November 3, 1977).
Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental
disease or defect, Doctor Balbas replied: "Before the
commission of the crime, he was normal. After the
commission of the crime, normal, but during the
commission of the crime, that is what we call
Psychosis due to short frustration tolerance" (45
tsn).
Doctor Cresogono Llacuna, a 1937 medical graduate
who undertook a two-month observation of mental
cases and who in the course of his long practice had
treated around one hundred cases of mental
disorders, attended to Ambal in 1975. He found that
Ambal suffered from a minor psycho-neurosis, a
disturbance of the functional nervous system which is
not insanity (65 tsn November 15, 1977). The doctor
concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal was
normal but nervous (68 tsn). He had no mental
disorder.
Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on
November 16, 1977 or about ten months after the
incident. He said that at the time of the killing he did
not know what he was doing because he was
allegedly not in full possession of his normal mental
faculties. He pretended not to know that was charged
with the capital offense of having killed his wife.
But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead
because he was informed of her death. During his
confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked
food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked in
the town plaza or was sent unescorted to buy food in
the market.
He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was
irritable. he admitted that he rode on a tricycle when
he surrendered on the day of the killing. He
remembered that a week before the incident he got
wet while plowing He feel asleep without changing his
clothes. At midnight, when he woke up, he had chills.
That was the commencement of his last illness.
The trial court concluded from Ambals behavior
immediately after the incident that he was not insane
and that he acted like a normal human being. We
agree with the courts conclusion.
"Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in
law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or
mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The
State should guard against sane murderers escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity."
(People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from
criminal liability an imbecile or an insane person
unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. *
According to the dictionary, an imbecile is a person
marked by mental deficiency while an insane person
is one who has an unsound mind or suffers from a
mental disorder. "Imbecil vale tanto como escaso de
razon y es loco el que ha perdido el juicio." An insane
person may have lucid intervals but "el embecil no
puede tener, no tiene estos intervalos de razon, pue;
en el no hay una alteracion, sino una carencia del
juicio mismo" (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)
Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in
language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain,
or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered
condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and
characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered
function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties,
or by impaired or disordered volition" (Sec. 1039,
Revised Administrative Code).
"The law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary" (Art.
800, Civil Code re Testamentary Succession; U.S. v.
Martinez, 34 Phil. 305 308). The law always presumes
all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to presume that
acts were executed unconsciously (People v. Cruz,
109 Phil. 288, 292; People v. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147,
153; U.S. v. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547; People v. Fausto,
113 Phil. 841).
"When there is no proof that the defendant was not of
sound mind at the time he performed the criminal act
charged to him, or that he performed it at the time of
madness or of mental derangement, or that he was
generally considered to be insane his habitual
condition being, on the contrary, healthy the legal
presumption is that he acted in his ordinary state of
mind and the burden is upon the defendant to
overcome this presumption" (U.S. v. Zamora, 32 Phil.
218.)
"Without positive proof that the defendant had lost
his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to
or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be
presumed that he was in a normal condition" (U.S. v.
Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil. 62).
A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the
defense of mental incapacity, has the burden of
establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at
the very moment when the crime was committed
(People v. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)
What should be the criterion for insanity or
imbecility? We have adopted the rule, based on
Spanish jurisprudence, that in order that a person
could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning
of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he must be
deprived completely a reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the
crime (People v. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660)
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting
circumstance, there must be complete deprivation of
intelligence in the commission of the act or that the
accused acted without the least discernment. Mere
abnormality. (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292;
People v. Renegado, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA
275, 286.)
A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who
tried to vindicate his honor by taking violent
measures to the extent of killing his wife (whom he
suspected of infidelity) can hardly be regarded as an
imbecile (Formigones case).
Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a
tendency to having violent fits when angry, his acts
of breaking glasses and smashing dishes are
indications of an explosive temper and not insanity,
especially considering that he did not turn violent
when a policeman intercepted him after he had killed
his wife. (Cruz case.)
"There is a vast difference between an insane person
and one who has worked himself up into such a
frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good
judgment in what he does. Persons who get into a
quarrel or fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during
the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not
always, acts like a madman, The fact that a person
acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The
popular meaning of the word crazy is not
synonymous with the legal terms insane, non
compos mentis, unsound mind, idiot, or lunatic." capacity to distinguish between right and wrong
(U.S. v. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88, 91.)
"The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives
of anger, hatred, or revenge is not insanity." (People
v. Foy, 138 N.Y. 664, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 92.)
"One who, in possession of a sound mind, commits a
criminal act under the impulse of passion or revenge,
which may temporarily dethrone reason and for the
moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be
shielded from the consequences of the act by the
plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the
commission of a criminal act, when it is made
affirmatively to appear that the person committing it
was insane, and that the offense was the direct
consequence of his insanity." (State v. Stickley, 41
Iowa 232m cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 94.)
The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where
the accused killed by strangulation a sixteen-year-old
girl, who got leaves from his banana plants, and
sliced the flesh of her legs, thighs and shoulders,
cooked the flesh and ate it like a cannibal. (People v.
Balondo, L-27401, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA
155).chanrobles law library
Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that
the accused is insane (People v. Martin, 120 Phil. 14,
20-21).
Justice Cardozo in his article, "What Medicine Can Do
For The Law", traces briefly the origin of the rule
regarding insanity as a defense. He
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the early stages of our law, wayback in medieval
times, insanity was never a defense for crime. The
insane killer, like the man who killed in self-defense,
might seek a pardon from the king, and would often
get one. He had no defense at law. Gradually insanity
was allowed, but only within narrow limits. This was
what was become known as the wild-beast stage of
the defense. Then the limits of the defense were
expanded, but still slowly and narrowly. The killer was
excused if the disease of the mind was such that he
was incapable of appreciating the difference between
right and wrong. At first this meant, not the right and
wrong of particular case, but right and wrong
generally or in the abstract, the difference, as it was
sometimes said, between good and evil. Later, the
rule was modified in favor of the prisoner so that
generally would not charge with responsibility if there
was no capacity to understand the difference in
relation to the particular act, the subject of the crime.
"The rule governing the subject was crystallized in
England in 1843 by the answer made by the House of
Lords to questions submitted by judges in the famous
case of Mc-Naghten, who was tried for the murder of
one Drummond, the secretary of Sir Robert
Peel."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the MNaghten case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, Clark and
Finelly 200, the following rule was laid down: "To
establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must
be clearly proved that at time of committing the act,
the party accused was under such a defect of reason
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know
it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the MNaghten case, it appears that Daniel
MNaghten shot Edward Drummond on January 20,
1843. Drummond died as a consequence of the
gunshot wound on April 25, 1843. Drummond was the
private secretary of Sir Robert Peel, prime minister.
MNaghten shot Drummoned, thinking he was Sir
Robert. MNaghten labored under the insane delusion
that he was being hounded by his enemies and that
the prime minister was one of them. Medical
evidence tended to prove that MNaghten was
affected by morbid delusions which carried him
beyond the power of his own control, leaving him
unable to distinguish right and wrong, and that he
was incapable of controlling his conduct in connection
with the delusion. The jury found him not guilty by
reason of insanity.
As stated in another case, the "test of the
responsibility for criminal acts, when insanity is
asserted, is the capacity of the accused to distinguish
between right and wrong at the time and with respect
to the act which is the subject of the inquiry."
(Colemans case, 1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)
Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test
which means that "assuming defendants knowledge
of the nature and quality of his act and his knowledge
that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the
mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the
power of his will which would enable him to prevent
himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found
guilty." The commission of the crime is excused even
if the accused knew what he was doing was wrong
provided that as a result of mental disease he lacked
the power to resist the impulse to commit the act.
(State v. White, 270 Pac. 2d. 727, 730; Leslie Kast, 31
North Dakota Law Review, pp. 170, 173.)
The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called
wrong test, supplemented by the irresistible impulse
test, does not alone supply adequate criteria for
determining criminal responsibility of a person
alleged mental incapacity." "An accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the
product of a mental disease or a mental defect. A
mental disease relieving an accused of criminal circumstance of voluntary surrender to the
responsibility for his unlawful act is a condition authorities. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
considered capable of improvement or deterioration; punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death.
a mental defect having such effect on criminal The lesser penalty should because of the presence of
responsibility is a condition not considered capable of one mitigating circumstance and the absence of
improvement of deterioration, and either congenital, aggravating circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal
or the of injury or of a physical or mental disease." Code).
(Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45
A.L.R. 2d. 1430 [1954].) WHEREFORE, the trial courts decision is affirmed.
Costs against the Appellant.
As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of
criminal responsibility may be stated to be the SO ORDERED.
capacity to understand the nature and consequences
of the act charged and the ability to distinguish
between right and wrong as to such act, and in a * Article 8 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 (from
majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive which article 12 of the Revised Penal Code was taken)
test."cralaw virtua1aw library provides that "no delinquen, y por consiguiente estan
exentos de responsabilidad criminal (1) El imbecil y el
And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the loco, a no ser que este haya obrado en un intervalo
MNaghten case exists along with the "irresistible de razon.
impulse" test or some other formula permitting a
defendant to be exculpated on the ground that, This was modified in the existing Spanish Penal Code
although he knew the act was wrong, he was unable which in its article 8 (1) provides "que esta exento de
to refrain from committing it. responsabilidad criminal el enajenado y el que se
halla en situacion de transtorno mental transitorio, a
"Since the broadest test suggested, which is the no ser que este haya sido buscado de proposito para
Durham or Product rule, also permits inability to delinquir" (1 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 Ed.,
distinguish between right and wrong to be p. 495).
considered, even though it refuses limit the inquiry to
that topic, it would appear that insanity which meets
this test is a defense in all Anglo-American
jurisdictions and that the only controversy is over
whether there are some cases in which the right-and-
wrong test is not met, but in which a defense on
grounds of insanity should nevertheless be
recognized." (21 Am Jur 2d 118.)
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was
not substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The
presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was
not completely bereft of reason or discernment and
freedom of will when he mortally wounded his wife.
He was not suffering from any disease or
defect.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The fact that immediately after the incident he
thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing
authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that
what he had done was wrong and that he was going
to be punished for it.
Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating
G.R. No. 138453 - May 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. MELECIO ROBIOS y DOMINGO, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two
indivisible penalties, as in the present case for
parricide with unintentional abortion, the lesser one
shall be applied in the absence of any aggravating
circumstances. Hence, the imposable penalty here
is reclusion perpetua, not death.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the April 16,
1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 95-
45, finding Melecio Robios2 y Domingo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion and sentencing him to
death. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robios guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court
hereby renders judgment sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. He is also
ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of the victim; and P22,800.00 s actual
damages."3
In an Information dated May 31, 1995, 4 appellant was
accused of killing his pregnant wife and the fetus
inside her. It reads thus:
"That on or about March 25, 1995 at around 7:00 a.m.
in Brgy. San Isidro, Municipality of Camiling, Province
of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Melecio Robinos,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab by means of a bladed knife 8 inches long, his
legitimate wife Lorenza Robinos, who was, then six
(6) months pregnant causing the instantaneous death
of said Lorenza Robinos, and the fetus inside her
womb."5
When arraigned on July 27, 1995, appellant, with the
assistance of his counsel, 6 pleaded not guilty.7 After
due trial, the RTC convicted him.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the
prosecution's version of how appellant assaulted his
pregnant wife, culminating in a brutal bloodbath, as
follows:
"1. On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the
morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robios was in his
parents' house at Barangay San Isibro in Camiling,
Tarlac. While Lorenzo was cooking, he heard his
parents, appellant Melecio Robios and the victim
Lorenza Robios, who were at the sala, quarrelling.
"2. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, 'Why did
you come home, why don't you just leave?' After
hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance
of about five meters, saw appellant, with a double-
bladed knife, stab Lorenza on the right shoulder.
Blood gushed from where Lorenza was hit and she fell
down on the floor. Upon witnessing appellant's attack
on his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house
and ran to his grandmother's house where he
reported the incident.
"3. At around eight o'clock in the morning of the same
day, Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the victim
Lorenza Robios, was at the house of his mother
Remedios Bueno at Barangay San Isidro. Benjamin, a
resident of Barangay Mabilang in Paniqui, Tarlac, went
to his mother's house for the purpose of informing his
relatives that on the evening of March 24, 1995,
appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro Robios, at
Barangay Mabilang. However while Benjamin was at
his mother's house, he received the more distressing
news that his own sister Lorenza had been killed by
appellant.
"4. Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin
did not go to her house because he was afraid of
what appellant might do. From his mother's house,
which was about 150 meters away from his sister's
home, Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at him,
'It's good you would see how your sister died.'
"5. Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain
Virgilio Valdez who called the police station at
Camiling, Tarlac. SPO1 Herbert Lugo and SPO3 Tirso
Martin, together with the other members of the PNP
Alert Team at Camiling, Tarlac, immediately went to
Barangay San Isidro. The police, together with
Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials and
barangay folk, proceeded to the scene of the crime
where they saw blood dripping from the house of
appellant and Lorenza. The police told appellant to
come out of the house. When appellant failed to
come out, the police, with the help of barangay
officials, detached the bamboo wall from the part of
the house where blood was dripping. The removal of
the wall exposed that section of the house where
SPO1 Lugo saw appellant embracing [his] wife.
"6. Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor.
Appellant, who was lying on his side and holding a
bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand,
was embracing his wife. He was uttering the words, 'I
will kill myself, I will kill myself.' Lorenza, who was
lying on her back and facing upward, was no longer
breathing. She appeared to be dead.
"7. The police and the barangay officials went up the
stairs of the house and pulled appellant away from
Lorenza's body. Appellant dropped the knife which
was taken by SPO3 Martin. Appellant tried to resist
the people who held him but was overpowered. The
police, with the help of the barangay officials present,
tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope. However,
before he was pulled away from the body of his wife
and restrained by the police, appellant admitted to
Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a barangay
kagawad, that he had killed his wife, showing him the
bloodstained knife.
"8. Upon examining Lorenza, SPO1 Lugo found that
she was already dead. She was pale and not
breathing. The police thus solicited the services of a
funeral parlor to take Lorenza's body for autopsy.
Appellant was brought to the police station at
Camiling, Tarlac. However, he had to be taken to the
Camiling District Hospital for the treatment of a stab
wound.
"9. After the incident, Senior Inspector Reynaldo B.
Orante, the Chief of Police at Camiling, Tarlac,
prepared a Special Report which disclosed that:
'The victim Lorenza Robios was six (6) months
pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds on the
different parts of her body.
'That suspect (Melecio Robios) was under the
influence of liquor/drunk [who] came home and
argued/quarreled with his wife, until the suspect got
irked, [drew] a double knife and delivered forty one
(41) stab blows.
'Suspect also stabbed his own body and [was]
brought to the Provincial Hospital.
'Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade
sharp knife about eight (8) inches long including
handle.'
"10. During the trial of the case, the prosecution was
not able to present the doctor who conducted the
autopsy on Lorenza Robios' body. Nor, was the
autopsy report presented as evidence."8
Version of the Defense
Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of
the prosecution that he indeed killed his wife, but
seeks exoneration from criminal liability by
interposing the defense of insanity as follows:
"Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant
interposed insanity. The defense presented the
testimonies of the following:
"FEDERICO ROBIOS, 19 years old son of Melecio
Robios, testified that his parents had occasional
quarrels[. B]efore March 23, 1995, his father told him
that he had seen a person went [sic] inside their
house and who wanted to kill him. On March 23,
1995, he heard his father told the same thing to his
mother and because of this, his parents quarreled
and exchanged heated words.
"LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal
Colony, testified that she came to know Melecio
Robios only in May to June 1996. Every time she
visited him in his cell, accused isolated himself,
'laging nakatingin sa malayo', rarely talked, just
stared at her and murmured alone.
"BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the
Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that he and the accused
were seeing each other everyday from 6:00 o'clock in
the morning up to 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. He
had observed that accused sometime[s] refused to
respond in the counting of prisoners. Sometimes, he
stayed in his cell even if they were required to fall in
line in the plaza of the penal colony.
"DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner
of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that as the
accused's inmate, he had occasion to meet and
mingle with the latter. Accused sometimes was lying
down, sitting, looking, or staring on space and
without companion, laughing and sometimes crying.
"MELECIO ROBIOS, herein accused-appellant,
testified that on March 25, 1995, he was in their
house and there was no unusual incident that
happened on that date. He did not know that he was
charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. He could not remember when he was
informed by his children that he killed his wife. He
could not believe that he killed his wife." 9
In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this
case was automatically elevated to this Court for
review.10
The Issues
Appellant submits for our consideration the following
assignment of errors:
"I
The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight
to the testimony and psychiatric evaluation of Dr.
Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-
appellant to be suffering from psychosis or insanity
classified under schizophrenia, paranoid type.
"II
The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-
appellant's defense of insanity."11
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Main Issue
Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance
At the outset, it bears noting that appellant did not
present any evidence to contravene the allegation
that he killed his wife. Clear and undisputed are the
RTC findings on the identity of the culprit and the
commission of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion. Appellant, however,
interposes the defense of insanity to absolve himself
of criminal liability.
Insanity presupposes that the accused was
completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of will at the time of the commission of the
crime.12 A defendant in a criminal case who relies on
the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of
establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment
when the crime was committed.13 Only when there is
a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of
the commission of the crime should the exempting
circumstance of insanity be considered.14
The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity
and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every
person is presumed to be of sound
mind.15 Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving
it.16Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane when
the crime was committed.
A perusal of the records of the case reveals that
appellant's claim of insanity is unsubstantiated and
wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both
prosecution and defense witnesses show no
substantial evidence that appellant was completely
deprived of reason or discernment when he
perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife.
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, a domestic altercation
preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said
that appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all
and without knowledge of the nature of his action. To
be sure, his act of stabbing her was a deliberate and
conscious reaction to the insulting remarks she had
hurled at him as attested to by their 15-year-old son
Lorenzo Robios. We reproduce Lorenzo's testimony
in part as follows:
"Q: - Before your father Melecio Robios stabbed your
mother, do you recall if they talked to one and the
other?
A: - Yes, sir.
ATTY. IBARRA:
Q: - Did you hear what they talked about?
A: - Yes, sir.
Q: - What did you hear?
A: - 'Why did you come home, why don't you just
leave?', Sir.
COURT:
In other words, you better go away, you should have
not come back home.
ATTY. IBARRA:
Q: - After you mother uttered those words, what did
your father do?
A: - That was the time that he stabbed my mother,
sir."17
Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what
he had done to his wife. He was even bragging to her
brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her.
Bueno testified thus:
"ATTY. JOAQUIN:
Q: - Now, from the house of your mother, can you see
the house of your sister?
A: - Yes, sir.
Q: - When you arrived at the house of your mother,
Lorenzo Robios was already there in the house of
your mother, is that right, Mr. Witness?
A: - Yes, sir.
Q: - And he was the one who informed you about your
sister already dead?
A: - Yes, Sir.
Q: - Did you go near the house of your sister upon
learning that she was already dead?
A: - No, Sir.
ATTY. JOAQUIN:
Q: - Why?
A: - My brother-in-law was still amok, Sir.
COURT:
Q: - Why do you know that he was amok?
A: - Yes, sir, because he even shouted at me, sir.
Q: - How?
A: - It's good you would see how your sister died,
Sir."18
Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding
law enforcers how he had just killed his wife may
have been a manifestation of repentance and
remorse -- a natural sentiment of a husband who had
realized the wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at
the time of the killing and immediately thereafter is
inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge
of what he had just done. Barangay Kagawad Rolando
Valdez validated the clarity of mind of appellant when
the latter confessed to the former and to the police
officers, and even showed to them the knife used to
stab the victim. Valdez's testimony proceeded as
follows:
"Q: - And what did you discover when you went there
at the house of Melecio Robios?
A: - When we arrived at the house of Melecio Robios,
it was closed. We waited for the police officers to
arrive and when they arrived, that was the time that
we started going around the house and when we saw
blood, some of our companions removed the walling
of the house and at that time, we saw the wife of
Melecio Robios lying down as if at that moment, the
wife of Melecio Robios was already dead, Sir.
Q: - When you were able to remove this walling, what
did you do?
A: - We talked to Melecio Robios, Sir.
xxx-xxx-xxx
Q: - What was he doing when you talked to him?
A: - When we saw them they were both lying down
and when we got near, he said he killed his wife and
showing the weapon he used, sir.
Q: - What is that weapon?
A: - Double bladed weapon, Sir.
COURT:
What is that, knife?
A: - It's a double bladed knife, sir.
xxx-xxx-xxx
COURT:
He admitted to you that he killed his wife?
A: - Yes, sir.
Q: - How did he say that, tell the court exactly how he
tell you that, in tagalog, ilocano or what?
A: - What I remember Sir he said, 'Pinatay ko ni baket
ko' meaning 'I killed my wife,' Sir."19
Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not
undertaken without his awareness of the atrocity of
his act.
Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the
defense witnesses hardly supports his claim of
insanity. The bulk of the defense evidence points to
his allegedly unsound mental condition after the
commission of the crime. Except for appellant's 19-
year-old son Federico Robios,20 all the other defense
witnesses testified on the supposed manifestations of
his insanity after he had already been detained in
prison.
To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of
the commission of the offense, or the accused must
have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he
would still be criminally responsible. 21 Verily, his
alleged insanity should have pertained to the period
prior to or at the precise moment when the criminal
act was committed, not at anytime thereafter.
In People v. Villa,22 this Court incisively ratiocinated
on the matter as follows:
"It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the
time he was examined at the center. But, in all
probability, such insanity was contracted during the
period of his detention pending trial. He was without
contact with friends and relatives most of the time.
He was troubled by his conscience, the realization of
the gravity of the offenses and the thought of a bleak
future for him. The confluence of these circumstances
may have conspired to disrupt his mental
equilibrium. But, it must be stressed, that an inquiry
into the mental state of accused-appellant should
relate to the period immediately before or at the
precise moment of doing the act which is the subject
of the inquiry, and his mental condition after that
crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for
purposes of determining his criminal liability. In fine,
this Court needs more concrete evidence on the
mental condition of the person alleged to be insane
at the time of the perpetration of the crimes in order
that the exempting circumstance of insanity may be
appreciated in his favor. x x x."23 (Italics supplied)
Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for
exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence
must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If
the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the
commission of the crime, the accused cannot be
acquitted.24
The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the
psychiatrist who conducted an examination of the
mental condition of appellant, does not provide much
help in determining his state of mind at the time of
the killing. It must be noted that she examined him
only on September 11, 1995, or six months after the
commission of the crime. 25 Moreover, she was not
able to make a background study on the history of his
mental condition prior to the killing because of the
failure of a certain social worker to gather data on the
matter.26
Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible
that the accused had already been suffering from
psychosis at the time of the commission of the
crime,27 she likewise admitted that her conclusion
was not definite and was merely an opinion. 28As
correctly observed by the trial court, her declarations
were merely conjectural and inconclusive to support a
positive finding of insanity. According to the RTC:
"The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza, who
examined accused at the National Center for Mental
Health, Mandaluyong City, that at the time of
examination accused Melecio Robios was still
mentally ill; that accused was experiencing
hallucination and suffering from insanity and it is
possible that the sickness have occurred eight (8) to
nine (9) months before examination; and in her
opinion accused was suffering from delusion and
hallucination. And her opinion that at the time
accused stabbed himself, he was not in his lucid
interval, is merely her conclusion. xxx xxx xxx Aside
from being her opinion, she conducted the mental,
physical and neurological examinations on the
accused seven (7) months after the commission of
the offense. That span of seven (7) months has given
accused an opportunity to contrive and feign mental
derangement. Dr. Mendoza had no opportunity to
observed (sic) and assessed (sic) the behavior of the
accused immediately before, during and immediately
after the commission of the offense. Her finding is
conjectural, inconclusive. She did not conduct
background examination of the mental condition of
the accused before the incident by interviewing
persons who had the opportunity to associate with
him."29
Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have
proven that he had already been completely deprived
of reason when he killed the victim. 30 Verily, the
evidence proffered by the defense did not indicate
that he had been completely deprived of intelligence
or freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession or
avoidance and, as such, clear and convincing proof is
required to establish its existence.31 Indubitably, the
defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required
to overthrow the presumption of sanity.
Second Issue:
Proper Penalty
Although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of
insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the death
penalty on appellant. It imposed the maximum
penalty without considering the presence or the
absence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. The imposition of the capital penalty
was not only baseless, but contrary to the rules on
the application of penalties as provided in the Revised
Penal Code. Even the Office of the Solicitor General
concedes this error in the imposition of the death
penalty.32
Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime
of parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty
to be imposed on him should be that for the graver
offense which is parricide. This is in accordance with
the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states: "When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, x x x."
The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is
punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. In all
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty consisting
of two indivisible penalties, the court is mandated to
impose one or the other, depending on the presence
or the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.33 The rules with respect to the
application of a penalty consisting of two indivisible
penalties are prescribed by Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which is quoted
as follows:

"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty

composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

xxx-xxx-xxx

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating

circumstances in the commission of the deed, the
lesser penalty shall be applied." (Italics supplied)

Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of

two indivisible penalties and there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower
penalty shall be imposed.34 Considering that neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were
established in this case, the imposable penalty should
only be reclusion perpetua.35

Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital

crime per se, it is not always punishable with death.
The law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death -- two indivisible penalties, the
application of either one of which depends on the
presence or the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances.36

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court

of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68) in Criminal Case No.
95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty
is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with
current jurisprudence, appellant shall pay the heirs of
the victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity
and P22,800 as actual damages, which were duly
proven. No pronouncement as to costs.
[G.R. NO. 148695 : May 27, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. RANDY
BELONIO y LANDAS, Appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review before this Court is
the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Negros Occidental (Branch 50 stationed in Bacolod
City) in Criminal Case No. 00-20595, dated February
26, 2001, finding Randy Belonio y Landas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and
sentencing him to death.
The Amended Information dated April 27, 2000,
charged appellant with Murder as
follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
That on or about the 6th day of January, 2000, in the
City of Talisay, Province of Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with an improvised knife, with intent to kill, and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one RAMY TAMAYO, thus causing
injuries in the vital parts of the body of the latter
which caused his instantaneous death.
That accused RANDY BELONIO y LANDAS is a
recidivist for having been convicted by final judgment
of 4 years, two (2) months, one day to six years in
Crim. Case 94-16609 entitled: People of the
Philippines v. Randy Belonio y Landas for
Homicide.2 cralawred
Upon his arraignment on May 24, 2000, 3 appellant,
assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.
In his Brief,4 the Solicitor General narrates the factual
antecedents of the case, as summarized by the trial
court, as follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Jennifer Carampatana testified that on January 6,
2000, her grandmother was buried and there was a
wake in their house at Brgy. Zone 14 in the evening.
Her first cousin, the late Ramy Tamayo, also called
Ramon Tamayo, arrived in their house at about 10:00
P.M. together with his wife.
Jennifer invited Ramy to talk outside of their house.
Before they could sit on a nearby bench, Ramy
decided to buy cigarettes from a store only a few
meters away. The store was furnished with a small
opening for the store-keeper to attend to the
customers and Ramy was occupying that space in
front of the opening to pay when the accused Randy
Belonio arrived. Randy tried to force his way in front
of the opening and as a consequence, he bumped on
Ramy. Jennifer saw that Randy gave Ramy a long and
hard look.
Jennifer said that he and Ramy sat and talked on the
bench. The accused came over and sat on the other
end of the bench. Then the accused asked Ramy for
the latters cigarette lighter. The accused asked Ramy
from what place did he come from and why was he
there. Ramy answered the accused in a normal
manner.
The accused left but after a few minutes he returned,
Jennifer, who was facing the direction of the
approaching accused, saw him and noticed that he
was wearing long sleeves. Ramy Tamayo could not
see the accused as he was facing sideways to
Jennifer. Without saying a word and without warning,
the accused delivered a stabbing blow with a dagger
which was concealed in his hand. Ramy was hit on
the right chest, Jennifer stood up and ran towards her
house shouting for help. There at the gate of the
fence of her house, she heard another thudding
sound of a stabbing blow.When Jennifer entered her
house, she announced that Ramy was stabbed.
Jennifer and her relatives rushed out of the house.
Jennifer saw the accused running away towards the
back of the barangay hall. The Tanods who came over
failed to find the accused. Then when the Barangay
Captain and the policemen arrived, Jennifer informed
them of the direction towards which the accused fled.
The accused was arrested from one (1) of the houses
near the barangay hall where he took refuge.
Dr. Raul V. Pama, Jr. was the acting City Health Officer
of Talisay City on January 6, 2000. He conducted an
autopsy on the remains of Ramy Tamayo and listed
his findings in a necropsy report which he prepared.
These findings are as
follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
1.Stabbed wound, 1.7 cm. in length, sutured sharp on
one (1) and (inferior portion) and blunt on the other
end (superior portion) located at the 4 th intercostal
space;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Dr. Pama explained that the wound is just above the
left nipple and it penetrated downward hitting the left
side on the heart;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2.Stabbed wound at the sternal. The wound is
situated just above the site of the first wound.
The first wound was fatal as it damaged the
heart.5 cralawred
In his Brief,6 Randy Belonio adopted the above
findings of the trial court and the prosecution.
However, he raises the defense of insanity, an
exempting circumstance, and for such purpose,
depends on the expert assessment of his witness, Dr.
Antonio Gauzon, who certified
thus:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
This is an individual who is suffering from
(Schizophrenia), Chronic Undifferentiated and
probably triggered by (s) ubstance abuse of Shabu
and Marijuana.
Recommending treatment and rehabilitation in a
mental institution like the National Center for Mental
(H) ealth in Mandaluyong City or treatment in the
psychiatric unit of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano
Regional Hospital in Bacolod City and later
rehabilitation in the Negros (O) ccidental Mental
Health Center at Paglaum Village, Bacolod
City.7 cralawred
The RTC was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant was guilty of Murder and that he had full
control of his mental faculties. It held that the
testimony of Dr. Ester Regina Servando was more
weighty and credible than that of Dr. that he and the victim did not know each other at
Gauzon.8 cralawred that time.11 cralawred
The trial court convicted appellant, Appellant also asseverates that Dr. Gauzon is a
thus:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary reliable expert witness and is more knowledgeable
and experienced than Dr. Servando. 12 He explains
that Dr. Servando was once under the tutelage of Dr.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the
accused Randy Belonio y Landas GUILTY beyond Gauzon and that at the time of their respective
testimonies, the former was only 37 years old, while
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code the latter was 57 years old. 13 Appellant also cites
portions of the trial courts Decision where Dr. Gauzon
as charged in the Information, as Principal by Direct
(Participation) with the qualifying aggravating referred him to the Bacolod City Health Office for
psychiatric examination. The trial court also branded
circumstance of treachery and the special
aggravating circumstance of recidivism. There are no the accused as a homicidal maniac, which appellant
says, is judicial notice of his mental sickness. 14 In
other aggravating circumstances nor is there any
mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, the accused is sum, he concludes that all of these circumstances
show that he was insane at the time of the killing.
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act.Proof of the existence of some abnormality of
the mental faculties will not exclude imputability, if it
can be shown that the offender was not completely
deprived of freedom and intelligence. 19 As culled from
the trial courts findings, Belonio, after giving the
victim a hard and resentful look, sat near the latter,
lighted his cigarette and conversed with
him.20 Afterwards, he left and came back armed with
a dagger with which he stabbed Tamayo. Immediately
thereafter, he escaped and went into hiding. Contrary
to a finding of the existence of insanity, these acts
tend to establish that Belonio was well aware of what
he had just committed, and was capable of
distinguishing right from wrong. Otherwise, he would
not have attempted to escape and go into hiding.

We find these arguments without merit.
The accused is held civilly liable to pay the heirs of
Randy Tamayo the following amounts:
The moral and legal presumption is that one acts with
1.The sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; free will and intelligence, and that a felonious or
criminal act has been done with deliberate intent,
that is, with freedom and intelligence.15Whoever,
2.The sum of P3,629.70 as reimbursement for therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the
hospital expenses;
burden of proving its existence.
Aside from the bumping incident earlier discussed,
the only other evidence of insanity that appellant
could relevantly point to is the medical certificate
prepared by Dr. Antonio Gauzon stating that Belonio
was suffering from schizophrenia. This witness was
presented to refute the findings of the prosecutions
expert witness Dr. Ester Regina Servando which
negated the existence of this mental condition.

3.The sum of P940,716.00 as compensatory A run-through of Dr. Gauzons testimony strengthens

damages; andcralawlibrary
4.The sum of P100,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Jinky
Tamayo as moral damages.9 cralawred
Hence this automatic review.
In his brief, appellant assigns this lone alleged error
of the court a quo for our
consideration:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
The trial court seriously erred in not appreciating the
exempting circumstance of insanity pursuant to
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
favoring the accused-appellant.10 cralawred
In support of his appeal, appellant argues that he was
not in his right and normal frame of mind when the
killing took place. He avers that no normal person
would ever bump another person, give the latter a
hard look and eventually stab him to death. He adds
Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and
avoidance, and as such must be adequately
proved.16 The law presumes that all persons are of
sound mind, and that acts are done
consciously.17 cralawred
In the case at bar, the defense utterly failed to
discharge its burden of proving that appellant was
insane. The testimony or proof of appellants insanity
must relate to the time preceding or the very
moment of the commission of the offense
charged.18 We find the evidence adduced by the
defense sorely insufficient to establish his claim that
he was insane at the time he killed Tamayo.
The main circumstances presented by the defense
that remotely evinces that appellant was insane at
that time was his act of bumping the victim, without
any apparent reason, giving him a long hard look, and
then eventually stabbing him. However, this
sequence of events cannot overcome the legal
presumption of sanity, let alone prove appellants
insanity.
this Courts resolve to affirm the lower courts findings.
Part of his testimony is reproduced as
follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q.Now, from this Medical Certificate, Doctor, there is
specifically mentioned here that the subject here was
found to be incoherent and irrelevant and disoriented
as to time, person and place, and that there was
plight of ideas and adjustment, as well as insights.
Will you kindly explain this to this Honorable Court?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.What meant there is that, when you talk to the
individual, sometimes you get answers right,
sometimes it is wrong. That is when you say that he
is incoherent. When you say irrelevant, that pertain to
the question. Now, as far as dates, he could not
remember the date. As far (as) the place, he could
not recall the place when he was in my office.And
some of the persons that were with him, he could not
identify them. Now, when I say that there was plight
of ideas, that (was) when he was talking.As a matter
of fact, I gave an example, when I asked a question
when I asked him about the first killing incident and
his answer was, face to face kami, simbahan namon
kag inagaw namon ang baril because of warship. That
is only one, because there were others that you could
not understand what he was talking about whether
you have to rely only on other things. And
sometimes, he would talk on things which are not
there. That means he was hallucinating. Now,
judgment is usually poor. Because, when I asked him
of what he will do regarding the case, he would just
say that, Ti, amo na ya. And he said, Ano kamo da
ya? kay ang warship. So, I was asking him about the
values of what he was doing and he could not give
me that answer. And he does not know what he was
doing. That means that there was no reality testing.
He does not know what is the real fantasy.
xxxxxxxxx
Q.Now in your opinion as an expert in terms of
Psychiatry, about how long has the subject, Randy
Belonio, been suffering from his mental disorder that
you mentioned in your Medical Certificate?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Since childhood. If you would notice, I put there in
the history that his father was medically disabled
when he was ten (10) years old, and the mother was
only a fish vendor and there were, I think, eight (8) to
ten (10) in the family and with a meager income and
have to (fend) for themselves. And in a very young
age of ten (10), the parents had the attitude of
Bahala na ang kabata-an. That means, they have to
take care of themselves. At age 13, he was brought
by the relative to Manila, and although he was
incoherent, you can get from his answer by
mentioning so many places, (like) Manila, Pasay,
Caloocan, Novaliches, MRT, Cubao. That means, at
age 13, he was already around these areas (f) ending
for himself. And the (s) treet (u) rchins, you know for
a fact, that they are influenced by drugs. So, by that
time, with that dysfunctional family, and without any
family to take care of himself, he was not doing what
the society expects him to do. So that they have
dysfunctional family and with dysfunctional relatives.
So, the value system was really poor. So that the
thinking process of this individual was not developed
to what the society expects him to be. So, it started
at that time. So, when he was taking shabu, it
triggered every tissue that the symptoms came out.
Thats why, he became suspicious, (he) became
irritable and anybody who would try to not befriend
him and tried to be angry with him, he would
immediately suspect that something would happen to
him in which he would react by defending himself,
and probably by killing. This individual had, actually,
committed, say, killing. I would not say murder
because thats your term, but he had killed already
three (3) persons in different years. So, he does not
already know what he was doing because he was
psychotic, which in your parlance is insane.
Q.Now, Doctor, on January 6, 2000, and even prior to
this date, what you are trying to say is that, this
subject, Randy Belonio, was already suffering from
schizophrenia?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.21 cralawred
Dr. Gauzon testified that based on his interview with
Belonio on October 25, 2000 (around nine
months after the stabbing incident) the latter was
suffering from schizophrenia. However, the evidence
of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense
may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of
alleged abnormal behavior immediately before or
simultaneous to the commission of the
crime.22 cralawred
The first set of facts narrated by the doctor relates to
Belonios condition during the interview, months after
the incident. His report was silent as regards the
incidents occurring prior to or during the
circumstance for which Belonio stands trial. The
second part of his testimony dwelt on Belonios life
history, which was offered to prove that he had been
suffering from his alleged condition since childhood.
However, perusing the story as narrated by the
doctor, the same was a mere statement of Belonios
life and family history, explaining what brought about
his supposed mental condition. There was no showing
that he was actually suffering from schizophrenia
during his juvenile years. To demonstrate that he had
been suffering from this condition, the doctor pointed
to the fact that he has already killed three (3)
persons, including the present incident. However,
such conclusion is non sequitur and, at best, a
circuitous argument. Further, the veracity of these
findings is belied by the fact that the accused did not
raise this defense during his prosecutions for the
other killings. No other circumstances evincing its
existence were presented during trial.
Furthermore, Dr. Gauzons examination cannot
surmount Dr. Servandos punctilious and
overwhelming analysis, which took two days to
narrate. She explained the history of the accused,
including his family and medical background,
conducted a mental status examination, which was
based on her direct interviews with him, and gave a
series of other written psychological
examinations.23 cralawred
The portion of Dr. Servandos testimony pertinent to
her findings regarding Belonios mental condition is
quoted as follows:
FISCAL AGRAVIADOR:
Q.Can you please read for the record this (r) esult
which consist only of one (1) sentence?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Psychiatric Evaluation Result. Base(d) on history,
mental status examination, and psychological
examination, patient was noted to be evasive,
suspicious, and manipulative but no psychotic
features were observed upon evaluation. x x x.
Q.So, let us first, may I ask, what do you me(a) n by
patient was noted to be evasive, suspicious, and
manipulative?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Actually, during the psychological examination, we
have to give series of questions. And then the patient
(does) not answer directly to our question. He would
go around the bush. And then, after that, we also
found out during the result of the psychological
examination that the same pattern was noted.
Q.Does this mean that he was totally capable of being
manipulative or evasive?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.
Q.He did it intentionally?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.
Q.With the knowledge that he knew the answer but
does not want to give the answer?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.
Q.Meaning to say, that he has full control of his
mental faculties that time?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.
Q.Because there was an intention to be manipulative
and there was an intention to be evasive because he
was suspicious?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.
Q.When you said that there was no psychotic
features(,) x x x (w) hat does this mean?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.When you say psychosis, those are compose[d] of
symptoms such as delusion and hallucination that are
being extracted from the patient or being displayed
by the patient. However, during the examination, the
symptom or the patients answers are not enough to
put him to a criteria of psychosis because the
delusion and the hallucination as well as the thought
process, the thought contents must be concretized
enough in order for us to determine to diagnose that
this patient is actually suffering from psychosis.
Q.So, subjected to your examination, this patient did
not come up to the level where he could be
diagnosed as having delusion and hallucinations?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Leading to psychotic features.
Q.So, that is the meaning of not having psychotic
features?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.24 cralawred
The insanity issue raised by appellant boils down to
the credibility of these two expert witnesses and their
respective testimonies. The time-honored doctrine is
that the question of which witness to believe is one
best addressed by the trial court. The findings of fact
of the judges who heard the evidence are accorded
great respect and are seldom disturbed on appeal for
they had the opportunity to directly observe the
witnesses, and to determine by their demeanor on
the stand the probative value of their
testimonies.25 The Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the ruling of the trial court which found Dr.
Servandos testimony more credible for the following
reasons:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
1.It could not be gainsaid that Dr. Servando is a
disinterested and unbiased witness. She does not
know the accused and she is not known to the
accused. She will not be benefited if the Court
upholds her findings and she had no reason to testify
falsely. On the other hand, Dr. Gauzon was admittedly
paid for his services, hence, it could not be truly said
that he is an impartial and disinterested witness. If
his findings (are) upheld, the benefit to the practice of
his profession is
enormous;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2.As a government official, Dr. Servando has the
presumption of regularity in the performance of her
duty. No such presumption arises in favor of Dr.
Gauzon;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3.The findings of Dr. Servando that the accused is
evasive and manipulative is supported by the Courts
own observation. x x x.
xxx
4.The conclusion of Dr. Gauzon is principally based on
his interview with the accused and the members of
the accuseds family. It was the members of the
accuseds family, the sister of the accused who
informed Dr. Gauzon that at the age of 13, the
accused began to use drugs. The information that the
family of the accused was impoverished; that the
accused spent his adolescence in Metro-Manila; that
the accused was a neglected child were all supplied
by the kins of the accused who were not presented as
witnesses. There was no showing that Dr. Gauzon
took precautionary steps to validate the
information.On the other hand, Dr. Servando also
conducted interview of the accused and his
accompanying relatives including the BJMP guard who
escorted him. In addition, Dr. Servando conducted a
series of written tests which are tailored to determine
the mental capacity of a person. The result of the
written tests confirms the observation of Dr. Servando
in the interview that the accused is evasive and
manipulative.26 cralawred
Unlike in other jurisdictions, Philippine courts have
established a more stringent criterion for the
acceptance of insanity as an exempting
circumstance. In our jurisdiction, mere abnormality of
the mental faculties is not enough; there must be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act.
Every individual is presumed to have acted with
complete grasp of ones mental faculties. Appellants
past does not discredit the facts that (1) he did not
act with complete absence of the power to discern;
(2) he was not deprived of reason; and (3) he was not
totally deprived of his will.
As held in People v. Madarang,27 cralawred
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not
guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the
crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was
insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the
accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone and if
found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is
rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt as he
had already admitted committing the crime. x x
x.28 cralawred
Inasmuch as Belonio failed to present convincing
evidence to establish his alleged insanity at the time
he stabbed Tamayo, we are constrained to affirm his
conviction.
We must add that we have meticulously reviewed the
records of this case, especially the evidence of the
prosecution. We find no reason to modify, much less
reverse, the findings of the trial court that, indeed,
appellants guilt for murder has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
We now look into the propriety of the penalty
imposed by the trial court.
Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659, any person found guilty of
murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. The same Code further instructs that when in
the commission of the crime there is present an
aggravating circumstance which is not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.29 cralawred
A review of the records supports the conclusion of the
trial court on the presence of treachery, which
qualified the crime to murder. For treachery to be
appreciated, two elements must concur: (1) the
means of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted.30 cralawred
In the present case, Jennifer Carampatana testified on
how the killing was executed, as follows:
Q.What did you do there?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.While we were conversing at that bench, after a
short while, or five (5) minutes, Randy Belonio came
and he asked to light his cigarette because Ramy was
smoking at that time. He was allowed by Ramy to
light his cigarette.
Q.Was there any conversation between Ramy Tamayo
and Randy Belonio aside from asking lighting of
cigarette?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.While asking to light the cigarette, Randy inquired
from Ramy why he was there, Ramy told him that he
is attending the wake of his grandmother. Further,
Randy asked him where he came from?And Ramy
answered that he is from Hda. Bubog.
Q.After that what did Randy Belonio do if he did
anything?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.He (sat) for a while, and a little while after that, he
took a look at Ramy. After some minutes, he went
out.
Q.And after few minutes was there any incident
happened?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.After three (3) minutes Randy went back. He just
walk normally, and when he was near Ramy he
stabbed Ramy hitting on the chest and while the
weapon was still on the breast of Ramy I stood up and
ran away.
Q.From what direction did Randy came when he
approach you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.He came from their house because their house is
near our house.
Q.In relation to you, where is this house located?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Witness indicating that he came from her side,
where the house is situated.
Q.And which side did you sit, the side near the
direction of the house of Randy Belonio or far from
the house of Belonio?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.The other side.
COURT:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
It was Ramy who was sitting near the house of Ramy?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WITNESS:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Yes, sir.
APP AGRAVIADOR:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Q.And what was the position of Ramy Tamayo when
he was suddenly stab.
A.He was sitting in this manner.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness illustrating by crossing her legs over the
other legs and move slightly her body was in side
way.
APP AGRAVIADOR:
Q.That means that Ramy Tamayo did not see Randy
Belonio who was coming from the house?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes, Maam.
COURT:
Let me interrupt. He was facing you?Ramy was facing
you while you were facing the direction where the
house of Randy Belonio, so that Ramy was facing on
the other side?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WITNESS:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
A.Yes, sir.
COURT:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Proceed.
APP AGRAVIADOR:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Q.When Randy Belonio suddenly thrust the knife on
the chest of Ramy Tamayo, did you see the reaction
of Ramy Tamayo?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.He was not able to move. After that, I want to ran to
the house.
APP AGRAVIADOR:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Q.When for the first time did you see the weapon
used by Randy Belonio in taking the life of Ramy
Tamayo?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.When he thrusted that knife.
COURT:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Before or after he delivered the stabbing blow?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.At the moment he delivered the stabbing blow, that
was the first time I saw that knife.
APP AGRAVIADOR:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Q.When you saw Randy Belonio approaching Ramy
Tamayo x x x, you did not see the knife?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Because he was wearing long sleeve to cover his
hand.31 cralawred
Appellants acts of leaving, then returning after a few
minutes armed with a knife -- which he concealed
while approaching the victim and which he used in
stabbing him -- while the latter was sitting, unaware
and not forewarned of any danger, manifest a
deliberate employment of means to ensure the killing
without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the victim might make.
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism, which
was alleged in the Information was also duly proven.
A recidivist is one who at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same
title of this Code.32 The records33 show that appellant
was previously convicted by final judgment of
Homicide, which like Murder, falls under the title of
Crimes against Persons.
The award by the court a quo of P50,000 as civil
indemnity is in accordance with jurisprudence.34 The
amount of P25,000 as exemplary damages should
also be given because of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism. However, the
court erred in awarding the amount ofP940,716 as
loss of earning capacity. In accordance with the
formula adopted by the Court in Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
v. CA (31 SCRA 511 [1970]), and using the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality,35 the loss of Tamayos
earning capacity is to be computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x (Gross
Annual Income Living
Expenses) WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision in Criminal Case
No. 00-20595 convicting the appellant of the crime of
where: Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 the age of the murder and sentencing him to DEATH is AFFIRMED.
deceased) The award for loss of earning capacity
is INCREASED to P1,362,545; moral damages
is REDUCED to P50,000; actual damages
= 2/3 (80-24) x [(P200x365) - P36,500] is DELETED but temperate damages of P25,000 and
exemplary damages of P25,000 are awarded.
=P1,362,545
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659 amending
The award for loss of earning capacity should Section 23 of the Revised Penal Code, let the records
therefore be P1,362,545. of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of
this decision, to the Office of the President for
There being testimonial evidence in support of moral possible exercise of the pardoning power.
damages, an award for it is proper. However, it should
be reduced to the more reasonable amount Costs against appellant.
of P50,000 considering that it is not meant to enrich
an injured party. SO ORDERED.
Actual damages for the hospital expenses in the
amount of P3,627.70 were duly supported by
receipts. However instead of awarding actual
damages, we grant temperate damages in
accordance with People v. Andres ,36 where the Court
said:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
[W]e declared in the case of People v. Villanueva that:
when actual damages proven by receipts during the
trial amount to less than P25,000, as in this case, the
award of temperate damages for P25,000 is justified
in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount.
Conversely, if the amount of actual damages proven
exceeds P25,000, then temperate damages may no
longer be awarded; actual damages based on the
receipts presented during trial should instead be
granted.
The victims heirs should, thus, be awarded temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.37 cralawred
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position
that R.A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless they
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.
[G.R. No. 37673. March 31, 1933.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. POTENCIANO
TANEO, Defendant-Appellant.
Carlos S. Tan for, Appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PARRICIDE; INVOLUNTARY ACTS OF ACCUSED;
EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY. By virtue of
the facts stated in the decision, Held: That the
defendant acted while in a dream of his acts, with
which he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense
of entailing criminal liability.
DECISION
AVANCEA, C.J. :
Potenciano Taneo lived with his wife in his parents
house in the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc,
Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being
celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were
entertained in the house. Among them were Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon,
Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping,
he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and,
upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he
wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo
attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to
attack his father after which he wounded himself.
Potencianos wife who was then seven months
pregnant, died five days later as a result of her
wound, and also the ftus which was asphyxiated in
the mothers womb.
An information for parricide was filed against
Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was
sentenced by the trial court to reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to
pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant
appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the
commission of the crime the defendant had a quarrel
over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and
Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down and
fight, and when he was about to go down, he was
stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the
commission of the crime, it was noted that the
defendant was sad and weak, and early in the
afternoon he had a severe stomachache which made
it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when he
fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell
asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab
him with a bolo, while Abadilla held his feet, by
reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him
that he his enemies were inviting him to come down,
he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At
the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him
that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his
wife really wounded and in desperation wounded
himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around
him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did
not have any trouble with his wife, but that he loved
her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with
Tanner and Malinao, or had any motive for assaulting
them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a
dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were
not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal
liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into
consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a
motive for committing a criminal act does not
necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply
they are not known to us, for we cannot probe into
the depths of ones conscience where they may be
found, hidden away and inaccessible to our
observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an
extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit
a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of
committing it. But under the special circumstances of
the case, in which the victim was the defendants
own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into
consideration the fact that the defendant tried to
attack also his father, in whose house and under
whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner
and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as
may be inferred from the evidence presented, we find
not only a lack of motives for the defendant to
voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also
motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also
of the same opinion. The doctor stated that,
considering the circumstances of the case, the
defendant acted while in a dream, under the
influence of an hallucination and not in his right
mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the
supposition that the wound of the deceased was a
direct result of the defendants act performed in order
to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the
evidence does not clearly show this to have been the
case, but that it may have been caused accidentally.
Nobody saw how the wound was inflicted. The
defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife.
He only seemed to have heard her say that she was
wounded. What the evidence shows is that the
deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the
defendant at the door of the room as he was coming
out. The defendant did not dream that he was
assaulting his wife but that he was defending himself
from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was
really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reversing the
judgment appealed from, the court finds that the
defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with
which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be
confined in the Government insane asylum, whence
he shall not be released until the director thereof
finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a
menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos and Butte, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 46539. September 27, 1939.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. VALENTIN DOQUEA, Defendant-
Appellant.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias & Castillo
for Appellant.
Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and
Assistant Attorney Paredes, jr ., for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; HOMICIDE; MINOR
WHO ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT. Counsel for the
appellant argues that to determine whether or not a
minor acted with discernment, we must take into
consideration not only the facts and circumstances
which gave rise to the act committed by the minor,
but also his state of mind at the time the crime was
committed, the time he might have had at his
disposal for the purpose of meditating on the
consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning
he could have had at that moment. He mistakes the
discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of
the Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least
for lack of intention which, is a mitigating
circumstance, is included among other mitigating
circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The
discernment that constitutes an exception to the
exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an
act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong,
and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts
and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behavior of said minor, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also
after and even during the trial (U. S. v. Maralit,;36
Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the
Conclusion arrived at by it is correct.
D E C I S I O N DIAZ, J.:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was
prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by
stabbing him in the breast with a knife on November
19, 1938, in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The
court, after trying the case, held that the accused
acted with discernment in committing the act
imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with
the provisions of article 80 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered
him to be sent to the Training School for Boys to
remain therein until he reaches the age of majority.
From this order the accused interposed
an appeal alleging that the court erred in holding that
he had acted with discernment and in not having
dismissed the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly
thirteen years, nine months and five days old. The
incident that gave rise to the aggression committed
by him on the deceased is narrated in the appealed
order as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Between 1 and 2 oclock in the afternoon of
November 19,1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos
and one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in
the yard of the intermediate school of the
municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan. The
herein accused, who was also in said yard, intervened
and, catching the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos,
hitting him on the stomach. For this act of the
accused, Juan Ragojos chased him around the yard
and, upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape.
Said accused then turned against the deceased
assuming a threatening attitude, for which reason
said deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist,
returning immediately to the place where Epifanio
Rarang was in order to continue playing with him. The
accused, offended by what he considered an abuse
on the part of Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more
robust than he, looked around the yard for a stone
with which to attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos,
but finding none, he approached a cousin of his
named Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him
his knife. Epifanio Rarang, who had heard what the
accused had been asking his cousin, told the latter
not to give the accused his knife because he might
attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused, however,
succeeded in taking possession of the knife which
was in a pocket of his cousins pants. Once in
possession of the knife, Valentin Doquea
approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to
give him another blow with his fist, to which the
deceased answered that he did not want to do so
because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger than the
accused. Juan Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of
the accused, continued playing and, while he was
thus unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball
with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in the
chest with the knife which he
carried."cralaw virtua1aw library
The order also contains the following conclusions and
findings of fact which we are not at liberty to alter,
not being called upon or authorized to do so, in view
of the nature of the appeal before us, by section 138
of the Administrative Code, as amended by
commonwealth Act No. 3:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Taking into account the fact that when the accused
Valentin Doquea committed the crime in question,
he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of
the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such
pupil, he was one of the brightest in said school and
was a captain of a company of the cadet corps
thereof, and during the time he was studying therein
he always obtained excellent marks, this court is
convinced that the accused in committing the crime,
acted with discernment and was conscious of the
nature and consequences of his act, and so also has
this court observed at the time said accused was
testifying in his behalf during the trial of this
case."cralaw virtua1aw library
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in
the appealed order, convinces us that
the appeal taken from said order is absolutely
unfounded, because it is error to determine
discernment by the means resorted to by the
attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his
brief. He claims that to determine whether or not a
minor acted with discernment, we must take into
consideration not only the facts and circumstances
which gave rise to the act committed by the minor,
but also his state of mind at the time the crime was
committed, the time he might have had at his
disposal for the purpose of meditating on the
consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning
he could have had at that moment. It is clear that the
attorney for the defense mistakes the discernment
referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the Revised
Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for lack of
intention which, as a mitigating circumstance, is
included among other mitigating circumstances in
article 13 of said Code. The discernment that
constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age
but over nine who commits an act prohibited by law,
is his mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong, and such capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances
accorded by the records in each case, the very
appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment
and behavior of said minor, not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and
even during the trial (U. S. v. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155).
This was done by the trial court, and the conclusion
arrived at by it is correct.

Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the

costs to the appellant. So ordered.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 162052 : January 13, 2005]
ALVIN JOSE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 22289 affirming with modification the Decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch
36, convicting the accused therein of violation of
Section 21(b), Article IV in relation to Section 29,
Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga
were charged with the said crime in an Information,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the
municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, not being licensed or
authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to other
person METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or
shabu) weighing 98.40 grams, a regulated drug, and
in violation of the aforestated law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the charge.
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the
prosecution established the following:
'[O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of
the Fourth Regional Narcotics Unit received an
information from an unnamed informant. Said
unnamed informant was introduced to him by former
Narcom P/Senior Inspector Recomono. The
information was that a big time group of drug pushers
from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at
Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba,
Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was
assigned to act as the poseur-buyer. SPO2 William
Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other
members of the team. SPO1 Guevarra was provided
with marked money consisting of a P1,000.00 bill on
top of a bundle of make-believe "money bills"
supposedly amounting to P100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph
R. Castro, SPO2 William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna
went to the place on a Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1
Guevarra and the informant boarded an L-300 van.
They arrived at the Chowking Restaurant at about
11:00 in the morning. They positioned their cars at
the parking area where they had a commanding view
of people going in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp.
2-8 and TSN, July 11, 1996, pp. 4-7).
It was about 4 o'clock in the afternoon when a Toyota
Corolla with Plate No. UBV-389 arrived. Sonny Zarraga
was the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed
informant approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga.
Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra
and informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with
him 100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra
offered to buy the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1
Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100
grams of shabu. Guevarra responded in the
affirmative. He showed the aforecited bundle of
"money bills." Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to
bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to Bonifacio
Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, handed
the bundle of "money bills."
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal
to signify that the transaction was consummated
(TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately thereafter,
William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna approached and
introduced themselves as Narcom Operatives. They
arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The buy-bust
bundle of "money bills" and the shabu were
recovered. The two were brought to Camp Vicente
Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon conducted the
investigation. The shabu was brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination (TSN, July 30, 1996,
pp. 9-10 and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13).
P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo examined
the shabu. She reported and testified that the
specimen, indeed, was a second or low grade
methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996,
pp. 31-36).4
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to
establish the following facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on
November 13, 1995, they were at SM Mega Mall (sic),
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change money.
Suddenly, a person with a hand bag appeared and
ordered them to handcuff themselves. They were
later able to identify three of these people as Police
Supt. Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel Seno and a
certain Corpuz. They were all in civilian clothes.
They proceeded to where Sonny Zarraga's car was
parked. Sonny Zarraga was forced to board another
car while another person drove Sonny Zarraga's car
with Alvin Jose as passenger. They drove towards
Greenhills. They were eventually blindfolded. On the
way to Greenhills, one of the men opened the gloves
compartment of Sonny Zarraga's car. One of the men
saw a substance inside the said compartment. He
tasted it. Said person asked Sonny Zarraga if he could
come up with P1.5 Million peso (sic). Col. Castro even
showed the picture of Sonny Zarraga's mother-in-law
who was supposed to be a rich drug pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While
inside the said room, Sonny Zarraga's cellular phone
rung. It was a call from Sonny Zarraga's wife. Col.
Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga and asked her if she
could pay P1.5 Million as ransom for the release of
Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga instead offered to
withdraw money from the bank in the amount
of P75,000.00. The agreement was that in the bank,
Pinky Zarraga would withdraw the money and deliver
it to Col. Castro in exchange for Sonny Zarraga's
release. The agreement did not materialize. Col.
Castro and Pinky Zarraga met inside the bank but
Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw the money as
Sonny Zarraga was nowhere to be seen. There was a
commotion inside the bank which prompted the bank
manager to call the police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for
Alvin Jose who was left at the room and brought them
to Camp Vicente Lim. There, they were
investigated.rbl r l l CONSIDERING THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION OF
lbrr THE SHABU IN COURT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND,
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny
Zarraga's jewelry, P85,000.00 in cash and Sonny
Zarraga's car spare tire, jack and accessories. Noel
Seno was even able to withdraw the P2,000.00 using
Sonny Zarraga's ATM card.5
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting both accused of the crime charged and
sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny
Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, six (6) years and one (1) day to ten
(10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2
million each and to pay the cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive
imprisonment undergone both by the accused shall
be credited in their favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is
hereby ordered to deliver and surrender the
confiscated Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the
Dangerous Drugs Board.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred
that the trial court erred as follows:
I crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
JURISPRUDENCE.8
WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT THE APPELLANTS
COMMITTED THE CRIME OF SELLING PROHIBITED
DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IDENTITY OF THE
DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
FOUND THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED AGAINST THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER
PENALTY AGAINST THEM.
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO
PAY A FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF P2 MILLION
PESOS (SIC) AND THE COST OF THE SUIT.7
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision
appealed from with modification. The appellate court
reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose,
on its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old
when he committed the crime; hence, he was entitled
to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
and to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees. The
appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging
that since the Information failed to allege that he
acted with discernment when the crime was
committed and that the prosecution failed to prove
the same, he should be acquitted. The appellate
court denied the motion.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his Petition
for Review on Certiorari, alleging that -
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT PETITIONER, WHO WAS ONLY 13 YEARS
OLD WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED
BY HIM IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY
ZARRAGA, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE
ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT
THAT PETITIONER SO ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT,
PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE ESTABLISHED
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article
12 of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine (9)
and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime is exempt from criminal
liability unless he acted with discernment, in which
case he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603,
as amended by P.D. No. 1179, as provided for in
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He avers that
the prosecution was burdened to allege in the
Information and prove beyond reasonable doubt that
he acted with discernment, but that the prosecution
failed to do so. The petitioner insists that the court is
mandated to make a finding that he acted with
discernment under paragraph 1, Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code and since the CA made no such
finding, he is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
asserts that the allegation in the Information that the
petitioner and his co-accused conspired and
confederated to sell the shabu subject of the
Information sufficiently avers that the petitioner
acted with discernment; hence, there was no need for
the public prosecutor to allege specifically in the
Information that the petitioner so acted. It contends
that it is not necessary for the trial and appellate
courts to make an express finding that the petitioner
acted with discernment. It is enough that the very
acts of the petitioner show that he acted knowingly
and was sufficiently possessed with judgment to
know that the acts he committed were wrong.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a
minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is
exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony.
The law applies even if such minor is charged with a
such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his
age in order for him to be exempt from criminal
liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor
of such age is presumed lacking the mental element
of a crime - the capacity to know what is wrong as
distinguished from what is right or to determine the Q And what happened next? A The P1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money,
morality of human acts; wrong in the sense in which chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Sir.
the term is used in moral wrong. 9 However, such
presumption is rebuttable.10 For a minor at such an A After that I showed my money, Sir. Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused,
age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is what happened next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
burdened11 to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by
direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the
discernment, meaning that he knew what he was affirmative specifically'. I withdraw that. A I made signs to my companions, Sir.
doing and that it was wrong. 12 Such circumstantial
evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his Q When you said they asked you whether you can Q What signs did you give?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
overt acts before, during and after the commission of afford to buy 100 grams tell us who asked you that
the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon question?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head,
used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to Sir.
silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his A Sonny Zarraga, Sir.
hiding the corpus delicti.
Q And how did your companions respond to your
Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what signal?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove was his response?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who
was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime A After scratching my head, my companions
charged was committed, acted with discernment A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, approached us and arrested them.
relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The Sir.
only evidence of the prosecution against the Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who
petitioner is that he was in a car with his cousin, co- Q Did his companion bring out the shabu? arrested Sonny Zarraga?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
accused Sonny Zarraga, when the latter inquired from chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he A Yes, Sir.
could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in A Yes, Sir.
the affirmative, after which the accused Zarraga
called the petitioner to bring out and hand over Q Tell us.
the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft paper. Q What happened to the shabu?
The petitioner handed over the plastic containing chanroblesvirtualawlibrary A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir.
the shabu to accused Zarraga, who handed the same
to the poseur-buyer: A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny
Sonny Zarraga. Zarraga was arrested by these police officers?
Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with
the shabu?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary A Yes, Sir.
A The two of them, Sir.
A He handed it to me, Sir. Q Please tell us.
Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the
car, what did you tell them? Q After this shabu was handed to you, what A They introduced themselves as NARCOM
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary happened next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary operatives, Sir.

A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and Q And after that, what happened?
Sir. then I handed to him the money, Sir. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q And what was your response? Q When you say money, which money are you A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga,
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary referring to?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Sir.13

A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir.

Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to
you by the accused?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory,
Sir.
Q Who made the request for its examination?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir.
Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you.
What did you do with the shabu?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1
William Manglo, Sir.
Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the
accused, in what container was it contained?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was
wrapped in a plastic and white soft paper, Sir.14
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and
transacted with the poseur-buyer relative to the sale
of shabu. It was also accused Zarraga who received
the buy-money from the poseur-buyer. Aside from
bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to
accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat inside the
car and had no other participation whatsoever in the
transaction between the accused Zarraga and the
poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner
knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper
before and at the time he handed over the same to
his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to
ask the petitioner his age because he knew that
pushers used young boys in their transactions for
illegal drugs. We quote the testimony of the poseur-
buyer:
ATTY. VERANO:
Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your
informant?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A No, Sir.
Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin
Yamson?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I don't know the exact age, what I know is that he is
a minor, Sir.
Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I don't know, Sir.
Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your
affidavit, you stated the age of the boy?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.
Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy
at his age, were you not surprised that a young boy
like that would be in a group selling drugs?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
FISCAL:
It calls for an opinion, Your Honor.
ATTY. VERANO:
May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate
why or how this very young boy (sic) selling 100
grams of shabu.
COURT:
The witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are
being used by pushers.15
Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor
failed to elicit from the petitioner facts and
circumstances showing his capacity to discern right
from wrong. We quote the questions of the public
prosecutor on cross-examination and the petitioner's
answers thereto:
FISCAL:
Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.
COURT:
Please proceed.
FISCAL:
Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it
started on November 13, 1995 and did I hear it right
that you went to Manuela at 5 o'clock in the
afternoon?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WITNESS:
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from
Filinvest, Quezon City? You left Filinvest, Quezon City,
at 12 o'clock?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A No, Sir.
Q What time did you leave?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A After lunch, Sir.
Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that
you were in the custody of the police, you said that at
one occasion on that day, you have (sic) a chance to
be with your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it was inside
that [L]ancer car when your cousin saw his own
cellular phone on one of the seats of the car, is that
correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first
opportunity to make a call to anybody since the day
that you were arrested?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the
cellular phone.rbl r l l
lbrr
Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular A Yes, Sir. persons to commit a crime and decide to commit it.
phone appeared inside that [L]ancer car? Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties to
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Q Do you know the reason why they were there at such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is
that time?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the
A No, Sir. petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot thereby
be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused.
A No, Sir. Indeed, in People v. Estepano, 17 we held that:
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You
said that you were accosted by a male person at the Q These people do not know your car?
workshop and then you went out of Megamall and Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Rene's mental capacity to fully appreciate the
when you went outside, this man saw the key of the
car dangling at the waist. At whose waist? consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary A No, Sir. examination of Rene did not, in any way, attempt to
show his discernment. He was merely asked about
FISCAL: what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16
A From my cousin. April 1991 and whether he participated therein.
Accordingly, even if he was, indeed, a co-conspirator,
Q And at that time, that person did not have any No further question, Your Honor. he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the
knowledge where your car was? prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ATTY. VERANO: discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The
cross-examination of Rene could have provided the
A No, Sir. No re-direct, Your Honor. prosecution a good occasion to extract from him
positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in
this regard, the government miserably squandered
Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked COURT: the opportunity to incriminate him. 18 rbl
at the third level parking area of SM Megamall, is that r l l lbrr
correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a
drug user nor have you seen any shabu. In support of IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
A Yes, Sir. your claim, are you willing to submit yourself to an GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
examination?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed the Decision of the
Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36,
call to anybody?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary WITNESS: is SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged for insufficiency of evidence. 19No
A No, Sir. A Yes, Your Honor. costs.SO ORDERED.

Q Until the time that you reached the third level
parking of Megamall, he had not made any call?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A No, Sir.
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking
of the Megamall, you claimed that there was already
this group which met you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this group were the policemen who are the
companions of the male person who arrested you?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to
this Court?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
The witness is discharged.16
The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to
prove that the petitioner conspired with his co-
accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and
thereby proved the capacity of the petitioner to
discern right from wrong, is untenable. Conspiracy is
defined as an agreement between two or more
[G.R. No. 182239, March 16 : 2011]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. HERMIE M. JACINTO, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that
the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim's
positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime.[1] For it to prosper, the court
must be convinced that there was physical
impossibility on the part of the accused to have been
at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of
the crime.[2]
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose
judgment of conviction has become final and
executory only after his disqualification from availing
of the benefits of suspended sentence on the ground
that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one
(21) years, shall still be entitled to the right to
restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise
known as "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive
Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the
Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor
and for Other Purposes."
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,
[3]
appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court
the reversal of the judgment of his conviction.[4]
The Facts
In an Information dated 20 March 2003[5] filed with
the Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 1679-13-141[1],[6] appellant was accused of
the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at
about 7:00 o'clock in the evening more or less, at
barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
[Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating
circumstance of minority, the victim being only five
years old.[7]
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.[8] During pre-trial,[9] the defense admitted the
existence of the following documents: (1) birth
certificate of AAA, showing that she was born on 3
December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape
incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon
presentation of the original or upon identification
thereof by the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense
presenting witnesses to prove their respective
versions of the story.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The testimonies of AAA,[10] her father FFF,[11] and
rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito][12] may be
summarized in the following manner:
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they
were born. FFF's house is along the road. That of
appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters
from FFF. To access the road, appellant has to pass
by FFF's house, the frequency of which the latter
describes to be "every minute [and] every hour."
Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were
close friends. He bore no grudge against appellant
prior to the incident.[13]
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls
him kuya. She sees him all the time - playing at the
basketball court near her house, fetching water, and
passing by her house on his way to the road. She
and appellant used to be friends until the incident. [14]
At about past 6 o'clock in the evening of 28 January
2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to the
store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA
followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF
was not alarmed. He thought she was watching
television at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].
[15]
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the
evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum. [16] At the
store, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap. [17] He
was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short
pants.[18] All of them left the store at the same time.
[19]
Julito proceeded to the house of Rita to watch
television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA,
went towards the direction of the "lower area or
place."[20]
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing
a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants [21] when
he held her hand while on the road near the store.
[22]
They walked towards the rice field near the house
of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the
Perochos].[23] There he made her lie down on
harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed her
on the chest.[24] Already half-naked from waist down,
[25]
he mounted her, and, while her legs were pushed
apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a
push and pull movement.[26] She felt pain and cried.
[27]
Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the
Perochos.[28] She, in turn, went straight home crying.
[29]
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from
downstairs.[30] She was without slippers. [31] He found
her face greasy.[32] There was mud on her head and
blood was oozing from the back of her head. [33] He
checked for any injury and found on her neck a
contusion that was already turning black.[34] She had
no underwear on and he saw white substance and
mud on her vagina.[35] AAA told him that appellant
brought her from the store [36] to the grassy area at
the back of the house of the Perochos; [37] that he
threw away her pair of slippers, removed her panty,
choked her and boxed her breast;[38] and that he
proceeded thereafter to the Perochos. [39]
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the
Perochos.[40] He asked the appellant what he did to
AAA.[41] Appellant replied that he was asked to buy
rum at the store and that AAA followed him. [42] FFF
went home to check on his daughter, [43] afterwhich,
he went back to appellant, asked again, [44] and boxed
him.[45]
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even
date, Julito was still watching television at the house
of Rita.[46] AAA and her mother MMM arrived. [47] AAA
was crying.[48] Julito pitied her, embraced her, and
asked what happened to her, to which she replied
that appellant raped her. [49] Julito left and found
appellant at the Perochos.[50] Julito asked appellant,
"Bads, did you really rape the child, the daughter of
[MMM]?" but the latter ignored his question.
[51]
Appellant's aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the
policemen were coming to which the appellant
responded, "Wait a minute because I will wash the
dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees." [52] Julito did
found the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt. [53]
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the
police station to have the incident blottered. [54] FFF
also had AAA undergo a physical check up at the
municipal health center.[55] Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar,
M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a medical
certificate[56] dated 29 January 2003. It reads:
Injuries seen are as follows:
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck
area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall,
midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral
area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and
whitish mucoid-like material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o'clock and 9
o'clock position
Impression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar, [57] AAA
submitted herself to another examination at the
provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine
Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the provincial
hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-legal
certificate dated 29 January 2003, [58]the pertinent
portion of which reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M.
Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no
bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)[59]
Evidence for the Defense
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a
different version of the story. To corroborate his
testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt
Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he was at
the Perochos at the time of the commission of the
crime.[60] Luzvilla even went further to state that she
actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the
road.[61] In addition, Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-
in-law of appellant's aunt, Gloria, [62] testified on the
behavior of Julito after the rape incident was
revealed.[63]
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with
his parents whose house stands at the back of FFF's
house.[64] He denied that there was a need to pass by
the house of FFF in order to access the road or to
fetch water.[65] He, however, admitted that he
occasionally worked for FFF, [66] and whenever he was
asked to buy something from the store, AAA always
approached him.[67]
At about 8 o'clock in the morning of 28 January 2003,
appellant went to the Perochos to attend a birthday
party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors,
including appellant and his uncle Alejandro Perocho
[Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking
session, appellant's uncle sent him to the store to buy
Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20
meters from the house, he was able to return after
three (3) minutes. He was certain of the time because
he had a watch .[68]
Appellant's aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house,
confirmed that he was in her house attending the
birthday party; and that appellant went out between
6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay
from the store. She recalled that appellant was back
around five (5) minutes later. She also observed that
appellant's white shorts and white sleeveless shirt
were clean.[69]
At 6:30 in the evening,[70] Luzvilla, who was also at
the party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a drink
with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors.
[71]
She went out to relieve herself at the side of the
tree beside the road next to the house of the
Perochos.[72] From where she was, she saw Julito, who
was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry
AAA.[73] AAA's face was covered and she was
wiggling.[74] This did not alarm her because she
thought it was just a game. [75] Meanwhile, appellant
was still in the kitchen when she returned.[76] Around
three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a
white T-shirt,[77] running towards the house of Rita. [78]
AAA was slowly following behind.[79] Luzvilla followed
them.[80] Just outside the house, Julito embraced AAA
and asked what the appellant did to her.[81] The child
did not answer.[82]
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She
witnessed the punching incident and testified that
appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her,
FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, boxed
him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again
boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed
at appellant. Appellant's uncle Alejandro, a barangay
councilor, and another Civilian Voluntary Organization
(CVO) member admonished FFF. [83]
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o'clock in
the evening, she was watching the television along
with other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10,
Julito, who was wearing only a pair of black short
pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He
paced back and forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in
crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her
what happened. AAA did not answer. Upon Antonia's
advice, Julito released her and went out of the house.
[84]
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o'clock in the
evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him,
brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting
AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8 o'clock in the
evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked
again why he molested his daughter.[85]
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered
its decision,[86] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed upon a
5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and
orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With
costs[87]
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of
newly discovered evidence stating that appellant was
apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was
only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was
committed on 28 January 2003.[88] The trial court
appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty
from death to reclusion perpetua.[89] Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the
death penalty upon the accused is amended in order
to consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused,
therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx

Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to
the Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of the
ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review
by the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.[90]
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED
the decision of the trial court with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the
Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant
Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to indemnify the victim
in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.[91]
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave
due course to the appellant's Notice of Appeal.[92]This
Court required the parties to simultaneously file their
respective supplemental briefs. [93] Both parties
manifested that they have exhaustively discussed
their positions in their respective briefs and would no
longer file any supplement.[94]
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that
"THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE"[95] by invoking the
principle that "if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more reasonable
explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt,
then the evidence does not pass the test of moral
certainty and will not suffice to support a
conviction."[96]
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a
person accused of rape, we consider the three well-
entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility;
it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.[97]
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing
testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict
the accused.[98] More so, when the testimony is
supported by the medico-legal findings of the
examining physician.[99]
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
victim's positive identification of the perpetrator of
the crime,[100] except when it is established that it
was physically impossible for the accused to have
been at the locus criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime.[101]
I
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a
child under twelve (12) years of age even in the
absence of any of the following circumstances: (a)
through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority.[102]
That the crime of rape has been committed is
certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating in
the insertion of appellant's organ into the vagina of
five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of the
physicians sufficiently proved such fact.
AAA testified:
PROS. OMANDAM:
xxxx
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed
your panty and boxed you, what else did he do to you?
A He mounted me.
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
A Yes.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull
movement.
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were
your legs positioned?
A They were apart.
Q Who pushed them apart?
A Hermie.
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A His penis.
Q Where did he push his penis?
A To my vagina.
Q Was it painful?
A Yes.
Q What was painful?
A My vagina.
Q Did you cry?
A Yes.[103]
The straightforward and consistent answers to the
questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in
order to test that AAA well understood the
information elicited from her, said it all - she had
been raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says
so, she says in effect all that is essential to show that
rape was committed.[104] Significantly, youth and
immaturity are normally badges of truth and honesty.
[105]
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr.
Micabalo[106] revealed that the hymenal lacerations at
5 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions could have been
caused by the penetration of an object; that the
redness of the introitus could have been "the result of
the repeated battering of the object;" and that such
object could have been an erect male organ. [107]
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the
physician's finding of penetration conclusively
established the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge.[108]
II
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts
of the appellant at the time of the commission of the
crime are now in dispute.
The defense would want us to believe that it was
Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was
elsewhere when the crime was committed. [109]
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a
victim of rape could readily identify her
assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her,
considering that she could have a good look at him
during the commission of the crime.[110] AAA had
known appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and
AAA even walked together from the road near the
store to the situs criminus[111] that it would be
impossible for the child not to recognize the man who
held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial
court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for
one so young, that it was accused, whom she called
"kuya" and who used to play basketball and fetch
water near their house, and who was wearing a
sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her,
was convincing and persuasive. The defense
attempted to impute the crime to someone else - one
Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was steadfast
and did not equivocate, asserting that it
was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is
older, who molested her.[112]
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
ruled that the determination by the trial court of the
credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and
respect considering that it has "the opportunity to
observe the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full
realization of their oath,"[113] unless it is shown that
material facts and circumstances have been "ignored,
overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted."[114]
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness' attempt to throw the court
off the track by imputing the crime to someone else
is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private
complainant's positive identification of accused and
other corroborative circumstances. Accused also
admitted that on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the
supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this
incident, Pare?", thus corroborating the latter's
testimony that he confronted accused after hearing of
the incident from the child."[115]
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the
appellant that the trial court erred in finding his
denial and alibi weak despite the presentation of
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring
inconsistencies were all over their respective
testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of the
appellant's very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro
Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that
he gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had
already been drinking long before he bought Tanduay
at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt
Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-
examination, she revealed that her husband was not
around before, during, and after the rape incident
because he was then at work. [116] He arrived from
work only after FFF came to their house for the
second time and boxed appellant.[117] It was actually
the fish vendor, not her husband, who asked
appellant to buy Tanduay.[118] Further, the drinking
session started only after the appellant's errand to
the store.[119]
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough
to deserve consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro
joined the drinking session. This is contrary to
Gloria's statement that her husband was at work.
Luzvilla's testimony is likewise inconsistent with that
of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia
recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This
belied Luzvilla's claim that Julito wore a white shirt on
his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both
the prosecution, as testified to by AAA and Julito, and
the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent
in saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt,
Luzvilla's recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt
(colored black and later changed to white), and, thus,
a short-sleeved shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvilla's story that she saw AAA
walking towards Rita's house three (3) minutes after
she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening,
Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the house of Rita
at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial court's
appreciation in order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she
went straight home, crying, to tell her father that
Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into the
house of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers who
were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the
court believe. When the child was seen at the house
of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it
was only later, after she had been brought there by
her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a
look at her ? just as Julito Apiki said.[120]
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the
corroboration is credible, the same having been
offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The
defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify
as such, "they being related or were one way or
another linked to each other."[121]
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we
consider the corroborations on his whereabouts, still,
the defense of alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be
convinced that it would be physically impossible for
the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the
time of the commission of the crime.[122]
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the
facility of access between the situs criminis and the
location of the accused when the crime was
committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far
away and could not have been physically present at
the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity
when the crime was committed.[123]
In People v. Paraiso,[124] the distance of two thousand
meters from the place of the commission of the crime
was considered not physically impossible to reach in
less than an hour even by foot. [125] Inasmuch as it
would take the accused not more than five minutes to
rape the victim, this Court disregarded the testimony
of the defense witness attesting that the accused was
fast asleep when she left to gather bamboo trees and
returned several hours after. She could have merely
presumed that the accused slept all throughout.[126]
In People v. Antivola,[127] the testimonies of relatives
and friends corroborating that of the appellant that
he was in their company at the time of the
commission of the crime were likewise disregarded by
this Court in the following manner:
Ruben Nicolas, the appellant's part-time employer,
and Marites Capalad, the appellant's sister-in-law and
co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellant's
physical presence in the fishpond at the time Rachel
was raped. It is, however, an established fact
that the appellant's house where the rape
occurred, was a stone's throw away from the
fishpond. Their claim that the appellant never
left their sight the entire afternoon of December
4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for
Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for
almost four hours, since she testified that she, too,
was very much occupied with her task of counting
and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise,
Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away
from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire
attention solely on the appellant. It is, therefore,
not farfetched that the appellant easily
sneaked out unnoticed, and along the way
inveigled the victim, brought her inside his
house and ravished her, then returned to the
fishpond as if he never left.[128] (Emphasis
supplied.)
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense
witnesses that appellant never left their sight, save
from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to
ordinary human experience. Moreover, considering
that the farmland where the crime was committed is
just behind the house of the Perochos, it would take
appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the
road near the store next to the Perochos down the
farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could
have committed the rape after buying the bottle of
Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncle's
house.[129] Unfortunately, the testimonies of his
corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that
he was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of
the crime.[130]
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was
physically impossible for appellant to have been at
the time and place of the commission of the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has
sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
III
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the
Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic Act
No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3)
years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the death
rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:[131] penalty when rape is committed against a child below
seven (7) years old[141] applies.
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344][132] allows the
retroactive application of the Act to those who have The following, however, calls for the reduction of the
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time penalty: (1) the prohibition against the imposition of
of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act
the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of No. 9346;[142] and (2) the privileged mitigating
the offense. With more reason, the Act should circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has
apply to this case wherein the conviction by the the effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower
lower court is still under review. [133] (Emphasis than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of
supplied.) the Revised Penal Code.[143]
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty Relying on People v. Bon,[144] the Court
of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child penalties provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal
above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) Code.[145] Consequently, in its appreciation of the
years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of
found to have acted with discernment, in which case, appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree
"the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to
Act shall be observed.[134] suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
We determine discernment in this wise: minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, in its medium period,
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to as maximum.[146]
fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.
[135]
Such capacity may be known and should be We differ.
determined by taking into consideration all the facts
and circumstances afforded by the records in each In a more recent case, [147] the Court En Banc, through
case.[136] the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro,
clarified:
xxx The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
and that it was wrong. [137] Such circumstance includes offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next
the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed,
cunning and shrewdness.[138] but always in the proper period. However, for
purposes of determining the proper penalty
In the present case, we agree with the Court because of the privileged mitigating
of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark circumstance of minority, the penalty of death
place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus,
and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her the proper imposable penalty for the accused-
defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17) year- appellant is reclusion perpetua.[148] (Emphasis
old appellant's mental capacity to fully understand supplied.)
the consequences of his unlawful action.[139]
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua.
should be modified.
Civil Liability
The birth certificate of AAA[140] shows that she was
born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she was We have consistently ruled that:
only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil
indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the
imposition of the death penalty, regardless of
whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced
to reclusion perpetua.[149]
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor
at the time he committed the crime has no bearing
on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the
victim and her family.[150] The respective awards of
civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of
P75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper. [151]
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority which effectively
lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the
damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in the
amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence,[152] the amount of exemplary
damages should be increased from P25,000.00 to
P30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration;
Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period
of Suspension of Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law
notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of
majority at the time the judgment of conviction is
pronounced. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once
the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may
have resulted from the offense committed. However,
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law
under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of
sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,[153] which was
promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court
of Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, [154] the
aforestated provision does not apply to one who has
been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.[155]
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court
promulgated the decision in Sarcia,[156] overturning
the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the
nature of the offense committed by the child in
conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC)
Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence
would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if,
among others, he/she has been convicted of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No.
9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of
statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No.
9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has
been convicted of a capital offense and another who
has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court
should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in
conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a
heinous crime.[157]
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate
deliberations[158] on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005)
further strengthened the new position of this Court to
cover heinous crimes in the application of the
provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of
a child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion
of the deliberation reads:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18
years old is charged, accused with, or may have
committed a serious offense, and may have acted
with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for
the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago's] proposed Office of
Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a
judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests,
and restoration of the child should still be a
primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous
crimes, the intention should still be the child's
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx
(Italics supplied in Sarcia.)[159]
On 24 November 2009, the Court En
Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in
Conflict with the Law, which reflected the same
position.[160]
These developments notwithstanding, we find that
the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer
apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts
only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. [161] Section
40[162] of the law and Section 48[163] of the Rule are
clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now
twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative
intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a
child in conflict with the law should extend even to
one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one
(21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime
when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be
entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that
he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and
become a productive member of the community. The
age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of
the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not
material. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of
tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural
camp or any other training facility in accordance with
Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.[164]
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in
Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. - A
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,[165] the case
shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect
appellant's confinement in an agricultrual camp or
other training facility.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213
finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty
imposed on the appellant is reduced to reclusion
perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the
victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to the
court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance
with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 183563 : December 14, 2011]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. HENRY ARPON Y that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
JUNTILLA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals dated February 8, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 00560, which affirmed with modification
the Decision[2] dated September 9, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 7,
in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53,
finding the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of
statutory rape and seven (7) counts of rape against
the private complainant AAA.[3]cralaw
On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was
charged[4] with eight (8) counts of rape in separate
informations, the accusatory portions of which state:
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46
That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality
of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
who is the uncle of [AAA], the offended party,
actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], who was then
only eight (8) years old, without her consent and
against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance
that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree.[5]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by
lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with the use of force and violence
succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said
[AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance
and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree.[6]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48
That sometime in the month July 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by
lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with the use of force and violence
succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said
[AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance
that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree.[7]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by
lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with the use of force and violence
succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said
[AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance
that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree.[8]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by
lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with the use of force and violence
succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said
[AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance
that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree.[9]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by
lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with the use of force and violence
succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said
[AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance
that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree.[10]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by
lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with the use of force and violence
succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said
[AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance
that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree.[11]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by
lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with the use of force and violence
succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said
[AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance
that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree.[12] (Emphases ours.)
During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on
November 28, 2000, he entered a plea of not guilty.
[13]
On March 13, 2001, the pre-trial conference of
the cases was conducted and the parties stipulated
on the identity of the accused-appellant in all
the cases, the minority of the victim and the fact that
the accused appellant is the uncle of the victim. [14]
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing
stipulations was signed by the accused and his
counsel. The cases were then heard on consolidated
trial.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA
to prove the charges against the accused-appellant.
AAA testified that she was born on November 1,
1987.[15] In one afternoon when she was only eight
years old, she stated that the accused-appellant
raped her inside their house. She could not
remember, though, the exact month and date of the
incident. The accused-appellant stripped off her
shorts, panties and shirt and went on top of her. He
had his clothes on and only pulled down his zipper.
He then pulled out his organ, put it in her vagina and
did the pumping motion. AAA felt pain but she did
not know if his organ penetrated her vagina. When he
pulled out his organ, she did not see any blood. She
did so only when she urinated. [16]
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped
her again in July 1999 for five times on different
nights. The accused-appellant was then drinking
alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house
of AAA's neighbor. He came to AAA's house, took off
her panty and went on top of her. She could not see
what he was wearing as it was nighttime. He made
her hold his penis then he left. When asked again
how the accused-appellant raped her for five nights in
July of the said year, AAA narrated that he pulled
down her panty, went on top of her and pumped. She
felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina. Every
time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain. AAA said
that she recognized the accused-appellant as her
assailant since it was a moonlit night and their
window was only covered by cloth. He entered
through the kitchen as the door therein was
detached.[17]
AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped
her again twice in August 1999 at nighttime. He
kissed her and then he took off his shirt, went on top
of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in
her chest because he was heavy. She did not know if
his penis penetrated her vagina. She related that
the accused-appellant was her uncle as he was the
brother of her mother. AAA said that she did not tell
anybody about the rapes because the accused-
appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did.
She only filed a complaint when he proceeded to also
rape her younger sister, DDD.[18]
After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally
offered its documentary evidence, consisting of: (1)
Exhibit A - the Medico-Legal Report, [19] which
contained the results of the medical examination
conducted on AAA by Dr. Rommel Capungcol and Dr.
Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2)
Exhibit B - the Social Case Study Report [20] pertaining
to AAA's case, which was issued by the Municipal
Social Welfare and Development Office of the
Province of Leyte.
The Medico-Legal Report stated the following
findings:
P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:
- (-) Physical injuries.
OB- NOTES:
- Patient came in with history of rape since 8 year old
for so many times. last act was March 1999.
O: Pelvic Exam:
Ext. Genetalia - grossly normal.
Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration at 3 & 9
o'clock position
Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.
Internal Exam:
Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: = ARPON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ONE
NEGATIVE[21]
Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-
appellant to the witness stand to deny the
informations filed against him and to refute the
testimony of AAA. He testified that when the first
incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995, he was
only 13 years old as he was born on February 23,
1982. In 1995, he worked in Sagkahan, Tacloban City
as a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he
stayed there up to 1996. He stated that he was
working in Tacloban City when the alleged rapes
happened in the municipality of XXX. When he would
go home from Tacloban, he would stay at the house
of a certain Fred Antoni. He did not go to the house of
AAA as the latter's parents were his enemies. He said
that he had a quarrel with AAA's parents because he
did not work with them in the ricefields. He further
recounted that in July 1999, he was also living in
Tacloban City and worked there as a dishwasher at a
restaurant. He worked there from 1998 up to
September 1999. The accused-appellant likewise
stated that in August 1999, he was still working at the
same restaurant in Tacloban City. While working
there, he did not go home to XXX as he was busy with
work. He denied that he would have drinking sprees
with AAA's stepfather, BBB, because they were
enemies.[22]
On cross-examination, the accused-appellant
admitted that the mother of AAA was his sister and
they were close to each other. He said that his
parents were still alive in 1995 up to October 1999
and the latter then resided at Calaasan, Alangalang,
Leyte. He indicated that his parents' house was
about two kilometers away from the house of AAA.
While he was working at the restaurant in Tacloban
City, he would visit his parents once every month,
mainly on Sundays.[23]
The Judgment of the RTC
On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City,
Branch 7, rendered a Decision convicting
the accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art.
266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, and further amended by R.A. 8353 (Rape
Law of 1997) and R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) the
Court found accused HENRY
COUNT OF STATUTORY RAPE and SEVEN COUNTS
OF RAPE charged under the informations and
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH,
and to indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for each count
of Rape and pay moral damages in the amount
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and pay the
cost.[24] (Emphases in the original.)
The court a quo found more credible the testimony of
AAA. The fact that AAA was in tears when she
testified convinced the trial court of the truthfulness
of her rape charges against the accused-appellant. If
there were inconsistencies in AAA's testimony, the
trial court deemed the same understandable
considering that AAA was pitted against a learned
opposing counsel. The delay in the reporting of the
rape incidents was not also an indication that the
charges were fabricated. Moreover, the trial court
ruled that the findings of the medico-legal officer
confirmed that she was indeed raped. The accused-
appellant's defense of alibi was likewise disregarded
by the trial court, declaring that it was not physically
impossible for him to be present in XXX at any time of
the day after working hours while he was working in
Tacloban City. The trial court stated that the accused-
appellant was positively identified by AAA as the
person who sexually abused her and she held no
grudge against him. The trial court imposed the
penalty of death as it found that AAA was less than
18 years old at the time of the commission of the
rape incidents and the accused-appellant was her
uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil
degree. The trial court also appreciated against
the accused-appellant the aggravating circumstances
of abuse of confidence and nighttime.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[25] of the RTC Decision, asserting that
the trial court failed to consider his minority as a
privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in his
direct examination, the accused-appellant claimed
that he was born on February 23, 1982, such that he
was only 13 and 17 years old when the incidents of
rape allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999,
respectively. In a Resolution[26] dated November 6,
2002, the trial court denied the accused-appellant's
motion, holding that the latter failed to substantiate
with clear and convincing evidence his allegation of
minority.
The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic
review and were docketed as G.R. Nos. 165201-08. [27]
The parties then filed their respective briefs. [28] On
February 7, 2006, we resolved [29] to transfer
the cases to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our
ruling in People v. Mateo.[30] The cases were docketed
in the appellate court as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On February 8, 2008, the Court
of Appeals promulgated its assailed decision,
decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in
Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53
is AFFIRMED with modification awarding exemplary
damages to [AAA] in the amount of Twenty[-]Five
Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos for each count of rape
and clarification that the separate award of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages
likewise pertains to each count of rape. The death
penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua in
accord with Rep. Act No. 9346.[31]
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the
inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant
in the testimony of AAA were not sufficient to
discredit her. The appellate court held that the exact
age of AAA when the incidents of rape occurred no
longer mattered, as she was still a minor at the time.
More significant was her "straightforward, categorical
and candid testimony" that she was raped eight
times by the accused-appellant. The Court
of Appeals also agreed with the ruling of the RTC that
AAA's charges of rape conformed with the physical
evidence and the accused-appellant's uncorroborated
defense of alibi could not stand against the positive
identification made by AAA.
As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court
of Appeals ruled that the relationship of the accused-
appellant to AAA was both alleged in the informations
and admitted by the accused-appellant. The
appellate court, however, differed in appreciating
against the accused-appellant the qualifying
circumstance of AAA's minority. The lone testimony of
AAA on the said circumstance was held to be an
insufficient proof therefor. The aggravating
circumstance of nighttime was also ruled to be
inapplicable as it was not shown that the same was
purposely sought by the accused-appellant or that it
facilitated the commission of the crimes of rape. In
view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
relationship, the Court of Appeals awarded exemplary
damages in favor of AAA.
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[32] of
the above decision and the same was given due
course by the Court of Appeals in
a Resolution[33] dated May 27, 2008.
On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept
the appeal and required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire,
within 30 days from notice.[34] Thereafter, in
a Manifestation and Motion[35] filed on December 24,
2008, the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, prayed that it be excused from filing
a supplemental brief. On February 3, 2009,
the accused-appellant submitted a Supplemental
Brief.[36]
The Issues
In the accused-appellant's brief, the following issues
were invoked:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.[37]
The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the
part of the RTC to give weight to the incredible
testimony of AAA. He alleges that AAA could not
state with consistency the exact date when she was
first supposedly raped, as well as her age at that
time. The accused-appellant also avers that AAA
could not remember the dates of the other incidents
of rape charged, all of which were allegedly described
in a uniform manner. Contrary to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant posits that
the above inconsistencies cannot merely be
discounted as insignificant. He further insists that the
qualifying circumstances of AAA's minority and her
relationship to the accused-appellant were not duly
proven by the prosecution. The accused-appellant,
thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful examination of the records of this
case, the Court resolves to deny the appeal, but with
a modification of the penalties and the amount of
indemnities awarded.
To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found
the accused-appellant guilty of one (1) count of
statutory rape and seven (7) counts of qualified rape.
Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-
46, the first incident of rape was alleged to have
occurred in 1995 when AAA was only eight years old.
However, the accused-appellant points out that the
prosecution failed to substantiate the said fact as
AAA's testimony thereon was too inconsistent and
incredible to be worthy of any belief. He explains that
AAA initially claimed that she was raped for the first
time when she was eight years old. Nonetheless,
during her testimony regarding the incidents of rape
that occurred in July 1999, she said that
the accused did the same thing that he did to her
when she was only seven years old. On her redirect
examination, AAA then stated that she was first
raped in 1998 when she was eleven (11) years old.
Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
defines the crime of rape by sexual intercourse as
follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape
is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
In particular, "Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the
definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements
of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is
under twelve (12) years of age or is demented." [38]
The above provision came into existence by virtue of
Republic Act No. 8353,[39] or the Anti-Rape Law of
1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997. [40] Prior
to this date, the crime of rape was penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,[41] which
provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. -- Rape
is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of
age or is demented.
In People v. Macafe,[42] we explained the concept of
statutory rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code in this wise:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed
statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of
committing rape. What the law punishes in
statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman
below twelve years old. Hence, force and
intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of
inquiry is the age of the woman and whether
carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes
that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her
own on account of her tender years; the child's
consent is immaterial because of her presumed
incapacity to discern evil from good. [43] (Emphasis
ours.)
Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the
above-mentioned provisions of law are essentially the
same. Thus, whether the first incident of rape
charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before the
amendment of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997, the prosecution has the burden to establish
the fact of carnal knowledge and the age of AAA at
the time of the commission of the rape.
Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant,
"the date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime of rape, for the
gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a
woman."[44] "Inconsistencies and discrepancies in
details which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime are not grounds for acquittal."[45]
As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited
with veracity the substance of AAA's testimony. On
this matter, we reiterate our ruling in People v.
Condes[46] that:
Time and again, the Court has held that when
the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and
their respective testimonies, the trial court's
observations and conclusions deserve great respect
and are often accorded finality. The trial judge has the
advantage of observing the witness' deportment and
manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush of
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering
tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of
an oath" are all useful aids for an accurate
determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The
trial judge, therefore, can better determine if
witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless
certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case, its assessment must be respected for it had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were
lying. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the
[Court of Appeals].[47]
In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized
the testimony of AAA and we found no cogent reason
to disturb the finding of the RTC that the accused-
appellant indeed committed the first incident of rape
charged. AAA positively identified the accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes.
With tears in her eyes, she clearly and
straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape as
follows:
[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened
 when you were still 8 years old? Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel? A: He left.
A: Pain.[48]
[AAA] xxxx
The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the
A: There was but I cannot anymore remember the exact Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol and Dr. Gagala, who ATTY. SABARRE:
month and date. found "old, healed, incomplete" hymenal lacerations on the
private part of AAA. "[W]hen the testimony of a rape victim Q: You said you were raped on that July evening for five
Q: Just tell what happened to you when you were still 8 is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient nights how did he rape you?
years old? basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge." [49] A: (witness did not answer)
A: I was raped by Tiyo Henry.
Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have PROS. SABARRE:
Q: How did he rape you? been committed in July 1999, the Court disagrees with the
A: He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts. ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven with Make it of record that the witness is crying again.
moral certainty. The testimony of AAA on the said incidents
Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you? is as follows: Q: Why are you crying?
A: Yes, sir in our house. A: I am angry and hurt.
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape
Q: Who were the persons present then at that time? you in July 1999? PROS. SABARRE:
A: My younger brother and I. A: Five times.
Your honor please may I be allowed to suspend the
Q: About your mother and step father where were they? Q: Was it in the daytime or night time? proceeding considering that the witness is
A: In the ricefield. A: Night time. psychologically incapable of further proceeding.

PROS. SABARRE: Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night? xxxx

A: Different nights.
May we make it of record that the witness is crying. Q: I have asked you how did the accused rape you will
Q: Who were present then at that time when he raped you please narrate the whole incident to this
COURT you five times? honorable court?
: A: My Kuya and other siblings. A: The same that he did when I was 8 years old, he went
on top of me.
Have it on record. Q: You have companions why were you raped?
A: Because they were sleeping. Q: What was the same thing you are talking about?
PROS. SABARRE: A: He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and
Q: How did he rape you on that July night for five times, pump.
Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the will you please narrate to the court?
afternoon or evening? A: Because they have been drinking, he came to our Q: When he pump what did you feel?
A: In the afternoon. house, pulled out my panty and went on top of me. A: Pain.

xxxx Q: With whom was he drinking? COURT

A: With my step father. :
Q: After your clothes and [panty] were taken off Why did you feel pain?
by accused what did he do to you next if any? Q: Where did they drink?
A: He went on top of me. A: In our neighbor. A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I
urinate I feel pain.
Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked? Q: When he took off your shorts and panty what was
A: He has still clothes on, he did not take off his pants, the accused wearing at that time? ATTY. SABARRE:
he only pulled down the zipper. A: I do not know because I could not see since it was How did you recognize that it was Henry Arpon when
night time. it was night time?
Q: And when he pulled down the zipper and went on top
of you what did he do next if any? Q: When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing A: It was a moonlight night and our window was only
A: He was pumping on me. something? covered by cloth as cover.[50]
A: No, sir.
Q: Did he pull out his organ? From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single
A: Yes, sir. Q: What did he do with his penis? incident of rape. She made no reference whatsoever to the
A: He made me hold it. other four instances of rape that were likewise supposedly
Q: And where did he place his organ? committed in the month of July 1999.
A: In my vagina. Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with
it? The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape
allegedly committed in August 1999. AAA narrated only one private part.[53] "Etched in our jurisprudence is the amount to a sufficient justification for dragging a
incident of rape in this manner: doctrine that a victim of a savage crime cannot be young girl's honor to a merciless public scrutiny that
expected to mechanically retain and then give an a rape trial brings in its wake."[59]
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you accurate account of every lurid detail of a frightening
in the month of August 1999? experience -- a verity born[e] out of human nature As to the accused-appellant's objection that there
A: Two times. and experience."[54] was no proof of the age of the victim, we affirm the
Q: Was it during day time or night time?
trial court's finding that the prosecution sufficiently
A: Nighttime. We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused- established the age of AAA when the incidents of
appellant's defense of alibi deserves scant rape were committed. The testimony of AAA that she
Q: How did he rape you again that August 1999? consideration. "Alibi is an inherently weak defense was born on November 1, 1987,[60] the voluntary
A: He kissed me. because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. stipulation of the accused, with assistance of counsel,
To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear regarding the minority of the victim during pre-trial
Q: After kissing you what did he do next? and convincing evidence that he was in a place other and his testimony regarding his recollection of the
A: He took off his shirts. than the situs criminis at the time the crime was age of the victim,[61] his own niece, all militate
Q: After he took off his shirts what happened?
committed, such that it was physically impossible for against accused-appellant's theory. In People v.
A: He went on top of me and pump. him to have been at the scene of the crime when it Pruna,[62] the Court established the guidelines in
was committed."[55] "[S]ince alibi is a weak defense appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or
Q: When he made a pumping motion on top of you what for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:
did you feel? is worthless in the face of the positive identification
A: My vagina was painful and also my chest because he by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended
was heavy. crime."[56] party is an original or certified true copy of the
Q: Why did you feel pain in your vagina?
certificate of live birth of such party.
In the instant case, we quote with approval the
A: Because he was raping me.
findings of fact of the trial court that: 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
Q: Did his penis penetrate your vagina? authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
A: I do not know. The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few and school records which show the date of birth of
kilometers and can be negotiated by passenger bus the victim would suffice to prove age.
Q: If this Henry Arpon is present now in court could you in less than one (1) hour, hence, it is not impossible
recognize him? for the accused to be present in [XXX] at any time of 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document
A: Yes, sir.
the day after working hours while working in is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
Q: Where is he? Tacloban. Besides, the accused has his day off every unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of
A: That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when Sunday, which according to him he spent in [XXX], the victim's mother or a member of the family either
asked his name answered Henry Arpon).[51] Leyte. by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify
on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age
"It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a The accused was positively identified by the victim as or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
separate and distinct crime that the law requires to the person who sexually molested her beginning that Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The afternoon of 1995, and subsequently thereafter in the be sufficient under the following circumstances:
prosecution's evidence must pass the exacting test of coming years up to August 1999. She can not be
moral certainty that the law demands to satisfy the mistaken on the identity of the accused, because the a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of
burden of overcoming the appellant's presumption of first sexual molestation happened during the age and what is sought to be proved is that
innocence."[52] Thus, including the first incident of daytime, besides, she is familiar with him being her she is less than 7 years old;
rape, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish uncle, the brother of her mother. [57]
three instances when the accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of her. Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of
the accused-appellant that AAA may have been age and what is sought to be proved is that
The allegation of the accused-appellant that the prompted to falsely testify against him (accused- she is less than 12 years old;
testimony of AAA described the incidents of rape in a appellant) in view of the latter's quarrel with AAA's
uniform manner does not convince this Court. To our parents when he refused to work with them in the c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of
mind, AAA's narration of the sexual abuses rice fields.[58] Aside from being uncorroborated, we age and what is sought to be proved is that
committed by the accused-appellant contained an find the same specious and implausible. "Where the she is less than 18 years old.
adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting charges against the appellant involve a heinous
the crime of rape, i.e., that he placed his organ in her offense, a minor disagreement, even if true, does not

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the
victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving
the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against
him. (Emphases ours.)
Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that
at the time she took the witness stand (when she was
14 years old), the victim, as to her body and facial
features, was indeed a minor.[63]
That the carnal knowledge in this case was
committed through force, threat or intimidation need
no longer be belabored upon. "[I]n rape committed by
close kin, such as the victim's father, step-father,
uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is
not necessary that actual force or intimidation be
employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the
place of violence and intimidation."[64]
Penalties
On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the
former Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, punishes the crime of rape with reclusion
perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof also provides
that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime
of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law-spouse of the parent of the victim.
(Emphases ours.)
Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code relevantly recites:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of
the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
x x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime
of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
(Emphases ours.)
The Court finds that the circumstances of minority
and relationship qualify the three (3) counts of rape
committed by the accused-appellant. "As a special
qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the
concurrence of the victim's minority and her
relationship to the accused must be both alleged and
proven beyond reasonable doubt."[65] In the instant
case, the informations alleged that AAA was less than
eighteen (18) years of age when the incidents of rape
occurred and the accused-appellant is her uncle, a
relative by consanguinity within the third civil
degree. The said circumstances were also admitted
by the accused-appellant during the pre-trial
conference of the case and again admitted by him
during his testimony.[66]
In People v. Pepito,[67] the Court explained that "[t]he
purpose of entering into a stipulation or admission of
facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and
the court, as well, of the costs of proving facts which
will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which
can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These
admissions during the pre-trial conference are worthy
of credit. Being mandatory in nature, the admissions
made by appellant therein must be given weight."
Consequently, for the first incident of rape, regardless
of whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998, the
imposition of the death penalty is warranted. For the
second and third counts of rape, the imposable
penalty is also death.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in
order.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in
favor of the accused-appellant the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority. Although this
matter was not among the issues raised before the
Court, we still take cognizance of the same in
accordance with the settled rule that "[i]n a criminal
case, an appeal throws open the entire case wide
open for review, and the appellate court can correct
errors, though unassigned, that may be found in
the appealed judgment."[68]
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," provides
for the rule on how to determine the age of a child in
conflict with the law,[69] viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. -- The child in conflict
with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority.
He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict
with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18)
years of age or older. The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these documents, age
may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant
evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child,
it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,[70] we clarified that,
in the past, the Court deemed sufficient the
testimonial evidence regarding the minority and age
of the accused provided the following conditions
concur, namely: "(1) the absence of any other
satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate,
baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would
prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the
presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative
on the age and minority of the accused at the time of
the complained incident without any objection on the
part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary
evidence showing that the accused's and/or his
relatives' testimonies are untrue."[71]
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified
that he was born on February 23, 1982 and that he
was only 13 years old when the first incident of rape
allegedly happened in 1995.[72] Other than his
testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove
the date of his birth. However, the records of this
case show neither any objection to the said testimony
on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary
evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC and the
Court of Appeals should have appreciated
the accused-appellant's minority in ascertaining the
appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed
before Republic Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20,
2006, the said law is still applicable given that
Section 68 thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are
Serving Sentences. -- Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of
the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. They shall be
entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under
this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if
they are so qualified under this Act or other
applicable law.
People v. Sarcia[73] further stressed that "[w]ith more
reason, the Act should apply to [a] case wherein the
conviction by the lower court is still under review."
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal
responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is
explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. -- A
child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively
modified the minimum age limit of criminal
irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended,[74] "i.e., from `under nine
years of age' and `above nine years of age and under
fifteen' (who acted without discernment) - to `fifteen
years old or under' and `above fifteen but below 18'
(who acted without discernment) in determining
exemption from criminal liability."[75]
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the
information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46 was
allegedly committed in 1995, the testimony of
the accused-appellant sufficiently established that he
was only 13 years old at that time. In view of the
failure of the prosecution to prove the exact date and
year of the first incident of rape, i.e., whether the
same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously
discussed, any doubt therein "should be resolved in
favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the
latter."[76] The Court, thus, exempts the accused-
appellant from criminal liability for the first count of
rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9344. The accused-appellant,
nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were
committed in the year 1999, the accused-appellant
was already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the
said instances, the accused-appellant acted with
discernment. In Madali v. People,[77] the Court had the
occasion to reiterate that "[d]iscernment is that
mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may
be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded
by the records in each case." In this case, the fact
that the accused-appellant acted with discernment
was satisfactorily established by the testimony of
AAA, which we had already found to be credible.
Verily, AAA testified that she at first did not tell
anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the
hands of the accused-appellant because the latter
told her that he would kill her mother if she did so.
That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an
effort to conceal his dastardly acts only proved that
he knew full well that what he did was wrong and that
he was aware of the consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and in
conformity with our ruling in Sarcia, when the
offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age,
"the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
However, for purposes of determining the proper
penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still
the penalty to be reckoned with." Thus, for the
second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty
imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua for each count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of
the accused-appellant the circumstance of his
minority, the latter would have been entitled to a
suspension of sentence for the second and third
counts of rape under Section 38 of Republic Act No.
9344, which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. -- Once
the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may
have resulted from the offense committed. However,
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law
under suspended sentence, without need of
application. Provided, however, That suspension of
sentence shall still be supplied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering
the various circumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as
provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juvenile in
Conflict with the Law.
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no
longer be applied in the instant case given that
the accused-appellant is now about 29 years of age
and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit
to the application of a suspended sentence, namely,
when the child reaches a maximum age of 21. The
said provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law
to Court. -- If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in
conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the
child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to
comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the
law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached
eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to
order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum
age of twenty-one (21) years. (Emphasis ours.)
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344 is warranted in the
instant case, to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in
Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. -- A
child in conflict with the law may after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of
Corrections], in coordination with the [Department of
Social Welfare and Development].
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant
for the second and third incidents of rape shall not be
affected by the above disposition and the same shall
be enforced in accordance with law and the
pronouncements in the prevailing jurisprudence.
Civil Liability
The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.
[78]
that "[c]ivil indemnity is mandatory when rape is
found to have been committed. Based on
prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of
P75,000.00 to the rape victim as civil indemnity for
each count." We also explained in Sarcia that "[t]he
litmus test x x x in the determination of the civil
indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the
imposition of the death penalty, regardless of
whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced
to reclusion perpetua."[79] The trial court's award of
civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is ) origin for its appropriate action in accordance with
therefore increased to P75,000.00 for each of the Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
three (3) counts of rape committed in the instant
case. No costs.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same is SO ORDERED.
justified "without need of proof other than the fact of
rape because it is assumed that the victim has
suffered moral injuries [from the experience she
underwent]."[80] We also increase the trial court's
award of P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each of the
three (3) counts of rape herein established in keeping
with the recent case law.[81]
Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals' award of
exemplary damages. As held in People v. Llanas, Jr.,
[82]
"[t]he award of exemplary damages is also proper
not only to deter outrageous conduct, but also in view
of the aggravating circumstances of minority and
relationship surrounding the commission of the
offense, both of which were alleged in the information
and proved during the trial." The appellate court's
award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is raised
to P30,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape
in keeping with the current jurisprudence on the
matter.[83]cralaw
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing,
the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February
8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1 For the first count of rape herein established,
) the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla is
hereby EXEMPTED from criminal liability.
(2 For the second and third counts of rape,
) the accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED
RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
(3 As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant
) is ORDERED to pay AAA for each of the three (3)
counts of rape P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all
damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the
date of finality of this Decision
(4 The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of
[G.R. No. 5418. February 12, 1910. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
CECILIO TANEDO, Defendant-Appellant.
OBrien & De Witt, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Harvey, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE; CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
If life i taken by misfortune or accident while the
actor is in the performance of a lawful act executed
with due care and without intention of doing harm,
there is no criminal liability.
2. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF. When the accused,
under the plea of accidental killing, offers testimony
tending to prove the substance of his plea, the
burden is upon the State to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the killing was intentional.
D E C I S I O N MORELAND, J. :
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime
of murder committed, as alleged in the information,
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 26th day of January of this
year, the said accused, with the intention of killing
Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens,
and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation
shot him in the breast with a shotgun which
destroyed the heart and killed the said Sanchez, and
afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried the
body of the deceased in a well. The motive is
unknown. The premeditation consists in that the
accused had prepared his plans to take the deceased
to the forest, there to kill him, so that no one could
see it, and to bury him afterwards secretly in order
that the crime should remain unpunished."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the
Court of First instance of the Province of Tarlac and
sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal, accessories,
indemnification and costs. The defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this
case, in fact no dispute at all as to the important
facts. The accused was a landowner. On the morning
of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino
Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and
Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on
his land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and
a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens
after he had set his laborers at work. He remained
with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short
distance away across a stream to see how the
alteration which he had made in the malecon affected
the flow of water from the rice field on the other side
of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him across
the stream. On the other side of the stream he met
the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had
been living in a small shack for a month or so during
the rice-harvesting season. The accused asked the
uncle of the deceased where he could find a good
place in which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was
lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick of
fever. The deceased, a young man about 20 years of
age, was working at something under a manga tree a
short distance from the shack. Although the accused
directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack,
the deceased answered the question and pointed out
in a general way a portion of the forest near the edge
of which stood the shack. There is some contradiction
between the testimony of the accused and the
Government witnesses just at this point. The uncle of
the deceased testified that the boy and the accused
invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens and
that the accused accepted the invitation. The
accused, however, testified that he did not invite the
deceased to go hunting with him, neither did the
deceased go with him, but that he remained under
the manga tree "tying something." At any rate the
accused went into the forest with his gun. What took
place there is unknown to anybody except the
accused. Upon the subject he testimony as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to
me, that place where the wild chickens were to be
found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first
place, if I could kill some wild chickens we would have
something to eat on that day. So when I arrived at
that place I saw a wild chicken and I shot him. And
after I shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked
up the chicken and went near the place where I heard
the noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I
went back toward the malecon, where my
companions were working, running back, and when I
arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree not
far from where my companions were working; and I
called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the
occurrence, and to him I told of that occurrence
because he is my friend and besides that he was a
relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of
this he and myself went together to see the dead
body."cralaw virtua1aw library
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken
was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers
were found in considerable quantities at the point
where the chicken was shot and where the accident
occurred. The defendant within a few minutes after
the accident went out of the woods to the malecon
where he had left his laborers at work, carrying the
dead chicken with him. The accused called
Bernardino Tagampa, one of the laborers, to go with
him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa
says that they went a little way toward the woods and
came back. The accused says that they went to the
place where the body of the deceased lay and
removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it
would not be easily observed. It is certain, however,
that the body was concealed in the cogon grass.
During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon,
where his fellow laborers were working, probably to
hunt for a place in which to hide the body. The rest of
the laborers saw the witness Yumul take the chicken
which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it
to the wife of the accused, who testified that she
received the chicken from Yumul and that it had been
killed by a gunshot wound. That evening the accused
and Tagampa went together to dispose of the body
finally. They took it from the cogon grass where it lay
concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen
hundred meters from the place where it had originally
fallen, and buried it in an old well, covering it with
straw and earth and burning straw on top of the well
for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that he
helped the accused dispose of the body because he
was afraid of him, although he admits that the
accused in no way threatened or sought to compel
him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial denied
all knowledge of the death of the deceased or the
whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he
confessed his participation in the death of the
deceased and told the story substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the
prior relations between the accused and the
deceased had been normal. The deceased was a
tenant on land belonging to a relative of the accused.
There was no enmity and no unpleasant relations
between them. No attempt was made to show any.
There appears to have been no motive whatever for
the commission of the crime. The Government has
not attempted to show any. The only possible reason
that the accused could have for killing the deceased
would be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel
between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly
negatived by the fact that the chicken and the man
were shot at the same time, there having been only
one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and
omissions punished by law.
"Acts and omissions punished by law are always
presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary shall
appear."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"He who, while performing a legal act with due care,
causes some injury by mere accident without liability
or intention of causing it."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed
to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in
case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is
satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an
acquittal."cralaw virtua1aw library
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is
uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or
accident while in the performance of a lawful act
executed with due care and without intention of doing
harm, there is no criminal liability. (Tidwell v. State,
70 Ala., 33; State v. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am.
Dec., 417; Bertrong v. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160;
Williamson v. States, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. v.
Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. v. Castro, Fed. Cas.,
14752; State v. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of
negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is
there any question that he was engaged in the
commission of a lawful act when the accident
occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the
intention of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious
upon the part of the defendant are his concealment
and denial. I concur.
In the case of the State v. Legg, above referred to, it I am in entire agreement with the conclusions of the
is said (p. 1165):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph majority in this case.
"Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, I think it proper to state, nevertheless, that the
the accused is not required to prove such a defense doctrine laid down in the somewhat loosely worded
by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is West Virginia case of State v. Legg, cited in the
a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon majority opinion, and in the citation from 3 L. R. A., N.
the State to show that it was intentional, and if, from S., can not be said to be in conformity with the
a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the general doctrine in this jurisdiction, as laid down in
State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as the decisions of this court, without considerable
to whether or not the killing was accidental or modification and restriction limiting its scope to cases
intentional, the jury should acquit. . . But where wherein it is properly applicable.
accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits
the killing but denies that it was intentional.
Therefore, the State must show that it was
intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct the jury
that the defendant must show that it was an accident
by a preponderance of the testimony, and instruction
B in the Cross case was properly held to be
erroneous."cralaw virtua1aw library
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important
issue in a prosecution for homicide, which must be
submitted to the jury. And since a plea of
misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its
equivalent) which constitute an essential element in
criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be
negatived by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt."cralaw virtua1aw library
In support of such contention the author cites a
number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient
to support the judgment of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed,
the defendant acquitted, and his discharge from
custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[G.R. NO. 150647 : September 29, 2004]
ROWENO POMOY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Well-established is the principle that the factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are binding on the highest court of the
land. However, when facts are misinterpreted and the
innocence of the accused depends on a proper
appreciation of the factual conclusions, the Supreme
Court may conduct a review thereof. In the present
case, a careful reexamination convinces this Court
that an "accident" caused the victim's death. At the
very least, the testimonies of the credible witnesses
create a reasonable doubt on appellant's guilt. Hence,
the Court must uphold the constitutional presumption
of innocence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February
28, 2001 Decision2 and the October 30,
2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA
GR CR No. 18759. The CA affirmed, with
modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)5 of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in
Criminal Case No. 36921, finding Roweno Pomoy
guilty of the crime of homicide. The assailed
CA Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to
penalty in the sense that the [Petitioner] ROWENO
POMOY is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of six (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10)
days of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum,
the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all
other respects."6
The challenged
CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:
"That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the
Municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with his .45 service
pistol, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to
kill, and without any justifiable cause or motive, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and shoot one TOMAS BALBOA with
the service pistol he was then provided, inflicting
upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of
his body, which directly caused the death of said
victim thereafter."7
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented
respondent's version of the facts as follows:
"Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the
Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in
Concepcion, Iloilo.
"On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning,
some policemen arrived at the Concepcion College to
arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery
which took place in the municipality in December
1989. With the arrest effected, Balboa and the
policemen passed by the Concepcion Elementary
School where his wife, Jessica, was in a get-together
party with other School Administrators. When his wife
asked him, 'Why will you be arrested?' [H]e answered
'[Even I] do not know why I am arrested. That is why I
am even going there in order to find out the reason
for my arrest.'
"Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already
defunct 321st Philippine Constabulary Company at
Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in the
jail thereat, along with Edgar Samudio, another
suspect in the robbery case.
"Later that day, about a little past 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, petitioner, who is a police sergeant, went
near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained
and directed the latter to come out, purportedly for
tactical interrogation at the investigation room, as he
told Balboa: 'Let's go to the investigation room.' The
investigation room is at the main building of the
compound where the jail is located. The jail guard on
duty, Nicostrado Estepar, opened the jail door and
walked towards the investigation room.
"At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber
pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging by the
side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its
holster, with only the handle of the gun protruding
from the holster.
"When petitioner and Balboa reached the main
building and were near the investigation room, two
(2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the
shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .
45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a
pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the
Commanding Officer of the Headquarters arrived, he
disarmed petitioner and directed that Balboa be
brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma (first name not
provided) happened to be at the crime scene as he
was visiting his brother in the Philippine Constabulary.
When Dr. Palma examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma) said
that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the
hospital for he was dead.
"Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of
the deceased, Dr. Ricardo Jabonete, the medico-legal
officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Region
VI, Iloilo City, conducted an autopsy on the remains of
Tomas Balboa. The following were his findings:
'Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.
'Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and
medially, edges, modified by sutures, surrounded by
abrasion collar, 0.6 cm. In its chest, left side, 10.0
cms. from anterior midline, 121.0 cms. From left heel,
directed medially backwards from left to right,
penetrating chest wall thru 5th intercostals space into
thoracic cavity, perforating thru and thru, upper lobe,
left lung, lacerating left ventricular wall causing
punched out fracture, 8th thoracic vertebra and make
an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x 0.8 cm. Edges,
modified by sutures, back, right side, 8.0 cms. From
posterior midline, 117.0 cms. From right heel (2)
ENTRANCE, ovaloid, oriented medially downwards,
edges sutured, 0.7 cm. on its widest portion, at
infero-medial border, hypochondriac region, left side,
4.0 cms. From anterior midline, 105.0 cms. From left
heel, directed backwards, laterally wall into
penetrating abdominal cavity, perforating thru and
thru, stomach, head of the pancreas and mesentery,
make an exit, ovalid, 1.0 x 0.8 cm., oriented medially
upwards, edges, sutured, back, left side, level of 9th
intercostal space, 4.5 cms. From posterior midline,
110.0 cms. From left heel. x x x.
'CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary
to gunshot wounds on chest and abdomen.
'REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and
autopsied.'
"Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he
found on x x x Balboa's body were gunshot wounds.
The entrance of [W]ound No. 1 was to the left side of
the chest about the left nipple and exited to the right
side of the back. Its trajectory was backwards then
downwards from left to right. As to the possible
position of the assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the
nozzle of the gun was probably in front of the victim
and was more to the left side, and the gun must have
been a little bit higher than the entrance wound.
Wound No. 2 was located immediately below the arch
of the ribs, left side. Its direction was backwards and
laterally upwards. Dr. Jaboneta estimated that when it
was inflicted, the assailant must have pointed the
gun's nozzle to the right side front of the victim. The
distance between the entrance points of wounds No.
1 and No. 2 was found to be about 16.0
centimeters."8
Version of the Defense
The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the
assailed CA Decision, which in turn culled them from
the trial court. The RTC summarized the testimonies
of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa, the lone eyewitness
to the incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.;
and petitioner himself, as follows:
"Erna Basa:
"x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their
office in the camp up to the afternoon; at about past
2 o'clock that afternoon while working on the
backlogs, she heard some noise and exchange of
words which were not clear, but it seemed there was
growing trouble; she opened the door to verify and
saw Roweno Pomoy and Tomas Balboa grappling for
the possession of the gun; she was inside the room
and one meter away from the door; Pomoy and
Balboa while grappling were two to three meters
away from the door; the grappling happened so fast
and the gun of Pomoy was suddenly pulled out from
its holster and then there was explosion; she was not
certain who pulled the gun. x x x.
"Eden Legaspi:
"x x x [A]s early as 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of
January 4, 1990 she was inside the investigation room
of the PC at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at about 2
o'clock that same afternoon while there inside, she
heard a commotion outside and she remained seated
on the bench; when the commotion started they were
seated on the bench and after the commotion that
woman soldier (referring to Erna Basa) stood up and
opened the door and she saw two persons grappling
for the possession of a gun and immediately two
successive shots rang out; she did not leave the place
where she was seated but she just stood up; after the
shots, one of the two men fall down x x x.
"Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:
"He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo
Provincial Mobile Force Company then attached to the
defunct 321st PC Company; he was one of the
investigators of their outfit; about 2 o'clock or past
that time of January 4, 1990 he got Tomas Balboa
from their stockade for tactical interrogation; as he
was already holding the door knob of their
investigation room and about to open and enter it, all
of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach him and
take hold or grab the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa
was a suspect in a robbery case who was
apprehended by the police of Concepcion and then
turned over to them (PC) and placed in their
stockade; he asked the sergeant of the guard to let
Balboa out of the stockade for interrogation; from the
stockade with Balboa walking with him, he had his .
45 caliber pistol placed in his holster attached to his
belt on his waist; then as he was holding the
doorknob with his right hand to open the door, the
victim, who was two meters away from him, suddenly
approached him and grabbed his gun, but all of a
sudden he held the handle of his gun with his left
hand; he released his right hand from the doorknob
and, with that right hand, he held the handle of his
gun; Tomas Balboa was not able to take actual hold of
the gun because of his efforts in preventing him
(Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun; he used
his left hand to parry the move of Balboa; after he
held the handle of his gun with his right hand, in a
matter of seconds, he felt somebody was holding his
right hand; he and Balboa grappled and in two or
three seconds the gun was drawn from its holster as
both of them held the gun; more grappling followed
and five seconds after the gun was taken from its
holster it fired, the victim was to his right side when
the attempt to grab his gun began and was still to his
right when the gun was drawn from its holster until it
fired, as they were still grappling or wrestling; his gun
was already loaded in its chamber and cocked when
he left his house, and it was locked when it fired;
during the grappling he used his left hand to prevent
Balboa from holding his gun, while the victim used his
right hand in trying to reach the gun; after the gun
fired, they were separated from each other and
Balboa fell; he is taller than Balboa though the latter
was bigger in build; he cannot say nor determine who
of them was stronger; after Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag
shouted saying 'stop that' and he saw Sgt. Alag
approaching; sometime after, Capt. Rolando Maclang,
their commanding officer, came, got his gun, and said
that the case be investigated as to what really
happened. He said that when his gun was put in its
holster only its handle protrudes or comes out from it.
"Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a
suspect in a robbery case that happened during the
first week of December, 1989; he was the one who
filed that case in the town of San Dionisio and that
case involves other persons who were also detained;
before January 4, 1990 he had also the chance to
invite and interrogate Balboa but who denied any
robbery case; x x x [I]t was after he took his lunch
that day when Capt. Maclang called him to conduct
the interrogation; when he took Balboa from the
stockade he did not tell him that he (Balboa) was to
be investigated in the investigation room which was
housed in the main building which is fifty meters,
more or less, from the stockade, likewise houses the
administrative office, the office of the commanding
officer, officer of the operations division and that of
the signal division; his gun was in its holster when the
victim tried to grab it (gun); from the time he sensed
that the victim tried to grab his gun, he locked the
victim; the hand of the victim was on top of his hand
and he felt the victim was attempting to get his gun;
that the entire handle of his gun was exposed when
placed inside its holster; he cannot tell whether the
victim, while struggling with him, was able to hold
any portion of his gun from the tip of its barrel to the
point where its hammer is located; during the
incident his gun was fully loaded and cocked; Sgt.
Alag did not approach, but just viewed them and
probably reported the incident to their commanding
officer; he was not able to talk to Sgt. Alag as he
(Pomoy) was not in his right sense; when his
commanding officer came some five to ten minutes
later and took away his gun he did not tell him
anything.
"Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.
"He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who
conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Tomas
Balboa that afternoon of January 4, 1990; in his
autopsy findings respecting which he made an
autopsy report he said he found two entrance wounds
on the victim, the first on the left chest with
trajectory medially downward, while the second one
is on the left side of the stomach with trajectory
somewhat going upward; at the same time of his
examination he saw this victim to be wearing a light-
colored T-shirt and a jacket; other than the T-shirt
worn by the victim, he did not see or find any powder
burns and marks and that those dotted marks in the
T-shirt were believed by him to be powder burns as
they look like one; he also found a deformed slug in
the pocket of the jacket of the victim."9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual
findings: 1) the victim was not successful in his
attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been
in control of the weapon when the shots were fired; 2)
the gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing
incident and immediately before it went off; it
was petitioner who released the safety lock before he
deliberately fired the fatal shots; and 3) the location
of the wounds found on the body of the deceased did
not support the assertion of petitioner that there had
been a grappling for the gun.
To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts
discredited the claim of petitioner that the death of
Balboa resulted from an accident. Citing People v.
Reyes,10 the CA maintained that "a revolver is not
prone to accidental firing if it were simply handed
over to the deceased as appellant claims because of
the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already
first cocked and pressure was exerted on the trigger
in the process of allegedly handing it over. If it were
uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be
applied on the trigger to fire the revolver. Either way,
the shooting of the deceased must have been
intentional because pressure on the trigger was
necessary to make the gun fire."11
Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred
with this observation of the OSG:
"[Petitioner's] theory of accident would have been
easier to believe had the victim been shot only once.
In this case, however, [petitioner] shot the victim not
only once but twice, thereby establishing
[petitioner's] determined effort to kill the victim. By
any stretch of the imagination, even assuming
without admitting that the first shot was accidental,
then it should not have been followed by another shot
on another vital part of the body. The fact that
[petitioner] shot the victim two (2) times and was hit
on two different and distant parts of the body,
inflicted from two different locations or angles, means
that there was an intent to cause the victim's death,
contrary to [petitioner's] pretensions of the alleged
accidental firing. It is an oft-repeated principle that
the location, number and gravity of the wounds
inflicted on the victim have a more revealing tale of
what actually happened during the incident. x x x.12
Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of
self-defense. It held that petitioner had miserably
failed to prove the attendance of unlawful aggression,
an indispensable element of this justifying
circumstance.
While substantially affirming the factual findings of
the RTC, the CA disagreed with the conclusion of the
trial court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of public position had attended the commission of the
crime. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC
was modified by the appellate court in this manner:
"x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, the public official must use
his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his
office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the
accused could have perpetrated the crime without
occupying his position, then there is no abuse of
public position.' (People v. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670).
In the instant case, there is no showing that the
[petitioner] had a premeditated plan to kill the victim
when the former fetched the latter from the stockade,
thus, it cannot be concluded that the public position
of the [petitioner] facilitated the commission of the
crime. Therefore, the trial court's finding that the said
aggravating circumstance that [petitioner] took
advantage of his public position to commit the crime
cannot be sustained. Hence, there being no
aggravating and no mitigating circumstance proved,
the maximum of the penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, a penalty
imposable for the crime of homicide. x x x."13
Hence, this Petition.14
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the
following issues for the Court's consideration:
"I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and
reversible error in affirming petitioner's conviction
despite the insufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence to convict the petitioner, in contrast
to petitioner's overwhelming evidence to support his
theory/defense of accident.
"II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and
reversible error in affirming the conviction of
the petitioner on a manifestly mistaken inference that
when the gun fired, the petitioner was in full control
of the handle of the gun, because what the
testimonies of disinterested witnesses and
the petitioner reveal was that the gun fired
while petitioner and Balboa were both holding the
gun in forceful efforts to wrest the gun from each
other.
"III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming
the solicitor general's observation that the fact
that petitioner shot the victim twice
establishes petitioner's determined effort to kill the
victim.
"IV. The appellate court committed serious
misapprehension of the evidence presented when it
ruled that the trajectory of the wounds was front-to-
back belying the allegation of petitioner that he and
the victim were side-by-side each other when the
grappling ensued.
"V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real
import of petitioner's reaction to the incident when it
stated that the dumbfounded reaction of petitioner
after the incident strongly argues against his claim of
accidental shooting.
"VI. The appellate court committed grave error when
it disregarded motive or lack of it in determining the
existence of voluntariness and intent on the part
of petitioner to shoot at the victim when the same
was put in serious doubt by the evidence presented.
"VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that
the defense of accident and self-defense are
inconsistent.
"VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the
imposition of the penalties and damages."15
In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to
two: First, whether the shooting of Tomas Balboa was
the result of an accident; and second,
whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Accidental Shooting
Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings
of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court, are conclusive.16 Both courts possess time-
honored expertise in the field of fact finding. But
where some facts are misinterpreted or some details
overlooked, the Supreme Court may overturn the
erroneous conclusions drawn by the courts a quo.
Where, as in this case, the facts in dispute are crucial
to the question of innocence or guilt of the accused, a
careful factual reexamination is imperative.
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article
12 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from
criminal liability. - The following are exempt from
criminal liability:
xxx
'4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act
with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intent of causing it.' "
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a
finding that the harm to the victim was not due to the
fault or negligence of the accused, but to
circumstances that could not have been foreseen or
controlled.17 Thus, in determining whether an
"accident" attended the incident, courts must take
into account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill
and absence of fault or negligence. This
determination inevitably brings to the fore the main
question in the present case: was petitioner in control
of the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the shots
were fired?
Petitioner Not in Control
of the Gun When It Fired
The records show that, other than petitioner himself,
it was Erna Basa who witnessed the incident
firsthand. Her account, narrated during cross-
examination, detailed the events of that fateful
afternoon of January 4, 1990 as follows:
"ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. You said that while you were inside the
investigation room you heard a commotion. That
commotion which you heard, did you hear any
shouting as part of that commotion which you heard?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue
was not clear. It could not be understood.
Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that
commotion?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. No, sir.
Q. From the time you entered the investigation room
you did not hear any voice while you were inside the
investigation room as part of that commotion?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. There was no loud voice and their conversation
could not be clarified. They were talking somewhat
like murmuring or in a low voice but there was a sort
of trouble in their talks.
COURT:
Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their
conversation?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy
and Mr. Balboa the deceased in this case? Am I
correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a
gun?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating
by pointing to her side) and I saw both of them
grappling for that gun.
Q. Where was the gun at that time?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by
pointing to [her] side.)
Q. When you demonstrated you were according to
you saw the hands holding the gun. It was Sgt. Pomoy
who was holding the gun with his right hand?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in
its holster, the hand of Sir Balboa and Sgt.
Pomoy.
COURT:
Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its
holster?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster
with both hands grappling for the possession of
the gun.
Q. How many hands did you see?
A. Two.
Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that
of the victim?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY TEODOSIO:
Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the
gun?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.
Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy,
was it holding the gun?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on
the gun and Sir Balboa's hand was also there.
Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt.
Pomoy holding?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. The handle.
Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was
holding the gun with his right hand?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. At first they were not directly facing each other.
Q. So later, they were facing each other?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. They were not directly facing each other.
Their position did not remain steady as they
were grappling for the possession of the gun
force against force.
COURT:
Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots
were fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When I saw them they were already facing each
other.
Q. What was the distance?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Very close to each other.
Q. How close?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Very near each other.
Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such
a manner that their bodies would touch each other.
Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the
gun fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were
heard.
Q. And they were directly facing each other?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken
out from its holster?
A. While they were grappling for the possession
of the gun, gradually the gun was released
from its holster and then there was an
explosion.
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas
Balboa?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of
the gun was when it fired because they were
grappling for the possession of the gun.
Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were
grappling for its possession?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from
that very gun.
Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two
times?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun
fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the
barrel of the gun was pointed to because the
gun was turning.
xxx
Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun
when the gun fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in
the possession of Sgt. Pomoy. He was the one holding
the gun.
Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was
already in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the
gun in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had
separated themselves with each other, it was then
that I saw Sgt. Pomoy holding the gun.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster,
Sgt. Pomoy was the one holding the handle of
the gun? Am I correct?
A. Both of them were holding the handle of the
gun.
Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two
of them were holding the gun?
A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun,
Sgt. Pomoy and Sir Balboa.
Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was
holding the handle of the gun as you testified?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of
the gun?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Left hand.
Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the
gun with his left hand, was he in front of Sgt. Pomoy?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each
other. Pomoy's right and Balboa's left sides [were]
towards each other. They were side by side at a
closer distance towards each other.
xxx
Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the
handle of the gun during that time?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When I looked out it was when they were
grappling for the possession of the gun and the
right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was holding the
handle of the gun.
Q. When you saw them did you see what position of
the handle of the gun was being held by Tomas
Balboa? The rear portion of the handle of the gun or
the portion near the trigger?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When I looked at them it was the hand of
Sgt. Pomoy holding the handle of the gun with
his right hand with the hand of Sir Balboa over
the hand of Pomoy, the same hand holding the
gun.
Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed
from its holster?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I
was not able to notice clearly anymore whose
hand was holding the gun when I saw both
their hands were holding the gun.
Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, 'Daw duha
na sila nagakapot', what you really mean?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Still both of them were holding the handle of
the gun.
Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand
of Sgt. Pomoy as what you have previously said when
the gun was in the holster of Sgt. Pomoy?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I
saw that Sgt. Pomoy's right hand was still on
the handle of the gun with the left hand of Sir
Balboa over his right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, like
this(witness illustrating by showing his right hand
with her left hand over her right hand as if holding
something. The thumb of the left hand is somewhat
over the index finger of the right hand.)
COURT:
Which hand of the victim was used by him when the
gun was already pulled out form its holster and while
the accused was holding the handle of the gun?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Left hand.
Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding
a portion of the handle of the gun up to the time
when the gun was pulled out from its holster?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his
right hand because the left hand of Pomoy was used
by him in parrying the right hand of Sir Balboa which
is about to grab the handle of the gun.
COURT: victim were all over the weapon was categorically
asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of
Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left grappling for the gun, both hands of petitioner were
hand in pushing the victim away from him? fully engaged - - his right hand was trying to maintain
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary possession of the weapon, while his left was warding
off the victim. It would be difficult to imagine how,
under such circumstances, petitioner would coolly
A. Yes, sir. and effectively be able to release the safety lock of
the gun and deliberately aim and fire it at the victim.
Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was
he doing with his right hand? It would therefore appear that there was no firm
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary factual basis for the following declaration of the
appellate court: "[Petitioner] admitted that his right
A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with hand was holding the handle of the gun while the left
his right hand and Pomoy was using his left hand of the victim was over his right hand when the
hand to protect the victim from reaching the gun was fired. This declaration would safely lead us to
gun with his right hand. the conclusion that when the gun went off herein
[petitioner] was in full control of the gun."19
COURT:
Release of the Gun's Safety Lock and
Firing of the Gun Both Accidental
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO: Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol
was equipped with a safety lock that, unless released,
would prevent the firing of the gun. Despite this
Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was safety feature, however, the evidence showed that
able to hold the barrel of the gun of Sgt.
the weapon fired and hit the victim - - not just once,
Pomoy? but twice. To the appellate court, this fact could only
mean that petitioner had deliberately unlocked the
A. Yes, sir. gun and shot at the victim. This conclusion appears to
be non sequitur.
Q. And that was at the time before the shots were
fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim
grappled for possession of the gun. This frenzied
A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the grappling for the weapon - - though brief, having
gun using his right hand. been finished in a matter of seconds - - was fierce
and vicious. The eyewitness account amply illustrated
the logical conclusion that could not be dismissed:
COURT: that in the course of the scuffle, the safety lock could
have been accidentally released and the shots
Q. That was before the gun fired? accidentally fired.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That there was not just one but two shots fired does
A. Yes, sir."18 not necessarily and conclusively negate the claim
that the shooting was accidental, as the same
The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner circumstance can easily be attributed to the
did not have control of the gun during the scuffle. The mechanism of the .45 caliber service gun. Petitioner,
deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon in his technical description of the weapon in question,
from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart those explained how the disputed second shot may have
attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the been brought about:
"x x x Petitioner also testified on cross-examination
that a caliber .45 semi-automatic pistol, when fired,
immediately slides backward throwing away the
empty shell and returns immediately carrying again a
live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did,
fire in succession. Verily, the location of, and distance
between the wounds and the trajectories of the
bullets jibe perfectly with the claim of the petitioner:
the trajectory of the first shot going downward from
left to right thus pushing Balboa's upper body, tilting
it to the left while Balboa was still
clutching petitioner's hand over the gun; the second
shot hitting him in the stomach with the bullet going
upward of Balboa's body as he was falling down and
releasing his hold on petitioner's hand x x x."20
Thus, the appellate court's reliance on People v.
Reyes41 was misplaced. In that case, the Court
disbelieved the accused who described how his gun
had exploded while he was simply handing it over to
the victim. Here, no similar claim is being
made; petitioner has consistently maintained that the
gun accidentally fired in the course of his struggle
with the victim. More significantly, the present case
involves a semi-automatic pistol, the mechanism of
which is very different from that of a revolver, the
gun used in Reyes.22 Unlike a revolver, a semi-
automatic pistol, as sufficiently described
by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when
possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle.
Alleged Grappling Not Negated
by Frontal Location of Wounds
On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing
that the wounds of the deceased were all frontal, the
appellate court rejected petitioner's claim that a
grappling for the weapon ever occurred. It held that
"if there was indeed a grappling between the two,
and that they had been side [by] side x x x each
other, the wounds thus inflicted could not have had a
front-to-back trajectory which would lead to an
inference that the victim was shot frontally, as
observed by Dr. Jaboneta."23
Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is
indicative of the positions of the parties at the precise
moment when the gun was fired. Their positions
would in turn be relevant to a determination of the
existence of variables such as treachery, aggression
and so on.
In the factual context of the present case, however,
the location of the wounds becomes inconsequential.
Where, as in this case, both the victim and the
accused were grappling for possession of a gun, the
direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the
process, such that the trajectory of the bullet when
the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic.
In this case, the eyewitness account of that aspect of
the tragic scuffle shows that the parties' positions
were unsteady, and that the nozzle of the gun was
neither definitely aimed nor pointed at any particular
target. We quote the eyewitness testimony as follows:
"Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas
Balboa?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of
the gun was when it fired because they were
grappling for the possession of the gun.
xxx
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun
fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the
barrel of the gun was pointed to because the
gun was turning."24
xxx
"Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was
holding the gun with his right hand?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A At first, they were not directly facing each other.
Q So later, they were facing each other?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A They were not directly facing each other. Their
position did not remain steady as they were
grappling for the possession of the gun force
against force."25
In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:
"x x x. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
Balboa was shot frontally. First, because the position
of the gun does not necessarily indicate the position
of the person or persons holding the gun when it
fired. This is especially true when two persons were
grappling for the possession of the gun when it fired,
as what exactly transpired in this case. x x x.
"[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that
the petitioner was on the left side of the victim during
the grappling when the gun fired. The second wound
was thus inflicted this wise: when the first shot hit
Balboa, his upper body was pushed downward owing
to the knocking power of the caliber .45 pistol. But he
did not let go of his grip of the hand of petitioner and
the gun, Balboa pulling the gun down as he was going
down. When the gun went off the second time hitting
Balboa, the trajectory of the bullet in Balboa's body
was going upward because his upper body was
pushed downward twisting to the left. It was then that
Balboa let go of his grip. On cross-
examination, petitioner testified, what I noticed was
that after successive shots we separated from each
other. This sequence of events is logical because the
protagonists were grappling over the gun and were
moving very fast. x x x."26
Presence of All the
Elements of Accident
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the
accused was at the time performing a lawful act with
due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere
accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there
was no fault or no intent to cause the injury. 27 From
the facts, it is clear that all these elements were
present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a
member - - specifically, one of the investigators - - of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the
Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in
the lawful performance of his duties as investigating
officer that, under the instructions of his superior, he
fetched the victim from the latter's cell for a routine
interrogation.
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as
a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly
tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of
the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the
snatching of his service weapon by anyone,
especially by a detained person in his custody. Such
weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and
to kill or maim persons in the vicinity,
including petitioner himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He
exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his
service weapon from causing accidental harm to
others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept
his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept
it inside its holster at all times, especially within the
premises of his working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused
admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased,
much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar,
the guard in charge of the detention of Balboa, did
not testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner
that would indicate the intent to harm the victim
while being fetched from the detention cell.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim's
death was limited only to acts committed in the
course of the lawful performance of his duties as an
enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its
holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing
of the two successive shots - - all of which led to the
death of the victim - - were sufficiently demonstrated
to have been consequences of circumstances beyond
the control of petitioner. At the very least, these
factual circumstances create serious doubt on the
latter's culpability.
Petitioner's Subsequent Conduct
Not Conclusive of Guilt
To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct
of petitioner immediately after the incident was
indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt was evident
from the fact that he was "dumbfounded," according
to the CA; was "mum, pale and trembling," according
to the trial court. These behavioral reactions
supposedly point to his guilt. Not necessarily so. His
behavior was understandable. After all, a minute
earlier he had been calmly escorting a person from
the detention cell to the investigating room; and, in
the next breath, he was looking at his companion's

bloodied body. His reaction was to be expected of one
in a state of shock at events that had transpired so
swiftly and ended so regrettably.
Second Issue:
Self-Defense
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative.
Granting arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa,
he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from
real and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting
circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent
to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily
contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to
defend oneself from imminent danger. 28 Apparently,
the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out of
any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower,
maim or kill the victim for the purpose of self-defense
against any aggression; rather, they appeared to be
the spontaneous and accidental result of both parties'
attempts to possess the firearm.
Since the death of the victim was the result of an
accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner - - an
exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code - - a further discussion of
whether the assailed acts of the latter constituted
lawful self-defense is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner
is ACQUITTED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio
Morales, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 9-47.
2 20
Id., pp. 49-68. Sixteenth Division. Penned
by Justice B. A. Adefuin-de la Cruz (Division
chair) and concurred in by Justices Andres
B. Reyes Jr. and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador
(members).
3 24
Id., p. 70.
4 25
CA rollo, pp. 9-20.
5
Written by Judge Bartolome M. Fanual.
6 26
CA rollo, p. 8.
7
Dated October 28, 1991; CA rollo, p. 8.
8
Comment, pp. 2-7; rollo, pp. 77-82.
Citations omitted.
9
Petition, pp. 5-11; rollo, pp. 13-19.
Citations omitted.
10
69 SCRA 474, 479, February 27, 1976.
11
CA Decision, p. 16; rollo, p. 64.
12
Id., pp. 17 and 65. Italics supplied.
13
CA Decision, p. 19; rollo, p. 67.
14
This case was deemed submitted
for decision on January 13, 2003, upon this
Court's receipt of respondent's
Memorandum, signed by Assistant Solicitor
General Josefina C. Castillo and Associate
Solicitor Josephine D. Arias. Petitioner's
Memorandum, signed by Atty. Ferdinand M.
Negre and Atty. Karen O. Amurao-Dalangin,
was filed on October 1, 2002.
15
Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 15-16;
rollo, pp. 126-127. Original in upper case.
16
Borromeo v. Sun, 375 Phil. 595, October
22, 1999.
17
People v. Cariquez, 373 Phil. 877,
September 27, 1999. To determine
accident, the following three elements must
concur: 1) the accused is performing a
lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting
injury is caused by mere accident; and 3)
on the part of the accused, there is no fault
or intent to cause the injury.
18
TSN, July 29, 1994, pp. 22-40. (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
19
CA Decision, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 64-65.
Petition, pp. 25-26; rollo, pp. 33-34.
21
Supra. See 161 Phil. 611, 617, February
27, 1976, per curiam.
22
Supra.
23
CA Decision, p. 18; rollo, p. 66.
TSN, supra, pp. 30-31.
Id., p. 28. Underscoring and boldface
supplied.
Petition, pp. 27-28; rollo, pp. 35-36.
Boldface in the original.
27
People v. Cariquez, supra.
28
In the assailed Decision, the appellate
court - - while acknowledging the innate
differences between "accident" and "self-
defense," the former presupposing the lack
of intention to inflict harm and the latter
assuming voluntariness induced by
necessity - - nevertheless submits that the
standards to be used in determining
whether the elements of one or the other
are extant are one and the same.
The Court disagrees. It is apparent from
their varying definitions under the Revised
Penal Code that "accident" and "self-
defense" are two different circumstances.
Accident, as an exempting circumstance,
presupposes that while a crime may have
been committed, no criminal is to be held
liable. Section 4 of Article 12 describes
"accident" as an exempting circumstance
as follows:
"Article 12. Circumstances which are
exempt from criminal liability: - - The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
xxx
(4) Any person who, while performing a
lawful act with due care, causes an injury
by mere accident without fault or intent of
causing it."
xxx
On the other hand, the justifying
circumstance of self-defense presupposes
that no crime has been committed for
which a criminal can be held liable. It is
apparent, from a reading of Section 3 of
Article 11, that the law treats the justifying
circumstance of "self-defense" as a totally
different circumstance with another set of
elements, as follows:
"Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The
following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person
or rights provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself."
xxx
With their differing elements, one cannot,
as the appellate court erroneously did,
utilize the standards used in proving "self-
defense" to prove whether or not under the
same facts, "accident" is extant.
[G.R. No. 1352. March 29, 1905. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., Defendants-
Appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin, for Appellants.
Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. COERCION. Held upon the evidence that the
defendant Baculi was exempt from responsibility
under article 8, paragraph 9 of the Penal Code.
2. EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION. Extrajudicial
confessions not made voluntarily can not be received
in evidence. (Act No. 619, sec. 4.)
3. FAILURE TO REPORT A CRIME. Failure to report to
the authorities the commission of a crime is not an
offense punished by the Penal Code.
DECISION
MAPA, J. :
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of
First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of
presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the
crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the
persons of the American school-teachers Louis A.
Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest
Eger, because, without having taken part in the said
crime as principals or as accomplices, they took part
in the burial of the corpses of the victim in order to
conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this
sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he
confessed to having assisted in the burial of the
corpses, it appears that he did so because he was
compelled to do so by the murderers of the four
teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this,
but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the
crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness
for the prosecution. This witness says he was present
when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in
was not a member of the group who killed the both instances. So ordered.
Americans, but that he was in a banana plantation on
his property gathering some bananas; that when he Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
heard the shots he began to run; that he was,
however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of
the band; that the latter called to him and striking
him the butts of their guns they forced him to bury
the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person
who performs the act by reason of irresistible force
(par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such
circumstances when he executed the acts which are
charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros,
there is no proof that he took any part in any way in
the execution of the crime with which he has been
charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary,
since Baculi, as well as on of the witnesses for the
prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that
he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of
the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of
occurrence when the burial took place. The
confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made
before an official of the division of information of the
Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states
when testifying as a witness, can not be considered
as legal proof, because the same witness says that
Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants
who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears
besides, from the statements of another witness for
the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the
confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through
the promise made to him and to the other defendants
that nothing would be done to them. Confessions
which do not appear to have been made freely and
voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of
pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec.
4 Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission.)
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the
authorities the perpetration of the crime, which
seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and
which the court below takes into consideration in his
judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and
therefore that can not render the defendants
criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with
a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we acquit
[G.R. No. 1481. February 17, 1903. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v.

LIBERATO EXALTACION ET AL., Defendants-
Appellants.

Alberto Barretto, for Appellants.

Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; DURESS. The

defendants were captured by brigands, who
compelled them, by threats of death, to take and
subscribe an oath to support the Katipunan Society,
an organization created for the purpose of subverting
the Government by force: Held, That the duress under
which the defendants acted relieves them from
criminal liability.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan

presented to the court of that province an information
charging Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura
Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion, in that they,
subsequently to the 4th day of November, 1901,
willfully and illegally bound themselves to take part in
the rebellion against the Government of the United
States in these Islands, swearing allegiance to the
Katipunan Society, the purpose of which was to
overthrow the said Government by force of arms, this
against the statute in the case made and provided.

In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the

provincial governor of Bulacan, testified under oath
that the two defendants were arrested in the month
of March, 1903, the police some days before having
captured a number of documents in the encampment
of one Contreras, a so-called general of bandits,
situated at a place called Langca, of the town of
Meycauayan, among which documents appeared the
papers now in pages 2 and 3 of the record, signed by
the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who recognized
the said documents when they were exhibited to
them; that the said defendants stated to the witness
that they had signed the documents under
compulsion; that the purpose of the Katipunan
Society was to obtain the independence of the
Philippines; that this statement was made in the
house of the parish priest of Meycauayan in the
presence of Exequiel Casa and Fernando Nieto. The
latter, upon their examination as witnesses, testified
to the same facts stating that the defendants told
Governor Tecson that they had signed the said
documents under fear of death at the hands of the
thieves by whom they had been captured. The
witness Casas, the municipal president of
Meycauayan, testified that he held office as such in
place of the former president, Don Tomas Testa, who
was kidnapped in the month of October, 1902.
The said documents, the first of which was dated July
4 and the second July 17, 1902, were written in
Tagalog, and contain an oath taken in the name of
God, and a covenant on the part of the subscribers to
carry out the superior orders of the Katipunan, and
never disobey them until their death in the defense of
the mother country. The two accused under oath,
testified to having signed the said documents and
alleged that they did not so under compulsion and
force while they were held as captives by the thieves;
that the defendant Tanchinco was captured in the
fields one day when he was going to work on his farm
by three armed men, unknown to him, who asked him
if he was an agent or friend of President Testa, and
upon his replying in the negative they compelled him
in view of his denial to sign a document, now on page
3 of the record.
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify
to the fact that he was captured at a place called
Kaibiga in the township of Novaliches, and that on the
day following his release, having been unable to pay
the $300 which was demanded of him, he reported to
the president, Tomas Testa. The defendant Liberato
Exaltacion under oath testified that he was captured
near Meycauayan by five persons, unknown, dressed
as policemen and armed with guns or revolvers; that
these men bound him and took him into the forest
and there compelled him by threats of death to sign
the document now on page 2 of the record; that
thereupon they allowed him to go upon promise to
return. This defendant testified that Antero Villano
and Tomas Rivera saw him while on the road in the
hands of the thieves. Both the accused testified that
as soon as they were released they presented
themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in the Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard, Mapa, McDonough and
presence of witnesses, and subsequently went to Johnson, JJ., concur.
Bonifacio Morales, a lieutenant of volunteers, and
reported to him the fact that they had been
captured.
The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano,
Dalmacio Ferrer, and Hipolito de Leon of whom the
last two were present when Tanchinco appeared
before Senor Testa, the president of Meycauayan, and
reported to him what had happened to him all
testified to the same fact and corroborated the
statements of the accused with respect to their
capture and their subsequent report to President
Testa and to the witness Morales.
The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the
two documents above referred to, signed by the
accused, is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the
latter or to justify the imposition upon them f the
penalty inflicted by the judgment of the curt below.
The facts, established by the evidence, that the
defendants were kidnapped by brigands who
belonged to the Contreras band, and that they signed
the said documents under compulsion and while in
captivity, relieve them from all criminal liability from
the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The
conduct of the defendants in presenting themselves
first to the local president of Meycauayan and
subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio Morales, of the
Bulacan Government Volunteers, as soon as they
were released by the bandits is corroborative of their
testimony, and is the best demonstration of their
innocence. This conclusion is not overcome by the
trifling discrepancy between the testimony of the
witness Yusay and that of the defendant Tanchinco
nor the fact that Exaltacion was unable to determine
the date when he was captured or that on which he
appeared before President Testa.
The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and
punished by Act No. 292 not having been established
at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the
opinion that the judgment below must be reversed
and the defendants acquitted with the costs de oficio.
The judge below will be informed of this decision and
a copy of the judgment entered herein will be
furnished him for his information and guidance. So
ordered.
[G.R. No. L-6082. March 18, 1911.]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, Defendant-Appellant.
C.W. Ney, for Appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. MUNICIPAL PRESIDENTS; ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANT.
he case of U. S. v. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472), followed as
to the authority of a municipal president to make an arrest
without a warrant for an offense committed in his presence,
the municipal president being held to have all the usual
powers of a public officer for the making of arrests without
warrant.
2. ID.; ID.; ARRAIGNMENT AS SOON AS "PRACTICABLE."
Held, That under all the circumstances of this case, as set
forth in the opinion, the defendant, after having arrested the
complaining witness without a warrant, brought him before
a justice of the peace as soon as "practicable" thereafter,
notwithstanding the fact that three days were expended in
doing so.
3. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION AT TO NECESSITY FOR ARREST.
In the absence of all evidence to the contrary, this court will
not presume that, in a particular case of defiance of local
authority by the unlawful violation of a local ordinance even
where the offense thus committed is, in itself, trivial and
unimportant, it may not have been necessary or at least
expedient to make an arrest and bring the offender forthwith
before the proper judicial officer.
D E C I S I O N CARSON, J.:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the
court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary
detention" of the complaining witness for a period of
three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625
pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of
this case there can be no doubt of the lawful
authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his
functions as municipal president, to make arrest of
the complaining witness which resulted in his alleged
unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence,
the alleged offense with which the complaining
witness in this case was charged was committed by
him in the presence of the municipal president, who
must be held to have had all the usual powers of a
police officer for the making of arrest without
warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the case of
U.S. v. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point
The judgment of conviction of the court below must that in a particular case of a defiance of local
therefore be reversed, unless the evidence discloses authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance,
that having made the arrest, the defendant arbitrarily it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make
and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the an arrest and send the offender forthwith to the
complaining witness to be detained for a period of justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if
three days without having him brought before the only to convince all would-be offenders that the
proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial forces of law and order were supreme, even in the
of the charge on which he was arrested. But so far as absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
we can gather from the extremely meagre record in
this case the arrested man was in fact brought before The judgment of the lower court convicting and
a justice of the peace as soon as "practicable" after sentencing the defendant must be reversed and he is
his arrest. True, three days were expended in doing, hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is
so, but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So
the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the ordered.
peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and
to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two [G.R. No. 45186. September 30, 1936.]
adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to take a
long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEFINA
prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the BANDIAN, Defendant-Appellant.
other of the adjoining municipalities for trial, the
failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due Jose Rivera Yap for Appellant.
to the fact that the written complaint, which was
intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, Solicitor-General Hilado for Appellee.
was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the
prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on SYLLABUS
both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must
assume that in this respect the officers in charge 1. CRIMINAL LAW; INFANTICIDE AND ABANDONMENT
were controlled by local conditions, changes in the OF A MINOR; WHEN PUNISHABLE. Infanticide and
weather, or the like, which, as appears from the abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be
uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must
by boats safer and more commodious sometimes to be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or
one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining omission. Even in cases where said crimes are
municipalities. committed through mere imprudence, the person
who commits them, under said circumstance, must
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or
arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may
exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in be held liable.
the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is
nothing in this record upon which to base a finding 2. ID.; EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY. The
that his defendant caused the arrest and the law exempts from criminal liability any person who
subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than acts under the circumstances in which the appellant
in the due performance of his official duties; and acted in this case, by giving birth to a child in a
there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the thicket and later abandoning it, not because of
premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the imprudence or any other cause than that she was
trivial nature of the offense for which the arrest was overcome by severe dizziness and extreme debility,
made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no with no fault or intention on her part. She has in her
judicial officer in the remote community where the favor the fourth and seventh exempting
incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no circumstances.
certainty of the early return of the absent justice of
the peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to

DECISION
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted
thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the
corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of
the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said
sentence alleging that the trial court
erred:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her
alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had
thrown away her newborn babe, and
"II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond a
reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion
perpetua, with costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
The facts of record may be summarized as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
At about 7 oclock in the morning of January 31, 1936,
Valentin Aguilar, the appellants neighbor, saw the
appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas
from her house, apparently to respond to a call of
nature because it was there that the people of the
place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes
later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with
her clothes stained with blood both in the front and
back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not
being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and,
having noted that she was every weak and dizzy, he
supported and helped her go up to her house and
placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before
Aguilar brought her to her house, what had happened
to her, the appellant merely answered that she was
very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant
in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano
Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later
requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the
hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant.
Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when
he saw the body of newborn babe near a path
adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a
few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it
and the latter told him to bring the body to the
appellants house. Upon being asked whether the
baby which had just been shown to her was hers or
not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident of 2 oclock in the
afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno,
president of the sanitary division of Talisayan,
Oriental Misamis, went to the appellants house and
found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor
of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed,
were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts,
the physician in question declared that the appellant
gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that after
giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill
it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the
man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been
living maritally, because the child was not but of
another man with whom she had previously had
amorous relations. To give force to his conclusions, he
testified that the appellant had admitted to him that
she had killed her child, when he went to her house
at the time and on the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving
absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose testimony
was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was
contradicted by the very witnesses for the
prosecution and by the appellant, as will be stated
later, they were of the opinion and the lower court
furthermore held, that the appellant was an
infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not
agree with both. On the contrary, he maintains that
the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a
minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the
Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having
resulted in the death of the minor allegedly
abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no
evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr.
Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found
on the body of said child were not caused by the
hand of man but by bites of animals, the pigs that
usually roamed through the thicket where it was
found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be
punishable, must be committed wilfully or
consciously, or at least it must be the result of a
voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even
in cases where said crimes are committed through
mere imprudence, the person who commits them,
under said circumstance, must be in the full
enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be
conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held
liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the
appellant, in causing her childs death in one way or
another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so
wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause
to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because
her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown
to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years
before the incident; her married life with Kirol she
considers him her husband as he considers her his
wife began a year ago; as he so testified at the
trial, he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he
believed from the beginning, affirming such belief
when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by
the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified
that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the
birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no
cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the
witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that
the child was taken from the thicket and carried
already dead to the appellants house after the
appellant had left the place, staggering, without
strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the
extent of having to be as in fact she was helped to go
up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear
how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomucenos
affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the
fact that the appellant denied having made any
admission to said physician and that from the time
she became pregnant she continuously had fever.
This illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly
caused by her long illness as well as the profuse
hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled
with the circumstance that she is a primipara, being
then only 23 years of age, and therefore
inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the
inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such
event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol
a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a
day is uneducated and could not supplant with
what she had read or learned from books what
experience itself could not aware of her childbirth, or
if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable,
due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be
considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the
seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised
Penal Code), to take her child from the thicket where
she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned
and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in
question, by going into the thicket, according to her,
to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact
that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly
lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of
giving birth to her child in that same place and later
abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any
other reason than that she was overcome by strong
dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be
blamed therefor because it all happened by mere
accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The
law exempts from liability any person who so acts
and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12,
subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts
and considerations, and granting that the appellant
was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket
and that she later failed to take her child therefrom,
having been so prevented by reason of causes
entirely independent of her will, it should be held that
the alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the
appellant are true; and it appearing that under such
circumstances said appellant has the fourth and
seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, she is
hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had been
accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and as
she is actually confined in jail in connection with this
case, it is ordered that she be released immediately.
So ordered.
Avancea, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., concur.