Radu Dudu

Teoria Relaiilor Internaionale

Noiembrie 2015

Stat i suveranitate

1. Statul: elemente de definiie

Convenia de la Montevideo privind drepturile i ndatoririle statelor (Uruguay, 1933) codific teoria
declarativ a statalitii, acceptat ca parte a dreptului internaional cutumiar. Cel mai bine cunoscut
este art. 1 al Conveniei, care stabilete patru criterii de statalitate recunoscute de organizaiile
internaionale:

Statul, ca persoan de drept internaional, ar trebui s posede urmtoarele caracteristici: (a) o

populaie permanent; (b) un teritoriu definit; (c) guvernmnt; i (d) capacitatea de a intra n
relaii cu alte state.

Articolul 3 menioneaz c Existena politic a unui stat este independent de recunoaterea de ctre
celelalte state teoria declarativ a statalitii.

Articolul 11 interzice utilizarea forei militare pentru a ctiga recunoaterea suveranitii.

Analiza noastr se axeaz pe urmtoarele cinci caracteristici eseniale ale statal itii:

1. ordine legal-instituional

2. organizaie cu monopol asupra uzului al violenei organizate

3. suveranitate

4. societate

5. teritoriu.

1.1 Ordine legal-instituional

Statul ca structur de autoritate politic este constituit de instituii, legi, norme, reguli i principii dup
care sunt guvernate relaiile sociale. Structurile statului sunt structuri de autoritate ce reglementeaz
comportamentul cetenilor i constituie, n parte, ceea ce sunt i ce pot face cetenii (roluri sociale
i relaii sociale). Ele distribuie controlul asupra mijloacelor de producie, de distrucie i de reproducie.

Instituionalizarea normelor de exercitare a autoritii stabilizeaz ateptrile cu privire la:

comportamentul celorlali membrii ai societii;

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 puterea exercitat de ctre autoritile statului, abilitate s vegheze la respectarea legii. Statul
are menirea de a asigura respectarea drepturilor i libertilor indivizilor, dar indivizii au nevoie
de protecie legal fa de interveniile arbitrare ale autoritilor statului checks and
balances.

1.2 Monopol asupra uzului al violenei organizate

Violena organizat se refer la ntrebuinarea coordonat a forei letale de ctre un grup. Exist tipuri
de violen care nu se conformeaz acestei descripii:

violena neletal, ce revine nu doar comportamentului statelor, ci i indivizilor sau grupurilor;

violena individual, care nu implic aciune colectiv, ori care este fcut de mai muli dar nu
organizat (e.g. revoltele sau violena de grup).

Michael Nicholson (2001: 128) prezint distincia dintre:

- violena somatic (direct): ncercarea deliberat de a rni sau ucide pe cineva prin aciune
individual sau de grup;
- violena structural (Johan Galtung, 1969): are loc atunci cnd oamenii sunt rnii sau ucii ca
urmare a unor aciuni indirecte, care nu au acest scop, dar probabile ca urmare a organizrii
sociale i a managementului precar al riscului n societate. De exemplu, moartea ca urmare a
srciei impuse de o structur social opresiv este privit ca o form de violen structural,
sau moartea n accidente auto ca urmare a strii precare a drumurilor. La fel, moartea ca
urmare a tolerrii sau neglijenei din partea autoritilor a funcionrii unor localuri nesigure
din punct de vedere al normelor de prevenire a incendiilor.
- violen cultural (Galtung, 1990): orice aspect al unei culturi care poate fi utilizat pentru a
legitima violena n form direct sau structural. Violena simbolic inculcat ntr-o cultur
nu ucide i nu mutileaz ca violena direct sau precum cea structural. Totui, este utilizat
pentru a le legitima pe ambele, precum n teoria unui popor dominant ( Herrenvolk) sau a unei
rase superioare.1

Triunghi al violenei: violena direct se prezint ca eveniment; violena structural se prezint ca

proces; violena cultural se prezint ca invariant social, ca permanen.

Ceea ce este distinct pentru violena exercitat de stat este aspectul ei organizat. O organizaie lipsit
de aceast capacitate nu poate fi numit stat.

Monopolul violenei este un concept mai complex. Statele moderne i divid potenialul coercitiv n
dou tipuri de organizaii: fore de poliie, pentru securitatea intern, fore armate, pentru cea
extern. Comanda i controlul acestora este centralizat la nivelul efului de stat. Totui, centralizarea
nu e elementul esenial n explicarea monopolului violenei; i eful statului este integrat n ordinea

1 Johan Galtung (1990), Cultural Violence, in Journal of Peace Research, vol. 27. No. 3, p. 291

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legal-instituional, astfel c aciunile sale sunt supuse condiiilor legii. Important este efectul
centralizrii, nu centralizarea nsi. Efectul trebuie s fie dublu:

- agenii coercitivi ai statului trebuie s acioneze n mod coerent i complementar, nu competitiv sau
antagonic;

- agenii coercitivi trebuie s fie unificai, n sensul c fiecare trebuie s perceap o ameninare la
adresa celorlali ca pe o ameninare la propria adres.

Legitimarea exercitrii violenei este cea mai dificil chestiune din punct de vedere conceptual. Statul
trebuie s aib nu doar capacitatea de a menine monopolul, ci i dreptul i autoritatea moral de a o
face, acceptate de membrii societii n absena coerciiei. Dar legitimitatea i autoritatea statului este
mereu contestat. De exemplu, cartelele drogurilor din American Latin exercit n teritoriile pe care
le controleaz un cvasi-monopol al violenei organizate.

n statele totalitare oamenii nu-i pot exprima liber convingerile, ceea ce pune un semn de ntrebare
asupra legitimitii monopolului asupra violenei. Este consensul tacit suficient pentru a conferi
legitimitate? Atunci cum stau lucrurile cu rezistena nonviolent mpotriva statului, precum refuzul
plii impozitelor? Necesit legitimitatea susinerea din partea majoritii populaiei?

1.3 Suveranitatea

Distincia de baz privind suveranitatea este ntre suveranitatea intern i cea extern.

- Suveranitatea intern se refer la stat ca la un centru de autoritate politic n societate.

- Suveranitatea extern se refer la absena imixtiunii din partea unei autoriti supraordonate
statului n ordinea internaional, precum un alt stat sau o organizaie internaional (anarhie
internaional).

Aceast distincie este independent de tipul de regim politic fascist, comunist, liberal, democratic
sau totalitar. Totui, regimul politic este esenial pentru nelegerea funciunii agentului i titularului
suveranitii dup caz, monarhul, despotul, oligarhia, junta sau naiunea.

1.4 Societatea

Statele sunt constituite prin structuri de exercitare a autoritii asupra societii; ca atare, ele presupun
logic preexistena unei societi. Statele sunt distincte de societate, dar sunt legate conceptual de ele:
nu exist societate, nu exist nici stat. Relaia dintre stat i societate depinde de forma concret luat
de structurile de stat.

Dar ce este societatea? Care sunt condiiile pentru ca o populaie s poat fi numit societate?

Una este ca populaia s adere la un corp comun de reguli sociale; de obicei, astfel de reguli
sunt codificate n legi.

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 O alta este ca societatea s aib limite identitare, istoric i geografic. Acestea pot fi vagi (fuzzy),
precum n cazul imperiilor trecutului ale cror limite (limes) erau date de distana la care
capacitatea metropolei de coerciie prin putere militar devenea insuficient.

Dar care sunt condiiile ce favorizeaz formarea societii ca parte constitutiv a statului? Pe de o
parte, unele aspecte importante ale vieii sociale sunt anterioare formrii statului. Fiinele umane sunt
sociale ntr-o msur att de pronunat nct se poate susine c starea prestatal era una colectiv,
nu individual. Identitile de grup trib, clan, naiune sunt bazate pe elemente precum limba,
cultura, religia, etnia, dar i pe o construcie istoric a trecutului comun, cu rol fondator i edificator.
Acestea sunt uneori efecte ale politicii de state, ns comunitile au existat social nainte de formarea
structurilor statale.

Identitile de grup sunt construcii sociale, adic sunt produsul aciunii colective intenionale. Cu alte
cuvinte, ele sunt produsul unor fore sociale concrete (contingente), orientate ctre un scop.

Statele moderne sunt definite ca state naiune, dei este important s distingem categorial ntre stat
i naiune. Naiunile sunt entiti colective complexe, care mbrac att aspecte obiective, eseniale,
ct i aspecte de construcie social de regul prin reconfirmarea i reconfigurarea periodic a unei
mitologii istorice cu for de liant social, alturi de elemente precum limba, etnia, religia i celelalte
norme culturale i sociale.

There are two major ways of thinking about national identity. One is that all people who live
within a country's borders are part of the nation, regardless of their ethnic, racial, or religious
origins. This liberal or civic nationalism is the conception with which contemporary Americans
are most likely to identify. But the liberal view has competed with and often lost out to a
different view, that of ethnonationalism. The core of the ethnonationalist idea is that nations
are defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith,
and a common ethnic ancestry. (Mueller 2008, Us and Them)

1.5 Teritoriu

Componenta teritorial este legat intrinsec de stat: nu exist stat fr teritoriu, dei exist nc
teritorii neincorporate unei entiti statale (de exemplu Antarctica sau apele maritime internaionale).

(a) Chiar dac teritoriul trebuie s aib granie, lrgimea graniei poate fi variabil. n lumea modern
suntem obinuii cu granie idealizate, abstractizate ca infinit de subiri linii geometrice care
delimiteaz precis ntinderea unui stat. Totui, istoric, au existat multe organizaii cu monopol asupra
violenei organizate pe un teritoriu ale cror limite precise au fost contestate, suprapuse, sau care se
diminuau gradual n intensitate. Imperiile antichitii aveau puncte de concentrare a autoritii
(metropola imperial), din care aceasta descretea spre periferii, pn la dispariie sau confundare cu
zone ale unor puteri nvecinate.

(b) Semnificaia politic a granielor teritoriale este interpretat diferit n diferite teorii politice.
Viziunea realist asupra relaiilor dintre state consider c graniele dintre teritorii coincid cu graniele
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dintre concepiile de sine (noi, naiunea) i de interes naional. Este o viziune hobbesian, n care
limitele teritoriale constituie ziduri de aprare ce se cer aprate cu orice pre. Pe de alt parte,
concepia constructivist asupra RI concepe sinele i interesele sale ca fiind relativ flexibile i
adaptabile.

2. Suveranitatea
Stephen Krasner (1999: 4) 2 distinge patru aspecte distincte ale conceptului de suveranitate.

Suveranitatea legal internaional (SLI) se refer la practicile asociate cu recunoaterea reciproc a

statelor, de regul ntre entiti teritoriale care au independen juridic formal. Regula caracteristic
este recunoaterea mutual a entitilor teritoriale ce au independen juridic formal.

[I]nternational legal sovereignty has been concerned with establishing the status of a political entity in
the international system. Is a state recognized by other states? Is it accepted as a juridical equal? Are its
representatives entitled to di plomatic immunity?

Can it be a member of international organizations? Can its representatives enter into agreements with
other entities? This is the concept used most frequently in international legal scholarship, but it has
been employed by scholars and practitioners of international relations more generally. (Krasner 1999,
p. 14)

The decision to recognize or withhold recognition can be a political act that can support or weaken a
target government. Weaker states have sometimes argued that the recognition of governments should
be automatic, but stronger state who might choose to use recognition as a political instrumen have
rejected this principle. States have recognized other governments even when they did not have effective
control over their claimed territory, such as the German and Italian recognition of the Franco regime in
1936, and the American recognition of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia in 1970. States have
continued to recognize governments that have lost power, including Mexican recognition of the Spanish
republican regime until 1977, and recognition of the Chinese Nationalist regime by all of the major
Western powers until the 1970s. States have refused to recognize new governments even when they
have established effective control, such as the British refusal in the nineteenth century to recognize the
newly independent Latin American states until a decade after they had established effective control, the
Russian refusal to recognize the July monarchy in France until 1832, and the U.S. refusal to recognize
the Soviet regime until 1934.

The frequency and effectiveness of the use of recognition or nonrecognition as a political instrument
have depended both upon the distribution of power (conflicting policies by major powers reduce the
impact of recognition policies) and the degree of ideological conflict. (Krasner 1999, p. 15)

Entities that lack either formal juridical autonomy or territory have also been recognized. India was a
member of the League of Nations and a signatory of the Versail les settlements even though it was a
colony of Britain. The British Dominions were signatories at Versailles and members of the league even
though their juridical independence from Britain was unclear. India and the Philippines were founding

2 Stephen D. Krasner (1999), Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press

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 members of the United Nations even though they did not become formally independent until 1946 and
1947 respectively.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was given observer status in the United Nations in 1974
and this status was changed to that of a mission i n 1988, coincident with the declaration of Palestinian
independence, even though the PLO did not have any independent control over territory. Belorussia
and the Ukraine were members of the United Nations even though they were part of the Soviet Union.

Andorra became a member of the United Nations in 1993 even though France and Spain have control
over its security affairs and retain the right to appoint two of the four members of its Constitutional
Tribunal. Hong Kong, a British colony and then part of China, became a founding member of the World
Trade Organization, even though China was not. The Order of Malta is recognized as a sovereign person
by more than sixty states even though it lost control of Malta in 1798 and holds no territory other than
some buildings in Rome. (Krasner 1999, pp. 16-17)

Suveranitatea westfalian (SW) se refer la organizarea politic bazat pe capacitatea unei entiti
geopolitice de a exclude actorii externi din structurile sale de autoritate teritorial. Regula
caracteristic este excluderea prezenei actorilor externi, de facto i de jure, de pe teritoriul unui stat.

While coercion, intervention, is inconsistent with international legal as well as Westphalian sovereignty,
voluntary actions by rulers invitation do not violate international legal sovereignty, although they do
transgress Westphalian sovereignty. The fundamental norm of Westphalian sovereignty is that states
exist in specific territorie within which domestic political authorities are the sole arbiters of
legitimate behavior. While autonomy can be compromised as a result of both intervention and
invitation, the former has gotten much more attention. For many observers, the rule of nonintervention
which is always violated through coercion or imposition, as opposed to voluntary invitationis the
key element of sovereign statehood.

Suveranitatea domestic (SD) se refer la organizarea formal a autoritii politice n stat i la

abilitatea autoritilor publice de a exercita controlul efectiv asupra granielor proprii. Implic att
specificarea autoritii legitime n stat ct i msura n care aceast autoritate poate fi efectiv
exercitat.

Polities can be organized in many different ways without raising any issues for either international legal
or Westphalian sovereignty. Authority may be concentrated in the hands of one individual, as Bodin and
Hobbes advocated, or divided among different institution as is the case in the United States. There can
be federal or unitary structures. The one point at which the organization of domestic authority could
affect international legal sovereignty occurs in the case of confederations in which the individual units
of the state have some ability to conduct external relations.

Suveranitatea de interdependen (SI) se refer la abilitatea autoritilor publice de a controla fluxul

de informaii, idei, bunuri, oameni, capitaluri peste frontiera de stat. Nu privete autoritatea n stat, ci
exclusiv capacitatea de control a fluxurilor peste frontiera de stat.

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 The scope of activities over which states can effectively exercise control is declining. New issues have
emerged such as atmospheric pollution, terrorism, the drug trade, currency crise and AID which are
a product of interdependence or new technologies and which are transnational rather than national.
States cannot provide solutions to these and other issues. (Krasner 1999, p. 12)

Krasner arat c aceste patru tipuri de suveranitate sunt logic independente unul de altul, ceea ce
nseamn c un stat poate avea un tip de suveranitate fr ale avea pe toate celelalte. Exemple:

Dac un stat este membru la un acord prin care sunt recunoscute structuri de autoritate
extern, precum ntre membrii UE, atunci SW este diluat n mod benevol.
Un stat precum Taiwan are SW, dar nu SLI.
Un stat poate avea SLI, dar o SD foarte redus. Exemplu: statele euate (failed states) din
Africa, precum Somalia, Ciad sau Sudanul de Sud.
UN stat poate avea SLI, SW si SD, dar s aib capacitate foarte redus de control al fluxului de
bunuri si persoane peste granie (SI). Acelai efect este uneori pus pe seama globalizrii.

Recunoaterea SLI este, n mod tipic, un act diplomatic ncrcat de semnificaie politic, rezultat al
calculelor de tip cost-beneficii. Pentru statul recunoscut diplomatic este facilitat ncheierea tratatelor.
De asemenea, este oferit imunitate diplomatic i protecie legal mpotriva aciunilor ostile ale altor
state.

SLI este dorit de liderii entitii politice ce caut recunoatere internaional deoarece constituie
implicit o recunoatere i o validare a lor ca lideri legitimi i le asigur accesul la resurse externe.

Totui, dup cum arat Krasner, regula recunoaterii reciproce a tuturor teritoriilor cu independen
teritorial formal nu a fost niciodat aplicat universal:

Faptul c liderii statelor doresc recunoaterea nu nseamn c o i obin ntotdeauna. Nerecunoaterea

a fost folosit ca instrument de politic extern. Conductori cu teritoriu i autonomie juridic de facto,
precum regimul comunist chinez ntre 1949 i anii 1970, nu au fost recunoscui. n acelai timp, au fost
recunoscute entiti lipsite de autonomie juridic formal Belarus i Ucraina au devenit membri ai
Naiunilor Unite. Chiar i entiti fr teritoriu au fost recunoscute. Mulahii iranieni au avut o ans
mai bun de a rmne la putere n 1979 violnd regula imunitii diplomatice dect respectnd-o.
(Krasner 1999: 8)

Dar, n vreme ce majoritatea statelor lumii se bucur de SLI, relativ puine au SW. Suveranitatea
westfalian a altor state a fost adesea nclcat prin intervenie sau prin invitaie. Statele puternice au
recurs la intervenii, constrngnd statele mai slabe s accepte structuri de autoritate dictate din afar.
De asemenea, liderii statelor au lansat invitaii, adic politici voluntare prin care au renunat la pri
ale propriei autoriti, precum cea de a semna tratate privind respectarea drepturilor omului care
stabilesc structuri juridice supranaionale, sau de a intra n acorduri de mprumut internaional, care i
dau creditorului si dreptul de a impune anumite cursuri politice. Norma autonomiei, baza SW, a fost

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subminat de norme alternative care privesc drepturile omului, drepturile minoritilor,
responsabilitatea fiscal i meninerea stabilitii internaionale.

Ca urmare a presiunilor multiple, s-a ajuns la o decuplare a normei autonomiei de practica

internaional. Deseori vorba i fapta nu coincid. Statele puternice au nclcat principiul neamestecului
n afacerile interne ale altor state prin recursul la norme alternative: rspndirea democraiei,
Responsabilitatea de a proteja (R2P), protecia cuceririlor socialismului sau protecia propriilor
ceteni aflai n state strine.

Teza lui Krasner este c n mediul anarhic al politicii internaionale, n care statul este supus la solicitri
multiple din interior si din exterior, n care exist asimetrii de putere i lipsete o structur autoritar
de luare a deciziilor, deciziile sunt luate ca urmarea unor calcule raionale de maximizare a intereselor
materiale i ideatice.

Organized hypocrisy is the normal state of affairs. (Krasner 1999: 9)

2.1 State euate/state fragile (failed states/fragile states)

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/2013-failed-states-interactivefimap

12 indicatori sociali, economici i politici inclui n formula de calcul a indicelui:

1. presiuni demografice
2. refugiai (internally displaced persons, IDP)
3. revendicri de grup (group grievance)
4. situaii de refugiere colectiv
5. dezvoltare inegal
6. declin economic
7. delegitimizarea statului
8. servicii publice
9. drepturile omului
10. aparatul de securitate
11. elite facionalizate
12. intervenii externe

The Methodology Behind the Index

Weak and failing states pose a challenge to the international community. In today's world, with its highly
globalized economy, information systems and interlaced security, pressures on one fragile state can
have serious repercussions not only for that state and its people, but also for its neighbors and other
states halfway across the globe. Witness in recent times for example, the negative ripple-effects from
weak and failing states such as Somalia, Libya, Yemen, Haiti, Cote d'Ivoire and the Balkan states.

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 Since the end of the Cold War, a number of states have erupted into mass violence stemming from
internal conflict. Some of these crises are ethnic conflicts. Some are civil wars. Others take on the form
of revolutions. Many result in complex humanitarian emergencies. Though the dynamics may differ in
each case, all of these conflicts stem from social, economic, and political pressures that have not been
managed by professional, legitimate, and representative state institutions.

Fault lines emerge between identity groups defined by language, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality,
class, caste, clan or area of origin. Tensions can deteriorate into conflict through a variety of
circumstances such as competition over resources predatory or fractured leadership, corruption, or
unresolved group grievances.

The reasons for state weakness and failure are complex but not unpredictable. It is critically important
that the international community understand and closely monitor the conditions that create weak and
failed states and be prepared to take the necessary actions to deal with the underlying issues or
otherwise mitigate the negative effects of state failure.

To have meaningful early warning, and effective policy responses assessments must go beyond
specialized area knowledge, narrative case studies and anecdotal evidence to identify and grasp broad
social trends. An interdisciplinary combination of qualitative research and quantitative methodologies
is needed to establish patterns and acquire predictive value. Without the right data, it is impossible to
identify problems that may be festering `below the radar.' Decisi on makers need access to this kind of
information to implement effective policies.

2013 Failed States Index Ranking

1. Somalia, 2. Congo (D. R.), 3. Sudan, 4. Sudanul de Sud, 5. Ciad, 6. Yemen, 7. Afganistan, 8. Haiti, 9.
Republica Central African, 10. Zimbabwe, 11. Irak, 12. Coasta de Filde , 13. Pakistan, 14. Guineea, 15.
Guineea Bisau, 16. Nigeria

129. Mongolia, 130. Romnia, 131. Panama, 132. Bulgaria, 133. Bahamas 134. Muntenegru

2015 Fragile States Index

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/17/fragile-states-2015-islamic-state-ebola-ukraine-russia-
ferguson/

Ukraine faced a crisis. Nigeria passed a test. And the Islamic State and Ebola left indelible marks. How
2014's success stories and struggles affected state and global stability last year and set the stage
for 2015.

The Fund for Peace (FFP)

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