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PETITIONERS:
Not liable jointly and severally with Olympio Mendoza and
Severino Aguinaldo because the present petition involves
Lot No. 46 and not Lot No. 106 of the same estate, which lot
was later donated to the Barangay Bahay Pare of Candaba,
Pampanga.
Resolution of Investigating Fiscal wherein private
respondent's complaint against petitioners and the other
defendants in the agrarian court for violation of P.D. 583 was
dismissed, to show that private respondent's "point is
already settled and considered closed.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS:
RULING: YES
Petitioners are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence already
presented and evaluated by the trial court and re-evaluated again by
the respondent appellate court.
We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead put
finis to the factual findings in this case. Settled is the rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the
exceptions which do not obtain in the instant case.
Trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits
of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes "B" and "C")
although the affiants were not presented and subjected to
cross-examination.
Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the 'Rules of Court shall
not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory
character.' The same provision states that 'In the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy,
affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are
admissible in evidence.'
Ong Chia v. Republic, G.R. No. 127240, [March 27, 2000], 385 PHIL 487-499
On August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship.
The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed
contending that petitioner:
(1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known;
(2) failed to state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473,
7;
(3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2;
(4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have
been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and
(5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.
To wit:
a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the
Special Committee on Naturalization in which petitioner stated that in
addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since
childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong.
ISSUE: WON the evidence annexed by the OSG to the appellants brief need
to be presented and formally offered?
RULING: NO
The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization.
EXCEPTION: "practicable and convenient."
That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented
by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the
more practical and convenient course of action considering that
decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata.
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on
the basis of the same documents.
ANALYSIS:
The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which
has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to
object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived
of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in
fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.
The Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No.
031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and
his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents.
As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since
petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that
may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion
that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., G.R. No. 153660, [June 10, 2003], 451
PHIL 839-848
ISSUE: WON, in labor case, it is the proper in giving evidentiary value to the
affidavits despite the failure of the affiants to affirm their contents and
undergo the test of cross-examination
RULING: YES
The argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not
presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of
evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before
administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on
the basis of position papers only."
Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of
law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the
Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given
only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel,
that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no
real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case considering
that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence
different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules
of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the
necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not
even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position
papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.
This resolves the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent, Cirtek Electronics, Inc., of the Court's
Decision dated November 15, 2010.
Respondent-movant avers:
that petitioner, in filing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
availed of the wrong remedy, hence, the Court should have
dismissed the petition outright. It goes on to aver that the Court
erred in resolving a factual issue whether the August 24, 2005
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was validly entered into , which
is not the office of a petition for certiorari.
Respondent-movant further avers that the MOA 1 signed by the
remaining officers of petitioner Union and allegedly ratified by its
members should have been given credence by the Court.
respondent-movant maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot
insist on a ruling beyond the compromise agreement entered
into by the parties;
ISSUE:
RULING:
1. YES
While an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement
voluntarily entered into by the parties because it requires the interference and
imposing power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes
jurisdiction, the award can be considered as an approximation of a
collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been
entered into by the parties. Hence, it has the force and effect of a
valid contract obligation between the parties.
The appellate court's ruling that giving credence to the "Pahayag" and the
minutes of the meeting which were not verified and notarized would violate
the rule on parol evidence is erroneous. The parol evidence rule, like
other rules on evidence, should not be strictly applied in labor
cases. Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil
Laboratories, Inc. teaches:
[R]eliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In
labor cases pending before the Commission or the Labor
Arbiter, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law or equity are not controlling. Rules of procedure and
evidence are not applied in a very rigid and technical sense in
labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded from
accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even
contrary to, what is stated in the CBA. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
ANALYSIS:
A question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. The rule, however, is not without
exceptions, viz.: SaCIDT
This rule provides that the parties may raise only questions of
law, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Generally, we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh
the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals
below. When supported by substantial evidence, the
findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding
on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court,
unless the case falls under any of the
following recognized exceptions:
(1)When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2)When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
(3)Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4)When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(5)When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6)When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(7)When the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court;
(8)When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9)When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and
(10)When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal
Medical Center (RMC) for check-up. The tests revealed that her right kidney
is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-
functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney
operation in September, 1999.
PETITIONER ATIENZA:
(1) violate the best evidence rule because the same are mere
photocopies;
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not
prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact
sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their
proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed
under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
ANALYSIS:
Some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those
covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary. Laws
of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, include the
structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings. In
this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha's kidneys before,
and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were
in their proper anatomical locations.
Amora v. People, G.R. No. 154466, [January 28, 2008], 566 PHIL 472-481
On June 27, 1993, a fire broke out in the building used by petitioner as
residence and as a bakery. The fire also gutted nearby houses.
Adelfa's father had earlier entered into a contract of lease with petitioner,
whereby the latter was to use the lot and erect a building thereon for a
monthly rental of P50.00, for a period of twenty (20) years. The lease contract
provided that, upon the expiration of the contract on July 10, 1993,
ownership over the building shall be transferred to the lessor.
On January 4, 1993, Adelfa informed petitioner that she would no longer
renew the contract of lease.
During the actual fire, petitioner was within the premises, heard
shouts from his neighbor, ignored the same at first, and only later
on did he finally stand up to see what was going on.
ISSUE: whether the guilt of petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: YES
The trial court found that the circumstances enumerated above sufficiently
point to the petitioner as the author of the crime. Indeed, all these
circumstances, taken together, are consistent with the hypothesis
that petitioner is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent.
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court as affirmed
by the appellate court. Case law states that findings of facts of the trial
court, especially if affirmed by the appellate court, are given great
respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court unless the trial court ignored,
misunderstood or misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance which,
if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.
It is clear that the place of the commission of the crime was a residential and
commercial building located in an urban and populated area. This qualifying
circumstance places the offense squarely within the ambit of Section 2 (7)
of P.D. 1613, and converts it to "destructive arson," 7 viz.:
ANALYSIS:
People v. Ochate, G.R. No. 127154, [July 30, 2002], 434 PHIL 575-587
Roseller went home ahead of her sister. On his way home, he passed by
the hut of accused Roldan Ochate where he saw the latter in the yard
tucking a scythe on his waist.
The family couldnt find Rowena so they proceeded to report the incident
to barangay.
The search was conducted the whole evening of September 26, 1994 to no
avail.
It was only around eight o'clock the following morning that the group found
Rowena in a ricefield about fifty meters from Ochate's house. She was
already dead cause by deep and penetrating incised wounds in the
neck and abdomen.
Police officers as well as other members of the barangay went to see Ochate at
his house but they were not able to find him. It was only on September 29,
1994 that a certain Bienvenido Pantallano, a member of the CAFGU,
was able to locate Ochate and he took Ochate in his custody and
brought him to the Chief of Police of Tampilisan.
ISSUES:
RULING:
1. NO
ANALYSIS:
Immediately after the purchase of the rifle, Heesen left for a deer hunting trip
in an area known as Ute Park near the town of Eagle Nest in Colfax County.
At about this time, appellant, Jesse G. Lopez, was sitting next to a tree
about fifty yards away from the point where Heesen's gun subsequently
discharged.
Heesen wanted to cross the log to see the deer better, and as he stepped across
the log his left foot caught on a little limb sticking out and caused him to
stumble. His left foot went down hard on the ground on one side of
the log and his right foot slipped on the grass. This brought the gun
down and the gun discharged, the bullet striking appellant. Heesen
testified that he had his hand at least six inches away from the trigger when
the gun discharged. Immediately after the gun discharged he observed that
the gun was on "fire" position.
APPELLANTS LOPEZ:
ISSUE:
On March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed
from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel
was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark
Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about
her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no.
106 as the culprit. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher
Bongcarawan.
He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section
to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this
back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the
suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the
security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and
took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also
called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.
The accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast
guard to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF).
When requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the
same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a
secret combination lock.
The suitcase was forcibly opened and searched without his consent,
and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to
such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence
against him. He also contends that People v. Marti is not applicable in this
case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the
duties of a policeman.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by
the vessel security personnel. The search and seizure of the suitcase and
the contraband items was therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
search and seizure does not apply.
In this case, the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked to get his
baggage, he knew it would be inspected. Why he got the Samsonite
suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock known
only to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did not present his
small "maleta" for inspection for fear that its contents consisting of expensive
sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated, but he brought the
Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive
sunglasses, and even watches.
Analysis:
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa, this Court has ruled
that to warrant conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs must be with
knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi existed together
with the possession or control of such articles. It has been ruled, however,
that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge oranimus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession. Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to
explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor
of medicine, and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands
clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers
and for damages against petitioner.
RULING: NO
A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right
to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her.
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the
packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts
to his friend in Zurich.
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI
and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from
the cellophane wrapper
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job
Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like
dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera
cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigars
Mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which
is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search
ANALYSIS:
in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies
of his life
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances
further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his
complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German
national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so
indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On
the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof
giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses,
or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At
this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
People v. Ayangao y Batong-Og, G.R. No. 142356, [April 14, 2004],
471 PHIL 379-394
Two weeks before August 13, 1999, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum and PO3
Nestor A. Galvez, members of the Criminal Detection and Intelligence Group
based at Diamond Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, received
information from one of their informants that a certain woman
from Mountain Province delivers dried marijuana leaves for sale at
Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat, Pampanga to some drug pushers.
Their target female who was described by their informant as about 50 years
old, 5 feet in height, straight long hair and coming from Kalinga
province.|||
The woman alighted from the tricycle and subsequently loaded two
sacks with camote fruits on top. The two officers proceeded to the place
where the woman was and noticed marijuana dried leaves protruding.
APPELLANT AYANGAO:
Illegality of her arrest because she was not read her Miranda
rights.
the warrantless search was invalid, not having been made
pursuant to a lawful arrest.
RULING: YES
The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as appellant was actually
committing a crime when she was arrested transporting
marijuana, an act prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made,
the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also valid as the
legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the arresting police officers to validly
search and seize from the offender
(1) any dangerous weapons and
(2) the things which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
In this case, the arresting officers had probable cause to make the arrest in
view of the tip they received from their informant. This Court has already
ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search. Although the apprehending officers received the tip
two weeks prior to the arrest, they could not be faulted for not applying for a
search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of appellant's arrival was
NOT known by the informant.
The trial court gave more weight to the testimony of PO3 Sagum that stated
otherwise, as evidenced by his finding that the informant arrived at the
police station at 5:00 A.M. on August 13, 1999 and informed them
that the appellant was arriving at 6:00 A.M.
People vs Salanguit, GR No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the residence
of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches,
Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who
testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams
of shabu from accused-appellant.
The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that
the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his
room.
They heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly,
about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed
over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof.
1. 11.14 grams SHABU: For violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, finding the accused guilty sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto
mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional; and,
SEARCH WARRANT
G R E E T I N G S:
Accused-appellant appealed:
First, the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as
evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was
invalid.
Issues:
Rulings:
in People v. Dichoso the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425,"
without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized
the search and seizure of "dried marijuana leaves and
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of
paraphernalia." This Court, however, upheld the validity of the
warrant:
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs
and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or
which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search
warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Under the "plain view doctrine,", for this doctrine to apply, there must be:
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was
found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with,
the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on
accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its
recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after
the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1
Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
3. No unnecessary force
4. 11.14 grams SHABU: For violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, finding the accused guilty sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto
mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional; - AFFIRMED
Analysis:
Aday v. Superior Court, the warrant properly described two obscene books
but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the
"plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for
admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been explained:
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the
conduct of a search pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for
possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is
limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within
his immediate control. The rationale for permitting such a search is to
prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or
to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
People v. Sy-Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, [February 4, 2003], 444 PHIL 757-
777
On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening, SPO2 Mario Nulud
and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received a report from their confidential
informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that
night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City.
The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag and the civilian informer positioned
themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting
Thunder Inn Hotel. The other group acted as their back up.
RTC Decision:
On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court:
Accused-appellant SY CHUA
he has been under surveillance for two years, there was therefore
no compelling reason for the haste within which the arresting officers
sought to arrest and search him without a warrant;
that since his arrest was null and void, the drugs that were seized
should likewise be inadmissible in evidence since they were obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizures and arrest.
RULING: NO
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The
record reveals that when accused-appellant arrived at the vicinity of
Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car along the McArthur
Highway, alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance of the
Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box.
Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents
and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime.
No less than SPO2 Mario Nulud, the team leader of the arresting operatives,
admitted that their informant has been telling them about the activities of
accused-appellant for two years prior to his actual arrest on
September 21, 1996. Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to them
hours before accused-appellant's arrest was not a product of an "on the-
spot" tip which may excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest.
Accordingly, the arresting team's contention that their arrest of accused-
appellant was a product of an "on-the-spot" tip is untenable.
On Stop-and-Frisk:
There was no valid "stop-and-frisk" in the case of accused-appellant. To
reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and
seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending
police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-
appellant's business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he
was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced
themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.
The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial
inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and
suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter's outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine
reason, in accordance with the police officer's experience and the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held
has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. 27 It should therefore be
emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for
this principle to apply
On Plain View:
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items
found in accused-appellant's possession. First, there was no valid
intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e., the plastic bags found in the Zest-O
juice box which contained (shabu) and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber
ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered. The police officers first
arrested accused-appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked
into the sealed Zest-O juice box before they were able to see and later on
ascertain that the crystalline substance was shabu.
On Non-marking of evidence:
ANALYSIS:
True enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant,
Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the
sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast
followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting
something.
Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the
vehicle occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight
tilt to its side Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum,
a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating
Council, decided to report the incident to the Philippine National
Police of Angeles City. He took out his radio and called the Viper,
the radio controller of the Philippine National Police of
Angeles City. By the time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle
had started to leave the place of the accident taking the general
direction to the north.
Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the
vehicle had hit somebody.
He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the
restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle.
During the chase he was able to make out the plate number of the
vehicle as PMA 777 He called the Viper through the radio once again
reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was
involved in a hit and run accident.
Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2
Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (When the vehicle was about twelve
(12) meters away from their position, the two police officers boarded
their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and
strobe light and drove out to intercept the vehicle. They cut
into the path of the vehicle forcing it to stop
The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while raising
both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla.
Appellant was wearing a short leather jacket such that when he alighted
with both his hands raised, a gun tucked on the left side of his
waist was revealed.
SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the
former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers
SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by
legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office. After disarming
appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident
which was angrily denied by appellant.
Another vehicle, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan and
SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8, 1993). As the
most senior police officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the
matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested for
the hit and run incident
He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle
was dangling and the railing and the hood were dented. Appellant,
however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with
the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3
Borja with his right hand saying 'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko'. Because
appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long
magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back
right pocket. SPO Mercado saw this and so when appellant turned
around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado
confiscated the magazine from appellant. Suspecting that
appellant could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a
magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back to his
vehicle by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-
17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite rifle lying horizontally at
the front by the driver's seat. It had a long magazine filled with
live bullets in a semi-automatic mode. He asked appellant for the
papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily
that they were at his home. SPO Mercado modified the arrest of
appellant by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms.
SPO Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, but granted his
application for bail of P200,000. During the arraignment on
January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after
he refused, upon advice of counsel to make any plea Petitioner waived
in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of the
case.
OSG opined:
strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to
cancel petitioner's bail bond.
RTC Decision:
GUILTY and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21
years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum".[11]
Petitioner Padilla appealed:
(1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under
the exclusionary rule;
(2) that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and
(3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and
cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by
arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the
scene of the hit and run.
Issues:
1. WON the arrest was valid when the arresting officer did not see
the actual hit and run?
Rulings:
It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require
that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears
the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the
scene.
For Paragraph b
There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time
between the hit and run and the actual apprehension.
The policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of
petitioner,[38] its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang),
and the dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the
arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run
incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal
knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.
5. customs search.
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted
magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This
latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the
alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information
estopped him from assailing any purported defect.
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an
active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner,
their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under
a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance).
This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search:
(i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or
area of immediate control and
(ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.
The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the
exclusionary rule.
Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third
instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally
permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to
the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have
been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some
criminal offense.
Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office
per verification from available records on file this Office as of this date:
"However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number
35723Y, licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San
Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM under Re-Registered License.
"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe
for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it
cruel and unusual.'
Conclusion:
Analysis:
PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana. He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they
waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him.
They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to
contain three kilos of marijuana leaves.
Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who
had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated.
The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and
sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the
accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but
carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses.
The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he
had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him.
OSG opined:
For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short
argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under
Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made
the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
A No, more.
Q Why not?
Issues:
Rulings:
1. No
Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a
reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was
arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the
time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the
arrest, another two weeks and a third "weeks before June 25."
On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting
team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr
3. No probable cause.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the
case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and
should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that
the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to
use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a
lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by
the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the
evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
Conclusion:
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence
against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption
that he is innocent.
Analysis:
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion
that the accused-appellant was not really beaten up because he did
not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That
is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC
authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984
and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
Roldan v. Arca, for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are
subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the
customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were
caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust"
operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable
because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of
selling the prohibited drug.
Since the informer did not give the exact time of the delivery of shabu, the
police officers staked out the expressway exit until late afternoon.
the police did not have valid ground to arrest them, their subsequent
search of them was illegal and the evidence of the seized shabu cannot be
admitted in evidence against them.
the chemist who examined the seized substance did not testify in
court, the prosecution was unable to establish the indispensable element
of corpus delicti.
ISSUE:
RULING:
An immediate search was warranted since they would have gone away
by the time the police could apply for a search warrant. [8] The drugs could be
easily transported and concealed with impunity.[9]
In the present case, all the information the police had about the persons
in possession of the prohibited drugs was that they were two men and a
woman(NO NAME) on board an owner type jeep. A search warrant issued
against such persons could be used by the police to harass practically anyone.
2. No need
This Court has held that the non-presentation of the forensic chemist
in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal.[14] The
corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the dangerous drug
itself. This means that proof beyond doubt of the identity of the prohibited
drug is essential.
As it has been held in a recent case, [23] failure to comply strictly with
those requirements will not render the seizure of the prohibited
drugs invalid for so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter attests that Bokingco admitted that
he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing
several days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion.
On the basis of his extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was charged for murder
qualified by evident premeditation and treachery. TRIAL COURT
CONVICTED and CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
1) whether the qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to convict
appellant Bokingco of murder and
2) WON the extrajudicial admission made by Bokingco during PI is
admissible?
3) whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-
conspirator.
4) whether the extrajudicial admission made by Col against Bokingco is
admissible?
RULING:
It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and
Cols plan to kill Pasion.35 Bokingcos confession was admittedly taken
without the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution,
3. NO
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired
with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Cols actuations can be
equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the initial information
filed against appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution,
for murder.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco
had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves
were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of
his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.1avvphi1
4. NO,
In as much as Bokingcos extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him,
it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the
latter as a cohort.
Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible
against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against
them.48 An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made
by a conspirator.
JAIME DELA CRUZ VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
At 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and special investigators NBI,
received a Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and Charito
Escobido (Charito).
The complainants claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, they were
picked up by police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy
gave a number to the complainants, and when the latter gave the number a
ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office
located Cebu City. In the said police office, they met "James" who
demanded from them P100,000, later lowered to P40,000, in exchange
for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to
the NBI to file a complaint and narrate the circumstances of the meeting
to the authorities.
whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.
RULING:
NO,
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested
for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II
of R.A. 9165.
Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of
extortion.
ANALYSIS:
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users,
this Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs
cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of
dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and the
confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous
drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated,
the filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs
should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous
drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused
as provided for in Sec. 15.
To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate
the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them
with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of
residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for
use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence
obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should
have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs
and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec.
14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social
Gatherings or Meetings).
ON SELF-INCRIMINATION:
It has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled
to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy;
to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with
bloody footprints;