657 SCRA 822 Civil Law Persons and Family Relations
Tyrone was
Family Code Article 36; Psychological Incapacity Totality
of Evidence
Burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff
In 1976, Valerio Tyrone Kalaw and Ma. Elena Fernandez
married each other in Hong Kong. They had 4 children.
In 1985, Elena left Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone had an affair
with another woman and even had children with the other
woman. Tyrone later on went to the US with that other woman
and their children. He left behind his 4 children. It was a
househelp and their driver who had to take care of the 4
children. Elena would only visit the children on weekends.
In 1994, Tyrone filed a petition to have his marriage with
Elena be declared void on the ground that Elena is
psychologically incapacitated. He presented two expert
witnesses, namely: Dr. Cristina Gates (Psychologist) and Fr.
Gerard Healy (Catholic Canon Law Expert).
Dr. Gates testified that based on her interview with Tyrone as
to Elenas personality, she concluded that Elena is suffering
from narcissistic personality disorder. This was manifested by
her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her
frequent nights-out with friends.
Fr. Healy corroborated the testimony of Dr. Gates. However,
like Dr. Gates, Fr. Healy did not personally evaluate Elena. He
even said that he assumed that the factual allegations made by
Tyrone were true and that it is however the duty of the court to
make a final determination as to the truth of such allegations.
He merely evaluated the statements.
On her part, Elena presented Dr. Dayan. Dr. Dayan personally
evaluated both Tyrone and Elena. After her interviews, Dr.
Dayan concluded that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated. She concluded that Tyrone is a distancer who is
concerned more with his work and friends than his family,
while Elena was clingy, immature, and doubtful of Tyrones
love in short, both are emotionally immature.
Other witnesses presented were their children who all testified
that despite their parents differences, both took good care of
them.
The RTC ruled that the marriage is void. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that it is the
plaintiffs, in this case Tyrones, duty to prove psychological
incapacity (so the SC did not discuss Elenas, the respondent,
presentment as to their psychological incapacity).
not able to prove Elenas psychological incapacity since the
expert witnesses he presented heavily relied on Tyrones
allegations of Elenas constant mahjong sessions, visits to the
beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of
their children. Tyrones allegations, which served as the bases
or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were
not actually proven. In fact, during trial, Elena was able to
rebut Tyrones allegations. Even their children testified that
Elena attended to them and had no issues with the care shown
them by their mother.
The most that the evidence can prove in this case are grounds
for legal separation but not psychological incapacity.
The SC emphasized that psychological incapacity is the
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations. The plaintiff must prove
that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or
behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that
completely disables him or her from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The
psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the
time of marriage, and must be incurable.
Read full text
NOTE: This was reversed by the Supreme Court in January
2015 upon motion for reconsideration by Tyrone. Many said
that the SC relaxed the application of Article 36 due to such
reversal but was denied so by the SC Spokesperson Atty. Ted
Te.
Antonio vs Reyes
Antonio vs. Reyes
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006
FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36
years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first
meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a
subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A
child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. She even
did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she
represented to her husband as adopted child of their family.
They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for
reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage
with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of
the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family
Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void.
HELD:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand
the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to
comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own
testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist
who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes
is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations
on his wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological
incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate
stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in
a world of make-believe that made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning
and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes
psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically
identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity
of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It
would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love,
trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable
considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his
cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
SILVINO A. LIGERALDE,
Petitioner,
- versus -
MAY ASCENSION A.
PATALINGHUG and the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition seeks to set aside the November 30,
2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed
the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner Silvino
A. Ligeralde (Silvino) and private respondent May Ascension
A. Patalinghug (May) null and void.
Silvino and May got married on October 3,
1984. They were blessed with four children. Silvino claimed
that, during their marriage, he observed that May had several
manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He described
her as immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity,
negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed, characterized
their marital relations.
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home
at 4:00 oclock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had
watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted
later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a
hotel. Silvino tried to persuade her to be conscientious of her
duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored. His
persuasions would often lead to altercations or physical
violence.
In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the
thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children,
and the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from
separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her.
The couple started a new life. A few months after,
however, he realized that their marriage was hopeless. May
was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when
Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was
nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a
nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover.
Later, May confessed that she had no more love for
him. They then lived separately.
G.R. NO. With Mays irresponsible, immature and immoral
behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is psychologically
Present:incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.
CORONA,
VELASCO, JR.,Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred
NACHURA,the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological
PERALTA, and
evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was
MENDOZA,psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still
young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same
was serious and incurable.[3]
Promulgated:
On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage
April 15,
of2010
Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based on
Basilio.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It
ruled that private respondents alleged sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code and that the psychologist failed to identify and
prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The core issue raised by petitioner Silvino Ligeralde is that the
assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture and, therefore,
issued without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.[4]
The Court required the private respondent to
comment but she failed to do so. Efforts were exerted to locate
her but to no avail.
Nevertheless, the petition is technically and
substantially flawed. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees
with the public respondent that the petitioner should have filed
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the
wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright dismissal.
Substantially, the petition has no merit. In order to
avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court,[5] the petitioner must clearly show
that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in
jurisdiction. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie,
there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of
power.[6]
In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission
of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed
CA decision dismissing petitioners complaint for declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Upon close scrutiny of the records, we find nothing whimsical,
arbitrary or capricious in its findings.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.[7] The Court likewise
laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration
of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code,
in Republic v. Court of Appeals.[8]Relevant to this petition are
the following:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable;
and (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
Guided by these pronouncements, it is the Courts
considered view that petitioners evidence failed to establish
respondent Mays psychological incapacity.
Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause,
gravity and incurability of private respondents condition. Even
Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of her
psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the
totality of the evidence presented during trial.[9]
More importantly, the acts of private respondent do
not even rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that
the law requires. Private respondent's act of living an
adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence
was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that
respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state.[10]
Doubtless, the private respondent was far from being
a perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had some
character flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a
conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the time of
the marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her
marital and family duties and obligations.[11]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 was not a happy one because of her parents' continued
interference and attempt to break up their union; greatly
influenced by her parents, Filipinas, even at the early stages of
Republic of the Philippines their marriage, already treated Orlando with contempt and
Supreme Court without the love and respect due him as her husband; when
Manila Orlando started a junk shop business, Filipinas ridiculed him
instead of giving him encouragement; later on, his business
became successful and he was able to embark upon another
THIRD DIVISION business venture; he put up a pharmaceutical company which
also became profitable; Filipinas then became interested and
began to interfere in the operation of the business; however,
ORLANDO G. TONGOL, G.R. NO. 157610 because of her bad attitude, the employees were aloof; she also
Petitioner, resented the fact that her husband got along well with the
Present: employees; as a result, she quarreled with her husband causing
the latter embarrassment; she even suspected that the income
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., of the business was being given to her husband's relatives;
Chairperson, their continued fighting persisted and affected their children;
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, efforts at reconciliation proved futile because their differences
CHICO-NAZARIO, had become irreconcilable and their marriage impossible; in
NACHURA, and 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from Filipinas; in
REYES, JJ. 1994, the spouses filed a petition for dissolution of their
FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Promulgated: property relationship; and the petition was granted in 1995.
Respondent. October 19, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that
---------x efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their
marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage
failed because it is Orlando who is psychologically
DECISION incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a married man.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of
his sister, Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza Guevara, an
Assailed in the present Petition for Review employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the spouses Tongol. Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, psychiatrist who conducted a psychological examination of
2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245, and its Resolution of March both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing their
19, 2003, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision
CA Decision affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the Regional granting the petition for dissolution of their conjugal
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149, which partnership of gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas
dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage regarding the spouses' psychological examination. On the
filed by herein petitioner Orlando Tongol. other hand, record shows that evidence for Filipinas only
consisted of her own testimony.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149,
Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.
M. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on August 27, 1967. Out
of their union, they begot four children, namely: Crisanto, On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.
born in 1968; Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick, born in 1971, Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE
On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, which was FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City, COURT AND THE HONORABLE
Branch 143 on April 24, 1995. COURT OF APPEALS THAT
DRA. CECILIA VILLEGAS
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC FAILED TO STATE WHETHER
of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity OR NOT RESPONDENT'S
of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is INADEQUATE PERSONALITY
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential DISORDER WAS GRAVE,
marital obligations. PERMANENT AND INCURABLE
(par. 12, p. 3, Annex A, hereof).
In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got
married over the objection of the latter's family; their marriage
 2. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE APPEAL (p.
7, ibid.).
3. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (Annex B,
hereof).[2]
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or
not the totality of the evidence presented in the present case is
enough to sustain a finding that herein respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[3] the term psychological
incapacity was defined as:
[N]o less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. x x x[4]
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.[5]
While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina,
[6]
wherein the guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36[7] of the Family Code was laid down, this Court
finds it significant to reproduce the same quoted portion, to
wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as the foundation of
the nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under
the principle ofejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven
to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be
 relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus,
mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital
obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent
function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.[8]
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[9] which
took effect on March 15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines have
been modified. Section 2(d) of the said Rule provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages.-
xxxx
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article
36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either
or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert
opinion need not be alleged.
The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the
Solicitor General, stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition to the petition. Attachment of expert opinionsto
the petition is also dispensed with.
In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the
conclusion of the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas, that
respondent is suffering from Inadequate PersonalityDisorder.
However, both courts ruled that the behavior exhibited by
respondent does not amount to psychological incapacity as
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the
assessment of the RTC and the CA for the following reasons:
First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas
who made the following written evaluation regarding
respondent's psychological makeup:
xxxx
On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-
Tongol belonged to a matriarchal family
where the mother assumed a more active
and dominant role. She was left to the care
of her aunt and developed a basic feeling a
(sic) rejection.
The only college graduate among 7 children
her operating intellectual ability is low-
average. Sudden change overwhelmed her.
When seized by an impulse, she is likely to
give way, even minor pressures upset her
and when this happens, emotional control
could not be relied upon.
 In marriage when her husband shows good
relationship with their employees, especially
with females, she became (sic) suspicious,
jealous, and threatened, and this is related to
her basic feelings of rejection in early life.
She coped (sic) up with her uncomfortable
feelings by exhibiting temper tantrums,
irritability and dominance, a replica of her
mother's attitude, but to the distaste of her
husband.
At present she is depressed, though hostile,
and now living in the expectation of further
rejection. Additionally, she is threatened by
a neurological illness (tremor of the hands)
for which she is consulting a neurologist.
Based on the above findings, it is the
opinion of the undersigned that Mr.
Orlando Tongol is suffering from some
depressive features, which seems to be a
recent development as a result of marital
problems. On the other hand, Mrs. Tongol is
suffering from an Inadequate Personality
Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which
renders her psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. She is unable to cope with the
sudden work and environmental shifts, that
overwhelmed her, due to insufficient
psychological inner resources.[10]
In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained respondent's
personality disorder in this wise:
ATTY. VILLAREAL -
xxxx
Q- What exactly do you mean [by]
inadequate personality disorder?
A- Inadequate personality disorder means,
there are not times that in all aspects of her
life, she could not function in the way that
she feels or she is confident. She has always
been very much in doubt of her own
capabilities, Sir.
Q- What about hysterical coloring?
A- Hysterical coloring means, there is
always an exaggeration of her psychological
reactions to any stresses, Sir.
Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?
A- Exaggeration in any emotional reactions
or situations like if she would be seeing the
husband talking to some employees then,
she is suddenly irritable and would present
some tantrums. In short, she cannot control
her emotion at the moment of
stresses circulations, Sir.[11]
When asked how such personality disorder affects
respondent's capacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, Dr. Villegas expounded as follows:
ATTY. RENDOR -
xxxx
Q- How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your
findings?
A- Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and she
finished commerce. Basically, she has a
feeling of rejection from the start of
her development and this was carried on into
her adult life. When the husband started
having some good relationship with
his employees, then she started to get jealous
and she would embarrass him in front of
their employees and insulted him and would
go into tantrums and this was very much
resented by Mr. Tongol, Sir.
ATTY. RENDOR -
Q- In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you
tell us the reason why Mrs. Tongol acted in
such a way?
A- Because of her basic rejection at that
time, Sir. She was afraid
that Mr. Tongol was already rejecting her as
a wife and being attracted to other people,
but it is the way of how Mrs. Tongolreacted
to her own feelings of rejection, Sir.
xxxx
Q- What made you say that because of
inadequate personality disorder,
Mrs. Tongol rendered her psychological
(sic) incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of the marriage. What is
your basis in saying that?
A- She belongs to a very matriarchal family.
The mother was very dominant. She always
gets what she wanted in the house. In
short, she was the authority in the house and
during her growing up stage, she was given
up to the aunt, for the aunt to take care of
her. She only came back to the family when
she was already a sort of an early teenager.
With this, there has always been a feeling
of rejection during her personality
development. Besides, she feels that she is
one of those not favor (sic) by the mother
during her growing up stage, Sir.

Q- Based on your examination of the
spouses, what do you recommend as far as
the marriage is concerned, considering
that this is a petition for the annulment of
marriage?
A- I could recommend that they have their
marriage annulled because it will only be
sufferings from (sic) both of them because
on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is
more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is
also suffering from some depression, Sir.[12]
The Court can only gather from the foregoing explanations of
Dr. Villegas that as a child, Filipinas had always felt rejected,
especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those
feelings of rejection even when she became an adult and got
married; that her fits of jealousy and temper tantrums, every
time she sees her husband having a good interaction with their
employees, are ways of coping up with her feelings of
rejection. However, Dr. Villegas failed to link respondent's
personality disorder to her conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her obligations as
wife and mother. The Court cannot see how respondent's
personality disorder which, according to Dr. Villegas, is
inextricably linked to her feelings of rejection, would render
her unaware of the essential marital obligations, or to borrow
the terms used in Santos, to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. What has been
established in the instant case is that, by reason of her feelings
of inadequacy and rejection, respondent not only encounters a
lot of difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her
obligations towards her husband, such as respect, help and
support for him. However, this Court has ruled that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations.[13] As held in Santos:
There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
[14]
Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily
explain if the personality disorder of respondent is grave
enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Petitioner contends that respondent's
exaggerated reactions to normal situations, her unreasonable
feelings of rejection brought about by her dysfunctional
upbringing, are all indications of the gravity of her
psychological condition. Even granting that respondent's
psychological disorder is serious, the fact remains that there is
no evidence to prove that such condition is of such nature as to
render respondent incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage.
Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable.
Neither in her written evaluation nor in her testimony did Dr.
Villegas categorically and conclusively characterize
respondent's inadequate personality disorder as permanent or
incurable. Dr. Villegas was not sure of the permanence or
incurability of respondent's illness as shown by her following
statement:
I could recommend that they have their
marriage annulled because it will only be
sufferings from (sic) both of them because on
the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more
or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also
suffering from some depression, Sir.
[15]
(Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article
36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses.[16] The fourth guideline in Molina requires
that the psychological incapacity as understood under Article
36 of the Family Code must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. In the present case, the testimonies of both petitioner and
respondent as well as the other witnesses regarding the
spouses' differences and misunderstanding basically revolve
around and are limited to their disagreement regarding the
management of their business. In fact, respondent herself, in
her Memorandum submitted to the trial court, claimed that
their quarrels arose solely from their disagreement on how to
run their business.[17] This is confirmed by the testimony of
petitioner's sister who lived with the spouses for a
considerable period of time.[18] However, a mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.[19]
In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband
and wife enumerated under the Family Code include the
mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the household
and provide support for the family, which means that
compliance with this obligation necessarily entails the
management of the income and expenses of the household.
While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt,
affect the other aspects of one's marriage as to make the
wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient ground to
declare a marriage null and void. In the present case,
respondent's disagreement with her husband's handling of the
family's business and finances and her propensity to start a
fight with petitioner spouse regarding these matters can hardly
be considered as a manifestation of the kind of psychological
incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and
even normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.
Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's
obligation to the other spouse but also one's obligation toward
their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented
to show that respondent had been remiss in performing her
obligations toward their children as enumerated in Article 220
of the Family Code.[20]
It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves.[21] It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage.[22] It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.[23] In the instant case, the Court finds no error in the
findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the aversive
behavior of petitioner and respondent towards each other is a
mere indication of incompatibility brought about by their
different family backgrounds as well as their attitudes, which
developed after their marriage.
In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a
psychological disorder. However, the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case does not show that her
personality disorder is of the kind contemplated by Article 36
of the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render
her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of complying
with the essential obligations of marriage.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the
preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
[24]
Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.[25]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25,
2002 Decision and March 19, 2003 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 158896. October 27, 2004]
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner
vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July
2003, reversing the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001,
which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco
(respondent Manuel).
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco (Petitioner Juanita)
and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June
1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After
discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the
couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named
Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of
married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the
declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout
their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and
selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her
extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly
complained about almost everything and anyone connected
with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and
anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement,
tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial
matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the
prestige and high position of his office as judge of the
Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him
and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their
neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional
advancement as she did not even give him moral support and
encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before
marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and
appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that
such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if
treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense
beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and
that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless
marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent
Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in
Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against
her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is
a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who
was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she
supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his
philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and
had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the
complaint.
In the pre-trial order,[3] the parties only stipulated on the
following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years
old.
 Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel
first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in
his petition. He testified that his parents never approved of his
marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to the
seminary.[4] The early years of their marriage were difficult
years as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and
wife by his parents and it was at this period that his wife
started exhibiting signs of being irritable and
temperamental[5] to him and his parents.[6] She was also
obsessive about cleanliness which became the common source
of their quarrels.[7] He, however, characterized their union as
happy during that period of time in 1979 when they moved to
Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new house.
[8]
In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with
various community organizations, it was then that he felt that
he and his wife started to drift apart. [9] He then narrated
incidents during their marriage that were greatly embarrassing
and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with
an elderly neighbor;[10] when she would visit him in his office
and remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she
kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a
ballpen from his table;[11] when she caused his office drawer to
be forcibly opened while he was away;[12] when she confronted
a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an
affair with him;[13] and other incidents reported to him which
would show her jealous nature. Money matters continued to be
a source of bitter quarrels.[14] Respondent Manuel could not
forget that he was not able to celebrate his appointment as
judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for
lack of money, but she was very generous when it came to
celebrations of their parish priest. [15] Respondent Manuel then
denied that he was a womanizer [16] or that he had a mistress.
[17]
Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal
properties and obligations.[18]
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of
Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom went to
respondent Manuels office.[19] But when she was there, she
would call witness to complain about the curtains and the
cleanliness of the office.[20] One time, witness remembered
petitioner Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuels
drawer looking for his address book while the latter was in
Subic attending a conference.[21] When petitioner Juanita could
not open a locked drawer she called witness, telling the latter
that she was looking for the telephone number of respondents
hotel room in Subic. A process server was requested by
petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper.
When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to
open the locked drawer. On another occasion, particularly in
August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner
Juanita remark to respondent Manuel sino bang batang
bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?[22]
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR.
VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a
psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita. [23] From her
psychiatric evaluation,[24] Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria
Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is
a partner relational problem which affected their capacity to
sustain the marital bond with love, support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth
Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of
both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a
defective communication pattern which is characteristically
negative and deformed. This affected their competence to
maintain the love and respect that they should give to each
other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both
partners who are expected to use healthy strategies to solve
their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be
derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-
compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression.
In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego
to cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became
callused to the detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his
failure to prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who display
narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other
maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be
responsive and sensitive) to each others needs and feelings.
The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a
progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their
psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply with
the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their
patterns of maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of
personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with
code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about more
emotional mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid sets of
traits which were in existence before the marriage will tend to
be pervasive and impervious to recovery.[25]
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent
Manuels allegations. She insisted that they were a normal
couple who had their own share of fights; that they were
happily married until respondent Manuel started having extra-
marital affairs[26] which he had admitted to her.[27] Petitioner
Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her marriage
and that she truly loved her husband. [28] She stated further that
she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting
up for him while he was in law school to serve him food and
drinks. Even when he already filed the present case, she would
still attend to his needs. [29] She remembered that after the pre-
trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel
implored her to give him a chance to have a new family.[30]
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a
psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, [31] testified
that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner
Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report. Said
report stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the
psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria
Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature,
conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman
who possess [sic] more than enough psychological
potentials for a mutually satisfying long term
heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is
respectful of traditional institutions of society like the
institution of marriage. She was also found to be a
loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is
 capable of enduring severe environmental stress in her
social milieu. Finally, she is reality-oriented and
therefore capable of rendering fair and sound decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the
respondent to be psychologically capacitated to comply
with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.[32]
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco
since 1992 described the Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet
to each other.[33] The couple would religiously attend prayer
meetings in the community.[34] Both were likewise leaders in
their community.[35] Witness then stated that she would often
go to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she
still saw respondent Manuel there.[36]
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent
Manuels petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner Juanita holding in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not
preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was]
happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was]
blest with a son. Their life together continued years thereafter
in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical,
depressed and obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties
relationship sometime in the early 90s when the defendant-
wife started receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.
xxx xxx xxx
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-
jerk responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on
marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have
succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of
irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now
stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such
cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a
marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he
or she sometimes may sound like a firetruck. [37]
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in
an order dated 04 May 2001.[38]
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr.
Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically
incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals.[39] Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant
Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and
defendant. That is a shared feeling which between husband
and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in
each others feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who
view the relationship with love amore gignit amorem, sacrifice
and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious of its
value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court
of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in
which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can
do no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower
court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage
declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity,
not only of defendant but also of himself.[40]
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER
JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH
IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING
TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT
THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE
PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF
REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IV.IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF
HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The Courts Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag[41] is apropos.
There, we held that whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity
of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case.
Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according to
its own facts as there can be no case that is on all fours with
another. This, the Court of Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in
Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu
with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved
therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of their
wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15
March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the
petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We
sustained the wife for the reason that an essential marital
obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a
non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband
who is constantly embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and
overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession with
cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet irritants and who
is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person
and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these
inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent
Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals[42] where we declared
that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.[43] In Republic v.
Court of Appeals[44] we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation
of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be protected by the state. The
Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a)
medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint,
c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos.
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.[45]
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now
resolve the issue of whether or not the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent
Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the
preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
[46]
With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic
v. Court of Appeals [47] that the burden of proof to show the
nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel
herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr.
Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own evidence, contains
candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best
position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the
essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, My husband is kind, a good
provider, cool, intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at
gastador In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him
whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because
he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest problem is
not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his
girl now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I
even saw them together in the car. I think that it was the girl
who encouraged him to file the petition. She feels that the
problems in the relationship is [sic] paulit-ulit, but, that she
still is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is
not really psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told
her, You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new
family. She answered and said, Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to
fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin.[48]
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr.
Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and their
witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which
respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the
obligation of fidelity.[49]Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does
not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.[50] It must be shown that
respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality which makes him completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state [51] and
not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own
flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has
admitted that: I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to
have a child at that particular point.[52]
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of
the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his
wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession
with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature
(especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to
endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies
that paralyze her from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that
these defects were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable.[53] In fact, Dr. Maaba,
whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent
Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically
capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations
of marriage.[54]
The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness,
Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not help his case any.
Nothing in there supports the doctors conclusion that
petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the
contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of
petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception
of their marriage as required by law but from her experiences
during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as
they wanted their son to enter the priesthood,[55] her husbands
philandering, admitted no less by him,[56] and her inability to
conceive.[57] Dr. Garcias report paints a story of a husband and
wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who
pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier
and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as
a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself
during his direct examination.[58]
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both
parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss
life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married
couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with
the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a
way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and
void marriage. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.[59]As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:[60]
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery
respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled,
so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working.
Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.[61]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and
effect. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,
vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9,
2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April
30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the
petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 151 rendered a Decision1 denying the petition for
declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix
Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy
does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient
to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court
reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in
toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on
record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects"
were incurable and already present at the inception of the
marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's
testimony failed to establish the substance of respondent's
psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she
arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed
personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that
there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse
integral element in respondent's character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the
essential marital obligations.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of
merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with
this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was
denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate
tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The
Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment8 but
failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the
opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on
petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it complied on
March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the
OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in
a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of
this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises
supportive of such factual determination.10 It is a well-
established principle that factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this
Court,11 save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like
when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues
of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the
case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is
a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the instant
case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.13 As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with
certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily
on psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be
fully explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly
demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the
resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's
psychological condition. Here, appellant contends
that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed,
the evidence on record did not convincingly establish
that respondent was suffering from psychological
incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his
"defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving,
petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's
alleged failure to perform his so-called marital
obligations was not at all a manifestation of some
deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable
psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's
relationship before the marriage and even during their
brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all
bad. During that relatively short period of time,
petitioner was happy and contented with her life in
the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's
own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and
loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when
petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It
was only when they started fighting about the calls
from women that respondent began to withdraw into
his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-
called marital obligations. Respondent could not
understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her
constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger,
temper and jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she
arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed
personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is
the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr.
Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed
personality disorder is dependent on others for
decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to
the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr.
Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital
affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself.
Notably, when asked as to the root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr.
Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive.
She replied that such disorder "can be part of his
family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a
history of respondent's parents having difficulties in
their relationship. But this input on the supposed
problematic history of respondent's parents also came
from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly
demonstrate that there was really "a natal or
supervening disabling factor" on the part of
respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated
him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the
essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner
likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed
psychological or mental malady existed even before
the marriage. All these omissions must be held up
against petitioner, for the reason that upon her
devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the
marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the
"leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the
violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his
family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent
preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family
on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents
for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding
his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects
spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations
and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment
do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a
marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and
appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy
however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.19 No less
than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and
the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although
to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and
4124 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the
marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make the
marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that
these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the
matter.26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves.27 Neither it is to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like.28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying
the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner
to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Anaya vs Palaroan
Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953.
Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954
on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the
validity of the marriage and granting Auroras counterclaim.
While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their
marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative
of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such
pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent.
She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando
on such ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her
husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is
a ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with
another woman was not one of those enumerated that would
constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph providing that no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground
for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does
not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an
annulment of marriage.
Buccat v Buccat (1941)
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat
April 25, 1941
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Baguio.
Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in
March 1938, became engaged in September, and got married
in Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who
was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing
this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life
with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their
marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married
Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be
granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy
before the marriage?
Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a
marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested
and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was
concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law
student, did not suspect anything about Luidas condition
considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy
(highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlargedstomach
) when they got married.
Decision:
SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Costs to plaintiff-
appellant
Aquino vs Delizo
Aquino vs. Delizo
109 Phil 21
FACTS:
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the
ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her
marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the
fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in
April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case
to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco for new trial and decision complained is set aside.
represent the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion.
Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence
presented was the marriage contract between the parties.
Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of

marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for
certiorari to review the decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged

by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would annul a
marriage.

HELD:

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage.
Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to
say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since
she was naturally plump or fat. It is only on the 6th month of
pregnancy that the enlargement of the womans abdomen
reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of
the abdomen more general and apparent.