Sei sulla pagina 1di 194

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CHAPTER - 6
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

We have seen so far that the course of Philosophical development has

indulged in the attempted proofs of the existence of God or Supreme Being.

For the bare necessities of thought some have developed their basis while

others tried to found themselves on the facts of experience. Some on very

general facts as that something exists or that something is in motion. Still

another group has tried to build on highly special facts, as that living beings

are put together in a purposive manner or that human beings are subject to

certain improbable urges and passions, as well as the many specifically

religious needs and feelings.

The general Philosophical verdict is that none of these proofs is

forceful. The proofs based on necessities of thought are universally regarded

as fallacious and the proofs based on the general facts of existence and motion

are only felt to be valid by a minority of thinkers who cannot demonstrate their

sense of validity to others, Religious people, somehow agree in the total

absence of any cogent proofs of the Being they believe in And non religious

people with a tinge of agnosticism willingly mitigate their rejection. We can

try to show that the Divine Existence can be conceived in a satisfactory

religious manner if we also conceive it as something inescapable and

necessary, whether for thought or reality.(1-

1. New Eseiays in Philosophical Theology


Can God's Existence be disproved
J N. Findlay
P 47, 48
m )

Findlay writes, we should give greater precision to our use of the term

God. It is plainly one thing, to pronounce of Gods existence, it he be taken

to be some ancient shapeless stone, or identify him with the bearded Father of

the Sistine ceiling, and quite another matter, we make him an all pervasive

immaterial intelligence or characterize him in some yet more negative and

analogical manner. 2

Sivaraman Krishna3 describes the term nothing as well as the terms

God and the Ultimate are significant descriptions of the divine, the three

terms corresponding to three perspectives, the Non-theistic, the theistic and the

trans-theistic, which span the vast and complex Indian religious landscape,

Buddhistis as well as Hindu.

The Hindu scripture, when it speaks the language of not this, not this,

presupposes on the part of the receiver who listens to the word it sounds an

experience of negation. According to Vedmta, Brahman is the ultimate

character or structure of the universe. Infact the universe is Brahman in


i

disguise. When the universe is reduced to its starkest nakedness, it is

Brahman.

2 Ibid 3 God the self and Nothingness


p. 48 God language and the language of nothing
Sivaraman Krishna
P.P 184,155
(1 5 0

T h e q u e s t fo r G o d h e a d b e h in d th e m a n ife sta tio n T a d E k a m fo r w h ic h th e

g o d s tr u ly stan d fin d s its e x p lic it a rtic u la tio n in th e V e d a n ta (U p a n isa d s).

G o d s n atu re is n o t e x h a u ste d in h is re la tio n sh ip to m a n a s cre a to r or

p ro v id e n c e .

H e is so m e th in g in h im s e lf o u t o f a ll re la tio n s an d fu n c tio n s, e v e n th e

m o s t in tern al o f th em . T h is is A b s o lu te a n d h e is n o t m e r e ly a te rm o f th e

re la tio n o f d iffe r e n c e b e tw e e n G od a n d th e W o rld . V e d a n ta , th e re fo re ,

u n d erstan d s G o d as th e G re a t B e in g (B ra h m a n ) w ith o u t a se c o n d .

T h ro u g h o u t a ll th e o u r d is c u s s io n o f r e lig io u s fa ith , w e h a v e c o m e to

th e fo llo w in g m o d e l - re lig io u s b e lie fs are true or fa ls e , a n d th e ir truth or

fa ls ity is d eterm in ed b y so m e re a lity th at e x is ts o r fa ils to e x is t in d e p e n d e n tly

o f a n y b e l i e f th at w e h a v e J C ie rk e g a a rd , th e re fo re is c o n c e rn e d i ' : _ w i t h

w h a t h e c a lls s u b je c tiv e truth. A b e l i e f is s u b je c tiv e ly tru e, in h is a c c o u n t o f

th e m a tter i f it is h e ld in th e p ro p e r w a y , and th e q u e stio n o f th e o b je c tiv e truth

o f th e b e l i e f (its co rresp o n d en c e to re a lity ) th en b e c o m e s irre le v a n t , truth is

n o t in tro d u ced in to th e in d iv id u a l fro m w ith o u t, b u t w a s w ith in h im a ll th e

tim e 4 K ie r k e g a a r d S h a rp ly co n trasts e x is te n tia lis t th in k in g w ith a b stra ct

4. A History of Western Philosophy


Frank Thilly
P.584
(151)

speculation. Whereas abstract thinking explores the realm of possibilities by

means of logical techniques and achieves only hypothetical knowledge

existentialist thinking achieves truth about the actual, concrete individual.

Kierkegaard is well aware that truth according to his definition is equivalent to

faith

We have discussed many arguments for and against the existence of

God in the previous chapters. On the basis of such arguments, we arrive at

three opinions - one can believe anyway in the existence of God (meaning that

one has theistic faith) or one can believe in the non-existence of God (meaning

that one has an atheistic faith) or one can hold no beliefs at all on the question

(in which case one is an agnostic).

Pascal advances a classical argument in which he shows it is better to

have a theistic faith. To him it we do anything wrong you run the risk of losing

eternal life and suffering eternal damnation. But if we have a theistic faith,

even if we are wrong, there is little that we will really have lost. In short belief

in God is the only reasonable course of action.

Ofcourse, there are a variety of classical objections to this argument. Is

Pascal right in supposing that the non-believer will lose eternal Salvation

because of his non-belief? Granted that there is no evidence either way, would

it be just of God to condemn the non believer for his non-belief?


<15$

And if God would not do that, then Pascals argument collapses. Secondly,

what is the purpose of this argument? Can a person choose what he is going to

belief? And if he cannot then how will he be led to a religious belief by virtue

of Pascals argument.

By way of contest, William James wants to claim that there are atleast

some cases in which we may legitimately come to hold a belief even though

the evidence on that issue is inconclusive. The religious beliefs Asuch cases

which&tebelieveiieven though the evidence for it is not present.

Faith is more often used to refer to complete certain belief in

something. According to such a definition, atheism and science are certainly

not acts of faith. Theism is based upon the faith of man on the supernatural

divine God whereas atheism is based upon reason. There is no empirical

evidence of theistic beliefs. But atheistic tendencies are empirical.

Faith is also used to refer to belief without supporting evidence or

proof. Skeptical atheism certainly does not fit that definition, as skeptical

atheism has no beliefs. Strong atheism:? closes, but still does not really match,

as even the most dogmatic atheist will tend to refer to experimental data when

asserting that God does not exist.


( 15 1 )

Atheists often decide that wanting to believe something is not enough;

there must be evidence for the belief. But of course atheists see no evidence

of God-they are unwilling in their souls to see.

This argument, that the absence of evidence should, not be confused

with evidence of absence, may appear to be neutral with respect to religion,

the naturalist should apply it to the possibility of a naturalist explanation

where it has abided us so far, whereas atheist might invoke it to defend his

view with the argument that the absence of evidence regarding divine

intervention is not evidence of the absence of such an intervention.5

Atheism is the position that runs logically counter to theism, in that

sense, it can be said to be anti-religious. However, when religious believe

speak of atheists being anti-religious they usually mean that the atheists have

some sort of antipathy or hatred towards theists.

Atheism is certainly not a belief in any sort of super human power, nor

is it categorized by worship in any meaningful sense. Widening the definition

of religious to encompass atheism tends to result in many other aspects of

human behaviour, suddenly, becoming classed as religious as well.

5 God, Reason and Theistic proof,


S.T. Davis
P 182
(m

May be it is not a religion in the strict sense of the word, but surely

belief in atheism (or science) us still just an act of faith, like religion is. Faith;

ofcourse individual atheists or scientists can be as dogmatic as religious

followers when claiming that something is certain. This is not a general

tendency - however, there are many atheists who would be reluctant to state

with certainty that the universe exists.

Now, the question is, do the theistic proofs prove the existence of God

of theism? Or do they just prove the existence of some sort of less impressive

first mover or source of religious experience or designer of the universe?

The God of theism6 includes the attributes like

(i) Uniqueness (there is but one God)

(ii) Existing at all times (including now)

(iii) All powerful (omnipotent)

(iv) All knowing (omniscient)

(v) Perfectly morally good and

(vi) Personal (being a person and caring for us as persons)

6 Ibid 18 9
(15

But surely the theistic proofs fail to include in the existence of a being or

beings with these properties.

Again, the purpose of a Theistic Proof is to:-

1. Show that theists are rational in their belief in the existence of God.

2. Show that it is more rational to believe that God exists than it is to

deny that God exists.

3. Show that it is more rational to believe that God exists than to be

agnostic on the existence of God.

4. Show that it is as rational to believe in God as it is to believe in

many of the things that atheist philosophers often believe in (e.g. the

existence of other minds or the objectively of moral right or

wrong.

5. Show that it is irrational not to believe that God exists (that is, it is

irrational to be either an atheist or an agnostic).7

Indeed one can imagine that many atheists and agnostics are not being

bothered at all if some theistic proofs showed that theists are rational in

believing in God as long as that argument accomplishes nothing more

dramatic than that.

7. Ibid
P. 189-190
(15$

An exception to this point would be atheist philosopher. Kai Nielsen, who on a

number of occasions has opined that for somebody living in the twentieth

century with a good philosophical and a good scientific education, who

thinks carefully about the matter - for such a person it is irrational to believe

in God. 8

In the medieval period Western philosophy displays that theistic

provers were aware o f the fact that there were people who did not share their

beliefs about God. Anselm referred to the fool of the Psalms who said There

is no God in his argument in Proslogion II. Still the theistic proofs that these

and other medieval thinkers offered, sound like intellectual efforts that are

largely internal to faith. The purpose of medieval theistic proofs was not to

convince people that God exists, but to show that God exists can (via

conclusive demonstrative proofs) be known Between the medieval and the

modem period, changes in the context and purpose of theistic proofs took

place; there are - The Enlightenment, Classical foundationalism and the

evidentialist objection to religions faith.

8 J P Moreland and Kai Nielsen (eds)


Does God Exist ? The great Debate
(Nashville, Tennessee Thomas Nelson 1990)
Qtd. in God, Reason and theistic Proof
Stephen T Davis
P 190
( 15

The Enlightenment period of European philosophy thought that began in the

seventeenth century and hi its stride in the eighteenth. Some of its central

theme were

(1) mistrust of religion and of authority in general.

(2) emphasis on human experience and reason as the only reliable

guides to truth.

(3) The emergence of certain political ideals, especially secular

democratic and liberal ones and

(4) Optimism about the prospect of human problems beings overcome

through education, the use of reason and a roughly utilitarian

approach to social and moral issues.9

Enlightenment thinkers (and those influenced by them) could never

accept a claim on any subject merely because the Church or the Bible or the

Church Fathers endorsed it. We can land the same reflections among the

Indian atheists.

9 God Reason and Theistic Proof


S.T. Davis
P 79
M. N. Roy who are bent on reorienting Indian Philosophy, try to dig out

bits of materialist ideas of the Carvakas and others, long since buried under the

ground, and to rehabilitate them as the really valuable elements of the Indian

Philosophical heritage with which a new philosophy is to be forged.10

In India, the atheistic philosophers challenged the authority of the Gods

by trying to explain the being and becoming of the world in a rationalists and

materialists way.

This materialistic trend distinguishes it from all others and also from

the nature philosophical schools. Naturally, materialism could reach its aim

most quickly if it denied the existence of soul. But so far as the assumption of

a soul served only the explanation of the phenomenal world, as was the case in

the old nature philosophy before it was connected up with belief in God and

with the doctrine of Deliverance, it was also acceptable to Materialism. But

while this nature philosophical schools were governed by a striving towards

the understanding of the phenomenal world and their attempts at explanation

gradually formed into a full-fledged Philosophical system, the materialists

satisfied themselves all the while with their positing of a purely negative aim.

Therefore, the Indian characterization of them as deniers or negativists is

appropriate.11

10 Radhaknshnan & Integral Experience 11 Materialism E fwo.u.wallien.


J G. Arpura Qtd. in Carvaka/Lokayata Edt By DPC
P. 21 P 47
Vedic priest-craft, but as a school of philosophical thought, it was sterile.

Nevertheless, it very greatly influenced Buddhist Philosophy. This trend of

dispute o f the nihilistic doctrine gives rise of materialistic tendency.

Indian materialism rose as a reaction to nihilism. So, the materialists

schools of Indian philosophy represented currents of thought evidently

stimulated by nihilism. In order to prove the reality of some existence, Kapila

had to fall back upon the material world. The existence of matter by itself, or

that o f disembodied spirits, could not be proved to the satisfaction of the

skeptics who expounded their nihilist doctrines on the logical deductions from

the early spiritualist cult which was being set up in order to drug the victims of

social chaos, so that they might ignore the miseries of this world as bad

dreams. 12

Even the most extreme nothing of a physicist is not an absolute

Nothing devoid of any properties and measures. For example, Stephen

Hawkings proposal for a universe without boundaries avoids questions about a

beginning in time, but it does not do so without making any assumption. 13

Indian materialists, particularly the Carvakas are mentioned in many

parts o f Manus Institutes14 as Nastikas (nihilists), Pasandis (heretics) and

12 Materiaalism 14. Manu's !nstitute( li 11, in 150,161, iv 30, 61,163 etc)


M.N Roy J. Muir .
P.79 Qtd. in Carvaka/Lokayata
13 Science,Religion and Naturallism, D.P. a

f
W.B Drees
P 268 360
( 1.6)

reviler of the Vedas. The Carvaka philosophy disappeared long ago from India

was looked down upon greatly by the Brahmanical Orthodoxy that no sin

could be compared with Nastikya. 15

The CSrvaka philosophy developed their materialistic tendencies had to

pass through four different stages of development.

In its first stage, it was a mere tendency of opposition. It called in

question all kinds of knowledge immediate as well, as mediate and all

evidence, perception as well as inference. In its second stage, Svabhavavada,

recognition of perception as a source of knowledge and the theory of

identification of body with the self were incorporated into it. In its third stage,

an extreme form of hedonism, which was due perhaps to the corruption of

freedom of thought - social, religion and political formed the most important

feature of this school. The reaction to this extreme form of licentiousness was

destructive to the very vitality of this school. From that period this extremely

materialistic school leaned towards spiritualism. In that period, under severe

attack from the spiritualists, it gave apart from the body and tried, gradually to

identify the sense organs, breath and the organ of thought with the self. Before

that the materialists had affirmed that inference was not a means of

knowledge. But at this stage, they accepted at first probability and then even

15. G . Tucci

A S k e tc h o f Indian M aterialism

Q td. Ibid p. 3 8 4
inference, though in a restricted form, as a true source of knowledge.10

The extreme form of materialism can have similarity with the

naturalists.

In the same context, the naturalists make out that man's soul is hut a

puff of Vapour', It is something thrown up by the random collisions el

particles in aimless flight. It is an accident and death may blot out the human

species. Mans mind like the Carvakas is a material conglomeration ot swiftK

moving atoms. The nature of the human self is interpreted in a way in which

roles it of its reality. Biologists argue that the individual person is the product

of his heredity and environment. Psychologists tell us that the sub-conscious

mind, which is the seat of instincts and emotions, is the determining factor m

man's life. Sociologists argue that the social environment in which a man s

born moulds his mind and character. On such a materialist view, the role of the

individual in the shaping of history is negligible. There is a force or principle

that governs human affairs, historic destiny, fate, providence, and economic

laws. There is inevitability about the future of man. 17

To Devatma, the philosophical basis of universe is nature one.

unlimited, uncreated, self-existent whole of embodied existences in ceasekw"

16 A short History of Indian 17 Religion & Culture


Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism Radhakrishnan
D.R Shastri P?155,15&
Qtd. in Carvaka/Lpkayata
Edt DPC
Pp396,397
( 162,)

change for better or worse. Each of these characteristics of the universe

excludes the possibility of the existence of, God or Brahman. By, this, DevStma

is able to show reasonably how there is and can be no being corresponding to

the idea of God or Brahman.

Clarke and dHolbach citing some points argue, that God as a reflexive

principle includes self-existence ad self-consciousness. dHolbach correcting

this view maintains that matter being generieally comprehensive composed of

active and divergent fundamental units which are radically responsible for all

that is and acts. Clarke demonstrates three successive predicates about reality.

These are (1) eternal (2) immutable and independent and (3) self-existent or

necessary. dHolbach concurs these attributes but counters that they inhere

nature or matter. Clarke is right about his predicates, he is wrong about their

subject.18

Newton also employed a logistic method that dHolbach himself

initiated. He brings all movements down to their composing motions and

traces these effects back to their originating forces. Newton himself admitted

that discourse about god was like a blind man talking about colours. He

suggests as the only alternative to his view of god, nature and destiny. His

18 At the Origins Modern Atheism


M J. Buckley
P 300
(163)

image of god is unacceptable but his alternative goes perfectly with the

convictions of dHolbachs natural philosophy. Newtons force, variously

realized in motive force, gravitation. and divine dominion gives way to

dHolbacks matter and its essentially different active units. 19

Indian heterodox philosophy, Buddhism stands parallel to materialism,

since it negates the existence of God and the eternal soul. But the two differ in

one point because Buddhism accepted law of karma i.e. retribution for good

and bad. In all the proceedings of Buddhas sermon, his bold and hostile

attitude against the theories which accepted existence of soul is manifested. At

the same time he with equal gesture opposes Indian materialism only because

it disregards law of karma.

But Buddhism was the result of spiritual revolt of Indian materialists. It

eventually freed India from Brahmanieal domination for several hundred

years. The triumph of Buddhism and its supremacy for so many centuries

prove that the metaphysical school of thought represented by the vedantists

could not check the tide of materialism and rationalism. The metaphysical

monism of the Vedanta system was constructed by the Brahmin intellectuals

in order to fiombat the materialist schools of philosophy which had logically

resulted from the earlier speculation of thinkers no longer satisfied with the

19. Ibid
P. 313
(164 )
fantacies and fairy tales of the primitive vedic religion.20

Karl Marx also comments, The Indian Brahmin who proves the

holiness of the Veda by reserving for himself alone the right to read it.21

As the Buddhists and the Jainas supported the materialists in their

attack of Vedic sacrifices, the old heretic attackers became move powerful. It

was Samikara and his school who did not even consider the Carvaka School as

a system of philosophy. But *'o at the sometime he retorts in his Sarva

Siddhanta Sara Samgraha, that by adopting only those means which are seen,

such as agriculture, the tending of cattle, trade, politics and administration

etc., a wise man should endeavour to enjoy pleasure here in this world.

Madhavacaryya considered therefore the Lokayata or Carvaka as the lowest

system of philosophy securing the most decided victory. *22

Carvaka/Lokayatas opened a new chapter between themselves and

other orthodox schools citing Manus uttering (iii 65) e.g. Nastikya

Karmanam, which is so characterized in some Buddhist Texts - natthi

sukata - dukkatanam kammanam phalam vipako. Again in the Prakarana

pancika of Salikanatha and in the gflokavartika of Kumlrila we find Lokayatika

20 Materialism
M.N. Roy
P .8 2
21 Marx (& Engels) OR 25
Qtd in Indian Atheism
P .3 5
22. A Short History of ind Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism
D R. Shastri
Qtd in Carvaka/Lokayata
Etd.. DPC
P 422 -423
( 165)

refutations to personal God. This central idea of materialism inspired many

modem philosophers.

Plato, one of the spiritualistic thinkers of the west in his fanatical zeal

would have liked to buy up and bum all the works of Democritus, the father of

western materialism, Similar manner^ die Vedic Orthodox philosophers in

their fanatical zeal ollected and destroyed the original works of the Brhaspati

school of philosophy, the extreme materialist system of India. But the

Buddhistic and the Jaina schools were spiritualistic and therefore they did not

meet total annihilation.24

Buddha however borrowed the fundamental philosophical dectrine

from the upanisads and originated on the heels of Vedanta. But later on it

eschewed all links with older tradition developed that intellect being relational

involves itself in insoluble antinomies. This in order to be one with Reality, it

has to get itself transformed into immediate Spiritual Experience. (Bodhi or

Prajna)

Buddhism and Vedanta are the different stages of development of the

central thought of the Upanisads. It finds indirect support in Buddhism, its

elaboration in Mahayaha Buddhism, its open revival in Gaudapada which

23 A Sketch of Indian Matenlism


G. Tucci
Qtd. in ibid
P. 389
24 Opcit
P49Z
( 166 )

reaches its zenith in Samkara and cultuinates in Post Samkarites. 25

The principal teaching of the Upanisads is that Atman is Brahman and

that it is the only reality, the one universal essence. In Buddhism, this

identifying of the real self or soul with Brahman is not to be found. It was

scientific in its approach and plainly atheistic. Buddha rejected the Brahmin

philosophy, which spoke of Atman as the soul or self, which had a share in the

Absolute. Therefore, he taught the theory of An-atta, not that of an immortal

self.

The Silence of Buddha as interpreted by Radhakrishnan may be

interpreted therefore as the expression of an attitude of atheism or of

agnosticism or of a deep moral earnestness and deep love for humanity26.

A modem philosopher Feuerbach, the enthusiastic disciple of Hegel

like Buddha gives priority to man and tries to establish humanity as GodHe

saidf My first thought was God, my second reason my third and lastman. ,27

Feuerbach says' man is projecting and objectifying his own goodness

and in the fantastic being called God. So God is the product of pure human

imagination. He said religion is the dream of human mind and the turning

25. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy


C. D. Sharma
P 318
28 Indian Phil Vol. I
Radhakrishan
P. 465
27 Darsharwlntemation V e ! tX
Atheism with special reference to Feuerbac, Marx, Nedzsche and Conte
D. R. Bhandan
P .9
( 16?)

point of history will be the moment when man becomes aware that the only

God o f man is man him self .28 For Devatma also there is no evidence in

Nature from which we can infer the existence of God as perfect spirit,

omniscient, omnipotent and all good. He like Spinoza, under takes to study the

nature of human personality in the context of the cosmos and understands and

interprets the good and evil of human personality, its bondage and freedom in

this total context, Spinoza maintains, there is no God other than Nature

Feuerbach writes, religion believes in and worships not God but human

nature conceived as in itself the divine or supreme perfection. He concludes',

*the aim of his teaching is to change friends of God into friends of man

believers into thinkers, worshippers into workers'.29 In this way for him

humanism is turned into God of religion. God is discovered. Solely on earth

and in man. Descartes God depends upon Nature in order to be God. What is

in itself successively present throughout everything is nature or Matter. To

Aurobindo, matter is Brahman gone unconscious and the steps in evolution

one reascending of Brahman to its Absolute consciousness. Evolution is home

coming of the Brahman.

The humanism propounded by Karl Marx can be compared with

Buddhas humanism. Both of diem were initially inclined towards humanism

28. Ibid
P. 10
29. Ibid
P 10
<16g)

as it is evident from the fact that they began their study in and around humai

interests. Buddha was concerned with the problem of human sorrow and it

solution resulting in his Historic deliverance of I.! Enlightenment

(bodh) in the shape of the Four Noble Truths and the Eight Fold Path.

Marx was also equally concerned with human suffering like Buddha

But unlike the latter, he understood it in a specific sense, i.e. suffering of man

is due to poverty, leaving out of account other kinds of suffering to which he

is liable and from which he is equally in need of being freed.

Marx has been called as a natural bom atheist. Marx highly influenced

by Hegel and Feuerbach accepted Feuerbach's proposition that "God to be the

'fictitious' creation of man's sick conscience. Man is the only reality, the onh

meaning of the universe of evolution and of history. Thus liberated from the

divine shackle he is free to create himself fully in solidarity with his fellow

men. Supreme reality is man and nofGod. Marxs humanism is practical


In
hence pure atheism.^This glorification^man is the goal of Marx's atheistic

humanism . 0

Generally religions are built on faith rather blind faith it would seem

But in Buddhism emphasis is laid on seeing, knowing, understanding' ant:

not on faith or belief. In Buddhist texts there is a world saddha' which is

30. Ibid
PP10,11
usually translated as faith or belief. But saddha is not faith as such but

rather confidence bom out of conviction. Therefore, the teaching of the

Buddha is qualified as ehi passika inviting us to come and see, but not to

come and believe. With reference to his own enlightenment the Buddha said,

the eye was bom, knowledge was bom, light was bom. It is always seeing

through knowledge or wisdom and not believing through faith. And the

teachings of the Buddha, the necessity of purity, of courtesy, of uprightness, of


T1
peace and of a universal love, far reaching, grown great and beyond measure.

Buddha opines that there is no other reliever of pain than Truth. Truth heals

from great pain and danger.

Jainism, like Buddhism and in a sense even more than Buddhism is

intensely spiritual and ethical. The Jainas, therefore, are not atheistic in this

sense. Denial of God does not necessarily mean atheism in Indian Philosophy.

Otherwise, the Sankhya and the MTmlmsa, which do not believe in the

existence of God, would not have been called Orthodox.

It seems that the composition of the earlier Upanisads and the Vedanta

sutras have been separated by several hundred years. During that period the

spiritual development of India was in the direction of materialism represented

by Kannada, Kapila and many others, and of rationalism represented by

31. What the Buddha taught f


Wal Pola Sri Rahuia
P.8
( 170)

Buddhists and the Jainas subsequently.

In the Jaina literature we find that although the Jaina denies God, but it

does not^godhead . Every liberated soul is a God. According to^Jaina, there is

no necessity of bringing in God to explain creation, for the world was never

created. Jainism, under the influence of Brahmanism, deified the Tirthankaras,

has built temples for them, has worshipped their idds, has shown the same

devotion to them as other Hindu Orthodox people have shown to their gods.

The Jainas like the Brahmanism, also believed in soul, but they

conceived it as a constantly changing entity - something very different from

the orthodox simple and immortal divine spark of man. They thought that the

soul was composed of an infinite number of particles - soul atoms ~ which

was constantly increasing and decreasing. That, in their opinion did not affect

the permanence of the soul, for a thing can be permanent and non-permanent

at the same time. For example, although the water is constantly flowing, the

stream of water is always there.

M.N. Roy observes that, the Jaina philosophers quite interestingly

maintained that contradictory attributes, such as being and non-being, could

belong to one and the same thing. They subjected the conceptions of

absoluteness; unity and eternity to their unsettling style of reasoning. The

32 Materialism
M.N Roy
P. 101
(17S)

result was the rejection of the doctrine of Brahman. The disruptive effect of
their views and methods or reasoning can be judged from the charge
Samkaraeharyya brought against them, If you maintain that the heavenly
world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the
absence of all determinate knowledge, which is implied in such statements,
will result in nobodys acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world
and final release'33
The theistie systems of philosophy are generally anthropomorphic.
They bring down God to the level of man. Jainism, on the otherhand looks
upon himself as God when his inherent powers are fully in blossom. Jainism
favours the spirituality of mans inner life by acquiring good qualities. . In
Manusambit! (10/63) as we find besides the ritualismof rites and sacridices
Manu has advised man to acquire the four qualities chatuvarayam) ahimsa
(non-violence), satyam(truthfulness),aste-yaCnon-siealin^and sdiaudia. (cleanliness).
Ahimsa satyamasteyayamshauchamindriya nigraha.
Etat satnasik&mdharma chaturvamtyamabrabin manu Manusamhita (10/63)
' - t Jainism also takes these
qualities as the vows of their life. The Jainas seven fold mode of predication
(saptabhangi) is right so far as it cautions us against one sided conclusions but

33. Ibid
P.P. 10(3-103
{Ill)

in the end it is nothing more than such one sided solutions.

According to Hirriyana the truth is that the primary aim of Jainism is

the perfection of soul, rather than the interpretation of the universe.34

Jainism gives more than any other creed absolute religions

independence and freedom to man. Jaina philosophy tries to give light to the

view that Kala (time), svabhava (nature) niyatil/ (desKn-y), Karma (action)

and purusartha (ahdeaveour) these five jointly mould our happiness or sorrow

but not God or Super Natural being. It is quite contrary to the Vedic point of

view of happiness and sorrow. Because, according to Vedic tho^tG od or

Super Natural Being is the prime govemer of our happiness & sorrow.

The philosophical view of the sihkhya with its dualism of purusa and

prakrti and a plurality of infinite purusas cannot be regarded as a satisfactoiy

solution of the main problem of philosophy.The arguments which are put

forwarded by the Sankhya^ According to S.P. Kanal would have established

plurality of purusas if difference in birth and death, or the absence or presence

of a sense organ or activity and passivity etc. were applicable to purusa.

However, the Sahkhya system would not allow these differences to be true of

purusa, but of prakrti. Further if these differences are taken away, there is

nothing to distinguish one purusa from another and hence plurality of purusas

34 Out lines of I.P.


Hirriyana
P 173
( 173)

collapses. Sankhya, again in its reaction against.. Absolutism, the doctrine has

discarded the idea of a universal soul, but considering it into two prakrti and

Purusa has reduced each to a mere abstraction. 35

Badarayana in his Brahma StTtra considered the Sa^ikhya system as

representing the strongest philosophical opposition to the Upanisadic views.36

The author of Sveta ^vStara Upanisad did the same. There were some law

givers among the ruthless champions of Vedic Orthodoxy considered the

Sankhya view as much heretical as those of the Buddhists, Jainas and the

Lokayatas; even a mere touch of the followers of any of these views, they

declared was a sin and pollution which could be removed only by ritual

bathing. 37

Khandadeva,38 one prominent MTmarasakas, found it impossible to

allow even a scrap of theism in his philosophy only to be loyal to the spirit of

Jaimini, the founder or the Mhnamsaka school.

So Max Muller referring to the charge of atheism that has been brought

against Jaiminis MTmamsa observes This sounds a very strange charge after

what we have seen of the character of this philosophy, of its regard for the

Vedas, and the defense of its revealed character, lay its insistence on the

35. The Ethics of Devatma 37 Ibid


S.P. Kanal P 205
P 128-129 38 Ibid
36 Indian Atheism P.211
D P .C
P .2 0 5
( 174)

c o n s c ie n tio u s o b s e rv a n c e o f a ll c e re m o n ia l in ju n c tio n s . S till it h a s b e e n

b ro u g h t b o th in a n c ie n t a n d in m o d e m tim e s . H o w e v e r th e re se e m s to b e a

m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g h e r e . 39

It se e m s th e re fo re rid ic u lo u s , h o w a n a lm o s t fa n a tic a l z e a l fo r th e

V e d a s le d th e M T m a m sa k a s to a c c e p t a ra d ic a l fo rm o f a th e is m , th e re a l re a s o n

m ig h t b e th e e n o rm o u s tim e -g a p b e tw e e n th e V e d a s a n d o u rs e lv e s h a s re s u lte d

fo r u s in th e lo s s o f s o m e v ita l a s p e c ts o f th e a n c i e n t V e d i c t r a d i t i o n . 40

M a x M u l l e r 41 a g a i n , w r i t e s I t w a s b u t a n o th e r a tte m p t a t ju s tif y in g th e

w is d o m o f G o d , a n a n c ie n t T h e o d o c e e th a t w h a te v e r w e m a y th in k o f it

c e rta in ly d id n o t d e se rv e th e n a m e o f a th e is m . I f th e M lm lm s a k a s w e re c a lle d

a th e is ts , it m e a n t n o m o re th a n th a t th e y trie d to ju s tify th e w a y s o f G o d in

th e ir o w n w a y .

S a m k a r a 42, h im s e lf v ig o ro u s ly a rg u e d w ith a g re a t d e a l o f o b v io u s

te x tu a l a n d p h ilo s o p h ic a l ju s tific a tio n - th a t th e a lle g e d c o m m itm e n t o f th e

S a n k h y a to th e V e d ic s ta n d p o in t w a s c o m p le te ly s p u rio u s . T h e S a n k h y a

P h ilo s o p h y s u ffe re d a g e n e ra l w re c k a c c o rd in g to K .C . B h a tta c h a r y y a w h ic h is

a d m itte d b y b o th th e tra d itio n a l a s w e ll a s e m in e n t m o d e m S c h o la rs . H e p u ts

39. Max Muller C .W XIX 42. Samkara (on Brahma Sutra ii 1 12)
Qtd in I.A. refutes at least 60 of the aphorisms of the Brahma Sutra
D.P.C were pointedly meants to retute the Sankhya
P .2 0 6 Qtd. in I A .
40. Ibid D .P C
P. 211 P. 204
41. Max Muller
Qtd in I A
D.P.C.
P. 207
( 175)

the same more clearly, Much of the SSftkhya literature apprears to have been

lost, and there seems to be no continuity of tradition from ancient times upto

the age of the commentators. In such systematic works as we have, one seems

to have a hazy view of a grand system of speculative metaphysics. There is so

much that is clothed in a poetic or mystic garb on which commentators do no

help us much but which are suggestive enough to tempt us to construct the
43
system anew .

The Purva Mmamsakas standpoint was somewhat unique. They were

as thoroughly opposed to philosophical idealism in the history of Indian

Philosophy as anybody else perhaps was. This hostility led them to share a

great deal of the views of the later Nyaya Vais'esikas.

Keith 44 writes; There was an almost unbroken continuity between at

least one aspect of the vedic tradition and the Munamsa philosophy, the latter

being both historically and logically only a cultivation of the former. The

Sankhya derives the doctrine of Prakrti from the SvetaSvatara Upanisad, the

theory of the three Gunas from the three colour in the Chandogya and the

doctrine of purusa, the relation of mind, intellect and soul from the Katha

Upanisad.45

43. K C Bhattacharyya S.P. 127 45. A Critical Survey of Indian Phhilosophy


Qtd In Indian Atheism C.D. Sharma
D.P.C. P 31
P. 75
44 Keith K.M. 60
Qtd. in I.A
D P .C .
P.204
(17

T h ro u g h o u t o u r e n tire d is c u s s io n th e p ro b le m c e n tre d ro u n d th e

q u e s tio n - I s G o d a h is to ric a l p e rs o n ? P e rh a p s th e re a s o n w h y h is e x is te n c e is

o fte n d e n ie d is b e c a u s e o f h is B e i n g c a n n o t b e s u b je c te d to th e te s t o f

e m p iric a l h is to ry .

W e h a v e s e e n th a t m o s t o f th e In d ia n p h ilo s o p h e rs o f d iffe re n t s c h o o ls

h a d s h o w n th a t th e lo g ic a l a rg u m e n ts a n d re lig io u s e x p e rie n c e s fa il to

e s ta b lis h th e tru th o f b e lie f in G o d . W e c a n a ls o tu r n o u r v ie w fo r th e a th e is tic

e x p la n a tio n th a t s c ie n c e h a s d is c o v e re d a b o u t th e u n iv e rs e .

P h y s ic a l a n d s o c ia l s c ie n c e s fin d e x p la n a tio n o f a ll e v e n ts w ith in th e

u n iv e rs e . T o h o ld th a t G o d in te rfe re s in th e w o rk in g o f u n iv e rs e in th e fo rm o r

m ira c le s is re p u g n a n t to s c ie n c e . S o m ira c le s w h ic h m e a n n o n -n a tu ra l

c a u s a tio n o p e ra tiv e in th e c h a in o f n a tu ra l c a s e s , h a v e n o t b e e n v e rifie d in

s c ie n tific la b o ra to rie s .

T h e a u to n o m o u s c h a ra c te r o f th e u n iv e rs e s re p e ls th e id e a o f a s u p e r

n a tu ra l p o w e r c o n tro llin g th e e v e n ts in th e u n iv e rs e . S c ie n tific u n d e rs ta n d in g

o f th e u n v e rs e d d is p e n s e s w ith th e id e a o f th e c re a to r a n d c o n tro lle r o f th e

u n iv e rs e i.e . it fin d s it re a s o n a b le to b rin g in G o d fo r e x p la in in g P h y s ic a l,

b io lo g ic a l, p s y c h o lo g ic a l, s o c ia l, a e s th e tic , m o ra l a n d s p iritu a l e v e n ts in th e

u n iv e rs e . T h e id e a ls h a v e a s m u c h ro o ts in th e n a tu ra l o rd e r a s fa c ts . I t m e a n s

th a t th e e v e n ts in th e u n iv e rs e g iv e n o g ro u n d fo r in te rfe rin g th e e x is te n c e o f

G o d .
( 177)

For the Indian atheists the concept of God was only a subjective error

given the status of an objective truth. It was firmly conceived in certain

recognized forms of fallacious thinking. The Indian atheists are allowed to co

exist within the same framework of thought, the rejection of this particular

illusion. But to Sartre. The existentialist, the distinction between noumenal

and phenomenal realities is superfluous. This distinction is based on the

assumption that for any perceivable object, there is an inner or true reality,

which is imperceivable. This makes the objects we perceive as mere images,

an illusion. E.g. when we speak of pain, it is not like perceiving the

phenomenon pain and some real pain hiding behind this phenomenon. Pain

is not perceivable object. It is inferred from some perceivable phenomena like,

yelling, crying etc. though these phenomena themselves are not pain . 46

We see now that Indian philosophers deny God on three considerations

- epistemological, Ontological and ethical.

First - the question arises^ Does any of the recognized instruments of


*
valid knowledge prove the existence of God ?

Second - question is that Is it necessary to postulate God for evolving

a rational scheme of reality and for solving the problem of the origin of the

46. Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVII


Why Being-For-Others ?
Bhagat Oinam
P 169
physical world ? and the third - question is held the assumption of a Moral

Governor necessary for explaining human destiny or providing the sense of

human responsibility and purposiveness with the required rational^?


\

As we have mentioned earlier chapters that atheism gives a new way to


A

some modem thought like humanism, secularism^naturalisrn, modernism etc.

Now, we are going to discuss atheistic views of some of the modem

intellectuals , scientists .

The world view which assimilates human world into physical world is

known as materialism and the view which assimilates physical world to

human consciousness is idealism or Brahman Vada or Absolutism.

Devatma, the naturalist philosopher ofrm tfam th century tries in his

Naturalistic approach to integrate the two worlds, without denying their

distinctive characteristics. In early development of philosophical search, the

failure was due to the fact that the two worlds are reduced or translated into

each other when they are of different nature.

Therefore, Devatmas interpretation of the universe is scientific in the sense

that it is established firstly on the basis of matter - force unit, which, is in

ceaseless change. To exist is to change, for to exist is to be matter-force unit,

this law again have value aspect too. Every change furthers or retards the

existence or quality of entity in which it takes place and/or as it effects


m)

others. Since a change does not merely further or endanger the existence but

also either improves or ruins the qualities of the entities and change is cosmic,

there is emergence of new conditions and new existents or species. The

changes in the atmospheric conditions and the living species that paved the

way for the rise of human species were changes for the better, for human

species shows some gifts for understanding and discovering truth,

appreciation and creation of beauty and perception and practice of moral

principles in social living. The law of evolution is a name for processes of

changes in individuals and species which make for betterment in the strength

and qualities of existents for nutual good. There is an opposite process too.

The law of devolution. This law is the nature for those processes in individuals

and species which adversely affect the strength and qualities of existents and

lead to their extinction.

Since to Devatma47, nature is all and totality of all existents, human

personality as soul-body organism or psychophysical organism, is a part of

Nature. It has no origin, destiny outside Nature. It is an evolute from the

animal world. It is bom, embodied existent like other existents. So science

also discovers that consciousness is related to body and is inseparable from it.

It finds no instance or evidence for disembodied consciousness or atma or

47. Ethics of Devatma


S.P Kanal
P. 186
( 18 1 )

God. Science finds that everything is in ceaseless change. There is no evidence

of unchanging existences. So belief in unchanging atma or God is a myth.

Regarding the existence of God Einstein said, It have become a scientist only

to know whether God was free or not to create the world. Further he said,

Science is lame without religion and religion is blind without science. But

quote interestingly, scientists like Galileo, Kepler, and Copernicus, Newton

etc. could not do away the concept of God. Newton made his famous, line in

Principia Mathematica - Hypothesis non-fingo\ He said, T cant find any

reason of world synthesis, so I do not assume any theory. At the good grace of

God or Divine Being, the sun, the moon and all the planets shall go in their

own way. Australian physicist Paul Davis in 1983 in his book God and new-

physics asks the questions - who created this world ? How will it be

destroyed ? What is matter ? What is the nature or soul ? What is mind ? He

admits that no other questions are so complicated and deep rooted than the

question of world evolution.

In conclusion, we may its four great intellectual atheists who

deliberately denied God, because they had created for themselves a new

attractive God of their own.

Feuerbach, as we have written earlier has taken humanity as the God of

his life. Similarly,, Marx, the noted Marxist accepted Feuerbachs proposition
( 181)
and maintains that man makes religion, religion does not make man. To him,

man is the creator of his world, his history and himself. Religion for him is

only the illusory sun about which man revolves so long as he does not revolve

about himself. He believes in classless society, because religion is the result of

classes in the society. By treating ever one equally, the classes in the society

will disappear.

Another strong atheist Nietzsche brings a new concept o f superman, the

new God who dwells on earth, creating a heaven over here. For him God is

really, man. He eries boldly God is dead, the Christian God. He will replace

God the creator and guiding spirit of history, and will plan and manage history

as a whole himself. Therefore he said, I teach men no longer to bury ones

head in the sand of heavenly things but to bear it freely, a earthly head, which

creates a meaning for the earth. 48

Comte, like Feuerbach believes social humanity as God. He wanted all

man to love the human race. Thus transforming the philosophy of positivism

into religion of humanity. Comte tried to eliminate God as an illusion or

mans arrested youth! Man can satisfy completely his religious appetite by

directing his thoughts, feelings and actions towards his own humanity. Comte

made man as absolute like God himself.

48. D arsana International Bhandan Vol xxxix


P 11

(
182)

In his religion God of Catholicism is slowly being assimilated into God

o f humanity. For Kierkegaard also mans relationship to God is what makes

him human . 49

Thus, atheism of these intellectuals paved the way for many changes in

the church today. Side by side atheistic thought' feacted to the theistic proofs,

because neither logical arguments nor the fundamentals of scientific

understanding have the least tendency to warrant the truth of the belief in God.

Charles Bradlaugh says - The atheist doesnot say, there is no God, out he

says I know not what you mean by God. I am without the idea of God. The

word God is to me a sound conveying no clear or distinct affirmation .50

49 Religion Culture
Radhakrishnan
P. 104
50. Charles Bradlaugh in his Plea of Atheism
Qtd in Ercy of Phil Vol I
P 176
CH A P TER- 5
ATHEISM IN SANKHYA AND M IM lM SA
ATHEISM IN SANKHYA AND MlMAMSA

We have discussed and analysed atheistic elements that prevailed in all

the three heterodox schools of Indian Philosophy. We can at a glance

summarise the CSrvakas or the Lokayatas as materialists, the Buddhism as a

school of realism and naturalism while the Jainism as a relativistic pluralism

But the common feature of all of them is that none of these schools has faith n

God or Supreme Being or adores such Being.

In Brahmanical philosophy, two main traditions appear to have been

established by the time of the flourishing of the Sramana schools, 500 B.(

the Sahkhya and the Mfmamsa.

Among the orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, the Sankhya and the

Mfiiiamstr schools do not adhere to the view of the intervention of am

Supreme Being or God in creation or dissolution of the world process. I he

Sahkhya system is sometimes described as the atheistic Sankhya' (nirisva a

sahkhya) since it does not uphold God as the creator, and therebx it is

distinguished from the Yoga which is called the 'Theistic Sankhya' (Sesutr.i-

Sahkhya).

As we come across that the Vedas are the fountainhead of all forms <>i

Hinduism and they are mostly God-oriented. The Vedas regard Him as I'm.

(Agni), the Majestic (Indra). the terrible (Rudra) and the just (Varunai

Hinduism as such being a Vedic religion, consists essentially of rapport with


( 116)

the transcendent Being, ever free and ever the Lord ' 1 and this consciousness

has never left it at any stage of history.

Contrary to this stand, however in the Vedic hymns itself, we find sonu

passages which refer to heretics and unbelievers. They evidently were tin

pioneers of the revolt against the natural religion and as such fore fathers o'

Indian Philosophy. The origin o f naturalist and skeptic thought can be found ti.

the Rg Veda itself, for instance the creation hymn" which concludes the

dialogue between the parents o f mankingjt- the twin brother and sister. Yam.i

and Yam i. This thought was also developed in some of the major IJpanisads.

e.g. Chandogya, Katha Upanisads etc.

The Sankhya represents a relatively free development of speculation

among the Brahmanas, independent of the Vedic revelation. It can be said

quasi-materialists where as the Vaisesikas are materialists.

Kapila, the founder of this school while fighting against the nihilistic

tendencies came very close to materialism. He had to prove the reality of some

existences,because the existence of thought by it self or that of disembodied

spirits could not be proved to the satisfaction of the s k e p tic s .

I God the Self and Nothingness 2. Materialism


Reflection & Western M.N Roy
God Language & the language of nothing P. 78
K. Sivaraman
P. 156
( 117)

and as a result Kapila had to fall back upon the material world. But the late

Sankhyas e.g. Vijnlnviksu, in the Sixteenth century tried to revive the earlier

theism in Sankhya. The first available work of the Sankhya school is the

Sankhya-Sutra' of Kapila.

Next to Kapila, his disciple Asuri and Asuri's disciple Paffca&kha

wrote some books which aimed at a clear and elaborate exposition of the

Sankhya system. As these works were lost in course of time, only available

book was Nvarakrsna's Sankhya-Karika which was the authoritative text

book of the Sankhya. Gauda padas Sankhya-Karrika-bhasya. VdcaspatiN

"Tattva Kaumudi. Vijnanaviksus and Sankhya-sara' and Aniruddha'.

Sankhya Pravacana-sutra Vrtti are some other important works of the

Sankhya System.

The Sankhya Philosophy, provides a basis. Theoretical exposition of

human nature enumerating and defining its elements analyzing their manner of

co-operation in the state of bondage (baddha) and describing their state ol

disentanglement or separation in release (moksa). As we read in the

Bhagvadgita - Purile and unlearned people speak of 'enumerating

knowledge (Sankhya) and the "practice of introvert concentration (yoga)

distinct from each other, yet anyone firmly established in either gains the fruit

of both.
(118)

The state attained by the followers of the path of enumerating

knowledge is attained also through the exercises of introvert-concentration. He

truly sees who regards as one the intellectual attitude of enumerating

knowledge and the practice of concentration .3

As Zimmer points out, the main conceptions of the Sankhya system

are (1) that the universe is founded on an irresoluble dichotomy of Life

monads (purusa) and matter (Prakrti). (2) that matter (Prakrti) though

fundamentally simple and uncompounded nevertheless exfoliates or manifests

itself, under three distinctly differentiated aspects (the so called gunas) which

are comparable to the three stands of a rope and (3) that every one of the life

monads (Purusa) associated with matter (Prakrti) is involved in the bondage

of an endless round of transmigration (Samsara).4

The Sankhya upholds the theory of Sat Karyavada. Prakrti being the,

primal cause, though unintelligent and Purusa, being the self conscious the

teleological evolution starts, the different gross and subtle evolutes arise in the

process.

3 Bhagvad Gita 5.4.5. 4 Ibid


Qtd in Philosophies of India P 281
H. Zimmer
P 280
( 119)

These ideas do not belong to the original stock of the Vedic Brahman k

tradition. We do not find any mention of pantheon or divinity, beyond tlu

vicissitudes of earthly bondage, as that of the Vedic gods in the has a

teachings of the Sankhya. The Sankhya system along with its allied system tin

yoga related to the mechanical system of the Jainas. The Sankhya System is

therefore, traced back its origin in the Upanisads and in the Bhagvad-Gita.

In the SEnkhya Sutras' written by Kapila and Isvarakrsna's Sankhya

Knrika' we get an exposition of the Sankhya doctrine excluding the refutation-

of the doctrines of other people, and excluding the parables attached to the

original Sankhya works - Sastitantras'astra. Sankhya Sutras contain along with

its refutations of other doctrines a number of parables.

Kapila, was regarded as semi-mythical holy man who stands outside the

traditional assembly of the Vedic saints and sages, as an Enlightened One on


his own right. His miraculous power is recognized in a celebrated episode ot

the Mahabharata.5

Kapila and others also maintain a clear cut dualism between Purusa and

Prakrti. Purusa like Aristotle's God is the "sour, "self, 'the spirit', the

subject', the knower'.

5. Mahabharata 3.107
Qtd. in Philosophies of India Zimmer P. 282
( 120)

It is neither body nor senses nor brain, nor mind (manas) nor ego

(ahaihkara) nor intellect (buddhi). It is not a substance which possesses

consciousness. Consciousness is its essence as Vedantas Maya' is the sakii

of Brahman. On the otherhand. Prakrti is the root cause of the world of


*

objects. All worldly effects are latent in this uncaused cause, it is the first

principle of this universe, it is called Pradhana, as the unmanifested state of all

effects, it is known as Avyakta, as the extremely subtle and imperceptible

thing, it is called Anumana, as the unintelligent and unconscious principle it U

called Jada. In the Sankhya philosophy, the world process is described b\ the

purusa - Prakrti (soul and Nature) instead of God. In Zoroastrianism, like the

dualism of Purusa-Prakrti, we find Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu. These

two warring principles struggle and in their struggle is grounded the drama of

cosmic life and human history. Here, one is the principle of light, justice and

good, and the other is the principle of darkness, injustice and evil. The battle

between these two is decided by the victory of the good. Before the triumph of

light over darkness is complete, the universe and mankind must pass through

endless cycles of exhausting torment and untiring strife.6

6. Religion 7 Culture
Radhakrishnan
P.P. 35, 36
( 121)

In Sankhya philosophy also, the life monad also known as Purusa, man,

atman, self is the living entity concealed behind and within all the

metamorphoses of our life in bondage.

Just in the Jainism, here also the number of life monads (JTvas) in the

universe is supposed to be infinite and their proper nature (Svarupa) is

regarded as totally different from that of the life less matter (Prakrti) in

which they are engulfed. They are termed Spiritual (cit. citi, cetana, caitanya)

and are said to be of the nature of sheer, self effulgent light (prahhasa) . *7

Within each individual, the self luminous purusa, atman or pums illuminates

all the processes of gross and subtle matter - the processes that is to say of

both life and consciousness - as these develop within organism, yet this life

monad itself is without form or content. In its indifference to the supremacy of

an absolute spirit as well as its doctrine of the relation of avidya and the souls

entanglement in samsSra, the SSnkhya reminds us of Buddhism. Under the

influence of the Svabhava-Vada, the capacity to unfold the universe was

transferred completely to Prakrti rendering the idea of Godas superfluous.

Nilakantha8 categorically declared that the doctrine o f Svabhava was that o f

the Sahkhyas; SvabMva iti parinam vadinam Sankhyariam.

7 Philosophies of India '


Zimmer
P. 285
8. Nilkantha on Mahabharata Santiparva 232.21 (ed) Poona
Qtd in Indian Atheism
D P. Chottapadhyaya
P 67
( 122)

Devatnia, in a parallel with the SSnkhya is anxious to abide within the

strict limits of knowledge. He holds that the reality of God cannot be

established by logical proofs. For example, God is said to be all powerful. It

means that there is no other powerful man than God and it limits Gods power

and his power becomes finite. So if God exists, Nature has dependent and

created existence, for if it exists in its right, it limits Gods power. Therefore,

the Sankhya maintains that there is no sensible evidence or inferential

knowledge or scriptural testimony of Isvara or God, Devatma also felt it in the

interest of truth to reject the equivalence of Nature and God and proceeded to

show that Gods existence cannot be established.

In the Sankhya Sutras, it is also mentioned that there is no inferential

proof (of God), because of the want of (universal) relation.9

If there be an inferential proof of God there must be a suitable probans

for it and the invariable precondition for the inference would be the perception

of an invariable relation between that probans and God. But since God is never

perceived, the perception of such an invariable relation between Him and the

probans for His inference is not possible at all. Therefore, it is useless to

imagine that there can be ^ inferential proof for the existence of God.

9
Qtd. In Ind. Atheism
DPC
P - ^ '3
( 123)

The Sankhya philosophers who repudiate the existence of God give the

following arguments - If God is affected by selfish motives, He is not free; if

He is free, He will not create this world of pain and misery. Either God is

unjust and cruel or He is not free and all-powerful. If He is determined by the

Law of Karma, He is not free; if not He is a tyrant. Again, God being pure

knowledge, this material world cannot spring from Him. The effects are

implicitly contained in their cause and the material world, which is subject to

change, requires an unintelligent dd ever-changing cause and not a spiritual

and immutable God. Again, the eternal existence of the Purusas is inconsistent

with God. If they are the parts of God, they must have some divine power. If

they are created by God, they are subject to destruction. Hence there is no

God .10

The external existence of the purusas is inconsistent with the infinity

and creatorship of God. Nevertheless, physical principles of materialism were

elaborated philosophically by Kapila. He is known as an atheist and

maintained that Gods existence cannot be proved by logical evidence. But the

real merit of his philosophy is the recognition of the objective reality of the

physical world.

10 A Critical Survey of Indian Phil


C D. Sharma
P. 165
( 124)

Kapila retorted - The world is not unreal; because there is no fact

contradictory (to its reality), and because it is not the (false) result of dcpra\cd

senses (leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed)*.11

Kapila, visualized existence of a heirarchy, so to say. composed ol

twenty-five realities. In addition to the soul, nature, mind and sel -

consciousness, there are subtle, elements, sense organs and 'gross clement',

He like Hegel conceived Idea expressing itself. Although the process oi

evolution is set on its head, the realities however are derived inducti\el\

from the immediately perceptible gross elements. The existence of the subtle

elements' (Sound, colour, touch, taste and small) is inferred from the gross

elements' which are directly perceptible. The process is traced to the primal

state of nature in which everything lies in a state of inaction.12

Together with the Vaisesika system the SSnkhya philosopln also

reduces the gross elements' to atoms, but Kapila traces a simpler, all

pervading substance the severally existing atoms down to a still simpler all

pervading substance. However, by seeking the ultimate substance beyond the

atoms, Kapila anticipated the most modern conception of substance instead ol

rejecting materialism.

II M at e r i al i sm 12 Ib id
M .N Ro v l>. 89
P. 88
( 125)

To some extent the Slftkhya Philosophy is akin to the Vaisesika philosophy.

Both these schools of thought adhere to the mechanistic view. According to

Slnkhya, nature is not only eternal, but self operative. Thus, Nature is the

Final Cause. Since mind and self-consciousness are placed within the scheme

o f nature, they are included in the materialistic system. Only the soul stands

outside, but like Newtons deux-ex-machina, it is completely unnecessary

for explaining the being and becoming of the world. The existence of nature is

inferred from its perceptible phenomena, these are real, they must have a real

cause. Those ultimate elements are called in the Vaisesika. and Nyaya systems,

atoms.

According to Devatma, the Sahkhya philosophy holds soul or purusa to

be transcendental in character. But the facts that it gives to prove plurality of

souls are purely empirical. They do no have the least tendency to prove the

plurality of souls as transcendental beings. To Devatma, ofcourse souls are

parts of the natural order i.e. empirical in original, character and content.

The fundamental principles of ancient Indian materialism were stated

originally in the Vaisesika system. The dominating position in the intellectual

life o f that period was occupied by the Sahkhya system of Kapila. He being

deviated from the strictly materialistic ground, developed rather a rational-

naturalist system of metaphysics.


( 126)

The SSnkhya as a rational naturalist philosophy developed certain

positive principles which made the admission of god absolutely unnecessary.

Madhava and Vsfcaspati Misra clearly explain this position.

Madhava, in his Sarvadars'ana samgraha1- explained the Sahklna

position of purusa-prakrti in matters of creation. It may be argued I be

unintelligent pradhana, without being guided by a conscious being, cannot

engage itself in producing effects like mahat (i.e. the first evolute o f the

primeral matter) etc. Therefore, there must be a conscious Being to guide it In

this way, the Omniscient supreme God must be assumed.'

But in reply it can be said that there is instance in which we can sec

that something unintelligent without being guided by any conscious being

may engage itself to serve some purpose e.g. the unconscious milk How s lor

the nourishment of the calf, also the unconscious water flows lor the benefit

of the world. Similarly, prakrti, though unconscious, will act for the liberation

of the purusa.

MSdhava fully agreed on two points about Sankhya atheism with

Vataspati Misra. 14

13. Madhava, Sarvadarsana Samgraha (Anand) (ed) 14. Ibid


P. 120 P 81
Qtd. in Indian Atheism
D.P.C
P. 80
( 127)

First, the assumption of God was ontologicaliy irrelevant.

Secondly, it was also logically repulsive.

The Sankhya as a philosophy based on logic and reason developed that

the admission of God in matters of creation is absolutely unnecessary. Both

Madhava and Vaeaspati Misra agreed that the primeval matter, moved by the

laws of motion inherent in it (svabhlva) adequately accounted for the origin of

and development of the world. The self sufficiency of the principle of Prakrit

is followed from the implicit acceptance of the doctrine of Svabhava. Grass

and water taken by the cow, naturally got themselves transformed into milk

that nourishes the calf. So, was the process of the transformation of primeval

matter into the world or the evolution of the world from the primeval matter.

There was no question of any supernatural principle guiding either of the

processes. There was no need of assuming God as the nimitta-Karana of the

world. 15 .

The theists claim that Gods existence was proved by His being the

dispenser of the fruits of actions (Karma-phala - datrtayatat-Siddheh)16.

15. Ibid
P 81
16. V ijn a n a v ik s u
O n S a n k h y a -S u t r a , V . 1
Q td . in Ib id
P .8 9
( 128) -

VijnSnaviksu was more inclined to theistic Sahkhya than to atheistic

Sffnkhya. But in reply, the author of SShkhya-Sntra said The attainment of

the fruits of actions is not due to the superintendence of God, because that is

attained from the action itself. 17

The Sahkhya Philosophers further ask the theists how far the idea of

God could have an inherent logical legitimacy. As D.P. Chottapadhyaya

maintains that they came to the reasoned conclusion that it had none in as

much as the concept was infested with an internal inconsistency.

The theists maintain that on the one hand God had to create the pre

condition for pain and suffering and on the other God is also moved by the

desire to remove pain and suffering. It is the logical in consistency on which

Madhava and Vacaspati Misra agree. But significantly they both were not

sympathetic atheists. Midhava was a devout vedantist, while Vacaspati,

commenting on the Nyaya showed his extraordinary philosophical competence

in defending theism.

Likewise Gaudapada showed in his exposition of Sahkhya Karika that

the Sankhya philosophy without its atheism was necessarily incomplete. He

choose the verse number 61 of Sahkhya Karika for this purpose.

17 Sankhya Sfflrav II
Ibid
P.89
( 129)

He commented against those who viewed the first cause as (iod 01

Isvara- The Sankhya teachers have said - "H ow can things endowed wi l l

gunas proceed from God, who is supposed to be devoid of the Guna-s?

Therefore, it will be an inconsistency to conceive the origin o f the three worlds

endowed with three gunas from Him.

In Indian atheism, the aphorism namely, "Because God is unproved s

one o f the most famous proclamations.

The Nyaya Vaisesika and the Sankhya held that perception is a means

of knowledge, which is due to the contract of senses and therefore essentialK

temporal. The Sankhya Sutra on this point felt obliged to deny God but the

later Naiyayikas never saw any antagonism between those points and then

firm conviction in the existence o f God.

M adhava concludes his account of the Sankhya with the words,

nirisvara-sahkhya Sas'tra-pravartaka - Kapila etc. (Kapila is the founder of

the atheistic Scfnkhya). 19

18. Gaudapada on SSnkhya Karika 61


As Qtd. in Ind. Atheism
D.P.C.
P 77
19. Sarva dar^ana samgraha 121
Qtd. n Ibid

P. 84

v
( 130)

In the fifth chapter of the Sankhya Stltra we find the polemic and

logical refutation of the theistic assumption. In first, third and the sixth

chapters also some kind of refutations are there.

But, Vijhanaviksu, the commentator with a personal theistic bias raised

some doubt about the atheistics aphorism Because God is not

proved,(isvarasiddheh) and not because God does not exist, (isvarabhavat).

He argued that the denial of God was not to be confused with the denial of

the possibility of the theoretical proof for His existence. He in the same spirit

argued that by a careful understanding to the actual wordings of the sutra

showed that it was designed simply to deny the possibility of proving God and

not of proving his non-existence.20

But modem scholars bluntly reject such interpretations and they

maintain that both these expression Because God is unproved and Because

God is not existent are same.

In order Says Garbe, to bridge over the chasm between the Sankhya

system and his own theism (which he is pleased to style Vedantic),

Vijhanaviksu, resorts to the strongest means to do away with one of the

fundamental doctrines of the genuine Sankhya, which is the denial of God 21.

20 Vijnanavikasu Sankhya Sutra 152


Ibid
P. 87
21. Garbe S P B pref. Xii
Qtd In Ibid
PS7
( 131)

-Vijnanaviksu was more inclined to theistic Sankhya than to atheistic

Sankhya. This is proved by his own remarks in his Sahkhya pravacana bhffsya,

Yogavarttika and Vijnanam^ta bhasya (an independents commentary on the

Brahmasutras of Badarayana or theistic Sankhya lines) Vijnanaviksu, agreed

more with the views of the Sankhya doctrine of the Puranas, where both the

diverse purusas and the prakrti are said to be merged in the end in Isvara, by

whose will the creative process again began in the prakrti at the end of each

pralaya. But in SSnkhya-Sntra we get that the Sankhya maintains such a

rational explanation, that it could explain all facts without the intervention of

God or Isvara and Vijnanaviksu could not do away with such atheistic

explanations.

But Vijnanaviksus comments differed a great deal from Vacaspati

Misra. In some grave points Vacaspati remained silent while Vijnanaviksu

gave interpretations. He described the gunas as reals or super subtle

substances, but Vacaspati and Gaudapada (the other commentator) of the

Safikhya Karika remained silent on the point. Before Vijnanviksu, no definite

explanation of the gunas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain and dullness

(sattva, rajas and tamas) was made 22

22 History of Indian Phil. S N Dasgupta,


p.p. 223, 224
( 132)

M. N. Roy2 categorically refers to the atheistic and materialistic views

combatted from Samkara's own work,

Religious doctrines are all meaningless words. Their foundation is the

idea of God whose very existence cannot be proved. The God is the creator,

but he has no origin. If it is admitted that there must be a creator and ruler ol

the world, then there arises the question - who created the creator? Whence

did He come? The creator is said to be without beginning and w ithout end.

without any limit. But after all, he is a creator, which implies a personalitx on

his part. The God is indeed, considered to be the creator. But a person cannot

be without beginning and end and other limits. If the God is limited then, is t

not possible that there may exist a power over and above. Him? The God is

believed to be all powerful and all-pervading. But these attributes of the God

cease to be what they are believed to be, as soon as they are imagined by man

Thus, the essence of the God, the creator, disappears. Then, it is taught that

desire is the cause of creation. From this, it follows that God Himself is not

free from desire.

2 3 . M a te r ia lis m M . N R o y 1 0 5
( 133)

Further, if the universe is created by the will of God, then God Himself must

have the feeling of want, for wish grows out of want. The feeling of want

destroys omnipotence, Omniscience and all other super human attributes

ascribed to God.

Likewise, in another Vedic school of thought i.e. the Mimaftsa school

or better known as the Purva Mfmamsa school, we do not find any mention of

God or Supreme Being in the process of creation just like the SaAkhya.

This school was the outcome of ritualistic side of the Vedic culture just

as the Vedanta (also known as Uttar&MTmarhsa) is the development of the

speculative side. The mimamsa school helps and support ritualism (a) by

giving methodology of interpretation with the help of which the complicated

Vedic injunction regarding rituals may be understood, harmonized and

followed without difficulty and (b) by supplying a philosophical justification

of the beliefs on which ritualism depends.

The Buddhists, Jainas and the CHrvakas challenge the authority of the

Vedas. The reality of the world and the existence of soul are denied by some

Buddhists. Some Upanisads disparage the idea that heaven is the goal of man

and rituals are the best possible human activities. The Mimamsa tries to meet

all such criticisms and upholds the original faith underlying ritualism.
( 134)

Jaimini 24, as the founder of the Mtmamsa school and also author of the

Mfmamsa-Stltra was held high by Badaranya, himself who has his distaste for

the ontology and epistemology of the PtTrva Munamsa.

As a philosophy, the MimamsI' is inconceivable without the Vedas. It

thrives on the Vedas, draws its entire intellectual nourishment from the Vedas

and in its major part, intends to be nothing more than the effort to settle the

principles of textual interpretation for the right understanding of the Vedas.

In Munamsa Philosophy, atheism formed an integral part and many

MTmamsakas energetically argued that any concession to the idea of God

amounted to the surrender of the fundamentals of their philosophy. It became

practically a part of the philosophical commonsense of traditional India to

view atheism as an inseparable feature of the Muriamsaka. Keith in his

Karma Mffnamsa puts it rather mildly, the atheism of the true MfmamSa is

regarded with such unanimity as to render it impossible to explain it away 26.

Interestingly, as mentioned by D.P. Chottapadhyaya, some of the major

logical considerations against the possible existence of God which we come

24 Indian At heism 26 Keit h KM 60


D.P.C Qt d, in I A
P 206 D.P.C.
25. Ibid P.2 0 7
P. 205
( 135)

across in the Mimamsa literature are practically the same as found in the

writings of the Buddhists and the Jainas, though as it is well known from the

point o f view o f Vedic Orthodoxy, the Mimamsakas were the most determined

opponents of the Buddhists and the Jainas. Thus, not withstanding all the

mutual differences between the Buddhists, Jainas and the Mimamsakas, there

could have been some kind of free exchange of ideas among these

philosophers is so far as they all belonged to the some fraternity of the Indian

atheists.27

The earliest extant commentary on the Mimamsa-Sutra is the

Sabarabhasya, the name of the commentator is Sahara.

The greatest Mimamsakas after Sahara were Prabhakara and Kumarila.

Both commented on Sabarabhasya. Apart from his major work called the

Brhati, Prabhakara wrote a smaller work called Laghvi. Kumarilas work

consisted of three parts called the Slaka-vartika, Tantra-vartika and the

Tuptika of which the first is philosophically most significant.

Salikanath28, who lived possibly in the 9th century A.D., in his

Prakaranapaftcika gives a standard exposition of Prabhakaras views.

27 ibid 28. Ibid


P.P 208,209 P 215
( 136 )

Works expounding kumarilay Bhattas view are numerous, the most

prominent authors of the Mimamsa system are Mandana Misra, Partha Sara!In

Misra and Sucarita Misra.

The Mfmamsakas, like the SSnkhya Philosophers believe in the realrt\

of the external world and of the individual souls. They believe in the l aw <!

Karma, in Unseen Power (Apurba), in heaven and hell, in liberation and in the

ultimate authority of the r- Vectaxs.

Verbal Testimony (Veda) proves that yajna should be held as primary

and the mention of the deity secondary. The performance of the ritual act

generates apurva. Apurva literally means not existing before'. It is taken b\

the Mfmamsakas to mean the resultant of any action (Karma) in invisible

stage which it is supposed to assume before producing visible results.

The Mfmamsakas argue that the performance of vajna direct >

generates the apurva and this apurva ultimately leads to the result designed

Sahara rejected God on the ground that there is no proof of I In

existence. However Sahara shows in Vedic deities and also the Mtmamsa

thesis that these were nothing more than the words used in the V e d a -,

29. Qtd. in M am am sa-Sutra ii 1.5 and Sahara on it


I.A.
DP C
P. 243
(137)

But later Mimamsakas accepted Saharas views but later on being confronted

with the attack from the theists they could not stand Saharas rejection of God.

Both Prabhakara and Kumarila with all their mutual differences, elaborately

argued why the assumption of God was completely illogical.

The Mimamsakas give priority to ritual performance i.e. yajna, not the
1 *

devas. Those who desire heaven (in the sense of pleasure) should perform the

Dars'a and Purnamasa, Jyotistama rituals. The Vedas speak of the

instrumentality of the yajna itself and not of the devas in producing the fruit.

This fruit or result is the real purusartha or that which is the aim of man and it

is mans endeavour for the sake of Purusartha and not of the deity.30

But the question arises how the performance of the ritual directly

generates the apurva? Sahara answers that this is proved by verbal testimony

i.e. specifically the Vedas. The knowledge that anything gives fruit i.e. any

inducing agent gives a partieularfruit, arises from verbal testimony and not

from direct perception or any other source of knowledge. 31

The Mfmamsaka philosophers atheism was concerned mainly with the

Nyaya Vaisesikas proof for the existence of God. The later Buddhists and

30 Ibid 31. Ibid


P .P . 2 4 4 , 245 P 244
(138 )

Jainas were also concerned with the refutation of NySya Vaisesikas proof for

the existence of God, theyalleged^creator and moral governor of the world.

Their atheism is extremely technical and scholastic. But the Mimamsakas

were no doubt keen on refuting the Nyya Vais'esikasproof of the existence of

God as their brother atheists were. They felt bothered by a special problem

which was overlooked by other atheist philosophers, particularly Buddhists

and the Jainas. This followed from their attitude to the Vedas. While the

Buddhists and. the Jainas were interested in the Vedas at best negatively i.e.

only in the sense of rejecting their validity - the Mimamsakas were utmost

serious about the authoritativeness of the Vedas. And the Vedas, atleast as

apparently understood, were full of all sorts of gods or devas. They were Agni,

Indra, Mitra, Varuna etc. How then were the Mimamsakas to look at the Vedic

Gods? Were they to reject the ideas of one God in favour of a multitude of

gods? Were they to reject monotheism in favour of polytheism?

Sahara in his commentary on the Mtmamsa-Sutra asks the questions

whether the vedic gods have anything to do with the human lot, with ritual

actions and their results, whether these gods have any real or substantive

existence!
But he came to the conclusion that these gods could have no existence

in the real sense of the term. Sahara, therefore, answered that in the Vedas

these stood for mere sounds or words i.e. the only existence which the Vedic

gods had was purely verbal. The so called gods Mitra, Varuna.etc. were not

divine beings at all. They were mere words instead.

It followed from this that from the Mimamsa point of view there was no

possibility of any interference by these Vedic gods with human lot. They had

nothing to do with the results of human actions. Hence there was no sense in

offering any sacrifice to them deprived as they were of any substantive

existence, these gods could not accept any offering not could they feel pleased

with these.

Prof. Hari Das Bhattacharyya, writes in his article on Indian Ethics in

die book. The cultural Heritage of India Thus, the Mimamsa, Buddhism and

the Jainism together establish firmly the self-sufficiency of the moral law and

lay the basis for classical doctrine of Karma according to which moral action

produced their own fruits without reference to any kind of divine dispensation.

The great difficulty arose out of the logical impossibility of reconciling self

sufficiency of moral law with omnipotence of God. Once the self sufficiency

o f causal law is fully grasped, Gods existence must stand rejected. 32

32 H.D. Bhattacharyya, Head of the Deptt. of Phil. Decea University


Qtd, in Ethics of Devatma
S.P. Kanal P 61
(m

As against the Nyaya Vaisesikasclaim that it was necessary to admit

God as the creator of the world, the Prabhakaras along with the Bhattas argued

that the idea of creation itself was a myth. Experience Prabhakara urges show

us the bodies of all animals being produced by purely natural means, we can

argue hence to the facts of the past and the future, and need invoke no

extraneous aid. 33

Devatma maintains the same process p f creation among the different

existents or beings to every new existent comes into being as the result of the

action of some immutable process of Nature, and again when any existent

grows or evolves gradually, it does so in accordance with the immutable laws

of Nature. By the immutable law o f Nature, he means that the same set of

conditions produce the same effect. He, therefore, to put in the words of B.

Russell says - whatever knowledge is attainable must be attained by

scientific methods and what science cannot discover mankingj!cannot know.

All that knowledge is termed science which is detained through experimental

investigation of the various departments of Nature, keeping facts of Nature


'XA
supreme.

33 Qtd. in Indian Atheism - 34. Ethics of Devatma


D.P.C. S. P Kanai
P 216 P. 137
( 14.1)

Ganganath Jha also observes that Prabhakara denies a creator of the

universe but he admits that the universe is made of components' parts. But he

rejects the view that the universe has had a beginning at any particular point

of time or that it would come to an end at any particular point of time. But in

everyday experience, we see every constituents individually have their

beginnings one after another.

Prabhakara again argues on the NySya VaiSesikas point of super

mundane or Gods interference in the merit and demerit (dharma and adharma)

of the individual souls resulting from their past actions. According to him

dharma and adharma must belong to the same individual to whom itself the

body belongs, it cannot be supervised by any other being howsoever

intelligent he might be. God could have no knowledge of the dharma and

adharma of the being that is bom as man or animal etc, and without such

knowledge, he could not exercise any effective control over it.

But the Nyaya Vaisesika philosophers themselves come to the

conclusion that the relation between God and the destiny (dharma - adharma)

of the individual and without a consistent relation the question of Gods

supervising the destiny is ruled out.


( 142.)

The two relations samyoga and samavaya could not be maintained. Sanm;i

(conjunction) is possible only between the substances but the Nyaya Vaisesika

considers the individual destiny, as a quality hence there could be no relation

of God and the individual destiny. Similarly, samavaya is the relation of

inherence between two substances, hence the inherence of God in the

individual destiny is ruled out.

Like Prabhakara. Kumarila also challenged NyHya Vaisesika,

argument for the existence of God.

He considered that Nyaya Vai/esikas view of God as an efficient

intelligent cause of the world also means Him as the exclusive sole - sufficient

cause of everything or the creator of everything excepting the dharma adharma

of the individuals.

In this sense, the upholder must admit that God existed before the

creation of everything. But what was the time, place and condition of the

universe when God existed before creation, the theists cannot give suitable

reply.

Again, the theists had to admit that the creator either possesses a bod\

or he does not. In both the cases difficulty arises, because if God is without i

body, he cannot have any desire or wish to create the world, and if He is with

a body, he had to face all troublesome questions the answers of w hich are not

satisfactory.
(14 3 )

If God creates the world with a desire the question arises why he should create

a world M l of evils?

Kumirila argued that for the production of something the definite

material^required. What is the material for the production of the world by

God? The theists reply just as the spider could create something without any

external material, God also creates out of nothing. But Kumarila argues Even

the production of the spiders net is not to be viewed as being without any

material basis, the net is produced by the saliva which in its turn, is produced

from the bodies of the insects eaten by the spider.

The theists claim that some amounts of pain or evil were indispensable

for the creation of the world. To this kumarila argues, God being viewed as

omnipotent, some amount of evil was indispensable for creation could not be a

binding on Him. If it is a binding on Him, the theists could not claim Gods

omnipotence.

Kumarila further attacks the theists point of God as an all perfect being.

If God creates the world, what is the purpose behind His creation of this

world? But the theists reply of Gods compassion or pity to create the world

could not do away His omnipotence and omniscience.

35. Indian Atheism


D.P.C
P 223
(m

Badarayana replies that God creates the world out of Sport or Lila. The

kings engage themselves in the act of hunting not to satisfy specific want but

because it is a mere pastime for them. Children fond to play for having the

sheer fun of the game.

Kumarila points - If the activity of the creator were due to a desire for

mere amusement, that would go against His ever contentedness. And (instead

o f affording any amusement) the great amount of work (required for creation)

would be a source of infinite trouble for Him. And His desire to destroy the

world (at the time of Pralaya or Periodic cosmic, dissolution) would be hardly

explicable. 36

Both Kumarila and Prabhakara reject the ideas of creation and

dissolution of the world and accept a constant process of becoming and

passing away. 37

Kumarila, thus pointing to. the internal contradictions involved in the

position of the theists argued that the Vedic passages apparently referring God

and His creation were not to be taken as actual evidences for the existence of

God.

36. ibid 37. Ibid


P.224 P. 234
(1 4 8 )

He maintained the real implication of celtain passages of the Mahabharata and

the Puranas which only are superficially understood or basically

misunderstood. For the Vedantic theists the strongest proofs for the existence

o f God were the scriptural or Vedic declarations in favour of Him. Thus,

refuting the doctrine o f God, which was perhaps originally advanced by

Badarayana in his Brahmasutra, Kumarila rejected Nyaya Vaisesikas view of

God, He argued that Nyaya Vaisesikas conception of Pralaya or universal

dissolution like its theological counterpart creation hardly made any sense.38

Kumarilas anti-theistic polemic was broader than Santaraksita and

Gunaratna. Their refutation was confined to the Nyaya VWesikas inference

of God. But Kumarilas refutation covered three parts. First, the refutation of

the doctrine of God expounded by Badarayana, in the Brahmasutra.

Secondly, the refutation of the Nyaya-Vai^esika view of God and

thirdly, the refutation of the Advaita VedSntic conception of God . 39

Radhakrishnan referring to the absence of God in the Mfmamsa philosophy,

comments, The Locuna of the Purva Mfmamsa was so unsatisfactory that the

latter writers slowly smuggled in God. 40

38. Ibid 39 ibid 4 0 . Ibid


P .2 2 7 P .2 2 0 P 212
( 14 1 )

He mentions in this connection the examples of Vedanta Desika,

Apadeva etc. Of these two, the former produced a strange work called the

Ses'vara MnnamsS-or Mlmamsa with God while latter advanced the thesis -

also strange from the Mimamsa point of view - that during the time of the

universal dissolution (pralaya) the Vedas remained and retained in the memory

of God.

Apadevas theory that God retained the Vedas during the timt, of

pralaya could be advanced only in complete disregard of the older and the

authentic stand point of the MTmamsa philosophy according to which the

conception of pralaya, like that of srsti or creation, was only a figment of the

theists imagination. But Prabhakara and Kumielia totally rejected the

conception of Pralaya and Srsti.

Vivekananda also in his third lecture on Practical Vedanta delivered

in London on 17th November 1896, affirmed that it is better, that mankind

should become atheist by following reason than blindly believing in two

hundred million of gods as the authority of anybody. The glory of man is that

he is a thinking being. Vivekananda so valued reason because he knew that his

people were rolling in superstition due to their ignorant reliance on authority


( 14 ?)

Believing in rationalism, Vivekananda necessarily believed in the

identity of. the individual who must not let himself be submerged by any

authority, priestly or royal. 41

Thus, in short the later tendencies of reconciling the Mimamsa

philosophy with theism amounted only to upsetting the fundamentals of this

philosophy.

4 1 . S w a m i V iv e k a n d a s V e d a n t ic S o c ia lis m -
R . K . D a s G u p ta
P 50
CHAPTER - 4
ATHEISM IN JAINISM
ATHEISM IN JAINISM

The foundation o f Jainism has been attributed by occidental historians

to vardhamana MahlvTra'a contemporary o f the Buddha, who died in 526 B.C.

The Jainism, which has affinities with the Buddhism and with the Sanikhya

does not recognize the validity o f the vedic (Hindu) scriptures and thus is

considered heterodox in the Indian tradition.

The Jainism, as Zimmer1says, is not derived from Brahman Aryan source

but reflects the cosmology and anthropology o f a much older Pre- Aryan upper

class being rooted in the same subsoil o f archaic metaphysical speculation as

Y oga, Sankhya, and Buddhism (the other non-vedic) Indian systems.

The M ula Sutras2 are considered as the original stttras or commandments,

as they are primarily needed to guide the Jaina monks in their religious practices.

By the Orthodox systems, as mentioned in the Prava cancara3the Jainism

is called Nastika. Nastika, according to grammarians is one who does not believe

in the other worlds, and in this sense the Jainas are nastikas. B ut according to

smrtis nastika means one who denies creation by an intelligent agent and also

one w ho denies the authority o f the Vedas. In both these senses, the Jainism is

nastika because it never accepts the theory o f creation and also it does not accept

the authority o f the Vedas.

1. Philosophiesof IndiaH-Zimmer P. 217


2. Gandharva Vada Muniratna Prabha Vijaya P 5
3. Pravacancara i&NUpadhye P 10c14
(98)

But the Jainism does accept a God. and hence the term atheist in its

etymological, sense can not be leveled against Jainism .If atheism means non-

acceptance of a popular God. who creates, protects and4:stroys the world assumed

in many Indian sistems. then Jainism is atheistic .

The Universe according to the Jainas is eternal and uncreated and n

contains two types o f entities - souls or life monads (jivas) and non-living mattei

(ajives or pudgals). The main teachings o f the Jainas are that there is a sharp

distinction between souls and matter that normally souls are implicated through

karma in the painful round o f rein incarnation and that by the practice o f virtue

meditation and great austerity. the ultimate release o f the soul is possible. Jainism

is atheistic but does not deny the existence o f gods as beings inside the cosmos

Henry Z im m er. therefore has called the Jainsm as trans theistic for it regards

the worship o f the gods as spiritually unimportant.

One o f the great figures o f humanity' was MahavTra. He is called \lina

the conqueror. He conquered his own self. He turned his attention from outw ard

nature to the study o f the human self. By a steady process o f austerity, discipline

self purification and under standing who had attained divine status. His example

is an incentive to others to pursue the same ideal o f self-conquest.

In contrast to the Buddha, MahavTra has never declared any nc\'

philosophical principle which he has received through enlightenment. Zimmc

puts. He was not the founder o f a new ascetic community but the reformer o l ' a i i

4 Ibid P xciv
5 Philosophies of India P 182
(9 9 )

old one. H e was not the teacher o f a new doctrine, but is represented as having

gained at the time of his illumination the perfect knowledge o f something which

both he and his community had known before only imperfectly and in part6.

Sruti considers that o f all sciences the science o f die self is the greatest adhyatma

vidya vidyanam; the Upanisad tells us atmanamividhi, knowthey s e lf , Samkara

lays down as an essential condition o f spiritual life atma anatma vastu viveka,

the knowledge o f the distinction between the soul and the non - soul. There is

nothing higher as Radhakrishnan 7 maintains in this world than the possession o f

ones soul.

In MahavTra, we find the example o f a man, who renounced the things o f

the w orld like Buddha, who was not entangled in the bonds o f matter, but who

was able to realize the inward dignity o f his own self. W hat are the ways by

which w e can attain this self realization? O ur scriptures tell us, if w e w ish to

know;! the self, sravana, manana and nididyasana as Vedanta maintains are to be

practiced. The Bhagvad Gita also says, Tad vidhi pranipatena pariprasnena

sevaya8.

The same three great principles w ere asserted by MahavTra, when he

mentioned darsana, jnana, caritra in his teaching.

In the very first sutra o f Tattvarthadahigama su tra, Umasvami 9 states this

cardinal teaching o f Jainism . The path to liberation lies through right faith,

knowledge, and conduct. Samyag- darsana-Jnana- caritrani moksa m argah

6. Ibid P. 224
7. Religion &Culture Radha Krishnan P. 135
8 Srimat Bhagvad Gita Sloka 34 P 134
Qtd in Ibid. P 135
9 Umasvami Tat sut 1 2 3
Qtd in Introduction to Indian Phil. S.C. Chattejee P 105
( 100)

As the Buddhism, has mentioned the three jew els o f the Buddha, the

Dharma and the Sangha, the Jainism also has mentioned these three jew els o f

moral conduct.

According Mahavira, we must have visvasa (faith), Sraddha, that there is

something superior to the things o f this world. M ere faith, blind unthinking

faith w ill not do. We must have manana (reflection). By reflection, w e convert

the product o f faith into a product o f enlightenment. B ut mere theoretical

knowledge is not enough. Vakyartha Jnanamatrena na amrtam - w e cannot get

life eternal by mere textual learning10. We m ust embody these principles in our

own life. Caritra or conduct therefore, is equally essential. We m ust start with

darsana pranipata or sravana. We come to Jnana, manana or pa|uprasna, then we

come to nididhiyasana, seva or caritra. According to the Jainas, these all are

essential in realizing the true self.

The Jaina Tirthankaras er-as mentioned by ZimmerJUhe M akers o f the

River-Crossing who represent the goal o f all human beings, the goal infact of

all living entities in this living universe o f re-incamating monads - are cut o f f

(Kevala) from the provinces o f creation, preservation and destruction, which

are the concerns and spheres o f operation o f the gods.

Although the Jainas maintain the Upanisadic ideal o f self realisation but

w ith certain variations. The Jainism differs from the Hindu and the Buddhist

10 Religion & culture Radha Knshnan P.136


11 Philosophies of India Zimmer P 181
( 101)

views and equated Atman and Jiva, only the Jiva is corrupt. The Jainism teaches

the theory o f Anekantavada or the Indefmiteness o f Being. The permanence o f

existing things are stressed only as regards their substance, hence soul and

body are considered to lee more intimate than m ilk and w ater12. Teaching the

doctrine o f pudgala, material or cosmic particles were thought to have infiltrated

and corrupted the soul. The Sankhya system, in a like manner uses empirical

facts to prove the plurality o f souls as transcendental b ein g s. These plurality

o f selves can be demonstrated by the obvious difference in the birth and death,

and the sensory and motor endowments o f different individuals . It shows

that there are plurality o f selves . Regarding the plurality souls o f Jainas Prof.

Jacobi sa y s , A characteristic dogma o f the Jainas which pervades the whole

philosophical system and code o f morals is the hylozoistic theory that not only

animals and plants but also the smallest particles o f the elements, earth, fire,

w ater and air are endowed with souls (Jiva)13.

According to the Jainas, space which is also infinite is conceived o f as

being in two parts-one (Lokakasa) where movement is possible and the other

(alokakasa) where it is not. W hatever is, is only the former and the latter is
14
empty akasa, an abyss o f nothing , stretching infinitely beyond it. M atter

possesses colour, flavour odour and touch'5,sound being looked upon not as a

quality but as mode o f it ( Pudgala parinama ) . 16

The Jainas and the M imamsakas also agree in holding that Atman is

12. The concept of man D.K Sankeethanany P 392 15. Sparsa-rasa-gandha-varnavantah pudgalah
Qtd. Divyadaan Vol-2 Umasvati Tattvarthadhigama sutra v. 23
13. Prof. Jacobi- Op. cit.Part 1 P xxxm Qtd m Ibid P. 160
Qtd in outlines of Indian Phil. Hirriyana P 160 16 Gunaratna- Op. Cit p.p.69-70
14 Ibid P 160 Qtd in Ibid P 160
( 102)

constituted o f caitanya, and that there is a multitute o f separate souls. Pleasure

and pain come to be experienced because o f karmic association according to

Jainism. B ut M imamsakas simply say that they are changes in the soul staff.

Thus Jainism is realistic and Atman is a substance endowed w ith sentiency as

distinguished from pudgala or matter which is devoid o f sentiency. Jainism does

not accept any idea like the individual souls being drawn back into some higher

soul, Brahman or Isvara17.

The'jainas uphold that karmic matter can be anrihilated by austerities, So

that gradually it can be totally removed from an individual.

We do not have the evidence o f a perm anent se lf w ithin us. W hat

introspection reveals when w e look within is a ceaseless flow o f thoughts,

feelings or desires. W hat is given in introspection is some state o f thinking

feeling or desire. It is wrong interpretation to hold that these changing states

m ust belong to something which itself does not change. This interpretation is

false, for it makes unintelligible.-the facts o f ceaseless change o f states. In

fact, Indian philosophy holds that our M ana or mind is in ceaseless change.

B ut they appeal to an intuition for the evidence o f perm anent transcendental

self is said to be a factor w hich accounts for the empirical w orld o f change.

But for Devatma, the naturalist o f the nineteenth century, what ever exists

is in ceaseless change therefore according to him if to be is to change, there

canot be a noumenal world o f changeless beings, God, souls, Brahman or Atman.

17 Pravacancara A N. Upadhye P. Lxx


( 103)

Buddhas anattavada is also the removal o f the soul from the noumenal world and

make it part o f empirical world. Devatma in affirming the universal law o f change,

denies substantial being to God or soul. There is no God, for there can be no

changeless being.

The Jainism, like the Budhism, establishes the self-sufficiency o f the

moral law and lay the basis for classical doctrine o f karma, according to which

moral action produced their our fruits w ithout reference to any kind o f divine

dispensation.

Hermann Jacobi concludes, It is clear that Brahmanieal speculations

are concerned w ith being as given in common experience 18.

A ccording to Jaina cosmology, the universe is a living organism, made

animate throughout by life monads which circulate through its limbs and spheres

and this organism will never die. We, ourselves i.e. the lifemonads contained

w ithin and constituting the very substance o f the imperishable great body are

imperishable too. We ascend and descend through various states o f being now

human, now divine, now animal, The bodies seem to die and to be bom , but the

chain is continuous, the transformations are endless, and all w e do have passed

form one state to the next19. Leibnitz, in his Monadology, similarly states, the

monad has no windows through which anything pass in or out, but in its action it

is dependent only on God and on its e lf. To have clear and distinct perceptions

only is the prerogative o f God. Leibnitz calls the active principle form, the

18. Jacobi 7:467


Qtd in The concept of Man D.K. Sankethamony P. 393
19. Philosophies of India H. Zimmer PP. 227,228
( 104)

passive matter, and makes the monad, since it is not like God. purus actus and

pure form consist o f both form and matter.

In regard to the dependence o f the world on God. there is certain conflict

noticeable in Leibnitz's monads; conflict between the metaphysical interests

involved in the substantiality o f individual beings together with the moral interests

and the opposing interests o f religion. On the one hand, creation for him is an

actualization o f finished, unchangeable possibilities and on the other hand he

teaches with the mediaeval philosophers that it was not accomplished by a single

act o f realization, the world is in a continuous creation. Jainism, represents a

scientific, practically atheistic, interpretation o f existence. For the gods are

nothing but life monads, wearing temporarily favourable masks, as Zimmer

points in supremely fortunate surroundings, where as the material univ erse L

uncreated and everlasting. The universe is composed o f six constitutes such as

Jiva, Ajiva, Dharma, Adhanna. Kala, and Pudgala.

Jainas interpretation o f matter and spirit has some points o f similarity

with the Sankhya as they both believe in the eternity o f matter and the perpetuus

o f the world. The Sankhya derives the development o f the material world ant;

living beings from the principles o f purusa and prakriti. The Jainas trace then

all to primeval nature. The Jaina conception o f the activity o f the soul has more

in common with the Nyaya Vaisesika.

20. Ibid. P.P. 270-271


( 1 0 5 )

InJainism, noattempt is madetosynthesise JivaandPudgala. spirit and


matter, subject andobject intoahigher unity. Thetheoryofrelativitycan not be
logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute Jainismoffers us an
empirical classificationofthings inthe universeandsoargues for aplurality ot
spirits. Jainismlooks upon the universe as filled with Jivas, even as I.eibnii/
thought that the world was filled with monads. There is affinity of Jainas
metaphysical schemewithLeibnitzsmonadismandBergsonscreativeevolution
InSamkara'sviewalsowehavethedoctrineofthepluralityofJivas onl\
so long as we treat the subject as an object which can be scrutinized. If \u
followthe implicationsofthought anddisentanglethesubject fromembodimen
in sensation and feeling, free it fromcontact with the object, we shall see tha:
there is onlyone subject inreality. The selfparticipated inactions, and yet die
not become involved inthe processes and consequences. It was all pervading
andyet unentangled.
TheJainism, andthe Sankhyaassignedapassiveroletoself. It describes
the selfnot as the force and substance ofthe cosmos but as the indivisual life
monand. Therewas nounique, all inclusive, divineBeingemanatingenergy and
substance fromatranscendental abyss, abyss. All actions belonged tothe \\ orld
ofmatter(ajivaprakriti). Eachlifemonads (ajTva,purusa)wasanindividual entity
a solitary stranger, dwelling inthewhirlpool ofcosmic matter1.

21. Ibid P.412


( 106)

A peculiar feature o f the Jaina theory is its doctrine that there are souls

even in inorganic objects, like metals and stones. The condition o f a soul depends

on the condition o f its body. Devatma, also shows compassion not only for

animals but also the feeling o f care even for inanimate things. It is no wonder

like the Jainas, that he made it a part o f the religion for his disciples to realize

their deep dependence on and inseparable relation with the inanimate w orld to

protect, preserve w hat was beautiful in it. In Jainas view, in an inorganic body

the souls consciousness remains dormant, while it ju st stirs in the organic body;

consciousness active in human beings.

Throughout the entire Jaina view o f the souls getting entangled in the not

souls and seeking to get disentangled from these, there was absolutely no place

for any God or Isvara. The development o f the world is rendered possible by the

doctrine o f the indefiniteness o f being and interaction o f substances. God, is

not necessary for creation or destruction. The substances by their interaction

produce new sets o f qualities. It is quite contrary to Carvaka view. The Jainas

repudiate the theory o f creation o f the world out o f nothing or a series o f

accidents, W hen the Jainas confronted w ith the theistic assumption, or the

doctrine o f G od (Isvara-vada), they felt obliged to declare clearly and

categorically against it. Hence, the Jainas were committed atheists orjisVara-

22 Indian Atheism D.P Chottapadhyaya P. 163


( 107)

Haribhadra was a prolific Jaina writer who wrote Sadadarsana Saniucca> a

belonged to the eight century A.D. Gunaratna, who was an acute logician of the

fifteenth century wrote commentary on Harbhadras text known as Tarkarahas\ a

dipika23. He was interested in refuting the Nyaya Vaisesika's proofs for tin.

existence o f God. In the whole of Indian history, we come across only two majoi

philosophies with a distinct bias for theism. These were the Vedanta and tin

later Nyaya Vaisesikas Vedanta was basically satisfied with the scriptura

declarations in favour o f the existence o f God and therefore was not mud

bothered by any need o f logically proving the existence of God. To the Vedanm

philosophers the scriptures were absolutely beyond the scope o f any possible

doubt. But in contrast, the Nyaya Vaisesikas were firm followers of logic am

therefore when they felt the need o f admitting God. they could not reman

satisfied with anything short of a formal proof for His existence. Therefore

they were the only philosophers in India to have insisted on a formal proof fot

the existence of God.

Gunaratna2 4 in a similar manner with Santaraksita refutes the Nya\ a

Vaisesikas inference of God. He first scrutinizes the Nyaya Vaisesika's inference

of God and then refutes these proofs.

Nyaya Vaisesikas maintain that Gods existence can be proved h\

inference. The inference is as follows -

Earth, jar etc. are caused by an intelligent agent, because there are of the

mature o f being effects, as for instance the jar.___________________________


23. Ibid P. 163 The other Jaina work famous for its polemic against the doctrine of God is 'Syadvadamanjari
24 Ibid P.P. 167-169
( 108 )

In order to prove the probans, because these (earth etc.) are o f the nature

o f being effects", suffer from no logical defect, the Nyaya Vaisesikas analyse

the following points -

Firstly, it is not an unproved (asiddha) one, because it can be definitely

proved that earth etc are actually o f the nature o f being effects, and hence it

must have an efficient cause. This intelligent agent or cause is God. The order,

design, co-ordination between different phenomena comes from God (kar\ a t).

Secondly, it cannot be objected that the probans o f the (original) inference is

contradictoy (viruddha). Thus, for example, the probans o f the inference ' sound

is eternal*, because it is 'produced* is contradictory* in as much as being

produced is flatly opposed to being eternal. But such contradiction is not

found in the probans ofN yaya Vaisesikas inference o f an intelligent cause ('1

earth etc. Thirdly, it is not possible to object that, the probans under consideration

is irregular (anaikantika or Savyabhicara). On the one hand, the presence ol

the probans is connected with the presence o f the probandum, while on the other

hand, the absence o f the probans is definitely connected with the absence o f the

probandum. Lastly, it cannot be objected that the probans under consideration is

negated by another and more powerful instrument o f valid knowledge (Kulatita

or Vadhita), in as much as neither perception nor scriptural authority goes against

it.

Gunaratna, advances his refutations against Nyaya Vaisesikas inference

o f God25. He presupposes four possible alternatives to the question - What is


25. Ibid P.178
( 109)

meant by earth etc. "being effects?" These are -

( i) Being composed o f parts

(ii) (ii)The inherence (sam avaya)ofthe being (satta) o f the previously non

existing effects like the earth etc. in their required causes.

(iii) Being the object o f the knowledge in the form "It is p ro d u ced '

(iv) Being characterized by transformation.

In each case, G unaratna show s the futility o f all the possible

interpretations o f the Nyaya Vaisesikas probans for the inference o f God. lu

concludes that it is nothing more than a pseudo-probans26.

Again, God is said to be without body or form. How can He then w o rk >i

matter to produce the world?

Like the existence o f God, the qualities o f omnipotence, unit), eternin

and perfection generally attributed to Him are also doubtful. If God is omnipotent

He should be supposed to be the cause o f all things. But this is not true as w <.

come across various objects like houses, pots etc. are not created by God. Again,

if He is eternally Perfect Being, then also it does not sound good. Because

perfection is the negation o f imperfection and it is meaningless to call a person

perfect who was never imperfect. Did God or didn't He exist in some form

prior to the making o f the world? If it is said that it all depends on the inscrutable

will o f God, we should put and end to all science and philosophy. Water can burn

and fire cool if that be the will o f God.

26. Ibid P. 182.


( 1 1 0 )

Gods are only according to the Jainas embodied souls like men and

animals, different from them in degree but not in kind27. Although the Jainas

reject God as the creator o f the world, they think it necessary to meditate or

and worship the liberated perfect souls (Siddhas). The liberated souls possessing

the God like perfections take the place o f God. Prayers are offered to them loi

guidance and inspiration. The offering o f prayers to five kinds o f pure so u f

(panca paramesti)28also forms a part o f the daily routine o f the devout Jainas

The liberated souls serve only as beacon lights. Realisation o f one's true sel

and not devotion to Tirthankaras is the way to freedom. We. conscious living-

souls. find ourselves bound to Karmic matter and the end o f our life is to remov i

this Karmic dress and regain our intrinsic nature. Hence Jainism also lift.

Buddhism aims at an ethical teaching and its aim is the perfection o f soul. Jainisn.

is a theological mean between Brahmanism and early Buddhism 2 . Brahmanisn i

emphasises the one, the permanent, the real and early Buddhism emphasizes tlu

many.the changing, the unreal. Jainism points out that both are the two sides o*

the same thing. Substance has its unchanging essence and therefore is permanent.

But it also has its changing modes and therefore it is subject to origination and

decay. Jainas take into account all the partial views; therefore it is called

Anekantavada. Jsainas epistemological and logical theory known as 'Syadvada

goes hand in hand with Anekantavada. They are like two sides o f the same com

The m etaphysical side that reality has innum erable characters is called

2 7 A n I n t r o d u c tio n to In d ia n P h ilo s o p h y S .C .C h a tte r je e P 110.

2 8 . T h e s e a re T h e A rh a ts , T h e S id d h a s , T h e A c a ry a s ,

T h e U p a d h y a y s , T h e s a d h u s V id e D ra v y a S a m g ra h a P. 4 9

2 9 . H o p k in s R e lig io n s o f In d ia P .2 8 3

Q t d . in O u t l i n e s o f In d P h il. H ir r iy a n a P. 1 5 5
(Ill)

Anekantavada. Jainas epistemological and logical side that we can know onl\

some aspects o f reality and that therefore all our judgem ents are necessarih

relative, is called Syadvada.

Jainism has rightly points out that all our knowledge is necessarily relati\ e.

conditional and partial. All human knowledge is empirical, therefore relatix e

The Buddhist doctrine of Dependent Origination, Shunyavada, Vijnanavada and

Advaita Vedanta have also maintained the necessary relative character o f om

empirical knowledge. But while they all agree in maintaining a distinction

between empirical and absolute, phenomenal and noumenal. Samvrti and

paramartha, the Jainas bluntly refused any such distinction50. But according n

the Jainas right belief is constituted by a clear comprehension from the reai

point o f view o f the nature o f the following categories - Jiva (soul), Aj iva (non

soul). Punya (virtue), papa (vice), Asrava (in flow o f karmas) Samvara (stoppage

o f karmas) Nirjara (shedding o f karmas) bandha (bondage) and Moksha

(emancipation).

Bhutadatthenathigada jivajivaya punnapavam cha

A savasamvaranijjara bandhomokkho ya sam m attam ''.

Therefore, Jainas theory o f Anekantavada and Syadvada had to face seven

criticism from its opponents. The Jainas take relative views ^ a b s o lu te while

all other teachings are relatively real, the Jaina teaching is held to be absolutely

real. This goes against the Jaina doctrine itself. If relatively is the only truth

how can the Jaina teaching be absolutely true? Jaina's acceptance o f Kevalajnana

30. A Critical Survey of Ind. phil.C.D. Sharma P.56


31. Samanya Sara (The nature of the self) chap.1 Sri Kundakundacarya P.23
( 112)

is also a halfhearted confession o f absolutism inspite o f its Syadvada, 1he

knowledge o f Kevalajnana is pure, full, perfect, direct and intuitive omniscience

This is certainly an admission o f absolutism32.

Though the Jainas rejected explicitly distinction between empirical anti

transcendental yet they have by implication always admitted it. The distinction

is vital and it is maintained in some form or other by many o f the great

philosophers o f the world. It is opinion and truth in Parmenides, the world and

the form o f Socrates, the sense and the idea o f Plato, the matter and the mover

o f Aristotle, the phenomenal and the noumenal o f kant.the Apara Vidya and

Paravidya o f the Upanisads, the Samvrti and paramartha o f Sunyavada. the

Vyavahara and Paramartha o f Vedanta are some instances. In Jainism, thn

distinction appears as the distinction between the indirect (paroksa) and tIn

direct (aparoksa), knowledge (perceptual knowledge which is ordinarialy regarded

as direct is here called indirect) between Syadvada and Kevalajnana. betw een

Paryaya and Dravya33.

Jainism, like Buddhism is intensely spiritual and ethical. It like Buddhism,

believes in the transmigration o f soul and law o f Karma. Like Vedanta. Sahkhy.i

and Buddhism, it holds ignorance to be the real cause o f bondage and ignorance

can be removed only by right knowledge. Karma is the link which unites the

soul to the body. Ignorance o f truth and four passions anger (krodha)greed (lobha >

pride (mana) and delusion (maya) which are called Kasaya or sticky substances

32. A critical survey of Ind. Phil. C D. Sharma P. 59


33. Ibid P. 59
34. Tot. Sut 8.9 Qtd in Intro, to Ind. Phil. S. C. Chatterjee P. 102
( 113 )

where Karmic particles stick, attract the flow o f karmic matter towards the soul

I f through proper self discipline all karma is worked out and there arises the

full blaze o f omniscience in the Jiva, it becomes free. A free liberated soul in

Jainism is called a Siddha or the perfected'. In Buddhism, it is called an arhant

What Vedanta puts negatively. Jainism puts positively, the former links nescience

with misery' and the latter omniscience with eternal bliss, the Vedanta annihilates

nescience by submerging the individual into the universal while Jainism sa> s

that the individual itself becomes universal, still each retaining its separate

individuality, with this omniscient bliss, when stripped o f its karmas. 1lie

omniscience is possessed by Jaina prophets like Mahavtra and b> all liberated

souls 6.

Every Jaina has to take five vows - not to kill anything (A him sa). not to

lie (Satya) not to take what is not given (A steya), to pressure chastitv

(Brahmacharya) and to renounce pleasure in external things (A parigraha). But

the most important o f all is the vow o f ahimsa, the vow o f non violence, o f non

injury to living beings. Some Jainas even renounce agriculture for it tears up the

soil and crushes insects. In this world it is not possible to abstain from v iolenc e

altogether. As in the BhSgavata Purana 1.13.46, it is said Jiva Jivasya Jivanam-

Life is the food o f life37. Sikhism also favours highly o f ahiriisa but it has not

stretched it like the Jainas. The Jainas accepted the caste system and some ol

their teachings are the same as those o f the Brahmanical religion. But the>

35. Outlines of Ind. phil. Hirriyana P. 168.


36. Pravacancra Kundkundacrya A. N. upadhye. P. Lxxi
37 Religion and Culture Radha Krishnan P. 137
( 114)

rejected the Vedas, forbade sacrifices and prohibited the killing o f living beings.

Their spirit was similar to that o f Buddhism. M. K. Gandhi, shares the same

faith in non-violence and the pow er o f love. In his words there is no other way

o f apprehending God than the way o f love. God is present in everyone o f us and

thereby a gradual process o f extending love we can love everybody and thereby

God himself. This kind o f love demands a kind o f self - sacrifice - a sacrifice

o f the egoistic and selfish ways for the love, and the good o f others. For Gandhi

Truth is G od. To him, God is a matter o f inner realization and faith. Jainism

also brings down God to the level o f man. It looks upon man him self as God

w hen his inherent powers are fully in blossom. God is only another w ord for the

soul at its best. Jainism, therefore can be called atheistic. To Jainism, karma, by

itself w ithout the intervention o f any divine pow er is adequate to explain the

w hole o f experience and thus im press on the individual his com plete
38
responsibility for w hat he does .

Jainism more than any other creed gives absolute religious independence

and freedom to man.

It is basical ly^religi on which promotes human beings w ith the qualities

o f tolerance and appreciation o f others point o f view.

38. Outlines of Ind phil. Hirriyana P. 171


CHAPTER - 2
LOKAYATA S APPROACH TO ATHEISM
CHAPTER - 3
ATHEISM IN EARLY BUDDHISM
ATHEISM IN EARLY BUDDHISM

Buddhism flourished in the sixth century B.C. and grew up together

with the Brahmanical systems. From the writings of eminent scholar, it is

established that the original teachings of the Buddha were, to a large extent

directly inspired by the Slnkhya views. D. P. Chottapadhyaya writes - In the

Buddha, carita by A^vaghosa, we get full-length bio-graphics of the Buddha.

There are many evidences on the strength of which it is confidently claimed

that his teachings, greatly inspired by Kapila. It will be a great blunder if we

overlook the similarity between the Sankhya and the Buddhism. In rejecting

God, Buddha was no less deliberate and categorical than the Slnkhya system.

As the Sankhya school developed much earlier than Buddhism, it can be said

with strong presumption that at least for his atheism, the Buddha was directly

indebted to the Slfikhya, although he differs from Kapila in his main interest. 1

The four features of the Sankhya school as mentioned by H. Zimmer

appeared in Buddhism as well - an insistence that all life is, necessarily,

suffering; an indifference to theism and to Vedic sacrificial ritualism; a

denunciation of ascetic extravagances (as represented e.g. in Jainism) and a

1. Indian Atheism,
D P. Chottapadhyya,
P.9 5
(71)

belief in Parinama-nityatva, the constant becoming of the world .2

The oldest school of Hinayaha Buddhism is the Sthaviravada

(Theravada in Pali) or the doctrine of the Elders. This school probably

represents the basic. Original teachings of the Buddha, although with a good

deal o f Scholastic elaboration. The Sarvastivadins are divided into two classes

such as Vaibhasikas and Sautrantikas.

The Theravadin scriptures are written in Pali. They are divided into

three sections or baskets, (Tipitaka in Sanskrit Tripitaka) Sutta (discourses)

Vinaya(Rules of conduct) and AbhidhSmma (Analysis of Doctrine) .3

Buddha as the founder of Buddhism, was known as Gautama,

Siddhartha in his early life. He is known as Buddha, the Enlightened one,

after he got historic enlightenment, The Buddha means the wise.

Buddha, however as a philosopher totally discarded metaphysical

questions such as the questions - Is the soul existent or not? Is it real or

not? Does the soul survive after death? And hence forth to him, these

questions are futile and if we bother about these metaphysical questions, we

are not less fool than that man, whose heart pierced by a poisonous arrow and

who instead of taking it out whiles away his time on idle speculation about

2. BrahmajalasuttSTnta (Dighanikaya 1.30 34) translated by T,W. Rhys Davids 'Sacred Books of the
Buddhists'
Qtd. in H. Zimmer - Philosophies of India,
P 331.
3. Ency of Phil. Vol I,
P 419
(72)

the origin, the size, the metal, the maker and the shooter of the arrow .4

Buddhas main teachings are centred round with the practical questions

of life. Therefore, individuals are described by the Buddha as having three

characteristics-suffering (duhkha), anatta or absence of an eternal self, and

anicca or impermanence.

Buddha was an ethical teacher with a practical and realistic view of the

life. He was interested in arriving at a rational view of really and in

determining the nature of the ultimate cause of the world Buddha saw

suffering everywhere and in everything. He established his Four Noble Truths;

Eight fold Paths for the cessation of misery. Avidya (ignorance) which is the

root cause of suffering; is the wrong belief in Atman, and Prajna (wisdom)

consists in eradication of this belief. To him God was only an illusion; there

was no proof for his existence. He was not only the discoverer to Truth but

also its revealer to mankind. He shared with men the truth, which he had

attained. He rigorously eshchewed all theoretical considerations as vain, as

they are not conducive to the spiritual life.

iThe anatta or no-self doctrine implies both that living beings have no

eternal souls and that there is no cosmic self. The Buddha indeed did not

believe in a creator and seems to have found the existence of evil and suffering

4. Majjhima NikSya I 63
Qtd in Critical Survey of Indian Phil. Chandradhar Sarma,
P. 70
(73)

to be an insuperable obstacle to such a belief. In regard to persons, the Buddha

analyzed them as a series of mental and physical states. The concept of an

underlying self is superfluous and erroneous. This is in line with the doctrine

of impermanence, which implies that all entities whatsoever can be .analysed

as a series of transitory states. Briefly, then the Buddhas teaching amounts to

a recasting of the atheistic tradition in early Indian thought, as exemplified

contemporaneously in Jainism .5

To the Vaibhasikas, a thing exists in all the three points of time - past

present and future though its modes undergo changes every moment. But to

the Sautantrikas, a thing exists only in the present - neither in the past nor in

the future - and is momentary - it is replaced by a completely different

phenomenon at every succeeding moment.6

Radha Krishnan observes - the difference between Buddha and the

Upanisads and declares thaA f there is a difference between the teachings of

the Upanisads and the Buddha, it is not in their views of the world experience

(Samsara) but in regard to their conception of reality (nirvana) .7

Again RadhaKrishnan observes that both the Buddha and the Upanisads

have the same problem. Phenomenal existence is imperfection

5. Encyclopaedia of Phil. Vol. I, 7. The Central Phil. Of Buddhism


P .4 1 7 T. R V. Murti,
6. I.P. Vol. I P P. 19-20
Radhakrishnan
P.P. 616,619
(74)

and pain. Both agree in the point of placing before us the ideal of a state

beyond all possibility of pain and bondage. The Upanisads speak it more

positively as a State of consciousness and bliss (Vijhanam anandam brahma).

But the Buddha emphasizes the negative aspect of it. Nirvana is the

annihilation of sorrow.8

The greatest Mahayana philosopher Asvaghosa in his Buddha Carita

writes about Buddhas arguments against belief in God. Buddha argues if there

is an Omnipotent, all good God, there can be no evil in the world. If God is

all-good and all movements of things and actions of men are His actions, so

they are also good. But quite contrastingly, we see sufferings, evils, in and

around us, so there can be no all good God. Buddha argues against Brahman

too. If Brahman is beyond all relation of things, then his existence cannot be

established by any reasoning. The whole universe is a system of relations.

Bradley also justifies this view. How can that which depends on nothing and is

related to nothing, produces things which are related to one another and

depend for their existence on one another. According to Buddha, human

reason is the final, indeed the only arbiter of what can be rationally believed.

In order to be rational, beliefs must be based on good evidence. So a belief is

rational if and only if it either is a foundational belief that i s properly basic or

else is a non-foundational belief that is based on or supported by a properly

8 Ibid
P 18
( 75 )

basic belief. A basic belief, therefore for Aquinas, is properly basic if it is

either self evident (that is to understand it is to see that it is true) or else

evident with respect to the senses (that it is something that we know direct!>

through the senses). For modem philosophers like Descartes, Hume a belief is

properly basic if it is either self evident or incorrigible. An incorrigible belie)

is a belief about which the believer cannot possibly be mistaken like I am

now in pain' or I miwseem to be seeing a green apple or. But that belief in ( r o d

cannot be properly basic because it is neither self-evident with respect to the

senses, nor incorrigible9.

Buddha, therefore quite convincing rejects an omnipotent, all powerful

God as he holds reason and experience to be the source and test of a true

belief. A belief is true if it satisfies the laws of logic and is verified b>

experience. On this point, Buddha discourages his disciples on metaphysical

questions. The confusion arises as Geden says, The inference however, that lie-

intended to imply personal disbelief in the supernatural and in the existence >l

a God, and to urge or enjoin this upon his disciplines is certainly mistaken

The position which it was his purpose to adopt was neither atheistic, nor in the

strict sense of the term, agnostic.

9. God Reason and Theistio Proofs T. Davis


p.p. 80, 81
(76)

But for his hearers it was immaterial whether the reply was in the affirmative

or negative, and speculation on the subject was discouraged or forbidden, lest

it should impair or destroy that firm spirit of self reliance.

While it was his object to arouse in their hearts He simply refuses to

communicate to his disciples knowledge which he judges to be needless for

practical life, and the consideration of which would only minister to a harmful

curiosity anxious to speculate on matters beyond human Ken . 10 Buddha mostly

tried to make his disciples concentrate on the practical problems of the

extinction of suffering. He formulates minimum theoretical basis for his

practical programme and this theoretical basis was completely indifferent to

the possible existence of God. It proves that the Buddha himself preferred to

follow the foot stepps of Kapila and looked at the concept of God as at best a

fiction. (It is contrary to what Geden imagines) . *11

Again and we find in Poussins remark, Buddhas indifference to a first

principle or God. if Pousin putsit, Buddhism in so far as it is a philosophic

system, is radically averse to the idea of a Supreme Being - of a God, in the

Western sense of the word. 12

10. Geden in E.R.E.VI 270 12 Ibid


As quoted in Indian Atheism P 100
D.P. Chattopadhyaya, P. 99
11. Ibid
P 99
( 77 )

Stcherbatsky puts it that the Upanisadic Speculation may in a sense lx

regarded as having prepared the way for the peculiar-teaching of Buddha, and

Buddha Simply carried to their logical conclusions, tendencies which ui

discover already in the Upanisad.1" Thus, the whole tenor of the earh

Upanisads is against belief in a Personal God.

Buddha dismisses that conception altogether. Again, the self r

negatively conceived as devoid of all attributes', nirguna in the IJpanisacK

Buddha, eliminates the conception of self altogether. There are other points >t

resemblance between the two, but the belief in the Karma doctrine found m

Buddhism serves as the clearest proof of its connection with Upanisadic

thought.14

S.R. Goyal presumes that Buddhism borrowed the pantheon >t

Brahmanism. Not only the demi-gods such as the Yakshas. Gandhanas

Kinnars and Nagas aare common to both, the old Vedic gods India and

Brahma were also worshipped by the Buddhists. In Buddhism. AvaloKitesxam

is called Mahesvara (an epithet of Siva) and Manjusri is often called

Kumarabhuta (Kumara Karttikeya).

13. Central Conception of Buddhism T. Stcherbatsky


P.68
14 Ibid
P. 69
(78 )

The Tantrika, pantheon of Both the religious is almost identical,Tara, Kali,

Chamunda, Sarasvati, Varahe, Hariti Mahakala, Ganesa etc. were

worshipped by both . 15

But Buddha, as we find agreed with the earlier Upanisadie thinkers in

criticizing the Vedic animal sacrifices, priest craft and worship of natural

deities. Like the Upanisadie thinkers he emphasized the Superiority of inner

awakening over external ceremonies and stressed the operation of Law of

Karma, moral retribution and rebirth. He did no condemn the whole Sruti, but

only that part of it, which enjoins sacrifices. Kapila also rejected

sacrifices,prayers and ceremonies as much as Buddha did.

Buddha concentrated his main fire against the Upanisadie idealism and

not on materialism. Most of the immediate disciples of Buddha like Sariputta

and Moggalana, belonged to the realistic school of the Vaibhasikas, which was

very near to materialism.

Law of Karma is a part of the beliefs of Buddhism. But Buddhas

concept of Karma also differs from the Upanisadie philosophers. The

Upanisadie Philosophers used Karma in the sense of religions rituals or

performance, which would purify persons from the effects of their evil deeds.

15. A History of Indian Buddhism S. R. Goyal


p. 273
(79)

Buddha vehemently condemned religious rituals and said men must

suffer for the things he did in this world itself. One cannot escape the

consequences of ones actions by performing religious rites. Thus, Buddha

used the word Karma in a sense just opposite to the Upanisads. The plurality

o f transmigrating eternal selves controlled by Karma is replaced by a plurality

o f impermanent individuals. Buddhism, transformed the notion of Karma by

holding that motives, rather than the acts themselves are what count and that

Karma needs craving (tanha) as a necessary condition for its effectiveness. For

the Hindu theologian, Samkara, the power of Karma depends on ignorance, so

that the contemplative knowledge that the self is the sole reality brings

liberation from the continuing effects of Karma.16

The whole teachings of the Buddha is based in the Doctrine of Pratitya

Samutpada or Dependent Origination. It implies that whenever the cause is

present, the affect arises. It is contained in the Second Noble Truth i.e. There

is cause of suffering and the Third Noble Truth i.e. there as cessation of

suffering. Suffering is samsara, cessation of suffering is nirvana. Both are only

two aspects of the same reality. Pratitya Samutpada, viewed from the point of

view of relativity is Samsara, and viewed from the point of view of reality, it

is nirvana.

16. Ency. of Phil. Vol. 4,


P.325
( 80)

The salistamba sutra says - whosoever sees the Pratitya samutpada

sees the Buddha, and whosoever sees the Buddha sees the Dharma (Truth of

Reality) . 17

The Hindu affirms that man can realize his identity with Brahman, the

ground of all beings, the Buddhist say that man can live in a transfigured

world where samsara and nirvana are one.

Sara Sutta18 gives a description of Nibbana in the following words -

The stream ceases to flow where water earth and air function not, there the

whirlpool whirs not, there itself both mind and matter come to final

cessation. Buddhas teaching strikes a mean between two extreme courses

e.g. Believing neither in Being nor in Non-Being, but in becoming. He

believes neither in chance nor in necessity exclusively but in conditioning

happening. He upholds the middle path between materialism and spiritualism.

Buddha said - There are two extremes, Omonk, from which he who leads a

religious life must abstain. What are those two extremes? One is a life of

pleasure, devoted to desire and enjoyment that is base, ignoble, unspiritual,

unworthy and unreal.

17 He who sees the Paticcasumppada sees the Dharm ma and he who sees the Dharm ma, sees
the paticcasumppada' Dialogues II
P 44
Qtd. in the C entral Phil. O f Buddhism T .R V Murty
P 7
18. S ara Sutta 31 .27 33
Sam yukta Nikaya I.P. X II
( 81)

The other is a life o f mortification; it is gloomy, unworthy, unreal. The


perfect one, O monks, is removed from both these extremes and has
discovered the way which lies between them, the middle way, which
enlightens the eyes, enlightens the mind, which leads to rest, to knowledge, to
enlightenment, to Nirvana .19
In Vajira Sutta, Bhikkuni Vajira expounds the philosophy o f substance

less ness in the famous stanza - As the Chariot is known depending on the
different parts o f it, so a being is known depending on the five aggregates'

Again in Milindapanho we find that the venerable Nagasena said

Just as the Chariot on account o f its having all these things - the pole, the

: * 1 axle, the wheels, the spokes, the tram

work, the yoke and the goad - comes under the generally understood symbol

the designation in common use o f Chariot similarly Soul o r ' individualii>

or being or personality is only a generally understood symbol, tin


K i-. c{ kri , d C . VC ' O f pC * ;rV, AwO V
designation in common use, for the five involved in the matter .21

19. Oldenberg Opcit. P. 127,


Qtd. in Critical Survey of Indian Phil.
M. Hirriyana
P. 151
20. Vajira Sutta 5.10.10,
Samyukta Nikaya I,
P. XIV
21 Milindapanho - ii, l.l Qtd. In Critical Survey of Indian Phil. C.D. Sharma
p .^ ? e
(82)

NirvSna, the cardinal principle of Buddhism contradicted the entire


i
system of Buddhist philosophy. Sam karacharyya himself pointed out that

contradiction. Nor can the atoms and skandhas - sensation, knowledge,

feeling, verbal knowledge and impression be assumed to enter on activity on

their own account, for that would imply their never ceasing to be active 22

The ideal of nirvana is the cessation of all activity.

According to Buddhistic mechanistic view of nature atoms and their

aggregates are auto-active. Therefore, M.N. Roy puts it that as

Samkaracharyya pointed out their activity can never cease and the material

world is eternal.23

Therefore, no school of Buddhist Philosophy admits the existence of

any extra-natural or metaphysical intelligence such as God or Soul which

might bring about the first aggregation of atoms, Therefore, atomic

combination must be visualized as a mechanical process out o f which the so

called internal that is the intelligent part of existence arises.24

Therefore, for the solution of the question of life, Buddha found that

belief in God was useless since the existence of God, as the spiritual cause of

the universe can be established only upon the assumption of the

22 M a t e ri a l i sm M . N . R o y
P .9 8
23 Ibid
P .9 8
24. Ibid
P 98
(83)

extra-materiality of human consciousness, the rejection of the doctrine of soul

necessarily lead to the denial of God. 25


.also
To Devatma All the entities which exist in Nature as its constituent

parts, whether animate or inanimate are composed of only two kinds of things.

One of them is called the Matter and the other is termed as the force. Both

these things form the substance out of which the whole Nature and all its

constituent parts are made. Therefore he asserts three,propositions - (1)

Matter exists; (2) Force exists and (3) Matter and Force are inseparable from

each other. 26

Devatmas view can be justified from the modem conception of matter

in Physics. The interchangeability of matter and force affirms the existence of

matter rather than deny it. To say, that something of a piece of matter can be

changed into force is to assert that matter exists, and again to say that force

become matter is to assert that force exists. So^say that they are

interchangeable is to affirm their inseparability. 27

In Abhidamma Kosa, the Vaibhasikas says, matter is the collective

organism, consisting of the fourfold substrata of colour, small, taste and

contact. The minutest form of mpa is paramanu.

, 25 Materialism M. N. Roy
P.97
26. The Ethics of Devatma
S. P Kanal
P. 49
27 Ibid
P 54
(84)

It is indivisible and yet it is not permanent. It is like a momentary flash into

being. 28

Matter and motion are inseparable. It would not be incorrect to say that

the vaibhasika concept of matter and change comes nearest to the modem

concept. Stcherbatsky is of opinion that the main approach of such a

Buddhlistic system lies in reducing all psychic process to purely physical ones,

negating the independent existence o f the sowl and affirming that the so called

soul is simply one of the properties of organized matter. Stcherbatsky says -

The universal elements of matter are manifested in their actions or functions.


IJQ

They are consequently more energies than substances.

Vaibhasika strongly repudiates God because His existence - is flatly

contradicted by solid facts established by clear observation. .These facts are,

first, the coming of the effect to being is necessarily presupposed by some

form o f strict succession. Secondly, the effect is conditioned by space and

time.

God is supposed to be the Omniscient and Omnipotent creator of the

world. This means that He is the exclusive and self sufficient cause of

everything in the world.

28 Buddhism-M arxist Approach


R, Sankrrtyayan
P 46
29. Ibid
P.4 6
( 85)

Having these qualities, God could not maintain this precarious conditions >(

cause effect relation.

Again, the Naiyayikas and other theists maintain that every cl k\

presupposes some conscious agent, and that the world being an effect, point <

some conscious agent or God. They, as a superintending agent o f the mown

Law o f the world, accept the presence o f God. Naiyayikas believe God to be ,

perfect, ever blissful, benevolent and eternal.

Buddhists and other reply to these proofs in a logical manner n

Buddha carita and Tattva Samgraha it is well exposed. It is shown in tin.

following way -

(1) It is true that an effect implies a cause, but it does not necessarily impl\

that it should be a conscious being. The unconscious seed develops i

to germ, the germ into a title and so on without the aid o f any conscious

principle. In the same way, the world 'pro?ets can go without tin

guidance o f any intelligent or conscious cause. ,0

(2) God, is regarded as the uncaused cause. But it is not tenable, since am

event is invariably conditioned by another cause and son on th.n

something is a cause but is itself not caused is self contradictor\

30 B.C , IP. Radha Krishnan Vol.l


P.p. 455, 457
( 86)

It can therefore, be asked from what cause has God come into being? 31

(3) God is regarded as all perfect, benevolent, whereas the world is full of

evils and imperfections. How could a perfect being.create such a world

full of evils and imperfections? If all the evils and imperfections found

in the world be the work of God, then He Himself must be endowed

with these qualities and accordingly, could never be perfect. If God, is

benevolent also, why he created the world full of pains and sufferings?

The Bhutidatta Jataka, thus asks as to why God does not make all men

happy and why He does not bring order into the world?

If it is admitted that men experience joys and sorrows according to their

own deeds, then the law of karma will have to be regarded as the

supreme principle, and God will have no role to play.32

(4) It may be asked whether God acts with or without some purpose. If He

has some purpose, He is not perfect, because purpose means the wish to

fulfil some desire or want, which cannot be there in a perfect being.

31 Ibid
P .4 5 6
32. Ibid
P. 456 & Sarva Siddhanta Sara Samgraha I.P, Vol I p.p. 4 56,458
(87)

If he acts without any purpose, He must be a lunatic or fool, since a being

who creates such a vast world without any purpose must be very

unintelligent,33

(5) If God, be the agent or cause of everything, men will have no freedom

o f will. Thus, in Anguttara Nikaya, it is said by Buddha, Some ascetics

and Brahmins hold whatever comes to men happiness or suffering or

neither all is caused by the will of the creator (issara-nimmana). But I

(Buddha) say, to so then because of the will of their creator and God,

human beings become murderers, thieves, unchaste, liars, slanders,

malicious and heretical. If we believe in a creator or God, then we lack

the free will to do what is to be done and also refrain from doing what

is not to be done.34

(6) The Nyaya Vaisesikas hold that the four kinds of atoms, as also other

substances like aklsa, space, self etc. are eternal. These substances

cannot, therefore, be said to be created by God. How can, then God, be

the creator of all?

The Naiyayikas hold that just as there is an intelligent agent i.e. a

potter, for the production a jar, so there must be an intelligent creator

for things like trees, mountains etc.

33. B C. I.P. Vol f p 456


34. Sarva Siddhanta Sara Samgraha I. P. Vol. 1, P. 458
AN. Vol I -H I , 6 1 - 3
(88)

But Santark Sita and Kamalasila argue that this argument of Naiyayikas

is untenable, because trees, mountains etc. are so different in nature

from a jug that the same principle cannot be applied to both the cases35.

(7) Even if, for the arguments sake, it is accepted that there is an

intelligent agent behind the phenomena like trees, hills etc., it is

groundless to accept only one Omniscient creator of all these

phenomena.36

(8) It is said that God creates, maintains and destroys the world in

accordance with the good and bad deeds of beings. If be so, God cannot

be regarded as independent.37

Buddha refutes the Omnipotent God, from pragmatic point of view

also. For the cessation of suffering in life one should not take refuge in God,

but by strict adherence to disciplined, ethical life. A belief in God has no

practical value, it does not help us in moral progress. It is Karma and not God,

that can destroy our sufferings.

Buddha is of opinion that the belief in God will make men illogical,

inactive and irresponsible.

35. A. K II 64
T.S. Isvara Parika 61
Ibd 158
36. T.S. Isvara Parika 73, 92
Ibid 158,161
37. Purusa Parika
Ibid 158,161
(89)

If God is regarded as the sole cause of the universe, men will throw all the

burdens one him and will not rely on their own efforts. But Buddha does not

want that man should be dependent on something outside, himself rather he

wants to make man master of his own fate.

In the Abhidamakosha, Vasubandhu says, The assumption that God is

the cause of the world o%is based on a false belief in an eternal self (atman).

This belief is realized to be untenable as soon as it is recognized

thateverything is permanent and therefore): subject to suffering.38

But it is commonly believed that there is as an abiding substance called

soul (Atman) in man, which persists through changes that overcome the body,

exists before birth and after death, and migrates from one body to another.

Buddha, throughout his life, abandons the question of such a soul. But the

question may be put, how does then. Buddha explain the continuity of a

person through different births or even through different births or even

through the different states of childhood, youth and old age? Though denying

the continuity of an identical substance in man, Buddha does not deny the

continuity of the stream of successive states that compose his life. Life is an

unbroken series of states, each of these states depends on the condition just

preceding and gives rise to the one just succeeding it.

38 A. K 58
ibid 161
(90)

The continuity of the life series is therefore, based on a causal connection

running through the different states, The conception of a soul is thus replaced

by that of an unbroken stream of consciousness as mentioned by William

James also. The present state of consciousness inherits its characters from

previous ones, the past in a way continues in the present, through its effect.

Memory thus becomes explicable even without a soul. He, therefore,

repeatedly exhorts his disciples to give up the false view about the self.

Buddha points out that who suffers from the illusion of the self, does not know

its nature clearly, still he strongly protests that he loves the soul, because he

wants to make the soul happy aad-by obtaining salvation,

Hinduism and Buddhism also, describe the broad features of human

life, the pervasiveness of suffering in a way not wholly alien to the doctrine of

the Existentialists. The world is subject to time, historicity, change. Life is

haunted by death, beauty by decay. Nothing abides, everything passes away.

As a remedy of this malady, the Upanisads provide the prayer,'Lead me from

the unreal to the real, from darkness to light, from death to immortality .39

Buddhas view is also similar to this. He says each one has to pass

through this world full of the futility of our achievements the restlessness of

temporal life, its confusions and contradictions, its ultimate nothingness,

39 Religion & Culture Radha Knshnan


P.99
( 91 )

in order to fulfill himself and recognise at the depth of all struggles the lastin

peace Nirvana, Sakkyaditti (Substance view) is avidya (ignorance) pa

excellence, and from it proceed all passions. Denial of Satkaya (atman u

Substance) is the very pivot of the Buddhist metaphysics and doctrine a

salvation. 40

Buddha replaced the soul by the theory of a mind continuum. b\

series of psychical states rigorously conditioned as to their nature h\ tm

causal law governing them (dharma - sanketa). According to him this alom

provides for progress (change, efficacy) and continuity (responsibility) as cacl

succeeding state (good or bad) is the result of the previous state. I hus n

avoids the futility of Karma which is an inescapable predicament of t k

acceptance of the permanent soul on the one hand and nihilism or material ivu

which follows from the non - acceptance of continuity on the other.

Buddha's view of mind is similar to the modern western view of 1lum.

According to him mind is ceaseless flow of thoughts, feelings or d e s ir ^ 11

It is scientifically justified also that for the existence of force, change ^

undeniable and change is inexplicable without force. To exist is to change, ami

40. The central Phil, of Buddhism


T. R V. Murty
P 17
41 The Ethics of Devatma
S. P. Kanal
P. 78
(92)

to change is to imply force. Leibnitz opines - Not only is a body at rest the

present movement of its motion in a place commensurate to it, but it has also a

conation or effort to change its place, so that the succeeding state follows on

itself from the present state by the force of Nature, otherwise in the present

and also in any moment a body which is in motion would differ in no way

from a body which is at rest 42

Bryan de Krester writes The Buddhist believes that the tragedy of

mans existence is life itself. Man is only a bundle of transient emotions and

sensations, tossed to and fro, on a surging and suffering sea of becoming. The

Christian believes that life, contrastingly as a gift of God, is good and

meaningful. But man, by his act of defiance against God has brought tragedy

into human life.43 Since the existence of God, as the spiritual cause of the

universe, can be established only upon the assumption of the extra-materiality

of human consciousness, the rejection of the doctrine of soul necessarily leads

to the denial of God. God cannot be reached except through the doctrine of

soul. Therefore, Buddhas philosophy is known as eAn-atta Vada (No-soul-

theory).

42. Ibid
P.5 2
43 De Krester Man in Buddhism & Christianity 64-65
Qtd. In D.K Sankethamonee's The concept of Man
Published in Divyadaan Vol. 2
(93)

An unchanging eternal soul, as impervious to change would render spiritual

life, lose all meaning, we would in that case, be neither the better nor the

worse for our efforts. The atman is the not cause of all attachment, desire,

aversion and pain. When we take anything as a self (substantial and

permanent), we become attached to it and dislike other things that are

opposed to it.

Buddha, according to Mrs. Rhys Davids44 did not deny the soul or self

outright but only that body, the sense organs etc. were the self. The words

body is not the self mind is not the self, cannot rationally be said to imply

that there is no self or soul or real man. Buddhism never denied the existence

of a personality, or a soul, in the empirical sense, it only maintained that it was

not the ultimate reality (not adharma) whereas Kant defines reality as a trinity

of ideas God self and the world. Vedanta reduces it to two and finally to one in

terms of the famous formula Brahman is real, the world is illusory and the

self is the same as Brahman and no other. The world is eliminated and God,

identified as the self. In Vedic conception true self is identical with Absolute

(Brahman).

44. Th e Central Phil. O f Buddhism


T . R V . Murti
P .2 1
(94 )

Buddha denies soul and hence the theory o f transmigration o f souls. But

does life end after death? What about the good and bad deeds committed by

man in this life? What about the concept o f process?

This apparent contradiction is solved by modem dialectics by realizing

that life in general is endless and the good and evil deeds o f man are

remembered by his successors. The individual body and mind vanish but his

contribution to society lives and becomes past o f the eternal human process.

There were no doubt fierce disputations between the Brahmanical and

Buddhist philosophers. But we cannot agree to the vi ew that Buddhism in

ancient India was not a part o f the larger Hindu tradition and that there was

something like a separate Buddhist, culture. Buddhism was an o f f short o f the

Sramana tradition which was certainly non-Vedic, but it was one o f the two

main strands o f our religious tradition, the various facts o f which collectively

produced the comply fabric o f Hindu civilization.45

The dialogues o f Buddha as preserved in the Pali Canons, are

suggestive; t hey are as little systematic as the U p an i sad jt ^ eT s , 7^ 3^

f I Buddhists systems grew out o f them much in the way the Brahmanical

systems grew out o f the Upanisads. According to T. R. V. Murty,

45. A history of Indian Buddhism


S. R. Goyal
P 270
m

Buddhism is treated as deviations rather than as radical departure from the

Upanisadic tradition (atmavada)46.

Radhakrishnan47 also maintains that the Upanisads subordinate the

sacrificial piety to the spiritual religion which they formulate, but they did not

attack in the way in which the Buddha did. The Buddhas main object was to

bring about a reformation in the religions practices and a return to the basic

principles. All those who adhere to the essential frame work of the Hindu

religion and attempt to bring it into conformity with the voice of awakened

conscience are treated as avataras. The Buddha was accepted as an avatara,

who reclaimed Hindus from sanguinary, rites and erroneous practices and

purified their religion of the numerous abuses which had crept into it. Our

Puranas describe the Buddha as the ninth avatara of Visnu. The Buddha

utilized the Hindu inheritance to correct some of its expressions. He came to

fulfill not to destroy. The goal of world unity is to be achieved by Ahimsa

which is insisted on by Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. From this pointed

of view the Buddhistic endeavour comes nearest to modem humanists world

view.

46. The Central Phil O f Buddhism


T R. V . Murty
P. 14
47. Religion & Culture
Radha Krishnan P. 130
(96)
Inspired by the Puranika religion, the Mahayaha theology propounded

the doctine of the eternal Buddha, which was not distinguishable from the

absolute Brahman of the Upanisads.

The cult of bodhisattvas, who make it the mission of their life to bring

solace to suffering mankind and to elevate their moral and spiritual

equipment^ Exercised a powerful influence upon the popular mind. It

represented a positive reaction against the extreme pessimism and other

worldliness of the early exponents of Buddhism. The emergence of Mahayana

led to the creation of poetry, drama, philosophy and an exalted code of

selfless ethics. Instead of seeking private and personal salvation, people came

to value the service of fellow beings to the surer and better path to higher life.

(Humanism) It added to the necessity of knowledge,, the necessity of purity, of

courtesy of uprightness, of peace and of a universal love, fqr reaching grown

great and beyond measure. 48

In the words of L.M. Joshi - Buddhism constituted the dominant

stand of Indian Culture. He also maintained that the Hindus worship the

Buddha because their religion is largely based on the teachings of the

Buddha49.

48. Lectures on some points in the history of Indian Buddhism


T. S Rhys. Davids
P 28
49 L. M Joshi: Studies p 330
Qtd. In A History of Indian Buddhism
S. R Goyal
P. 270
LOKAYATAS A P P R O A C H TO A T H E IS M

The school o f Carvaka, otherwise known as the Lokayata DarSana was

know n to the students o f Indian Philosophy as a Purva Paksa in alm ost all the

systems. The references o f the Lokayata or the Carvaka darsana are found in the

Epics and in the Early Buddhistic literature.

Lokayata is explained by Wilson1 as the system o f atheistical philosophy

taught by Carvaka. Petersburg Dictionary 2 explains it as Materialism. The word

used for m aterialism is also called Lokayatam ata i.e. the view o f common

people. L oka means the common world. Lokayata means lokesu-ayato

i.e. accepted and supported inlarge by the com m on people. They exert

themselves about it, strive about it through the pleasure they take in discussion,

for living beings donot stir-up their hearts to right doing by reason. The lokayata

is a text book o f the vitandas (sophists) Lokayatam, Vuccati vitandavada

sattham3.

Lokayata is however mentioned in various books o f the fourteenth

century. In the M ilinda also, the word is used for twice. In the Brahmajala sutta,

Pitakas refer to famous saying tarn jivam tam sariram (for instance in M ahali

and Jalia Suttas)4.

Samkaracharyya also used the word Lokayata in his Brahm asutra for

several times. H e uses it in the same sense as the view o f those w ho look upon

1 T W . Rhys Davids on Lokayata . 2 Ibid,


Quoted m Carvaka/Lokayata P-369
P-369, 3 Ibid
Edited by D. P. Chattopadhyaya P-371.
4. ibid
P-370.
(4 6 )

the soul as identical w ith the body, as existing only so long as the body exists,

not continuing, after death, in a new condition and separate from the body5.

B ut there is no evidence o f anyone throughout all writings w ho called

him self a Lokayatika, or his own knowledge lokayata.

The Lokayatas Claim that the cause o f the world is svabhava as commented

by Bhatta Utpala6 in the commentary o f the Brhat Samhita. From svabhava, arises

the variegated world and because o f svabhava it is eventually destroyed.

SvabhSvad eva jagad vicitram ut padyate.

Sabhavato vilayam yati.

N o original w ork o f this Lokayata or Carvaka school is know n except a

much later work, Tattvopaplavasim ha o f Jayarasl Bhatta published by the

Oriental Institute o f Boroda in 1940.

We find verses attributed to the Carvaka and the name o f Brhaspati as the

founder o f the Lokayata school, more familiarly known as the Carvaka Darsana

in the works ofSastravarta Samuccaya, the Sadadarsana samuccaya o f Haribhadra

Suri (AD 700-70), and the Sarvadarsana samgraha o f Madhavacarya (fourteenth

century A.D.).

There are various view points also as to the origin, o f the Lokayata or

carvaka school.

Brhaspati, a heretical teacher is regarded as the traditional founder o f

this school. Sometimes this Brhaspati is equated with the teacher o f the gods

5 Ibid
P370
6 Cf Bhatta Utpala - Brhat Sam hiti (1.7) Quoted in Gopinath Kabiraj Lokayata & Doctrine of Svabhava'.
1 Carvaka/Lokayata. Edited DPC
P 449
(47)

who propagated materialism among the asuras so that they might be ruined.

Carvaka, after whose name this school is so called, is said to be the chief disciple

o f Brhaspati. According to another view, Carvaka is the name of the founder of ^

this school. According to still another view, the word Carvaka is not a proper

name but a common name given to a materialist, and it signifies a person who

believes in eat, drink and be merry (the root charv) means to eat, or a person

who eats up his own words or who eats up all moral and ethical considerations

or a person who is sweet tongued (Charu-vak) and therefore whose doctrine is

superficially attractive7.

Brhaspati, the traditional founder of this school is regarded as the founder

of materialism. This view is based on the facts -

(a) That some Vedic hymns ascribed by tradition to Brhaspati, son of

Loka, are marked by a spirit of revolt and free thinking,

(b) That Mahabharata and elsewhere materialistic views are put in the

mouth of Brhaspati and

(c) That about a dozen sutras and verses are found quoted or referred
g
to by different authors as the materialistic teaching of Brhaspati.

In the first chapter of Sarvadar&ma Samgraha, MHdhavacarya wrote

Carvaka darcana as a system of philosophy, which believed neither in god nor in

future existence. We can cite some of the passages containing atheistical and

satirical remarks. These are similar to the same tenor, which occurs in the Visnu

7 A critical st udy of Indian Philosophy, C. D. Sarm a 8 An Int roduction t o Ind. Phil.


P 40 SCCh a t t a r j e e & D M .Dut t a
P5 6
(4 8 )

PurHna and in the Ramayana.

1. The passage from Sarvadar&na Samgraha is as follows - All this

has been uttered by Brhaspati as well - There is no heaven, no

final liberation, no soul (which continues to exist) in another

world, nor any ceremonies of castes or orders which are productive

of future reward.

2. The Agnihotra sacrifice, the three Vedas, the mendicants triple

staff (tridanda), and the practice of smearing oneself with ashes,

are only means of livelihood ordained by the creator for men who

have neither understanding nor energy.

3. If (it be true that) an animal slaughtered at the Jyotistoma sacrifice

is (in consequence) exalted to heaven, why does the worshipper

not immolate his own father ?

4. If a sraddha (offering of food to the manes) satiates even defunct

creatures it is quite superfluous to furnish people who are setting

out upon a journey with any provisions (as their friends to remain

behind can offer food to them).

5. Since (as you say) persons in heaven are filled with oblations

presented upon earth why is food not similarly offered (by those

below) to people on the roof of the house?


(49 )

6. While a man lives, let him live merrily, let him borrow money,

and swallow clarified butter how can a body return to earth after

it has been reduced to ashes? Yavajjfbet sukham jtbet mamkrtva

ghritam pibet paraloka gatam punaragamanam kutah?

7. If a man goes to another world when he quits his body, why does

affection for his kindred not impel him to come back?

8. Hence ceremonies for the dead are a mere means of livelihood

devised by the Brahmins, and nothing else.

9. The three composers of the Vedas were buffoons, rogoues and

goblins, everyone has heard of jarpharT, turpharTand other such

(non-sensical) exclamations of the pandits.

10. It is well known that in an asvamedha (horse sacrifice) the

embraces of the horse must be received by the queen, and it is in

like manner, also well known what other sorts of things are to be

grasped by those buffoons. In the same way, the eating of flesh is

prescribed by those goblins9.

In Visnu Purana, similar verses are quoted which are identical with

above passage.

In the passage of the Ramayana, the Brahmin Javali endeavours

ineffectually to shake the resolution of Rama, who was unwilling to deviate

from the arrangements made by his late father Da/aratha and return from the

9 Qtd in J Muirs
Carvaka/Lokayata Edt by DPC,
P 352
( 50)

forests of the south to Ayodhya to take possession of the throne offered to him

by his dutiful brother Bharata. In his speech Javali tried to incite Rama in the

following way:

1. Anyone who feels attachment to any persons such as his father

and mother is to be regarded as insane since no one is anything to

any other.

2. You, most excellent ofmen, ought not by abandoning your paternal

kingdom, to enter upon a wrong road painful, uneven and beset

with troubles.

3. Da^aratha (his father) is now nothing to you, nor you to him, that

king (was) one person and you (are) another, do, therefore, as I

advise.

4. If an oblation eaten here by one (really) passes into the body of

another, then let a sraddha be offered to a man who is traveling

abroad he need not eat upon his j oumey.

5. These books composed by wisemen containing such precepts as

worship, bestow, offer sacrifice, practice austerities are mere

charms to draw forth gifts.

6. Accept this great kingdom, which is free from rivals and enemies.

Even RSma, when he had heard these discourse although slow to

wrath, was greatly incensed at being exhorted to atheism10.

10. RSmayana Ayudhya kSnda Section 108 Ed Schfegel


Carvaka/ Lokayata Edt. by DPC,
355e3S$
p.P.
(5 1 )

We can cite many more instances and examples o f Carvakas atheism

which are developed through the different vedic and other religious literary

works. As for example there are lofty examples in M anus Institutes eg. ii, II, it

is mentioned whatever Brahmin addicting him self to rationalistic writings (hetu

-sastra), shall despise these two sources o f (Knowledge, the J>ruti and the Smrti)

is to be cast out by good m en as a nihilist and reviler o f the Veda xii, 9 5,96.

A ll religious systems (smrtis) which stand apart from the Vedas, and all

heretical opinions whatever, are unprofitable in the next world, for they are

founded on darkness. W hatever books separate from the Vedas, spring up and

disappear, are worthless and false due to their recentness o f date.

In the Rg Veda viii, 89,3.4, reference is made to some free thinkers who

had doubted the existence o f Indra.

In the Nirukta, YSska refers to an older author named Kautsa, w ho had

spoken o f the hymns o f the Veda as often being unmeaningful or contradictory11.

(original sansk. Texts, ii 180 bb).

But no well known text on Lokayata has come down to us. So the principal

tenets o f this school can be restored only on the basis o f the Lokayatam ata that

is to be found in the POrvapaksa o f many Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophical

works.

In the long list o f various sorts o f hermits given in the Harsa carita, the

Lokayatikas come among others who would be classed by Vedahtists as heretics.

H Ibid
p.p 3 6 8 ,3 6 2.
(52)

The w ord lokayata was used in about 500 B.C. in a complimentary w ay as the

name o f a branch o f Brahmin learning and probably meant N ature Lore - wise

saying, riddles, rhymes and theories handed down by tradition as to cosmogony,

the elements, the stars the weather, scraps o f astronomy, o f elementary physics,

even o f anatomy, and knowledge o f the nature o f precious stones and o f birds

and beasts and plants. Even before the Christian era masters o f the dark sayings,

the mysteries o f such mundane lore, w ere m arked w ith sophists and casuists12.

In the fourteenth century, the great theologian Sayana M adhava in his

longish chapter ascribes to the Lokayatikas the m ost extreme forms o f the let-

us-eat and drink for tomorrow w e die view o f life, o f Pyrrhonism in philosophy,

and o f atheism in theology13.

Kautilya, in the fourth century B.C. speaks o f the LokSyatikas only once

in his work, but the connection in which he speaks o f them seems to indicate

that they had a system like that o f the Sankhya Yoga.

In the second century B.C., Patanjali speaks o f the Lokayatas and o f

Bhaguri as their Varttika or supporter14.

In the second century A.D. VatsaySna in his KHmas'astra, quotes a number

o f L oklyata sutras and refutes them. These sutras relate to the desirability or

otherwise the study o f Pharm asastra. The To|cayata, w ho believes neither in

Dharma nor in adharma says -

1. Religious rites should not be practise^,

______ 2. Because their fruition depends upon the future.


12 D Rhys Lokayata Edt by DPC, , ' 13. Ibid '
P 374 ; R 375

14 H P Sastri Qtd m Lokayata/Carvaka Edt by DPC,


P 379
( 53 )

3. And is doubtful.

4. Who, unless he is a fool, gives away what belongs to him to others?

5. A pigeon today is better than a peacock tomorrow.

6. A sure kaudi is better than a doubtful goldcoin. So says the

Lokayata.

These six seems to be genuine aphorisms from the Lokayata sutras15.

In the eighth century, Haribhadra Suri, the voluminous writer o f the Jainas,

writes six verses in his saddarsana samuccaya noting the fact that the Lokayatas

regard earthly enjoyment as the highest aim o f human life. But his commentator

Gunaratna gives us a quotation from Vacaspati, which may be synonymous with

Brhaspati. Prthivyaptejovayuriti tattvani tatsamudaye sanravisayendriyasamjhas


# * * *

tebhyascaitanyam16. Earth, water, fire and air are the four elements and out o f

these combinations body, sense organs and consciousness arise.

From the statements o f the commentator Gunaratna, it appears that there

were Lokayatikas even in his time, the end o f the fifteenth century A.D., that

they were given to eating and drinking, that they indulged in all sorts o f sensual

excesses, that they w ere KSpalikas, besmeared w ith dust and they w ere Yogins

belonging to all casfes.

In a w ork entitled to Sarva siddhanta sara sam graha attributed to

Samkarlcaryya in the early part o f the ninth century, it is stated that BSrhaspatya,

A rhata and Buddhism are non-Vedic systems o f philosophy. The well known

15 Carvaka/Lokayata Qtd in IbidH PSastn


P 379
16 Ibid
P 379
(54 )

verse agnihotram trayo Vedah etc. Samkara attributes to Brhaspati and he says

that the Lokayatas do not believe in the blessings o f the future existence, but

only in such blessings as agriculture, commerce, dairy farming and dandaniti,

which produce tangible results in this world. This is w hat Kautilya also says

about the followers o f Brhaspati, the author o f an ancient Artha&astra before

him, w ho according to him, believed only in varta (Economics) and dandamti

(coercion)17.

In an another work entitled Sarvadarsanasamuccaya the writer includes

the slokas on the Lokayatikas as found in H aribhadras work. From this it is

possible to recount a history o f the system from the seventh century B .C. to the

present day. Here it was written as - The Lokayatikas do not believe in'Kvara or

in a future existence. Virtue and vice they have none. They believe in the present

and not in the past nor in the future. They are positivists. They have few doctrines

to defend but many to assail, and in the matter o f assailing they are bold, direct

and exceedingly sarcastic. Here are some o f their sarcastic arguments -

1. Those who take a dip under the water o f the Ganges with a view to

rise up to heaven seen to be no better than sheep, w ho in order to

advance for a fight in front, always retrace their steps.

2. I f the animal immolated in a sacrifice goes to heaven, why does

the sacrifice not kill his father and send him to heaven?18

17. Ibid P 18 Ibid P


P. 380-3SH P 380-381.
( 55 )

Recently Dr. F. W. Thomas has published a work entitled Brhaspati Sutra,

which has been eagerly studied by all scholars interested in Indian history, thought

and society. Brhaspati is said to have been propounder o f the doctrine o f the

Lokayatikas. The Brhaspati sutras give us the most important piece of information

as regards the Lokayatika's close connection with the Kapalikas. It says, for the

production o f wealth Lokayata is the sastra for kama or earthly enjoyments.

Kapalika is the sastra. But the Brhaspati sutras tell us that the Kapalikas are an

ancient sect, at least as ancient the Lokayatas. Brhaspati considers them to he

distinct sects, but Gunaratna identifies the Kapalikas with the Lokavatikas

Nodoubt Brhaspati sutra gives the idea that there are more Kapalikas bent on

Kamasadhanathan Buddhists19.

Again, the original school o f Brhaspati meant vitanda or casuistn

and nothing else20. In it vitanda was essential. It was in its original stage. withou>

any constructive element and without any positive theory to propound. It \\a>

negative and destructive. It is recorded in Tattvapaplava simha, written by Jayarasi

Bhatta. This negative aspect o f the doctrine finds expression in the Vedas

themselves. The Vedic hymns pointedly refer to scoffers and unbelievers. I hose

hymns which are traditionally ascribed to Brhaspati, son o f Loka. contains tin.

first germs o f protest against a mere verbal study o f the Veda and emphatically

declare that a man who tries to understand the Veda is far superior to a mere

sacerdotal priest. It is written that the Manduka hymns is a panegyric o f frogs

19 ibid
p.p 381 - 383
20 D R Sastri : A Short History of Indian Materialism. Sensationalism and Hedonism
Qtd in C'arvaka/I.okavata
P. 400
(56 )

who are described as raising their voices together at the commencement o f the

rains like Brahmin pupils rapeating the lessons o f their teachers, and this

celebrated hymns on frogs is a satire, so declares M ax M uller21 upon the priest

hood. Yaska clearly tells us that those w ho merely memorize the texts w ithout

knowing the meaning, do not see the real form o f the Veda. In the Chandogya

Upanisad, it is stated that a performace accompanied by knowledge, produces a

better result than a perform ance w ithout knowledge. Jaimini, in his Purva

MImamsa system, devotes an entire chapter to drawing the conclusion that study

consists not only in learning by heart the letter o f the Vedas but also in clearly

understanding its spirit. So long under the designation o f Barhaspatya, it admitted

no authority other than its own. In its seconc^stage, in explanation o f the origin
/' "

o f an event or product it accepted the doctrine o f svabhava. This doctrine o f

svabhava maintains that the effects are self existent and are produced neither

by different things as causes nor by themselves, in as m uch as no cause can be

found for the filament o f the lotus or the eye like marks on the pea-cocks tails.

I f it cannot be found, it certainly does not exist22.

We can draw five essential features ofLokayata or CarvSka dar^ana. There

a re -

-A. Bhutavada - That is m atter is the only reality. These ate earth,

water, fire and air.

2. Dehatmavada - there is no soul separate from the body.

21 Maxmuller-Six systems P 94 Qtd in Carvaka/Lokayata Edt by DPC,


P.400
22 Ibid
P.401
(57 )

3. Pratyaksapradhanavada - Perception is the only source of

knowledge,

4. Svabhavavada - The varieties in the world is a natural fact, therefore

as the creator of the world, the presence of God or supernatural

being is simply creation of mind.

5. Paralokavilopavada - there is no future world, therefore,

transmigration of soul is futile.

In the second Act o f the allegorical play called prabodhachandradoya

krishnapati mishra sums up the teachings of Carvaka materialism - Lokayata is

the only shastra, perception is the only authority, earth, water, fire and air are

the only elements, enjoyment is the only end of human existence, mind is only

a product of matter. There is no other world, death means liberation23.

According to the Lokayata or Carvaka, perception (pratyaksa) through

sense organs is the only valid source of knowledge. Lokayatas do not accept

anumana or inference as a source of knowledge since it is based on unperceived

facts. Out of the four substances earth, water, fire and air arise bodies, senses

and objects of this world just as red colour is produced by the combination of

betel nut, leaf and lime. There is no soul or consciousness apart from the body.

So, the continuity of self or soul is meaningless. When the body perishes, soul

also perishes. Therefore, transmigration of soul, heaven, hell etc. are mere

imagination. Plato says, there are four elements out of which the body is

23 A critical survey of Ind Phi C D Sharma


P 41
( 58)

com posed. These are earth, fire, w ater and air24. K am alasila w rites in

Lokayatasutra tat samudaaye visayendrisamjha25. With the denial o f karma phala,

this school denied the existence o f the universal mysterious agency called fate

or Adrsta or Daiva i.e. dependence on the being or the supernatural. It denies the

existence o f merits and demerits acquired in our previous existence. B ut most

Indian philosophers are in conformity the the law o f karm a and simultaneously

with the retribution o f good and bad deeds. The opponents argue that fate must

be admitted as the cause ofthe differences and determinations o f the phenomenal

w orld. B rhaspati and others bring forw ard the doctrine o f Svabhava or

spontaneous generation o f things according to their respective natures.

SvabhSvavada, in contrast to Adhyatmavada which is adoctrine ofimmortal

soul does not accept law o f karm a also.

In Sveta^vatara Upanisad, w e find some examples o f theories current in

its time in explanation o f the universe. A nd naturalism i.e. Svabhavavlda forms

one o f this -

Kalah Svabhava niyatiryadrccha etc. Svabhavavada denies the principle

o f causality and asserts the supremacy o f the inherent or immanent nature o f a

thing .

Svabhavavada is more or less identical with Yadrcchavada. Yadrccha is


*

defined by Samkaracharyya as akasm ikapraptih or coincidence.

24 Plato Dictionary 25. Tattva Samgraha Panjika, 1860 Qtd in Ibid


P 74 P 77
Qtd. in CltrYaka Dar/ana L Chotta pSdhyaya 26. Qtd in LokSyata & the doctrine of SvabfrSva
Gopmath Koviraj
f.p
(59)

The lokayatas acceptance ofSvabhava or nature as the origin o f the world

is reflected in Devatama*s conceptof the w orld process. A ccording to him also,

the origin o f the w orld is grounded in nature. By nature, he gives emphasis on

the scientific explanation o f m atter force leading to change.

In M ahabharata, sim ilar doctrine o f svabhava is found w ith the

materialistic out look. Those who thought that material elements alone were

ultimately real subscribed to the doctrine o f Svabhava. Svabhavam bhuta

cintakah27.

Madhavacaryya in his Sarvadar^ana Samgraha 28 refers to the arguments

o f Lokayata in the following manner -

[But an opponent w ill say] if you thus do not admit adrsta, (the unseen)

the various phenomena o f the word would be just fortuitous (akasmika). However

(answer the Lokayatas) this is not properly said in as much as it [i.e. the causation

o f all phenomena] is adequately explained by Svabhava. Again, the fire is hot,

the w ater is cold and air is neutral (i.e. neither hot nor cold) to touch. By whom

are all these varieties created? because ofSvabhava all these are so29. Devatma,

also finds no supernatural hand in the creation o f the world. It is by natural force

everything is created.

The Lokayata the Carvaka is also known as Nastikya, Barhaspatya,

Bhutavadin and Iccantika etc.

27 Mahabharata Santipriba 232 19 Qtd. in Out lines of Ind Phi Hirriyana


P 105
28 Ind Atheism DPC 29 Ibid
P 65 P 65
(60 )
The Indian philosophers appropriately characterise the supporters o f

materialism as deniers or negativists (Nlstikas). The CIrvaka or Lokayata is

also called N astika, since it negates soul, the authority o f the Vedas,

transmigration o f soul etc. For Indian materialist it is not only the denial o f the

soul and the exclusive restriction to matter as the cause for the explanation o f

the world. Its aim is to dispute and deny the continuance o f life after death, the

restriction o f good and bad work, and the moral claims derived out o f them. Its

interest is totally negative in character. It is interested in the philosophical

questions so far as they serve this aim.

A s the Carvaka lokayata philosophy has grounded its origin to Brhaspati,

the founder o f this school it is also called Barhaspatya. It is known as Bhutavadin,

since it regards the four elements as the ultimate for the origin o f everything.

It is also called Icclntika, as it believed in natural, spontaneous origin o f

things and beings o f the world.

A s a result o f this materialistic trend, a number o f materialists come

forward to materialize their views.

Among them kambalasvatara, kakudt/1 katyayana AjitaK?#U&mkabalm etc.

are prominent.

Ajita Keshkambalin, the materialist represents the following views

- There is no gift in charity, there is no sacrifice, there are no offerings. There

is no fruit and ripening o f good and bad actions. There is no this world or that.
(6 1 )

There is neither mother nor father. There are no ascetics and Brahmanas who

have gone along the right path o f conduct and follow the right conduct who have

seen this world and that world out o f independent knowledge and proclaimed it.

A man consists o f four elements. W hen he dies earth goes into the mass o f

earth, water into the mass o f water, fire into mass o f fire, breath into the mass o f

air and the sense organs enter into space30.

Again another teacher, Kakuda Katyayana teaches the following - There

are seven masses, which are neither created nor brought forth. They are unfruitful,

unchangeable and are firm like a pillar. They move not, nor do they change, they

do not disturb each other, nor are they also to procure joy, g rief or jo y and

grief. The seven masses are the earth mass, the water mass, the five mass, the air

mass, pleasure, pain and the souls31.

Out o f the seven categories admitted in the Vai^esika philosophy, such

as substance quality, action, universality, particularly, inherence and non

existence, only the category o f substance is partially admitted by the Carvakas.


I

A ccording to them, quality and action are not separate categories distinct from

the substance itself which is their substratum and universality, particularity,

inherence and non-existence are completely imaginary or unreal.

Again o f the nine substances admitted by the Vaisesika, five substances

namely, aklsa, time, space, self and mind are not admitted as realities in thp

carvaka philosophy. The old w ritings o f the Jainas also describe sim ilar

30 Materialism - E Frauwaliner
Carvaka/Lokayata Edt by DPC 31 Ibid
P 479 P. 480
(6 2 )

materialistic doctrines. Thus it led to the creation o f a foil fledged materialistic

system in the form o f Lokayata school.

Now, it will be quite convenient for us to discuss the Lokayatas or

Carvakas materialistic, atheistic and naturalistic tendencies under the three heads,

namely Epistemology, Metaphysics and Ethics.

The entire philosophy o f the CarvSkas may be said to depend logically

on their epistemology or the theory o f knowledge. According to the Carvaka or

Lokayata, perception (Pratyaksa) is the only source o f knowledge and they deny

the validity o f other sources such as inference (Anumana) and o f testim ony

(sabda). \

We m ust see the view points or the Carvakas for their acceptance o f

Pratyaksa Pramana as the source o f knowledge. A t the same time enquire under

w hat ground they try to reject inference and other pramanas as sources of

knowledge.

Both the heterodox and orthodox accordingly set about examining their

traditional beliefs, and tried to interpret them consistently. The interpretation

involves a great deal o f independent reasoning. The Carvakas or Lokayatas

rejection o f inference is that there is not sufficient w arrant for believing in the

truth o f the inductive relation or Vyapti which forms its basis. The ascertainment

o f this relation, depends upon observed facts, and since observation is necessarily

restricted in its scope it does not entitle us, it is urged, to universalize the
(63)

conclusion reached with its help. It is necessary to find out w ith certainty the

elements o f invariability (niyama) and o f relevancy (ananyatha siddhi) involved

in such a notion. Lokayatikas inference being a means o f the ascertainm ent o f

causality contests its evidentiary value.

The conviction that universal uncomitance or the absence o f a condition

limiting the universality o f the relation on which all inference are based is in

accessible to human resources. The result is that to the Lokayatikas, there is no

order revealed in the world, either o f sense or o f intellect.

B ut in order to demonstrate their stand that perception is the only source

o f knowledge they had to have recourse to all variety o f logical subtleties. In

Slnkhya tattva Kaumudi, there is an example when the materialist affirms that

inference is not a means o f knowledge, how is it that he can know that a man is

ignorant or in doubt or in error? For ignorance, doubt and error cannot possibly

be discovered in other man by sense perception. Accordingly by the materialist

ignorance etc., in other man m ust be inferred from conduct and from speech

and therefore inference is recognized as a means o f knowledge even against his

will32.

So, it is seen that ancient Lokayata lost its original character as it was no

more a rilti, but became a hetuvidy a, a tarka vidya full o f logical subtleties33.

Later on, the Loklyatas appear to have disappeared, but its doctrine still

remained occasionally accepted by disbelievers or materialists, w ho always exist

32 Ind Phi Radha Krishnan Vol.2


P 284
33 Carvaka/Lokayata Tueci-Asketch of Indian laterialism
P.392
(64)

in every country even in a country which can be called the fatherland o f idealism34.

It is interesting to note that Sunyavada Buddhists and Advaita Vedantists


i

also have rejected the ultim ate validity o f inference. There has been long

controversy between Udayana, the logician and Sriharsa, the Vedantin regarding

the validity o f inference and Sriharsa has denounced all attempts to prove the

validity o f inference. B ut there is a radical difference between the Carvakas

viewpoint and the Vedantins and Sunyavadins view points. The Carvakas accept

only perception and uphold it as a the true means o f valid knowledge. But the

Sunyavadins and the Advaitins reject the ultimate validity o f all means o f

knowledge such as including perception, though they insist on the empirical

validity o f all means o f knowledge. The distinction betw een ultimate and

empirical knowledge is unknown to the CcRvaka.

We can ask the question Do w e not have a kind o f perception, called

internal, which gives an immediate knowledge o f our mental statues? And do we

not perceive in this, consciousness which is no where to be perceived in the

external material objects ? I f so, does it not compel us to believe that there is in
i

us some non-material substance whose quality is consciousness - the substance

w hich is called soul or spirit (Atm3)? The Nyaya Vaisesika and others admit a

separate sense organ called mind. W ith its help people experience pleasure,

pain etc. But in the CUrvaka view, no separate internal sense organ in the form o f
35
the m ind has been admitted . But science, neurological sciences admit the

existence o f mind.____________________________________________________
34. Ibid
P. 392
35 Ananta Kumar Bhattacharya C ah'aka Darsana
Qtd m Lokayata/Carvaka Bdt. by DPC,
P 463
(65)

The Carvakas admit that the existence or consciousness is proved by

perception. But they deny that consciousness is the quality o f any unperceived

non-material or spiritual entity. According to the Carvaka, what people mean by

a soul is nothing more than this eonscious living body (caitanya vi&ta deha eva

atmS), the non-material soul is never perceived. We have direct evidence o f the

identity o f the self with the body in our daily experiences and when we say I am

fat, I am lame, I am reading and writing, I am sitting etc. in these cases, the body
i
only is the self, in the said awareness involving the T , it is being revealed as the

doer. I f the T , the self, w ere different from the body, th ese w ould be

meaningless36.

Again, according to the Carvaka or Lokayata the consciousness arises

due to particular combination o f four material elements, earth, water, fire and

air. Consciousness is an epifphenomenon or bye product o f matter, there is no

evidence o f its existence independent o f the body.

C arvika argues if there is no independent identity o f the soul, there is no

need o f assuming the possibility o f immortality. O n the contrary, death means

the end o f the individual. All questions about previous life, after life, rebirth,

enjoyment o f fruits o f actions in heaven or hell, therefore become meaningless.

M ore or less in the same m anner the Carvaka or Lokayata is about to

denounce the existence o f God on the basis that it is not perceivable. The four

elements are sufficient for the creation o f the world, the supposition o f a creator

36 Ibid
P 454 i
(66 )

is meaningless.

B ut the question may be put - can the material elements by themselves

give rise to this wonderful world? D o w e not need an efficient cause for

combination o f these material elements?

In reply, the Carvaka states that the material elements themselves have
i

got each its fixed nature (svabhava). It is by the natures and laws inherent in

them that they combine together to form this world.

Q uite consistently, the same view point is presented by D evatm a,

W henever a new existent comes into being, it is the result o f the action o f

some immutable process o f Nature and w hen any existent grows or evolves

gradually, it does so in accordance w ith the immutable laws o f nature. In the

same way when any existent in nature undergoes a degeneration or dissolutionary

change in its being, it is also obedience to the immutable laws o f nature37.

B ut Devatma accepts the law o f causality since the change does not take

place haphazardly or unmethodically but they do so by certain fixed process or

immutable law o f nature. By the immutable law o f nature, Devatma means that

the same set o f conditions produce the same effect.

Therefore, according to both the Carvaka and Devatma" there is thus no

necessity o f God or an omnipotent, omnipresent being to create the world. The

CSrvakas or the Lokayatas is therefore, regarded as atheists.

Indian philosophers like the MTmamsakas believe that highest goal o f

37 Ethics of DevatmS
S P Kanal
P 74
(67)

human life in heaven which can be attained hereafter by perform ing vedic rites.

But according to Carvaka, the notion o f heaven hell etc. are the inventions o f

the priests for their livelihood.

Contrastingly, D evatm as ethical views are different. His distinction

between ethics and religion is therefore, different. Theistic religions regard

good conduct in relation to other human beings as ethical conduct. They regard

conduct in relation to god as religious. So ethics is concerned w ith relationships

in the empirical world. Religion is concerned w ith relationship o f m an w ith the

supersensible w orld e.g. god or gods. For DevStma, there is no supersensible

being called God and the distrinction between Ethics and Religion falls within

the natural world. Devatmas Ethics is naturalistic in the sense that it denies any

being beyond good or evil or that the love o f or identity w ith or realization o f
38
supersensible reality is the highest destiny for human personality .

Likewise, Lokayatas philosophy also dismisses necessarily all b elief in

a super natural or transcendental being, and w ith it also belief in everything that

constitutes the specific subject m atter o f religion and philosophy. Thus,

Hiriyanna, says, Carvaka or Lokayata recognizes neither a God who controls

the universe nor conscience which guides man, and it does not care for b elief in

a life after death, which, so far as right conduct is concerned, matters more

according to the Indian than even b elief in the existence o f God39. Thus it draws

away m ans mind altogether from the thought o f a higher life and fixes it upon

38 Ibid
P 194
39 Outlines of Indian Phi. Hirriyana
P 193
(68 )

the w orld o f sense. O f the four purusarthas or human values (dharma, artha,

kama and moksa), the Carvakas o f Lokay atikas reject two viz, dharma and moksa,

thus restricting the scope o f human effort to the attainment o f sensual pleasure

(Kama) or securing the means there o f (Artha). The Carvakas are so impatient

o f obtaining pleasure that they do not even try to secure freedom from pain,

N obody casts away the grain because o f the husks so say the Carvakas in

Sarvadarsana Samgrah. The repudiation o f the traditional teaching and all the

moral and spiritual discipline for which it stands is a necessary corollary to this
i

crude utilitarianism, whose motto, is sufficient unto the day is the good there

o f (Yavatf&et SukhamjiVet). We can think o f a school without the ideal o f moksa,

but not without that o f dharma. The life devoid o f dharma is to reduce man to the

level o f the brute40.

B ut as a positive point o f the C lrvaka materialism, it can be said that it

applied to the main questions o f philosophy, a judgm ent free from the fancies

o f theology and the dictates o f authority. M aterialism is the first answer to the

question o f how far our unassociated reason helps us in the difficulties o f

philosophy41.

The chief importance o f the CSrvaka system for us lies in the evidence it

affords o f the many sidedness o f philosophic activity in India in ancient times

and o f the prevalence o f a great deal o f liberty o f thought as well as o f freedom

o f expression.

4 6 Ibid
P 194
41 Ind. Phil Vol-1 Radha Knshnan
P 285
i
(6 9 )

The long process of the development of naturalist, rationalist sceptic,

agnostic and materialist thought in ancient India found its culmination in the

Carvaka Philosophy. The Carvaka view that no inference can yield certain

knowledge is the view of many contemporary Western thinkers like the

pragmatists and logical positivists.


p
L iul A
A PTFD
i lliK - 11
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

ATHEISM as opposed to Theism is one of the pertinent issues of

philosophical enquiry. Atheism is the critique and denial of metaphysical

beliefs in God or spiritual beings. As such it is the opposite of theism, which

affirms the reality of the divine and seeks to demonstrate its existence1. It is

perhaps the most serious spiritual affliction of modem man.

Atheism, as we find in the Dictionary of Philosophy2, is a system of

views rejecting faith in the supernatural (spirits, gods, life beyond grave etc.)

It is characterized by an absence of belief in the existence of gods. It explains

the sources of religion and the reasons for its emergence, criticizes religious

dogmas from the stand point of a scientific study of the universe, exposes the

social role of religion and shows how religious prejudices are to be overcome.

Generally, atheism as an absence of belief in the existence of gods

comes about either through deliberate choice or from an inherent inability to

believe religious teachings, which seem literally incredible. It is not a lack of

belief bom out of simple ignorance of religious teachings.

We can say that many atheists feel that it is simply a human weakness

to want to believe in gods. Certainly in many primitive human societies,

1 Britannica, Vol. I 2 A. dictionary of Philosophy


P. 666. P. 25
(2)

religion allows the people to deal with phenomena that they do not adequately

understand.

Some atheists even go beyond a mere absence of belief in gods, they

actively believe that particular gods or all gods do not exist. Just lacking belief

in gods is often preferred to as the weak Atheists position whereas believing

that gods do not (or cannot) exist is known as Strong Atheism.

Etymologically ATHEIST originated, in two, Greek, roots A which

means, Without or Not, Theos, which means deity. Thus, a person who

is without a belief in any deity is an atheist.3

In the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy4, we get that the terms atheist and

Godless are still frequently used as terms of abuse. Never the less, there are

relatively few people in whom the thought of atheism and atheists arouse

unspeakable horror.

In France, until the revolution and in most other countries it was illegal

to publish works in defence of atheism and infact real or alleged atheists were

subjected to dire prosecution throughout the times of Christian domination.

Such was the case with Shelley. When he was an undergraduate at

Oxford, he published a short and very temperate pamphlet entitled The

Necessity of Atheism. This at once aroused a violent protest which resulted in

3. W ebsters New World Dictionary,


P .4 6
4. The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. I
P. 174
(3 )

the burning of all undistributed copies and in the expulsion of Shelley and his

friend Thomas Hogg from the university.5

Many atheists feel that the idea of God as presented by the major

religions is essentially self-contradictory, and that it is logically impossible

that such a God could exist. Others are atheists through skepticism because

they see no evidence that God exists.

The most interesting question for philosophers " Ls - is atheism a

logically tenable position ?

Of course, some people are atheists without having any particular

logical argument to back up their atheism. For some, it is simply the most

comfortable, common sense position to take.

A true atheist, is defined by Fichte, as the person who, instead of

following the voice of conscience, always calculates consequences before

acting in a moral situation. He,in his Appeal to the people denies the charge

of atheism. We need no other god (Than the moral world order) and we

cannot comprehend another one. There is no rational justification for going

beyond the moral world order to a separate entity as its cause.6 Paul Tillich has
rj
defined atheism as the view that life has no depth, that it is shallow.

5. Ibid 7. Ibid
P. 174 P 175
6. The Encyclopaedia of Philophy, Vol. I,
P 192.
(4 )

According to the most usual definition an atheist is a person who

maintains that there is no God, that is, the sentence God exists expresses a

false proposition.8

Atheist according to most modem dictionaries is a person who either

passively believes that no God exists and/or who actively asserts this belief

e.g. Websters New World Dictionary defines an atheist as a person who

believes that there is no. God.9 This definition implies that atheists have

investigated proofs for the existence and non-existence of God, and have

decided that no God exists or that the probability of one existing is

phenomenally small. It includes a closet atheist - one who believes that there

is no God but does not assert this belief to others. This definition would seem

to imply that a person, who believes in the existence of a Goddess, but not a

God, is also an atheist. This definition will probably not satisfy many

Goddess worshippers. Webster Dictionary, 1913 had a more inclusive

definition that includes non-male deities - one who disbelieves or denies the

existence of a God or a supreme intelligent being. 10

In chamber Encyclopaedia, it is mentioned that atheism properly

8. Ibid
P. 175
9. W ebsters New World Dictionary
P. 137
10. Ibid
P 173
(5 )

denotes the denial of the existence of God and it is to be distinguished from

skepticism, which is the denial that God is knowable.11

In 18th Century, the emergence of atheism is witnessed among the

French Encyclopaedists, who combined British empiricism with Rene

Descartes mechanistic conception of the universe. Humes skepticism is a

more consistent and forceful statement of the original Pyrrhonian view. Hume

argues that our ideas reach no further than our experience. Hume in his

dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779) argued against the traditional

proofs for the existence of God, as did Immanual Kant. Kants skeptical

thought provided a new road to Pyrrhonism. He holds that all our knowledge

begins with experience. But neither Hume nor Kant were atheist, but their

restriction of human reason to sense experience undercut Natural Theology

and left the existence of God as a matter of pure faith.12

But agnostic like T.H. Huxley did not categorically deny the existence

of God. He coined the term agnosticism at a meeting of the Metaphysical

society in 1876. He defined an agnostic as someone who disclaimed both

(strong) atheism and theism, and who believed that the question of whether a

higher power existed was unsolved and unsuperable. He denies that we have

11 Chambers Encyclopaedic, Vol. I 13. Britannica vol. I


P 723 P. 151
12. Britannica I
P. 666.
(6 )

any knowledge of God who is beyond the realm of human knowledge and

definition.

Atheism arises from a mentality and attitude which involves a flight

from the invisible towards the visible, from the transcendent towards the

immanent, from the spiritual towards material. 14 Atheism begins when

intellectual doubts arise about the existence of God.

Atheism is also said to be equivalent to Pancosmism i.e., the doctrine

that the universe. consists of nothing but those physical and psychical

existences which are perceptible by the senses or are cognizable by the

imagination and finite understanding. Pancosmism however is a positive

doctrine while atheism both by etymology and usage is essentially a negative

conception and exists only as an expression of dissent from the theistic

positive belief. 15

Here to contrast the atheistic views with the theistic ones, a brief survey

of development of theism in general has been made.

Theism is the belief that all the entities in the cosmos which are known

to us through our senses or inferred by our imagination and reason are

dependent for their origination and for their continuance in existence upon the

14. D.l. Vol. xxxix


P.9
15. E.R.E. Vol. 2,
P. 173
( 7) .
creative causal actions of an Infinite and Eternal self consciousness and

Will .16 And in course of time, this self -existent. Being progressively reveals,

His essence and character in the ideas and ideals of His rational creatures, and

thus stands in personal relationship with them.

Our idea of God or an infinite Being is derived from intuition and

thinking. In other words intuition supplies the material and thinking supplies

the form. Their combination produces the idea of God.

In order to explore the implication it is quite necessary to have some

knowledge about the different uses of the word God and correspondingly the

reference to as belief in God. What do we mean by God ? All the believers

characterize God as an imaginary, supernatural, omnipotent, Being who is

supposed to have created the world and to rule it. He is immensely powerful,

highly intelligent and very good, loving and just. God on Tillichs view,

Infinity transcends every finite being. 17 In Judaism, it is known as Jehovah,

in Islam Allah in Christianity, the Holy Trinity (God), the father, (God), the

son and (God) the Holy spirit.

Orthodox theism is defined by Prof. Flint as the doctrine that the

universe owes its existence and its continuance in existence to the reason and

will o f a self existent Being, who is infinitely powerful, wise and good . 18

16. E.R. E. Vol. 2, 18. Theism (Eight Edditor), Flint


P. 173 P. 19
17. Ency. O f Philosophy, Vol. I, Qtd. in Idea of God A Seth Pringale Pattision P. 334
P. 176
(8)

The basic source of our idea of God is pure feeling, which is completely non-

rational. The idea of God developed along with the development of religious

consciousness and culture. Anthropological study shows that uncivilized

people through the experience of dreams and supposed ghosts come to believe

in the existence of super human beings who act for or against human welfare

and are thus objects of worship and fear. They believed that the energies in

nature are the manifestation of Wills resembling their own. This idea has been

prevailed long before the idea of one Infinite Supreme Being is reached. These

Sevage people along with this conception of a variety of finite super human

personalities develop the conception of one supreme Spiritual Reality behind

all the changing phenomena of nature. They by their intuitive idea of infinity

regard this reality, as the omnipresent cause which controls all the forces of

nature. And this reality in course of time manifests Himself in varying degrees
10
within the human souls.

A person who believes in a specific God or Goddess or combination of

deities is a theist. Theists belief in God may be viewed from three positions -

belief in a metaphysical God, in an infinite anthropomorphic God and in a

finite anthropomorphic God.

The western scholars and some of the Indian scholars inspired by and

19 E. R.E. Vol. 2,
P.P. 173,174
(9 )

even obsessed with the western interpretation are apt to believe that when the early

Vedic Aryans, who were primitive, semi civilized and semi barbarians settled down

and began to wonder at the charming and tempting events and to fear the terrible and

the destructive aspects of nature, they personified them in an anthropomorphic

fashion and called them gods and goddess and began to worship them.

This was the stage of naturalistic and anthropomorphic polytheism. Then

gradually polytheism yielded place to monotheism and the latter to monism. Max

Muller introduces Henotheism as a traditional stage from polytheism to monotheism.

Henotheism means belief in one and only God, because the Vedic Aryans regarded

any God they were praising as the most supreme and the only God.20

Anthropomorphism is the transfer of human shape and characteristics to the

external forces of nature and attributing them to mystical beings (gods, spirits).

Anthropomorphism is connected with Animism and Totemism and occurs in most

religions - in Islam and Judaism it occurs in hidden form. Animism is the belief in

the soul and spirits that affect the lives of people and animals and exert and influence

over the objects and phenomena of the surrounding world. Primitive men imagined
01
that things, plants and animals possessed souls.

The conceptions of tribal and national gods came into existence with the

collapse of the primitive communal system, the development of tribal associations

20. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy


C.D. Sharma,
P. 15
21. A dictionary of Phil.
PP. 20, 22
(10)

and the rise of classes and the state. The conception of a single and omnipotent

Almighty God, deity, the Lord of Heaven took shape as a copy of the single oriental

despot. 22

Here theology is turned to idealism to prove the existence of God

philosophically and embellish this idea in pseudo-scientific terms to present God as

an absolute idea, a universal will, a kind of impersonal rational principle .23

In India, w e fmd the various conceptions o f God or Gods both in the

Vedas and the Upanisads. In the Vedas, there are many gods and not one o f

them can be styled the Supreme G od, not one o f them is superior to others.

A t the same time, it is found that practically everyone o f them is described as

the One G od and thecas having different names and different attributes and

powers and different functions

A long w ith the use o f G od, the terms Brahm an and A tm an are also

used in the Upanisads for ultimate realities, which have been, described as the

two pillars on which rests nearly the whole edifice o f Indian Philosophy. 24

In the Purusa Sukta 25 or the Hymn o f the cosmic person, w e have the

m ost magnificent description o f the spiritual unity o f the cosmos as both

22. Ibid
P. 178
23. Ibid
P. 178
24. Outlines of Indian Phil.
Hirriyana,
P .5 4
25. Rg veda X. 90
Qtd. In A Short History of Religion & thought in India,
K. Swami,
P 6
( 11)

immanent and transcendent reality. The all compassing Purusa, who is all

heads, all eyes and all limbs everywhere, envelops and permeates creation

from all sides and stands above its as the glorious immortal. Such is the

majestic purusa, the god of all gods. From Him proceeds the* original

Creative Will (Later identified with Brahma, Hiranyagarbha or Prajapati) by

which this vast universe was projected in space and time.

Similarly, the Nasadiya Sukta of Rg. Veda26 (10, 129) gives for the first

time intimations of the seers sounding the depths of Being. The astounding

vision of the transcendent by the relative is the apparent theme of this famous

hymn. Though the Absolute is the Being above all beings existence beyond ail

possible concepts about it, becomes an intriguing something, about which

nothing definite can be said and of which no definition can be given, when it

is envisaged by the individual. Reality here is depicted as not being capable of

designated either as existent or non-existent for there was none to perceive it

before the manifestation of the heaven and the earth. There was as if, only an

indescribable stillness, dee^ in its content ant defying all approach to it by

anyone. There was neither death, nor immortality, for there was no

differentiatedness whatsoever. Naturally, there was neither day nor night.

There was only That One (Tad Ekam) Presence throbbing in all splendour

26. Rg. Veda X 129


Qtd. in Ibid
P.P 6,7
( 12)

and glory but appearing as darkness to the eye that would like to behold it.

There was nothing second to it, it alone was. From it, this creation arose. But

how it all happened no one can say, for everyone came after creation.

In a famous Mantra, the Rg Veda27 declares that Existence or (Reality)

is one, though the wise ones call it by various epithets like Indra, Mitra,

Vanina, Agni, Yama, Vayu, thus unifying all the gods in a single being.

The word Veda stands for the Mantras and the Brahmanas. The

Mantras and the Brahmanas are called Karma Kanda or the portion dealing

with the sacrificial actions, while the Aranyakas and the Upanisads are called

the Jnanakanda or the portion dealing with knowledge.

The main theme of the Upanisad is the spiritual unity of all existences.

This is clearly reflected in the opening verse of the Isavasya Upanisad.

Isavasyam idam sarvam 28 - conveys the idea that one supreme, omnipotent

reality of the entire cosmic scheme is hailed as Isa or the supreme ruler. The

Kena Upanisad illumines the nature of knowledge by contrasting sense

knowledge with the knowledge of ultimate reality, which transcends sense

knowledge. The Katha Upanisad reflects a happy blend of mysticism and

philosophy, and breathes the pure fragrance of sublime poetry. Mundaka

Upanisad draws an initial distinction is hailed as Isa or the

27. R g .V e d a 1.1 64,46 . 28. Quoted fn Philosophy in Religion


Qtd. in Ibid A. R. Mahapatra
P .7 P .1 5
( )
1 3

s u p re m e ru le r.

T h e M a n d u k y a U p a n is a d a n a ly s e s th e p ra n a v a m a n tra A U M . O n e o f

th e M a h a v a k y a s o r lo fty u tte ra n c e s A y a m a tm a B ra h m a T h is A tm a (th e s e lf

o r m a n ) is B ra h m a , o c c u rs in th e B rh a d a ra n y a k a U p a n is a d . A t firs t th e re

w a s th e A tm a n a lo n e S a y s th e A ita re y a 30 A g a in , A ll th is is B r a h m a n 3 1 , I

a m B ra h m a n 32 a re so m e o f th e lo fty m a h a v a k y a s o f th e U p a n is a d s .

T h e c h a n d o g y a a n d th e B rh a d a ra n y a k a U p a n is a d s p ro v id e a m p le sc o p e

fo r s p iritu a l p e rfe c tio n w ith its V e d ic s y m b o lis m a n d v e d a n tic in te n tio n . T o

c h a n d o g y a 33 b e lo n g s th e c la s s ic d e c la ra tio n o f s u p e rla tiv e s ig n ific a n c e . T h a t

th o u a r t T a t t v a m a s i.

29 Brhadaranyaka 2.5.19,
Qtd. in An Introduction to Ind. Phil
S. C. Chatterjee, & D.M Dutta
P. 356
30. 'OmAtma Vaidam eke eva agreasti' Aitareya - 1 .1 .
Ibid, P 356
31. Brahma eva idamvisvam (Mundakya Upanisad, 2.2,11 and Sarvam Khalu Idam Brahma
Chandogya Upa, 3 14 1,
Ibid P 356
32 Aham Brahma asmi Brhadaranyaka 1.4.10,
Ibid, P. 356
33. Tat tvam asi chandogya - 6,
Qtd, in A critical survey of Ind Phil
C. D. Sharma,
P 26

T Q ^S lS if
(1 4 )

Though the Upanisads are absolutistic in their approach, they are not

lopsided in any sense of the term. Together with their lofty proclamations of

Brahman beyond the range of understanding, they provide for the emotional

aspiration of man by their concept of God, who creates, preserves and destroys

the universe as a divine play. 34

Along with the use of words God, Brahman, the word Absolute has
/
also been used to. mean the highest reality. In the Upanisads and Samkara used

it for both the immanent, personal aspect and also for the transcendent

impersonal aspect. Hegel, used the term Absolute in place of God and

Spinoza termed it as ^Intermediate Substance. Ramanujas theism regards

God as an Infinite Being, free from the limitations of space and time. But for

Sri Aurobindo, the Absolute or Saccidananda, as he calls it, projects Itself out

of Itself. This self projection is a self limitation and this is what we call

creation.

But whatever the term we use as theism, atheism, agnosticism or

skepticism, the common element in all these isms is that the idea of God is

present in all these theists and atheists as well.

The Upanisads however to some extent reflected their hostile tendency

to ritual of Brahmanas and embody a theory of the universe quite distinct from

34. A Short History of Religion & Philosophical thought in India


K. Swami
P.2 4
( 15)

the above.

It is best reflected in Mundaka Upanisad35 against the sacrificial

ceremonial in the course of which it is stated that whosoever hopes for real

good to aceruefum these rites is a fool and is sure to be overtaken again and

again by death and decrepitude.

But there is equally antagonistic trend of approving sacrificial rites to

Agni and Soma, the sacrificial deities in the Svetasvatara Upanisad.

We can give summarise the philosophical theories of Upanisads -

(a) The matter exists from eternity independent of God (Swasvanad

Upanisad Sutra II).

(b) God creates the universe out of nothing and the world is controlled

by Him.

(c) God and the universe are identical and

(d) God alone is real.

Similarly in western religions the most fundamental theological claim is

that there is an all-perfect being, God. Aristotle recognizes plurality of

individual substances, his meta-physical position is pluralism rather than

monism. Moreover, the substances arrange themselves in an ascending scale,

35. Out lines of Ind. Phil.


Hirriyana,
P.48
(1 6 )

the limits of which are indeterminate matter at the bottom and God or Pure

form at the top .36

We can raise some questions - Is there any reason to suppose that God

exists ? Is there any proof of His existence ? Is there some reasons to suppose

that He does not exist ?

There are three classifical proof of the existence of God. One of these is

the cosmological argument. It argues that there must be a God to create the

world or nothing would exist in the world. The Teleological argument argues

that there must be a God the world would not be orderly, harmonious as it is,

And Ontological argument is a product purely of philosophical thought.

The Western and the Indian philosophers give various proofs of the existence

of God.

St. Aquinas Thomas37 puts forward some proofs. These are -

(a) Everything that is moved requires something to move it, every effect

implies a cause, a first unmoved mover like Aristotles God,

otherwise ad we should have ad infinitum position in causal series.

(b) Natural objects are merely contingent or possible, it is not necessary

that this or that exists, there must be something that is not merely

36. History of Western Phil.


Frank Thiliy
P .1 0 5
37. History of Western Phil.
PP. 2 3 0 ,2 3 1
(17)

possible but real or necessary, something that forms the ground or

basis of the contingent or possible, something which is absolutely

necessary. It is supported by Kant in the cosmological argument.

(c) Things form a graduated scale of excellence, there must be a highest

form or degree of perfection to complete the series of more or less

perfect objects.

Since everything is caused by the fust cause, the first cause must be

most perfect being, the cause of all perfect things in the world. St.

Augustine supports this proof.

(d) Everything in nature realizes an end or purpose. Such action implies

an intelligence to guide it, a purposeful universe implies a great

purposer, and an intelligent God.

God therefore, is the first and final or purposive cause of the universe.

God created the world including matter out of nothing. God, being the first

cause He must be the cause of both matter and form.

The Cosmological proof has taken a number of forms, the most important, of

which are known as the causal argument and the; argument from contingency,

causal argument tries to justify God as the cause of the total chain of events

called the universe, whereas the argument from contingency tries to prove the

existence of God from the fact that the things and events have dependent

origination or contingent existence.


( 18)

The ontological argument put forward by St. Anselm 38 begins with the

very conception of God as all perfect - as that being than which nothing

greater can be conceived, therefore, God must exist and that His existence is

entailed by His nature. Existence is one of His perfections. Therefore he puts

his argument - Truly there is a God although, the fool hath said in his heart

there is no God (Psalm XIV-I). The relation between Gods nature or essence

and existence is necessary as the relation between triangle and three sidedness

is necessary. Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the

understanding, at least than which nothing greater can be conceived.

Kant39 rejects ontological argument - the conception of a being that

contains all reality does not imply existence. Existence is not a real predicate

like red, omniscience etc. Existence does not follow from the bare concept of

the most real being, we cannot spin out of an arbitrary Idea, the existence of an

object corresponding to it Being is not the concept of something that could

be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing or of

certain determinations as existing in themselves.

38. Ibid. 39. Ibid


P .207 P. 436
(19)

The proposition God exists is not a statement about God that He

possesses the properly of existence but about the concept of God that there is

an instance which satisfies the definition of God. Existential propositions are

always true or false as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of definition.

Whether anything of a specific description or definition exists can be tested by

experience.

Finally, there is the Teleological argument for the existence of God. It

is the argument, which supports the view that the universe was created by a

wise creator, God. His presence maintains order and purposive adaptiveness,

so that the parts of natural objects are made and put together in. such a way to

enable these objects perform a variety of tasks.

Naiyayikas f in a similar context maintains God as the creator,

maintainer and destroyer of this world". However they regard God as an

efficient cause, but not material cause of the universe. God creates the

universe out of eternal atoms, space, time, ether, minds (manas) and souls.

Vaisesikas view of creation is similar with the Naiyayikas. God is the

directive cause of actions of all living beings. He is said to possess all the six

perfections in their fullness, majesty, power, glory, beauty, knowledge and

freedom. Thus, God is the moral Governor of the world of living beings, the
(20)

impartial dispenser of the fruits of our actions. 40

The Naiyayikas arguments Tor Proofs for the existence of God are more

or less similar with the proofs given by Western Philosophers.

There are equally tenable arguments against the existence of God. The

two points that contradict the existence of God are (i) The eternity of matter

and (ii) the problem of evil.

Science maintains that matter is eternal and this claim rales out a God

conceived as the creator of the material universe. If the physical universe had

been created by God, it would follow that there was 'a time when the quantity

of matter was less than it is now, when it was infact zero. But physics

presupposes or proves that the quantity of matter has always been the same.

Since the most ordinary people include creator of the material universe

in their concept of God and since they mean by creation a temporal act of

making something out of nothing the appeal to the eternity of matter is

effective as a popular argument for atheism .41

Similarly, the argument from evil and imperfections in the universe

deserves careful consideration.

40. An Introduction to I.P.,


S.C. Chatterjee & D.M. Dutta
P.P. 209,210
41. The Encyclopaedia of Phil. Vol. I.,
P. 176.
(21)

The evils and imperfections in the universe contradicts the very idea of

God as a all wise, all powerful and all good being. If God is all wise, He

should know how to avoid these evils. If He is all-powerful, then He should be

able to see that they do not occur. Then if He exists, how is it that they too do

exist? If ofcourse, the conception of God is different - if it is supposed that

these properties do not literally possessed by God - then the argument would

collapse.

The following seem to be the major ways that Theologians have

adopted for avoiding the problem of evil -

a) Evil is an illusion.

b) Evil is merely the privation of good.

c) Evil has to exist as a counterpart of the good.

d) Evil is the by-product of the operations of the laws of nature which

are intrinsically good.

e) The presence of evil brings out the good in people.

f) Evil is a warning to man or mans punishment for his sin and

s) Evil is due to mans free w ill 42

Thus the presence of evil threatens the existence of God as an ail powerful

Being.

42. Ibid
P176,177
(22)

In India also, the dissatisfaction with the Vedic Natural religion gave

rise to speculations about the origin of things, M.N. Roy observes Indian

speculations about the origin of things developed directly into metaphysics

and a precarious form of monotheistic religion. Yet towards the close of the

mystic Vedic era, approximately about the 7th or 8th century B.C., there arose

thinkers who represented distinct materialistic tendencies. 43

He puts it, Not only was the authority of the Vedas boldly challenged,

but the earlier forms of metaphysical thought were subjected to ridicule, and

the denial of the Gods or supernatural agencies was stretched to the logical

conclusion of denying the existence of everything since this, latter depended

on the existence of imaginary metaphysical entities. 44

In the Vedas and the Upanisads we to a great extent find atheistic and

rationalistic thought, We can give some instances -

In the Rg. Veda45 NemaRishi (Sage) boldly challengesfthe existence of

Indra. He said, There is nobody called Indra, who has seen him ? Whose

praise art thou going to sing ?

In Nirukta 1/15, Yaska Kautsa declared that the hymns of the Vedas

43 Materialism 45. Rg V e d a - 8/100/3


M.N. Roy Qtd. In Indian Atheism.
P. 76 D.P.C.
44. Ibid P.P. 36.37.
P 77

A
( 23)

w e re m e a n in g le s s a n d q u ite c o n t r a d i c t o r y .4 6 In U p a n is a d s a ls o w e fin d th e

e x p o s itio n o f ra tio n a lis t a n d n a tu ra lis t th in k in g a n d th e m o s t o u t sp o k e n

h e re tic a l v ie w s .

M .N . R o y w r i t e s 47, i t d e n ie s t h e e x is te n c e o f G o d a n d s o u l, it h o ld s th a t

n o th in g b u t m a tte r e x is ts , a n d th a t th e re is n o o th e r w o rld b e y o n d th is w o rld .

Its th e s is c a n b e s u m m a riz e d a s fo llo w s -

T h e re is n o in c a r n a tio n , n o G o d , n o h e a v e n , n o h e ll. A ll tra d itio n a l

re lig io n s lite ra tu re is th e w o r k ,o f c o n c e i t e d fo o ls , n a tu re , th e o rig in a to r, a n d

tim e , th e d e s tro y e r a re th e ru le rs o f th in g s a n d ta k e n o a c c o u n t o f v irtu e o r v ic e

in a w a rd in g h a p p in e s s o r m is e ry to m e n , p e o p le d e lu d e d b y flo w e ry sp e e c h e s

c lin g to G o d s te m p l e s a n d p r i e s t s . ( S w a s a n v e d U p a n is a d S u tra II).

AO

A s H irriy a n a o b se rv e s - t h e h y m n w h ic h rid ic u le s th e v o ta rie s o f th e

V e d a b y d e s c rib in g th e m a s s e lfis h p ra ttlin g , p rie s ts th a t g o a b o u t s e lf

d e lu d e d .

T h e J > v e ta s v a ta ra U p a n is a d , re fe rs to a n u m b e r o f a lte rn a tiv e s to th e

th e is tic a s s u m p tio n a n d s o m e o f th e s e w e re re m a rk a b ly m a te ria lis tic o r n e a r

m a te ria lis tic . I n C h l n d o g y a U p a n i s a d 4 9 P r a j a p a t i a n d I n d r a - V i r o c h a n a .

4 6 . C a r v a k a D a r s a n a 4 8 . O u t l i n e s o f I .P .

D . P C . H i r r i a y a n a

P . 5 2 P . 4 4

4 7 . M a t e r i a l i s m 4 9 . C h a n d o g y a U p a n i s a d 8 . 7 . 8

M . N . R o y Q t d . I n L o k a y a t a D a r s a n a

P . 7 7 D . P . C . P 5 5
(24)

conversation, We find similar materialistic tendency.

The highly intellectual theories of God, soul > and the world put forth

by the Upanisads were not appreciated by the common man as he could

neither understand them since they were too abstract nor consequently could

he practise them. Therefore, he either went back to the barren ritualism of the

Vedic religion or fell an easy prey to rebellious doctrines promulgated by the

Svabhava Vadins or naturalists.50

So far, we have discussed various views and opinions regarding the

existence or non-existence of God in both Western and Indian thought.

It is now proposed to discuss and analyse ATHEISM that developed

in Indian thought. Developing from the Vedas, the Brahmanas and the

Upanisads, Indian religions philosophy evolved into various schools of

thought. The spirit of seeking reality is the hidden basic nature of humanity,

and at this point in Indian history this spirit asserted itself through religious

philosophy.

We are going to discuss briefly the atheistic tendencies of the heterodox

schools and only two major orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy.

j Indian atheism is mostly developed among three heterodox schools -

viz- the Carvaka or the LokSyata, the Buddhists and the Jainas. We will

50. onceptoflnd. Phil.


C.K. Saraswati
P 26
(25 )

discuss. Early Buddhism mostly. They are simply called atheists, as they do

not believe in God or the Authority of the Vedas. And among the orthodox

groups, there are some philosophers who do not believe or mention God in the

process of world creation, yet they are included in Orthodox schools only

because they accept the authority of the Vedas. Some of the Sahkhya and the

MTmamsaka Philosophers are atheists. These philosophers whether they are

consistent atheists requires critical analysis.

The Carvaka philosophers also known as the Lokayatikas are

atheists in the right sense of the term because they do not believe in God or

supernatural deity and also do not accept the authority of the Veda. Brhaspati,

is known as the founder of this school

The CHrvikas are known as materialists since they accept

matter to be the ultimate reality and the philosophical basis of atheism is

materialism.

In India, we find the trace of materialism in the epics and in the

early Buddhistic uterature.

The externals of ritualism which ignored substance and

emphasized the shadow, the idealism of the Upanisads unsuited to the

commoners-the political and social crisis rampant in the age, the exploitation

o f the masses by petty rulers, monks and the wealthy class, the lust and greed
(2 6 )

and petty dissentions in an unstable society paved the way for the rise of

materialism in India. 51

In Majjhima Nikaya1, we fmd a reference to a person known as Ajita

Kesha Kambalin, a materialist probably so called because he must be having a

blanket of hair with him, who believed only in perception and in four elements

. earth, water, fire and air. 52

According to the Carvaka or Lokayata, perception is the only source of

knowledge and what is arrived by means of direct perception is the only truth

and hence what is not perceivable is non-existents to them.

Lokayatas believed matter to be the only reality, the four eternal

elements earth, water, fire and air can explain the development of the world

from protozoa to the philosopher. Intelligence is the modification of the four

elements and it is destroyed when the elements from which it arises are

dissolved.

j There is no world, other than this, neither heaven, nor hell. These' are
[

the inventions of imposters. Religion is a foolish aberration a mental disease.

To treat history as Gods witness to justice or the events of the world are

planned by evidence for the salvation of the soul is nothing short of hypocrisy.

51. A Critical Survey of Indian Phil.


C.D. Sharma
P. 40
52 . Ibid
P 41
(27)

Nature thus thinks herself without any meddling by the gods. The Carvakas

philosophy is thus called naturalistic or svabhavavada since they regard this

world to be a natural outcome of from elements.

The perceptual theory of gives rise to nihilism and skepticism. The


i

Carvakas whole metaphysics, epistemology and ethics centred round on

their philosophy of matter as the ultimate reality and perception being the
>

only source of knowledge.

Scepticism or agnosticism is only the expression of a free mind that

refuses to accept traditional wisdom without criticism. In spite of the defects

this school exercised a profound influence on the current beliefs and broke the

fascination of the past. The materialist theory had a good deal to do with the

speculation of the old religion of custom and magic.53

Buddhism - In the 6th century B.C., Prince Siddhartha, known as

Buddha, the enlightened one founded Buddhism, His greatness lies in the

fact that he was not a metaphysical philosopher discussing the metaphysical

problems. He was an ethical philosopher a practical man, in the right sense of

the term.

He taught only two things to his disciples - (1) Misery and (2)

Cessation of misery. His philosophy centred round the Four Noble Truths,

53. I.P. Radhakrishnan


P. 283
(2%)

which were the deep reflections of his enlightenment.

Buddha formulates his famous Four Noble Truths such as

(1) There is suffering (duhkha)

(2) There is a cause of suffering (Duhkha Samudaya)

(3) There is a way to cessation of suffering (DuhMra-nirodhamargi).

(4) There is a way leading to this cessation of suffering^dukha nirodha

gamini pratipat)

In the second Noble Truth consists of the twelve links of (causation

starting from Jada-marana and ending in Avidya known as (dvadasa nidana) or

(bhava Cakra), the wheel of rebirth. Truth. This life circle of the Buddha

resembles Bergonian life impetus (elanvital) as the development of life

cannot be satisfactorily explained as merely accidental but it is the outwar d

expression of an internal urg, i.e. (bhava).

In the Fourth Noble Truth the Buddha enumerates the Eight fold Path

(astangka margp) i.e. Right views, Right resolve, Right Speech, Right

conduct, Right livehood, Right effort, Right mind fulness, and Right

concentration.

Buddha was quite consistent that the world of experience does not

require for its explanation any God. Buddha tau ght that each man could grin

salvation for himself without the mediation of the priests or any reference to

God.

Buddha felt the hollowness of the beliefs which people were

accustomed to regard as articles of faith. He raised his voice in indi giant


(29)

protest against superstition and unreason means of sacrifice, rites etc. He

denied divinity of Gods and undermined the authority of the Vedas.

Buddha being disinterested seeker after truth did not start with any

prejudice. Yet he is a rationalist since he tried to study reality or experience

without any reference to supernatural revelation. In this point Buddha is at one

with modem scientists who are of opinion that the idea of supernatural

interference should not be introduced into the logical interpretation of natural

phenomena. ^

Buddha only to fid of the Upanisads of their inconsistent compromises

with Vedic polytheism and religion set aside the transcendental aspect as

being indemonstrable to thought. He emphasized the ethical universalism of

the Upanisads. Early Buddhism, therefore, is not an absolutely original

dectrine.54

The sages (rishis) of the Upanisads laid the greatest emphasis on the

soul (individualistic or cosmic). Soul is something non-material, eternal and

unchangeable. Buddhism aimed primarily at shuttering this etemalist

philosophy of the Upanisads and that is why it is called Anatmavada as

against the Atmavada or soul theory of the Upanisads.

But among the followers of Buddha, Buddhism has been interpreted

54. I.P. Radhakrishnan


P .P. 360-361
(30)

differently. The Hinayanists are the followers of real old Buddism, which

iseonservative, and they deny the existence of God. Here, Dharma has taken

the position of God. It denies God but however allows worship of Buddha.

They accept the Law of Karma, rebirth and Nirvana as the cessation of

consciousness, which does not depend on the grace of God.

The other group the Mahayana Buddhism is a bit liberal and according

to it, Nirvana is not a negative but a positive state of bliss. Its ideal saint is

Bodhisattva. Buddha is identified with transcendental reality and is said to

possess the power o f reincarnation. 55

Thus in Buddhism, instead of God, Buddha held up Nirvana, a

counterpart to theistic salvation, instead of the soul in bondage, he put up the

Karma chain which binds man and causes pain in more than one birth.

Jainism - Like, Buddhism, Jainism is also atheistic or Nastika i.e. one

who does not believe in God.

Jainism like Buddhism denies the existence of an Intelligent first cause,

adores deified saints, possesses clergy, practicing celibacy and think it sinful

to take the life of any animal for any cause. The central feature of Jamas

philosophy is its realistic classification of knowledge with its famous doctrine

of Syadvada or Sapta bhanginaya or sevenfold mode of prediction and its

55. Ibid
P.P. 354-355
( 31)

a s c e tic e th ic s .

J a m a s m e te rp h y s ic a l th e o ry o f A n e k a n t a v a d a is re a lis tic a n d

re la tiv is tic p lu ra lis m . B o th m a tte r (p u d g a la ) a n d s p irit (J iv a ) a re re g a rd e d a s

s e p a ra te a n d in d e p e n d e n t re a litie s . It re m in d s u s o f le ib n itz s m o n a d is m a n d

B e r g s o n s c re a tiv e e v o lu tio n is m . J a in a s b e lie v e th a t th e re a re s o u ls in

in o rg a n ic o b je c ts lik e m e ta ls a n d . s to n e s . In a n in o rg a n ic b o d y th e s o u ls

e n d o rs e m e n t u n c o n s c io u s n e s s w h ilis t is a c tiv e in h u m a n b e in g . In J a in a s

lo g ic , w e fin d th e th e o ry o f s y a d v a d a i.e . th e th e o ry o f re la tiv ity o f

k n o w le d g e .

J a in is m h a s a ffin ity w ith B u d d h is m w ith re g a rd to p ra c tic a l w a y o f life .

M a h a v lra lik e B u d d h a in s is te d th a t w e s h o u ld n o t in ju re life w h e th e r in sp o rt

o r in s a c rific e .

T o s tre n g th e n th e p o s itio n o f p ro te s t, th e y b o th d e n y G o d fo r w h o s e

p ro p itia tio n th e s a c rific e s w e re b e in g o ffe re d . C h ie f fe a tu re o f J a in is m s e e k s to

s h o w a w a y o u t o f th e m is e ry o f life b y a u s te rity in w a rd a n d o u t w a r d . 56

T h e re m a rk a b le re s e m b la n c e b e tw e e n J a in is m a n d B u d d h is m in , th e ir

e th ic a l a s p e c t is d u e to th e fa c t th a t th e y b o th b o rro w fro m th e sa m e

B ra h m a n ic a l s o u rc e s .

A m o n g th e is tie p h ilo s o p h e rs w h o d o n o t re c o g n iz e G o d a s th e s o le

5 6 . I .P .V o l 1

R a d h a k ris h n a n

P .2 9 3
( 32)

c re a to r b e lo n g to th e S a n k h y a a n d th e M tm a m s a p h ilo s o p h y ..K a p ila w a s th e

fo u n d e r o f th e S a n k h y a S c h o o l.

T h e e le m e n ts o f S a n k h y a w e re s u b o rd in a te d in th e U p a n is a d a n d th e

B h a g v a d G ita to a n id e a lis tic th e is m . In its c la s s ic a l fo rm h o w e v e r th e

S a n k h y a d o e s n o t u p h o ld th e is m . In its in d iffe re n c e to th e su p re m a c y o f a n

a b s o lu te s p irit a s w e ll a s in its d o c trin e o f th e re la tio n o f A v id y a a n d th e

s o u l s e n ta n g le m e n t in S a m s lra , th e S a n k h y a re m in d s u s o f B u d d h is m .57 B u t

la te r S a n k h y a s a s fo r e g . V ijn a n a v ik s u in th e s ix te e n th c e n tu ry trie d to re v iv e

e a rlie r th e is m in th e S a n k h y a . T h e S a n k h y a m a in ta in s a c le a r c u t d u a lis m

b e tw e e n P u ru s a a n d P ra k rti a n d fu rth e r m a in ta in s th e p lu ra lity o f P u ru s a s .

T h e S a n k h y a is n o t a th e is tic in th e s e n s e th a t it e s ta b lis h e s th a t th e re is

n o G o d . I t o n ly sh o w s th a t th e re is n o re a s o n fo r s u p p o s in g th a t th e re is o n e . I t

e x p la in s th e w o rld p ro c e s s b y th e c o -o p e ra tio n o f P u ru s a a n d P ra k rti. F ro m

th is e v o lu tio n a ry p ro c e s s M a h a t, A h a n k a ra , M a n a s , se n s o ry o rg a n s , m o to r

o rg a n s a ris e .

T h e o ld g o d s o f th e V e d ic h y m n s m a n a g e to liv e u n d e r th e a e g is o f th e

ra tio n a lis tic S a n k h y a . T h e S a n k h y a a c c e p ts th e th e o ry o f a V y a v a s th a p a k a

Is h a ra w h o a t th e tim e o f c re a tio n a rra n g e s th e s u c c e s s iv e d e v e lo p m e n ts o f

P ra k rti.

57 . Iib id V o l. II
P 316
( 33 )

Like the SUnkhya, the MTmamsa philosophy also does not mention (>00

in matters o f creation. It believes in the authority o f the Vedas. It is most!

concerned with the ritualistic part o f the Vedas. It is also like the Sankhw:

pluralistic realism, Prabhakara, Kumarila are known MTmamsa kas. 1 h>

Mlmamsa believes in the law o f Karma, in unseen power (Apurva) in heaves

and hell, and God is ruled out as an unnecessary hypothesis, though the late

MTmamsakas like'. Apadeva and Laugaksi try to bring in God in thci

philosophy . 38

Mlmamsa does not admit the periodic creation and dissolution, tin
'

world. The world was never created and never shall it be destroyed. Thougl

individuals come and go, though the finite material products arise and perish

yet the world as such the universe as a whole goes on forever, uncreated an<

imperishable. There was never a time when the universe was different Iron

what is now.

In the subsequent chapter the atheistic tendencies o f both the Sankln.

and the MTmamsa are discussed.

The materialist schools o f Indian Philosophy represented currents o

thought evidently stimulated by nihilism. In order to dispute the doctrine tha

nothing existed it was necessary to rely upon the existence o f the material

58. A critical survey of Indian Phil.


C D. Sharma
P. 233
(34)

world, which no sensible person could possibly dispute. The connection

between nihilism and the outspokenly materialistic Vaisesika system still


%

remains a matter of investigation. But its connection with the quasi -

materialist Sahkhya system is quite evident. In their fight against the

nihilists, the Sankhya were driven very close to out and out materialism . 59

Even the Vedanta SUtras themselves do not accept the scriptures as

answering all the questions raised by those dissatisfied with the dogmas of

natural religion.
*

Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas, Sandlya studies the
A

Sastras60 (Bhagvata).

So highly developed and powerful were the materialist and naturalist

schools combatted by slamkarachSryya, that whenever he tried to refute their

arguments logically, he was driven to take up an essentially materialistic

position. His pantheistic monismis inverted to materialism.

Samkaracharyya begins his commentary of the Vedanta StJtras with the

assumption that it is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the

subject are opposed to each other as much as darkness and the light are and

therefore cannot be identical. Samkara exposed the materialist implication of

59. Materialism 60. Ibid


M.N. Roy P.106
P.79
(35)

the Vedantist pantheism. The dualistic conception of his monotheism could

be established only by the absurd sophistry of the doctrine of Maya. In

order to establish the Reality of an existence, which is simply assumed and

which by its very nature, as well as admittedly cannot be proved, the

perceptible and provable existence is declared to be an illusion. The Brahman

is associated with a certain power called Avidya which is the cause of all the

appearances of the world, the power cannot be called Being, tor Being is

only Brahman. But immediately it is also admitted that it cannot be called

non being, for 4t any rate, it produces the appearances of this world. MSya
i

belongs to Brahman as a Sakti. The material cause of the world is Brahman

in so far as it is associated with Maya. Like Spinozas conception of God, as

Substance jfamkaras conception of God as Para Brahman or Nirguna

Brahman, differs from the God of Religion. Therefore, as S.C.. Chatterjee

writes it is no wonder, therefore, that like Spinoza, Samkara also is Sometimes

accused o f atheism.61

In course of our discussion, we may bring F.H Bradleys views. He

insisted that an ultimate being i.e. an absolute could not have relations. In as

much as monotheism refers to an ultimate being it could not be linked with a

theistic stance..

61. Intro. To Ind. Phil.


S.C. Chatteijee and D.M. Dutta
P 395
(36)
seeing that theism necessarily implicates relation. For being in relation clearly

implicates there being another entity outside the one which has relation and

this inescapably limits and confines the latter. An entity being in relation

cannot therefore be all inclusive, unlimited. But according to Bradley, an

absolute being must be all inclusive and unlimited. If it is not, it cannot be

absolute. It follows, for him, therefore, that if a being is in relation it cannot be

absolute. The absolute with the all inclusive and limitless, is possible only

when our discourse is grounded in the dimension of power but not when it is

grounded in the dimension of consciousness. It holds good with respect to an

absolute being i.e. to a God, who is constituted as a being of power as an It,

it does not hold with respect to an absolute being i.e. to a God, who is

constituted as a being of consciousness, as a Thou. The early Indian

metaphysicians also regarded Brahman as an intelligent being or an

intelligent principle. But the materialists combatted that conception. The

materialists did not require the postulate of an external intelligence or force to

give the first impulse for the origin of the world.62

Kant defines reality as at rinity if Ideas - God, self and the World. The

great value of Kants work is that it has shown the absolute necessity of self

evidence in knowledge if we are to have a metaphysical theoiy of reality. And

for this reason K.C. Bhattacharyya defines philosophy itself as self evident

62. God, the self and Nothingness Collection by I.C P.R. Luknow
Reflections Eastern and Western
Essay Monotheism Encyclopaedia Judaica
P. 5?
( 37)

elaboration of the self evident. On its basis he develops his metaphysics

the self or subject and pleads for a real subjective study of the subject.<

Now, we turn to the naturalistic views of 19th century philosophet

namchy S.N. Agnihotri, largely known as Devatma. He viewed religion-

beliefs and interpretations in a more scientific and naturalistic way. He rosi.

above the Absolutistic or theistic attachment and openly committee

himself to the scientific method in the construction of his naturalistic W chai

schanung.64 He holds that there is nothing over and above nature. A naturalist

is committed to rejecting traditional religion, which is based on beliefs of flu

super-natural. In traditional religion, the super natural personal deity i-

worshipped because he is thought of as the zenith of both goodness am:

power.65

Devatma. before he turned naturalist, tried to prove the existence >1

God on three grounds. (1) The work of Gods power in the mineral world. <2

the work of God's power in the body of man and (3) the work of God's pow et

in the soul of man.

In support of his first argument he justified that as in the case of man

made book, we have to admit the existence of an intelligent author of it. in the

63. R a d hakrishnan & in teg ratly E xperience 65. E n cy clo p aed ia o f Phi
J.G, A rpura V ol. 5
P. 45 P. 145
64. T he E th ics o f D evatm a
S.P. K anal
P. 34
(38)

same way behind the expressions and relations of Nature, we have to admit

the existence of an intelligent author behind the book of this infinite Nature, of

which man is merely an infinitestimal part, and that this author is God.

In support of his second argument he put forward the view that there

are several bodily organs of man which do not move by mans own will viz.

lungs, liver, heart etc. These organs must work by the will of somebody. That

somebody is God.

In support of his third argument he said that there must be somebody

who is the author of that beauty of higher life, that felicity of mind and those

higher urges which we feel in our soul when the higher feelings are awakened.

That somebody is God.

Devatma himself came to reject these arguments on his reaching the true

understanding of the nature of force. He sat4, 'he error involved in all these

three arguments was as regards the ignorance about the nature of force and the

deductions based upon it. Force in whatever form it exists, inanimate, organic,

conscious or self-conscious is self-active, self-changing. To be force is to

change. Force is ceaselessly changing itself. The forces working in Nature

have in millions of years of their ceaseless changes assumed two forms -

(1) Non-living inorganic blind force of heat, light, electricity etc.

(2) Living organic forces in plants, animals and human existences.


(39 )

Now, in the words of Devatma66 none of these forces possessed any of

these attributes associated with the supposed person called God. Is God the

light of the sun which produces variety of beautiful colours in the vegetable

world, and which enables us to see various forms with our eyes? Again, is

God any of those multifurious life forces which work in millions of plants,

animals and human existences^ The theists would reply negatively.

Therefore, he came to conclusion that in Nature, everything is dependent,

related causally to one another. The human Soul also is not uncreated in

nature. It is the product of certain conditions in the biological world. It cannot

be independent of its living body, nor can the living body be independent of

physical universe, Every existents in the universe is in ceaseless change. The

soul, thus as a part of nature is in ceaseless change. The soul is also subject of

the laws o f nature i.e. life and death. Transcendental soul, free will is a

creation of imagination. Soul being a party of nature seeks adjustment within

it. Its relation with supra natural or transcendental in the form of God or

Brahman is illusory. Therefore like Carvaka, Devatma holdsthat transcendental

ideals of moksa are false.

Devatma rejected the belief in God only when he realized the scientific

method operating behind the occurences of Nature.

66. T.E.D. S. P. Kanal


PP. 38,39
(40)

A scientist may have the religions beliefs such as the belief in God or

soul etc. But in their scientific research they wont find the reason of such

beliefs. Mac doogall so w riter A Newton, a Pupin a lodge may tell as

impressively of his religion and moval convictions, but these convictions are

not the conclusions, to which he is led by his physical research. 67

Naturalism explains ail events and existences by natural causes i.e. as

steps in one orderly process of change - instead of having recourse at any

point of difficulty to the direct interference of some metaphysical agent or to

some theory of special creation. The continuity of natures processes so

strongly insisted on by Naturalism, in which the general idea of law and

orderly change presents itself to an age predominantly influenced by the

natural sciences.

Naturalists are generally engaged in helpful clarifications of problems

which arise in the course of human life rather than with anything else of

philosophical problems.

A naturalists view of reality not only has consequences for a

theological view of reality but also for the understanding of religions.

Religions are phenomena within reality. Thus, they can be studied just like

other human phenomena. Such naturalists view portrays the richness of matter.

67. Qtd. in Dharniadarsan


G. Barua
P. 98
(41)

Naturalists view of reality does not imply that we devalue human but that we

upgrade our views of reality. Naturalists explanation of human beings does

not follow that they are insignificant or equal in significance to e.g. sponges,

worms or rocks. In ones assessment of human being, the richness of matter

supports a sense of gratitude towards the reality which has given birth to us

and to all these other phenomena.68

The achievements of value in human life are due to two factors -

(1) Mans natural endowment together with the deposit of his past

achievements in the cultural heritage of a society and

(2) Things and process in non-human nature on which man depends for

the possibility of his successes and indeed his very life. 69

The first group includes religions humanists like Feuerbach Comte etc.

Feuerbach declared there was nothing outside nature and man, and that the

Supreme Being created by mans religious imagination were merely fantastic

reflections of mans own essence.

In Comtes view the service of humanity is the noblest ideal which

could be proposed to an individual. In the past self integration in the pursuit of

the ideal has been thought of a service of God, Unity with God or submission

to Gods will. To naturalist like Devatma, Dewey etc. the religious quality

68. Science, Religion & Naturalism 69. Ency. of Phil. Vol. 7


W.B. Drees P. 145
P 246
(42)

can be more effectively solved if the quest is not carried on under this banner.

To reflective men, super naturalist dogma will always appear dubious at best.

Huxley, a thorough going naturalist holds that the super naturalist world

view in terms of which religion has traditionally performed its functions is no

longer tenable in the light of modem scientific knowledge. He thinks that it is

possible to develop a full-blown religion on a naturalistic basis. Huxley puts

forward evolutionary naturalism, a view of the spatio - temporal universe

inspired by modem biology and cosmology, in which the universe is

conceived of as an indefinitely extended creative process always tending to

higher levels of development with all the sources and principles of this

creativity immanent in the process. 70

The idea of a first cause does not help us in moral progress. It lead to

inaction and irresponsibility. If God exists, He must be the sole cause of all

that happens good as well as evil and man can have no freedom of his will.

It appears that some of words most foremost philosophers, scientists

and artists have been avowed atheists. And increase in atheism has <|one hand

in hand with the spread of education. Even spokesman of the most

conservative religious groups have in recent years conceded that atheism may

well be a philosophical position i.e. adopted for the development of reasons.

70 Eney of Phil. Vol. 7


P 145
(43)

Jean Marie Le Blond expresses that atheism can be serene and deeply

human .71

Radhakrishnan says, atheism is the root of all modem challenge to

religion and is productive of all kinds of substitutes for religion such as

Naturalistic atheism, agnosticism, Humanism, Pragrmatism, Modernism;

Secularism etc.72

The atheistic existentialism is propounded by Heidegger, Sartre,

Camus. The existentialists maintain that the essential defect of rational thought

is that it proceeded from the principle of antithesis of subject - object i.e.

divided the world into two spheres the objective and the subjective, Rational

thought considers all reality including man only as an object as a Substance

something alien to man. Genuine Philosophy,existentialism maintains must

proceed from the unity of subject and object. Existentialism is a way of

thinking which takes selfconscious existence as the proper subject and point of

departure for philosophy.

Sartres basic ontological premise of existentialism is negative and

atheistic Existentialism is nothing but an attempt to draw all the

consequences from a consistent atheistic position .73 He holds that the very

notion of God is self contradictory and it relegates religious beliefs and

71. Ency. of Phil. Vol. 1 73. A History of Phil


P.174 Frank Thilly
72. Radhakrishnan & Integra! Experience P 589
J.G.Arpura
P. 40
(44 )

theological dozmas to a limbo of pure mythology.74

An atheists deliberately attempts to break his vital, intimate bonds of

communion with God. There are some great intellectual atheists like

Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Comte of our times who deliberately denied God

and they created for themselves a new, attractive God of their own. An

elaborate discussion of the same has been made in the last chapter of the

present work.

74. Ibid
P. 589

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