Terrorism As Conflicting Networks & Language Games

T E R R O R I S M A S C O N F L I C T I N G N E T W O R K S & L A N G U A G E G A M E S
Therefore, see without looking, hear without listen-/ ing, breathe without asking:/ The inevita-
ble is what will seem to happen to you/ purely by chance;/ The Real is what will strike you as
really absurd:/ Unless you are certain you are dreaming, it is certainly/ a dream of your own;/
Unless you exclaim – “There must be some mistake”/ – you must be mistaken. - Auden 1
But because being here is much, and because/ all this/ that’s here. So fleeting, seems to re-
quire us/ and strangely/ concerns us. Us the most fleeting of all./ Just once, everything, only
for once. Once and no more./ And we, too,/ once. And never Again. But this/ having been
once, though only once,/ having been once on earth – can it ever be cancelled? - Rilke 2
Introduction
Can we imagine a world without terrorism? Can we imagine a set of policies that
actually address the root-causes of terrorism; policies that reduce the probability of
terrorist acts occurring; policies that reduce rather than increases their probability.
Could it be that our counter-terrorism policies to date have been ineffectual because
we do not really understand terrorism? 3 What follows is a philosophical discussion
of terrorism as a system. By philosophical I mean a conversation that attempts to
clarify our thinking on this topic. To accomplish this conversation I have introduced
grammar that is more familiar to philosophers, especially those who have read Witt-
genstein. I am treating terrorism as a system of interrelated parts, a network. 4 The
terrorists who carry out an attack are actually just one small component of this sys-
tem. Focusing our Intelligence gathering to catch these individuals and funding mili-
tary attempts to kill these individuals will do little to destroy the system that com-
prises terrorism.
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been fighting two wars in Afghani-
stan and Iraq (both are still ongoing) as components in the “war on terrorism.” The
United States has spent more than three trillion dollars of U.S. taxpayers’ income (or
future income). All this for a “war on terrorism.” Yet, nuclear threats from privatized
terrorist organizations or rogue states today are highly probable. More likely than at
any time in the past. There is no end in sight to potential threats. The likely suspects
whom may one-day carry out an attack against interests of the United States have
exponentially increased. It does not take genius to imagine if the next trillion dollars
might be spent far differently.
Can we imagine more nuanced and productive objectives? Policies that are moral?5
Different policies than those that have been tried and found wanting? To make these
choices – on what to allocate capital and how much capital – requires dialogue. Are
we captive to our own language concerning terrorism? Is the language that we use
to describe the war against terrorism choking off new, more creative ways for us to
Lyle Brecht DRAFT 2.8 -- Friday, July 9, 2010 CAPITAL MARKETS RESEARCH Page 1 of 19
imagine how to deal with the problem of terrorism? Presently, even if the political will
existed, do we lack the grammar for such dialogue?
What should concern us is the grammar some use to describe today’s counter-terror
policies of the United States: renditions, secret prisons, concentration camps, tor-
ture, wars of occupation, oil-centrism, and empire, to describe the “war against ter-
rorism.” Credible surveys of world opinion rank the President of the United States
about equal to Osama bin Laden as among the best-known terrorists in the world.
The United States government, in these surveys, is ranked with al-Qaeda as among
the most dangerous terrorist organizations in the world.
Might even discussing counter-terrorism policy from within the monicker, “the war
against terrorism,” be inappropriate and misleading? The grammar of war denotes a
set of activities that can result in something being won. Whether through occupying
territory or by applying force to make the other side give-up. Neither course is avail-
able to opponents in a contest employing terrorism. Terrorism is not a contest that
can be “won” in any conventional way of thinking. War can be won through the em-
ployment of violence and counter-violence. Terrorism cannot. Cleaning up our
grammar is important. This requires that we first clean up our thinking; about terror-
ism.
In this discussion I introduce a series of propositions regarding terrorism. I discuss

terrorism as a systems game, the game of “terror-ism.” Terror-ism is a game that is
being played in real-time by two opposing sides. A game of deadly moves and
counter-moves. For example, one side could open with an attack using tactical nu-
clear weapons. Then, what should the other side’s move be? This way of thinking
may illuminate new possibilities. That is my hope. Possibilities for policies to ade-
quately address such threat scenarios. Possibilities for rethinking how funding is
allocated to produce specific results. Most of all, one might consider if this is a
game worth playing at all. Especially, according to the rules established by the op-
posing side.
These propositions suggest a terrorist attack need not occur any more frequently
that every twenty to thirty years. Yet even at this frequency of attack, terrorism re-
mains a top-of-the-mind issue. An issue requiring hundreds of billions of dollars
spent on counter-measures. Money not spent on other pressing problems. This as-
sumes the “rules of a game” are similar to today’s counter-terrorism policies.
These propositions suggest that both Intelligence and military force (as we presently
imagine these activities) provide limited means for thwarting attacks. Or responding
to threat scenarios. Twenty-first century terrorism is a particular, dispersed, net-
worked activity. It is emergent from the activities of the system within which it is em-
bedded. Terrorism is merely a tactic (albeit horrific and immoral) to achieve particular
results. As a tactic, it rapidly evolves (changes tactical forms and strategy). These
tactical forms of post-modern terrorism have evolved specifically as a counter-force
to traditional Intelligence gathering and military force. Traditional Intelligence gather-
ing and military force was developed and perfected for modern state-to-state con-
flict. These institutions may be ill suited to adequately address emergent activities
from systems requiring re-engineering and restructuring, not destruction.
Whether traditional linear-thinking Intelligence and military force can be adapted to

evolve quickly enough to counter emergent and non-linear-thinking twenty-first cen-
tury terrorism is unclear. Terrorist attacks in the future are more likely to look different
than knowable attacks imagined today. Groups and individuals that our Intelligence
has no knowledge of will most likely carry out future attacks. And these attacks may
not even employ violence. At least the forms of violence we associate with terrorist
attacks today. Attacks to achieve unrelenting fear and massive disruption. Disruption
of existing systems: of commerce and governance and life-sustenance.
These propositions are just a beginning to create a new grammar concerning terror-
ism. Grammar capable of articulating questions that are hard to ask coherently in
today’s talk of terrorism. Questions concerning present policy that might enable
imaginative and creative dialogue of new possibilities. Today’s game of terror-ism, to
be played competently at all, requires an abrupt change, a metanoia, from yester-
day’s decisions; from yesterday’s methods and practices. It is past time to stop
waging a war against terrorism that cannot be won. Let us start playing this game
smarter, with a new mind. If we choose to play at all.
Propositions
1. Terror-ism6 is a life-game7 pitting two opposing sides with differing world-pictures 8

against one another. The objective of the life-game of terror-ism is to elicit fear of
suffering and pain in the Other.9 A game is won if one side is able to establish and
maintain control over the other side through this fear.
.1 World-pictures are determinate of life-games. Life-games emerge over time

through trial and error, constrained by our particular world-pictures.
.1.1 Life-games are descriptive of activities that have meaning (and importance)
for participants of a game. Individuals in the West tend to play life-games for
utilitarian reasons. Different life-games compete with one another based on
their utility. This may not be the case for people from other cultural and relig-
ious backgrounds. There are many kinds of games to play with Others rather
than the game of terror-ism.
.1.2 World-pictures are described through contingent language-games 10 in use

by followers of a particular world-picture. These language-games delimit
how one describes the slice of reality that one sees or can be shown.
.1.2.1 Language-games are comprised of grammar and the rules for the use of this
grammar. Language-games are used to construct narratives incorporating
symbols and metaphors that describe deep aspects of the reality we can be
shown through our world-picture.
.1.2.2 The particular world-picture in dominant use at any one point in time limits
the context for how language-games might be used to show someone an
aspect of the wider reality around them.
.1.2.3 The particular world-picture in dominant use at any one point in time limits
the meaning for what these language-games might say (the narratives that
can be said; those that have meaning) about the aspect of the wider reality
one is shown.
.2 Terrorism can arise out of almost all types of world-pictures. It is an emergent

activity; a tactic resulting from certain systems thinking concerning reality as
seen through the individual or group’s world picture. Few individuals, maybe
none, start out with the intention of becoming a “terrorist.” Terrorism itself is just
one component, an aspect of an entire system of thought and human activity.
Attempting to stamp out terrorism by interdicting acts of terror or by capturing
or killing individuals is like attempting to stop the spread of bubonic plague by
bloodletting. The entire system that is creating the pathology must be ad-
dressed.
.2.1 Terrorism is merely a tactic for engendering fear; fear that produces change.
Fear is an emotional response. It is internal to the self. What are important
are the language-games one uses to describe this fear. The language-games
one uses to talk about this fear will most likely drive the moves one makes in
the life-game of terror-ism. What the terrorist wants to do is to get inside our
head; to propel us to think about their case (“cause”). That is the primary
objective of a “winning” move; to force us to rethink our world-picture. The
act of terror is just a means (albeit immoral and horrific) to this end. Thus, all
acts of terror are ultimately political and theological. Despite the in-humane
means (terror), it behooves players to look at the information contained in
the move (act of terror) and the assumptions driving the game of terror-ism.
.2.2 A terrorist attack, to be effective, must be public and symbolic. The act must
be designed to do more than just kill the other. It must establish a narrative
that means something to the opposing side on which this act is perpetrated.
Repeated narrative accounts of the act via media and remembrance (anam-
nesis) magnify the importance of the event in the minds of the affected
population. This also spreads the impact of the move beyond the immedi-
ately affected individuals harmed by the attack.
.2.3 It is highly unlikely that government by itself can “control” the language-
games establishing perception of a terrorist attack. Neither limiting access
to knowledge of the attack nor claiming an event was different than what
actually occurred is typically helpful. No matter what language-games media
reports use to manipulate or government spokespersons spin, what is im-
portant is the narrative account individuals adopt themselves.
.2.3.1 It is possible for individuals or governments to use a terrorist attack to pro-

duce disproportionate fear, either intentionally or unintentionally, for a time.
.2.3.2 If individuals or governments use means to produce disproportionate fear

intentionally, the outcome from this manipulation cannot be known with cer-
tainty or confidence. Usually, telling the truth (in narrative form), as one un-
derstands it, is the least risky path.
.3 The moves in the life-game of terror-ism do not determine the level of fear felt.
The language-games one personally and collectively uses to express the fear
felt is what establishes the level of fear personally and collectively.
.3.1 A move (terrorist attack) is just an activity or event in space and time. By
itself, a move means little without interpretation.
.3.2 How a move is interpreted determines the effectiveness of a game move to

produce fear.
.3.3 The objective of each move may not only be to create fear. Violence is not
the only means to create fear. Counter-violence is not the only means to
create fear in opponents. (Counter-violence will not stop violence.) However,
violence and counter-violence are often the most readily used moves and
counter-moves. This is not to suggest that these are the best moves.
.3.3.1 A game, once started, cannot be stopped using violence or counter-violence

moves.
.3.3.2 The objective of a game cannot be to stop the game.
.3.3.3 The only way to stop a game, once it has started, is to not play.
.4 The moves and counter-moves in the life-game of terror-ism may be capital-

intensive unless one is careful.
.4.1 One side’s game strategy may be to elicit particularly expensive and asym-
metric moves by their opponent(s).
.4.1.1 For example, a game strategy of disproportionate spending for counter-

moves might create such financial stress as to weaken the play of the oppo-
nent.
.4.1.2 Disproportionate spending for counter-moves also creates an almost auto-

matic “moral advantage” for the less-endowed opponent.
.4.2 If a game has no foreseeable ending, one should calculate the available
cash flow available to play a game during each discrete period of play.
.4.2.1 Once the available cash flow for each period is known, capital constraints
should limit the type of moves one instigates to play a game.
.4.2.2 Game moves should be chosen based on their cost-effectiveness in playing

a game. There will never be adequate capital available to fund all desired
moves and counter-moves.
.4.3 Alternatively, one might calculate the capital requirements to stop a game by
not playing.
.4.3.1 Stopping a game by not playing is highly unlikely because too many vested
interests imagine that by not playing a game they will be worse off.
.4.3.2 If one wishes to stop a game by not playing, capital must be invested to
change the world-picture of game players so that a new game, other than
terror-ism, can be imagined.
.4.3.3 The capital required to change world-pictures so that a new game can be
imagined is probably more than the capital necessary to fund playing the
game in any one play-period.
.5 The moves and counter-moves in a game may be counter-productive unless one

is careful. That is, moves and counter-moves are selected that intensify the fear
and increate the tempo, rather than slow the game down or reduce perceived
fear.
.5.1 A game may lead to an ever-increasing spiral of violence and counter-

violence unless one is particularly careful in designing moves and counter-
move strategy. This spiral-effect means that more people on both sides will
loose their lives in each successive move.
.5.1.1 It is highly unlikely that through moves of violence and counter-violence that
enough individuals on each opposing side can be killed to cause the spiral
of violence to cease. This is one difference between war and the game of
terror-ism.
.5.1.2 The game of terror-ism feeds on violence. The strength of a game intensi-
fies. Violent moves and counter-moves tend to produce a self-perpetuating
game.
.5.2 A game may lead to an ever-increasing requirement for capital to fund

moves and counter-moves unless one is particularly careful in designing
moves and counter-move strategy.
.5.2.1 The tempo and intensity of a game determine the capital requirements of the
financially dominant opponent in a game. The less financially able opponent
can get by with significantly less funds, yet play the game well.
.5.2.2 Any specific move in a game can be extremely inexpensive, yet produce
disproportionate financial damage if one of the opponents is a nation state
and the other a group of privatized individuals. Nation states that are nuclear
security states are particularly vulnerable to the costs of terrorism. More so

than non-nuclear states.
.6 It is risky to conflate non-game objectives with game objectives when making

moves.
.6.1 For example, initiating moves that acquire oil reserves may be a solid na-
tional strategic objective. But claiming this move should be made for
counter-terror purposes is dangerous. It is destructive of game-play, with
unforeseen consequences.
.6.2 Playing the game is hard enough. Introducing other strategic considerations
into the game only hobbles the play of the side adding the complexities.
Playing the game competently requires fixity of purpose and clear vision, not
multiplexed purposes.
2 A game of terror-ism is always played for deeper reasons than to control the
Other through fear. These reasons may always be explained using rationality and
objective language. However, these reasons may be best able to be understood
non-rationally (theologically) using subjective language. This applies to both
sides playing the game. By “theologically” I mean the use of subjective grammar
that describes the meaning of particular motivations and aspects of reality.
2.1A game of terror-ism is a rational game played by both sides for real reasons
like: human freedom, self-determination, access to natural resources, a “better
life,” the basic requirements for living (e.g. food, clean water, shelter), etc.
Games of terror-ism are almost never played for evil reasons, from the perspec-
tive of each player.
2.1.1 The probability (P) of any one imagined move in a game of terror-ism will
approach certainty (P = ~0.96t) over a specific planning period.
2.1.2 What cannot be calculated with any degree of certainty or confidence are
the results from any imagined move.
2.1.3 The only means of reducing the probability (P) of any imagined move in a
game is to invest capital to remove the pre-conditions for that move.
2.1.4 Intelligence is an inadequate means for removing all pre-conditions for a

specific move. At most, Intelligence can uncover a small percentage of data
concerning the actors who may wish to participate in a game of terror-ism

and their specific plans during any one game-period.
2.1.4.1Terrorist attacks in the future are more likely to look different than knowable
attacks imagined today. The probability of accurately anticipating an attack
and adequately planning for its counter valence is very low, almost negligi-
ble. The only attacks that we are capable of averting are known or knowable
attacks.
2.1.4.2The organizational structure of Intelligence affects the quality of Intelligence

gathering and analysis less than the mission parameters for the Intelligence
agencies being coordinated, all else being equal. Data is collected and ana-
lyzed based on its utility to the perceived mission. Aberrant data is dis-
counted until a paradigm shift occurs (a change in world-picture) that ren-
ders the previously aberrant data obvious and discussable.
2.1.4.3Intelligence mission budgets typically do not accurately reflect the relative

importance of various missions. Usually missions that are established and
known receive the bulk of available funding. Important new missions are
almost invariably under-funded. The level of funding for a mission also is not
determinate of the quality or results for that mission. The level of dedication
and capabilities of specific individuals assigned to a mission is often a
greater determinant of results than funding levels.
2.1.4.4There is never budget available to adequately fund all-important missions.
2.1.4.5Future attacks are most likely to be carried out by groups and individuals
our Intelligence has no knowledge. The probability of accurately anticipating
an attack by specific, unknown individuals or groups is very low, almost
negligible. The only attacks that we are capable of averting are attacks by
known or knowable attackers.
2.1.4.6The occurrence of a terrorist attack in any one period does not mean that
inadequate Intelligence was gathered prior to the attack. The attack does
not indicate that Intelligence efforts have failed. The absence of an attack
during any one period does not mean that adequate Intelligence was gath-
ered to thwart future attacks. The gathering and use of Intelligence has little
bearing on the probability of future terrorist attacks overall. However, the
gathering and use of Intelligence does affect the probability of terrorist at-
tacks by specific individuals and groups, and specific threat scenarios.
2.1.4.7Future attacks may not even employ violence, at least the forms of violence
we associate with terrorist attacks today. We might expect that future oppo-
nents develop non-violent moves. Even though these moves are non-violent,
they may produce unrelenting fear and massive disruption of existing sys-
tems: of commerce, governance and life-sustenance.
2.1.4.8Maintaining the strictest secrecy regarding counter-moves primarily assists

the gaming strategy of the opponents in the terror-ism game. Secrecy slows
down constructive learning and accountability for playing the game better.
Also, terrorism, due to its dispersed and networked structure must rely on
the eyes and ears of non-professionals to gather data. Over attentiveness to
secrecy only aids opponents in the game of terror-ism.
2.1.4.9Today’s mission for Intelligence may be fundamentally flawed. By focusing

on humanocentric threats of intentional violence, Intelligence ignores the
greater threats from natural sources and unintentional humanocentric vio-
lence. By focusing on threats of terror and bad guys, Intelligence misses
non-political, non-violent counters to these threats that are naturally occur-
ring or that could be fostered through investments in human corrective ac-
tion.
2.1.5 Military activities designed to kill specific terrorist actors or destroy interest
on the part of potential participants in a game of terror-ism is an inadequate
means for removing all pre-conditions for a specific move.
2.1.5.1The use of counter-violence and force for game-moves, at best, may slow
the tempo of counter-moves in a game. Counter-violence and force cannot
stop a game. The use of counter-violence and force for moves can increase
the tempo of the terror-ism game.
2.1.5.2The use of force and counter-force for game moves does nothing to direct
the world-picture, language-games or grammar of one’s opponent(s) to-
wards peace. What the use of force and counter-force does is to accentuate
and reinforce the language-games of violence used by one’s opponents.
2.1.5.3Military mission budgets typically do not accurately reflect the relative im-
portance of various missions. Usually missions that are established and
known receive the bulk of available funding. Important new missions are
almost invariably under-funded. The level of funding for a mission also is not
determinate of the quality or results for that mission. The level of dedication
and capabilities of specific individuals assigned to a mission is often a
greater determinant of results than funding levels.
2.1.5.4There is never budget available to adequately fund all-important missions.
2.1.5.5The occurrence of a terrorist attack in any one period does not mean that
inadequate countervailing force was used prior to the attack. The absence
of an attack during any one period does not mean that adequate force was
used to thwart future attacks. The use and intensity of force has little bearing
on the probability of future terrorist attacks overall. However, the use of force
does affect the probability of terrorist attacks by specific individuals and
groups and specific threat scenarios.
2.1.5.6Today’s mission for the military may be fundamentally flawed. By focusing

narrowly on violence and counter-violence manpower roles, training, weap-
ons systems and mission, the military ignores the greater threats from natu-
ral sources and unintentional humanocentric violence. For example, the mili-
tary spends over a million dollars per capita to train special forces opera-
tives to excel in difficult combat operations. Yet, there is no comparable mili-
tary program, with similar per capita spending to train individuals to excel in
difficult negotiating circumstances in order to avoid violence as the solution
to a conflict.
2.2The moves of each side have a logical structure. However, oftentimes a move is
determined more by the institutional structure of participating actors in a game
than by the tempo (cadence) and tactical requirements of a game itself.
2.2.1 Making moves that are based on the institutional structure of the side play-
ing a game rather than the tempo and tactical requirements of the game it-
self often leads to moves that are nonsense (illogical or irrational).
2.2.2 Making moves that are based on sectarian religious objectives often leans to
moves that are nonsense (illogical or irrational), as well as encourages tor-
ture.
2.2.2.1Each move in the game has a theological component. This theological

component describes the meaning one might attribute to this action. This
meaning is subjective, not objective. That is, theological discourse is non-
rational, not rational discourse (also, not irrational discourse). Theological
discourse is able to discuss things that rational discourse misses. Theologi-
cal discourse is necessary to explain and understand the meaning of things
in one’s world-picture. Theological discourse is helpful to elucidate the logi-
cal structure of a game.
2.2.2.2Sectarian religiosity and religious discourse is not the same as solid theo-
logical discourse. While solid theological discourse is subjective, sectarian
religious discourse is often objective and ideological. Whereas solid theo-
logical discourse is non-rational, sectarian religious discourse is often irra-
tional. Solid theological discourse can be accomplished successfully in set-
tings where the Other is embraced. Sectarian religious discourse is often
initiated to exclude the Other. Sectarian religious discourse often attempts to
arrive at certainty when there is none; to apply conformance while inde-
pendent thinking is what is needed; to apply sectarianism where plurality is
necessary. Sectarian religious discourse does not elucidate the logical struc-
ture of a game.
2.2.2.3Letting sectarian religiosity determine game moves makes no more sense

in this game than in a game of chess.
2.2.2.4Torture cannot be logically used as a means for eliciting truth or discerning

the certainty of specific data. For example, there is no way to ascertain with
certainty the probability that information obtained through torture is accu-
rate. The only means to determine if torture produces accurate retrieval of
information in any particular situation is to already know for certain the data
the tortured subject provides, before they provide it. That is, the data must
be known in some other, objective fashion than through torture to be known
with any certainty at all. Torture and the proclivity to torture may result from
sectarian religiosity to engage in retributive justice, to punish the “evil”
Other. Torture is an irrational counter-terror activity. It is merely a form of
barbarous terrorism; a means to produce terror.
2.2.3 Game moves may produce a political result. But this result cannot be calcu-
lated with any degree of certainty or confidence.
2.2.4 Game moves must be decided using rational means based on the particular
logic of the move being played. Neither religious nor political dialogue is
useful for determining the best next move.
2.2.4.1Political dialogue is useful for initiating conversation to decide whether to

play a game or not. Whether or not to play a game of terror-ism cannot be
made on purely rational calculus. This decision is ethical in nature. Ethics
defies rational analysis. Likewise, the ethics of specific moves cannot be
decided using a rational calculus. Political dialogue (along with theological
considerations) is necessary to arrive at whether specific moves in the game
are ethically acceptable.
2.2.4.2Political dialogue is also useful to establish levels of available capital that

might be invested to play a game and that spent on specific game moves.
However, the opportunity costs for playing a game and each move should
also be calculated (e.g. “What are we giving up by playing this game at this
level of intensity, at this time?”).
2.2.4.3Letting political dialogue determine game moves makes no more sense in

this game than in a game of chess.
3 A game of terror-ism comes in at least three different flavors. All are emergent
from prevailing world-pictures of players at the time a game is being played. All
comprise terror-ism, based on their potential fear-inducing results.
3.1One flavor is a game of terror-ism played by two human opponents, where there
is a perceived “Other.”
3.1.1 This flavor of game has an “enemy.” The Other is the enemy. The enemy is
described as “evil;” polluted with strange and bizarre ideas that are foreign
to our world-picture.
3.1.2 An example is al-Quida, which orchestrated the 9-11 attacks on the United
States.
3.2A second flavor is a game of terror-ism played, by default, against the odds of
an event occurring. The Other are those who fail to act.
3.2.1 This flavor of game has no real enemy outside or “other than.”
3.2.2 An example that illustrates this flavor of the life-game of terrorism is the
problem of global warming. The “terrorists” in this flavor of game are those
officials who promote inaction because of self-interested, self-enriching
considerations. They fail to act for the public good. Their inactions cause
death and produce fear, just as any more-conventional terrorist attack may.
It only sometimes occurs more slowly, over a protracted period of time. This
still meets the conditions of a game of terror-ism.
3.3A third flavor is a game of terror-ism played by two human opponents where
there is no perceived Other.
3.3.1 This flavor of the terror-ism game has no enemy outside, but an enemy on
the inside; one of “us.”
3.3.2 Examples that illustrates this flavor are some key executives of the failed
ENRON Corporation. These individuals looted the company and destroyed
billions of dollars in employee pension funds, caused the death of numerous
citizens in California by disrupting electric power service, and consumed
millions of dollars in public funds through protracted legal proceedings. If
the deliberate and premeditated actions of these individuals can create as
much death and destruction as any more-conventional terrorist act, why
would we not imagine these people as our opponents in a game of terror-
ism?
4 A hermeneutics of hope best describes the thinking required for mapping the
best moves in a game of terror-ism. This is because a primary component of the
game is the use of symbolic and metaphoric narrative, not “war planning strat-
egy.” These narratives are ultimately theological narratives. That is, they supply a
deep meaning for moves and counter-moves in the game. The best moves ask
deeply penetrating questions of each other’s world-pictures.
4.1We live daily with violence all around us. Why some forms of violence and not
others become constituted as moves in a terror-ism life-game is due to the
language-games used to describe the violence. If the language-games discuss
the violence as “symbolic” and associated with specific deeper objectives that
challenge the world-picture of those to whom the violence is being done, then
oftentimes the violence is referred to a terror-ism.
4.1.1 Insurgencies may or may not incorporate terrorist actions in their tactics. But
insurgencies are not games of terror-ism. For example, would the fight for
independence by American colonists against the British be categorized as a
terrorism or an insurgency? It was an insurgency. The insurgency in Iraq is
an insurgency. It is not a game of terror-ism.
4.1.2 Virtually all wars include terrorist actions. For example, the fire-bombing of
Dresden during WWII; the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki; the resulting death of 49 million people from the National Social-
ists’ policies in Nazi Germany, most of whom were civilians: including six
million Jews, hundreds of thousands of Poles, homosexuals, Soviet prison-
ers, Gypsies (Romas) and handicapped German nationals. This does not
make wars the same as a game of terror-ism.
4.2The grammar of terror-ism works in two directions. If counter-moves involve

counter-violence, the party to whom terror was done, now becomes a perpetra-
tor of terror-ism (from the perspective of third parties). The contest then be-
comes one of two “terrorist groups” doing terror-ism to one another. There are
no objectively-determined “good guys” vs. the “bad guys” in this scenario. Both
act as “terrorists.” The fact that either side does not wish to acknowledge their
“terror-ism,” but imagine instead that they are acting/reacting in self-defense,
does not change this systemic perception.
4.2.1 There is a difference between seeing and showing. Seeing involves a know-
ing (both explaining and understanding) internal to the self. We cannot see
what cannot be explained, nor understood. Showing, on the other hand,
involves having something demonstrated outside the interiority of the self.
Thus, this something is publicly knowable by those outside the confines of
the life-game being played. One perspective is not necessarily more “real”
than another’s, but what one can see, or what one can be shown at any par-
ticular point in time, does not constitute the entirety of what is real and true.
Neither what one can see or be shown can be known with certainty.
4.2.2 What is real and true is that terror-ism life-games, where moves and
counter-moves revolve around violence and counter-violence for their sub-
stance, are games between two terrorist-like sides. Both parties are engag-
ing in a game of terror-ism.
4.2.3 To play the terror-ism game with violence entails one becoming “like a ter-
rorist” from someone’s perspective.
5 A game of terror-ism is built upon a philosophical dualism of “the Other” that is

philosophically, scientifically, and theologically nonsense (from a post-modern
perspective).
5.1The philosophical assumption is that the Other is universally and incontrovertibly

“different than and less than” our self and those who constitute our reference
group. There is little truth to this statement. There are no known laws of physics,
biology, or psychology, or other sciences that confirm this belief. This belief of
exclusion, rather than embrace of, the Other is usually based on fear. If fear was
not already evident, the Other would not be able to engage in a game of terror-
ism to build on this pre-existent fear. Theologically speaking, this is idolatry.
5.2Usually, Others are more similar to one’s own self than different or less than.
5.2.1 World-pictures can be radically divergent between two different representa-

tives of the human race, yet exhibit fundamental similarities in human pur-
poses and desires for what constitutes a “good life.”
5.2.2 Oftentimes the prevailing problem with those having divergent world-
pictures has to do with issues of power. If an aspect of the world-picture of
one group is that they are obviously superior to other groups of humans, or
have access to a disproportionate amount of world resources, or are looking
for obsequiousness from the other group, then this is an inherently con-
flicted situation.
5.2.2.1Conflict does not necessarily lead to violence and counter-violence. Con-

flict does not usually lead to a game of terror-ism.
5.2.2.2For a game of terror-ism to begin, two parties must be willing and ready to
play. Also, other dialogic options to a game of terror-ism either must have
been exhausted, or not be available to both parties.
6 If we are playing a game of terror-ism, we may not be playing other games that
may be more interesting, more important life-games (e.g. liberal democracy,
education, health-care, commerce, managing our finances so that future genera-
tions are not burdened by our consumption, etc.).
6.1“Winning” is not useful grammar for describing outcomes from playing a game
of terror-ism. This game cannot be “won” by either side. That is, playing a game
of terror-ism long enough will transform both sides into different actors from
whence a game began. Neither side may retain the same world-picture with
which they began a game. Both sides’ world-pictures will most likely change by
playing a game of terror-ism.
6.1.1 The change of world-picture enabled by playing the game might result in
new possibilities for human freedom that could be viewed as either positive
or negative from today’s vantage point by different constituencies.
6.1.2 However, it is impossible to calculate whether or not new possibilities for

human freedom could have been reached in the future by alternate, less
costly means than by engaging in a game of terror-ism today.
6.1.3 Secrecy inhibits new ideas for developing game strategy. Instead, secrecy
tends to encourage the game be played around fairly narrow, known strate-
gies with fairly conventional tactics, with limited usefulness. That is why the
opponents in the game may be viewed as “creative” and “resourceful” when
they really are not. They only appear as such relative to the “uncreative” and
“lack of resourcefulness” of the conventional secret tactics used to thwart
attacks in the game of terror-ism.
6.2“Loosing” is useful grammar for describing outcomes from playing a game of

terror-ism. The game of terror-ism cannot be “won” in any conventional way of
thinking about winning.
6.2.1 No particular move in the game can be accurately classified as a “terrorist

move” or a “counter-terrorist move.” Each move is just “a move” or “a
counter-move” in the game of terror-ism being played.
6.2.2 All moves in the game entail loosing something: freedom of movement,
capital, human lives, opportunities, world-pictures, reputation, respect, faith,
hope, etc.
7 What we cannot speak about, we cannot imagine. Illiteracy and incompetence in

interpreting the “text” of our opponent’s moves of terror breeds unimaginative
pain and suffering from inappropriately-chosen game moves/counter-moves
gone bad.11
ENDNOTES
1W. H. Auden, “For the Time Being,” in W. H. Auden, Collected Longer Poems (New York:
Random House, 1969), 138 quoted in John Dominic Crossan, The Dark Interval: Towards a
Theology of Story (Polebridge Press, 1988), 39.
2 Rainer Maria Rilke, Selected Works: II. Poetry, trans. J.B. Leishman (New York: New Direc-
tions, 1967), 244 quoted in Crossan, 2.
3 Since 9/11, despite the massive effort of the expensively funded U.S. “war on terrorism,”
terrorism world-wide is at an all-time high; magnitudes beyond pre-9/11 levels.
4 These “self-organized networks of terror.... obey rigid laws that determine their topology,
structure, and therefore their ability to function. They exploit all the natural advantages of self-
organized networks, including flexibility and tolerance to internal failures” and disruption
through normal means. See Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Linked: The New Science of Networks
(Cambridge, MA: Persius Publishing, 2002), 223.
5Can we rightly imagine that the present ‘war on terrorism’ waged on behalf of the American
people is moral? Since 9/11, America’s ‘war on terror,’ waged ‘to preserve the American way
of life,’ has killed an estimated 30,000 to 100,000 people, wounded another 250,000 people,
and displaced more than a million people from their homes, the vast majority of those killed,
wounded or displaced being women and children.
6 “Terror-ism” indicates that we have objectified and reified this activity and turned it into an
aberrant “life-game.” Terrorism, as a human activity, is almost as old as human civilization.
What is new today is how we talk about terrorism. We have changed our world-picture to in-
clude terrorism as a central aspect, almost a doctrine, for how we view reality. This is new.
7Games of importance “played” against one or more opponents that have non-trivial out-
comes (i.e. life or death).
8 “World-picture,” according to Ludwig Wittgenstein, might be thought of as a frame or

framework through which we look to discern what is real and what is not, and what is impor-
tant, from our vantage point. Ultimately, this looking creates a “picture” of the world that we
use to decipher new data. New data needs to “fit” this picture. It must “make sense” within
our world-picture. Otherwise, new data (ideas, experiences, paradigms) are nonsense, even
though they are “real” in a larger sense.
9 Used in this context, “Others” are the opponent(s), in all his/her manifestations, in a game.
“Other” describes someone “different” than our self and our preferred reference group. Other-
ness is typically perceived as a symptom “of godlessness and degeneration.” “Others” are
those who inhabited the camps of Auschwitz and the Gulag. “Others” are those whom the
modern state wages genocide, the “categorical killing” of those who are classified as “Other.”
See Zygmunt Bauman, “A Century of Camps? (1995)” in Peter Beilhartz, ed., The Bauman
Reader (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 277, 280.
10“Language-games,” from Ludwig Wittgenstein, highlights the reality that individual words
and sentences have different meanings and connotations based on context. Also, these
meanings “evolve” over time; word and sentence meanings are not static but dynamic, requir-
ing interpretation to convey meaning.
11 An account of the ‘meaning’ of the situation is in no way ‘given,’ but must be ‘constructed’
in light of the system of interests revealed as the policy-maker addresses issues of contin-
gency and particularity related to the crisis situation engendered by the treat of terrorism. See
Paul H. Ballard, “Pastoral Theology as Theology of Reconciliation,” Theology 91, 1988, 375
quoted in Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (London: HarperCollinsPub-
lishers, 1992), 556, 562.

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In this discussion I introduce a series of propositions regarding terrorism. I discuss

Whether traditional linear-thinking Intelligence and military force can be adapted to

1. Terror-ism6 is a life-game7 pitting two opposing sides with differing world-pictures 8

.1 World-pictures are determinate of life-games. Life-games emerge over time

.1.2 World-pictures are described through contingent language-games 10 in use

.2 Terrorism can arise out of almost all types of world-pictures. It is an emergent

.2.3.1 It is possible for individuals or governments to use a terrorist attack to pro-

.2.3.2 If individuals or governments use means to produce disproportionate fear

.3.2 How a move is interpreted determines the effectiveness of a game move to

.3.3.1 A game, once started, cannot be stopped using violence or counter-violence

.3.3.2 The objective of a game cannot be to stop the game.

.4 The moves and counter-moves in the life-game of terror-ism may be capital-

.4.1.1 For example, a game strategy of disproportionate spending for counter-

.4.1.2 Disproportionate spending for counter-moves also creates an almost auto-

.4.2.2 Game moves should be chosen based on their cost-effectiveness in playing

.5 The moves and counter-moves in a game may be counter-productive unless one

.5.1 A game may lead to an ever-increasing spiral of violence and counter-

.5.2 A game may lead to an ever-increasing requirement for capital to fund

security states are particularly vulnerable to the costs of terrorism. More so

.6 It is risky to conflate non-game objectives with game objectives when making

2.1.4 Intelligence is an inadequate means for removing all pre-conditions for a

concerning the actors who may wish to participate in a game of terror-ism

2.1.4.2The organizational structure of Intelligence affects the quality of Intelligence

2.1.4.3Intelligence mission budgets typically do not accurately reflect the relative

2.1.4.4There is never budget available to adequately fund all-important missions.

2.1.4.8Maintaining the strictest secrecy regarding counter-moves primarily assists

2.1.4.9Today’s mission for Intelligence may be fundamentally flawed. By focusing

2.1.5.4There is never budget available to adequately fund all-important missions.

2.1.5.6Today’s mission for the military may be fundamentally flawed. By focusing

2.2.2.1Each move in the game has a theological component. This theological

2.2.2.3Letting sectarian religiosity determine game moves makes no more sense

2.2.2.4Torture cannot be logically used as a means for eliciting truth or discerning

2.2.4.1Political dialogue is useful for initiating conversation to decide whether to

2.2.4.2Political dialogue is also useful to establish levels of available capital that

2.2.4.3Letting political dialogue determine game moves makes no more sense in

4.2The grammar of terror-ism works in two directions. If counter-moves involve

5 A game of terror-ism is built upon a philosophical dualism of “the Other” that is

5.1The philosophical assumption is that the Other is universally and incontrovertibly

5.2.1 World-pictures can be radically divergent between two different representa-

5.2.2.1Conflict does not necessarily lead to violence and counter-violence. Con-

6.1.2 However, it is impossible to calculate whether or not new possibilities for

6.2“Loosing” is useful grammar for describing outcomes from playing a game of

6.2.1 No particular move in the game can be accurately classified as a “terrorist

7 What we cannot speak about, we cannot imagine. Illiteracy and incompetence in

8 “World-picture,” according to Ludwig Wittgenstein, might be thought of as a frame or

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