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RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, - versus - complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said

office, on which are handwritten entries which are


BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, the interpretation of the results of the ultrasound
examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari be the same as or identical to the certified
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the photocopy of the document marked as Annex 2 to
Decision[1] dated September 22, 2006 of the the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint;
by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza),
which, in turn, assailed the Orders[2] issued by EXHIBIT B the certified photo copy of the X-ray
public respondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in request form dated January 30, 1997, which is
Administrative Case No. 1882. also marked as Annex 3 as it was actually
likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate Lantin, IIIs counter-affidavit filed with the Office of
court, follow. the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection
with the criminal complaint filed by the herein
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent complainant with the said office, on which are
Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) handwritten entries which are the interpretation
for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in of the results of the examination. Incidentally,
1999, due to the same problem, she was referred this exhibit happens to be also the same as or
to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, identical to the certified photo copy of the
ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The document marked as Annex 3 which is likewise
tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It dated January 30, 1997, which is appended as
was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is such Annex 3 to the counter-affidavit dated March
non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on
underwent kidney operation in September, 1999. May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer
to this complaint.
On February 18, 2000, private respondents
husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a EXHIBIT C the certified photocopy of the X-ray
complaint for gross negligence and/or request form dated March 16, 1996, which is also
incompetence before the [BOM] against the marked as Annex 4, on which are handwritten
doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful entries which are the interpretation of the results
kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. of the examination.
Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo
and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza. EXHIBIT D the certified photocopy of the X-ray
request form dated May 20, 1999, which is also
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross marked as Annex 16, on which are handwritten
negligence and/or incompetence committed by entries which are the interpretation of the results
the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit
the removal of private respondents fully appears to be the draft of the typewritten final
functional right kidney, instead of the left non- report of the same examination which is the
functioning and non-visualizing kidney. document appended as Annexes 4 and 1
respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in
complainant Romeo Sioson presented his answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela
evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson, also Vega however, the document which is marked as
named as complainant there, filed her formal Annex 4 is not a certified photocopy, while in the
offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the case of Dr. Lantin, the document marked as
formal offer of documentary evidence are her Annex 1 is a certified photocopy. Both documents
Exhibits A to D, which she offered for the purpose are of the same date and typewritten contents
of proving that her kidneys were both in their are the same as that which are written on Exhibit
proper anatomical locations at the time she was D.
operated. She described her exhibits, as follows:
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to
EXHIBIT A the certified photocopy of the X-ray private respondents [Editha Siosons] formal offer
Request form dated December 12, 1996, which is of exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are
also marked as Annex 2 as it was actually inadmissible because the same are mere
originally the Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs photocopies, not properly identified and
counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of authenticated, and intended to establish matters
Pasig City in connection with the criminal which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are
incompetent to prove the purpose for which they QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
are offered. ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION
private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE A PROPERTY RIGHT
by the [BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It OR ONES LIVELIHOOD.[4]
reads:

The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the
[Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of CA.
[herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents]
De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a
[therein] respondent Florendo are hereby petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to
ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose assail the Orders of the BOM, admitting in
they may serve in the resolution of this case. evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed
Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 Orders were interlocutory, these cannot be the
p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment
respondents. that completely or finally disposes of the case.[5]
At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any
SO ORDERED. plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the only and remaining
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the remedy left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari
abovementioned Order basically on the same under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground
reasons stated in his comment/objections to the of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
formal offer of exhibits. excess of jurisdiction.

The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration However, the writ of certiorari will not issue
of petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It absent a showing that the BOM has acted without
concluded that it should first admit the evidence or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
being offered so that it can determine its discretion. Embedded in the CAs finding that the
probative value when it decides the case. BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave
According to the Board, it can determine whether abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the
the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of
at it through the process of admission. x x x.[3] Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.

Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally
adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best
with the CA, assailing the BOMs Orders which evidence rule; (2) have not been properly
admitted Editha Siosons (Edithas) Formal Offer of identified and authenticated; (3) are completely
Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their
petition for certiorari for lack of merit. purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the
exhibits are inadmissible evidence.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
We disagree.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE FILED THE PETITION before administrative bodies such as the BOM.[6]
FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 Although trial courts are enjoined to observe
WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 strict enforcement of the rules of evidence,[7] in
OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS connection with evidence which may appear to
DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
RESPONDENT BOARD. admissibility, we have held that:

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE: [I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting
them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED admitting them unless plainly irrelevant,
GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that
their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter Pedro Lantin IIIs counter affidavit filed with the
found relevant or competent; on the other hand, Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which
their admission, if they turn out later to be was investigating the criminal complaint for
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of
by completely discarding them or ignoring them. Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her
[8] surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her
case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction prove that her kidneys were both in their proper
between the admissibility of evidence and the anatomical locations at the time of her operation.
probative weight to be accorded the same pieces
of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport The fact sought to be established by the
Corporation v. Court of Appeals[9] teaches: admission of Edithas exhibits, that her kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of the time of her operation, need not be proved as
whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.[11]
to be considered at all. On the other hand, the
probative value of evidence refers to the question Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely
of whether or not it proves an issue. the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a
matter of fact.[12] Thus, they likewise provide for
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission some facts which are established and need not
of Edithas exhibits violated his substantive rights be proved, such as those covered by judicial
leading to the loss of his medical license is notice, both mandatory and discretionary.[13]
misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section Laws of nature involving the physical sciences,
20, Article I of the Professional Regulation specifically biology,[14] include the structural
Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads: make-up and composition of living things such as
human beings. In this case, we may take judicial
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be notice that Edithas kidneys before, and at the
conducted in accordance with these Rules. The time of, her operation, as with most human
Rules of Court shall only apply in these beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the
character and whenever practicable and best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of
convenient. Technical errors in the admission of Rule 130 provides:
evidence which do not prejudice the substantive
rights of either party shall not vitiate the 1. Best Evidence Rule
proceedings.[10]
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;
As pointed out by the appellate court, the exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
substantive rights of petitioner because, at any admissible other than the original document
rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that itself, except in the following cases:
the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper
anatomical locations at the time she was (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed,
operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
131 of the Rules of Court: on the part of the offeror;

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following (b) When the original is in the custody or under
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, the control of the party against whom the
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce
evidence: it after reasonable notice;

(y) That things have happened according to the (c) When the original consists of numerous
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits accounts or other documents which cannot be
of life. examined in court without great loss of time and
the fact sought to be established from them is
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray only the general result of the whole; and
Request Forms dated December 12, 1996,
January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, (d) When the original is a public record in the
1999, filed in connection with Edithas medical custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
case. The documents contain handwritten entries public office.
interpreting the results of the examination. These
exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr.
international.6 As a market research facility, TNS
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether conducted public surveys about consumer goods,
respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for products, merchandise and/or services of its
gross negligence in removing the right clients.7 TNS hired several field personnel on a
functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left project-to-project basis whose functions were the
non-functioning kidney, not the proper following: a) to gather data on consumer goods,
anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As commodities, merchandise, and such other
previously discussed, the proper anatomical products as requested by clients, through
locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her personal interviews, telephone interviews and/or
operation at the RMC may be established not only such other modes akin to the foregoing; and b) to
through the exhibits offered in evidence. submit the gathered data to the company for
evaluation and/or analysis.8chanrobleslaw
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay
evidence of the anatomical locations of Edithas Petitioners Jeanette V. Manalo, Vilma P. Barrios,
kidneys. To further drive home the point, the Lourdes Lynn Michelle Fernandez, and Leila B.
anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Taio (petitioners) were hired by TNS as field
Edithas kidneys, and the removal of one or both, personnel on various dates starting 1996 for
may still be established through a belated several projects. They were made to sign a
ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area. project-to-project employment contract.
Thereafter, TNS would file the corresponding
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, termination report with the Department of Labor
such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed.[15] and Employment Regional Office (DOLE-
Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the RO).9chanrobleslaw
Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals
of the exhibits because [it] transferred from the Petitioners were likewise assigned office-based
previous building, x x x to the new building.[16] tasks for which they were required to be in the
Ultimately, since the originals cannot be office from 9:00 oclock in the morning to 6:00
produced, the BOM properly admitted Edithas oclock in the evening, but most of the time, they
formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM worked beyond 6:00 oclock without receiving the
shall determine the probative value thereof when corresponding overtime pay. These office-based
it decides the case. tasks were not on a per project basis and
petitioners did not sign any contract for these
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision jobs. These assignments were not reported to the
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755 is DOLE either.10chanrobleslaw
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Later in August 2008, a meeting among the Field
Interviewers (FIs) was called by TNS field
G.R. No. 208567, November 26, 2014 manager. They were told that all old FIs assigned
in the tracking projects would be pulled out
JEANETTE V. MANALO, VILMA P. BARRIOS, eventually and replaced by new FIs contracted
LOURDES LYNN MICHELLE FERNANDEZ AND from an agency. Old FIs would be assigned only to
LEILA B. TAIO, v. TNS PHILIPPINES INC., adhoc projects which were seasonal. This
AND GARY OCAMPO, prompted petitioners to file a consolidated
complaint for regularization before the
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule LA.11chanrobleslaw
45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 29,
2013 Decision1 and the August 7, 2013 On October 20, 2008, petitioners and TNS were
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA- required to file their respective position papers.
G.R. SP No. 117637, which set aside the July 23, On October 21, 2008, petitioners were advised by
2010 Decision3 of the National Labor Relations TNS not to report for work anymore because they
Commission (NLRC) and its October 28, 2010 were being pulled out from their current
Resolution4 and reinstated the May 29, 2009 assignments and that they were not being lined
Decision5 of the Labor Arbiters finding that up for any continuing or incoming projects
petitioners were project employees. because it no longer needed their services. They
were also asked to surrender their company
Respondent TNS Philippines Inc. (TNS), with Gary IDs.12 Petitioners, thereafter, filed a complaint for
Ocampo as its president and general manager, illegal dismissal, overtime pay, damages, and
was engaged primarily in the business of attorneys fees against TNS. Later, the labor
marketing research and information, as well as cases for regularization and illegal dismissal were
research consultancy and other value-added consolidated.
services to a wide base of clients, both local and
On May 29, 2009, the LA rendered a The NLRC further ruled that, being regular
decision,13dismissing the complaint on the employees, petitioners were illegally dismissed
ground that petitioners were found to be project because TNS, who had the burden of proving
employees who knew the nature of their positions legality in dismissal cases, failed to show how and
as such at the time of their employment and who why the employment of petitioners was
agreed with full understanding that the contracts terminated on October 21, 2008.19 Thus, the
would lapse upon completion of the project stated NLRC set aside the LA decision and held TNS
in their respective contracts.14 The LA further liable for illegal dismissal, ordering the latter to
ruled that even if petitioners were continuously pay petitioners their respective backwages and
rehired for several and different projects, the separation pay.20chanrobleslaw
determining factor was whether, at the time of
hiring, the employment was fixed for a specific TNS moved for reconsideration, but its motion
project or undertaking and its completion was was denied. Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari
predetermined.15chanrobleslaw with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the CA.
The LA was also of the view that petitioners were
not illegally dismissed because as project On January 29, 2013, the CA ruled in favor of TNS
employees, the employer-employee relationship and opined that the projects assigned to
was terminated upon completion of the project or petitioners were distinct and separate from the
phase for which they were hired. The term of other undertakings of TNS; that they were
their employment was coterminus with the required to sign project-to-project employment
duration and until the accomplishment of the contracts; and that a corresponding termination
project.16chanrobleslaw report was made to DOLE for every accomplished
project.Further, it stated that the repeated re-
As to the claim for overtime pay and damages, hiring of petitioners for at least one (1) year did
the LA held that petitioners were not entitled to not ipso facto convert their status to regular
them.Field personnel were excluded from the employees. According to the CA, the mere fact
coverage of the minimum requirements on hours that a project employee had worked on a specific
of work and overtime pay. project for more than one (1) year did not
necessarily change his status from project
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the employee to regular or permanent
NLRC. Consequently, the NLRC rendered its employee.21chanrobleslaw
judgment17 in favor of petitioners and reversed
the LA ruling. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary As to the issue of grave abuse of discretion, the
CA held that the NLRC committed such abuse
We note that, initially, complainants used to be when it refused to consider the pieces of
project employees as shown by the samples of evidence submitted by TNS during its
project-to-project employment contracts, project determination of the merits of the latters motion
clearance slips, and the establishment for reconsideration. It stressed that the technical
termination reports adduced in evidence. Case rules of evidence were not binding in labor
records, however, show that the last time cases,22 that even if the evidence was not
respondent company filed an establishment submitted to the LA, the fact that it was duly
termination report was in November 2007 introduced on appeal before the NLRC was
indicating project completion on November 30, enough basis for it to admit
2007. What is clear though is that complainants them.23chanrobleslaw
were allowed to continue working after November
30, 2007. Respondent company did not adduce in Not in conformity, petitioners filed a motion for
evidence employment contracts relating to the reconsideration but it was eventually denied.
latest employment of the complainants. In the
absence of proof that the subsequent Hence, this petition presenting the following
employment of the complainants continued to be
on a project-to-project basis under a contract of ARGUMENTS:
employment, complainants are considered to
have become regular employees after November WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
30, 2007. The failure to present contract of APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
project employment means that the employees PETITIONERS ARE NOT REGULAR EMPLOYEES OF
are regular.18chanrobleslaw THE RESPONDENT COMPANY.

[Emphases supplied] WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF


APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
HONORABLE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF could be proved by the employment contracts
DISCRETION.24 signed voluntarily by the employees and by the
termination report filed with the DOLE after the
Petitioners assert that the factual circumstances completion of every project.29Yet, no project
of the case undoubtedly show their regular employment contracts were shown. It is well-
employment status and that the NLRC correctly settled that rules of evidence shall be liberally
exercised its discretion. The respondents argue applied in labor cases, but this does not detract
otherwise insisting that the decision of the CA from the principle that piecemeal presentation of
was correct evidence is simply not in accord with orderly
justice.30The NLRC was correct in saying that in
The Courts Ruling the absence of proof that the subsequent
employment of petitioners continued to be on a
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court project-to-project basis under a contract of
is not a trier of facts. In petitions for review under employment, petitioners were considered to have
Rule 45, the Court only resolves pure questions of become regular employees.31chanrobleslaw
law and is precluded from reviewing factual
findings of the lower tribunals,subject to certain TNS contended that the repeated and successive
exceptions.This case is an exception as this rehiring of project employees does not qualify
Court may review factual conclusions of the CA petitioners as regular employees, as length of
when they are contrary to those of the NLRC or of service is not the controlling determinant of the
the Labor Arbiter.25chanrobleslaw employment tenure of a project employee, but
whether the employment has been fixed for a
Upon review of the records, the evidence failed to specific project or undertaking and its completion
clearly, accurately, consistently, and convincingly has been determined at the time of the
show that petitioners were still project employees engagement of the employee. The repeated
of TNS. rehiring was only a natural consequence of the
experience gained from past service rendered in
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, other projects.32chanrobleslaw
clearly defined a project employee as one whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project In Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC,33 the Court held that
or undertaking the completion or termination of once a project or work pool employee has been:
which has been determined at the time of the (1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently,
engagement of the employee or where the work rehired by the same employer for the same tasks
or service to be performed is seasonal in nature or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are vital,
and the employment is for the duration of the necessary and indispensable to the usual
season.Additionally, a project employee is one business or trade of the employer, then the
whose termination of his employment contract is employee must be deemed a regular employee.
reported to the DOLE everytime the project for
which he was engaged has been completed. Although it is true that the length of time of the
employees service is not a controlling
In their Comment,26 the respondents stressed determinant of project employment, it is vital in
that the NLRC decision was mainly anchored upon determining whether he was hired for a specific
the supposed lack of compliance with the undertaking or in fact tasked to perform functions
termination report requirement under the vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual
applicable DOLE Department Orders. The NLRC business or trade of the employer.34 Petitioners
ruled that petitioners were regular employees for successive re-engagement in order to perform
having been allowed to continue working after the same kind of work firmly manifested the
the last submitted termination report. Thus, TNS necessity and desirability of their work in the
submitted, albeit belatedly, the termination usual business of TNS as a market research
reports from November 2007 up to the last facility.35 Undisputed also is the fact that the
termination report filed on November 18, 2008, petitioners were assigned office-based tasks from
by attaching it to the motion for reconsideration 9:00 oclock in the morning up to 6:00 oclock in
filed before the NLRC.27chanrobleslaw the evening, at the earliest, without any
corresponding remuneration.
Although TNS belatedly submitted the supposed
lacking termination reports, it failed to show the The project employment scheme used by TNS
corresponding project employment contracts of easily circumvented the law and precluded its
petitioners covering the period indicated in the employees from attaining regular employment
said termination reports.TNS itself stated in its status in the subtlest way possible.Petitioners
motion for reconsideration28 before the NLRC were rehired not intermittently, but
that the project employee status of the employee continuously,contract after contract, month after
month, involving the very same tasks. They For said reason, at the outset, the supposed
practically performed exactly the same functions project employment contract was highly doubtful.
over several years. Ultimately,without a doubt, In determining the true nature of an employment,
the functions they performed were indeed vital the entirety of the contract, not merely its
and necessary to the very business or trade of designation or by which it was denominated, is
TNS. controlling.Though there is a rule that conflicting
provisions in a contract should be harmonized to
Granting arguendo that petitioners were rehired give effect to all,36in this case, however,
intermittently, a careful review of the project harmonization is impossible because project
employment contracts of petitioners reveals employment and probationary employment are
some other vague provisions. Oddly, one of the distinct from one another and cannot co-exist
terms and conditions in the said contract stated with each other.Hence, should there be ambiguity
that: in the provisions of the contract, the rule is that
all doubts, uncertainties, ambiguities and
The need for your services being determinable insufficiencies should be resolved in favor of
and for a specific project starting ____________ labor.37 This is in consonance with the
your employment will be for the duration of said constitutional policy of providing full protection to
project of the Company, namely Project labor.
___________ which is expected to be finished on
_____________. The Company shall have the option In sum, petitioners are deemed to have become
of renewing or extending the period of this regular employees. As such, the burden of
agreement for such time as it may be necessary proving the legality of their dismissal rests upon
to complete the project or because we need TNS.Having failed to discharge such burden of
further time to determine your competence on proving a just or authorized cause, TNS is liable
the job. for illegal dismissal.

To the Court, the phrase because we need Accordingly, as correctly ruled by the NLRC, each
further time to determine your competence on petitioner is entitled to backwages from the time
the job would refer to a probationary of their dismissal up to the finality of this decision
employment. Such phrase changes the tenor of plus separation pay, following their prayer for
the contract and runs counter to the very nature such relief in lieu of reinstatement, computed as
of a project employment. TNS can, therefore, follows as of May 29, 2009:
extend the contract which was already fixed
when it deemed it necessary to determine a)
whether or not the employee was qualified and fit Backwages:
for the job. Corollarily, TNS can likewise pre- October 21, 2008 to May 29, 2009 = 7.27 mos.
terminate the contract not because the specific P382.00 x 26 days x 7.27 mos.
project was completed ahead of time, but =
because of failure to qualify for the P72, 205.64
job.Consistently, the terms and conditions of the b)
contract, reads: Separation Pay:
December 1, 2008 to May 29, 2009 = 5.93 mos.
4. It is expressly agreed and understood that the P382.00 x 26 days x 5.03 mps./12
Company may terminate your employment after =
compliance with procedural requirements of law, P4,908.10
without benefit of termination pay and without
any obligation on the part of the Company, in the P77,113.80
event of any breach of any conditions hereof: Finally,nowhere in the NLRC resolution denying
a) TNS motion for reconsideration can it be found it
If the project is completed or cancelled before the outrightly denied the said motion for belatedly
expected date of completion as specified in submitting the lacking termination reports. In
paragraph 1 hereof; resolving the motion, the NLRC also took into
b) consideration the records of the case, meaning,
If we should find that you are not qualified, including those belatedly submitted, and despite
competent or efficient in the above-stated review of these records, it still found the evidence
positions for which you are hired in accordance insufficient to overturn its decision against TNS.
with the company standards made known to you
at the start of your employment; To reiterate,the technical rules of evidence are
xxx not binding on labor tribunals.Such a rule,
however, is not a license for parties to a case to
be remiss in their duty to present every and all
proofs, at the earliest opportunity, that will best February 2002
support their claim and help the courts to fully, Dawn Karen S. Sy
exhaustively and speedily resolve the Data Control Clerk
controversy. October 1999

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Prudential Plans Employees Union FFW (PPEU
January 29, 2013 Decision and the August 7, FFW), on the other hand, is a local chapter of the
2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- Federation of Free Workers and is the authorized
G.R. SP No. 117637 are SET ASIDE. The July 23, bargaining agent of Prudentialifes rankandfile
2010 Decision of the National Labor Relations employees. The individual petitioners are
Commission is hereby REINSTATED. members of PPEUFFW.

Respondent Prudentialife is an insurance


VENUS B. CASTILLO, LEAH J. EVANGELISTA, company, while respondents Jose Alberto T. Alba
DITAS M. DOLENDO, DAWN KAREN S. SY (Alba), Atty. Ceferino A. Patio, Jr. (Patio) and
AND PRUDENTIAL PLANS, INC. EMPLOYEES Rosemarie de Lemos (de Lemos) are its President,
UNION FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS First VicePresident for Corporate Services Group,
(PPEUFFW), , v. PRUDENTIALIFE PLANS, and Assistant VicePresident for Human
INC., AND/OR JOSE ALBERTO T. ALBA, ATTY. Resources, respectively.
CEFERINO A. PATIO, JR., AND ROSEMARIE
DE LEMOS, Under Section 4, Article X of the parties
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),
In a labor case, the written statements of co Prudentialife employees were granted an optical
employees admitting their participation in a benefit allowance of P2,500.00 to subsidize
scheme to defraud the employer are admissible prescription eyeglasses for those who have
in evidence. The argument by an employee that developed vision problems in the course of
the said statements constitute hearsay because employment. The pertinent CBA provision states:
the authors thereof were not presented for their
crossexamination does not persuade, because Section 4. Optical benefit. The Company shall
the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in provide an amount not to exceed P2,500.00
proceedings before the National Labor Relations inclusive of VAT to any covered employee to
Commission (NLRC), which are summary in nature defray the cost of eyeglasses that may be
and decisions may be made on the basis of prescribed by the accredited HMO physician or
position papers. employees personal optometrist. The benefit
can be availed of only once every two (2) years.4
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the
January 14, 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Many Prudentialife employees petitioners
Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 111981 which included availed thereof and Prudentialife was
reversed and set aside the dispositions of the flooded with requests for reimbursement for
NLRC, as well as the CAs March 16, 2011 eyeglasses the employees supposedly purchased
Resolution3 denying reconsideration thereof. from a single outfit/supplier, Alavera Optical.
Suspecting fraud, Prudentialife began an
Factual Antecedents investigation into the matter, and on February 22,
2006, it sent individual written Notices to
Individual petitioners Venus B. Castillo (Castillo), Explain5 to petitioners and other employees who
Leah J. Evangelista (Evangelista), Ditas M. availed of the benefit. The notices revealed its
Dolendo (Dolendo), and Dawn Karen S. Sy (Sy) initial findings that the given address and
were regular employees of respondent telephone number of Alavera Optical were
Prudentialife Plans, Inc. (Prudentialife), to wit: fictitious; that the official receipts and
prescriptions issued by Alavera Optical appear to
Employee Name have been forged; that the eyeglasses were
Position grossly overpriced; and that Prudentialife was
Date Employed being required to pay for the eyeglasses even
Venus B. Castillo though they have not been released as yet. The
CFP Clerk notices required the recipients thereof to submit
November 27, 1995 their written explanation relative to acts of
Leah J. Evangelista dishonesty and fraud which they may have
Data Encoder committed in connivance with Alavera Optical.
October 16, 2000
Ditas M. Dolendo Petitioners and the other availing employees
Data Control Clerk submitted their respective written explanations.
Prudentialife brought the subject eyeglasses to Petitioner Sy explained that Dr. Simeona Alavera
reputable optical shops particularly Sure Vision arrived at the Prudentialife office on January 27,
and Sarabia Optical for comparative 2006, complete with eye examination equipment
examination as to quality and price. The and charts; that she subjected herself to
eyeglasses of Evangelista and Dolendo were examination; that thereafter, Dr. Simeona Alavera
brought to Sure Vision Optical, Star Mall branch, offered to give her the official receipt and
Mandaluyong City, and Sys were brought to prescription for eyeglasses even before actual
Sarabia Optical, Greenbelt I branch, Makati City. payment thereof; that she did not bother to
The two optical shops found that Dolendo and investigate the authenticity, qualifications or
Sys eyeglasses had no grade, while the grade on integrity of Dr. Simeona Alavera or Alavera
Evangelistas eyeglasses did not match the Optical, but was confident of her diagnosis; that
prescription issued to her. It was likewise she was not aware of the market value of the
discovered that the cost of petitioners eyeglasses but was satisfied of the price at which
eyeglasses, as declared in their respective official she bought them; and that she believed that the
receipts and reimbursement requests, was refraction grade of her eyeglasses was the same
excessive compared to similar frames and lenses as that written on the prescription issued by
being sold by Sure Vision and Sarabia Optical.6 Alavera Optical.10

In her written explanation, Castillo claimed that Other Prudentialife employees admitted that the
she acted in good faith in availing of the optical eyeglasses they obtained cost only so much, yet
benefit allowance; that she did not conspire with were overpriced for purposes of reimbursement.
Alavera Optical in the overpricing of her Thus, employees Roselle Marquez, Edgardo
eyeglasses; that she was made to believe that Cayanan, Jennifer Garcia, Nerissa Rivera, Orlando
her transaction with Alavera Optical whereby Labicane, Michael Arceo, Jennifer Fronda and
the latter would issue an official receipt for the Leopoldo Padlan acknowledged that the true cost
eyeglasses even without actual payment thereof, of their respective eyeglasses ranged from only
which Castillo would then claim from Prudentialife P1,200.00 P1,800.00, and yet Alavera Optical
was regular; that she was unaware that Alavera issued official receipts for a greater amount
Optical was using a fictitious address and ranging from P2,500.00 P2,600.00 with their full
telephone number; and that she had no intention knowledge and consent, which latter amounts
to defraud Prudentialife.7 were actually reimbursed to them by Prudentialife
even before the eyeglasses were released or
Evangelista wrote that on January 27, 2006, a paid for; that the fraudulent scheme was
certain Dr. Simeona Alavera of Alavera Optical spearheaded by a certain Elvie of Head Office;
offered to prepare her eyeglasses which she and that Elvie and Dr. Simeona Alavera told them
could pay later, or after the release of her optical that the scheme was being carried out in other
benefit allowance to which she agreed; that on departments/offices within Prudentialife.11
January 30, 2006, her eyeglasses, together with
the prescription and official receipt, were Prudentialife discovered that the employees who
delivered to her, and she submitted the same to availed of the optical benefit allowance obtained
Prudentialife to claim reimbursement; that on their eyeglasses from Alavera Optical, based on
February 1, 2006, she obtained a P2,500.00 the employees reimbursement requests/petty
reimbursement for her eyeglasses, which she cash vouchers and the official receipts12 that the
used to pay Dr. Simeona Alavera; and that she prescriptions13 for the eyeglasses were issued by
acted in good faith and pursuant to company a certain Dr. Alan Alavera, yet the address,
policy.8 telephone number and Tax Identification Number
of Alavera Optical were fictitious; that it was
For her part, Dolendo stated that she met Dr. Prudentialife employee Elvie Villaviaje who
Simeona Alavera through her colleague at work; arranged with Alavera Optical for the conduct of
that she heard that the doctor was conducting eye examinations within company premises; that
eye examinations at the third floor of their to entice the employees, Alavera Optical offered
building, thus she had her eyes examined as well; to release the eyeglasses and issue the
that on January 30, 2006, she received the official prescriptions and official receipts even before
receipt for her eyeglasses in the amount of actual payment is made; and that the
P2,500.00 and the doctors prescription therefor, reimbursements sought for the eyeglasses were
which she forwarded to Prudentialife; and that more or less the same, or averaged at P2,500.00,
she had no knowledge of any dishonesty or yet they cost much less. Likewise, Prudentialife
overpricing of the eyeglasses relative to the found that some of the eyeglass purchases were
optical benefit allowance.9 fictitious; that some of the eyeglasses purchased
had no lens or grade; and that Alavera Optical
issued prescriptions, released the eyeglasses,
and issued the official receipts therefor even Hence, you are terminated effective immediately
though they have not been paid for. upon receipt hereof and your separation benefits
under the Companys Optional Retirement
Thus, Prudentialife concluded that petitioners and Program are hereby forfeited.
other employees knowingly availed of the optical
benefit allowance to obtain a refund of the Furthermore, please be informed that your
maximum P2,500.00 benefit even though they termination is without prejudice to whatever legal
did not have vision problems, or that their action which the Company may pursue to protect
eyeglasses were worth less than P2,500.00. its interests.15

On April 10, 2006, Prudentialife issued individual Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
Notices of Termination14 to petitioners and other
employees. The notices, signed by respondent On May 5, 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for
Patio, stated in part that illegal dismissal, money claims and damages
(illegal dismissal case) against respondents,
In sum, we find that your explanation consisted docketed as NLRCNCR Case No. 000503815
mainly of bare denials and professions of 06.16 Another case was filed for unfair labor
innocence. We regret to inform you that we find practice, docketed as NLRCNCR Case No. 0007
your explanation to be not acceptable on the 0588206, which was later on consolidated with
following grounds: the illegal dismissal case.
Based on the statements made by the other
employees involved in this case, our investigation In their Position Paper,17 petitioners mainly
reveals that you are aware of the scheme by contended that they were illegally dismissed
which the attending optometrist, Mrs. Simeona based on a charge of dishonesty that was not
Alavera, would issue to you an Official Receipt for proved, but was mainly founded on suspicion,
an amount grossly in excess of the real cost of conjecture and suppositions. They claimed that
your eyeglasses to enable you to collect the they did not commit any padding of the cost of
excess amount for your personal use. the eyeglasses they bought from Alavera Optical;
nor did they commit any act detrimental to
You and the other employees were examined by Prudentialifes interests. They argued that quite
Mrs. Alavera in the presence of one another and the contrary, their transactions with Alavera
you were apprised of the scheme during the Optical were valid and done in the ordinary
examination/checkup. course of business; that their right to due process
was violated as they were not given ample time
During the investigation, we confirmed that there and opportunity to defend themselves; that they
was never any actual delivery of the eyeglasses were deprived of their right to counsel; and that
to you, yet you submitted a reimbursement their bargaining agent PPEUFFW was not
request. You therefore submitted an O.R. for an informed of the case against them. For these
item which you have not actually received. reasons, petitioners argued that they should be
awarded their money claims and damages.
Your failure and refusal to divulge the whole truth
shows your lack of any effort to come clean and In their Position Paper18 seeking dismissal of the
help in the investigation of the case. In fact, it Complaint, respondents cited Prudentialifes
displays an attempt on your part to mislead the emphasis on promoting integrity and honesty
investigation and further confirms our findings of among its ranks, which policy is embodied in its
your dishonesty. Personnel Manual, the pertinent provision of
After careful and thorough evaluation, we find which was precisely utilized in indicting
you culpable of DISHONESTY which, under petitioners. They insisted that petitioners were
Section 2.6 (i) of the Personnel Manual is dishonest in knowingly claiming reimbursement
punishable by Dismissal, to wit: for overpriced or padded eyeglasses, in falsifying
2.6 DISHONESTY the official receipts and other documents relative
to the optical benefit allowance, and in obtaining
The disciplinary actions for offenses on reimbursement for eyeglasses which they did not
Dishonesty shall be the following but not limited pay for or receive. They charged that petitioners
to: bare denials are drowned by overwhelming
evidence gathered which include confessions by
(i) Padding receipt for reimbursement or other employees proving their knowledge,
liquidation of advances or expenses complicity, and participation in the fraudulent
scheme. Respondents pointed out that when the
1st Offense Dismissal fraudulent scheme was carried out on January 27,
2006, petitioners except for Castillo were all
present in one room where the eye examinations employees and the admissions obtained from
were conducted, together with the employees some of them. Having established breach of trust
who confessed to the scheme; they were all through a scheme perpetrated to defraud
issued official receipts on the same day, and Prudentialife, the Labor Arbiter held that the
claimed reimbursement at the same time on company possessed the right to dismiss the guilty
January 30, 2006. Respondents added that employees as a measure of selfprotection.
Alavera Optical applied the same modus operandi
to all the employees it dealt with in regard to the The Labor Arbiter held further that the dismissal
optical benefit program; that petitioners could not of an estafa charge21 against the guilty
have been excepted, and that their eyeglasses employees does not necessarily result in a finding
were similarly priced and within the range of the of illegal dismissal. Conversely, the filing of a
eyeglasses of those who confessed to the subsequently dismissed estafa charge cannot
scheme; and that having committed falsification constitute unfair labor practice, as this is a right
of company documents, petitioners were guilty of granted to Prudentialife as a party injured by the
serious misconduct and dishonesty, which merit fraudulent scheme; the filing of criminal charges
dismissal and denial of respondents monetary could not have the effect of preventing
claims and prayer for an award of damages. petitioners from filing the illegal dismissal case,
nor were the latter cowed into fear as a result of
On the issue of due process, respondents argued the filing of the charges.
that the twin notice requirements were satisfied:
the notices to explain apprised the recipients The Labor Arbiter found baseless petitioners
thereof of their supposed acts and the rule monetary claims, prayer for damages, and their
violated, as well as the penalty prescribed for effort to hold the individual respondents liable,
such violations. Moreover, notices of termination stating that petitioners have not substantiated
were duly sent to petitioners. All in all, these claims and it has not been shown that the
petitioners were afforded due process and given individual respondents exceeded their authority
the opportunity to defend themselves. Finally, in the performance of their functions, or that they
respondents took exception to the inclusion of acted in bad faith.
Prudentialife officers as respondents to the
Complaint, claiming that their acts were done Ruling of the National Labor Relations
pursuant to their duties and in furtherance of the Commission
corporate objective, which should thus exempt
them from personal liability. Respondents filed an appeal with the NLRC. In a
December 8, 2008 Decision,22 the NLRC reversed
On April 30, 2007, Labor Arbiter Fe S. Cellan the Labor Arbiter, decreeing thus:
issued a Decision19 in the illegal dismissal case,
decreeing as follows: CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the
present appeal is partly Granted in that
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant complainantsappellants were illegally dismissed
consolidated complaints are hereby DISMISSED and hence, should be reinstated and be paid their
for lack of merit. full backwages from the time they were illegally
dismissed up to the finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.20
All other claims of complainantsappellants are
The Labor Arbiter held that there was ground to dismissed for lack of merit.
dismiss petitioners, finding that there was a
concerted and premeditated scheme to defraud SO ORDERED.23
Prudentialife, using the optical benefit provision
in the CBA to enrich the availing employees by In sum, the NLRC held that petitioners liability
declaring overpriced eyeglasses, obtaining has not been substantiated, it not having been
reimbursement therefor, and pocketing the shown that petitioners were privy to the
difference between the amount reimbursed and fraudulent scheme. The NLRC believed that the
the actual cost or selling price of the spectacles. admissions of the other employees do not prove
This constituted dishonesty. petitioners complicity and participation in the
scheme. It declared that respondents failed to
The Labor Arbiter added that respondents took submit independent evidence to show the
pains to investigate and substantiate the charges petitioners guilt, and that petitioners were not
against the guilty employees, submitting the given the opportunity to meet and crossexamine
subject eyeglasses to other optical shops for respondents witnesses or those employees who
examination and comparison instead of merely submitted written explanations admitting the
relying upon the written explanations of the presence of an illegal scheme to profit by the
optical benefit provision in the CBA, namely establishing petitioners liability; that due process
Roselle Marquez, Edgardo Cayanan, Jennifer was observed by respondents, as petitioners were
Garcia, Nerissa Rivera, Orlando Labicane, Michael furnished with the requisite twin notices before
Arceo, Jennifer Fronda and Leopoldo Padlan; thus, their services were terminated; and that
their statements are inadmissible. petitioners were afforded the opportunity to be
heard on their defense through their respective
Nonetheless, the NLRC declared that there was written explanations, and no hearing was
no denial of procedural due process, since required before a decision on their case could be
petitioners were afforded the opportunity to meet properly arrived at.
the charges against them and respondents were
not remiss in their duty to accord them this right Petitioners moved to reconsider, reiterating that
during the process. Regarding the charge of the CA based its Decision on conjecture; that the
unfair labor practice, the NLRC was convinced evidence against them was not substantial; and
that respondents are not guilty of undue that due process was not observed. In a March
discrimination in initiating criminal charges 16, 2011 Resolution,27 however, the CA stood its
against petitioners for their perceived violation of ground. Thus, the instant Petition.
the Revised Penal Code.
Issues
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but in an
August 8, 2009 Resolution,24 the NLRC stood its Petitioners submit the following assignment of
ground. errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Ruling of the Court of Appeals I

Respondents went up to the CA via an original THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND
Petition for Certiorari ,25 insisting that there was COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
just cause to dismiss the petitioners for serious AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
misconduct. On January 14, 2011, the CA issued JURISDICTION WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION
the assailed Decision, decreeing as follows: NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
AS ALREADY DETERMINED BY THIS HONORABLE
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the COURT;
petition is GRANTED.
II
The assailed Decision dated 08 December 2008
of public respondent NLRC as well as its assailed THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
Resolution dated 28 August 2009 are REVERSED ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated 30 April IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED
2007 of Labor Arbiter Fe S. Cellan is hereby THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE NATIONAL
REINSTATED. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION WHICH
DETERMINED THAT:
SO ORDERED.26
While the affidavits offered in evidence by
In reversing the NLRC, the CA found that there respondentsappellees indeed recounted how the
was indeed cause to dismiss petitioners, the fraudulent scheme is being undertaken by
evidence indicating that petitioners and the other Alavera Optical and some employees who availed
employees knew, assented and took part in the of their services, it cannot however, escape our
scheme to profit by pocketing the difference attention the fact that there is nothing in the said
between the declared cost and actual cost of the affidavits that categorically implicate
eyeglasses; that based on the written statements complainantsappellants to the subject
of the other participants to the scheme, transactions;
petitioners are guilty of serious misconduct,
dishonesty, fraud and breach of trust, which Let it be emphasized that in labor cases,
rendered them unfit to continue working for substantial evidence is required to establish ones
Prudentialife. The appellate court cited case. By substantial evidence, it means such
particularly the fact that the eyeglasses relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
purchased by petitioners from Alavera Optical did accept to support a conclusion. x x x this
not have any grade. Commission would not be amiss to state that
time and again it held that unsubstantiated
The CA added that since the instant case is a accusation no matter how sincerely felt is nothing
labor case, only substantial evidence and not but hearsay that deserves no probative value;
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required in
Be it noted that in the cases of Aniceto W. Naguit provision under the CBA, since they did not claim
Jr. v. NLRC, 408 SCRA 617 and the case of Mario or receive anything other than the eyeglasses;
Hornales v. NLRC, 364 SCRA 778, it has been that no evidence was shown to support
settled that for an affidavit to be given respondents claim that their eyeglasses were
evidentiary weight, the affiants must testify on overpriced, and any variation in prices of
[their] statements therein to attest [to] the eyeglasses between the various optical shops
veracity of [their] testimony and; the opposing merely shows that free market forces were in
party must be given the opportunity to meet and operation not that the particular eyeglasses
crossexamine the affiants in order for them to they obtained from Alavera Optical were
test the truthfulness of their statements. x x x it overpriced; and that their categorical denial was
is palpably clear complainantsappellants were sufficient to negate any accusation or suspicion
not afforded by respondentsappellees the of involvement in the scheme or conspiracy
opportunity to meet the affiants and to cross surrounding the optical benefit provision in the
examine them. Likewise, neither were these CBA.
affiants testified [sic] on the veracity of their
statements either during the administrative Petitioners thus pray for the reversal of the
investigation conducted by the respondents assailed dispositions and the reinstatement of the
appellees nor before the Labor Arbiter. x x x28 December 8, 2008 NLRC Decision. In addition,
they seek an award of damages and attorneys
Petitioners Arguments fees.

In their Petition and Reply,29 petitioners urge a Respondents Arguments


judicious review of the case given the conflicting
decisions of the labor tribunals and the appellate In their Comment,31 respondents pray for the
court. They add that it was improper for the CA denial of the Petition, arguing against a departure
to adjudge them guilty of wrongdoing based on from the CA pronouncement and insisting that
the written admissions of their coemployees and the appellate courts disposition of the issues was
not on evidence pointing to their wrongdoing, and sound and based on substantial evidence. They
it is unfair for the CA to sweepingly rule that the contest the NLRC Decision, claiming that it is
acts of some employees were attributable to all gravely erroneous and based on a
who availed of the optical benefit allowance. misapprehension of the facts. They insist on the
validity of petitioners dismissal, which according
Petitioners further cite that while Prudentialife to them was based on adequate documentary
supposedly found that the eyeglasses they evidence; and that the fact that not all who were
purchased had no grade, they were not afforded involved in the illegal scheme were dismissed
the opportunity to meet and contest this finding; does not affect the liability of petitioners.
that this finding was not included in the written Besides, some of them resigned or left
notice to explain which they received, and thus Prudentialife right after the incident occurred
could not be a valid basis for their dismissal since while others have shown that their availment of
they were unable to explain their side on such the optical benefit was genuine. They hold that
issue. Petitioners reiterate the NLRC findings that the petitioners dismissal was based on
the other employees who admitted to the illegal substantial evidence gathered in an investigation
scheme did not implicate them, nor can these duly conducted, and on the findings of reputable
employees statements be used to show optical shops which made an examination and
petitioners guilt or privity to the illegal scheme comparison of the petitioners eyeglasses; that
since these written statements are inadmissible overall, petitioners are guilty of dishonesty; that
in evidence as they were not given the they did not violate petitioners right to due
opportunity to contest them, nor were they process; and finally, that petitioners are not
allowed to crossexamine the employees who entitled to their money claims, damages, and
prepared and submitted them; that in Garcia v. attorneys fees given that their dismissal was for
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.,30 it was held that cause and no bad faith attended the same.
the statement of a coemployee may not be used
to prove the guilt of an employee accused of Our Ruling
theft of company property; and that there can be
no other conclusion than that their dismissal was The Court affirms.
based on mere conjecture and suspicion, and for
this reason, the burden of proof which falls on When there is a divergence between the findings
Prudentialife has not been properly discharged. of facts of the labor tribunals and the CA, there is
a need to refer to the record. It is an established
Additionally, petitioners claim that they did not rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
unduly profit from availing of the optical benefit cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally For its part, Alavera Optical submitted a fictitious
limited to reviewing errors of law. This Court is address, telephone number and Tax Identification
not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of Number, using these in the written prescriptions
review, the findings of fact of the CA are it issued. And to entice Prudentialife employees
conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not into participating in the scheme, Alavera Optical
our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over offered to release the eyeglasses and issue the
again. There are, however, recognized prescriptions and official receipts even before
exceptions to this rule such as when there is a actual payment therefor is made which meant
divergence between the findings of facts of the that participating employees need not pay for the
NLRC and that of the CA.32 cost of their eyeglasses from their own pockets,
but could use the documents to obtain immediate
The evidence on record suggests that, with the reimbursement from Prudentialife.
aim in view of availing the optical benefit
provision under the CBA, Prudentialife employee It likewise appears that based on the
Elvie Villaviaje initiated a companywide scheme reimbursement requests/petty cash vouchers and
with Alavera Optical whereby the latter, through official receipts, the cost of the eyeglasses is
its optometrists, conducted eye examinations more or less the same, or at an average of
within company premises and issued P2,500.00, which coincidentally is the maximum
prescriptions on January 27, 2006, and reimbursable amount under the optical benefit
subsequently prepared and released eyeglasses provision in the CBA.
to the participating Prudentialife employees. In
turn, these employees claimed reimbursement for From the above, it appears that there was a
the cost of their eyeglasses through the optical conspiracy to defraud Prudentialife using the
benefit provision, to the allowable extent of optical benefit provision in the CBA to unduly
P2,500.00. The evidence shows that even before enrich the availing employee, and possibly
they could pay for the cost of their eyeglasses, Alavera Optical, through overpricing of the
Alavera Optical offered to issue, as it did issue, latters eyeglasses and appropriation of the
official receipts in advance to the availing difference between the bloated price and the
employees, which they used to secure actual cost. Employees who participated in the
reimbursements from Prudentialife ahead of the scheme knew, as they were informed by the
actual payment of the eyeglasses; the petitioners proponents of the scheme namely Elvie
acknowledged this fact in their individual and Villaviaje and Alavera Optical, of the fact that if
respective written explanations. Likewise, some they participated and underwent eye examination
of the availing employees33 except petitioners through Alavera Optical, they would be issued a
admitted that they knew that the true cost of prescription and official receipt indicating that
their respective eyeglasses ranged from only they paid up to P2,600.00 for the frames and
P1,200.00 P1,800.00; that Alavera Optical lenses that were prescribed, which documents
deliberately issued official receipts for a greater they could then use to obtain reimbursements of
amount ranging from P2,500.00 P2,600.00 with up to P2,500.00 from Prudentialife even if they
their full knowledge and consent; that they used did not actually pay for them, and though the
these official receipts to claim reimbursement; cost of the eyeglasses was less than P2,500.00.
and that Prudentialife actually reimbursed them Any employee who, knowing of the scheme, yet
to the extent of P2,500.00. participates therein, becomes a coconspirator to
the fraud.
It as well appears that after some of the subject
eyeglasses were submitted to other optical shops It is elementary that when there is a conspiracy,
for inspection, comparison and examination, it the act of one is the act of all the conspirators,
turned out that these did not have any grade, or and a conspirator may be held as a principal even
that the grade did not match the prescription if he did not participate in the actual commission
issued for the eyeglasses. Specifically, Dolendo of every act constituting the offense. In
and Sys eyeglasses had no grade, while the conspiracy, all those who in one way or another
grade on Evangelistas eyeglasses did not match helped and cooperated in the consummation of
the prescription issued to her. It was likewise the crime are considered coprincipals since the
found that the cost of the eyeglasses including degree or character of the individual participation
petitioners, as declared in the respective official of each conspirator in the commission of the
receipts and reimbursement requests covering crime becomes immaterial.34 In proving
them, was excessive compared to similar frames complicity, direct evidence is not necessary, as it
and lenses being sold or offered by other optical can be clearly deduced from the acts of the
shops. conspirators;35 it may be proved through a series
of acts done in pursuance of a common unlawful
purpose.36
advances or expenses. Dishonesty is a serious
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons offense, and no employer will take to its bosom a
come to an agreement concerning the dishonest employee.38 Dishonesty implies a
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. [d]isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
Conspiracy need not be proved by direct untrustworthiness; lack of integrity[; l]ack of
evidence and may be inferred from the conduct honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
of the accused before, during and after the fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
commission of the crime, which are indicative of defraud, deceive or betray.39 Acts of dishonesty
a joint purpose, concerted action and have been held to be sufficient grounds for
concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act dismissal as a measure of selfprotection on the
of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present part of the employer.40
when one concurs with the criminal design of
another, indicated by the performance of an overt The written statements of petitioners co
act leading to the crime committed. It may be employees admitting their participation in the
deduced from the mode and manner in which the scheme are admissible to establish the plan or
offense was perpetrated.37 scheme to defraud Prudentialife; the latter had
the right to rely on them for such purpose. The
From the evidence on record, it has been argument that the said statements are hearsay
sufficiently shown that petitioners actually took because the authors thereof were not presented
part in the commission of the acts complained of, for crossexamination does not persuade; the
which makes them coconspirators to the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in
scheme. For sure, it cannot be said that they are proceedings before the NLRC, which are summary
exceptions to the rule simply because they in nature and decisions may be made on the
categorically denied participation, or that there is basis of position papers.41 Besides, these
no direct evidence of their complicity. Quite the written declarations do not bear directly on
contrary, there is evidence pointing to their petitioners participation in the scheme; their
participation in the fraudulent scheme. First of guilt has been established by evidence other than
all, they all knew that even though they were not these statements.
paying for the eyeglasses, Alavera Optical would
issue, as it did issue, an official receipt falsely Petitioners reliance on Garcia v. Malayan
showing that the eyeglasses have been paid for, Insurance Co., Inc.42 is misplaced. Far from
which they would then use, as they did use, to declaring that the statement of a coemployee
obtain reimbursement from Prudentialife. By may not be used to prove the guilt of an
presenting the false receipt to their employer to employee accused of theft of company property,
obtain reimbursement for an expense which they the Court held therein that the affidavit of the co
did not in fact incur, this constituted dishonesty. employee cannot serve as basis for the finding
that said petitioner conspired in the theft because
Secondly, it was discovered that Dolendos and it was so lacking in crucial details. The opposite
Sys eyeglasses had no grade, while Evangelistas is thus true: the affidavit or statement of a co
eyeglass lens did not match the prescription employee in a labor case may prove an
issued to her. An eyeglass without graded lenses employees guilt or wrongdoing if it recites crucial
could only indicate that the wearer thereof has no details of his involvement.
vision problems, which does away with the
necessity of availing of the optical benefit Furthermore, petitioners contention that they
provision under the CBA which is understandably were not apprised of the fact that it has been
reserved for those employees who have discovered that their eyeglasses had no grade
developed vision problems in the course of comes as a surprise. The truth or falsity of this
employment. By availing of the benefit, the fact or allegation is readily ascertainable by the
employee represents to Prudentialife that he has petitioners themselves; the answer is literally
developed vision problems. If this is not true, right before their very eyes. If their eyeglasses
then he has committed an act of dishonesty as indeed had a grade, then they would have said so
well. Given the circumstances then obtaining, outright and not relegate the matter to a mere
the same principle holds true with respect to due process issue. They are presumed to wear
eyeglasses whose lenses do not match the these very spectacles each and every day.
corresponding prescription. Besides, as early as in the respondents Position
Paper below, it was raised as an issue that
For their dishonesty, the penalty of dismissal is petitioners eyeglasses either had no grade or did
justified pursuant to Section 2.6 (i) of the not match the prescription issued therefor;
Prudentialife Personnel Manual which prescribes indeed, petitioners have been given sufficient
the penalty of dismissal for acts of padding opportunity to meet such accusation in the Labor
receipts for reimbursement or liquidation of Arbiter stage.
another person took the exam on his behalf.
Finally, petitioners argument and prayer for an Thus, the CSC-CARAGA filed a formal charge for
award of damages and attorneys fees may not dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best
be allowed, since they did not question the interest of service against respondent on January
NLRCs denial thereof in its December 8, 2008 13, 1999.[4]
Decision. Only respondents went up to the CA on On September 27, 2000, respondent filed an
certiorari. It is wellsettled that a party who answer denying the charges against him and
does not appeal from the decision may not obtain moved for a formal hearing and investigation.
any affirmative relief from the appellate court The CSC granted the motion and scheduled a
other than what he has obtained from the lower hearing on October 31, 2000. Respondent failed
court whose decision is brought up on appeal. to appear on the said date but subsequently filed
The exceptions to this rule, such as where there an omnibus motion for the production of original
are (1) errors affecting the lower courts documents relative to the charges against him
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) plain and the presentation of persons who supervised
errors not specified, and (3) clerical errors, do not the October 25, 1992 PBET. His motion was
apply in this case.43 [A] party who did not granted and the concerned proctor and
appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed examiners were subpoenaed.
to have the judgment modified. All that he can do
is to make a counterassignment of errors or to After evaluating the evidence, the CSC found:
argue on issues raised below only for the purpose
of sustaining the judgment in his favor.44 On the basis of the photographs attached [to] the
PBET application form and the picture seat plan,
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January it is evident that the person who filed the
14, 2011 Decision and March 16, 2011 Resolution application form for the PBET is not the same
of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 111981 person who actually took the said examination on
are AFFIRMED. October 25, 1992. This disparity of physical
features of the former and latter are evident. The
G.R. No. 174935 person who filed the PBET has fuller cheekbones
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION , - v e r s u s - and slanted eyes, thinner lips and has a different
CARPIO MORALES, hairstyle from that of the John Doe who took the
said examination. On the other hand, the latter
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to has thinner cheekbones, elongated chin, full lips
set aside the February 22, 2006 decision[2] of the with a moustache and round eyes. Also, the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79047 signatures appearing of the PBET applicant and
and its resolution denying reconsideration.[3] that of the PBET examinee are also in different
On October 25, 1992, respondent Tristan C. strokes, curves and slants.
Colanggo took the Professional Board
Examination for Teachers (PBET) and obtained a Comparing the signatures on the [PBET
passing rate of 75.98%. On October 1, 1993, he application form] and [picture seat plan] vis--vis
was appointed Teacher I and was assigned to Don those affixed on the PDS of respondent more
Ruben E. Ecleo, Sr. Memorial National High School evidently reveals that the three are different
in San Jose, Surigao del Norte. persons. The photographs and signatures
appearing on the [PBET application form] and
Subsequently, a complaint questioning the [picture seat plan] are far and different from the
eligibility of teachers in Surigao del Norte was facial features and signatures from both John
filed in the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Does. Respondent looks older, has full
CARAGA Regional Office No. XIII (CSC-CARAGA) in cheekbones, flatter nose and thin lips. In other
Butuan City. The CSC-CARAGA immediately words, the picture and signatures affixed on the
investigated the matter. PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS
undoubtedly belong to three different persons
In the course of its investigation, the CSC- which clearly serve a ground to establish a just
CARAGA discovered significant irregularities in cause for CSC-CARAGA to issue a formal charge
respondents documents. The photographs of on January 13, 1999 against respondent.[5]
Tristan C. Colanggo attached respectively to the (emphasis supplied)
PBET application form and to the October 25,
1992 picture seat plan did not resemble The CSC concluded that respondent did not apply
respondent. Furthermore, the signature found in for and take the PBET exam. Thus, in Resolution
the PBET application form was markedly different No. 021412, the CSC found respondent guilty of
from that affixed on respondents personal data dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best
sheet (PDS). It appeared that someone other than interest of service and ordered his dismissal. [6]
respondent filed his PBET application and still
Respondent moved for reconsideration but his evidence in his favor through the compulsory
motion was denied.[7] process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for The investigation shall be conducted for the
certiorari in the CA alleging that the CSC purpose of ascertaining the truth without
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable
Resolution No. 021412.[8] He pointed out that the in judicial proceedings. It shall be conducted by
pieces of evidence against him were inadmissible the disciplining authority concerned or his
as they were unauthenticated photocopies of the authorized representatives. (emphasis supplied)
PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS.
The provision above clearly states that the CSC,
On February 22, 2006, the CA granted the in investigating complaints against civil servants,
petition.[9] It ruled that the photocopies of the is not bound by technical rules of procedure and
PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS evidence applicable in judicial proceedings.
should have been authenticated.[10] Only
documents or public records duly acknowledged The CSC correctly appreciated the photocopies of
or certified as such in accordance with law could PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS
be presented in evidence without further proof. (though not duly authenticated) in determining
[11] Consequently, the CA annulled and set aside whether there was sufficient evidence to
Resolution No. 021412 and ordered the dismissal substantiate the charges against the respondent.
of charges against respondent.[12] Worth noting was that respondent never objected
The CSC moved for reconsideration[13] but was to the veracity of their contents. He merely
denied.[14] Hence, this petition. disputed their admissibility on the ground that
they were not authenticated.
The CSC essentially avers that the CA erred in
finding that it committed grave abuse of As a general rule, a finding of guilt in
discretion in rendering Resolution No. 021412. administrative cases, if supported by substantial
[15] The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases evidence (or that amount of evidence which a
in the Civil Service[16] (Uniform Rules) does not reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
require strict adherence to technical rules of justify a conclusion),[18] will be sustained by this
evidence. Thus, it validly considered the Court.[19]
photocopies of the PBET application form, picture
seat plan and PDS in resolving the formal charge The CSC graciously granted respondents motions
against respondent in spite of the fact that they to ensure that he was accorded procedural due
were not duly authenticated. process. Moreover, it exhaustively discussed the
differences in appearances of respondent and the
The petition is meritorious. persons whose photographs were attached to the
PBET application form and the picture seat plan.
Administrative rules of procedure are construed It likewise compared the various signatures on
liberally to promote their objective and to assist the said documents.
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims and Resolution No. 021412 reveals that the CSC
defenses.[17] Section 39 of the Uniform Rules carefully evaluated the allegations against
provides: respondent and thoroughly examined and
weighed the evidence submitted for its
Section 39. The direct evidence for the consideration. The penalty (of dismissal) imposed
complainant and the respondent consist of the on respondent was therefore fully in accord with
sworn statement and documents submitted in law[20] and jurisprudence.[21] We find no grave
support of the complaint or answer as the case abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC.
may be, without prejudice to the presentation of
additional evidence deemed necessary but was ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
unavailable at the time of the filing of the The February 22, 2006 decision and August 17,
complaint and the answer upon which the cross- 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-S.P.
examination, by the respondent and the No. 79047 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
complainant respectively, shall be based.
Following the cross-examination, there may be re- Resolution No. 021412 dated October 22, 2002
direct or re-cross examination. and the May 19, 2003 resolution of the Civil
Either party may avail himself of the services of Service Commission finding respondent Tristan C.
counsel and may require the attendance of Colanggo GUILTY of dishonesty and conduct
witnesses and the production of documentary prejudicial to the best interest of service and
dismissing him from the service with forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits and the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the
disqualifying him from reemployment in the petitioner himself.[3]
government service are REINSTATED.
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court
granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE Philippine citizenship. The State, however,
PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed contending that petitioner: (1) failed to
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of state all the names by which he is or had been
the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the known; (2) failed to state all his former places of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed
Cotabato[2] admitting petitioner Ong Chia to to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable
Philippines citizenship. manner during his entire stay in the Philippines,
in violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade
The facts are as follows: or occupation and his previous incomes have
been insufficient or misdeclared, also in
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his
China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived petition with the appropriate documentary
at the port of Manila on board the vessel evidence.[4]
"Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found employment and Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a
eventually started his own business, married a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July petitioner with the Special Committee on
4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,[5] in
petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under which petitioner stated that in addition to his
C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known
Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As
stating his qualifications as required in 2, and lack petitioner, however, failed to state this other
of the disqualifications enumerated in 3 of the name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it
law, stated - was contended that his petition must fail.[6] The
state also annexed income tax returns[7]
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to
citizenship under the provisions of Letter of show that his net income could hardly support
Instruction No.270 with the Special Committee on himself and his family. To prove that petitioner
Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, failed to conduct himself in a proper and
Manila, docketed as SCN Case No.031776, but the irreproachable manner during his stay in the
same was not acted upon owing to the fact that Philippines, the State contended that, although
the said Special Committee on Naturalization was petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel
not reconstituted after the February, 1986 had been married twice, once before a judge in
revolution such that processing of petitions for 1953, and then again in church in 1977,
naturalization by administrative process was petitioner actually lived with his wife without the
suspended; benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were
married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if
qualifications and presented three witnesses to there be any. The State also annexed a copy of
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was petitioner's 1977 marriage contract[8] and a
Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the Joint-Affidavit[9] executed by petitioner and his
testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by wife. These documents show that when petitioner
the court whether the State intended to present married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977,
any witness against him, he remarked: novero no marriage license had been required in
accordance with Art.76 of the Civil Code because
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living
petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in together as husband and wife since 1953 without
the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the benefit of marriage. This, according to the
the major portion of the history of the Philippines, State, belies his claim that when he started living
so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor with his wife in 1953, they had already been
Please, that petitioner really deserves to be married. ella
admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for
this reason, we do not wish to present any The State also argued that, as shown by
evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence,
[10] petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax
but he did not include said address in his petition. return "because he is not liable for income tax
yet" confirms that his income is low. . ."It is not
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals only that the person having the employment gets
rendered its decision which, as already noted, enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's be shown that the employment gives one an
application for naturalization. It ruled that due to income such that there is an appreciable margin
the importance of naturalization cases, the State of his income over expenses as to be able to
is not precluded from raising questions not provide for an adequate support in the event of
presented in the lower court and brought up for unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and
the first time on appeal.[11] The appellate court thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity
held: or public charge." ...Now that they are in their old
age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor the allowance given to them by their children.
General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this The monthly pension given by the elder children
present petition for naturalization his other name, of the applicant cannot be added to his income to
"LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his make it lucrative because like bonuses,
previous application under Letter of Instruction commissions and allowances, said pensions are
No.270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated contingent, speculative and precarious
in the petition for naturalization and failure to
include the same militates against a decision in Hence, this petition based on the following
his favor...This is a mandatory requirement to assignment of errors:
allow those persons who know (petitioner) by
those other names to come forward and inform I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
the authorities of any legal objection which might DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION
adversely affect his application for citizenship. CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN
APPLCATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE
petition for naturalization that he formerly THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF
resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization
Law requires the applicant to state in his petition II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
"his present and former places of residence." This THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME
requirement is mandatory and failure of the OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS
petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
As explained by the Court, the reason for the
provision is to give the public, as well as the III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF
investigating agencies of the government, upon APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN HIS
the publication of the petition, an opportunity to PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND
be informed thereof and voice their objections FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
against the petitioner. By failing to comply with
this provision, the petitioner is depriving the IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
public and said agencies of such opportunity, THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN
thus defeating the purpose of the law A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a brando
proper and irreproachable manner when he lived-
in with his wife for several years, and sired four Petitioner's principal contention is that the
children out of wedlock. It has been the appellate court erred in considering the
consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year documents which had merely been annexed by
cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis
clergy and begetting by her three children out of of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's
wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and decision. Not having been presented and formally
irreproachable as required by the Revised offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of
Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies paper devoid of any evidentiary value,"[12] so it
him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the
naturalizationnigel Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual offered.
income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to accounted for as a typographical error on the part
note Rule 143[13] of the Rules of Court which of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No.
provides that - 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the
petition, is the correct case number is confirmed
These rules shall not apply to land registration, by the Evaluation Sheet[18] of the Special
cadastral and election cases, naturalization and Committee on Naturalization which was also
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove
suppletory character and whenever practicable the authenticity of the documents presented by
and convenient. (Emphasis added) the State.

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal Furthermore, the Court notes that these
offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being documents - namely, the petition in SCN Case No.
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint
the present case involving a petition for affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
naturalization. The only instance when said rules petitioner's income tax returns - are all public
may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such documents. As such, they have been executed
cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." under oath. They are thus reliable. Since
That is not the case here, since reliance upon the petitioner failed to make satisfactory showing of
documents presented by the State for the first any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on
time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more the authenticity of these documents, it is our
practical and convenient course of action conclusion that the appellate court did not err in
considering that decision in naturalization relying upon them.
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata.[14] Consequently, a final favorable One last point. The above discussion would have
judgment does not preclude the State from later been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle
on moving for a revocation of the grant of all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the
naturalization on the basis of the same effect of petitioner's failure to include the address
documents. "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance
with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a
the State to present and formally offer its document which forms part of the records as
documentary evidence before the trial court, he Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization.
was denied the right to object against their Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his address in his petition, but argues that since the
fundamental right to procedural due process.[15] Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it
We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the had been fully published,[19] with the petition
rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which and the other annexes, such publication
has not been formally offered is to afford the constitutes substantial compliance with 7.[20]
opposite party the chance to object to their This is allegedly because the publication
admissibility.[16] Petitioner cannot claim that he effectively satisfied the objective sought to be
was deprived of the right to object to the achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give
authenticity of the documents submitted to the investigating agencies of the government the
appellate court by the State. He could have opportunity to check on the background of the
included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the applicant and prevent suppression of information
brief he filed with the Court of Appeals, thus: regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in
nigella any community where he may have lived at one
time or another.[21] It is settled, however, that
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was strictly construed in favor of the government and
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has against the applicant.[22] As noted by the State,
not been established. In fact, the case number of C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant
the alleged petition for naturalization is 031767 for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his
while the case number of the petition actually present and former places of residence.[23] This
filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said provision and the rule of strict application of the
document is totally unreliable and should not be law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's
considered by the Honorable Court in resolving argument of "substantial compliance" with the
the instant appeal.[17] requirement under the Revised Naturalization
Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged ought to be denied. marinella
discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals In their position papers, petitioners claimed that
is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank
DENIED. with respect to the activities for which they were
employed, having continuously rendered
janitorial and messengerial services to the bank
ROLANDO SASAN, SR - versus - for more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION control and supervision over the means and
4TH DIVISION methods by which they were to perform their
jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 void because the latter had no power to do so
of the Rules of Court are the Decision[1] dated 24 since they had become regular employees of E-
April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP PCIBank.
No. 79912, which affirmed the Decision dated 22
January 2003 of the National Labor Relations For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000241- a Contract for Services with HI, an independent
2002 finding that Helpmate, Inc. (HI) is a job contractor which hired and assigned
legitimate independent job contractor and that petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and
the petitioners were not illegally dismissed from messengerial services thereat. It was HI that paid
work; and the Resolution[2] dated 31 October petitioners wages, monitored petitioners daily
2006 of the same court denying the Motion for time records (DTR) and uniforms, and exercised
Reconsideration filed by the petitioners. direct control and supervision over the petitioners
and that therefore HI has every right to terminate
Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank),[3] a their services legally. E-PCIBank could not be held
banking entity duly organized and existing under liable for whatever misdeed HI had committed
and by virtue of Philippine laws, entered into a against its employees.
Contract for Services[4] with HI, a domestic
corporation primarily engaged in the business of HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an
providing janitorial and messengerial services. independent job contractor engaged in the
Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire and assign business of providing janitorial and related
workers to E-PCIBank to perform services to business establishments, and E-
janitorial/messengerial and maintenance PCIBank was one of its clients. Petitioners were its
services. The contract was impliedly renewed employees, part of its pool of janitors/messengers
year after year. Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr.,[5] assigned to E-PCIBank. The Contract for Services
Leonilo Dayday,[6] Modesto Aguirre,[7] Alejandro between HI and E-PCIBank expired on 15 July
Ardimer,[8] Eleuterio Sacil,[9] Wilfredo Juegos, 2000. E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract
[10] Petronilo Carcedo,[11] and Cesar with HI and, instead, bidded out its janitorial
Peciencia[12] were among those employed and requirements to two other job contractors, Able
assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch along Services and Puritan. HI designated petitioners to
Gorordo Avenue, Lahug, Cebu City, as well as to new work assignments, but the latter refused to
its other branches in the Visayas.[13] comply with the same. Petitioners were not
dismissed by HI, whether actually or
O 23 July 2001, petitioners filed with the constructively, thus, petitioners complaints
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu City before the NLRC were without basis.
separate complaints[14] against E-PCIBank and
HI for illegal dismissal, with claims for separation Labor Arbiter Gutierrez focused on the following
pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances, issues: (a) whether petitioners were regular
damages, attorneys fees and costs. Their employees of HI; (b) whether petitioners were
complaints were docketed as NLRC RAB-VII Case illegally dismissed from their employment; and
No. 07-1381-2001 and raffled to Labor Arbiter (c) whether petitioners were entitled to their
Jose G. Gutierrez (Labor Arbiter Gutierrez) for money claims.
their proper disposition. Subsequently, on 22
August 2001, the petitioners[15] amended their On 7 January 2002, on the basis of the parties
complaints to include a claim for 13th month-pay. position papers and documentary evidence, Labor
Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that
Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but the parties still failed ground that it did not possess the required
to arrive at a mutually beneficial settlement; substantial capital or investment to actually
hence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez ordered that they perform the job, work, or service under its own
submit their respective position papers. account and responsibility as required under the
Labor Code.[16] HI is therefore a labor-only
contractor and the real employer of petitioners is
E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners.
According to Labor Arbiter Gutierrez: 2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing
therein that it has Total Assets of P20,939,935.72
[T]he undisputed facts show that the [herein as of 31 December 2000;
petitioners] were made to perform not only as
janitors but also as messengers, drivers and one 3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax
of them even worked as an electrician. For us, Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00582 registered
these jobs are not only directly related to the under the name of HI showing that it has a parcel
main business of the principal but are, likewise of land with Market Value of P1,168,860.00
deemed necessary in the conduct of respondent located along Rizal Avenue (now Bacalso
Equitable-PCI Banks principal business. Thus, Avenue), Cebu City, and
based on the above, we so declare that the
[petitioners] are employees of respondent 4. Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583
Equitable-PCI Bank. And having worked with registered under the name of HI showing that it
respondent Equitable-PCI Bank for more than one has a commercial building constructed on the
(1) year, they are deemed regular employees. preceding lot located along Bacalso Avenue, Cebu
They cannot, therefore, be removed from City with market value of P2,515,170.00.[19]
employment without cause and without due
process, which is wanting in this case. Hence, the
severance of their employment in the guise of The NLRC promulgated its Decision on 22 January
termination of contract is illegal.[17] 2003 modifying the ruling of Labor Arbiter
Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the
documentary evidence presented by HI for the
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered directing the declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with
respondents Equitable PCI Bank and Helpmate, sufficient capitalization, which cannot be
Inc. to pay jointly and solidarily the complainants considered engaged in labor-only contracting.
as follows:
On the charge of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled
1. Cesar Paciencia - P43,130.00 that:
2. Dominador Suico, Jr. - 32,015.00
3. Roland Mosquera - 33,250.00 The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely
4. Petronilo Carceda - 72,770.00 filed. The record shows that barely eight (8) days
5. Roland Sasan, Sr. - 60,420.00 from 15 July 2001 when the complainants were
6. Leonilo Dayday - 75,240.00 placed on a temporary off-detail, they filed their
7. Eleuterio Sacil - 53,010.00 complaints on 23 July 2001 and amended their
8. Mario Juntilla - 65,360.00 complaints on 22 August 2001 against the
9. Wilfredo Juegos - 57,950.00 respondents on the presumption that their
10. Modesto Aguirre - 54,245.00 services were already terminated. Temporary off-
11. Alejandro Ardimer - 59,185.00 detail is not equivalent to dismissal. x x x.[20]
TOTAL - P606,575.00[18] The NLRC deleted Labor Arbiter Gutierrezs award
of backwages and separation pay, but affirmed
his award for 13th month pay and attorneys fees
Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the 13th
Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI month pay, to the petitioners.[21] Thus, the NLRC
appealed the same to the NLRC, 4th Division, decreed in its 22 January 2003 Decision, the
stationed in Cebu City. Their appeals were payment of the following reduced amounts to
docketed as NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002. In petitioners:
support of its allegation that it was a legitimate
job contractor, HI submitted before the NLRC WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
several documents which it did not present of Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez dated 7 January
before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. These are: 2002 is MODIFIED, to wit:

1. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Ordering respondents Helpmate, Inc. and


Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing Amended Equitable PCI Bank to jointly and severally[22]
Articles of Incorporation, and General Information pay the complainants of their 13th month pay
Sheet Stock Corporation of HI showing therein and attorneys fees in the aggregate amount of
that it increased its authorized capital stock from Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Two
P1,500,000.00 to P20,000,000.00 on 12 March and 00/100 (P43,472.00), broken down as follows:
1999 with the Securities and Exchange
Commission;
1. Aguirre, Modesto - P5,434.00 JURISDICTION AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
2. Ardimer, Alejandro - 5,434.00 OF DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE NLRC 4TH
3. Carcedo, Petronilo - 5,434.00 DIVISIONS DECISION AND GRAVELY ERRED IN:
4. Dayday, Leonilo - 5,434.00
5. Juegos, Wilfredo - 5,434.00 I. ACCEPTING AND APPRECIATING THE PIECES OF
6. Juntilla, Mario - 5,434.00 EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENTS DURING
7. Paciencia, Cesar - 5,434.00 APPEAL, ALL EXISTING DURING THE TIME THE
8. Sacil, Eleuterio - 5,434.00 NLRC RAB 7S TRIAL, CONTRARY TO THIS
TOTAL P43,472.00[23] HONORABLE COURTS PREVIOUS ESTABLISHED
DECISIONS.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied II. REVERSING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THE
by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 1 July 2003. FACTUAL FINDING OF NLRC RAB 7 THAT THE
[24] RESPONDENT HI WAS LABOR ONLY CONTRACTOR.

Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, III. RULING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THAT
petitioners sought recourse with the Court of THE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL COMPLAINTS WERE
Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari[25] PREMATURELY FILED.[28]
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79912.
Before proceeding to the substantive issues, we
In its Decision dated 24 April 2006, the Court of first address the procedural issues raised by
Appeals affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI petitioners.
was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not
illegally dismiss petitioners: Petitioners object to the acceptance and
consideration by the NLRC of the evidence
As to the question of whether or not, as a presented by HI for the first time on appeal. This
legitimate independent job contractor, is not a novel procedural issue, however, and our
respondent HI illegally dismissed the petitioners. jurisprudence is already replete with cases[29]
We rule in the negative. allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not
presented before the Labor Arbiter, and
It is undisputed that the contract between submitted to the NLRC for the first time on
respondent HI and its client E-PCIBank expired on appeal. Technical rules of evidence are not
July 15, 2000. The record shows that after said binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use
expiration, respondent HI offered the petitioners every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
new work assignments to various establishments each case speedily and objectively, without
which are HIs clients. The petitioners, therefore, regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in
were not even placed on floating status. They the interest of due process.[30]
simply refused, without justifiable reason, to
assume their new work assignments which The submission of additional evidence before the
refusal was tantamount to abandonment. There NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of
being no illegal dismissal, petitioners are not Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing
entitled to backwages or separation pay.[26] in courts of law or equity are not controlling in
labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are
The fallo of the 24 April 2006 Decision of the directed to use every and all reasonable means to
appellate court reads: ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, and procedure all in the interest of substantial
judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been
petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such
decision of the NLRC, Fourth Division, in NLRC as documents and affidavits, submitted by the
Case No. V-000145-2003 promulgated on June 22, parties for the first time on appeal. The
2003.[27] submission of additional evidence on appeal does
not prejudice the other party for the latter could
submit counter-evidence.[31]
Petitioners now come before us via the instant
Petition raising the following issues: In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[32] we again emphasized
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF that:
APPEALS ACTED IN EXCESS OF THEIR
[T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving present their counter-evidence to the
evidence, even for the first time on appeal, documentary evidence presented by HI. Having
because technical rules of procedure are not failed in this respect, petitioners cannot now be
binding in labor cases. heard to complain about these documentary
evidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC
The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded and the Court of Appeals based its finding that HI
from receiving evidence on appeal as technical is a legitimate job contractor.
rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases.
In fact, labor officials are mandated by the Labor The essence of due process is simply an
Code to use every and all reasonable means to opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law opportunity to explain one's side. It is also an
or procedure, all in the interest of due process. opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
Thus, in Lawin Security Services v. NLRC, and action or ruling complained of. It is not the denial
Bristol Laboratories Employees Association-DFA v. of the right to be heard but denial of the
NLRC, we held that even if the evidence was not opportunity to be heard that constitutes violation
submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was of due process of law. Petitioners herein were
duly introduced on appeal to the NLRC is enough afforded every opportunity to be heard and to
basis for the latter to be more judicious in seek reconsideration of the adverse judgment
admitting the same, instead of falling back on the against them. They had every opportunity to
mere technicality that said evidence can no strengthen their positions by presenting their own
longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the substantial evidence to controvert those
first course of action would be more consistent submitted by E-PCIBank and HI before the NLRC,
with equity and the basic notions of fairness. and even before the Court of Appeals. It cannot
win its case by merely raising unsubstantiated
doubt or relying on the weakness of the adverse
For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in parties evidence.
petitioners protestations against the We now proceed to the resolution of the
documentary evidence submitted by HI because substantive issues submitted by petitioners for
they were mere photocopies. Evidently, our consideration, particularly, whether HI is a
petitioners are invoking the best evidence rule, labor-only contactor and E-PCIBank should be
espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of deemed petitioners principal employer; and
Court. It provides that: whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from
their employment.
Section 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the Permissible job contracting or subcontracting
contents of a document, no evidence shall be refers to an arrangement whereby a principal
admissible other than the original document itself agrees to put out or farm out to a contractor or
x x x. subcontractor the performance or completion of a
specific job, work or service within a definite or
The above provision explicitly mandates that predetermined period, regardless of whether such
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a job, work or service is to be performed or
document, no evidence shall be admissible other completed within or outside the premises of the
than the original document itself. Notably, principal.[35] A person is considered engaged in
certified true copies of these documents, legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the
acceptable under the Rules of Court[33] were following conditions concur:
furnished to the petitioners. Even assuming that
petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, (a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a
we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are distinct and independent business and
not covered by the technical rules of evidence undertakes to perform the job, work or service on
and procedure as observed in the regular courts. its own account and under its own responsibility
Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the according to its own manner and method, and
decision to grant the petition proceeds from an free from the control and direction of the principal
examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful in all matters connected with the performance of
look into the arguments contained in position the work except as to the results thereof;
papers and other documents.[34]
(b) The contractor or subcontractor has
Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity substantial capital or investment; and
when they filed their motion for reconsideration
before the NLRC, their Petition to the Court of (c) The agreement between the principal and
Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or contractor or subcontractor assures the
contractual employees entitlement to all labor CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
and occupational safety and health standards, Numbered VII-859-1297-048
free exercise of the right to self-organization,
security of tenure, and social and welfare is issued to
benefits.[36]
HELPMATE, INCORPORATED
330 N. Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City
In contrast, labor-only contracting, a prohibited
act, is an arrangement where the contractor or for having complied with the requirements as
subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places provided for under the Labor Code, as amended,
workers to perform a job, work or service for a and its Implementing Rules and having paid the
principal.[37] In labor-only contracting, the registration fee in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
following elements are present: PESOS (P100.00) per Official Receipt Number
9042769, dated October 16, 1997.
(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have
substantial capital or investment to actually In witness whereof, and by authority vested in me
perform the job, work or service under its own by the Labor Code, as amended, and its
account and responsibility; and Implementing Rules specifically Department
Order No. 10 series of 1997, I have hereunto set
(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed my hand and affixed the Official on this 23rd day
by such contractor or subcontractor are of December 1997.[45]
performing activities which are directly related to
the main business of the principal.[38] Having been issued by a public officer, this
certification carries with it the presumption that it
was issued in the regular performance of official
In distinguishing between permissible job duty.[46] In the absence of proof, petitioners bare
contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting, assertion cannot prevail over this presumption.
[39] we elucidated in Vinoya v. National Labor Moreover, the DOLE being the agency primarily
Relations Commission,[40] that it is not enough to responsible for regulating the business of
show substantial capitalization or investment in independent job contractors, we can presume in
the form of tools, equipment, etc. Other facts that the absence of evidence to the contrary that it
may be considered include the following: whether thoroughly evaluated the requirements submitted
or not the contractor is carrying on an by HI as a precondition to the issuance of the
independent business; the nature and extent of Cerificate of Registration.
the work; the skill required; the term and duration
of the relationship; the right to assign the The evidence on record also shows that HI is
performance of specified pieces of work; the carrying on a distinct and independent business
control and supervision of the work to another; from E-PCIBank. The employees of HI are
the employers power with respect to the hiring, assigned to clients to perform janitorial and
firing and payment of the contractors workers; messengerial services, clearly distinguishable
the control of the premises; the duty to supply from the banking services in which E-PCIBank is
premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; engaged.
and the mode and manner or terms of payment.
[41] Simply put, the totality of the facts and the Despite the afore-mentioned compliance by HI
surrounding circumstances of the case are to be with the requisites for permissible job
considered.[42] Each case must be determined contracting, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez still declared
by its own facts and all the features of the that HI was engaged in prohibited labor-only
relationship are to be considered.[43] contracting because it did not possess substantial
capital or investment to actually perform the job,
In the case at bar, we find substantial evidence to work or service under its own account or
support the finding of the NLRC, affirmed by the responsibility. Both the NLRC and the Court of
Court of Appeals, that HI is a legitimate job Appeals ruled to the contrary, and we agree.
contractor. Substantial capital or investment refers to capital
stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case
We take note that HI has been issued by the of corporations, tools, equipments, implements,
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) machineries and work premises, actually and
Certificate of Registration[44] Numbered VII-859- directly used by the contractor or subcontractor
1297-048. The said certificate states among other in the performance or completion of the job, work
things: or service contracted out.[47] An independent
contractor must have either substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, among others. The On the second requisite regarding the payment of
law does not require both substantial capital and wages, it was HI who paid petitioners their wages
investment in the form of tools, equipment, and who provided their daily time records and
machineries, etc.[48] It is enough that it has uniforms and other materials necessary for the
substantial capital. In the case of HI, it has proven work they performed. Therefore, it is HI who is
both. responsible for petitioners claims for wages and
other employees benefits. Precisely, the contract
We have expostulated that once it is established of services between HI and E-PCIBank reveals the
that an entity such as in this case, HI has following:
substantial capital, it was no longer necessary to
adduce further evidence to prove that it does not Indemnity for Salaries and Benefits, etc. [HI] shall
fall within the purview of labor-only contracting. be responsible for the salaries, allowances,
[49] There is even no need for HI to refute the overtime and holiday pay, and other benefits of
contention of petitioners that some of the its personnel including withholding taxes.[54]
activities they performed such as those of
messengerial services are directly related to the
principal business of E- PCIBank. As to the third requisite on the power to control
the employees conduct, and the fourth requisite
In any event, we have earlier declared that while regarding the power of dismissal, again E-
these services rendered by the petitioners as PCIBank did not have the power to control
janitors, messengers and drivers are considered petitioners with respect to the means and
directly related to the principal business of a methods by which their work was to be
bank, in this case E-PCIBank, nevertheless, they accomplished. It likewise had no power of
are not necessary in the conduct of its (E- dismissal over the petitioners. All that E-PCIBank
PCIBANKs) principal business.[50] could do was to report to HI any untoward act,
negligence, misconduct or malfeasance of any
HI has substantial capital in the amount of employee assigned to the premises. The contract
P20,939,935.72. It has its own building where it of services between E-PCIBank and HI is
holds office and it has been engaged in business noteworthy. It states:
for more than a decade now.[51] As observed by
the Court of Appeals, surely, such a well- [HI] shall have the entire charge, control and
established business entity cannot be considered supervision over all its employees who may be
a labor-only contractor. fielded to [E-PCIBank]. For this purpose, [HI] shall
assign a regular supervisor of its employees who
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four may be fielded to the Bank and which regular
standards in determining the existence of an supervisor shall exclusively supervise and control
employer-employee relationship, namely: (a) the the activities and functions defined in Section 1
manner of selection and engagement of the hereof. x x x.[55]
putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of
wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of All these circumstances establish that HI
dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of undertook said contract on its account, under its
control of the putative employees conduct. Most own responsibility, according to its own manner
determinative among these factors is the so- and method, and free from the control and
called control test.[52] direction of E-PCIBank. Where the control of the
principal is limited only to the result of the work,
The presence of the first requisite for the independent job contracting exists. The janitorial
existence of an employer-employee relationship service agreement between E-PCIBank and HI is
to wit, the selection and engagement of the definitely a case of permissible job contracting.
employee is shown by the fact that it was HI
which selected and engaged the services of Considering the foregoing, plus taking judicial
petitioners as its employees. This is fortified by notice of the general practice in private, as well
the provision in the contract of services between as in government institutions and industries, of
HI and E-PCIBank which states: hiring an independent contractor to perform
special services,[56] ranging from janitorial,
Selection, Engagement, Discharge. [HI] shall have security and even technical services, we can only
exclusive discretion in the selection, engagement, conclude that HI is a legitimate job contractor. As
investigation, discipline and discharge of its such legitimate job contractor, the law creates an
employees.[53] employer-employee relationship between HI and
petitioners[57] which renders HI liable for the
latters claims.
In view of the preceding conclusions, petitioners
will never become regular employees of E- In substance, the complainants averred that in
PCIBank regardless of how long they were the performance of their duties as route helpers,
working for the latter.[58] bottle segregators, and others, they were
employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc.
We further rule that petitioners were not illegally They further maintained that when respondent
dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of the company replaced them and prevented them
Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank, from entering the company premises, they were
petitioners cannot insist to continue to work for deemed to have been illegally dismissed.
the latter. Their pull-out from E-PCIBank did not
constitute illegal dismissal since, first, petitioners In lieu of a position paper, respondent company
were not employees of E-PCIBank; and second, filed a motion to dismiss complaint for lack of
they were pulled out from said assignment due to jurisdiction and cause of action, there being no
the non-renewal of the Contract of Service employer-employee relationship between
between HI and E-PCIBank. At the time they filed complainants and Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and
their complaints with the Labor Arbiter, that respondents Lipercon Services, Peoples
petitioners were not even dismissed by HI; they Specialist Services and Interim Services being
were only off-detail pending their re-assignment bona fide independent contractors, were the real
by HI to another client. And when they were employers of the complainants.[3] As regards the
actually given new assignments by HI with other corporate officers, respondent insisted that they
clients,[59] petitioners even refused the same. As could not be faulted and be held liable for
the NLRC pronounced, petitioners complaint for damages as they only acted in their official
illegal dismissal is apparently premature. capacities while performing their respective
duties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 24 On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera
April 2006 and Resolution dated 31 October 2006 rendered a decision ordering respondent
of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs company to reinstate complainants to their
against petitioners. former positions with all the rights, privileges and
benefits due regular employees, and to pay their
full back wages which, with the exception of
PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, vs. COCA-COLA Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be
BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent. computed upon proof of his dismissal as of 31
May 1998, already amounted to an aggregate of
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under P1,810,244.00.[4]
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] dated 21 In finding for the complainants, the Labor Arbiter
December 2001 which affirmed with modification ruled that in contrast with the negative
the decision of the National Labor Relations declarations of respondent companys witnesses
Commission promulgated 30 March 2001.[2] who, as district sales supervisors of respondent
company denied knowing the complainants
On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of personally, the testimonies of the complainants
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its were more credible as they sufficiently supplied
officers, Lipercon Services, Inc., Peoples Specialist every detail of their employment, specifically
Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc., filed a identifying who their salesmen/drivers were, their
complaint against respondents for unfair labor places of assignment, aside from their dates of
practice through illegal dismissal, violation of engagement and dismissal.
their security of tenure and the perpetuation of
the Cabo System. They thus prayed for On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the
reinstatement with full back wages, and the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an employer-
declaration of their regular employment status. employee relationship between the complainants
and respondent company when it affirmed in toto
For failure to prosecute as they failed to either the latters decision.
attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or
submit their respective affidavits, the claims of In a resolution dated 17 July 2001 the NLRC
fifty-two (52) complainant-employees were subsequently denied for lack of merit
dismissed. Thereafter, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera respondents motion for consideration.
conducted clarificatory hearings to elicit
information from the ten (10) remaining Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the
complainants (petitioners herein) relative to their Court of Appeals which, although affirming the
alleged employment with respondent firm. finding of the NLRC that an employer-employee
relationship existed between the contending statements, much less to be cross-examined,
parties, nonetheless agreed with respondent that their affidavits should, as the Court of Appeals
the affidavits of some of the complainants, rightly held, be stricken off the records for being
namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in
Espina, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, evidence. With respect to Nestor Romero,
Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, should respondent points out that he should not have
not have been given probative value for their been impleaded in the instant petition since he
failure to affirm the contents thereof and to already voluntarily executed a Compromise
undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, Agreement, Waiver and Quitclaim in
the appellate court dismissed their complaints for consideration of P450,000.00. Finally, respondent
lack of sufficient evidence. In the same Decision argues that the instant petition should be
however, complainants Eddie Ladica, Arman dismissed in view of the failure of petitioners[7]
Queling and Rolando Nieto were declared regular to sign the petition as well as the verification and
employees since they were the only ones certification of non-forum shopping, in clear
subjected to cross-examination.[5] Thus - violation of the principle laid down in Loquias v.
(T)he labor arbiter conducted clarificatory Office of the Ombudsman.[8]
hearings to ferret out the truth between the
opposing claims of the parties thereto. He did not The crux of the controversy revolves around the
submit the case based on position papers and propriety of giving evidentiary value to the
their accompanying documentary evidence as a affidavits despite the failure of the affiants to
full-blown trial was imperative to establish the affirm their contents and undergo the test of
parties claims. As their allegations were poles cross-examination.
apart, it was necessary to give them ample
opportunity to rebut each others statements The petition is impressed with merit. The issue
through cross-examination. In fact, private confronting the Court is not without precedent in
respondents Ladica, Quelling and Nieto were jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v.
subjected to rigid cross-examination by NLRC[9] squarely grapples a similar challenge
petitioners counsel. However, the testimonies of involving the propriety of the use of affidavits
private respondents Romero, Espina, and without the presentation of affiants for cross-
Bantolino were not subjected to cross- examination. In that case, we held that the
examination, as should have been the case, and argument that the affidavit is hearsay because
no explanation was offered by them or by the the affiants were not presented for cross-
labor arbiter as to why this was dispensed with. examination is not persuasive because the rules
Since they were represented by counsel, the of evidence are not strictly observed in
latter should have taken steps so as not to proceedings before administrative bodies like the
squander their testimonies. But nothing was done NLRC where decisions may be reached on the
by their counsel to that effect.[6] basis of position papers only.

Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse In Rase v. NLRC,[10] this Court likewise sidelined
Decision of the Court of Appeals; that, instead, a similar challenge when it ruled that it was not
the favorable judgment of the NLRC be necessary for the affiants to appear and testify
reinstated. and be cross-examined by counsel for the
adverse party. To require otherwise would be to
In essence, petitioners argue that the Court of negate the rationale and purpose of the summary
Appeals should not have given weight to nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules
respondents claim of failure to cross-examine and to make mandatory the application of the
them. They insist that, unlike regular courts, labor technical rules of evidence.
cases are decided based merely on the parties
position papers and affidavits in support of their Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v.
allegations and subsequent pleadings that may NLRC[11] succinctly states that under Art. 221 of
be filed thereto. As such, according to petitioners, the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing
the Rules of Court should not be strictly applied in in courts of law do not control proceedings before
this case specifically by putting them on the the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes
witness stand to be cross-examined because the that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are
NLRC has its own rules of procedure which were authorized to adopt reasonable means to
applied by the Labor Arbiter in coming up with a ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
decision in their favor. objectively and without regard to technicalities of
law and procedure, all in the interest of due
In its disavowal of liability, respondent process. We find no compelling reason to deviate
commented that since the other alleged affiants therefrom.
were not presented in court to affirm their
To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC sign the petition as well as the Verification and
are not bound by the technical niceties of law and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of contravention of Sec. 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of
law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and Court will cause the dismissal of the present
prevailing jurisprudence may be given only appeal. While the Loquias case requires the strict
stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a observance of the Rules, it however provides an
suppletory character and effect. The submission escape hatch for the transgressor to avoid the
by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel,[12] that an harsh consequences of non-observance. Thus -
affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay
evidence and has no real evidentiary value, x x x x We find that substantial compliance will
cannot find relevance in the present case not suffice in a matter involving strict observance
considering that a criminal prosecution requires a of the rules. The attestation contained in the
quantum of evidence different from that of an certification on non-forum shopping requires
administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the personal knowledge by the party who executed
Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the the same. Petitioners must show reasonable
discretion to determine the necessity of a formal cause for failure to personally sign the
trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot
even required as the cases may be decided based justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of
on verified position papers, with supporting liberal construction (underscoring supplied).
documents and their affidavits.
In their Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as Pauper
As to whether petitioner Nestor Romero should be Litigants, petitioners made a request for a fifteen
properly impleaded in the instant case, we only (15)-day extension, i.e., from 24 April 2002 to 8
need to follow the doctrinal guidance set by May 2002, within which to file their petition for
Periquet v. NLRC[13] which outlines the review in view of the absence of a counsel to
parameters for valid compromise agreements, represent them.[16] The records also reveal that
waivers and quitclaims - it was only on 10 July 2002 that Atty. Arnold
Cacho, through the UST Legal Aid Clinic, made his
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as formal entry of appearance as counsel for herein
against public policy. If the agreement was petitioners. Clearly, at the time the instant
voluntarily entered into and represents a petition was filed on 7 May 2002 petitioners were
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties not yet represented by counsel. Surely,
and may not later be disowned simply because of petitioners who are non-lawyers could not be
a change of mind. It is only where there is clear faulted for the procedural lapse since they could
proof that the waiver was wangled from an not be expected to be conversant with the
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of nuances of the law, much less knowledgeable
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that with the esoteric technicalities of procedure. For
the law will step in to annul the questionable this reason alone, the procedural infirmity in the
transaction. But where it is shown that the person filing of the present petition may be overlooked
making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full and should not be taken against petitioners.
understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
as a valid and binding undertaking. SET ASIDE and the decision of the NLRC dated 30
March 2001 which affirmed in toto the decision of
In closely examining the subject agreements, we the Labor Arbiter dated 29 May 1998 ordering
find that on their face the Compromise respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., to
Agreement[14] and Release, Waiver and reinstate Prudencio Bantolino, Nilo Espina, Eddie
Quitclaim[15] are devoid of any palpable inequity Ladica, Arman Queling, Rolando Nieto, Ricardo
as the terms of settlement therein are fair and Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and
just. Neither can we glean from the records any Nelson Manalastas to their former positions as
attempt by the parties to renege on their regular employees, and to pay them their full
contractual agreements, or to disavow or disown back wages, with the exception of Prudencio
their due execution. Consequently, the same Bantolino whose back wages are yet to be
must be recognized as valid and binding computed upon proof of his dismissal, is
transactions and, accordingly, the instant case REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that herein
should be dismissed and finally terminated petition is DENIED insofar as it concerns Nestor
insofar as concerns petitioner Nestor Romero. Romero who entered into a valid and binding
Compromise Agreement and Release, Waiver and
We cannot likewise accommodate respondents Quitclaim with respondent company.
contention that the failure of all the petitioners to
CIRTEK EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION- a QUESTION OF FACT arises when the doubt or
FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS vs. CIRTEK difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
ELECTRONICS, INC., alleged facts,[3] while a QUESTION OF LAW exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to what
This resolves the motion for reconsideration and the law is on a certain set of facts.
supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent, Cirtek Electronics, Inc., of the Courts The present case presents the primordial issue of
Decision dated November 15, 2010. whether the Secretary of Labor is empowered to
give arbitral awards in the exercise of his
Respondent-movant avers that petitioner, in filing authority to assume jurisdiction over labor
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, availed disputes.
of the wrong remedy, hence, the Court should
have dismissed the petition outright. It goes on to Ineluctably, the issue involves a determination
aver that the Court erred in resolving a factual and application of existing law, the provisions of
issue whether the August 24, 2005 Memorandum the Labor Code, and prevailing jurisprudence.
of Agreement (MOA) was validly entered into , Intertwined with the issue, however, is the
which is not the office of a petition for certiorari. question of validity of the MOA and its ratification
which, as movant correctly points out, is a
Respondent-movant further avers that the question of fact and one which is not appropriate
MOA[1] signed by the remaining officers of for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
petitioner Union and allegedly ratified by its 45. The rule, however, is not without exceptions,
members should have been given credence by viz:
the Court.
This rule provides that the parties may raise only
Furthermore, respondent-movant maintains that questions of law, because the Supreme Court is
the Secretary of Labor cannot insist on a ruling not a trier of facts. Generally, we are not duty-
beyond the compromise agreement entered into bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence
by the parties; and that, as early as February 5, introduced in and considered by the tribunals
2010, petitioner Union had already filed with the below. When supported by substantial evidence,
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and
resolution of disaffiliation from the Federation of binding on the parties and are not reviewable by
Free Workers resulting in the latters lack of this Court, unless the case falls under any of the
personality to represent the workers in the following recognized exceptions:
present case.
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded
The motion is bereft of merit. entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

Respondent indeed availed of the wrong remedy (2) When the inference made is manifestly
of certiorari under Rule 65. Due, however, to the mistaken, absurd or impossible;
nature of the case, one involving workers wages
and benefits, and the fact that whether the (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
petition was filed under Rule 65 or appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 it was filed within 15 (4) When the judgment is based on a
days (the reglementary period under Rule 45) misapprehension of facts;
from petitioners receipt of the resolution of the
Court of Appeals Resolution denying its motion (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
for reconsideration, the Court resolved to give it
due course. As Almelor v. RTC of Las Pias, et al. (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
[2] restates: findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme appellant and appellee;
Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate
mode shall be dismissed. This is to prevent the (7) When the findings are contrary to those of
party from benefiting from ones neglect and the trial court;
mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries
certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial
without citation of specific evidence on which
justice as expeditiously as possible. (emphasis
they are based;
and underscoring supplied)
Respecting the attribution of error to the Court in
ruling on a question of fact, it bears recalling that
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well its previous bargaining history and financial
as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not outlook and improvements as stated in its own
disputed by the respondents; and website.[7]

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of The appellate courts ruling that giving credence
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence to the Pahayag and the minutes of the meeting
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on which were not verified and notarized would
record. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) violate the rule on parol evidence is erroneous.
The parol evidence rule, like other rules on
In the present case, the findings of the Secretary evidence, should not be strictly applied in labor
of Labor and the appellate court on whether the cases. Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-
MOA is valid and binding are conflicting, the FFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc. [8] teaches:
former giving scant consideration thereon, and [R]eliance on the parol evidence rule is
the latter affording it more weight. misplaced. In labor cases pending before the
Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of
As found by the Secretary of Labor, the MOA evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are
came about as a result of the constitution, at not controlling. Rules of procedure and evidence
respondents behest, of the Labor-Management are not applied in a very rigid and technical sense
Council (LMC) which, he reminded the parties, in labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not
should not be used as an avenue for bargaining precluded from accepting and evaluating
but for the purpose of affording workers to evidence other than, and even contrary to, what
participate in policy and decision-making. Hence, is stated in the CBA. (emphasis and underscoring
the agreements embodied in the MOA were not supplied)
the proper subject of the LMC deliberation or
procedure but of CBA negotiations and, therefore,
deserving little weight. On the contention that the MOA should have
been given credence because it was validly
The appellate court, held, however, that the entered into by the parties, the Court notes that
Secretary did not have the authority to give an even those who signed it expressed reservations
arbitral award higher than what was stated in the thereto. A CBA (assuming in this case that the
MOA. The conflicting views drew the Court to re- MOA can be treated as one) is a contract imbued
evaluate the facts as borne by the records, an with public interest. It must thus be given a
exception to the rule that only questions of law liberal, practical and realistic, rather than a
may be dealt with in an appeal by certiorari narrow and technical construction, with due
under Rule 45. consideration to the context in which it is
negotiated and the purpose for which it is
As discussed in the Decision under intended.[9]
reconsideration, the then Acting Secretary of
Labor Manuel G. Imson acted well within his As for the contention that the alleged
jurisdiction in ruling that the wage increases to be disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW during the
given are P10 per day effective January 1, 2004 pendency of the case resulted in the FFW losing
and P15 per day effective January 1, 2005, its personality to represent the Union, the same
pursuant to his power to assume jurisdiction does not affect the Courts upholding of the
under Art. 263 (g)[4] of the Labor Code. authority of the Secretary of Labor to impose
arbitral awards higher than what was supposedly
While an arbitral award cannot per se be agreed upon in the MOA. Contrary to respondents
categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered assertion, the unavoidable issue of disaffiliation
into by the parties because it requires the bears no significant legal repercussions to
interference and imposing power of the State thru warrant the reversal of the Courts Decision.
the Secretary of Labor when he assumes
jurisdiction, the award can be considered as an En passant, whether there was a valid
approximation of a collective bargaining disaffiliation is a factual issue. Besides, the
agreement which would otherwise have been alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW
entered into by the parties. Hence, it has the was by virtue of a Resolution signed on February
force and effect of a valid contract obligation 23, 2010 and submitted to the DOLE Laguna Field
between the parties.[5] Office on March 5, 2010 two months after the
present petition was filed on December 22, 2009,
In determining arbitral awards then, aside from hence, it did not affect FFW and its Legal Centers
the MOA, courts considered other factors and standing to file the petition nor this Courts
documents including, as in this case, the financial jurisdiction to resolve the same.
documents[6] submitted by respondent as well as
At all events, the issue of disaffiliation is an intra- SECTION 2. Coverage. Other related labor
union dispute which must be resolved in a relations disputes shall include any conflict
different forum in an action at the instance of between a labor union and the employer or any
either or both the FFW and the Union or a rival individual, entity or group that is not a labor
labor organization, not the employer. organization or workers association. This
includes: (1) cancellation of registration of unions
An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict and workers associations; and (2) a petition for
between and among union members, including interpleader.[10] (emphasis supplied)
grievances arising from any violation of the rights
and conditions of membership, violation of or Indeed, as respondent-movant itself argues, a
disagreement over any provision of the unions local union may disaffiliate at any time from its
constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from mother federation, absent any showing that the
chartering or disaffiliation of the union. Sections 1 same is prohibited under its constitution or rule.
and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No. 40-03, Such, however, does not result in it losing its
Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate the legal personality altogether. Verily, Anglo-KMU v.
following circumstances as inter/intra-union Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa Sa
disputes, viz: Manila Bay Spinning Mills At J.P. Coats[11]
RULE XI enlightens:
INTER/INTRA-UNION DISPUTES AND
OTHER RELATED LABOR RELATIONS DISPUTES A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit
SECTION 1. Coverage. - Inter/intra-union disputes primarily designed to secure and maintain an
shall include: equality of bargaining power between the
(a) cancellation of registration of a labor employer and their employee-members. A local
organization filed by its members or by another union does not owe its existence to the federation
labor organization; with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and
(b) conduct of election of union and workers distinct voluntary association owing its creation
association officers/nullification of election of to the will of its members. The mere act of
union and workers association officers; affiliation does not divest the local union of its
(c) audit/accounts examination of union or own personality, neither does it give the mother
workers association funds; federation the license to act independently of the
(d) deregistration of collective bargaining local union. It only gives rise to a contract of
agreements; agency where the former acts in representation
(e) validity/invalidity of union affiliation or of the latter. (emphasis and underscoring
disaffiliation; supplied)
(f) validity/invalidity of acceptance/non-
acceptance for union membership; Whether then, as respondent claims, FFW went
(g) validity/invalidity of impeachment/expulsion against the will and wishes of its principal (the
of union and workers association officers and member-employees) by pursuing the case despite
members; the signing of the MOA, is not for the Court, nor
(h) validity/invalidity of voluntary recognition; for respondent to determine, but for the Union
(i) opposition to application for union and CBA and FFW to resolve on their own pursuant to their
registration; principal-agent relationship.
(j) violations of or disagreements over any
provision in a union or workers association WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of
constitution and by-laws; this Courts Decision of November 15, 2010 is
(k) disagreements over chartering or DENIED.
registration of labor organizations and collective
bargaining agreements;
(l) violations of the rights and conditions of ABOSTA SHIPMANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
union or workers association membership; - versus -
(m) violations of the rights of legitimate labor NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
organizations, except interpretation of collective (FIRST DIVISION) and ARNULFO R. FLORES,
bargaining agreements;
(n) such other disputes or conflicts involving The petition for review on certiorari[1] before us
the rights to self-organization, union membership seeks the reversal of the resolutions of the Court
and collective bargaining of Appeals (CA), dated October 20, 2003[2] and
(1) between and among legitimate labor April 6, 2004,[3] rendered in CA-G.R. SP No.
organizations; 66806.
(2) between and among members of a union or
workers association. The Facts
Respondent Arnulfo R. Flores entered into a 12- The agency alleged that sometime in September
month contract of employment, as radio officer, 1997, Flores prepared a petition for five Filipino
with the petitioner Abosta Shipmanagement crew members from the engine department,
Corporation (agency) for and in behalf of Panstar demanding the ouster of 1st Assistant Engineer
Shipping Co. Ltd. (Panstar) of Busan, South Korea. Rodolfo Escarola, reportedly for incompetence
Under the contract, Flores was to receive a salary and inefficiency; they threatened mass
of US$728.00/month for a 48-hour work week, a resignation. To create further unrest and
guaranteed overtime pay of US$439.00 a month, dissatisfaction, Flores induced Sofronio Tibay,
a monthly vacation pay of US$146.00, and a Herman Sebuando, Primitive Ferrer and
supplemental allowance of US$33.00 a month. Raymundo Angel, of the same department, to
write a letter to the ship management that they
Flores joined the vessel M/V Morning Charm would be taking their emergency leaves, one
sometime in June 1997. The Master of the vessel, after the other, in November 1997. They charged
Captain B.H. Mun, and Chief Engineer Gowang the vessel officers of mismanaging the crew.
Gun Lee are from South Korea. Aside from Flores, When confronted about the letter, however, they
there were other Filipino workers on the vessel. denied most of the letters contents, pointing to
On November 29, 1997, Flores was repatriated Flores as the author of the letter. At Flores
due to alleged infractions committed while on instigation, the crew members threatened to
board the vessel. In reaction, he filed a complaint disembark without waiting for their replacements.
for illegal dismissal on January 13, 1998 against The Master asked them to work for a less drastic
the agency and Panstar. solution, but they maintained their threat.

The Compulsory Arbitration Proceedings In light of the growing unrest on board the ship
and Flores negative work attitude, the Master,
Before the labor arbiter, Flores alleged that in the Capt. B.H. Mun, asked Flores to explain why he
course of his employment, he was asked by the should not be administratively sanctioned for (1)
Master to coordinate with several crew members disrespecting his superior officers through his
who were requesting that they be allowed to unruly, discourteous, impolite and violent
resign or pre-terminate their employment behavior; (2) inciting the crew to commit
contracts due to the alleged mismanagement of insubordination and engaging in an activity which
the vessel. He acted as coordinator as bidden, tends to create discontent among the crew or to
but was surprised to learn later that he was one destroy harmonious relations with the principal;
of those whose resignations were accepted. He and (3) inefficiency and other infractions,
sought clarification from the Master, only to be specifically: (a) staying at his quarters most of the
told that he was among the crew members who time while on duty, leaving unattended the
were considered to have resigned; hence, his messages from the charterer or from the Panstar
discharge on November 29, 1997. office; (b) revealing confidential messages to the
crew without the Masters permission; and (c)
Upon his return to Manila, he immediately insubordination.
informed the agency that he had been
erroneously included among those who were According to the agency and Panstar, Flores
considered resigned. He was surprised to learn became enraged after he was informed of the
that he was blamed for having instigated the charges, but could only vehemently deny the
mass resignation of the Filipino crew. When he accusations. The Master then decided to separate
tried to explain his side, the agency told him that Flores from the service as the former was
the action taken by the Master was final and that convinced that the charges were well-founded.
it was not interested in his story. The agency and Panstar claimed that Flores was
For their part, the agency and Panstar argued paid his overtime pay, salary for November 1997,
that Flores, while in their employ, insistently and and accrued vacation leave pay.
rudely questioned the crews working schedule,
including the propriety of requiring them to In a decision dated August 20, 1999,[4] Labor
render overtime services. They claimed that Arbiter Adolfo C. Babiano dismissed the complaint
Flores instigated the crew to rebel against the for lack of merit. He found that the evidence the
authority of the Master, under the guise of agency and Panstar presented were convincing
questioning social security and income tax enough to prove that Flores was a serious threat
deductions. As a result, the crew members to the safety of the vessel and its crew. He noted
became unruly, arrogant, and impolite, and were that Flores failed to refute the agencys and
even violent in expressing their views. They even Panstars allegations that he incited the crew to
refused to obey the lawful orders of the Master rebel against the authority of the Master and the
and the senior officers, thus causing dissension vessels senior officers. He also found Flores to
on board the vessel. have been paid all his monetary entitlements.
the affirmative declarations (reports) of Capt. B.H.
On appeal by Flores, the National Labor Relations Mun, Chief Officer Alfredo R. de Luna and 1st
Commission (NLRC), in its decision of December Assistant Engineer Rodolfo Escarola that Flores
29, 2000,[5] reversed the labor arbiters ruling. committed the infractions which led to his
The NLRC found that the agency and Panstar dismissal. In the face of these positive
failed to prove (1) that Flores termination of statements, the agency points out that Flores
employment was for a just or authorized cause could only offer bare and self-serving denials. It
and (2) that he was accorded due process. It stresses too that, contrary to the impression of
opined that the main basis for the dismissal the NLRC and the CA, Flores dismissal was not
action against Flores was the accusation that he only for inciting members of the crew to rebel
agitated the crew to rebel against the authorities against the ship officers, but also for other causes
of M/V Morning Charm, as reported by the Chief such as inefficiency and insubordination or
Officer (Chief Mate) and the 1st Assistant disobedience to the lawful orders of a superior
Engineer. The reports, the NLRC believe, did not officer, all prejudicial to the interests of the
constitute proof of the validity of the dismissal. employer.

Moreover, the NLRC noted that Flores was The agency insists that Flores contumacious acts,
dismissed immediately after the Master while on board the vessel, constituted a serious
conducted his inquiry on November 17, 1997. It and grave offense which posed a threat to the
stressed that the Masters so called administrative safety of the crew and the vessel. It adds that
inquiry did not satisfy the due process they also reflected Flores arrogance and
requirements, as Flores was not given an disobedience to lawful orders/directives of his
adequate time for his defense. superiors, punishable by dismissal pursuant to
Section 31 of the Philippine Overseas
Accordingly, the NLRC declared Flores to have Employment Administration Standard
been illegally dismissed. It directed the agency Employment Contract.
and Panstar to pay Flores, jointly and severally,
US$2,184.00 as salary for the unexpired portion The agency posits that the CA erred in brushing
of his contract, P50,000.00 in moral damages, aside the findings of the labor arbiter. It calls
and P25,000.00 in exemplary damages, plus 10% attention to the labor arbiters observation that
attorneys fees. The agency moved for Flores failed to refute the agencys allegation that
reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the motion he incited the crew to rebel against the authority
in its order of July 18, 2001.[6] The agency then of the Master and the senior officers of the
sought relief from the CA, through a petition for vessel. Flores did not also refute the charge that
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. to pressure the principal, he induced some
members of the crew to take their emergency
leaves one by one and to threaten the principal to
The CA Ruling an early sign-off.
In its first assailed resolution (dated October 20,
2003),[7] the CA dismissed the petition due to The Case for Flores
insufficiency in substance,[8] as the petitioner
failed to show that the NLRC committed grave In his comment[14] and memorandum,[15] Flores
abuse of discretion in reversing the labor arbiters asks that the petition be dismissed for raising
decision finding Flores dismissal legal. It purely questions of fact and not of law. He
sustained the NLRCs conclusion that the dismissal contends that the appellate courts findings are
was without a valid cause and that Flores was not to be disturbed as they are binding upon this
denied due process. Court and, although there are certain exceptions
to the rule, the petition does not fall within any of
The second assailed CA resolution[9] denied the the exceptions.[16]
agencys motion for reconsideration, prompting
the agencys present appeal[10] to this Court. Flores further submits that aside from raising only
questions of fact, the agency failed to state any
The Petitioners Case special and important reasons to justify the
exercise by the Court of its discretionary
Through its submissions the petition itself,[11] appellate jurisdiction in the case.[17]
the reply to Flores comment[12] and the
memorandum[13] the agency contends that in The Courts Ruling
affirming the NLRC ruling, the CA deviated from
the substantial evidence rule in quasi-judicial The procedural question
proceedings. It argues that Flores employer,
Panstar, met this standard of evidence through
We first resolve the procedural issue of whether 2. He revealed to the crew all outgoing and
we should rule on the petition which, as Flores incoming messages, without informing Capt. B.H.
contends, raises only questions of fact and not of Mun.
law. While it is true that the Court is not a trier of
facts, we deem it proper to re-examine the 3. Contrary to Capt. B.H. Muns instructions,
evidence in view of the variance in the factual Flores issued shore-passes to the deck crew
findings of the labor arbiter, on the one hand, and without the permission of the chief mate when
of the NLRC and the CA, on the other hand. the vessel made a port call at Maputo during its
last voyage. The deck crew members were not
The substantive issue supposed to go on shore as cargo was being
unloaded at the time. It was a rush operation
After a careful and objective study of the parties which had to be supervised and monitored to
submissions, we find that there is substantial avoid damage to the cargo and to be on alert for
evidence on record supporting Flores dismissal. stowaways. Flores went on shore nevertheless,
Substantial evidence[, it must be stressed,] is with some of the crew to whom he had issued
more than a mere scintilla[. It means such] shore-passes.
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even 4. Flores entered in his overtime sheet 40-50
if other minds, equally reasonable, might hours in excess of the monthly 85 hours, despite
conceivably opine otherwise.[18] the captains instructions to the crew not to go
over 85 hours; Flores did this to give the
The agency, to our mind, succeeded in showing, impression that he was doing a lot of work.
by substantial evidence, that its principal
(Panstar) had a valid reason for terminating 5. Flores stayed most of the time at the crew
Flores employment. The Master, Capt. B.H. Mun, restroom while on duty instead of the radio room,
decided to dismiss him not only for agitating the resulting in the failure, at times, of the charterer
crew to rebel against the authorities of the vessel and the Panstar Busan Office to communicate
M/V Morning Charm (which the NLRC considered with the vessel by INMARSAT phone. This gave
as the main reason for the dismissal),[19] but for rise to several complaints, especially from the
several other infractions. As the records show, charterer who was compelled to use two
and as Capt. B.H. Mun stressed in his letter of communication devices the facsimile machine
November 17, 1997 to the agency management, and the telex to send the same instruction or
[20] Flores was also charged with inefficiency or message to the vessel.
neglect of duty, insubordination, insolent and
disrespectful behavior, and other actuations Capt. B.H. Mun considered the foregoing
which made him unfit for his position and rank. infractions and a few more mentioned in his letter
as indications of Flores efforts to bypass his
Capt. B.H. Muns letter chronicled the bases of the authority and to act at cross purposes with him.
charges lodged against Flores, and its salient
points may be summarized as follows: It is clear that the letters of Chief Officer De
Luna[21] and 1st Assistant Engineer Escarola[22]
1. Since Flores came on board, he had been to Panstars Capt. Chung, detailing how Flores
complaining about the deduction of US$40.00 agitated the crew (with charges of
from the crews monthly allotment for the mismanagement of the vessel), and Capt. B.H.
Associated Marine Officers and Seamens Union of Muns letter to the agency all depict a radio officer
the Philippines (AMOSUP) Fund. To Capt. B.H. who undermined the authority of the shipmaster
Muns knowledge, the crew members were aware and the other officers in the guise of raising labor-
of the deduction. Despite this, Flores prepared a management issues on board the vessel.
letter to the International Transport Workers Additionally and as an indication of his disrespect
Federation (ITF) and asked the crew members to for the vessels management, as well as his low
sign it. Capt. B.H. Mun asked Flores to explain the regard for his work, he neglected his duties as
contents of the ITF letter to the crew to avoid any radio officer and disobeyed Capt. B.H. Muns
misunderstanding. Instead of pacifying the crew, instructions on several occasions. It is no surprise
he stirred them up and made them even more that his record of service[23] yielded a very poor
agitated. Also, despite Capt. B.H. Muns assessment or a no further employment
instructions to the contrary, he prepared letters assessment.
for the crew containing his own complaints and
sentiments against the company rather than The NLRC grossly erred in rejecting the letters as
those of the crew. proof of the validity of Flores dismissal. It
misappreciated the contents of the letters,
especially that of Capt. B.H. Mun. They did not
contain a mere accusation of wrongdoing.[24] infractions, as mentioned in the letters, could not
The letters made direct affirmative statements on have been just pigments of the imagination of
Flores transgressions, all of which only elicited Capt. B.H. Mun and the other officers as Flores
angry denials from him. More significantly, he insinuated; they were reporting on Flores actual
failed to refute the charges in the compulsory transgressions while on board the vessel.
arbitration proceedings, as the labor arbiter
emphasized in his decision. This aspect of the Still on the probative value of the letters, Flores
case should have been given due consideration wondered why the agency did not present in
by the NLRC. evidence the vessels logbook[28] the official
records of a ships voyage that the master is
In a different vein, Flores questioned the required by law to keep and where he records the
probative value of Capt. B.H. Muns statements, decision/s he made during the voyage, including
contending that they are self-serving. He all happenings on board.[29] The existence of a
regarded them as pure hearsay which cannot be logbook, however, does not at all preclude the
considered as evidence. It bears stressing in this admission and consideration of other accounts of
regard that under the law, technical rules of what was happening on board the vessel, such
evidence are not binding in administrative as, in this instance, the shipmasters report. In
proceedings, and the NLRC and the labor arbiters Abacast Shipping and Management Agency, Inc.
shall use every and all reasonable means to v. NLRC,[30] the Court explained -
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to technicalities of The [logbook] is a respectable record that can be
law or procedure, all in the interest of due relied upon to authenticate the charges filed and
process.[25] the procedure taken against the employees prior
to their dismissal. Curiously, however, no entry
Hearsay or not, and by way of reiteration, Capt. from such [logbook] was presented at all in this
B.H. Muns statements cannot just be ignored, for case. What was offered instead was the
Flores himself admitted in his position paper, as shipmasters report, which was later claimed to be
noted by the labor arbiter, that the shipmaster a collation of excerpts from such book.
asked him to be the coordinator or go-between
for several crew members who wanted to pre- At that, even if the shipmasters report were to be
terminate their contract.[26] It is not disputed admitted and considered, a close reading thereof
that Flores acted as such coordinator between will show that the private respondents have not
the crew and Capt. B.H. Mun. Thus, Capt. B.H. committed any act that would justify the
Mun specifically asked him to explain to the crew termination of their services before the expiration
the deduction of US$40.00 from their monthly of the contracts.
allotment for the AMOSUP Fund so that they
would understand and would not to be agitated;
instead of doing this, he stirred up the crew While the shipmasters report was not considered
further. In fractured English, Capt. B.H. Mun in Abacast Shipping, the reason behind the
stated: rejection was the Courts conclusion that the
separated employees had not committed any act
Notwithstand he should if necessary take all his that would justify their dismissal, as their
way be persuaded and kindly explained to the dismissal was based on mere apprehension. This
crew about misunderstanding ITF contents, but situation does not obtain in Flores case. As
he did has to say nothing of crew persuasion, mentioned earlier, Capt. B.H. Muns report made
more excite with big voices and stir up to the affirmative statements regarding Flores
crew to mischief. Two anhalf months ago, I asked infractions that led to his dismissal. These
him that dont be helping to crew to be sent infractions involved not only instigating several
company their letters specially, because his crew members to rebel against the vessels
prepared it for crew had writ down his own authorities and to disrespect their superiors, but
complaining with unless and reactive stories thru also other transgressions that made him unfit to
their letter. He didnt still follow to master continue in employment.
instruction thats why help to nice preparing crew
letter according to his say.[27] Even as he assailed the reports of Capt. B.H. Mun
and the other officers as hearsay and self-serving,
Flores failed to controvert the affirmative
The fact that Flores acted as coordinator or statements made in the reports. The reports were
liaison between the crew and the vessels officers submitted on compulsory arbitration. He did not
signifies that Flores did interact with the crew, refute the charges, thus leaving them unrebutted.
and had the opportunity to sow discontent among Capt. B.H. Muns statements, corroborated by the
them towards the shipmanagement. Flores reports of Chief Officer De Luna and 1st Assistant
Engineer Escarola, should have therefore been Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman
admitted as sufficient support for the charges. dismissed OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, the
administrative complaint initiated by Agdeppa
On the whole, we are convinced that Flores against respondents Marydel B. Jarlos-Martin
dismissal was justified on the following grounds: (Jarlos-Martin), Emmanuel M. Laurezo (Laurezo),
and Iluminado L. Junia, Jr. (Junia).
1. Sowing intrigue and dissension on board
the vessel M/V Morning Charm;[31] OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 arose from OMB-0-99-
2. Inefficiency and neglect of duty;[32] and 1015, another administrative complaint before
3. Insubordination or disobedience of the the Office of the Ombudsman.
lawful orders of the shipmaster.[33]
Junia, then Group Manager for the Project
The NLRCs rulings, disregarding these grounds, Technical Services Group of the National Housing
do not only constitute errors in the appreciation Authority (NHA), filed on May 25, 1999 a
of evidence; they were gross errors as they Complaint3 before the Office of the Ombudsman
practically disregarded the petitioners evidence. against several NHA officials, together with
Hence, the CA erred in not recognizing these Agdeppa and Ricardo Castillo (Castillo), resident
errors for what they were grossly abusive acts auditors of the Commission on Audit (COA) at the
that affected the NLRCs exercise of its NHA. Junias Complaint was docketed as OMB-0-
jurisdiction. 99-1015. Junia alleged that Supra Construction
(SupraCon), the contractor for the NHA project
The procedural due process issue denominated as Phase IX, Packages 7 and 7-A in
Tala, Caloocan City (NHA Project), was overpaid in
the total amount of P2,044,488.71. The
The records bear out that Flores was not given a
overpayment was allegedly facilitated through
reasonable opportunity to present his side vis--vis
the dubious and confusing audit reports prepared
the charges at the time he was dismissed. As the
by Agdeppa and endorsed by Castillo, to the
NLRC noted, Flores was immediately dismissed
detriment, damage, and prejudice of the
after Capt. B.H. Mun conducted his inquiry on
Government.
November 17, 1997. Although Flores merely
issued a vehement denial, Capt. B.H. Mun should
Junia also mentioned in his Complaint that
have given him a reasonable time to explain, if
Agdeppa had initiated several cases, arising from
necessary, in writing. While this lapse in
the same NHA project, against Junia and other
procedure cannot negate the existence of a valid
NHA officials. While the other cases had already
cause for Flores dismissal, as discussed above,
been dismissed for lack of merit, the Office of the
the violation of his right to procedural due
Ombudsman endorsed OMB-0-94-2543 to the
process warrants the payment of indemnity in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City where
form of nominal damages, as we held in Agabon
it was docketed as I.S. No. 99-1979.
v. National Labor Relations Commission.[34]
Given the circumstances in the present case, we
Notably, the Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015 was
deem an award of nominal damages to Flores in
signed by Junia, and certified and verified by him,
the amount of P30,000.00 to be appropriate.
but not under oath.4chanrobleslaw
In sum, we find the petition meritorious. On June 10, 1999, Jarlos-Martin, then Graft
Investigation Officer II of the Office of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Ombudsman, issued an Order5 in OMB-0-99-1015
resolutions dated October 20, 2003 and April 6, giving the following directives: (1) for Agdeppa
2004 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. We and Castillo to file their respective counter-
DECLARE the dismissal of respondent Arnulfo R. affidavits, witnesses affidavits, and other
Flores LEGAL, but AWARD him nominal damages supporting evidence in answer to Junias
in the amount of P30,000.00 for the violation of Complaint within 10 days from notice; and (2) for
his procedural due process rights. Junia to file his reply within five days from receipt
of copies of Agdeppas and Castillos counter-
affidavits.
RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA, Petitioner, v.
HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Agdeppa filed his Answer6 on July 26, 1999,
denying Junias allegations against him and
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of praying for the dismissal of the Complaint in
the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Rodolfo M. OMB-0-99-1015 for utter lack of merit. According
Agdeppa (Agdeppa) assailing the Resolution1 to Agdeppa, Junias claims that Agdeppa had
dated July 31, 2000 and Order2 dated September manipulated audit reports of overpayments to
28, 2000 of respondent Office of the
SupraCon to create confusion and defraud the This is to inform you Sir, that I have not yet
Government, were unfortunate, irresponsible, and receive[d] any kind of communication from you or
malicious. Agdeppa also clarified that I.S. No. 99- from your good office concerning my letter dated
1979, against Junia and other NHA officials, was July 12, 1999 (Annex A hereof) which was
now Criminal Case No. Q-99-81636 before the received by your Dibisyon ng Rekords Sentral on
Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, July 14, 1999 inquiring on the status of my letter
and a Warrant of Arrest7 had already been issued with its accompanying Sworn Statement, dated
on March 15, 1999 for Junia and Evaristo B. March 3, 1999, to Senator Renato L. Cayetano,
Macalino. which was instead endorsed to you by his Chief of
Staff, Atty. Raul M. Luna, in a 1st Indorsement
Junia immediately filed his Reply8 to Agdeppas dated April 23, 1999 for appropriate
Answer on July 30, 1999. action.cralawred

On September 6, 1999, Castillo filed his Answer9 One of the reasons why I am writing to you again,
likewise denying the allegations in Junias Sir, is to be sure that I will not be remiss in
complaint in OMB-0-99-1015. Castillo contended reminding you that your good office has still to
that Junias claims of overpayment were the act on my letter of July 12, 1999.
result of the latters erroneous appreciation of
existing documents; that the computations by the I also want you to know, Sir, that I am now being
COA audit team assigned at the NHA were issued harassed by certain elements in your honorable
with complete transparency and after undergoing office. This is manifest in the hasty evaluation of
the process of check and countercheck; and that the counter-complaint (Annex E hereof) (now
he had no participation in the computation and OMB-0-99-1015) filed by one of the respondents
payment made to SupraCon after his in OMB-0-94-2543 (now Criminal Case No. Q-99-
reassignment on July 6, 1987. 81636 before QC RTC Branch 86), which
complaint was received by your Dibisyon ng
Junia filed a Reply10 to Castillos Answer on Rekords Sentral on May 23, 1999, and which was
September 20, 1999. given due course by MARYDEL B. JARLOS-MARTIN,
Graft Investigation Officer II, through her ORDER
At around the same time the foregoing events dated 10 June 1999 (Annex F hereof) directing
were unfolding, Agdeppa wrote a letter11 dated me to answer OMB-0-99-1015.
March 3, 1999 addressed to Senator Renato S.
Cayetano (Sen. Cayetano), who was then the Please note, Sir, that the ORDER of June 10, 1999
Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Justice was served only on July 15, 1999 or the day after
and Human Rights. Agdeppa requested Sen. your office had received my letter of July 12,
Cayetano to conduct an investigation of 1999, giving the impression that the said order
incumbent officials of the Civil Service was issued as an after-thought and meant as a
Commission (CSC) and COA who purportedly leverage, if not a veiled warning, to stop me from
committed irregularities in the resolution of the pursuing the endorsement of my letter of March
administrative case against the government 3, 1999 to you.
officials and employees involved in the
reconsideration of the disallowed money claims of Please be informed too that the above-mentioned
SupraCon in the NHA Project. Agdeppa attached counter-complaint could not be the basis of the
to said letter his Sworn Statement12 dated March Order dated June 10, 1999 because the said
3, 1999, detailing under oath his accusations complaint was not an affidavit-complaint,
against the COA and CSC officials. In a 1st contrary to what was indicated in the said order.
Indorsement13 dated April 23, 1999, Atty. Raul M. Hence, there must be compliance first with
Luna, Sen. Cayetanos Chief of Staff, referred Section 4 and 4(A) of Administrative Order No. 07
Agdeppas letter dated March 3, 1999 to dated April 10, 1990 (Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto (Desierto) for Office of the Ombudsman) before Atty. Jarlos-
appropriate action. Martin could issue her order of June 10, 1999, x x
x:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Agdeppa then wrote a letter14 dated July 12,
1999 addressed to Ombudsman Desierto Notwithstanding a clear violation of my
inquiring as to the status of the 1st Indorsement substantive right, I had nevertheless opted to
from Sen. Cayetanos office. Failing to receive any answer OMB-0-99-1015 on July 26, 1999 without
reply, Agdeppa wrote another letter15 dated raising the issue on procedural due process and
August 19, 1999 addressed to Ombudsman without disturbing the deadline set by Atty. Jarlos-
Desierto, pertinent parts of which are reproduced Martin because I wanted the said case to be
below:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary resolved for lack of merit.
The fact, therefore, that there was great haste in dispensed with, unless otherwise required for
the commencement of the preliminary clarificatory hearing.
investigation of OMB-0-99-1015 while my letter of
July 12, 1999 remains un-answered until now Agdeppa, in a Motion to Resolve19 submitted on
could not but evoke my suspicion that your November 8, 1999, opposed Jarlos-Martins Order
honorable office is being used for other dated October 6, 1999, asserting as follows:
purposes.cralawred
25. With due respect, [Agdeppa] finds the order
I would like to request that you require Atty. of October 6, 1999 directing him to answer OMB-
Jarlos-Martin to resolve OMB-0-99-1015 with the 0-99-1015 anew and for [Junia] to reply if he so
same dispatch by which she had given due desires as a blatant disregarding of Section 4,
course to the counter-complaint of Mr. Iluminado Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
L. Junia, Jr., on one hand, and to direct the graft the Ombudsman (Annex 18 hereof) or of
investigation officer handling the endorsement of Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court (Annex
my letter of March 3, 1999 to inform me about 18-A hereof);
the status of the said endorsement.
26. From either of the above-mentioned rules
Realizing from Agdeppas letter dated August 19, relative to the procedure in the preliminary
1999 that Junias Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015 investigation of criminal cases, x x x the next
was not under oath, Jarlos-Martin issued an step after the filing of the respondents counter-
Order16 on September 23, 1999 with the affidavit is the setting of a hearing for
following directive for clarificatory questioning by the investigating
Junia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary officer if there are matters that need to be
clarified, and/or the investigating officer shall
You are hereby ordered to appear before the forward the records of the case together with
undersigned at the Office of the Ombudsman, his/her resolution to the designated authorities
Room 210, located at the 2nd Floor, Evaluation for their appropriate action thereon;
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau,
immediately upon receipt hereof, in order to 27. With due respect, the new order is no longer a
swear to your complaint dated May 18, 1999, means to carry out the so-called due process of
pursuant to Section 4(a), Rule II, Administrative law in the preliminary investigation of the above-
Order No. 07, otherwise known as the Rules of entitled case, which is a criminal case falling
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and/or Regional Trial Court;
Pursuant to the aforequoted Order, Junia
personally appeared before Laurezo on October 28. Rather, the new order became a tool to
6, 1999 to swear to his enhance or modify the substantive rights of
Complaint.17chanrobleslaw [Junia] to the injury of [Agdeppa] for giving the
former unwarranted benefits, advantage or
Also on October 6, 1999, Jarlos-Martin issued preference in the discharge of official,
another Order18 addressed to Agdeppa and administrative or judicial functions through
Castillo that reads: manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence;
You are hereby directed to file your counter-
affidavit, the affidavit/s of your witness/es and 29. This is manifest because of the records of
other supporting evidences, if any, in answer to OMB-0-99-1015 (the above-entitled case) is
the hereto attached copy of the Complaint- already complete as of September 6, 1999, which
Affidavit dated May 18, 1999, which is now under was the date of receipt of the answer of [Castillo]
oath, within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt hereof, by this honorable office, a copy of its first and last
with proof of service upon the complainant who page are hereto attached as Annex 19 hereof
may file a reply thereto within FIVE (5) DAYS from and it would be, therefore, anomalous to further
receipt, if he so desire/s. delay the evaluation of the said case by directing
[Agdeppa] to answer OMB-0-99-1015;
Your failure to do so within the aforesaid period
shall be deemed a waiver of your right to submit 30. To reiterate with stress, [Agdeppa] already
controverting evidence and this preliminary answered OMB-0-99-1015 through his answer
investigation shall proceed accordingly. which was executed on July 26, 1999 and filed
Thereafter, this case shall be deemed submitted with this honorable office[s] DIBISYON NG
for resolution on the basis of the evidence REKORDS SENTRAL on even date;
presented by the parties whose presence may be
31. It is likewise reiterated that [Junia] had even complaint dated May 18, 1999 by the Order dated
furnished [Agdeppa] with his reply dated July 30, June 10, 1999.20
1999 (Annex O);
On November 25, 1999, Castillo filed a
32. What will happen to the priceless effort and Manifestation and Compliance with
money that went with the preparation and Submission,21 acknowledging that the
submission of the aforementioned pleadings vis- Complaints and Annexes, subject of the Orders
-vis the service of the order dated October 6, dated June 10, 1999 and October 6, 1999 were
1999 to [Agdeppa] only? one and the same; adopting and incorporating by
reference his Answer dated September 1, 1999
33. It appears that it was only [Agdeppa] who was previously filed in the case; and praying that his
targeted by the Order dated October 6, 1999 latest pleading be considered sufficient
because [Castillo], who lives a block from compliance with the Order dated October 6,
[Agdeppas] residence at Roque Drive, declared in 1999. On December 6, 1999, Junia, in turn, filed a
his Affidavit executed on November 4, 1999 Manifestation22 in which he adopted his Reply
(Annex 20 hereof) that he had received only dated September 20, 1999 to Castillos Answer
one order relative to OMB-0-99-1015 and that dated September 1, 1999, including Annexes.
was the Order dated June 10, 1999 and nothing
more; Eventually, on June 14, 2000, Jarlos-Martin issued
a Resolution23 in OMB-0-99-1015, concluding as
34. For another, was the reply of [Junia] not follows:
enough to find probable cause to warrant the
filing of a criminal information against [Agdeppa] WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding
that is why he was given another chance, through probable cause to indict respondents RODOLFO
the Order dated October 6, 1999, to do a M. AGDEPPA and RICARDO B. CASTILLO for
clinching one; violation of section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act relative to the overpayment
35. Furthermore, it is not difficult to deduce from of the amount of P182,543.43 to SUPRA
the complete records of OMB-0-99-1015 that Construction, let, therefore, an information be
[Junia] is on a fishing for evidence expedition filed against them in the proper court.
because he included [Castillo] as a respondent in
the above-entitled case even if the latter was no The charge of overpayment to [SupraCon] of the
longer the auditor of COA at NHA when the 14- amount of P1,861,945.28, representing the
page Memorandum dated February 19, 1988 additional escalation cost for the subject contract
(Annex M Complaint) came into being, as his is hereby DISMISSED, for insufficiency of
(Castillo) tenure as chief auditor of the said evidence.
government agency ended on August 7, 1987 as
per Reassignment Order No. 87-3210 dated July Pursuant to Jarlos-Martins foregoing Resolution,
6, 1987; an Information24 dated June 14, 2000 was filed
before the Quezon City RTC-Branch 91, docketed
44. It is not difficult to see that the actual primary as Crim. Case No. 01-100552, charging Agdeppa
purpose of [Junia] in filing OMB-0-99-1015 is for and Castillo with violation of Section 3(e) of
him to get a relief from this honorable office in Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
order that he could stop his arraignment in Crim. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Quezon
Case No. Q-99-81636 before Judge Teodoro A. Bay City RTC-Branch 91 issued a Warrant of Arrest25
of the QC RTC Branch 86 arising from OMB-0-94- for Agdeppa and Castilllo on May 10, 2001.
2543 by spicing Crim. Case No. 16240, which is
still pending with the Sandiganbayans Second Meanwhile, as his Motion to Resolve in OMB-0-99-
Division, with [Junias] so-called evidence 1015 was still unacted upon by April 7, 2000,
against [Agdeppa and Castillo] in their alleged Agdeppa filed before the Office of the
participation in, and/or allowing, the illegal Ombudsman an Affidavit-Complaint against
payment of PHP1,861,945.28[.]At the end of his Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia, docketed as
Motion, Agdeppa prayed: OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470. Agdeppa accused Jarlos-
Martin, Laurezo, and Junia of violating Section
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is 3(a), (e), (f), and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019; and
respectfully prayed that the Order dated 6 Rule II, Section 4(a), (b), and (g) of Supreme
October 1999 be set aside and that the above- Court Administrative Order No. 07, dated April 10,
entitled case be now resolved and dismissed on 1990, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure
the basis of the records which were already of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman
complete as of September 6, 1999, with the same Rules of Procedure), based on the following
dispatch as the giving of due course to the averments:
1999 was already docketed as OMB-0-99-1015 as
20. That the act of respondent Jarlos-Martin in indicated by the big bold letters at the bottom of
issuing the Order dated 6 October 1999 when she the first page of the said complaint.
was supposed to have already resolved OMB-0-
99-1015 a long time ago, thus giving 26. That when respondent Laurezo subscribed to
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to OMB-0-99-1015 after it was already docketed as
respondent Junia to the damage and injury of such, he had, therefore, knowingly granted a
[petitioner Agdeppa], constitutes a violation of privilege or benefit in favor of respondent Junia
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended who was not qualified for or not entitled to such a
causing any undue injury to any party xxx, or privilege or advantage on 6 October 1999, which
giving any private party any unwarranted act is a violation of Sec. 3(j) of R.A. 3019, as
benefits, advantage or preference in the amended knowingly x x x granting any x x x
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial privilege or benefit in favor of any person not
function through manifest partiality, evident bad qualified for or not entitled to such x x x privilege
faith or gross unexcusable negligence. or advantage x x x.

21. That respondent Jarlos-Martin caused damage 27. That the failure of respondent Jarlos-Martin to
and injury to [Agdeppa] because she set aside resolve OMB-0-99-1015 notwithstanding the
the records of OMB-0-99-1015, which was already Motion to Resolve dated November 8, 1999 on
complete when she issued her Order, dated 6 the basis of the Order dated 10 June 1999
October 1999 and, thus, re-started the constitutes a violation of Section 3(f) of R.A.
preliminary investigation of the case all over 3019, as amended Neglecting or refusing, after
again. due demand or request, without sufficient
justification, to act within a reasonable time on
22. That the re-starting of the preliminary any matter pending before him for the purpose of
investigation on OMB-0-99-1015 gave obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to interested in the matter some pecuniary or
respondent Junia because, in the Order dated 6 material benefit or advantage, or for purpose of
October 1999, [Junia] was given another chance favoring his own interest or giving undue
to file his reply to any answer or counter-affidavit advantage in favor of or discriminating against
submitted after 6 October 1999, on one hand, or any other interested party.
gave respondent Jarlos-Martin a basis to resolve
the said case in favor of respondent Junia in case 28. That respondent Jarlos-Martin refused to
of non-compliance of [Agdeppa] to the said Order. resolve OMB-0-99-1015 even after due demand
or request because she will obtain pecuniary
23. That the act of respondent Laurezo on 6 benefit from doing so from respondent Junia as it
October 1999 of subscribing to OMB-0-99-1015 would delay the arraignment of the latter, who is
was to provide respondent Jarlos-Martin with a a respondent in Crim. Case No. Q-81636 before
basis, albeit unlawful, to issue her Order dated 6 Quezon City Regional Trial Court Branch 86, with
October 1999 (of even date) which act constitute Judge Teodoro A. Bay presiding.
corrupt practices act of any public officer under
Section 3(a) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended 29. That her obtaining of some pecuniary benefit
persuading, inducing or influencing another from respondent Junia, as well as for the purpose
public office to perform an act constituting a of discriminating against [Agdeppa] are manifest
violation of rules and regulations duly because the un-resolved OMB-0-99-1015 is
promulgated by competent authority or an practically the same as the Motion for
offense in connection with the official duties of Reconsideration dated May 17, 1999 filed by
the latter or allowing himself to be persuaded, respondent Junia before QC RTC Branch 86 to stay
induced, or influenced to commit such violation his arraignment in Crim. Case No. Q-81636 and
or offense. that she has only to blame herself for being
accused of such corrupt practices acts because
24. That the rules and regulations duly [Agdeppa] had categorically manifested to her
promulgated by competent authority that was the un-holy symbiotic connection of OMB-0-99-
violated by respondent Jarlos-Martin are Section 1015 with the Motion for Reinvestigation on Crim.
4(a)(b) and (g), Rule II, Administrative Order No. Case No. Q-81636 through the Manifestation
07 dated April 10, 1990 (Section 3, Rule 112 of dated August 9, 1999. x x x.
the Rules of Court). x x x.
30. That as a consequence of respondent Jarlos-
25. That respondent Laurezo could have not Martins refusal to resolve the preliminary
escaped noticing that the complaint dated May investigation of OMB-0-99-1015, which refusal is
17, 1999 he was about to subscribe on 6 October manifest through her Order dated 6 October
1999, respondent Junias arraignment in Crim. complaint-affidavit is in compliance with the
Case No. Q-81636 is being reset for many times procedural requirement which the parties to the
already, the latest of which is on May 10, 2000. case at bar have to comply.

31. That this is so, and will remain to be so, 11. I did not persuade, induce nor influence any
because the resolution of the above-mentioned public officer to violate any rules and regulations
Motion for Reinvestigation filed by respondent duly promulgated by competent authority or an
Junia, who is one of the accused in Crim. Case No. offense in connection with the official duties of
Q-81636, is waiting for the resolution of OMB-0- the latter. When the provision speaks of
99-1015.26 persuading, inducing, or influencing, it means
that there must be an active persuasion,
Acting on Agdeppas Affidavit-Complaint in OMB- inducement, or influence on the part of the public
MIL-CRIM-00-0470, Director Rudiger G. Falcis II official sought to be held liable. Active
(Falcis) of the Criminal Investigation, Prosecution persuasion, inducement, or influence cannot be
& Administrative Adjudication Bureau, Office of presumed, much less established, by the mere
the Ombudsman, issued an Order27 dated June 6, subscribing of an affidavit which is required by
2000, directing only Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo to law. It must be noted that there has been no
file their counter-affidavits and other evidence evidence whatsoever presented by [Agdeppa] to
within 10 days from notice. Laurezo, in his show that I actually and personally persuaded,
Counter-Affidavit28 dated June 22, 2000, induced or influenced other public officers,
asseverated that: specifically [Atty. Jarlos-Martin] to disobey any
law.
7. Any Lawyer-Investigator in the Office of the
Ombudsman, worthy of his salt knows that in 12. Complainant Agdeppa was in the state of
administering oath and subscribing affidavit- hallucination in alleging that when I subscribed
complaint, merely assures himself that the the complaint in OMB-0-99-1015, after it was
person to be sworn by him is the same person already docketed, I knowingly granted a privilege
who executes the complaint-affidavit and that the or benefit in favor of [Junia] who was not qualified
contents thereof are true of his own knowledge. for or not entitled to such privilege or advantage
He is not oblige[d] to inquire into the merit and/or on October 6, 1999. A complaint-affidavit is not a
status of his complaint. license, permit, privilege or benefit.29

8. It is clear from the aforestated facts and Agdeppa retorted in his Reply-Affidavit30 filed on
provisions of law, rules and regulations that my July 12, 2000:
official action in administering oath and
subscribing the complaint of Iluminado Junia on 9. That Par. no. 5, in so far as it concerns
October 6, 1999, is in accordance with law, done [Laurezos] reference to Section 15 of Rep. Act
in good faith and without any unlawful motive. No. 6770 as the authority from which he derived
his administration of an oath to Mr. Junias
9. It must be stated that Section 3(a) of R.A. 3019 [complaint] dated May 18, 1999, is denied as: (a)
is premised on a public officer[s] act of he was a usurper of the authority reserved to his
persuading, inducing or influencing another co-respondent Graft Investigation Officer Atty.
public officer to violate the rules and regulations Jarlos-Martin in OMB-0-99-1015, (b) it was already
with the unlawful intent of deriving personal gain too late in the day, so to speak, for him to
and advantage. As the facts established in the administer an oath to OMB-0-99-1015 as the said
instant case has shown, there is no opportunity case was already submitted for resolution as of
for me whatsoever to derive any personal gain or September 20, 1999 which date is the last day of
pecuniary advantage from the mere act of the preliminary investigation of the said case on
administering and subscribing the complaint- the basis of [Jarlos-Martins] Order dated 10 June
affidavit of Iluminado Junia. Neither was there any 1999, and (c) he should have asked questions
evidence presented to demonstrate that I why Mr. Junia is asking him to administer an oath
intended to derive any benefit from administering to his aforesaid complaint which was already
and subscribing the affidavit-complaint of Junia. more than four (4) months old on 6 October 1999,
Neither did I act for consideration. There is no to say the least.
evidence presented to demonstrate that I
received any pecuniary advantage in 10. That Par. no. 5, in so far as it pertains to
consideration of my administering oath and [Laurezos] claim that he merely assured himself
subscribing the affidavit-complaint of Junia. of the true/correct identity of Mr. Junia and that
the contents thereof are true of his own
10. Moreover, there was no damage caused to knowledge, is admitted but with the qualification
complainant herein. The authentication of the that he, as a graft investigation officer of this
Honorable Office, to reiterate, should have at expense which [Agdeppa] is being made to bear
least inquired why the document he was about to until now in OMB-0-99-1015?
subscribe already bear the big bold marking 0
99 1015. xxxx

11. That Par. no. 6, in so far as it relates to 19. That [Laurezos] contention in Par. no. 12 that
[Laurezos] quoting of paragraph (a) of Section 4 [Agdeppa] was in a state of hallucination in
of A.O. No. 07 (Procedure in the Preliminary charging [Laurezo] for violation of Section 3(a) of
Investigation of cases falling under the Rep. Act No. 3019 allegedly because he could not
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional be liable thereof as he did not grant any license,
Trial Courts) as his authority in administering the privilege or benefit when he subscribe to the
oath to OMB-0-99-1015, is denied because stale Complaint-Affidavit dated May 18, 1999,
[Laurezo] is not the investigating officer deserves no consideration. This is so because, in
referred to in the aforesaid paragraph of Section Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-51065-72,
4. This is so because, OMB-0-99-1015 is under his June 30, 1987, the Honorable Supreme Court,
co-respondent Atty. Jarlos-Martin and that on 6 ruling on the issue raised by the petitioner that
October 1999, the preliminary investigation of the inasmuch as he is not charged with the duty of
said case was already completed. Thusly, granting licenses or permits or other concessions,
[Laurezo] had no lawful authority under Sec. 4, then he is not an officer contemplated by Section
Rule II, A.O. No. 07 to intervene in OMB-0-99- 3(e), held that:
1015.cralawred Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven
subsections the corrupt practices of any public
16. That Par. no. 9, in so far as it relates to the officers declared unlawful. We agree with the
claim of [Laurezo] that there must first be a view adopted by the Solicitor General that the
showing of an intent of deriving personal gain or last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to
benefit in order that Section 3(a) of Rep. Act No. make clear the inclusion of officers and
3019 applies, is denied as the said provision of employees of offices or government corporations
the said law (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which, under the ordinary concept of public
merely states officers may not come within the term. It is a
Persuading, inducing or influencing another strained construction of the provision to read it is
public officer to perform an act constituting a applying exclusively to public officers charged
violation of rules and regulations duly with the duty of granting licenses or permits or
promulgated by competent authority or an other concession.
offense in connection with the official duties of It follows, therefore, that the only determination
the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, left for this Honorable Office is to find out if
induced, or influenced to commit such violation [Laurezo] is a public officer or not in order for him
or offense. to be held liable under Rep. Act No. 3019.31
Nothing more. Nothing less. Hence, [Laurezo]
should not add anything to it. Jarlos-Martin, for her part, avowed in her Counter-
Affidavit,32 dated June 23, 2000, thus:
17. That Par. no. 10 is denied because, when
[Laurezo] administered an oath to Mr. Junia on 6 4. I vehemently deny the said accusations, the
October 1999, it triggered the second preliminary truth of the matter being as follows:
investigation of OMB-0-99-1015. It is to be noted a. On June 7, 1999, OMB Case No. 0-99-1015
that the preliminary investigation of the said case entitled Iluminado L. Junia, Jr. vs. Rodolfo M.
was already completed on September 20, 1999 Agdeppa and Ricardo Castillo, For: Violation of
so there was no more basis for [Laurezos] co- R.A. No. 3019, was assigned to me.
respondent Atty. Jarlos-[M]artin to issue another
Order dated September 23, 1999 to enable her to b. Upon receipt thereof, I made an evaluation
subscribe to the complaint dated May 18, 1999. It report on the said case. I requested for an
follows, therefore, that, when [Laurezo] authority to conduct a preliminary investigation,
subscribed to the said complaint, he caused the which was granted on June 10, 1999. On even
suspension of the resolution of OMB-0-99-1015 as date, an order was issued directing the
he legitimized the illegal second preliminary respondents (of OMB 0-99-1015) to file their
investigation of the said case, thereby prolonging counter-affidavits.
the agony of the respondents concerned in terms
of prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation c. On July 26, 1999, Rodolfo M. Agdeppa filed his
and expense inherent in a criminal investigation. answer. Thereafter, on August 2, 1999, Iluminado
If there is no damage to [Agdeppa], as claimed by L. Junia, Jr. filed his reply to the said answer. Upon
[Laurezo], then what will [Laurezo] call the the other hand, Ricardo Castillo filed several
prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation and motions for extension of time until he finally filed
his answer on September 6, 1999. The reply on OMB-0-99-1015, which was complete when I
Castillos answer was filed by Junia on September issued the order dated October 6, 1999, is
20, 1999. likewise devoid of merit.

d. On September 23, 1999, I made a study of the 5.3. I did not set aside the records of the case. I
records of the subject case to determine if there was evidently inspired by utmost good faith to
is a need for clarificatory hearing or other comply with procedural matters, of which I was
documents to be presented, since the issues in authorized.
the subject case are complicated and involve
technical matters. 5.4. There is no basis on complainant Agdeppas
allegations that the records of the case [were]
e. It appears from the records that a letter was already complete when I issued the October 6,
sent by Rodolfo Agdeppa, manifesting before this 1999 order. The last pleading that I received
Office that there must be compliance first with before I issued the aforesaid order was the reply
section 4 and 4(a) of Administrative Order No. 7 to Castillos answer filed on September 20, 1999
dated April 10, 1999 before an order to file by Junia before the Records Divisions of the
counter-affidavit could issue, copy of the said office. I was not aware when Castillo personally
letter is hereto attached as Annex 1. received the said reply, since the proof of sending
is by registered mail. What if he files a rejoinder?
f. Upon confirmation, I noticed that although the It is to be noted that the purpose of preliminary
complaint looks like as if it was sworn to, since it investigation is to give opportunities to the
was signed by Iluminado Junia, Jr. and that there parties to expound their respective sides.
is verification and certification written thereat,
still, the same was not under oath. 5.5. Even assuming, arguendo, that the parties
have already submitted their respective
g. While it is my honest belief that I have pleadings, this cannot be made as basis to
performed my duty in accordance with the terminate the preliminary investigation and jump
provision of law which provides that The into the conclusion that the records [were]
Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of already complete. It bears emphasis that, during
the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed the study of the case, if the investigating officer
in any form or manner against officers or finds that there are matters which need to be
employees of the Government (see section 13, clarified, he/she may set a clarificatory hearing,
R.A. 6770), yet, to put things in order, the matter or if there are documents which need to be
can be best rectified by complying with the produced, subpoena duces tecum will issue.
provisions of section 4(a) and (b) of A.O. No. 7.
Thus, on the same date, or on September 23, 5.6. The allegation that the re-starting of
1999, I immediately issued an order directing preliminary investigation on OMB-0-99-1015 gave
Iluminado Junia, Jr. to appear before the Office of unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
the Ombudsman to swear to his complaint respondent Junia because, in the Order dated 6
pursuant to section 4 and 4(a) of A.O. No. 7, copy October 1999, the said respondent was given
of the said order is hereto attached as Annex 2. another chance to file his reply to any answer or
counter-affidavit submitted after 6 October 1999
[h.] On October 6, 1999, Junia personally (see par. 22, Complaint) was unfounded.
appeared before the Office and his complaint was
sworn to before Atty. Emmanuel M. Laurezo, an 5.7. The said order was intended to both parties
officer authorized to administer oath under and not only to Junia. Granting that the
section 31 of R.A. No. 6770. Subsequently, an preliminary investigation restarted by reason of
order to file counter-affidavit was issued in compliance with A.O. No. 7, this will not put into
accordance with section 4(b) of A.O. No.7. waste the efforts already exerted by the parties.
5. Under the circumstances, it is very clear that The complaint that was attached to the second
there is absolutely no basis in filing this case: order to file answer is the very same complaint
5.1. [Agdeppas] claim that my act of issuing the that was attached to the first order, only that it
Order dated October 6, 1999 when I was was put under oath. This means there is nothing
supposed to have already resolved OMB 0-99- new in the subject matter of the complaint, which
1015 a long time ago, finds no place. How could I the respondent therein had already studied.
resolve a case, which is not yet ripe for Needless to say, respondents must adopt their
resolution? At the time the said order was issued, previous answers and the complainant, his reply
preliminary investigation was still ongoing. thereto, which is exactly what Ricardo Castillo
and Iluminado Junia, Jr. did, copies of their
5.2. The charge that I caused damage and injury respective Manifestations dated November 24,
to [Agdeppa] because I set aside the records of
1999 and December 6, 1999 are hereto attached authorized to do so pursuant to Section 31 of RA
as Annexes 3 and 4. No.

5.8. The allegation that the order dated October 14. That the second Par. no. 5 is denied as the
6, 1999 will give me basis to resolve the case in record of OMB- 0-99-1015 indicates to the
favor of Junia in case of non-compliance of contrary the claim of [Jarlos-Martin] that there is
Agdeppa to the said Order (see par. 22, absolutely no basis for the filing of the above-
Complaint) is totally absurd and malicious. entitled case. It is to be noted that no less than
Director Rudiger G. Falcis II, of the Criminal
5.9. It is significant to note that in any case, it Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative
does not follow that if there is failure on the part Adjudication Bureau, this Honorable Office, had
of [Agdeppa] to file his answer, the case will be declared in his Order dated June 6, 2000 requiring
resolved in favor of [Junia]. The resolution of the [Jarlos-Martin] to file [her] counter-affidavit to the
case is based on the evidence on record. Thus, in above-entitled case because The Affidavit-
the subject case, OMB 0-9-1015, though Agdeppa Complaint filed by [Junia] dated April 6, 2000 xxx
did not submit a responsive pleading to the Order is sufficient in form and substance, thus, entirely
dated October 6, 1999 and instead filed a Motion belying [Jarlos-Martins] claim of absolute want of
to Resolve, his counter-affidavit which had basis in the filing of the instant case.
already form[ed] part of the records of the case, 17. That Par. no. 5.2 is denied because it is
will be treated as his answer. 33 precisely the Order dated October 6, 1999 which
gave [Jarlos-Martin] a veiled legal basis in
In his Reply-Affidavit34 filed on July 12, 2000, postponing, albeit illegally, the resolution of OMB-
Agdeppa countered: 0-99-1015. This is so because the said Order
11. That Par. no. 4(g), in so far as it relates to the changed the proceedings already put and held in
claim of [Jarlos-Martin] that the matter (a case place by the Order dated 10 June 1999. Thusly,
that was already subjected for preliminary the preliminary investigation of OMB-0-99-1015
investigation) is rectifiable by the application of went beyond the ambit of the Order dated 10
Section 4(a) and (b) of A.O. No. 07 is denied June 1999. x x x.35
because that is putting the cart before the horse,
so to speak. This is so because, in A.O. No. 07, The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution
only verified complaints undergo preliminary dated July 31, 2000 dismissing Agdeppas
investigations. Hence, when the un-sworn complaint in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 for the
complaint dated May 18, 1999 underwent following reasons:
preliminary investigation up to the time when the We find for [Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia].
last pleading thereof was filed on September 20,
1999, Section 4(b) of A.O. No. 07 is no longer We shall explain the pertinent provisions of
applicable because, without anymore clarificatory Republic Act No. 3019 which are clearly
questioning, what follows next is its resolution, inapplicable to the instant case:
pursuant to Section 4(g) thereof To warrant the indictment of [Jarlos-Martin,
Laurezo, and Junia] for violation of Section 3(e) of
12. That Par. no. 4(g), in so far as it concerns the RA 3019, it is not enough that the act of [Jarlos-
claim of [Jarlos-Martin] that she resorted to the Martin and Laurezo] in the discharge of their
issuance of her aforesaid Order dated September official function caused undue injury to
23, 1999 to put things in order, is denied [Agdeppa]. It behooves [Agdeppa] to prove that
because, to reiterate, she no longer has the the assailed act must have been done with
authority to issue such an Order after September manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
20, 1999 as there was already a last pleading inexcusable negligence (Alejandro vs. People, 170
filed to OMB-0-99-1015 on the basis of her Order SCRA 400). Moreover, unlike in actions for torts,
dated 10 June 1999 and, thusly, she was already undue injury in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 cannot be
mandated, by her very own Order dated 10 June presumed even after a wrong or a violation of
1999, to resolve the said case pursuant to right has been established, its existence must be
Section 4(g) of A.O. No. 07. proven as one of the elements of the crime, and
that the injury be specified, quantified, and
13. That the first Par. no. 5 (as there are two) is proven to the point of moral certainty. They
admitted but with the qualification that the cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial
appearance of Mr. Junia before the Office (EPIB) evidence or upon speculation, conjecture or
was on the basis of [Jarlos-Martins] Order dated guesswork; mere inconvenience is not
September 23, 1999. If this is the case, then constitutive of undue injury (Llorente vs.
[Jarlos-Martin] should have been the one who Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA 382).
should have administered the oath on the
complaint dated May 18, 1999 as she is also
Mere neglect or refusal, after due demand or
request, without sufficient justification, to act Agdeppa filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
within a reasonable time on any matter pending Resolution dated July 31, 2000 but said Motion
before the office of [Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo] is was denied for lack of merit by the Office of the
not punishable under Section 3(f) of RA 3019. It is Ombudsman in an Order dated September 28,
necessary that such neglect or refusal must be 2000. 37 The Office of the Ombudsman ruled in
for any of the following purposes: a) obtaining, said Order that:
directly or indirectly, from any person interested [Agdeppa] circuitously argued that something
in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit obvious transpired between respondents Laurezo
or advantage, b) favoring respondents own and Junia on one hand and between Laurezo and
interest, or c) giving undue advantage in favor of Jarlos-Martin on the other hand. We do not agree.
or discriminating against any other interested [Agdeppa] miserably failed to adduce any
party. That respondent Jarlos-Martin will obtain evidence, direct or circumstantial, to prove any
pecuniary benefit from her act or omission is an concert of voluntary action among [Jarlos-Martin,
allegation that must be proven to the point of Laurezo, and Junia] other than surmises and
moral certainty and cannot be presumed or conjectures. We cannot engage in a mental
based on surmises. calisthenics and stretch our imagination to the
possibility that [Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia],
Section 3(a) of RA 3019 punishes a public officer with criminal design, hatched a conspiracy to
who persuades, induces, or influences another to cause undue injury to [Agdeppa]. We would be
perform an act constituting a violation of rules committing injustice of cosmic proportions if
and regulations or an offense in connection with [Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia] are suddenly
the official duties of the latter, as well as the swept into a grand conspiracy through
public officer who allowed himself to be presumptions which do not have any basis in law
persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit and in fact.
such violation or offense. Evidence on record,
however, is bereft that respondents Junia and Dissatisfied, Agdeppa filed the instant Petition
Laurezo had a meeting of minds to commit a before this Court averring grave abuse of
violation. Besides, [Agdeppa] miserably failed to discretion amounting to lack or excess of
show which particular law, rule or regulation was jurisdiction on the part of the Office of the
violated by respondent Laurezo in affixing his Ombudsman in rendering the Resolution dated
signature to the complaint. July 31, 2000 and Order dated September 28,
2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, committed as
Section 3(j) of RA 3019 penalizes a public officer follows:
who knowingly approved or granted any license, (A)
permit, privilege, or benefit in favor of any person PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE
not qualified for or not legally entitled to such OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
license, permit, privilege or advantage. However, DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED A RESOLUTION
the terms benefit and advantage (if at all, the DISMISSING A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR
act of respondent Laurezo in subscribing the VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
complaint of respondent [Junia] gave the latter a PRACTICES ACT AGAINST ITS OWN
bonanza in the form of delay in the latters INVESTIGATORS AND A PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY
arraignment in another criminal case) should be ADOPTING THE RESULT OF THE PRELIMINARY
construed as analogous to the other terms which INVESTIGATION OBTAINED UPON AN ORDER
precede them, following noscitur a sociis, a rule WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE PRIVATE
of statutory construction. For some obvious RESPONDENT CONCERNED IN THE JOINT
reasons, whatever benefit or advantage, if any, INVESTIGATION IN SHEER CONTRAVENTION OF
was extended to respondent Junia, the same does THE RULES OF COURT WHICH APPLY
not come within the purview of Section 3(j) of the SUPPLETORILY TO THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF
Anti-Graft Law, it not being a license, permit or THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
privilege under the circumstances. (B)
PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE
The dismissal of the instant complaint, is OMBUDSMAN ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS
therefore, in order.36 JURISDICTION WHEN IT ALLOWED ANOTHER
INVESTIGATING OFFICER TO RENDER THE
The aforequoted Resolution was penned by RESOLUTION OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST
Ombudsman Investigator Alan R. Caares ITS OWN INVESTIGATORS IN CONSPIRACY WITH A
(Caares), with the concurrence of Director Falcis, PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL OTHER THAN THE
recommending approval of Deputy Ombudsman INVESTIGATING OFFICER WHO ISSUED THE
for the Military Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro), ORDER TO SUBMIT COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT IN UTTER
and approval of Ombudsman Desierto. VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH
APPLY SUPPLETORILY TO THE RULES OF P1,861,945.28 HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN
PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN. LAW
(C)
PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE MARTIN, LAUREZO AND JUNIA ARE GUILTY OF
OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF FORUM SHOPPING UPON THEIR UNIFIED STAND
DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED A RESOLUTION THAT JUNIA APPEARED BEFORE LAUREZO AND
DISMISSING OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 WHICH HAD EFFECTIVELY SUBSCRIBED TO OMB-0-99-
ALLOWED THE REALIGNMENT OF THE RULES OF 101539
COURT AND THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN THE Agdeppa enumerated and discussed more issues
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF A CRIMINAL in his Supplemental Memorandum, to wit:
CASE TO JUSTIFY ITS DISMISSAL.
D
(D)
PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS
OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF OMBUDSMAN, ACTING THROUGH THE OFFICE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED A RESOLUTION THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY,
DISMISSING OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 BY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
TOLERATING THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS IN
RESOLUTION OF OMB-0-99-1015 WHICH JURISDICTION WHEN HE APPROVED THE
TOLERANCE WAS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE RESOLUTION DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA -VERSUS- MARYDEL B.
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES. JARLOS-MARTIN, EMMANUEL M. LAUREZO,
(E) ILUMINADO L. JUNIA, JR., WHICH IS A COMPLAINT
PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE RESPONSIVE IN BOTH FORM AND SUBSTANCE,
OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF WITHOUT FIRST REQUIRING ILUMINADO L. JUNIA,
DISCRETION WHEN IT CONSIDERED AS GOSPEL JR. WHO IS A PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE HIS
TRUTH THE ALLEGATION IN THE COUNTER- COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT THERETO
AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENT LAUREZO THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT JUNIA APPEARED BEFORE E
HIM ON OCTOBER 6, 1999 TO HAVE HIS
AFFIDAVIT COMPLAINT PLACED UNDER OATH THE FILING OF OMB-0-99-1015 BEFORE THE
EVEN IF THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THE TRUTH HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
OF SUCH AN ALLEGATION COMING FROM THE VIOLATED SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 28-91
SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT HIMSELF.38 DATED SEPTEMBER 4, 1991 AND THE FAILURE OF
THE SAID HONORABLE OFFICE TO SUMMARILY
However, in his Memorandum, Agdeppa identified DISMISS THE SAID CASE ON THAT GROUND IS
and argued the following issues: GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS
OMBUDSMAN AND THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN F
FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS IN THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION DATED JUNE 14,
JURISDICTION WHEN THEY RENDERED A 2000 IN OMB-0-99-1015 BEFORE THE
RESOLUTION DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
ENTITLED RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA VERSUS- CITY ONLY ON APRIL 3, 2001 CONSTITUTES
MARYDEL B. JARLOS-MARTIN, EMMANUEL M. VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL
LAUREZO, ILUMINADO L. JUNIA, JR. UPON A RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE CASE
DENOMINATED AS OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 G
ENTITLED RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA -VERSUS- ATTY.
MARYDEL B. JARLOS-MARTIN, ATTY. EMMANUEL M. THE INFORMATION IN OMB-0-99-1015 CHARGING
LAUREZO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, PETITIONER OF VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(E) OF REP.
THE LAW, AND THE RULES IN THE PRELIMINARY ACT NO. 3019 FOR CAUSING INJURY TO THE
INVESTIGATION OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS GOVERNMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF P182,543.43
IN OVERPAYMENT ON WORK ACCOMPLISHMENTS
THE SPLITTING OF THE SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION OF SUPRA CONSTRUCTION IN PHASE IX, PACKAGE
IN OMB-0-99-1015 OF CAUSING AN 7 AND 7-A IS A DISGUISED RE-LITIGATION OF THE
OVERPAYMENT OF P2,044,488.71 INTO AMOUNT OF P169,577.97 YIELDING PRICE
OVERPAYMENTS OF P182,543.43 AND ESCALATION OF P3,088,941.42 WHICH WAS
ALREADY PASSED WITH FINALITY IN COA City RTC-Branch 91; or reopen a COA case
DECISION NO. 739 DATED JANUARY 10, 1989 decided long before in 1993.

H The Court will also not rule upon issues which


were raised by Agdeppa only in his Memorandum
COA DECISION NO. 2799 RENDERED BY THE and Supplemental Memorandum, specifically,
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON AUDIT ON APRIL issues [B], [C], [E], [G], and [H] thereof. These are
15, 1993 LACKED TRANSPARENCY AS IT issues which the Office of the Ombudsman,
SUPPRESSED THE EXISTENCE OF COA DECISION Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia did not have an
NO. 739 DATED JANUARY 10, 1989 WHICH opportunity to address or argue. The parties were
PREVENTED PETITIONER FROM MAKING A PROPER properly instructed by the Court in the Resolution
REASONABLE MOTION BEFORE IT OR A DECISIVE dated October 22, 2001 that [n]o new issues
TIMELY APPEAL BEFORE THE HONORABLE may be raised by a party in his/its Memorandum
SUPREME COURT40 and the issues raised in his/its pleadings but not
included in the Memorandum shall be deemed
waived or abandoned.41 Relevant herein is the
After an exhaustive review of the records, the ruling of the Court in Heirs of Ramon Garayes v.
Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp.42:

The Courts power of review in the We likewise reviewed petitioners Reply and we
present Petition is limited to OMB- note that the discussion therein referred only to
MIL-CRIM-00-0470 and the the denial of the motion for extension. No
grounds/issues timely raised and discussion whatsoever was made as regards the
discussed by the parties. substantial merits of the case. In fact, as we have
mentioned before, it was only in petitioners
The exchange of accusations between Agdeppa, Memorandum where they raised for the first time
et al., on one hand, and Junia, et al., on the other the issue that their appeal is meritorious.
hand, regarding the NHA Project, had given rise
to a number of administrative and criminal cases This is not only unfair to the respondents who
that are still pending before several were deprived of the opportunity to propound
administrative agencies and trial courts. their arguments on the issue. It is likewise not
allowed by the rules. In the June 23, 2008
At the outset, the Court makes it clear that its Resolution, the Court reminded the parties that
review herein shall be strictly limited to OMB-MIL- [n]o new issues may be raised by a party in the
CRIM-00-0470. To recall, OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 memorandum. The rationale for this was
involves Agdeppas complaint against Jarlos- explained by the Court in Heirs of Cesar
Martin, Laurezo, and Junia before the Office of the Marasigan v. Marasigan, thus:
Ombudsman for corrupt practices under Section
3(a), (e), (f), and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019, This Court significantly notes that the first three
allegedly committed by the latter three in the issues, alleging lack of jurisdiction and cause of
course of the preliminary investigation in OMB-0- action, are raised by petitioners for the first time
99-1015. The Office of the Ombudsman, in the in their Memorandum. No amount of
Resolution dated July 31, 2000 and Order dated interpretation or argumentation can place them
September 28, 2000, dismissed Agdeppas within the scope of the assignment of errors they
charges for lack of basis in fact and in law. raised in their Petition.

The Court underscores that it cannot touch upon The parties were duly informed by the Court in its
the merits of the other cases which, although Resolution dated September 17, 2003 that no
related and/or arising from the same set of facts, new issues may be raised by a party in his/its
are proceeding independently from and Memorandum and the issues raised in his/its
simultaneously with OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470. The pleadings but not included in the Memorandum
present Petition is not the proper remedy and, shall be deemed waived or abandoned. The
thus, the Court is without jurisdiction to review raising of additional issues in a memorandum
and annul the Resolution dated June 14, 2000 of before the Supreme Court is irregular, because
the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-99-1015, said memorandum is supposed to be in support
which recommended the filing of an Information merely of the position taken by the party
against Agdeppa and Castillo for violation of concerned in his petition, and the raising of new
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019; or enjoin issues amounts to the filing of a petition beyond
and dismiss the resultant criminal case, Crim. the reglementary period. The purpose of this rule
Case No. 01-100552, against Agdeppa and is to provide all parties to a case a fair
Castillo, which is now pending before the Quezon opportunity to be heard. No new points of law,
theories, issues or arguments may be raised by a grievously hamper the functions of the office and
party in the Memorandum for the reason that to the courts, in much the same way that courts will
permit these would be offensive to the basic rules be swamped if they had to review the exercise of
of fair play, justice and due process. discretion on the part of public prosecutors each
time they decided to file an information or
Petitioners failed to heed the Courts prohibition dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
on the raising of new issues in the Memorandum. The Court respects the relative autonomy of the
Based on the foregoing, we find no necessity to Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and
discuss the second issue which was raised by the refrains from interfering when the latter exercises
petitioners for the first time only in their such powers either directly or through the Deputy
Memorandum. (Emphasis supplied, citations Ombudsman, except when there is grave abuse
omitted.) of discretion. Indeed, the Ombudsmans
determination of probable cause may only be
The Court adheres to a policy assailed through certiorari proceedings before
of non-interference with the this Court on the ground that such determination
investigatory and prosecutorial is tainted with grave abuse of discretion defined
powers of the Office of the as such capricious and whimsical exercise of
Ombudsman. judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
For there to be a finding of grave abuse of
In general, the Court follows a policy of non- discretion, it must be shown that the
interference with the exercise by the Office of the discretionary power was exercised in an arbitrary
Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial or despotic manner by reason of passion or
powers, in respect of the initiative and personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion
independence inherent in the said Office, which, must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
people and the preserver of the integrity of the perform the duty enjoined or to act in
public service.43 The Court expounded on such contemplation of law. (Citations omitted.)
policy in M.A. Jimenez Enterprises, Inc. v.
Ombudsman,44 thus: Petitioner failed to clearly demonstrate
grave abuse of discretion by the Office
It is well-settled that the determination of of the Ombudsman that would have
probable cause against those in public office justified the issuance of a writ of
during a preliminary investigation is a function certiorari by the Court.
that belongs to the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman is vested with the sole power to It falls upon Agdeppa, as petitioner for the writ of
investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or upon certiorari, to discharge the burden of proving
the complaint of any person, any act or omission grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office
which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or of the Ombudsman, in accordance with the
inefficient. It has the discretion to determine definition and standards set by law and
whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts jurisprudence.
and circumstances, should be filed or not. As
explained in Esquivel v. Ombudsman: Grave abuse of discretion is well-defined and
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine not an amorphous concept that may easily be
whether there exists reasonable ground to manipulated to suit ones purpose.45 The Court
believe that a crime has been committed and gave the following comprehensive definition of
that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, said term in Yu v. Reyes-Carpio46:
thereafter, to file the corresponding information
with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule The term grave abuse of discretion has a
that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can
interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his only be considered as with grave abuse of
investigatory and prosecutory powers without discretion when such act is done in a capricious
good and compelling reasons to indicate or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
his constitutional mandate and the courts will not discretion must be so patent and gross as to
interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
upon respect for the investigatory and virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable despotic manner by reason of passion and
petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory hostility. Furthermore, the use of a petition for
proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will certiorari is restricted only to truly extraordinary
cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi- In the Order dated June 6, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-
judicial body is wholly void. From the foregoing 00-0470, the Office of the Ombudsman required
definition, it is clear that the special civil action of only Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo to file their
certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act counter-affidavits and evidence.
down for having been done with grave abuse of
discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show Agdeppa asserts that the Office of the
that such act was patent and gross. x x x. Ombudsman has jurisdiction over Junia, a private
(Citations omitted.) individual, who conspired with Jarlos-Martin and
Laurezo, public officers, in the commission of acts
Not every error in the proceedings, or every violative of Republic Act No. 3019. The exclusion
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes of Junia in the Order dated June 6, 2000 was in
grave abuse of discretion.47 While the contravention of procedural due process as Junia
prosecutor, or in this case, the investigating was an indispensable party in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-
officers of the Office of the Ombudsman, may err 0470 and without his counter-affidavit, there
or even abuse the discretion lodged in them by could be no complete preliminary investigation in
law, such error or abuse alone does not render said case.
their act amenable to correction and annulment
by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.48 The Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise
requirement for judicial intrusion is still for the known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, explicitly
petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Office provides:
of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of Section 22. Investigatory Power. x x x.
jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is
made, the intervention is disallowed in deference In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or
to the doctrine of non-interference. employee of the government and a private
person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall
Throughout his Petition, Agdeppa presents a have jurisdiction to include such private person in
grand conspiracy between the Office of the the investigation and proceed against such
Ombudsman and Junia, with the Office of the private person as the evidence may warrant. The
Ombudsman deliberately acting upon and officer or employee and the private person shall
deciding OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 (as well as OMB- be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same
0-99-1015) contrary to Agdeppas interest and penalties and liabilities.
favorable to Junias. Agdeppa sees every act or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman adverse There is therefore no question that the Office of
to his interest tainted with capriciousness and the Ombudsman has the power to investigate
arbitrariness. However, other than his own and prosecute a private person who conspired
allegations, suspicions, and surmises, Agdeppa with a public officer or employee in the
did not submit independent or corroborating performance of an illegal, unjust, improper, or
evidence in support of the purported conspiracy. inefficient act or omission. In this case, though,
The basic rule is that mere allegation is not the Office of the Ombudsman excluded Junia from
evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges the Order dated June 6, 2000, not because it did
based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise not have jurisdiction over a private individual,
cannot be given credence. When the complainant rather, because it found no merit in Agdeppas
relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and accusations against Junia in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-
fails to substantiate his allegations, the complaint 0470.
must be dismissed for lack of
merit.50chanrobleslaw The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as
counsel for the Office of the Ombudsman, Jarlos-
Taking away Agdeppas conspiracy theory, the Martin, and Laurezo explains that the
grounds for his Petition no longer have a leg to allegations in Agdeppas Affidavit-Complaint
stand on. As the succeeding discussion will show, basically focused on the purported violations of
the Resolution dated July 31, 2000 and Order the provisions of RA 3019 by public respondents
dated September 28, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00- MARTIN and LAUREZO as graft investigating
0470 were rendered by the Office of the officers and [a] reading of the complaint shows
Ombudsman in the valid exercise of its discretion. that JUNIAs alleged participation, if ever, was
peripheral and secondary[,] thus, the
The exclusion of Junia in the Order investigating officer, after evaluation, considered
dated June 6, 2000 is effectively an outright the complaint against [Junia] as not warranting
dismissal of the complaint as against him. further proceedings.51 In effect, the exclusion of
Junia from the Order dated June 6, 2000 was an
outright dismissal by the Office of the
Ombudsman of Agdeppas Affidavit-Complaint While the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed
insofar as said Affidavit-Complaint involved Junia. outright the Affidavit-Complaint as against Junia
in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, it decided to conduct
The Court recognized in Angeles v. Gutierrez52 a preliminary investigation of the charges against
that the Ombudsman has the discretionary power Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo contained in the same
to dismiss a complaint outright or proceed with Affidavit-Complaint. After the preliminary
the conduct of a preliminary investigation: investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman
likewise dismissed the Affidavit-Complaint as
The determination by the Ombudsman of against Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo for reasons that
probable cause or of whether there exists a are notably not dependent upon Junias non-
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has participation in the preliminary investigation. The
been committed, and that the accused is reasons for the dismissal of Agdeppas complaint
probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the against Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo, as well as
conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, Junia, were collectively discussed by the Office of
a preliminary investigation is by no means the Ombudsman in its Resolution dated July 31,
mandatory. 2000.

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Now as to whether or not the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure), Ombudsman was correct in not at all
specifically Section 2 of Rule II, states: investigating Junia is not for the Court to decide
in this Petition. Errors of judgment, as
Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not
investigating officer shall recommend whether it within the province of a special civil action for
may be: a) dismissed outright for want of certiorari, which is merely confined to issues of
palpable merit; b) referred to respondent for jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.53 And,
comment; c) indorsed to the proper government as had been previously discussed herein, without
office or agency which has jurisdiction over the evidence that the Office of the Ombudsman
case; d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or exercised its discretion capriciously and
official for fact-finding investigation; e) referred whimsically or arbitrarily and despotically in
for administrative adjudication; or f) subjected to excluding Junia from the Order dated June 6,
a preliminary investigation. 2000, there can be no grave abuse of discretion.

Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a Agdeppas assertion that he had been denied due
preliminary investigation upon receipt of a process is misplaced, bearing in mind that the
complaint. Indeed, we have said in Knecht v. rights to be informed of the charges, to file a
Desierto and later in Mamburao, Inc. v. Office of comment to the complaint, and to participate in
the Ombudsman and Karaan v. Office of the the preliminary investigation, belong to Junia, as
Ombudsman that should investigating officers the following pronouncements on the nature of a
find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may preliminary investigation in Uy v. Office of the
recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover, it is Ombudsman54 show:
also within their discretion to determine whether
or not preliminary investigation should be A preliminary investigation is held before an
conducted. accused is placed on trial to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious, and oppressive
The Court has undoubtedly acknowledged the prosecution; to protect him from an open and
powers of the Ombudsman to dismiss a complaint public accusation of a crime, as well as from the
outright without a preliminary investigation in trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public trial. It
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee is also intended to protect the state from having
on Behest Loans v. Desierto. to conduct useless and expensive trials. While the
right is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a
We reiterate that the Ombudsman has full component of due process in administering
discretion to determine whether a criminal case criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary
should be filed, including whether a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound for
investigation is warranted. The Court therefore trial and before being exposed to the risk of
gives due deference to the Ombudsmans incarceration and penalty is not a mere formal or
decision to no longer conduct a preliminary technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny
investigation in this case on the criminal charges the accuseds claim to a preliminary investigation
levelled against respondent Velasco. (Emphases is to deprive him of the full measure of his right
supplied, citations omitted.) to due process. (Emphases supplied, citation
omitted.)
In Cabahug v. People,55 the Court even directly jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional
addressed agencies tasked with preliminary Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner
investigation and prosecution of crimes, which prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
includes the Office of the Ombudsman, reminding Court, subject to the following provisions:
them as follows:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based
We cannot overemphasize the admonition to only on official reports, the investigating officer
agencies tasked with the preliminary shall require the complainant or supporting
investigation and prosecution of crimes that the witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate
very purpose of a preliminary investigation is to the complaints.
shield the innocent from precipitate, spiteful and
burdensome prosecution. They are duty-bound to b) After such affidavits have been secured, the
avoid, unless absolutely necessary, open and investigating officer shall issue an order,
public accusation of crime not only to spare the attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and
innocent the trouble, expense and torment of a other supporting documents, directing the
public trial, but also to prevent unnecessary respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from
expense on the part of the State for useless and receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and
expensive trials. Thus, when at the outset the controverting evidence with proof of service
evidence cannot sustain a prima facie case or thereof on the complainant. The complainant may
that the existence of probable cause to form a file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused service of the counter-affidavits.
cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must
desist from inflicting on any person the trauma of c) If the respondent does not file a counter-
going through a trial. (Emphasis supplied, citation affidavit, the investigating officer may consider
omitted.) the comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to
the complaint. In any event, the respondent shall
Clearly, the right to preliminary investigation is a have access to the evidence on record.
component of the right of the
respondent/accused to substantive due process. d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except
A complainant cannot insist that a preliminary for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a
investigation be held when the complaint was bill of particulars be entertained. If respondent
dismissed outright because of palpable lack of desires any matter in the complainants affidavit
merit. It goes against the very nature and to be clarified, the particularization thereof may
purpose of preliminary investigation to still drag be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in
the respondent/accused through the rigors of the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this
such an investigation so as to aid the section.
complainant in substantiating an
accusation/charge that is evidently baseless from e) If the respondent cannot be served with the
the very beginning. order mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having
been served, does not comply therewith, the
The Resolution dated July 31, 2000 complaint shall be deemed submitted for
in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 was issued resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman. f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and
their supporting evidences, there are facts
Agdeppa questions the fact that it was Director material to the case which the investigating
Falcis who issued the Order dated June 6, 2000 in officer may need to be clarified on, he may
OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 requiring Jarlos-Martin conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the
and Laurezo to file their counter-affidavits and parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be
evidence, but the preliminary investigation was present but without the right to examine or cross-
actually conducted and the Resolution dated July examine the witness being questioned. Where the
31, 2000 was penned by Investigator Caares. appearance of the parties or witnesses is
According to Agdeppa, this violates the same- impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may
investigating-officer rule under Rule II, Section 4 be conducted in writing, whereby the questions
of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure. desired to be asked by the investigating officer or
a party shall be reduced into writing and served
Rule II, Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of on the witness concerned who shall be required
Procedure reads in full: to answer the same in writing and under oath.

Sec. 4. PROCEDURE. The preliminary g) Upon the termination of the preliminary


investigation of cases falling under the investigation, the investigating officer shall
forward the records of the case together with his the service, the case cannot be decided and a
resolution to the designated authorities for their new trial will have to be conducted. That would
appropriate action thereon. be absurd; inconceivable.56 (Emphasis supplied.)

No information may be filed and no complaint Similarly, the fact alone that the investigating
may be dismissed without the written authority or officer of the Office of the Ombudsman who
approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling issued the resolution was not the one who
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of conducted the preliminary investigation does not
the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases. render said investigating officers resolution
erroneous or irregular. The investigating officer
The aforequoted provision lays down the may rely on the pleadings and evidence on record
procedure for a preliminary investigation and enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. performance of his duties as a public officer,
While it consistently refers to the investigating unless disputed by evidence to the contrary.
officer, it does not mandate that only one
investigating officer shall conduct the entire In this case, Director Falciss involvement in the
preliminary investigation and resolve the same. It preliminary investigation ended with the issuance
cannot be the basis for the same-investigating- of the Order dated June 6, 2000 directing Jarlos-
officer rule that Agdeppa invokes. Martin and Laurezo to submit their counter-
affidavits and evidence in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-
While ideally the investigating officer who 0470. Investigator Caares was in charge of the
conducted the preliminary investigation shall be preliminary investigation thereafter until the
the same one to resolve the complaint, there may issuance of the Resolution dated July 31, 2000.
be unavoidable circumstances necessitating a Hence, Investigator Caares was the one who
change in investigating officers (i.e., promotion, conducted a substantial portion of the preliminary
transfer, resignation, removal, retirement, or investigation.
death of the previous investigating officer) during
the course of the preliminary investigation. The Yet again, Agdeppas allegation that Director
position of the Court in instances when the judge Falciss outright dismissal of the complaint
who rendered the decision in a case was not the against Junia and exclusion of Junia from the
one who heard and received evidence may be Order dated June 6, 2000 influenced Investigator
applied by analogy: Caares into subsequently dismissing the charges
against Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo too, is pure
[I]t is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the speculation and devoid of any substantiation.
judge who heard the evidence was not the one Besides, the Resolution dated July 31, 2000
who rendered the judgment but merely relied on completely passed through the gamut of the
the record of the case does not render his review process in the Office of the Ombudsman
judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if before its issuance. After being penned by
the judge did not have the fullest opportunity to Investigator Caares, said Resolution was
weigh the testimonies not having heard all the reviewed not only by Director Falcis, but also by
witnesses speak nor observed their deportment Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro and Ombudsman
and manner of testifying. Thus the Court Desierto. If Deputy Casimiro and/or Ombudsman
generally will not find any misapprehension of Desierto had noticed any error or irregularity in
facts as it can be fairly assumed under the the Resolution, they could withhold their
principle of regularity of performance of duties of approval, make their own findings, and rule
public officers that the transcripts of stenographic differently; but they did not, and they approved
notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated the Resolution as it was penned by Investigator
by the judge himself. Caares. There is no reason for the Court to
doubt the entire review process in the Office of
Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by the Ombudsman as regards the Resolution dated
petitioner to engender doubt as to the factual July 31, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 and cast
findings of the court a quo? We find none. A aside the presumption of regularity in the
painstaking review of the evidence on record performance of official duties by Investigator
convinces us not to disturb the judgment Caares, Director Falcis, Deputy Ombudsman
appealed from. The fact that the case was Casimiro, and Ombudsman Desierto, without
handled by different judges brooks no clear and convincing evidence of the alleged
consideration at all, for preponderant evidence irregularity on the part of the aforementioned
consistent with their claim for damages has been officials. Agdeppas accusations were mere
adduced by private respondents as to foreclose a suspicions
reversal. Otherwise, every time a Judge who that do not support a finding of probable
heard a case, wholly or partially, dies or leaves cause to criminally charge Jarlos-Martin,
Laurezo, and Junia under Section 3(a), (e), interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
(f), and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019. discriminating against any other interested party.

Agdeppas criminal complaint in OMB-MIL-CRIM- (j) Knowingly approving or granting any license,
00-0470 is essentially rooted in two external acts permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person
by Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo in OMB-0-99-1015: not qualified for or not legally entitled to such
(1) Jarlos-Martins issuance of the Order dated license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a
September 23, 1999 requiring Junia to personally mere representative or dummy of one who is not
appear before the Office of the Ombudsman to so qualified or entitled.
swear to his Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015,
followed by the Order dated October 6, 1999 The pivotal issue for the Office of the
directing Agdeppa and Castillo to file their Ombudsman to determine in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-
counter-affidavits to Junias Complaint which was 0470 was whether there was probable cause to
then already under oath; and (2) Laurezos criminally charge Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia
certifying that Junia personally appeared before with the foregoing corrupt acts. Probable cause,
him on October 6, 1999 to swear to the for purposes of filing a criminal information, has
Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015. Agdeppa alleged been defined as such facts as are sufficient to
that these acts were committed by Jarlos-Martin, engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
Laurezo, and Junia in conspiracy with one another been committed and that respondent is probably
to deliberately benefit Junia and prejudice guilty thereof.57 The Court had set the standard
Agdeppa and, thus, constituted corrupt acts to support a finding of probable cause in
under Section 3(a), (e), (f), (j) of Republic Act No. Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan58
3019.
It bears stressing that probable cause need not
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 describes and be based on clear and convincing evidence of
penalizes the following as corrupt acts: guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
addition to acts or omissions of public officers It implies probability of guilt and requires more
already penalized by existing law, the following than bare suspicion but less than evidence which
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public would justify conviction. x x x. (Emphasis
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: supplied, citation omitted.)

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another In its Resolution dated July 31, 2000 in OMB-MIL-
public officer to perform an act constituting a CRIM-00-0470, the Office of the Ombudsman
violation of rules and regulations duly found no probable cause and dismissed
promulgated by competent authority or an Agdeppas complaint against Jarlos-Martin,
offense in connection with the official duties of Laurezo, and Junia. The Office of the Ombudsman
the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, determined that one or more element/s for each
induced, or influenced to commit such violation corrupt act in Agdeppas complaint is/are missing
or offense. and/or lacked factual basis. Agdeppas
accusations were nothing more than his bare
suspicions. As the Office of the Ombudsman
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, frankly declared in its Order dated September 28,
including the Government, or giving any private 2000, denying Agdeppas Motion for
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or Reconsideration of the dismissal of OMB-MIL-
preference in the discharge of his official, CRIM-00-0470, [Agdeppa] miserably failed to
administrative or judicial functions through adduce any evidence, direct or circumstantial, to
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross prove any concert of voluntary action among
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply [Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia] other than
to officers and employees of offices or surmises and conjectures.
government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions. There is no merit to Agdeppas contention that by
dismissing his Affidavit-Complaint in OMB-MIL-
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or CRIM-00-0470, the Office of the Ombudsman
request, without sufficient justification to act tolerated the realignment of the Ombudsman
within a reasonable time on any matter pending Rules of Procedure and violation of Agdeppas
before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly right to the speedy disposition of his case. There
or indirectly, from any person interested in the is utter lack of evidence presented by Agdeppa
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or that Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia conspired to
advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own maliciously and deliberately conduct the
preliminary investigation in OMB-0-99-1015 to is not under oath or is based on official reports,
Agdeppas prejudice. the investigating officer shall require the
complainant or supporting witnesses to execute
On the basis of Laurezos affidavits to substantiate the complaints. Said
certification, Junia personally provision did not expressly state that in such a
swore to his Complaint in situation, the complainant or supporting
OMB-0-99-1015 before Laurezo witnesses are to execute the affidavits only
on October 6, 1999. before the investigating officer assigned to the
case.
Agdeppa faults the Office of the Ombudsman for
giving full faith and credence to Laurezos Despite the Order dated September 23, 1999
allegation in his Counter-Affidavit in OMB-MIL- issued by Jarlos-Martin, there is no explicit rule
CRIM-00-0470 that Junia personally appeared that only she, to the exclusion of all other
before him on October 6, 1999 to verify and authorized officials, can administer the oath to
swear to the Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015. Junia. Insisting on such exclusivity will serve no
Agdeppa further challenges the authority of purpose. Junia is only required to subscribe and
Laurezo to administer the oath to Junia, when it swear to his Complaint before an official
was Jarlos-Martin, the investigating officer in authorized to administer oath. To subscribe
OMB-0-99-1015, who issued the Order dated literally means to write underneath, as ones
September 23, 1999 directing Junia to appear name; to sign at the end of a document. To swear
before her at her office to swear to the Complaint. means to put on oath; to declare on oath the
truth of a pleading, etc.62 The identity of the
According to Laurezos certification, Junia authorized official administering the oath,
personally appeared before him on October 6, whether Jarlos-Martin or Laurezo, is not relevant
1999 to swear to his Complaint in OMB-0-99- and would have had no significant legal effect on
1015. There is no question that Laurezo, as an the Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015. In the end, the
investigating officer of the Office of the Complaint became a sworn affidavit just the
Ombudsman, has the power to administer same.
oaths.59 Since Laurezo administered the oath to
Junia on October 6, 1999 in the performance of Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
an official duty, his conduct of the same enjoys discretion amounting to lack or excess of
the presumption of regularity and, hence, already jurisdiction by the Office of the Ombudsman in
satisfactory when not contradicted and overcome the issuance of its Resolution dated July 31, 2000
by evidence. The Court observed that other than and Order dated September 28, 2000 in OMB-MIL-
raising the question, Agdeppa did not present an CRIM-00-0470, the Court cannot depart from the
iota of proof that Junia was actually not present policy of non-interference.
before Laurezo on the date and place as the
latter certified. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Moreover, whether certain items of evidence


should be accorded probative value or weight, RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, G.R. No. 182835
and whether or not certain documents presented - versus - VELASCO, JR.,*
by one side should be accorded full faith and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
credit in the face of protests as to their spurious APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD,
character by the other side, are issues of fact.60
Agdeppa wants the Court to look into the This case concerns a claim of commission of the
propriety of or error in the appreciation of facts crime of violence against women when a former
by the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked
cannot be unaware that the Court is not a trier of woman, not her, but with her face on it.
facts, more so in the consideration of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither The Indictment
questions of fact nor even of law are entertained,
but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused
or grave abuse of discretion.61chanrobleslaw Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the
Lastly, Agdeppas argument that Junia should Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
have appeared, verified, and swore to his Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information
Complaint only before Jarlos-Martin, who issued that reads:
the Order dated September 23, 1999, is specious.
Rule II, Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality
Procedure only provides that, [i]f the complaint of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria
Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and Aurora who referred her to the police. Under
feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through
sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) the cellphone numbers he used in sending the
using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan
one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy.
whereby the face of the latter was attached to a Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a
completely naked body of another woman making motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards
it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted
depicted in the said obscene and pornographic and arrested him. They searched him and seized
picture thereby causing substantial emotional his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM
anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the
the said Irish Sagud.[1] police station, he shouted at Irish: Malandi ka
kasi!
The Facts and the Case
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State
The evidence for the prosecution shows that College of Technology, testified as an expert in
complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused information technology and computer graphics.
Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in He said that it was very much possible for one to
Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they lift the face of a woman from a picture and
became on-and-off sweethearts towards the end superimpose it on the body of another woman in
of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and
Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), enhanced by computer to make it appear that the
whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with face and the body belonged to just one person.
him.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face
touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope was not proportionate to the body and the face
with him, saying that he did not love the woman had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was
he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal fake and the face on it had been copied from the
and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales
the other woman and their child. Irish changed explained how this could be done, transferring a
her cellphone number but Rustan somehow picture from a computer to a cellphone like the
managed to get hold of it and sent her text Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers
for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 For his part, Rustan admitted having courted
and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October
messages but it was to ask him to leave her 2003 and their relation lasted until December of
alone. that year. He claimed that after their relation
ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish December 2004 but, after he told her that his
received through multimedia message service girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already
(MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
legs and with Irishs face superimposed on the
figure (Exhibit A).[2] The senders cellphone Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from
number, stated in the message, was 0921- Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort
8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. as she needed his help in selling her cellphone.
Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her When he arrived at the place, two police officers
face from a shot he took when they were in approached him, seized his cellphone and the
Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).[3] contents of his pockets, and brought him to the
police station.
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other
text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it Rustan further claims that he also went to
would be easy for him to create similarly Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her
scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to identify a prankster who was sending her
spread the picture he sent through the internet. malicious text messages. Rustan got the senders
One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the
text messaging shorthand, read: Madali lang person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene
ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede messages from the prankster, which he
ring send sa lahat ng chatter.[4] forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This
explained, he said, why the obscene messages
appeared to have originated from his cellphone 3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict
number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his
who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. constitutional rights; and
He presented six pictures of a woman whom he
identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).[5] 4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in
evidence the obscene picture presented in the
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustans wife, testified case.
that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures.
Michelle claims that she received the pictures and The Courts Rulings
hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained
them because she was jealous and angry. She did Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence
not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the against women includes an act or acts of a
woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in person against a woman with whom he has or
none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act,
and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she
was the woman in those four pictures. As for (a) Violence against women and their children
Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
fully dressed. any person against a woman who is his wife,
After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony former wife, or against a woman with whom the
completely credible, given in an honest and person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she or with whom he has a common child, or against
wept while recounting her experience, prompting her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
the court to comment: Her tears were tangible or without the family abode, which result in or is
expression of pain and anguish for the acts of likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
violence she suffered in the hands of her former harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
testimony is evidence of the credibility of her harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
charges with the verity borne out of human
nature and experience.[6] Thus, in its Decision Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute
dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan violence against women and these include any
guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. form of harassment that causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to a woman.
On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), Thus:
[7] the latter rendered a decision dated January
31, 2008,[8] affirming the RTC decision. The CA SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
denied Rustans motion for reconsideration in a Children. The crime of violence against women
resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed and their children is committed through any of
the present for review on certiorari. the following acts:
The Issues Presented h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that
The principal issue in this case is whether or not alarms or causes substantial emotional or
accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message psychological distress to the woman or her child.
the picture with her face pasted on the body of a This shall include, but not be limited to, the
nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological following acts:
distress, and humiliation on her in violation of
Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. 5. Engaging in any form of harassment or
violence;
The subordinate issues are:
The above provisions, taken together, indicate
1. Whether or not a dating relationship existed that the elements of the crime of violence against
between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined women through harassment are:
in R.A. 9262;
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like relationship with the offended woman;
the sending of the nude picture in this case, 2. The offender, by himself or through another,
already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of commits an act or series of acts of harassment
R.A. 9262; against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial be time enough for nurturing a relationship of
emotional or psychological distress to her. mutual trust and love.

One. The parties to this case agree that the An away-bati or a fight-and-kiss thing between
prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking
had a dating relationship with Irish. Section 3(e) place does not mean that the romantic relation
provides that a dating relationship includes a between the two should be deemed broken up
situation where the parties are romantically during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining
involved over time and on a continuing basis what away-bati meant, Irish explained that at
during the course of the relationship. Thus: times, when she could not reply to Rustans
messages, he would get angry at her. That was
(e) Dating relationship refers to a situation all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month
wherein the parties live as husband and wife romantic relation as continuous.[10]
without the benefit of marriage or are Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an
romantically involved over time and on a offensive picture should not be considered a form
continuing basis during the course of the of harassment. He claims that such would unduly
relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary ruin him personally and set a very dangerous
socialization between two individuals in a precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes
business or social context is not a dating any act or series of acts that constitutes violence
relationship. (Underscoring supplied.) against women. This means that a single act of
harassment, which translates into violence, would
Here, Rustan claims that, being romantically be enough. The object of the law is to protect
involved, implies that the offender and the women and children. Punishing only violence that
offended woman have or had sexual relations. is repeatedly committed would license isolated
According to him, romance implies a sexual act. ones.
He cites Websters Comprehensive Dictionary
Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial Rustan alleges that todays women, like Irish, are
or informal meaning to the word romance used as so used to obscene communications that her
a verb, i.e., to make love; to make love to as in getting one could not possibly have produced
He romanced her. alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional
or psychological distress. He claims having
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish
provisions the colloquial verb romance that such that she was already desensitized by them.
implies a sexual act. It did not say that the
offender must have romanced the offended But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan
woman. Rather, it used the noun romance to and his wife give their testimonies was not
describe a couples relationship, i.e., a love affair. impressed with their claim that it was Irish who
[9] sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-
7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that violence Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
against women x x x refers to any act or a series
of acts committed by any person against a Michelle, Rustans wife, claimed that she deleted
woman x x x with whom the person has or had a several other pictures that Irish sent, except
sexual or dating relationship. Clearly, the law Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make
itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a sense. She said that she did not know that
dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she
defines dating relationship while Section 3(f) deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said
defines sexual relations. The latter refers to a that she did not have time to delete them.[11]
single sexual act which may or may not result in And, if she thought that she had deleted all the
the bearing of a common child. The dating pictures from the memory card, then she had no
relationship that the law contemplates can, reason at all to keep and hide such memory card.
therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse There would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if
taking place between those involved. she knew that some pictures remained in the
card, there was no reason for her to keep it for
Rustan also claims that since the relationship several years, given that as she said she was too
between Irish and him was of the on-and-off jealous to want to see anything connected to
variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving
regarded as having developed over time and on a credence to her testimony.
continuing basis. But the two of them were
romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma
from October to December of 2003. That would that Irish experienced based on Rustans low
regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of
todays youth. What is obscene and injurious to an the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-
offended woman can of course only be SC).
determined based on the circumstances of each
case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the
legs spread open and bearing Irishs head and admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for
face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish the first time before this Court. The objection is
a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman too late since he should have objected to the
like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, admission of the picture on such ground at the
would be scandalized and pained if she sees time it was offered in evidence. He should be
herself in such a picture. What makes it further deemed to have already waived such ground for
terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the objection.[14]
picture with a threat to post it in the internet for
all to see. That must have given her a nightmare. Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the
present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-
and certain items were seized from him without judicial proceedings, and administrative
any warrant, the evidence presented against him proceedings.[15]
should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is
that the prosecution did not present in evidence In conclusion, this Court finds that the
either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the prosecution has proved each and every element
police officers seized from him at the time of his of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
arrest. The prosecution did not need such items
to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and
was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in
P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its
Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial resolution dated April 25, 2008.
conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v.
him consisted in Irishs testimony that she NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGPIT,
received the obscene picture and malicious text
messages that the senders cellphone numbers On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las
belonged to Rustan with whom she had been Pias charged appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit
previously in communication. Indeed, to prove (Enojas), Arnold Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez),
that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Fernando Santos y Delantar (Santos), and Roger
Irish and the police used such numbers to Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder before the
summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he Las Pias Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal
did.[12] Consequently, the prosecution did not Case 06-0854.1crallawlibrary
have to present the confiscated cellphone and
SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (PO2 Gregorio) testified
messages. that at around 10:30 in the evening of August 29,
2006, he and PO2 Francisco Pangilinan (PO2
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota
malicious text messages to Irish.[13] His defense Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a
was that he himself received those messages taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the
from an unidentified person who was harassing Aguila Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF
Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers
using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented approached the taxi and asked the driver, later
the cellphone number of the unidentified person identified as accused Enojas, for his documents.
who sent the messages to him to authenticate The latter complied but, having entertained
the same. The RTC did not give credence to such doubts regarding the veracity of documents
version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was shown them, they asked him to come with them
most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan to the police station in their mobile car for further
if he had merely tried to help her identify the questioning.2crallawlibrary
sender.
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent officers and left his taxi behind. On reaching the
to Irish through a text message constitutes an 7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang
electronic document. Thus, it should be Road, however, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan
authenticated by means of an electronic went down to relieve himself there. As he
approached the stores door, however, he came Manifesting in open court that they did not want
upon two suspected robbers and shot it out with to adduce any evidence or testify in the case,7
them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and the accused opted to instead file a trial
hit the other who still managed to escape. But memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their
someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his defense. They pointed out that they were entitled
death. to an acquittal since they were all illegally
arrested and since the evidence of the text
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around messages were inadmissible, not having been
and fired at an armed man whom he saw running properly identified.
towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who
came from the Jollibbee outlet, run towards On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,8
Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2 finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified
Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men by evident premeditation and use of armed men
were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio with the special aggravating circumstance of use
radioed for help and for an ambulance. On of unlicensed firearms. It thus sentenced them to
returning to his mobile car, he realized that suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with the possibility of parole and to indemnify the
them had fled. heirs of PO2 Pangilinan with P165,999.00 as
actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
Investigation Division of the Las Pias Police, P2,080,000.00 as compensation for loss of
testified that he and PO2 Teoson Rosarito (PO2 earning capacity.
Rosarito) immediately responded to PO2
Gregorios urgent call. Suspecting that accused Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June
Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in 14, 2012 the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the
the attempted robbery, they searched the appeal and affirmed in toto the conviction of the
abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that accused.9 The CA, however, found the absence of
Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred evident premeditation since the prosecution
instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to failed to prove that the several accused planned
monitor its incoming messages.3crallawlibrary the crime before committing it. The accused
appealed from the CA to this
The police later ascertained that the suspect Court.10crallawlibrary
whom PO2 Pangilinan had killed was someone
named Reynaldo Mendoza who was armed with The defense points out that the prosecution failed
a .38 caliber revolver. The police found spent 9 to present direct evidence that the accused
mm and M-16 rifle shells at the crime scene. Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in
Follow-up operations at nearby provinces resulted shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.11 This may be
in finding the dead body of one of the suspects, true but the prosecution could prove their liability
Alex Angeles, at the Metro South Medical Center by circumstantial evidence that meets the
along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.4crallawlibrary evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It has been held that circumstantial
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is
monitored the messages in accused Enojas more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from
mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, which the inferences are derived are proven; and
communicated with the other accused. The police 3) the combination of all the circumstances is
then conducted an entrapment operation that such as to produce a conviction beyond
resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and reasonable doubt. 12crallawlibrary
Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able
to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence
prosecution presented the transcripts of the the prosecution presented sufficiently provides
mobile phone text messages between Enojas and basis for the conviction of all the accused.
some of his co-accused.5crallawlibrary
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused
The victims father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously
that his son was at the time of his death 28 years parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The
old, unmarried, and was receiving police pay of officers were bringing him with them to the police
P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 per month. Ricardo station because of the questionable documents
spent P99,999 for burial expense, P16,000.00 for he showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of
the interment services, and P50,000.00 for the taxicab yielded Enojas mobile phone that
purchase of the cemetery lot.6crallawlibrary contained messages which led to the entrapment
and capture of the other accused who were also homicide, aggravated by the use of unlicensed
taxicab drivers. firearms, a circumstance alleged in the
information.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than
remain in the cab to go to the police station As to the admissibility of the text messages, the
where he was about to be taken for questioning, RTC admitted them in conformity with the Courts
tending to show that he had something to hide. earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic
He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to Evidence to criminal actions.15 Text messages
clear up the matter and claim his taxi. are to be proved by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the same or has personal
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused knowledge of them.16 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing
Gomez as one of the men he saw running away as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages
from the scene of the shooting. with the other accused in order to identify and
entrap them. As the recipient of those messages
4. The text messages identified Kua Justin as sent from and to the mobile phone in his
one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge
shootout; the messages also referred to Kua of such messages and was competent to testify
Justin as the one who was hit in such shootout on them.
and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite.
These messages linked the other accused. The accused lament that they were arrested
without a valid warrant of arrest. But, assuming
5. During the follow-up operations, the police that this was so, it cannot be a ground for
investigators succeeded in entrapping accused acquitting them of the crime charged but for
Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were rejecting any evidence that may have been taken
all named in the text messages. from them after an unauthorized search as an
incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not
6. The text messages sent to the phone in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been
recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly committedthe killing of PO2 Pangilinanand
made references to the 7-11 shootout and to the the investigating police officers had personal
wounding of Kua Justin, one of the gunmen, and knowledge of facts indicating that the persons
his subsequent death. they were to arrest had committed it.17 The text
messages to and from the mobile phone left at
7. The context of the messages showed that the the scene by accused Enojas provided strong
accused were members of an organized group of leads on the participation and identities of the
taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities. accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an
entrapment using this knowledge.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were
found in possession of mobile phones with call The award of damages by the courts below has to
numbers that corresponded to the senders of the be modified to conform to current
messages received on the mobile phone that jurisprudence.18crallawlibrary
accused Enojas left in his taxicab.13
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of
The Court must, however, disagree with the CAs Appeals Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-
ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a) HC 03377. The Court instead FINDS accused-
aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold Gomez y
firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to Fabregas, Fernando Santos y Delantar, and Roger
murder. In aid of armed men, the men act as Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the lesser crime of
accomplices only. They must not be acting in the HOMICIDE with the special aggravating
commission of the crime under the same purpose circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms.
as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of
use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of
special aggravating circumstance that is not reclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court also
among the circumstances mentioned in Article MODIFIES the award of exemplary damages by
248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a increasing it to P30,000.00, with an additional
homicide to murder.14 Consequently, the P50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
accused in this case may be held liable only for

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