[G.R. No. 119347.

March 17, 1999]

EULALIA RUSSELL, RUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO TAUTHO, SUSANA T.
REALES, APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS, GREGORIO
TAUTHO, DEODITA T. JUDILLA, AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO, WILLIAM
TAUTHO, AND MARILYN PERALES, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE
A. VESTIL, ADRIANO TAGALOG, MARCELO TAUTHO, JUANITA MENDOZA,
DOMINGO BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO
CABATINGAN, respondents.
FACTS:
On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents,
denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN 2275. The
complaint, in substance, alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of
land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu and containing an area of 56,977.40 square
meters, more or less. The land was previously owned by the spouses Casimero
Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Upon the death of said spouses, the property was
inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents. Since
then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public document
denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A
PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of
this deed, private respondents divided the property among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late
spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners claimed that the document
was false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that
no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The
complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be
issued to partition the land among all the heirs. [1]
On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss [2] the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the
total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3)[3] of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, [4] falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela. [5]Petitioners
filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss [6] saying that the Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended. [7]
On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to
Dismiss.[8] A Motion for Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners on
January 30, 1995. On February 13, 1995, the respondent judge issued another Order
denying the motion for reconsideration.[10]
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No.
MAN-2275.
HELD:
Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill,[12] we had the occasion to rule that:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts).[13]
The subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document
denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF
PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the
document in which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the
late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among
themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and
entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the
property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity
of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintif
is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. [19]
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149554. July 1, 2003]
SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and YOLANDA B. HUGUETE, petitioners,
vs. SPOUSES TEOFEDO AMARILLO EMBUDO and MARITES HUGUETE-
EMBUDO, respondents.

FACTS:
On March 2, 2000, petitioner spouses Jorge and Yolanda Huguete instituted against
respondent spouses Teofredo Amarillo Embudo and Marites Huguete-Embudo a
complaint for Annulment of TCT No. 99694, Tax Declaration No. 46493, and Deed of
Sale, Partition, Damages and Attorneys Fees, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-24925
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7. Petitioners alleged that their son-
in-law, respondent Teofredo, sold to them a 50-square meter portion of his 150-
square meter parcel of land, known as Lot No. 1920-F-2, situated in San Isidro,
Talisay, Cebu, for a consideration of P15,000.00; that Teofredo acquired the lot from
Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo by virtue of a deed of sale, [3] after which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 99694 was issued solely in his name; that despite demands,
Teofredo refused to partition the lot between them.
On March 15, 2001, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss [4] the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, arguing that the
total assessed value of the subject land was only P15,000.00 which falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, pursuant to Section 33(3) [5] of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. [6]
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss [7] alleging that the subject
matter of the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, is
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, as provided by Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as
amended. [8]
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration,[9] which was denied on July 26, 2001.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil action is one in which the subject matter is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
HELD:
No.
In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint was to
secure title to the 50-square meter portion of the property which they purchased
from respondents.
Petitioners cause of action is based on their right as purchaser of the 50-square
meter portion of the land from respondents. They pray that they be declared owners
of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any
interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was
P15,000.00, which was within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Court. The
annulment of the deed of sale between Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo and
respondents, as well as of TCT No. 99694, were prayed for in the complaint because
they were necessary before the lot may be partitioned and the 50-square meter
portion subject thereof may be conveyed to petitioners.
Petitioners argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition is not
well-taken. As stated above, the nature of an action is not determined by what is
stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and
the reliefs prayed for. Where, as in this case, the ultimate objective of the plaintifs
is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having
jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
G.R. No. 165777
CEFERINA DE UNGRIA [DECEASED], substituted by her HEIRS, represented
by LOLITA UNGRIA SAN JUAN-JAVIER, and RHODORA R. PELOMIDA as their
Attorney-in-fact, Petitioner,
- versus -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, BRANCH 35, ROSARIO DIDELES VDA. DE
CASTOR, NEPTHALIE CASTOR ITUCAS, FEROLYN CASTOR FACURIB, RACHEL
DE CASTOR, LEA CASTOR DOLLOLOSA, and ROSALIE CASTOR BENEDICTO,
Respondents. De Ungria et al. vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari for ownership, possession and damages,
and alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities,
and/or for recovery of Rosario's conjugal share with damages or redemption of the
subject land against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria et al. Respondent Rosariois the
surviving wife of the late Fernando Castor, while the rest of the respondents are
their legitimate children. The documents they (respondents) sought to annul are (1)
the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon
allegedly executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father;
and (2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss raising, among others
that the court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintifs to pay the
filing fee in full. Pending resolution of the motion, respondents filed a Motion to
Allow them to continue prosecuting this case as indigent litigants. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration and clarification on whether plaintifs should be allowed
to continue prosecuting the case as indigent litigants. Said motion was denied. The
same was filed to the RTC and to the CA; both were denied.
In a Decision dated May 26, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA found that
SC Circular No. 7 would not apply where the amount of damages or value of the
property was immaterial; that the Circular could be applied only in cases where the
amount claimed or the value of the personal property was determinative of the
court's jurisdiction citing the case of Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte.[16] The
CA found that respondents had paid the corresponding docket fees upon the filing of
the complaint, thus, the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the
failure to state the amount of damages claimed in the body of the complaint or in
the prayer thereof. The CA found that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss. It noted that the RTC's Clarificatory Order dated March 30, 2000, which
stated that if after hearing the Clerk of Court determines that the filing fee is still
insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien on the judgment that may be
entered was in accordance with the rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion.[17] The CA proceeded to state that a judicious examination of the
complaint pointed to a determination of the respective rights and interests of the
parties over the property based on the issues presented therein which could only be
determined in a full-blown trial on the merits of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss
despite respondents non-payment of the correct docket fees.
HELD:
Yes.
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the
complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing
fees. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a permissive
counter-claim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing
with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-
intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the total-sum claimed,
exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in litigation, is:
xxxx
(b) For filing:
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated ........ P 400.00
2. x x x
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees. Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract
which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction
of the RTC, the docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the
subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be based on
Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal Fees Form attached
to the records would reflect that the amount of P400.00 was paid to the Clerk of
Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon
respondents' proof of payment of the assessed fees, the RTC has properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues
until the case is terminated.

G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997

The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal guardian,
AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his
wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
FACTS:
Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On
September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to eject the spouses
Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises.
The amended Complaint 5 pertinently alleged that plaintif Caiza was the absolute
owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of kindness,
she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law
to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caiza already had urgent need of
the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be
raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that
through her guardian, Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to
vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of
unlawfully depriving plaintif of the possession of the house in question,
they . . (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because,
while they . . (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the
incompetent . . (was) losing much money as her house could not be rented by
others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the
date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been
living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful
service they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the latter had in
fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed"
to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Caiza's favor, 6 the
Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises and pay Caiza P5,000.00 by way of
attorney's fees. But on appeal, 8 the decision was reversed by the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96.
Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October 21,
1992, but failed in that attempt. In a decision 11 promulgated on June 2, 1993, the
Appellate Court 12 affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that (a) the proper
remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion
interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in the subject
premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort
of adopted family of Carmen Caiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the
holographic will of the plaintif; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has
passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to
the property, . . it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Caiza
that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and
possession, so much so that Caiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to
have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out." 13
Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994, 16 and her heirs, Amparo Evangelista, and
Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively, substituted for her. 17

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an ejectment action is the appropriate judicial remedy for
recovery of possession of the property in dispute.
2. Assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not Evangelista, as Caiza's legal
guardian had authority to bring said action.
3. Assuming an affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not Evangelista
may continue to represent Caiza after the latter's death.
HELD:
1. A cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. It is settled that in
an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from the plaintif is deemed sufficient, 22 and a complaint for
unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the
refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the
law.
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the
circumstances was that involving the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e.,
possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the proper
remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary action in the
RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to possession de jure.
2. Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging
the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward"
explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of
ward. A guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste,
and apply the income and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to the
comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any;
and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell
or encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to
such of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance.
3. While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward
is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, 39 the rule
afords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen
Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's
nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court 40 of
June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place
of the deceased, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.: 41
Sec. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty
(30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to
appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified
by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The
heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.