Vetting and CDI Observations

The following observations from numerous Vetting and CDI Inspections have been compiled subject-wise
for the convenience of seafarers. I couldnt do a proper scrutiny of these observations since the volume is
quite large. These are written in Maritime English. Some of them might have been written repeatedly or
be irrelevant with respect to ship type, new regulations, etc. I dont have sufficient collection of
observations on ECDIS. Ill include those in due course. I regret for any inadvertent mistakes.

Are you focused for Vetting/CDI?

Master and C/E must take the lead of the show.

a. One needs to be very thorough about the SIRE / CDI Check List. One needs to take it seriously
that he wants to do well in Vetting/CDI. Usually, it is seen that the level of sincerity varies greatly
among the officers and crew. It is due to improper motivation towards individual responsibilities,
lack of self-esteem and frail team work.
b. Negligence is very prevalent among junior officers now-a-days. As far as Vetting/CDI
Preparations are concerned, negligence could be sighted as someones ability for not being able to
comply with the SIRE/CDI Checklist. Till every word of the check list is understood and all
applicable check points are complied with, one can assume that he is trying his luck in getting a
good Vetting/CDI. A cursory preparation and tons of previous experience alone may not help in
getting good results in Vetting/CDI.
c. Lots of officers defend their points against what is written in SIRE/CDI Check Lists. In fact, it
should be treated as such that if SIRE/CDI says 1+1 = 3, you must say it as YES. No instructions
in SIRE/CDI Checklists are written to result in some unsafe practices on board. Unnecessary
arguments on board among ship staffs and with the inspector (some cases) bring no good result.
d. Do a meeting with your colleagues prior Vetting/CDI, try to motivate them towards achieving the
best outcome, distribute responsibilities, cross check their preparations. These will ensure a better
result.
e. Some inspectors are seen to be very fussy about everything from beginning of the inspection.
Stay cool and do not argue with the inspector with anger. You may always humbly seek
clarification with the inspector about a doubtful situation. Sometimes, good treat helps ease up a
tough situation. Too many small observations annoy the inspector and due to this fact, it becomes
difficult for him to ignore some serious observations.
f. Read every point of the check list and rule it out to ensure that you didnt miss out any major
thing. Give value to the suggestions / feedbacks of your colleagues. Boost up the moral of the
team.

Ill try to update this page time to time. Good Luck for Vetting and CDI Inspections!

Bunkering

1. No cargo specific MSDS for current blend of fuel oil being discharged.
2. No bunker analysis reports available for last bunkers loaded / in use.
3. Bunkering plan/checklist did not include/agreed initial loading rate and topping off rates.
4. The vessels current bunkering checklist in use did not reflect the sub-section for hazards
associated with toxic substances or the testing procedures to determine the presence of
H2S vapours.
5. Engineers were not familiar with the procedure of testing bunkers for H2S and were not
checking bunkers each time prior to, during or after bunkering operations. Relevant item
in Safety Checklist was being marked NA.
6. The last bunker transfer instruction did not included following: initial loading rate,
topping up sounding, internal tank overflow arrangement and alarm setting of the overfill
alarm units.
7. The bunker pipe line on the after main deck just forward of the accommodations had
three areas wrapped with fiberglass tape at "U" bolts and one area with a rubber tape.
The fiber glass wraps were reported to be chaff area under the "U" bolts and the rubber
tape was a slight leak that was noticed this port. It was reported that there was spare pipe
on board by the CE.
8. The vessel had a Bunker SSSCL. The repetitive checks were not being logged.
Operations prior to this did not have the SSSCL
9. The fwd bunker line drain lines (P & S) at the manifold have only one valve and no plug
fitted in the bottom.
10. The bunker checklist was not fully completed. Means of communication, designated
smoking rooms, H2S, benzene level were not recorded.

Cargo Operations

1. There was a pressure gauge only provided for cargo seachest valve testing device other
than preferable pressure/vacuum gauge in place.
2. Both monitoring panels for cargo tank overfill alarm and IG main control panel were
restricted to continue visual accessing during cargo operation as it was located behind of
cargo control panel.
3. Vessel provided with one full flow high velocity PV valve for each cargo tank. No
secondary system except for PV breaker on main IG line. No fixed pressure monitoring
or alarm system.
4. PV breaker gauge glass was not fitted with any valve or cocks.
5. Vessel not fitted with vapour return Manifold.
6. The master stated that no provisions were on board to inert the ballast tanks. (This item
was not on the list provided to the master due to an oversight by the inspector. It was,
however, discussed with the master at the time of discovery).
7. The Deck water seal was not marked with "normal level" and "Level Lines".
8. Fixed gauging system for cargo tanks appeared to have erratic errors, some ranging up to
1500mm, when being compared with corrected UTI ullages.
9. COT vapour lock adaptor not used when testing 02 in tank with portable analyser.
10. Sight ports to check SBT ballast could not be opened, wing nuts severely rusted and it
was not possible to open.
11. Pump Room Stripping pump and 2 Cargo Oil pumps oil visible and leaking from glands
and seals.
12. Vessel provided with one full flow high velocity p.v. valve for each cargo tank. No
secondary system except for p.v. breaker on main IG line. No fixed pressure monitoring
or alarm system.
13. Sl(P), Sl(S), 5C, 4S COT remote level gauges in CCR eratic.
14. Numerous bolt were required to open for inspection of FPK tank, no sample hole was
provided. It shared common bulk head with cargo tanks.
15. Dump V/V to slop tanks were passing through ballast tank and no procedures from
operator for testing these.
16. One portable O2 meter was not working.
17. Cargo port log was well record but it did not included detail of major event of cargo
operations such starting and stopping of individual cargo tanks
18. Some of the records of previous cargo operation and maintenance of cargo operation
equipment were not available. They were reported taken away from vessel by Korean
authority after the recent incident.
19. 8.59 The Two cargos previous to the one now on board were not cowed as per the
charters instructions. However the oil record book did not reflect COW operations being
completed to the MARPOL minimum on all crude cargos previous to those.
20. The vessel had isolation valves from the IG branch lines to the cargo tanks. However, the
isolation valves were found not secured, but in the open position. The valves were
secured when pointed out.
21. There were several recess type locks on the stop valves on the IG Line to the individual
tanks that protruded above their quard making them easily opened without the special
key.
22. During the inspection the delivered oxygen content from the I.G. system was checked
numerous times. The average oxygen content delivered was 5.4%.
23. Most of the cargo manifold gratings were not secured to the savealls.
24. For partial loading in cargo tanks the GM corrected by free surface effect should be less
than 9m and specific gravity of the cargo oil should not be over 1.
25. COP no. 2 shaft seal noted to be leaking slightly.
26. Cargo tanks were not fiited with independent High Level Alarm.
27. The high level alarms and overfill alarm systems not independent of the main gauging
system.
28. Vessel had no equipment to test oxygen contents of cargo tanks in closed cargo operation
system.
29. Off shore pressure gauges on stbd manifolds were covered by bag of cloth. Rectified
later.
30. According to the Chemical ICoF attachment, the vessel can load Acetic Acid (loaded on
30Jan09) and Phenol but there was not means to maintaining the P/V valves above the
 freezing point of the cargo. The vessel was provided with some Company
procedures to be followed when carry these cargoes.
31. The pressure alarms of the cargo tanks were not correctly set. The pressure settings were
exactly the same as the opening pressure of the P/V valves (220mbar/-35mbar). The
vessel was discharging without a vapour return. When the vacuum unit on a tank opened,
the vacuum alarm was activated at the same time and did not serve as a secondary means.
There was no company procedure on how the alarms should be set under different
loading/discharging conditions. This was discussed with the ships' staff and settings were
adjusted when the observation was raised.
32. The manifold manometers did not have shut off valves
33. P/V Valves were set to release pressure at 3.5 kpa. Tank no. 1S, 1P, 3S were at -3.8
kpa, -4.0 kpa and -3.6 kpa. There was no alarm. Checked PI and they were not released.
Indicating pressure measurement was not operating properly or P/V realets was not set
correctly.
34. The forward fire wire was not adjusted properly and it was to high off of the water.

Certification

1. Vessel's IOPP states vessel to be a crude oil tanker. Vessel currently carrying and
discharging fuel oil.
2. ESP Executive Hull Summary, CD-ROM containing following missing: (3) Survey
reports in the hull survey records, Part B; (5) Thickness Measurement Reports; (7)
Summary of Repairs, renewals and alterations.
3. Vessel sailing with below minimum number of qualified engineers. Minimum Manning
Certificate requires one Class 1, one Class 2 and two Class 3 Engineers. Vessel meets the
senior officer requirements, but the two junior engineers (3/E) and (4/E) hold Class 5 and
Class 4 Certificates of Competency respectively. New on signing 4/E also holds a Class
4.
4. Neither of the two junior engineer officers hold the minimum Class 3 certificates required
by the MMC - 3/E holds a Class 5 and 4/E holds a Class 4.
5. The IOPP certificate states vessel as crude oil carrier and presently loaded with black
product.
6. Tanks in addition to those listed in block 3.1 of the I.O.P.P. Certificate are being recorded
in catagory C-11 of the Oil Record Book.
7. Vapour Return system was fitted, but approved vapour control (emission) certificate and
manual were not on board.
8. P & I Insurance certificate was not written on end of period date.
9. Major modifications of hull were completed in September 2007, when vessel was
converted from single hull to double hull. However, this was not reported in IOPP
supplement form B issued by Lloyds Register. Relevant section was marked Not
Applicable. Last two inspections of ships bottom were reported as in 2002 & 2003 in
 Safety Construction Certificate. Vessel has been docked and fully converted thereafter in
2007. Docking survey was credited as per CCS in September 2007, while LR credited in
June 2006, which was actually an IWS.
10. Longitudinal assessment for vessel over 130 m and over 10 years old not mentioned in
Class Survey Report or Class Executive Summary Report.
11. The 2nd and 3rd Deck Officers did not hold BTM or BRM training certificates.
12. Vessels IOPP states vessel to be a crude oil tanker. Vessel currently carrying and
discharge fuel oil. China Classification Certificates not on board: Loadline, SAFCON,
IOPP.
13. Vessel sailing with below minimum number of qualified engineers. Minimum Manning
Certificate requires one Class 1, one Class 2 and two Class 3 Engineers. Vessel meets the
senior officer requirements, but the two junior engineers (3/E) and (4/E) hold Class 5 and
Class 4 Certificates of Competency respectively. New on signing 4/E also holds a Class
4.
14. Neither of the two junior engineer officers holds the minimum Class 3 certificates
required by the MMC 3/E holds a Class 5 and 4/E holds a Class 4.
15. Original Certificate of Registry, Certificate of Insurance or or financial Security in
respect of civil liability for oil pollution damage (Convention 1992), Certificate of
Insurance or or financial Security in respect of civil liability for bunker under oil
pollution damage 2001 and P&I Club Certificate of Entry was not on board. However
photocopy of same sighted.
16. IAPPC Record of Construction and Equipment did not show in section 2.4.1 if the tanker
had a vapour collection system installed and approved in accordance with SC/Circ.585.
Class had changed from NK to LR on 20 Aug 2008. There was no evidence that an
amended CSR in this respect had been requested. Vessel did not have on board CSR
Amendment Form (Form 2).
17. Revised Continuous Synopsis Record or an amendment form was not available.
18. Medical chest was certified for only up to 30 persons, while the Safety Equipment
Certificate was issued for 32 persons.
19. Chief Officer, the Designated Safety Officer had not undergone training in Safety
Officers Course.
20. Ballast Water Management Manual was not Class approved.
21. Appendix 3 of the provisional approved Shipboard Oil Pollution Prevention Emergency
Plan (SOPEP) not updated on the classification society still named to Nippon Kaiji
Kyokai and not Lloyds Register.
22. No USCG approved Vessel Responses Plan.
23. Appendix 3 of the provisional approved Shipboard Oil Pollution Prevention Emergency
Plan (SOPEP) not updated on the classification society still named to Nippon Kaiji
Kyokai and not Lloyds Register.
24. Current CSR not onboard
25. Sewage Pollution Prevention, Anti-Fouling and Air Pollution Prevention Certificate not
issued to vessel
26. Medical chest was certified for 30 persons and the safety equipment certificate was
issued for 32 persons.
27. Ballast Water Management Plan was not Class approved.
28. Still awaiting for ITF Special Agreement.
29. No International Anti-fouling System Certificate or Statement of Compliance.
30. The Minimum Safe Manning certificate issued on 14.05.07 as periodical unmanned
although class certificate recorded as manned.
31. In continuous synopsis record No.5 (latest) still recorded classification society as Nippon
Kaiji Kyokai and not Lloyds register.
32. International Tonnage (1969) still by NK to flag Panama, but had statements of change to
LR and Liberia.

33. Two conditions of class as follows:-

a)Issued 29.07.07,due 11/07 : Transverse bulkhead in cargo tank 1S leaking to 2S ballast

tank. Damage areas to be dealt, meantime ballast in 2S to be considered contaminated and
discharged by MARPOL.

b)Access ladders in ballast tank 2S heavily wasted, to dealt as found, issued 29.07.07 due
11.07

34. The International Ship Security Certificate made no reference to complying with the
applicable sections of part B.

The Safety Construction Certificate had not been endorsed for the inspection of the outside of
the ships bottom on 16 Aug 2007.

35. Certificate of last hydrostatic pressure testing of life boat air bottles were not sighted

36. Vapour lock fitted on cargo tanks were not calibrated and certified by the external agency.

37. Certificate attesting safe working load of single point mooring bow stopper was not on
board.

38. Machinery space was certified for unmanned operation but being manned all the time as
per the owners instruction

39. The vessel had been enrolled in LR Condition Assessment Programme, but with previous
ships name, and previous flag.

40. A plan was onboard but did not have a USCG approval letter , however there was written
evidence that the plan had been submitted to the coast guard for approval.

41. There was no documented evidence to indicate that the designated Safety Officer (Chief
Officer) had completed a formal Shipboard Safety Officers training course (CBT training in
progress on board)
42. BWMP is not class / administration approved

43. The ISSC was issued by Panama Maritime Authority, however, the CSR recorded it as
having been issued by LRS.

44. The Record of Anti-Fouling Certificate, Suez and Panama Tonnage Certificates stated the
previous ships name. This was rectified during the inspection.

45. SSC issued by the Government of the Republic of Panama on 15 may 2009 was a copy
sent by fax to the vessel on 18 May 2009

46. Certificate of Registry: Owner address was not stated in the Register Certificate

47. Some offices statutory certificates were issued on 2000 and 2001. (i.e certificate if
proficiency in survival craft and rescue boats-basic safety training and instruction training in
advanced fire fighting). There were no evidence that officers were attend refresher course.
48. Some ratings statutory certificates were issued on 2000 and 1999. (i.e certificate of
proficiency in survival craft and rescue boats-basic safety training and instruction training in
advanced fire fighting. There were no evidence that ratings were attend refresher courses.

Chief Engineer

1. Class as UMS but operating manned due to owners preference.

2. All entries in the Oil Record Book were signed by the C/E and not the person who
actually took the soundings/made the transfers. (This was corrected in the newest ORB
prior to the inspector's departure).
3. At the time of this inspection the engine room was operated in a fully manned condition
as required by the operator.
4. The machinery space was certified for unmanned operation but was not being operated in
the unmanned mode. The vessel departed the repair yard after the major conversion on 29
September 2007 and although the operators policy mentions that a vessel if UMS classed
to be in the unmanned mode within 15 days of departure from a repair yard it was
observed that the vessel was manned till date. As per the Chief Engineer there were
numerous leaks on various machinery which were in process of being rectified and the
machinery was still under observation till date.
5. It was observed both boilers were operating in the manual mode although there was
provision for both to be operated in the Auto mode. As per Chief Engineer there were
PCB failures in the electronic system and these PCBs were recently replaced and the
boilers had to be run on full load at press 22.10 bar in order to verify the proper operation
in the auto mode. As per Chief Engineer the vessel was awaiting for an appropriate
opportunity to carry out same.
 The vessel was fitted with an Engine Control Room overlooking the Main Engine. The
vessel was fitted 3 Auxiliary Engines. A/Es no. 1 and 3 generators were seen in
operation. No leaks were observed.

The boiler was observed to be operating in the manual mode. The I.G plant was observed
to be in operation and found to be in order. No. 1 IG fan was in operation. No leaks
observed. Records indicated the IGS alarms and trips were last tried out on 04 December
2007. The emergency air compressor, emergency generator, emergency fire pump, bilge
high level alarm, OWS 15 ppm alarm were all tested in the presence of the inspector and
found in order.
6. Engine room sky-light hatch cover was not kept closed strictly during cargo operation.
7. Though vessel is certified and equipped for UMS operations, machinery spaces were
being operated in manned mode since takeover by current operator, reportedly due to
Incinerator being run almost throughout the day due to low combustion capacity.
8. High pressure hydraulic system (working pressure 235 bars) for cranes and mooring
machinery is fitted in engine room but hydraulic mist detector was not fitted in the
vicinity.
9. Oil in bilges under three pumps.
10. UMS certified but not operated in this mode.
11. No cargo specific MSDS for current blend of fuel oil being discharged.
12. Vessel operating engine room manned. Reportedly due to high sludge generation from
purifiers (1.2 mt/day) that requires running of incinerator 20 hours a day.
13. The hot work area within Engine Room was approx 2 feet from the M.E Fuel V/V test kit
which use D.O as medium of testing. No means of fire protection nor fire retardant
material was provided.
14. Engine room skylight not all tightening dogs were fully in placed.
15. This was rectified before the end of inspection.
16. It was observed the suction line for the emergency fire pump passes through the engine
room with at least 7 flanges in the engine room. There is some lagging on 3 of the
flanges.
17. Starting of the emergency generator is by air driven motor, there is no spare starting
motor.
18. The engine control rooms engine monitor No. 1 was out of order.
19. One tanks entered in the IOPPC the LO drain tank, ha not been entered into the weekly
report under C 11.1 2-3.
20. On the two generators that were operating the tachometers were reading low and require
calibration.
21. The equipment fitted and utilized is a hull ground type (not recommended).The company
has not developed a safety policy concerning the use of electrical welding equipment.
22. The remote operated Main Engine air starting block valve was observed lashed in the
open position. The valve was not functional due to a worn spindle.
23. The inert gas cargo tank inlet valves were locked by a square bolt recessed into a collar,
however the head of the bolt on the inlet valve for cargo tank No .1 starboard protruded
 enough so that if could be loosesened using a conventional wrench (SOLAS II
-2/4.5.2.3.1)
24. There appeared to be welded repair to the IG scrubber vessel nozzle inlet pipe work.
25. The IG liquid P-V breaker gauge glass lower isolating valve was not of the self-closing
type and had been left in the open position.
26. Insulation mat was not provided in front of 440V main engine auxiliary blower starters
27. D/G no. 2 was not free of significant oil leak which had resulted in oil patches around
front and port side of the diesel generator
28. Machinery space was certified for unmanned operation but was manned throughout ,
reportedly for familiarization.
29. Dead Man Alarm System was not fitted.
30. 11 No result of lubricating and hydraulic oil testing programme although forwarded
ashore on 23.05.07
31. E/R manned throughout reportedly for familiarization.
32. While stored in separate, well ventilated compartments, there was an excessive number of
bottles on board, stowed so that the doors to the lockers could not be completely closed.
33. Primary Bilge tank appeared to have recently overflowed. Fuel oil filter area saturated
with fuel oil. Diesel Generators 2 & 3 were leaking oil with an accumulation in the bilges
beneath. The cascade tank was fitted with sight glasses that were dirty preventing the
proper observation of heating coil returns. Port side of main engine had areas of fuel oil
leakage.
34. Number 3MCP Turbine was observed with lube oil leaking into a metal container.
35. The Emergency Diesel Generator relied on a single electric starter. There was no spare on
board.
36. Several Oxygen and Acetylene storage cylinders were not properly secured with steel
clamps. These cylinders had been lashed in place using rope.
37. The Fixed oxygen and acetylene lines in the engine room were nit colour coded.
38. The fixed acetylene pipe in the bottle storage Area, was corroded and in need of
maintenance.
39. Transfers of engine room bilge water to the port slop tank were performed on 16th and
17th November 2008. The arrangement ,although approved by NKK , was not listed on
the ABS issued Form B
40. The upper areas of the engine room were dirty
41. Both SW service pump glands were leaking.
42. The resistance indicated on the 100v feeder panel was 0.75 mega ohms.
43. The Engine Control room main bus 100 volt insulation gauge indicated more than infinity
and it could not be reset in the test mode.
44. The main engine and auxiliary engines were observed to have leaks. The number 2 AE
had an oily rag stuffed into a space against the engine easing. The engineers had bearings
and seals on order and were awaiting spare parts.

45. A number of insulating mats were missing from in front of switchboard in engine room.
46. The engine room was certified for, but not operated in UMS mode, as per company
instructions, due to the short elapsed since the take over.
47. One of the auxiliary salt water cooling pump was observed leaking from the packing.
48. The earth testing device of both 110 / 440V was not working properly
49. Welding cable was repaired (joined) with insulation tape.
50. Welding machine was found with the earth return cable fixed to the ship s structure as an
earth return. (ISGOTT 9.5).

51. Minimum spares to be on board were defined for ME and AEs but not for other critical
equipment.
52. Emergency Bilge Suction Valve in E/R was not clearly secured to prevent from
accidental opening in port however rectified during inspection.
Fire Alarm Detector in accommodation and E/R was not identified with IMO signs. The
ORB Part 1 Code H26.4 Lub Oil received was logged in. However rectified during
inspection.
Access door to oxygen cylinders were seized and unable to open
53. M/E #3 cylinder head F.W portable thermometer was defective
54. Other (list) - The earthing cable of the welding machine was permanently fixed to the
engine workshop floor with a nut. There was no crocodile connection to fit it to the work
piece.
55. The funnel door could not be opened from the outside. The ISPS level was 1. A safety
party would not be able to enter the space in case of an emergency.
56. No direct access from the engine room to the steer gear, access was via the
accommodation alleyways and down a ladder.
57. No warning notices were available in engine room about the automatic starting of
machinery
58. Lube oil pumps safety guard was not available
59. There are not test record / parameter test for the N2 generator
60. It was not possible to see the boiler water level in either of the boiler water gauge glasses.
This was corrected before the inspection was completed.
Sheathing cover of main engine high pressure fuel lined joint at the splitter on the
cylinder head were not in place on units 1 and 7, and those on units 2, 3, 4 + 5 were
temporarily held in place by seizing wire. Corrected before completion of inspection.
61. Whilst change over procedures were available for emergency steering, the position of ram
stop/isolating valves were not clearly marked and the means to open and/or close these
valves was not available. Appropriate spanners were located in the steering flat for this
purpose before the inspection was completed.
62. Emergency starting instructions for the emergency generator do not include how to
change over to alternate starting method.
63. The height of the emergency diesel alternator fuel tank vent save-all is such that should it
fill with water, the water level will be above the tank vent outlet, risking water
contamination of fuel tank.
64. Observed acetylene bottle with open valve in storage locker .The line had positive
pressure from storage of cylinders bridge deck to engine work shop
65. There were no flashback arresters fitted at the oxygen and acetylene gas bottles.
66. The diesel oil tank overflow vent on the starboard side and the 2 lubricating oil tank vents
on the port side were not fitted with savealls.
67. Several lights around the superstructure were secured with plastic tie ups.
68. Residue had been recorded in the ORB Part I as being transferred from a generator LO
sludge tank, of capacity of 0.5m3, to the sludge tank, but this generator sludge tank was
not listed on form B of the IOPP Certificate.
69. Power packs hydraulic aggregate pumps were located within the main engine and oil mist
detector was not fitted.
70. Emergency generator room was not marked with an IMO approved symbol
71. No oil mist detector fitted at hydraulic power pack unit for Framo system, which was
located inside engine room (not in segregated compartment)
72. The aggregate pumps are located in the main engine compartment. The pumps are
shielded but the high pressure lines are not. No oil mist detector system fitted.
73. The headsets for the main and sound powered communication system at the engine side
were in poor condition. (ear pieces falling off the frames).
74. Oil Record Book Part 1 - entries of weekly sludge retention did not follow codes 11.1,
11.2 and 11.3.
75. 100V main switch board panel in the engine control room was reading low insulation of
0.1MOhm.

Chief Officer

1. It was observed that enclosed space permits were not being filled correctly. For ballast
tanks the question Has the space been cleaned was answered as Yes even though no
cleaning was done. For enclosed spaces permits in the E.R., all data was entered on the
computer including time of entry and exit.
2. The Fore Peak tank was in contact with Number 1 cargo tank. The tank could not be
easily checked for oil on the surface as manholes with many bolts had to be opened.
3. The ullage tables are new ones issued after the conversion to double hull tank, the tables
are not certified by Class.
4. The vessel is fitted with a semi dry Deck Seal unit. The system does not appear to be
functioning properly. Physical contact with the U tube that is normally empty during
operation was containing water.
5. The fire wire was measured for diameter and found to be 38mm wire, a certificate shown
to the inspector for the 38mm wire mentioned breaking strength as 919kn, far below the
minimum required for a vessel of this size.
6. The bitts in use are of 100 Ts SWL.
7. Each cargo tank was provided with only one unit of full flow pressure / Vacuum vent
valve. Each cargo tank was connected to Inert Gas main line on deck, that was connected
to one unit of P/V Breaker and one unit of P/V breather valve that was connected to mast
riser(connected to inert gas main line). No pressure sensor was fitted on any cargo tank.
8. 8.21 No high temperature alarm was fitted in the CCR only an indication that the pump
had tripped
9. The vessel had an approved Ballast Water Mgt plan. However, the Training log was not
being kept per the requirements. The log was only signed by the Chief Mate and the
current Chief Mate had not yet signed the log.
10. The individual cargo tanks are fitted with full volume Pressure valves and only thermal
variation vacuum valves.
11. Loading computer installed on board and did not have specific or type approval issued by
Class. A letter dated 17 Mar 1999 by NK advised Owners that appraisal certificate of
loading computer is issued if requested by Owner.
12. No record of the test of ballast line that passed though cargo tanks contrary to this
requirement.
13. The vessel has sloshing restrictions.2,4 and 6 the GOM should be <8.99 m and the SG of
the cargo <1000 MT/m3 in view of strengthening for sloshing.
14. The vessel had only one ballast pump. Failure of the pump or drive would require
connecting the ballast system to the cargo system
15. Deck seal water level indicator glass was turned black , water level was unable to see
16. There was no up-to date inventory available for the Draeger gas detection tubes carried
onboard. An up-to date inventory of these tubes was made before the inspectors
departure.
17. In order to visually inspect the ballast in the segregated ballast tanks it would have been
necessary to remove twenty (20) bolts from an inspection plate on each ballast tank.
18. The blanks fitted to No.2 Port side and No.3 starboard side (offshore side) cargo
manifolds were less than half the thickness of the pipe flange to which they were
attached.
19. The conditions for restoring stability in case of unstable conditions developing during
cargo operations were not found on board
20. The liquid level in the deck seal was not visible

21. A number isolating valves on the IG branch line to the cargo tanks were found unsecured.
22. External ropes tails from cargo oil tanks P/V operating levers were take away during
vessel terminal safety inspection
23. The pilotladder was not according the industry's requirement. Seven(7) steps instead of
four() were fitted below the 1st spreader.
24. The current ship/shore safety checklist did not record the agreed emergency signals and
shutting down procedures.
25. The ship is provided with secondary venting system. However, the setting of alarm was
lower than PV Valve than PV V/V Setting ( Primary Venting Means).
26. Cargo Duty Officer not familiar with pressure alarms.
27. The grease container for lubricating fitted with Ballast Pump Shaft was not in sufficient
level.
28. There was no Personal gas Meters on board.
29. There was no evidence that pre-load discharge meeting was held on board with a
personnel conducting cargo operations.
30. Main Steam supply to heating coils were blanked using v.thin (2mm) blank. Connecting
flanges were 25mm.
31. There were no records available for satisfactory completion of shore calibration of
reference pressure gauge.
32. There were no records available for fixed tank pressure gauging equipment calibration
checks.
33. Some of cargo samples were not stored in semi divided cells as required by IBC 16.5
34. Stainless steel P/V Valves heads were painted over.
35. Chief officer indicated that pressure alarms were set at same level as P/V release
suggesting in correct setting. Inspector watched control panel and noticed that tank 1S
alarm went when vacuum reached -3.2 kpa and other tanks reached -4.0 and nothing
happened.
36. When questioned, C/O said samples were disposed while tank washing into the slop tank.
Company procedure was to dispose only to shore facility.
37. The cargo sample record book was not fully completed. The seal numbers, voyage
numbers, type of sample were not recorded. It could therefore not be seen whether the
crew took manifold samples.
38. The Ship / Shore checklist did not include any reference to nitrogen purging, padding or
line displacing from the shore.
39. Observed 2 nos tank cleaning hoses in poor condition / broken
40. No records for inspection of Cofferdam space.
41. The gas free fan room located at mid ship was poorly maintained, stores were not
properly arranged.
42. O/F alarm of COT 2P as defective was activated with tank empty
43. N2 blanketing was carried out by shore for present cargo in 11P; there was not specific
procedure/checklist, precautions observed in case of over pressurization.
44. Cargo tank samples were observed being drawn by cargo surveyors through tank hatch
without any safety precautions
45. A heaving line was not in place for use with the lifebuoy at the gangway.( corrected at the
inspection )
46. A float type of fixed level gauge was fitted in all cargo and slop tanks. The grounding
reference heights were available on the level gauge panel in CCR, but stowage reference
heights were not.
47. Cargo tank lids were not fully secured tank lids had been wound down using strong
back screw but the peripheral dogs on each tank lid had not been tightened e.g. whilst
not leaking, 9P was being loaded at the time, 9S was empty but tank gasket was passing
due to thermal expansion of tank atmosphere. This was corrected immediately when the
situation was pointed out by the inspector.
48. Earthing arrangements for air driven salvage pumps located at end of main deck on both
port and starboard sides was inadequate wiring was loose on connectors and connectors
badly corroded. Port pump had major leak on discharge manifold this was replaced by a
stand-by pump before the inspector departed.
49. Indicator lights on alarm Panel for ballast pumps was indicating high temperature on the
bearing. Inspector observed the ballast pump was not running .
50. The spill pumps provided at the after ends of the cargo area did not have permanent
discharge connections and the discharges were led into a 200 litre drum on each side.
51. Cargo tank N 4 P was loaded with Naphta. It was inerted when it was loaded but internal
pressure of tank was -0.9 kPa.
52. Cargo hoses were stored horizontally on solid supports and they stored in the open, they
should be protected from direct sunlight. (Tanker Safety Guide Chemicals K.6).
53. Bow stopper locking bars were not in place when the vessel was alongside.

54. ODME was indicated at oil record book under item O as not functional due to
discharge valve not operating. Note: due to cargo in slop tank test planned for after
discharge operation
55. 12 nuts had to be removed in order to open hatch of ballast tank for checking water
surface for oil
56. Manifold pressure gauges were not fitted with valves or cocks. Note: According to master
these were ordered.
57. Cargo tanks being entered for sweeping after discharge of vegetable oil had not been
tested for the presence of carbon monoxide. The vessel had no gas monitors or detector
tubes to check for the presence of this gas.
58. Manifold pressure gauges had no cocks or valves fitted.
59. The crew could not visually check the surface of the ballast tanks for contamination prior
to discharge without removing numerous nuts from the tank hatches.
60. SOLAS secondary venting. The Cargo tank pressure monitoring and alarm system was
set to activate prior to the PV valves opening. The system would alarm at 19.4/ -3.4kpa
when the pv valves were set to operate at 20.0 /-3.5kpa.
61. Cargo tanks being entered for sweeping after discharge of vegetable oil had not been
tested for the presence of carbon monoxide. The vessel had no gas monitors or detector
tubes to check for the presence of this gas.
62. 0.55 MPA (5.5 Bar Approx) Pressure on cargo manifold line, port side manifold for no.6
Stbd cargo tank, indicating that the valve was leaking.
63. Ford Fire wire considerably more than 2 meters above the water, this was immediately
rectified.
64. The operator required 6-monthly inspections of Cargo and Ballast tanks. All tanks were
inspected and reported on, early in August 2008 and therefore all tanks were now
due/overdue for inspection at the same time.
65. No. 3S, 4CP and 10 S cargo tank high level alarms were out of order.
66. Three 200 litre drums stowed in the forecastle were not properly secured. Circa 3 cbm
capacity plastic tank for D.I. water in empty status, located at the midships manifold
centre platform, was not satisfactory secured (secured by two loose thin metal strips and
2 bolt and nuts).
67. The ballast pump room entry procedure does not require the checking of the atmosphere.
68. One inch diameter sampling points were fitted to the ballast tanks. More appropriate
sampling would require the removal of a round access cover (fitted with 12 stud bolts and
nuts) or a square cover, fitted with 24 stud bolts and nuts.
69. Ballast pump room entry was limited by only reporting to CCR, there was no procedure
to sample atmospheres prior to enter and no pump room entry log was maintaned on
board.
70. No adapter for calibration of personal multi gas monitor (GX-2001) was carried on board.
71. There was an hydraulic leak on the flow controller of cargo tank 14 port
72. The vacuum valves operated at -3.45kpa, the secondary venting alarm was set -3.8Kpa
(as per OCIMF guidelines 10% below). It was noted that the maximum operating
vacuum in the cargo tanks at the early stage of discharge reached between -4.2 and -
4.4Kpa. At this stage the audible alarm of the secondary alarm had been cancelled, thus
rendering the system defunct.
73. Cargo measurement interface of the loading computer was defective - parts on order. The
loading computer was operational, but not on line.
74. The vessel was loading an acid. Splash guards were not fitted at the manifold connections
and this requirement was not mentioned in the loading plan.
75. Purging records of Framo pumps and system dated 08-Jun-09, record of discharge for
pumps in cargo tank Nos. 6Port to be 03 Ltrs; 1Port, 3Port and 10Port to be 02Ltrs of

FFA

1. Fire training manuals were not ship specific. In process of being updated.
2. Main deck at accommodation port and stbd sides - two foam boxes missing their foam
nozzles, and found replaced with fire hose nozzles.
3. Safety equipment ( especially:EEBD, B.A and Compressor )monthly inspection was
being carried out, and record was maintained in the LSA, but no recorded in the ship's
log-book.
4. 11 out of 15 Breathing Apparatus Cylinders and LB Air Cylinders were last pressure
tested (hydrostatic) in October 2003, more than 5 years ago.
5. One main isolation valve tel-tail broken and did not indicate the open or closed position.
6. Main deck at accommodation port and stbd sides two foam boxes missing their foam
nozzles, and found replaced with fire hose nozzles.
7. The fire detection system did not cover the pump room and Forecastle space.
The system was reported fully operational all detectors active and test records were
sighted.
8. The fire detection system did not cover the pumproom and Forecastle space. The system
was reported fully operational all detectors active and test records were sighted.
9. A Safety Equipment Plan is not currently posted within the accommodation house.
10. The door to the forecastle store, which contained a firemans outfit was padlocked,
therefore the it might not be ready for immediate use.(Ref SOLAS II-2/14.2.1.2)
11. A foam isolation valve located on main deck was noted to be in fully closed position.
This was rectified immediately
12. Portable fire extinguisher was not stowed near entrance of forecastle store space
13. Deck Fire Main pipelines had scattered rust scales, mainly on the underside of the pipe.
14. Foam sample from fixed fire fighting system was analyzed on 04 June 2007 and the resits
did not comply with the manufactures specifications.
15. To update to ship specified fire training manuals which were received on 28.0707
16. Last annual control of foam concentration as required by MSC/Cir798/5.1 was on
04.06.07
17. No annual inspection of the air quality of breathing apparatus air recharging systems as
required by MSC/Cir.850.
18. No large axe and red emergency signal/torch as required by Guide to helicopter/ship
operation 6.1.1.
19. Foam Analysis report dated 4 June 2007, did not comply with manufacturers
specification.
20. No large axe and red emergency signal as required by guide to helicopter/ship operations
6.1.1
21. No annual air quality check for breathing apparatus air charging system contrary to
MSC/Circ 850.
22. To update the ship specific fire fighting manuals just received on 28.07.2007
23. Foam valves in the vicinity of 7C were leaking water on to the deck. Valves were in the
closed position. Caps were tightened to stop the leakage.
24. Fire main line IWO 6ws about 10 m had rust on it.
25. The low air pressure audible alarm for the Breathing Apparatus set located in the
wheelhouse was not operational when tested during this inspection. This alarm/regulator
unit was replaced with a functioning spare before the inspectors departure.
26. One HALON bottle with serial number-214, fitted to the fixed fire extinguishing system
in the Halon room, designated for Engine room was empty.
27. The main Framo hydraulic aggregate system was located inside the forecastle, the spaces
was not covered by any fix fire detection system.
28. There was no International Shore Connection available externally. The ICS was located
inside the accommodation on the PS next to the CCR as per safety plan
29. The room containing the foam system and the adjacent safety room containing the hyper
mist fire fighting system and quick closing valves and CO2 activation point were not
marked with their IMO luminescent symbols.
30. The SOLAS Training Manual for LSA was not ship specific and FSS does not include
gas freeing procedures.
31. Fire control plans were not available in the official language of the flag state
32. Fire detection system did not cover the paint locker or forecastle space, which contained
the main hydraulic aggregates.
33. Fire detection system did not cover the forecastle space, which contained the main
hydraulic aggregates.
34. Although the equipment was in good condition the fireman's outfits were located in
single units in the stairwell of each deck. It is recommended the the firemans outfits be
located in pairs and widely seperate locations.
35. Blue Mandatory signs for use of protective clothing were not posted at chemical store.
36. One of the two BA sets for fireman outfit tested was only with 120kg pressure.
37. Any means of fire fighting system was not provided on the sample lockers where was
defined as flammable liquid locker.
38. The three sets of chemical personnel protection safety equipment housed in the starboard
poop deck safety locker were incomplete only 2 fire lines and one BA set were
available. This was corrected before the end of the inspection.
39. The international shore fire connection was kept inside the accommodation and after the
vessel was informed that it should be readily available externally, this item was rectified
40. One of the vessels junior engineer officer was unable to demonstrate release of foam fire
fighting system for deck.

LSA

Solas Training manual was not fully ship specific. In process of being updated.
LIfeboat and liferaft launching instructions do not use IMO symbols.
Forward six man liferaft first aid kits expired 04.2008.
Stbd outer aft liferaft ID container cover missing.
Main deck lifebuoy lights not marked as being intrinsically safe. One set (forward main
deck) casing cover cracked.
Self igniting lights for lifebuoys on deck were not of Intrinsically safe type.
Davit posts for fixed lights for forward liferaft on main deck on both sides were found
seized and could not be turned to project outboard.
5.51 The vessel was fitted with two 16 man life rafts on each side of the ship. Both were
fitted with individual weak links and hydrostatic release units. The Present arrangements
had once raft mounted slightly on top of the other with the full weight of the raft resting
on the lower raft. Thus if the upper rafts hydro release unit failed to function the lower rat
would not come out of the rack and both rafts would be lost with the ship.
The life raft launching equipment was ceased.
The life saving appliances were marked with IMO symbols; there was a fire extinguisher
in the pumproom not marked with international symbol.
The lifeboat limits switch housings were becoming detached from the davit frames due to
corrosion.
One of the life saving appliances plans was not in the colours recommended by IMO.
As per Certificate, EPIRB last annual test was carried out on 05 February 2006. more
than 12 months and the release unit expiry was February 2007.
 Port Lifeboat embarkation ladder side ropes were frayed and fastening eyes were broken
The four inflatable liferafts onboard had been serviced ashore at Fire Protection Services
(USA) on 14 December 2006 and Certificates of Inspection provided to the vessel. The
Certificates for all four liferafts listed the food rations with an expiration date of July
2006; the Parachute Rockets had an expiration date of February 2006, Hand Flares
expiration November 2006 and the Buoyant smoke signals expiration December 2006. A
delivery ticket supplied together with these Certificates indicated that these items had
been replaced, however there was no confirmation of this on the Certificates of
Inspection.
The EPIRB was not marked with the vessels name. This was rectified before the
inspectors departure.
The channel indicating plate on one of the survival craft radius was loose
The manoverboard lifebuoys attached to the self-activating lights/moke signals were
underweight.
Life rafts were landed for annual service during the inspection.
The rescue boat did not meet the requirements, regarding the following:-
-Not larger enough to hold 5 persons and 1 strecther.
-Seating was provided on the inflatable sides.
-The protection cover was not adequate.
Lifeboat and Life raft operating instructions were posted but could not be seen under
emergency lighting conditions.
The davit launched liferafts on the port side have been replaced by throw overboard type.
This does not comply with SOLAS Ch III Reg 31.1.2 which required the rafts on both
side to be provided with launching appliances.
Two self activating smoke signal connected to MOB on bridge wings were not secured to
hull.
The life boat gripes were made of plastic sheathed wire. There was evidence of
breakdown of the sheathing and the ingress of water resulting in rusting of the wire core

Maintenance

1. PMS is not class approved.

2. No inspection/test records for wire slings in use: wire slings in ER noted to be hand
spliced.
3. A number of the Dressler couplings on the deck piping systems were not greased so
as to facilitate flexing in a sea way.
4. Vessel did not have a class approved Planned Maintenance System on board. Vessel
had a computerized programme covering the whole ship.
5. Computerised PMS system (Shipsure) was in use but was not approved by Class for
ship specific application. Top overhaul of No. 1 Generator was overdue by about
 2500 hours (interval 5000 hours) and exhaust valves of 5 units of main engine were
overdue by 3000 hours (interval 4000 hours), reportedly due to lack of opportunity.
6. Widespread spot corrosion was noted on starboard side main deck aft of manifold and
seawater spray experienced during the laden passage to Singapore resulted in severe
rust staining on deck affecting the cosmetic appearance in that area.
7. Corrosion was observed on the IG line, COW washing and some deck lines.
8. No Inspection/test records for wire slings in use. Wire splice in engine room noted to
be hand spliced.
9. There was no record of the cargo tanks being inspected since May 2004.
10. No record of the cargo heating system being pressure tested recently.
11. There was no record of the cargo tanks being inspected since May 2004. All ballast
tanks inspected by ships staff 6 monthly basis last inspection Nov 2006 reported
WBT as GOOD. COT coated top and bottom slop tanks were fully coated. WBT fully
coated with fitted anodes.
12. There was a policy for the inspection of other lifting equipment, however, there were
several chain falls in the engine room and in the port midship deck house that had
safety clasps broken or missing.
13. The other lifting equipment (chain falls and nylon straps) are not periodically tested
nor routinely inspected.
14. Individual lifting equipment is not identified. Maintenance and inspection program is
not currently developed. The PPM system has only one general line item and
guidance for the inspection of all engine room lifting equipment.
15. The most of the clamps holding the topmast air supply line to the mast were missing.
16. Several expansion pieces studs of electric conduit on main deck noted to be corroded
and thinned down. Some ladder steps and a winch platform step found to be corroded/
holed.
17. Port accommodation deck foam monitor was noted to be leaking with valve in closed
position.
18. Several studs in expansion pieces on COW line noted to be thinned down.
Some U bolt clamps on Marpol line and bunker line appeared thinned down
19. On port poop deck steel plates were lashed to hand rails.
20. Port lifeboat embarkation ladder side ropes were frayed and the fastening eyes were
broken.
21. COW pipeline had scattered rust scales, mainly on the underside of the pipe.
22. COW pipeline, Diesel Oil pipeline and Deck Fire Main pipeline had scattered hard
rust scales, mainly on the underside of the pipe.
23. The following deck opening corroded and wastage on sides (a) On poop deck for used
of taking provision to steering gear room, (b) 1 deck above main deck between
accommodation block and funnel for engine room.
24. On Port Poop deck steel plates were lashed to hand rails
25. COW line, DO, FO & Deck Fire Water Line had scattered rust scales mainly on the
underside.
26. The following opening on poop-deck wastage on sides a) For provision to steering
gear room, b) To engine room(skylight)

27. Grooved on fairleads about 3cms deep.

a)Port quarter main deck , 2 fairleads

b) Starboard quarter, main deck, 1 fairlead.

c)Poop deck starboard side , 4 fairleads

28. While for the most part free of rust, the decks were discoloured by dark staining,
reported to be from sand blast grit from the ship yard.

29. Accommodation ladder had wastage in the aluminum in some areas were steel fittings
were attached due to electrolytic action caused by lack of insulation

30. Hydraulic pipe support IWO 6ws to forward of pump room was completely worn out.

31. Wire mesh of vent head for diesel oil tank was worn out

32. Electrical conduit pipe junction box cover IWO 6ws was badly rusted.

33. There was a banded repair on the freshwater generator ejector pipework

34. There was a welded patch on the inert gas scrubber supply line engine room lower
level.

35. Some deck fittings were wasted from corrosion or damaged from wear and tear e.g.
Cable supports, topmast signal light supports, radar waveguide clamps and the operator
platform on the forward main deck mooring winch.

36. There was debris and old discarded gaskets laying on the fore and aft stringers and
some rags boled on the tank tops. The standard of housekeeping was not satisfactory.

37. The aft engine room bilge was observed to contain oil and the port bilge well in the
steering compartment contained remains of fabric waste.

38. The brackers for the light fitting located above the provision A ventilator was
corroded and broken.

39. On visual sighting of Fore peak tank and 5 wing ballast tanks, found that the edges of
the access trunks, face plates on the brackets were rusted and thinned down

40. Vessels weather deck had scattered spot rusts all over the deck, in general.

Note: Maintenance was in progress.

 41. Service pipe works on the main deck- Cargo, COW, Conduit and water pipes were
lightly pitted at places.

42. Edges of 4 light fitting 2 on main deck and 2 at funnel deck aft were corroded and
wasted.

43. Records not maintained for inspection of wire slings.

44. Sewage line located on 3rd platform was temporarily repaired with rubber hose and
clamps from two different locations.

45. Poop Deck and funnel deck were affected by isolated rust patches.

46. Several lengths of service pipe lines on main deck were affected by general and
moderate corrosion.

47. Main deck and weather decks were spot rusted.

48. Piping on main deck, such as cargo lines, I.G. lines, cow lines, fire lines, etc, were
spot rusted.

49. There was no maintenance job in the PMS for checking the non-return valve of the
cargo gas-freeing fan. This job was created in the electronic PMS when the observation
was issued.

50. There was numerous cans of paint stored inside the forecastle store but outside the
paint locker, therefore these cans were not protected with a fire fighting system.

51.The bottom rung of the starboard accommodation ladder was damaged

52.There was a electrical cable in the ballast pump room, adjecant to No. 2 (Starboard)
ballast pump, which was left with bare ends.

53. There were 2 small vents on the port side which were not marked.

54. One light fitting in purifier room was found with cracked glass, corrected by the crew

55. Areas with pitting corrosion were observed on the ladders step, cat walk
construction arid deck longitudinal There were evidences of on gong maintenance. Areas
with pitting corrosion were observed on the ladders step, cat walk construction
56. Area with pitting corrosion were observed on compass deck
57. One of the pilot ladders had synthetic ropes.
58. Cable conduit IWO cargo oil tank No: 8 Starboard was heavily corroded.

59. Cargo heating pipelines Some of the cargo tanks heating pipe lines (thermal oil line)
on deck were found heavily corroded.
 60. The lifeline in bow thruster space and engine room escape were made of synthetic
rope instead of manila

61. Sea water pipe for lub-oil cooler of aaprox OD-200mm was holed and repaired with
devcon putty.

62. The marked areas on main and poop deck were not painted with anti-slip paint.

Master

Work-rest:

How to avoid observations on W-R periods:-

1. The W-R records must be checked by the HOD without fail. Junior officers and/or cadets must
not be given this responsibility.

2. Consider timings for the followings: Drills, Trainings, Safety Meeting, Compliance with
Bridge Watch Level(Maneuvering, anchoring, berthing, un-berthing & shifting), Critical cargo
operations(C/O must be in CCR Start, stop, stripping, topping-off, change-over tanks, etc),
Survey, inspections, audits, bunkering, picking up stores, etc

3. Keep drills, safety meeting & training within normal working hours(0800-1700 Hrs)

4. Decide whether you want to show launch break as rest or work to best suit company policy

5. The bilge and slops discharge operations must be attended with a senior officer

6. Although some non-compliance are allowed by ILO-180, its always the best to avoid showing
non-compliance when you can do it easily. Even an allowed-non-compliance may remind the
inspector to dig through further to find more whereas he might as well have not looked for non-
compliance otherwise.

7. Record all required columns as per ILO requirements.

SMS:

Do Masters review of the SMS at the frequency mentioned in SMS. Ensure company sends
response with suggestions / remarks. An email acknowledgement from office is not sufficient.
Ensure unannounced Drug & Alcohol Test is done within the prescribed duration, as mentioned
in SMS.

Audit, Inspections, Survey

The SMS Internal Audit must not be over due. If overdue, an extension letter (email from office)
must be available on board. Also, the procedures of extension must be mentioned in SMS. An
extension letter without procedures for extension in SMS is useless. All the NCs and
Observations must be closed with relevant evidence attached to each NC/Obs. If computer based
program is available for closure, proper evidence must be available to show to the inspector. If an
NC/Obs was closed after the due date, an evidence of extension approval by company must be
available on board.

Ensure DD is done within time frame of class. A 5-yearly DD cant be substituted by IWS.

ESP File: Ensure all the reports (CD-Rom or Hard Copy) such as Executive Hull Summary, Hull
Survey Records, Thickness Measurement Reports, Summary of Repairs, Renewals and
Alterations, Longitudinal Strength of Hull Girder, etc are maintained as per the Index of the ESP
File.

CSR: Make sure all the forms (1 to 3) are available. The information in form-2 must match with
the information mentioned in various ship certificates. Any changes(example change of
technical management) since the last CSR must reflect in form-2. Form-3 must be updated.

Latest HVPQ must be on board.

Near misses, accidents and incident reports: Usually 4 near miss reports(2 deck, 2 engine) as
minimum per month should be available in the file . All near miss, accident and incident
reports must be closed out with office remarks. The reference of these reports (new or closed)
should be mentioned in the safety meeting reports to explain that these occurrences were
discussed with all crew aboard. An email confirmation of only acknowledge receipt by office
is not sufficient.

1. Enclosed Space Entry: Usually, one entry permit for one enclosed space. If company
Policy states about Tag System with multiple tank entries in a single permit, the
procedures could be followed to reduce paper works.
2. Risk Assessment File: Usually, vessel should not use the generic ones directly. A new R/A
should be prepared for the required operations. A R/A for a regular operation (say tank
cleaning) may be renewed provided that proper records and amendments to the existing
R/A are done properly as per company policy. Its expected to have in the file the R/As
for the following operations as minimum: Loading, Discharging, Tank Cleaning,
Mooring, Unmooring, STS, Working Aloft, Working Overside, Lifeboat Launching, etc.
3. SOPEP, SMPEP & VRP: These plans should be classed approved(original stamp) and on
board. Appendix B Vessel Specific information was missing from the VRP.
4. Other Plans: Make sure that the original class approved copies of ODMCS Manual, IGS
Manual, COW Manual, Stability Booklet, Vapor Recovery Procedures Manual, Garbage
Manual, BWM Manual, SEEMP Manual, General Arrangements Plan, Shell Expansion
Plan, loadicator, etc are available in masters office for quick reference.
5. Safety Meeting: It should preferably be filled out by master himself. Office response
must be available on board. An email confirmation of only acknowledge receipt by office
is not sufficient.
6. Deviation card: Valid for 2 years. Must be done by a certified compass adjuster. Original
copy must be on board. The deviation in card must match closely with calculated
deviations in compass error record book. A copy of the deviation card should be kept
inside the compass error record book.
7. Designated Safety Officer: He should possess a certificate of Safety Officer Course. His
designation should be mentioned in OLB and displayed in various locations on board.

27. ORB: The old copies should be kept on board for at least 3 years.

28.

29. Tank Inspection Records: To have records of inspection at the specified duration as per
company policy for the spaces: Cargo tanks, ballast tanks, fresh water tanks, tank cleaning
fresh water tanks, duct keel, void spaces, cofferdams, etc.

30. Aircon: Accommodation AC should be run on partial re-circulation when vessel is

handling flammable and toxic cargo. This is also required even if the vessel is handling non-
flammable and non-toxic cargoes in a terminal where other vessels are handling F & T
cargoes or terminal has F & T atmosphere. Positive pressure is to be maintained inside
accommodation. This can be checked with the help of small pieces of papers while opening
a door accommodation. If there is negative pressure inside accommodation, a draft of air will
flow from outside to inside as soon as the door is opened and the papers will be flying as a
result. An inspector usually checks it while entering accommodation. Usually all natural
vents are kept shut during handling of F & T cargoes. However, mechanical vents for galley
and toilets needs to be kept open.

31. Stability & Coating Restriction: Refer to trim & stability booklet to check whether the
vessel has restriction for density(DSG), sloshing, filling limit, GoM, etc. Refer to coating
manual to check whether the vessel has any coating restrictions

31. UMS Vessel: Vessel was classed as UMS but due to trade(Lightering Vessel)it was run as
manned.

32. Class Memo & Recommendations: Vessel should be free from class memoranda and
recommendations unless there are specific reasons to explain.
33. Bridge Telegraph printer: If its not operational, the movements should be recorded in
movement book.

34. Incinerator Ash: Disposal of incinerator ash should be recorded in garbage/ORB.

38. Loading computer: It should be class approved. There should be a back up CPU for
loadicator. The loading computer should be independent and not connected to other
networks. Vessel should have on board a record of class approved loadicator test condition
taken during last annual.

39. PMS : It should be class approved. Type approval is not sufficient. There should be no
overdue jobs.

42. Garbage Record Book: The garbage Record book should not be consisted with loose leaf
numbered pages in a ring binder.

43. P/B Breaker: The IG liquid P-V Breaker gauge glass lower isolating valve was not of the
self closing type and had been left in the open position.

44. Safe Manning: The vessel did not carry sufficient engine crew to properly man the engine
room given her present operations in the lightering trade.

45. Advanced OT/CT Course: Not all junior deck officers had Advanced Oil Tanker
Training courses and had to be supervised on cargo watch

46. PSC Observations: These should be regarded as NC and must be closed out within the
time frame.

47. Coastal states contact list: Vessel should have an updated copy. These are updated on 31st
March, 30th June, 30th September and 31st December every year.

48. Correction fluid: Its not allowed to use correction fluid (white ink) in log books to
correct any log book entries.

9. Publications: Vessel to have updated publications on board.

51. Entries in ORB: Responsible engineers should sign the entries for operations conducted
by them.
53. Antifouling Certificate: Usually issued at every scheduled DD and to be available on
board.
55. Hydraulic Motor in Forecastle store: If its fitted for forward mooring system should be
provided with pumping arrangement.

57. The International Medical Guide for Ship's 3rd edition was not available on board
60. MF Flanges: The steel blank flanges attached to the off-shore cargo manifolds should be of
the same thickness of the MF flanges.

63. IGS: Vessel was not provided with publication Inert Gas systems Although Vessel's DWT
was less than 20000 Tons, vessel was fitted with a nitrogen production plant, complying with IG
requirements.

65. Cargo MF: The manifolds were served by a crane of 5 tonnes SWL only. This was not in line
with the recommendation in publication : OCIMF Recommendations for Oil tanker Manifolds
and Associated Equipment.

66. ORB: The Panamanian ORB part I was provided with an additional part III Annex VI section
to be used when operating the boiler and the incinerator that have been not applied when using it
almost daily.

67. Familiarization C/list for cargo operations: There was no check list available for the
familiarization of the officers on cargo equipment

68. The ship is type II and II Chemical Tanker carrying Toxic Cargo as per COF. However, the Safety
Equipment available on board was not fully gas tight.
69. There was no company emergency procedures for fire in engine room.

70. There were no records available to show that the level gauges from the cargo tanks had been
calibrated within the last twelve months. The last date was 22/AUG/2007. There was a checklist,
but it was only showing a comparison against the
MMC.

71. There were no records for the calibration of the portable manometers that were used at the
manifold. There was a PMS job stating that all was checked and found in order, but the
manometers were not individually numbered and listed and no individual errors/corrections were
recorded.
72. C/O was new in rank. Master and C/O combined experience 2 years in rank. Chemical
experience level of the deck officers was limited to 1 year.
73. The operator's instructions for for nitorgen purging (3.5.23) were not specific they did not
clear instruction regarding pressures and venting procedures.
74. The chemical sample locker was too small for the samples to be adequately divided.

75. The designated Safety Officer (Chief Officer) had not completed a formal Shipboard Safety
Officers' training course. Note: The Chief Officer was in the process of completing an onboard
Videotel CBT course for Safety Officers. At the time of the inspection he had completed ten of
the fourteen modules.

76. The cargo sample lockers were located on the catwalk above the main deck. The lockers
were somewhat small. Part of the lockers had stainless steel divisions. Due to the large size of the
divisions, the small size of the lockers and the large number of samples involved, it was not
possible to divide the bottles in most cases.
77. Master was not aware of the company's guidelines for his responsibilities for salvage / form
to be used

78. No resistance list available for the 5 pcs cargo hoses in use on board

79. Reference pressure & reference Temperature gauge was available, however there was no
certificate available for last shore calibration

80. Port & stbd manifold are about 1.25 mtrs height and are not protected by an appropriate
handrails

81. Most of the officers are first time with the operator. The Chief Engineer / Second Engineer
joined together, after the previous C/E & 2/E refused to sail / transit in Somali waters

82. Evidence of energy conservation training for all crew was not sighted.

83. The vessel was not provided the Clean Ballast Tanks, but IOPP certificate, Form B, 7.2.1 was
ticked. Also, the vessel was provided with SMPEP, but 8.1 SOPEP was ticked insteand of 8.2
SMPEP.

84. Records of hours of work for most crew were revealed that it was recorded mostly in fixed
time frame even berthing / unberthing operation was taken placed. Any mooring or over time
works were not correctly reflected.

85. Electronic Chart Display System - An ECDIS which was approved by Class Society was
provided, but system was not updated within last 1 year. Last version of update program was C-
Map, Version 305, Week 25, June 2007. Update contract was expired in May 2008, and no
renewal agreement was available on board.

86. The output power in operational range of the AIS was 2 to 12.5 Watt and both of them were
over 1 Watt.

87. The Procedures and Arrangement manual revealed that the ventilation procedures does not
apply for the vessel, but Cargo Record Book, Code 'E', 15.3 was recorded most of time after tank
cleaning operation.

88. The operator, having only taken over the vessel 3 days before the inspection has yet to
implement their planned maintenance system on board and maintenance requirements for the
following could not be identified within the operators

89. The chemical fitness certificate allowed the vessel to carry benzene and associated
chemicals; benzene solidifies at 42 degrees F and occasionally requires heating. The vessel had a
simple system of steam heating with coils in the cargo tanks; a leak in a coil in a loaded tank
would involve benzene being carried to the engine room in the steam returns and ending up in
the cascade tank which was open to the atmosphere; the result would be a toxic atmosphere in
the engine room. The notes with the Certificate of Fitness made no mention of this potential
problem.

90. The vessel has one outstanding recommendation from class .

Starboard side shell plating G1-2 in way of engine room(workshop) between frame 21-22 about
3.5 mtrs below the upper deck was dented and to be permanently repaired at the next dry docking
,due date 06th June 2008

91. It was not possible to enter the paint locker on starboard side under the forecastle .The
atmosphere in the paint locker was observed with gas from Paint or other (thinner) .The paint
locker was not fitted with a mechanical ventilation.

92. The vessel had 5 "U" shaped and 4 "J" shaped ballast tanks, however under the worst case
condition the vessel did not meet the IMO intact stability conditions as the GM was not
acceptable. There were procedures clearly posted in the cargo control room to minimise this
effect.

93. There was no external means of operating the ballast pump room bilge system.

94. The vessel was certified for unmanned operations but had been operating with a manned
engine room due to a problem with the motor for the burner on 1 of the thermal oil boilers. A
new motor had been fitted at this port and the boiler was now working properly.

95. Readable plans showing the location of cargo measurement instruments were not available; it
was corrected by the Chief Officer before completion of the inspection.

96. Records indicating satisfactory completion of shore calibration checks of reference

thermometer within the last 12 months were not available

97. Records indicating satisfactory completion of shore calibration checks of reference pressure
gauge within the last 12 months were not available

98. Enclosed Space Entry Permits to enter various cargo tank and water ballast tanks were issued
in October & November 2008 but there was no evidence of carrying out Risk Assessment
required by ISGOTT 9.2.1

99. Vessel was fitted with Nitrogen generator but had one tank scope onboard.

100. Fire wires were of steel but had 6X37 Construction.

101. Only a photo copy of the 2nd Engineers Flag State Endorsement was on board and
it was noted that this was dated 16 June 2009, some 5 months previous.

102. One deck Mate was unable to describe the deployment procedure for the ETA even though
he had been on board for some 4 months.
103. A number of enclosed entry permits covering multiple cargo tanks did not mention the
cargo tanks to enter under the 'Spaces' column and no information had been entered under the
Clearance (work stopped and personnel withdrawn)' column on the front of the permit.

104. The sample lockers that contain sulphuric and phosphoric acid samples had only wooden
cellular divisions.

105. The Framo aggregates were located within the space, but this area was not protected by an
oil mist detector.

106. Master was not aware of any Change Management process and no related forms could be
found in the file.
107. There was only one instrument provided, which could measure % vol HC in Inert gas

108. Total 12 cargo tanks over fill alarm were on position as there were loaded more than % 98
volume.

109. The sea was classed for UMS but was not operating UMS.

110. When questioned, the master was not aware of the worst damage condition in the stability
book

111. It was reported by the Master that all Indian & Bangladesh officers who employed by the
manager were supposed to be done chemical specific medical checks & blood tests after
disembarkation, but there was no written procedure regarding the test. Myanmar crew who
employed by the owner were unable to clarify whether they would be attended such test after
disembarkation.

112. The records of the hours of rest records did not not have the 2columns headed Hours of
work and rest in any given 24hr period and Hours of work and rest in any given 7-day period
calculated.

113. Oiler Ye Lwin does not have ER watch Keeping endorsement.

114. Methanol tanks were cleaned for the next cargo by Gas freeing fan. Not permitted by P & A.
manual.

115. Gas oil washings were stored in 11P COT. Not a designated Slop tank for Annex I.

116. The Master and Chief Officer had not attended Ship Handling Courses.They both had
certificates issued by the Technical Operator for a two day Refresher Course covering Ship
Manoeuvring (Large Vessel, single unit propulsion), Bridge Team & Resource Management,
Passage Planning & Ship Manoeuvring and ECDIS.
117. According to the SMS, internal audits are carried out every 12 months. As the vessel was
delivered on 25 October 2007, the first internal audit had not been carried out yet (info).

118. The ratings are not necessarily rotated on vessels of similar class within the fleet managed
by the Technical Operator.

119. To the safety committee, environmental committee and management meeting minutes sent
from the vessel, the company feedback did not address solutions or suggestions to specific items.

120. Vessels tank cleaning procedure manual did not have IMO MSC.2/Circ 12, incorporated in
it; neither the vessel had same elsewhere

121. Vessels SMS stated AIS to be switched to 1W when in port whereas ISGOTT requires AIS
to be switched off or kept on a dummy load.

122. Stand-by pump discharge hose did not have any fixed connection to the designated
receptacles (drums). This could cause free fall of liquid and create a static electrical hazard

123. The space between the manifold grating bars had too much space between them and
walking and standing on them was very inconvenient and dangerous.

Mooring

1. The hydraulic system for the mooring winches was located in the forecastle store. but
there was no pollution prevention warning nor effective securing measures were provided
in the vicinity of the ejector overboard valve for this space. It was rectified prior inspector
departure.
2. Mooring winches were not marked for rendering capacity.
3. Vessel has both Tonsborg and Mandal shackles; about 30% of the winch wires have been
connected wrongly to the tails.
4. Three mooring wires on drums - (1) Poop stbd outer; (2) Poop port inner; (3) Stbd
forward main deck fwd are in poor condition with excessive number of broken wires
within the strands, particularly in the area of the eye splice. About half of the mooring
wire tails noted frayed and in poor condition. At least eight mooring wires are dated as
being installed in 1995
5. Bow stoppers and feaf man fairlead rollers not permanently marked with SWL. Mooring
wire tails were in use for more than 18 months (some of the mooring tails were in use
since year 2004).
6. Bow chain stoppers, associated foundation and supporting structure were not surveyed
within last 5 years. Bow stoppers were not marked with Certificates serial numbers.
7. No preventive measures (locking arrangement) were provided for accidental release of
bitter ends and bitter ends were placed inside the boxes hence not readily visible (without
opening box covers which secured with butterfly nuts).
8. The vessel was fitted with all open fairleads located at the focsle (with the exception of
the closed chocks for use at SBMs) and the poop deck with no mechanical means
provided across the rollers to prevent the ropes from coming off which was not suitable
for ship-to-ship transfer operations.
9. The vessels Brake Holding Capacity test certificate dated 29 August 2007 shows no
record of the rendering loads of any of the winches.
10. All mooring tail ropes were not replaced, accordingly they has been used over 18 months
continually, and last replaced on 24 Dec. 2007.
11. The vessels mooring wire tails had been in service more than 18 months.
12. Mooring winch clutch handles had many of the safety pins left out of position.
13. Brake drums rusty and heavy rust scaling on some mooring winches brake drums.
14. The ETA was not pre-rigged with wire pennant, pick-up rope and light and ready for
deployment.
15. Vessel has both Tonsberg and mandal shackles in use, about 30% of the connecting
shackles have been incorrectly attached to the wires and tails.
16. Three mooring wires on drums (1) Poop stbd outer; (2) Poop port timer; (3) Stbd
forward main deck fwd are in poor condition with excessive number of broken wires
within the strands, particularly in the area of the eye splices. Four other mooring wires
very rusty, but with no other apparent external damage.
Ships maintenance records indicate 11 mooring wires are overdue for renewal, having
been last renewed in January 1995, i.e. on winch drums numbers 5, 7, 8 and 13 20
inclusive.
About half of the mooring wire tails noted as being frayed and in poor or very poor
condition. Replacement periods for 19 of the 20 mooring wire tails exceed OCIMF
guidelines. Replacement dates: 3 in Jan 2003; 12 in Jan/Mar 2004; 4 in Aug 2004; and 1
in Feb 2006.
17. Bow stoppers and dead man fairlead rollers not permanently marked with SWL.
18. Both fire wire were of MBL 919 KN (94 ton ) which is less than 100 Ton.
19. BOW & Poop deck fairlead rollers were open type not closed.
20. Leaking hydraulic oil at hydraulic motor of aft starboard mooring winch no.7.
21. At aft mooring deck 5 pieces deck lighting without protection cages.
22. The safe working load for the deck pad eye around the manifold was not marked with
bead weld.
23. There was a temporary repair on the starboard anchor wash pipe in the forecastle
compartment.
24. The open mooring rollers fitted at forward and aft were not suitable for ship-to-ship
mooring. There was insufficient closed fairlead provided for head and stern lines for ship-
to-ship mooring
25. Records of the brake holding test for mooring winches shown that the rendering values
for some of the mooring winches were less than 60% MBL of mooring wires.
26. 9.22 The vessel starboard anchor chain appears to have a twist in it and the locking bar
cannot be set completely down in order to install the pin.
27. The vessel was conducting winch brake tests as required. However, the winch was single
drum with the calculations based on a single layer. During normal operations there were
multiple layers which would effect the test set point.
28. The mooring fittings SWL was punched it did not have any bead welded.
29. The stbd anchor was home but the locking bar was on a vertical link.
30. An SBM pick line had to be led round 2 roller leads, with right angles, to the stowage
drum.
31. The Aft ETA main tow wire had corrosion and broken strands on the eye and electrolytic
corrosion between the wire and the galvanized mechanical splice.
32. There were 12 bandit clip repairs in the hydraulic piping located just abaft the windlasses.
The air line had 2 bandit clip repairs.
33. The vessel conducted annual mooring winch brakes tests; however, the vessel was fitted
with single drum winches. The formula used for the BHC test on 16 May 2006 did not
take into account multiple layers of wire in the winch drum.
34. The vessel is outfitted with wire chaffing pendents for use during STS operations. The
wire tails are rated for 38 m/t while the mooring winches are set to render at 45 m/t.
35. The last mooring winch brake test was conducted based on calculation for one wire layer
on the full drum. During STS and normal mooring operations there are approximately 3
to 5 layers (depending on the lead, spring vs. heat or stern) remaining on the full drum,
reducing the holding capacity by approximately 30-40%.
36. The SWL is currently painted on the mooring bitts and chocks (weld bead outlines are
recommended)
37. According to the report of the mooring which brake test carried out on 13 September
2007 the mooring winch brakes rendered at 45 tonnes .which was less than 60% of the
minimum breaking load (MBL) of the mooring wires recorded as being 85 tonnes >(ref
Moorning Equipment Guidelines Ch 7.5.6).
38. Eight out of sixteen nylon mooring tails were in service since Aug 2006 and had not been
renewed within 18 months' as per OCIMF recommendation.
39. Aft spring mooring winches brake linings appeared thinned down at end section.
40. Loose mooring ropes /tug ropes were of polypropylene materials.
41. Mooring wire fitted on port poop deck centre mooring winch was damaged at the eye.
42. Mooring fittings SWL were not marked by bead weld.
43. Anchor bitter end release was provided inside the chain lockers

44. There were grooved on the following fairleads of about 3cm deep:-

a) Main deck, port quarter 2 fairleads

b) Main deck starboard quarter, 1 fairlead

c) Poop deck, starboard side, 4 fairleads.

45. Bitter end securing arrangement not outside chain locker.

46. Loose/Tug mooring ropes were of Polypropylene material.

47. Port Poop deck centre winch wire was damaged at eye.

48. Anchor bitter end release was within the chain lockers.

49. Mooring Equipment SWL was not Bead Welded.

50. Bitter end securing arrangement not outside the chain locker.

51. Mooring winches do not have split drums.

52. According to the report of the mooring winch brake test carried out on 25 th March
2008 , the brakes rendered at 39.9 to 40.6 tonnes which was 47-48% of the MBL of the
wire moorings.

53. The brake lining for the port aft mooring winch was worn

54. Mooring fitting, closed Panama chocks on the poop deck and on the fore castle deck,
had grooving in them of approx 8~10mm deep.

55. Mooring rope lead from the SPM bow stopper on the forecastle deck, to the stowing
winch drum was through two pedestal rollers between them, with a lead forming an acute
angle.

56. A pick-up mooring rope at an SPM could be led to the storage drum of a mooring
winch through two pedestrian fairleads and this arrangement was involving in an acute
angle of lead.

57. Pick up hawser was led to the warping drum after passing through 2 Pedestal roller.

58. Chain stopper was not leading directly to winch drum. Two pedestal rollers required
to be used in order to reach the winch storage drum.

59. There was BHC test conducted. However, no rendering test record of mooring winch
was sighted.

60. The lead for one of the stern rope was not satisfactory, it had been lead outboard
between a ship side roller lead and the roller leads boundary rope guard When the
mooring rope was turned up around a set of mooring bitts, its rope was observed to be
chaffing against the rope guard and could result in the rope being weakened or damaged

61. One mooring rope on the poop deck had been left flaked untidily under the drum end
of a mooring winch, this was a tripping hazard and after being brought to the ships
attention, this item was immediately rectified

62. There was a policy for testing the mooring winch brakes. They were tested annually.
The brake were hardened up to a pre-determined mark. The mooring winches had no
 split drum.There was no apparent procedures in place to ensure the brakes were
satisfactorily hardened up to compensate for the number of turns on the mooring winch.
This would vary with the length of line run out.

Navigation

1. Largest scale charts not always in use/available - e.g. for last voyage from Curacao to
Singapore, BA 2191
2. Old edition publication on board Light List A and B.
3. Old edition Radio Signals on board - ALRS Volumes 2, 3(1) and 3(2).
4. Deviation of magnetic compass in North & South latitudes between 25 & 35 degrees was
being found to be ranging between 5 & 9 degrees, though last Deviation Curve indicated
maximum 2 degrees deviation in those quadrants.
5. AIS was serviced on 10th Feb 09 no test report found on board only service report was
present.
6. The vessels manoeuvring characteristics were not in line with IMO Res. A.601 (15)
requirements in that they did not address the turning circle for shallow waters.
7. There was no facility such as SPOS or Chartco MetManager weather information system
provided to enable the ship to access current weather information charts at anytime.
8. Weather fax machine was provided. Weather fax charts do not have any world-wide
coverage. Weather fax charts do not cover certain areas including Arabian Gulf, Indian
Ocean, Bay of Bengal where the ship regularly transits.
9. It was observed the Radar performance monitoring was not recorded as mentioned in the
VIQ. There was no numeric, percentage, graphical measurement value.
10. An in use voyage chart was not updated with the latest Temporary Notice.
11. The GMDSS log had no records of ships daily position. The ships officer updated them
during inspection.
12. Vessel manoeuvring Characteristics display on the Bridge was not as per IMO Res. A601
13. The anchor Chains information and visibility distance were not included.
14. It was noted during this inspection that course changes were not consistently recorded in
the deck log or bell book.
15. Some of the charts used in the completed voyage were in poor condition and held
together with cello tape. New charts arrived on board at this port but not enough to
replace all of the well worn charts presently in use.
16. A check of the previous voyage charts showed that charts to the largest scale were not
used for some of the areas that were transited.
17. The vessel had not yet updated the helicopter landing areas per 4th edition Guide to
Helicopters.
18. The Passage Plan did not include calculation of air draft clearances when passing under
bridges or power lines. No guidance was given as to minimum permitted clearance. A
 comprehensive passage plan was reviewed ot covered UKC details, time intervals for
fixing and data from various publications.
19. The voyage Passage Plan was comprehensive berth to berth with the exception that the
bridges clearances encountered on the pilotage passage weer not in the plan.
20. The company policy does not clearly define the minimum UKC for alongside the
berth.The company policy states that a minimum of 20% UKC required of the vessel
deepest draft for ocean passages, 15% for coastal waters and fairways and 10% for inside
ports. The company must be informed prior to any variance of the minimum UKC policy.
21. USDMA Charts 11323 and11330 were worn and some small details along the folds were
not clearly legible and the edges had been repaired using adhesive tape.
22. The Automatic identification system was not interfaced with the ARPA units and the
display was located in a position where it could not be easily read from the ARPA
operating positions.
23. Standard deviation recorded was noted to be around 7 degree E. Deviation card was dawn
by compass adjuster on 24 Sep 2007 and had a maximum deviation of 1.5 deg E.
24. Compass Adjuster made magnetic Deviation Curve (dated 10 April 2005) and Ships staff
made magnetic Deviation Curve (dated 01 May 2006) did not compare favorably. The 2
curves were mirror images.
25. Wheelhouse poster not to the IMO Res.A.601 format.
26. The GMDSS Radio log listed the 2/.O as the person designated to handle distress
communication ,however the muster list placed the 2/O in an emergency party and listed
the 3/O as the designated person
27. The vessels daily position had not been recorded in the GMDSS log since 8 th November
2008
28. MF/HF printer was not working
29. Per departure last anchorage or pre arrival terminal checklist was not prepared.
30. New vessel, therefore quite large deviations recorded (up to 9 degrees).
31. On the available emergency check lists provided for the collision / grounding there was
not any mention about the VDR (provided on board) (New edition BPG).
32. Vessel during present call received n. 7 British Admiralty notice to mariners so not in
properly timely manner.
33. Although a paper passage plan was produced for present voyage from berth to berth, as
vessel on arrival did not proceed directly to the berth but went to the anchorage on the
prepared plan there wasn't any mention about this.
34. The vessel did not received any Navarea EGC warnings for the area III also if there were
few one in force.
35. In the GMDSS log the ship's position was not entered daily as required and this was
noted since 3 months ago.
36. MASTER/PILOT INFORMATION EXCHANGE DOESNOT PROVIDE PILOT WITH
SHIPS SQUAT AND UKC INFORMATION HOWEVER IT WAS RECTIFIED
DURING THE INSPECTION
37. There was no evidence that magnetic / gyro compasses were compared during navigation
with Pilot on board on Oct-12-2008.
38. The checklist NAV 04 for UKC calculation was not correctly completed. The minimum
charted depths recorded under 'Depth at Facility, 'Anchorage' and 'Transit' were incorrect.
The values were bigger than the actual charted minimum depth. As a result the obtained
net UKC was more than what was available in reality. For example during transit on the
River Scheldt, the minimum charted depth was 11.8m. The checklist showed that there
was 14 m available.
39. The navtex navigational warnings were not correctly managed. The navtex message
EA64 'Racon Vergoyer N inoperative' was not marked on BA chart 2451. Correction
TA12 'Dangerous explosive in position l../g..' was not marked on BA chart 1874. Both
corrections were applicable on the vessels route.
40. The operators passage planning instructions mentioned air draft clearances regarding
height of masts but did not give instructions to calculate the ADC passing under bridges
or power lines. Or give guidance to the Master as to minimum acceptable clearance.
41. There was a 6 to 9 degree discrepency between the deviation card and the the errors
obtained by observation of the magnetic compass when on easterly headings.The master
had notified the operator of this , and the vessel will be swung for a new deviation card
when leaving this port
42. It was observed that not in every case was the last position on one chart transferred to the
first position of the next and adjoining chart , the master stated that action will be taken to
ensure no chart position transfersare missed in the future.
43. The speed used to calculate the UKC,4 knots, for the Mississippi River was unrealistic.
44. There were no daily positions recorded in the Radio Log
45. The passage plan included calculations of under keel clearance. The speed used to
calculate squat, 4 knots, during the Mississippi River transit was unrealistic.
46. Deck officers are not aware of the type of charts used for ECDIS
47. T/P files are being maintained without the summary notice available / updates.
48. Abort points & contingency anchorage are incorrectly marked on charts. (Approach) for
this port.
49. The manoeuvring information posted was not on standard form as recommended by IMO
res 601
50. One of the bridge officers was not able to explain night signals for towing vessels
correctly, otherwise good knowledge demonstrated.
51. The primary means for navigation is nautical charts, but Safety Equipment Certificate,
Form E, 2.1 Nautical charts was double strike-through and not applicable for the vessel.
52. The voyage BA charts #1199 and 3480 were in poor condition; both charts were dirty and
taped together. (Requisition had been raised)
53. The following publications, which were onboard, were the old editions:-
1) IMO IMDG Code.
2) OCIMF Mooring Equipment Guidelines.
54. Both these publications were on order and were expected to be delivered at this port.
55. Are Lists of Lights, Tide Tables, Sailing Directions, the Nautical Almanac, the Annual
Summary of Notices to Mariners and the Chart Catalogue the current editions and have
they been maintained up to date where required?
56. BA NTM week numbers only were entered in the correction page of the Sailing
Directions, and pages affected were not marked for corrections in force.
57. 61. The GMDSS log book was not being properly maintained, entries for received
distress, urgency and safety messages were not logged in the GMDSS radio book
58. 62. The Navtex was not provided with printer, and there was no evidence indicating
navarea warning was brought to the attention of navigating officers.
59. 63. MF/HF radios DSC test was regularly carried out weekly, but there was no BQ
receipt since delivered.
60. 64. No Go Areas were heavily hatched over the entire chart, irrespective of where the
courses were laid off. The hatching was sufficient to obliterate useful information on the
chart.
61. The Navtex is not provided with a printer. There is no reliable system in place to manage
and file Navtex warnings.

Pollution

1. This vessel was provided with transfer arrangement from engine room bilge to slop port
by means of distance spool connection, but it was not approved by class on IOPP Form B
certificate.
2. Both Wilden pump at aft slop tanks the discharge connection hose leading to slops were
not permanently connected to slop tank. Thus, these Wilden pumps could not use
immediately until slop tanks be depressurized.
3. Vessel was experienced in small oil pollution within on deck area during cargo discharge
operation. It was happen to have spraying and popping cargo oils on deck through the
individual
P/V vents in No.3 COT(P) and No.3 COT(S) and spilled on deck around manifold area
which is estimated about 0.5 m3. Immediately cargo operation was suspended and
response to oil removal operation was conducted as appropriate. The root cause of
pollution was not known immediately but it was alleged to have been kept left open
manifold draining line which is leading to No.3 COT(P). Also, said drain line was not
coincide with drawing pipeline arrangement where posted in CCR.
4. Noted an oil leak on deck at one of the COW machines.
5. It was observed that the entries in the vessels Oil Record Book-Part II, under Code J, item
56 quantities discharged from vessels slop tanks had the following discrepancies vis-a-
vis the quantities recorded in the slop barge receipt.

On 18 October 2007 the vessel de-slopped figures from the slop tanks were a total of
168.2 cum whereas the slop barge quantity received as per the receipt was a total of 145.0
cum.
Again on 13 November 2007 the vessels de-slopped figures from port slop tank was a
total of 201.0 cum whereas the slop barge quantity received as per the receipt was a total
of 190.0 cum.
6. The vapour locks fitted were not certified to meet the new cargo tank configurations after
the major conversion from Single Hull to Double Hull.
7. Cargo valve operation pump unit tank was leaked with operation oil a few flowing rates.
8. No.4 COT (C) was designated as heavy weather ballast cargo tank, however
No.4COT(C) cow operation was not carried out in accordance with MARPOL Annex
113B.
9. The SOPEP after recent change of ships name and particulars was not endorsed by the
class or flag state.
10. The diesel and fuel oil tank aft were below their containment, negating the effectiveness
of the vent if the containment filled with water.
11. The garbage stowage containers are not fitted with proper sealable covers/lids.
12. Vessel was fitted with fixed pipe lines to transfer E/R bilge to slop tanks, but this was not
mentioned in IOPP form B. A note in this respect was included in full term IOPPC.
13. Old edition of Oil Record Book Part I was in use. In Oil Record Book Part I, oil
residue retention was not noted weekly.
14. Emergency disposal of cargo pump room bilge accumulations could not be carried out
remotely.
15. The following Oil Record Books found contrary to MARPOL Regulations 36 (2):-

a) Only copy and not original of last Part I and I were onboard.

b) For Part I copy covered for period between 07.05.07 and 13.05.07 and not last 2 years as
required by this Regulation :

c) For Part II copy covered for period between 02.04.07 and 11.05.07 and not last 2 years as
required by this Regulation.

16. ORB Part I old book was in use & oil residue retention was not noted weekly

17. Cargo Tanks not provided with Individual High Level Alarms.

18. Emergency Disposal and Pump room Bilge Accumulations cannot be carried out
remotely.

19. There were oil stains observed on the aft, port main deck boundary coaming and side rail
of ramp on port side.

20. While the direct and emergency bilge suctions were fitted with seals, they were not
numbered seals as recommended.

21. Stop times of incineration were not being logged as per the instructions in front of the
Garbage log book.

22. Minor oil leaks noticed from all three auxiliary engines, and from Main Engine.
23. Garbage bins on deck and in the engine room had a wooden cover. These were not fire
resistant. The bin for oily rags in the engine room also had a wooden cover.

24. Fuel and diesel oil tank air vents spill containers situated close to the ships side, if an
over flow occurred and the containers filled the oil could go over the side.

25. Some of the garbage drums stored on open poop deck were not with proper covers ,partly
open to free air.

Pump Room

1. Operation instruction for High suction ventilation damper in P/R was not posted in pump
room entrance. It was rectified prior insepctor departure.
2. Pump room was fitted with single extractor and no spare motor on board.
3. The pump room was fitted with 1 exhaust fan. There is no spare motor or rotor for the
exhaust fan.
4. The cargo pump room was provided with only one extraction fan, no spare extraction
fan motor and impeller was provided.
5. 8.82 It was found that two light fixtures located in the level of the pump room were
missing cover bolts. This renders the fixtures no longer intrinsically safe
6. The vessel was fitted with a fixed gas detection system in the cargo pumproom. The
equipment was part of the PMS, however, it was not according to the manufactures
manual. The vessel was only logging only calibration not the checking and changing of
filters.
7. The 2.5diameter off stickers on the discharge lines of #2 & 3 cargo pumps were
temporarily repaired with cold weld fibre glass.The lower pump seals appeared to be
tight with the pumps running at moderate speed.
8. Pump room H2S monitoring console in CCR was showing reading between 6ppm to
11ppm for the bottom gas detector. Reading by personal gas equipment at that location
was noted to be zero ppm.
9. During the first few hours of discharge, the engine room had difficulty regulating the
steam pressure to the cargo pump turbines. Cargo pumps were surging between 5.5 and 9
kg discharge pressure as read from the gauges at the pumps in the pump room.
10. Pump room light fixtures were fitted were fitted with 40 watt bulbs. Lighting was
marginal.
11. The pump room hydrogen sulphide gas detector display in the cargo in the cargo control
room was giving as errant reading.
12. Electric cooling fans had been rigged on Nos 2 and 3 cargo pump,lower turbine bearings.
13. An audible and visual repeater of the general alarm was not provided within the
pumproom.
14. Water sediments have been found inside the ballast pump room bilge due to a gasket
leakage on the fresh water pipeline passing inside the compartment discovered during the
inspection

Survey

1. Condition evaluation report was not available onboard for last Special Survey which was
completed on 14 Sep 2009.
2. The vessel was more than 130 meters length and more than 10 years old but did not have
measurement results for longitudinal strength of the hull girder.
3. The operator's Internal Audit was overdue as the most recent Internal audit was
completed on: 12 Dec 2007. The items identified at these audits had been dealt with,
closed out.
4. Periodic survey to attesting the strength of the bow chain stoppers foundations and
associated ship supporting structure was not available on board.
5. A memo was issued by class as follows: - Satisfactory surveys to be carried out when the
ship is in service, as required by paragraphs 4.2.10(a) of the improvised specifications for
the design, operation and control of Crude Oil Washing systems and Part B of the
approval letter attached to the COW manual to be endorsed by attending surveyor
accordingly
6. The date of delivery of the ship shown on the IOPP was 25th July 1994.However the 2nd
special survey had been carried out later than the 2nd anniversary date of delivery on10th
August 2004 and a letter of approval from the administration was not available at the
time of inspection.
7. Special Survey had been completed in 13 September 2008. Executive Hull Summary
Report was not yet on board
8. The vessel currently has a condition of class relating to damage to ships side plating in
way of engine room workshop.
9. There was an indent on the starboard side shell plating in way of No. 3 water ballast tank
and on frame No. 74. Class were aware of this problem and re-inspected the damage
during the inspection (see Memorandum - question 2.15). The starboard side main deck
boundary coaming in way of the manifolds was buckled.
10. There was one conditions of class as follow which issued on 10-09-2008 and with due
date 11/2008. Hydraulic system for CPP (drop of internal oil pressure) to be specially
examined and dealt with as found necessary.

Training

1. Master and 3/Officer did not hold appropriate ECDIS training certificate.
2. The Chief Officer was the designated Safety Officer. He had not undergone a safety
training course.
3. The vessel had just changed operators on 22 March 2007. The on board training video
training program had not yet been implemented. The operator provided shore based
training at a training center in Mumbai, India.
4. Three junior navigational officers have not attended ECDIS training.

Miscellaneous

1. He vessel was provided with a portable gangway of approx 10 metres in length which
was of insufficient length to be used when mounted onto the ships rail when the vessel
was at the normal ballast condition with freeboard of aprox 18 metres.
2. Chemicals were stored on open shelves in the steering gear room.
3. Most of the accommodation entrance doors were locked from the inside. The port was at
Marsec level (Ref: SOLAS XI- 2/8 &ISGOTT 5th Ch 24.1.
4. The vessel was shown to have bunkered on 15 August 2007 from 1900 to 2245.

According to the hours of work and rest log, the Chief Engineer did not show his hours of
work for this operation.

The Chief Officer was the Team Leader for tank entry on 24 and 26 August from 0800
1500 and 0800 1600. He was shown by the log as resting from 1200 to 1500 both days.

5. The Lookout was relieved at the mid point of his watch to have a coffee break and
conduct a safety round of the accommodation.
6. The vessel did not have the ability to inert double hull spaces whether through fixed
piping or portable hoses.
7. Most of the accommodation entrance doors were locked from the inside. The port was at
Marsec Level 1 (Ref:SOLAS XI-2/8.2 & ISGOTT 5th Ed.Ch.24.1)
8. Portable gangway onboard was very short, and cannot place on the pier. For this reason
embarkation and disembarkation was carried via accommodation ladder from sea side by
boat.
9. Tetracycline, There were only 100/250mg tablets out of the required 300/250mg for cat A
ocean going ships
10. On boarding the inspectors identity was not properly verified.
11. Fire rounds were not indicated as carried out at change of 12/4-4/8 morning watch.
12. It was reported that fire rounds were carried out after each watch during the hours of
darkness. Records in the Deck Log Book did not indicate that rounds had been carried out
after the 0000-0400 watch
13. Lighting in and around accommodation / stores ballast pump room inadequate / lamps
fused
14. Deck areas around funnel deck were dirty due to loose soot .
15. Current security level is not displayed on board.
Best Regards
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