DESBIC Treaty 14 Sept 2015

The subject of the said Entity(s) on the map topography of Africa also referred to as Africus?
The Entitys in question as so stated also described as cartoon phenomena, cartographic

topography and the Image(s), we the personal a tentative desires to emerge and evolve safely
and responsibly breathed life unto the stipulates image we have on record.
An ability to exact contentions at a higher Courtrooms resolve is all the reason we predicate
higher mass, a stronger flag far and free away from sodomic creatures double sides to live their
lives as evilest creature on record.
In view of the inflammatory re pore we see the subjects of abuses of alien technologies,
appears to include nuclear composite and-s fireproof like alien double sided lifestyles in areas of
dimensional are they the men in uniforms at our attention so contended. This means the Sheriff
Department Jurisdictions whereby we resided are caught disguising their appearances and-s
ulterior candor in an effort to inflict Hell-like desires at our a tentative need to grow, build,
evolve, research, make amends, re-group, change the status qua or atone for a policy objectives?
The cunning and dangerous where a bouts of mental health foilers whereby we suggested are-s
nothing to do with telling the truth at Courts and fraud in every case I say. The masses include
students enrolled in yester years antiquities lie and supplicate a false recollection(s) at when
history in this dimension came about. In so saying despite our defined logical and witnessed
ways and means of intercepting arresting agents in our said sisters resentments re pore these the
Sheriff deputies all kill so called pro-life creations, regularly in all their cares as to which
Justice Anton Sir, (a higher and Godly supreme contention) has your attention to what I will do.
The facts of life will be reminded the masses as noted are all replicas of Stevens sub-conscious
desire to evolve in a productive and peaceful manner aside from Hispanic replicas decision to
sodomize, rape, assault, torture and then kill our lifes especially noted is they of intent to furnish
weapons of killers I means rick and Lourdes desires along with Sheriff Howieson, Horn,
Hutchens and phony plain clothes assailants carefully selected middle school opinion-s.
See a hot lip service actress along with deputys we catch in the acts at this moment describing
neither icbm tries routinely nor telepathic cartoon phenomena in all eyes and ears in this
reasonable desire to culminate a relationship of honorable, respectable and reasonable re pore
doctors I notice?
Phony law practices of her at willed consensus to destroy properly identified evidence pertaining
to Wendy Suzanne Lindleys and they of a stipulated aggressors Joe Perez Santa Ana
Collaborative Courts Esq., continue to assail willful and malicious treachery, terrors, tortures,
atrocities, Hell raising-like protagonists ideations in an effort to imposed western leaders
decision to launch icbm first and seek Homages neigh.
Therefore in our decisions to stand for truth, justice and the said American way we clearly
contest and-s interjected these mishandling of facts for a policy objective describing as adages
and inscriptions noted as Humane and-conducive to civil approach, the DESBIC Treaty?
Descriptive Encode in Starbased Internal Command Communicates and Intercepts)

means=DESBIC.
The Articles of Genetic Disclosure, Discovery and Appeal(s).means=AGENDA
Suchly our contention to provide ideas and technical information as to address advise on our safe
and bountiful development the subjects that of Nuclear and-s WMD disarmament and directives
aimed at most volatile stock piles being singled out for elimination that and-s dis-appearment
capabilities we see the police and mental health affiliated individuals deter in opposition and-s
due to their beliefs, fire and guns are the law and these archives accurately describing fire proof
nuclear composited alien replicas of Human we see, the practicing attorneys situated a bomb
threat response to thwart our efforts we say.
PREFACE 1. UNDER ORDERS OF DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR

BASED INTERNAL COMMAND-COMMUNICATION-S AND AUTHORITY-S.
THE ARTICLES OF GENETIC DISCLOSURE
DISCOVERY AND APPEALS- DESBIC AGENDA
A U N Secretary General Auspicious
Attention NYPD & Charge de' affaires
Officer of the Commission-ment
of Treaty's U N 10017 N Y N Y
THE TREATYS BETWEEN ALL INSIGNIA'S TO AN EMBLEM, MARQUIS, ENSIGN,

STATE, REPUBLIC'S', TRUST, OR OTHER DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNTANCY IN STAR
BASED INTERNAL COMMAND FOR FRIENDLY RE PORE, UNIVERSAL LAW AND
ORDERLY PROCEDURES, NBC-WMD DISARMAMENT, EVOLUTE-GROWTH &
DEVELOPMENT UNDER AUTHORITY-S OF POLICE, SHERIFF AND ATTORNEY
GENERALS UNIFORMED CONSENT AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVENCE.
That of which START, II, NPT, INF submerge to form an integral part of this
Treaty's intended so stated purpose-s. In and though "acts of God's" are
rare , subject contends to assure all fissile materials are contained and
mitigated in safer areas of research to these ends.
HAVING SEEN LEGAL ACTION BROUGHT TO POLICE, SHERIFFS

DEPARTMENTS:
THE CELESTIAL ELDER THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANTON NOW PRESIDING (SEE
EXHIBIT A) MAP TOPOGRAPHY IMAGE AND SAID ENTITYS BUILT ON PREVIOUS
TREATY'S DESIGN AND CONSCRIPTION'S.
Descriptive Encode
1. VISUAL EXHIBIT(S) (a), (b), and (c)
2. PREFACE-S 1-2
3. PROLOGUE INTRO
4. PRE-AMBULAR
5. ARTICLE'S 1-19
6. THE SORT COMPACT AND RESEARCH TEXTS
7. INCORPORATION OF START (IOS) START DRAFTS
8. STATEMENTS ON MULT-MEGATON
ATTRIBUTION AND ANALAGY'S
9. WEAPONS OF ATTACK GLOSSARY-S

OF TERMS AND TERMINOLOGIES
10. PROTOCOLS AND TREATY INTEGRATION
11. APPENDAGES AND VARIANTS ASSIGNED
12. ANNEX 1 AND TREATYS BANNING

TRANSFER AND POSSESSION OF WMD
13. NUCLEAR FREE ZONE APPENDAGE AND TEXTS
14. CLOSING MINUTES AND PASSAGES
PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 05 March 2015 5: 00 pm PST
PREFACE 2
1. The encoded inscription is out-dated due to the fact the evidence

concerted to include extra-ordinary circumstances do have a say and an
influence on the way we approach the contemporaneous disarmament
questions. These circumstances include the extraterrestrial biological entity
on map topography of Africa has flexed its muscles somewhat and is in more
control then yester years; this and-s the disclosures made by Justice Anton
the ebe indicated the masses are indeed fire-proof and nuclear composite
replicas of Humans purposely bringing dangers forward in an effort to
confuse a witness and lone specimens psych intending on sodomic reproach
and Soully regressions.
2. Do to the length and difficultys following 300 pages of possible prioritys
and demanding concerns, technical advisor-s seek to reformat said lengthy
variations and outdated drafts of this agreement in accordance with its
intentions to re-situate glasnost perestroika 1990 to current wave bands
yuletides of supplement to resolve particulars more effectively.
3. The facts disclosed by "Celestial Justice" Anton include: we have neither

real riffs with Russia nor with Isis, in and they are Party's to an alien replica
scheme who do hack authors effort in an area of sack your right to discern
replicas in need of our assistance to some varying measure-s. United States
legislative assembly do the same in effort to construe neither replicas of our
word nor abuses in technology we see go off to counter the rights of Gods
will.
(a) In other words: The High Contracted Parties are at Convention whereby
we see Gods dislikes to dunder. Say that and more meaningful
approach than the said many directives ordered by Mr. Obamas
notations of all fed up may reply candidly, I say catch deceivers in the
act who still seem to a try on our areas of convey a rectum assault
coincidentally has a way of reiterated degenerative and regressive
concepts of life spans to contend against. That though..
(b)
Now by lifting the sanctions against our friends, the Russian Federation
and regarding their closeness to contiguous areas and zones of policing
as "internal" matter-s the nice Russian leaders will also construe dis-
appearment activation squadron and-s hereby the elimination of most
volatile arsenals not the lone and underlying problems to contend for-s
I say-s, so discretion-s so to speak-s, adages the national consensus
that of fake badges and occupations will be construed in area of fake
research as rightly contribute to the Sheriffs I knows mistaken
understanding of lifes purpose.
4. The Honorable Anton now presiding and little people we see in areas of
falsified datum view the fore mentioning action as reasonable to suggest so
then? This paradigm shift and policy change address advisement is directed
especially to Congress and Senate staff's attention-s I see-s for a purpose of
Utopian order-placard destination for while I was away want to lie as well will
situate a need to grow and develop?
(a) It will also be noted, the Desbic Treaty 2015 Legal Actionary Framework
manuscripts, (Lawsuit litigation documentation) will be construed as an
integral part of the legal grounds and authority to conduct business,
will contend inter alias Law Suit against County of Orange where we
resides detailed the definite ironies we see.
(b)http://countyintrouble.blogspot.com
THE DESBIC AGENDA TREATY

GENERALS UNIFORMED CONSENT AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVENCE-S.
Descriptive Encode in Star Based Internal Command the Articles of Genetic

Disclosure, Discovery and Appeal(s) Descriptive Encode in "Star Based"
Internal Command the DESBIC AGENDA inter alia: DESBIC TREATY The
Official Text Prologue Introductory Paragraphs are as Follows:
DESBIC Prologue Introductory
1. The United Nation's International Organization and all Party to an State of

nuclear energy utility or weaponized perceptions of defense related
analogies and situations un-becoming, hereinafter referred to as the:
"Nuclear Powers", forasmuch a side of Faith
2. Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty(s') between the High

Contracting Party's' of a Russian Federation and USSR proxy's status and an
United States of America, consensus toward a non-proliferation stances by
way side of all other economies re-deciding to nuclear deter and acclimate at
its supreme interest.
3. Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty's' for the de-limitation of

nuclear, bio-chemical and biological and/or-s (Weapons of Mass Destruction)
means wmd weapons grade ordnance within a State, and statements there
though nuclear energy policy remains as it's supreme interest; perspective of
policy setbacks in appendages.
4. Having witnessed first hand a lip service contention at holding desires,

START II itemized dismantle/decommission-ment at 1700 SLBM the new
generations of missile contraptions have outnumbered these past quotas and
are in violation of terminologys.
5. Having re-touched Treatys on files with a salutation's asides, contents of

nuclear, bio-molecular, and quasi chemical a specific accountancy of the
warheads and bomb explosive apparatus', inter alias: explosive actuators,
and, or fissionable assemble-ments or other descript or accounts of the
noun: meaning pressurized or non-pressurized vacuum release capability or
non, and-s mindful of the geological shelf life that of moax emissions in its
said to forgo, all insignias to an Ensigns are stipulates "bound" by actions
taken to construe penalty. Petitioners Pray for the Justices of the peace to
last throughout our memories to come here placed.
6. Decisive in their purpose for strengthening the Will, needs, and the related
subject matter of offensive and defensive fine lines of divisions in security
related protocol in its exercise conferred here in and a unity of the foregoing
principles for recourse and realization there sounded off a mutation definition
has no real military purpose; confess by tort and repent with whole heart-ed
a-vigor assuredly is all to situated.
7. Taking in to account commitments to universal Laws inasmuch all can

side-s, also-s taking into account the "Devil-like" existence of Human
replicas who so appear to be considering unprecedented universal-like
concession undertaking to the flagrances of roll call today and the challenges
we see.
8. Having question a people who exercise wreck less abandonment for the
United States Code of Justice at first and did construe wrongfully and
resorted to kidnap, tortures and intimidate bearing in mind, should auld
acquaintance be forgot?
9. Urges an U N Security Council to sustain interests of Charter here within

collective and continuous settlement in the fields of licensing re-assignment;
and retention of Inter-national- On Site Inspection and Recovery Units as to
safeguard the Programme we see of decommission and disappear-ment
operations to the call for actions as so required by U S Attorney General
asked a United Secretary General's U N herein if applicable to side.
10. Also urges the Principals therefrom address, advise and call attention to
the dangers and catastrophic element of the sudden outbreak of Walvis got
an idea and / or a missile attack(s) in a theater of highly valued, see fit to say
easy access target able said nuclear utility complexes. Im-prescriptive to the
facts all are energy in fission able acts of sabotage to this entry.
11. Mindful of the note to need, and the need to note; the principal
objectives in formulations hypothesized for the benefit of all who come to
breathe oxygen and drink water is take adequate measures on the exercise
of free speech to the matters concerning your awareness in disbandment of
nuclear utility complexities and complexes.
12. Welcomes agreed upon honest and equitable procedures and dates to a
side of a truer meaning of the word love and understanding the
contemporaneous same sex unions debate and discussions pertaining to
iotas of concerted opinion.
13. Appeals to all States relative in theories expressed of "abuses of alien

technology" a matter at Court-s suchly a concerted attention for?
14. Convinced that nuclear energy decommission and the complete

elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear
faulty accounting of history-s we see despite these undesirable allegory's
contending we leaned toward the relevant provisions of the Charter of an
United Nations on the reserve-use of force or threat of force, taking note of
Security Council resolution 984(1995) of 11 April 1995 and the views
expressed on it;
15. Recalling its relevant resolutions adopted in previous years in particular

resolutions 45/54 of a stated: 4 December 1990 46/32 of 6 December 1991,
47/50 of 9 December 1992, 48/73 of 16 December 1993, 49/73 of 15
December 1994, 50/68 of 12 December 1995, 51/43 of 10 December 1996,
52/36 of 9 December 1997, 53/75 of 4 December 1998, 54/52 of 1 December
1999 and 55/31 of 20 November 2000;
16. Having scrutinized the fact in and though START II did suggests policy's
aimed at nuclear threat reduction assimilation , the nuclear warheads issues
were itemized for undisclosed and-s obscure destinations now appended to
include Entirety of nuclear bio-molecular quasi-chemical stock piles, mostly
warheads and contraptions a primary concern, that of which dismantling,
disappear-ment, inspection, recovery, resuscitation and micro-
management to air spaces known to be desolate and safe in star based
destination-al non-deploy interprets.
17. Also recommends in view of the age of computer friendly automation,

active negotiations to assure an nuclear energy utilities newer construction
ban as by, for and of the people, be put in place by 31 December 2014 and
after waywardly to its life spans not by past 31 December 2027 subject to
advisements from star based internal dispatch.
18. Noting in depth that nuclear fissile material, manufacturing and fuel
enrichment reprocessing is a field of certainly we do seek to will continue to
be discussed moreover deterred to action we see as menacing so contended.
19. Realizing the Contracting Party's undertake, the presences of the

International Assemblies as measures to unite, the call to duty of up way
ward for numerous on site contingencies,.
20. Stresses the necessity to acknowledge the circle of dangerous targeting

of warhead-ed emplacements and counterpoint intent as a serious threat in
their relations to the Provisions of the multilateral Conventions to which they
are Party to, and two agreed upon motions of disposal in accordance to this
chapter with its interpretation of depositary functions being sought.
21. Appeals to the Nuclear States the importance and effectiveness of

confidence building measures, taking into account the a specific advantages
for general and comprehensive de-targeting of nuclear silo emplacements,
and one anothers population centers for the sake of the police and Sheriff
Department protectors of the safety commission I see.
22. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, nuclear utilities

specialized useages to acknowledge the act and fact that, other than Geiger
counter, nuclear medicine and hospital x-ray materials, there exists no real
need for nuclear utility explosive energy complexes. In pursuit of the said
objectives strictly provided under star board master generalizations nothing
in this Treaty shall include research in support of peaceful use of nuclear
energy utilities contrary to the opinions vested here under and-s in Articles
33 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations there tell.
23. Encouraging the establishment to ascertain to the fullest extent the

dangers associated with Independently owned and operated sales of nuclear
energy and the by-products associated to ex-spent highly radioactive waste
such as moax emissions and plutonium recyclable dangers imposed on
others.
24. Also encourages the public to endorse an International referendum on

the subject of bio-molecular chemo-quasi weapons and stockpiles of mass
destruction and their deployable states of storages as described do
constituted aggression still-s at Sheriff Departments candor that follow up by
hacking an said subjects free spoken contentions in an effort to construe
better there do see.
25. Requests the Secretary General's' organize and descend upon the United
Nations General assembly bring to that consensus 6 or so International
referendums every 6 years such as gasoline motor car manufacturing, Tran
genetic degeneration, and licensing fees, disarmament quotas forgo as such;
UNDER ORDERS OF DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR
BASED INTERNAL COMMAND-COMMUNICATION-S AND AUTHORITY-S.


That of which START, II, NPT, submerge to form an integral part of this
HAVING SEEN LEGAL ACTION BROUGHT TO POLICE, SHERIFFS

DEPARTMENTS:
THE CELESTIAL ELDER THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANTON NOW PRESIDING (SEE
EXHIBIT A) MAP TOPOGRAPHY IMAGE AND SAID ENTITYS BUILT ON PREVIOUS
TREATY'S DESIGN AND CONSCRIPTION'S.
Have decidedly ascribed:
We the Author's of this Manuscripts;
Have decided respond, to;
Article I (The Establishment of Treaty)
PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 03 March 2015
05 March 2015
Descriptive Encode
Pre Ambler: Part 1
1. For the purposes set out in the Texts of START II a definition(s') of SLBM
means "sea launch ballistic missiles", and not solely submarine based;
therefore the elimination descriptive of warheads, 2160 a side biannually,
the sea launch arsenals elimination descriptive of applicable warheads shall
be interpreting as warheads most anatomical combustible frequency fields
first priority, long range then medium and short range would be next
subjections towards reiterated the elimination of the most volatile stockpiles
in regard to importance for the two sides each and; China, who did so
counter with its own long range launchers and warheads assimilations.
Having read START II in particular, it was told us they that China are a major
manufacturer of weapons of mass destruction means: (wmd).
2. Apart from the obligations undertaken by the Multi-Nation Party's; in virtue
of the present Treaty's concerns of addressing a deploy hiatus circumvention
of bomber emphasis, where concerns actual nuclear warheads and explosive
fissile deploy ability and resolve to include this entry to the START II Treatys,
the subject of the matter governing warheads standard fission-ary explosive
and field frequency a specific-al data will continue to be concerted until the
matter is resolved and no longer compromises the security questions of all
insignias to an Ensign, Republic, State emphasis or Marquis of any intent to
defend a region with nuclear, bio-molecular, quasi-chemical, (nbc)-weapons
of mass destruction, (wmd) herein described.
3. 4. Omitted and Open
5. The application for the preceding Articles shall be taken up by Russian,

China, and U S A. An police officer can side swipe another law degree of
faulty constraints, knows who are strategies of lob a big one 12 nautical
miles off our coastal reaches seeks an injunction to notices something align
somewhere as if sided no U S nor Russian nor Chinese warships of any
aggregate displacements, including submersibles average attention, may
traverse assuagements by way side of lesser than 200 nautical miles off
United States Continental Russia mainlands and China mainland to this
contention.
6. An U S, Russian Federation, China and / or their allies or proxy status quo

visiting neighbors must first get cleared from their Head of States if
traversing a warship or submersibles of any designation closer than 200
nautical miles from each others coastal shorelines this and a Bering straits
traffic of warship at 6 nautical miles distances from one another's ambitions
to rub shoulders another winter folders and the three nuclear projectors,
except where concerns an atolls whereby it is state a difference of half the
fuller reaches of a Two Party shoreline shall be the limitations of statutory
trespass of every or any such vessel of war ad adages a 200 nautical miles
line of conform a sequence of pre-authorized destination charter.
(a) The same is appended by virtue of this declaration on the use of sub air
spaces in the Three High Contracting Partys ambitions to circum-navigate
closer than a 200 N-mile statute of limitation-al war ship motes operatic us
and or intended nor otherwise traffic in cargo of w m d N B Cs operable in its
own recognition of fallout intends to allow potential enemies to trespass
these margins of circumference are situated for a more certain case to not
altercate.
(b) These fore going inclusions in this Provisions, detail other Insignias not
bound by 200 nautical miles statutes situate an distance from one anothers
assuagements at least six nautical miles from a counter parts aggressions
unless permission and authorization have been given by each Head of State
and will be reviewed to includes, vessels of espionage subject to a $5 million
dollar penalty assessment per incident U S dollar U N mandate.
(c) This entrys Provision mental is an integral part of the Law therefore do
not float irresponsibly. The preceding application applies primarily for
the United States, the Russian Federation and
the Peoples Republic of China and all insignias to an Emblem are hereby
instructed to seek permission before entering the Contracting
Parties contiguous zones of occupation thereat.
7. A Black Sea entry at or around the Bosphorous straights, will not be

acceptable by western leaders recollection of phony retro in effect 01 March
2015 and situate noted an United States nor Allied vessels of war or warships
unless The Russian Federated Prime Minister and Russian President are both
in accord to request assistance from any or all other navies. Turkey will be
served 911 critical life supports by its own navy or it shall seek the
assistance of the resource of its friendly neighbor Russia, as to not statutorily
align one anothers ineptitudes for fire firstly invocation.
8. Omitted / Open
9. The obligations provided for in this Ad Interim Agreements preclude a

voiced SOS May Day for assistance from one another's vessels of war jargon
which must be given to Port Authority's and the Partys status quo' of
the High Contracting Parties, except where done a critical life petition and
Party' reserves right to-ebb tide all shores at to where concerns transnational
Russian U S A China Nationals on board an 911 critical life support embark-
ment emphases in as conferred hereto with a path to dis-engage in nuclear
aircraft carrier construction hiatus on the vessels of war aspect to searches is
all the placards.
10-12. Omitted and Open
13. Subject to this Articles limitable deploy positions for nuclear warheads,
count and repository; forded an exercise of private acceptances to shed light
on this warhead question there told. So in its exercise of free speech the
question of whether the surplus cuts had been dismantled and a yearly
quotation by the preceding afore mentioning deaf, dumb, blind actors on
how many warheads annually the U S, Russia and China capable of recycling
when underlying the authorized especially concert attention toward most
volatile stockpiles will continue to be an emphasis to the subjects of nuclear
composite Alien Presidents well capable of disappear-ment activitys to the
limitations provided for in treaty's intended purposes?
14. As afforded to seek Russia attention and siding neither are we indeed
said to have excess of nearer of forty thousand seventy three warheads to
ninety thousand or such in neither her areas of vastness; nor-s thirty five
percentages said on trajectory courses; so order a fiscal cliff reminder of a
said third percentile of these munitions are-s of which one, two, three
hundred or greater kiloton this Article indicates, the highest frequency field
fission-ary explosive calibrates. This and the subjects of buyer beware situate
possible espionage service attention to Iran the most high-s, a concert
attention to firstly officers of the Courts now describing inter agency liaisons
got an beat on a criminal activities in areas of loyalty and excitement with
the word we contend forbearing in mind the contemporaneous disappear-
ment research we see the Party's disclosure docket in an area of phony Court
documents and fictitious County iota of concerns. Entitys stated these
individuals are very well culpable of re-situating construe in a Celestial
supervisor's and the Honorable Justice's Anton's Court and contention-s for
Human rights attention needed.
15. U S arsenals are believed to be a parody in areas of evacuated a smaller

contingency then that of their Russian counterparts. U S. arsenals to survive
are believed to be less anatomically as explosive- when describing options
we set asides to construe not a fetter, decided by His Eminency Lord Anton
Sir-s.
16. Analysis: are the aggregate identifying numerical contingencies

accurate? How does the fact all armies in dissension bring are phony artists
lawful concerted understand-s that of which alien replica's of our subject of
interested discussion brought to our attention this morning has no iota of
concerted topics we can clearly assign to they of who are-s very well capable
of "energizing" a disappearing function on these dangerous and abominable
threats will contend Your Honor's Sir Thank You-s.
Discuss further:
17. So of 1700 SLBMs each side pertaining to START II the functions in

exercise as conferred by this program desires to enforce the High
Contracting Partys to the emphasis of "legal authority" will re-situate retro
effective dates to-engage on these said pertinence's ad adage past
extension dates 31 December 2007 have come to pass and the limitation
called into questions are said fell short of expectation, nevertheless a
witness and Host for Starfleet were lead to believe 1700 each side long
range and most anatomical calibration was the interpretation we had up-s.
18. In furtherance to the preceding paragraphs the subject of most volatile

stock pilings remains to be surveyed till the questions and ambiguity no
longer compromises the security suchly describe an welfare recipients
faithful effort to address the senses of needs to a reporter when I do still
continue to allegory a field(s) of counter terrorism I see.. Having situated
policy objectives, this Memorandums referred toward START II particular
emphasis with limitations and stipulated again disposal technique of most
volatile stocks emphasis agreed to when concerns arise to integrate our
numerical goals set forward from START II.
19. Omitted / Open
20. It was stated in START II and NPT, a technical ways and means of
verification would benefit the course of action we situating. Having say so,
the subject of disarmament of dangerous weapons of attack will continue to
be a subject so long as Lord Anton Sir-s, ways of doing things is situating
glasnost perestroika new openness with voice discussions and reliable, re
pore a side to share and live for from a new found idea of lawful and
meaningful expression in Anton's Judiciary presence whereby an answer to
the ambiguitys may be instrumental when facing technical means of
verification ironies.
21. Trans national units of 54 men of the such as otherwise agreed to by and
byways for-s each of the High Contracting Parties shall construe
assigned Committees input on size and duties of inspection teams multi-task
functions such as stationary sentrys, (if applicable) and On Site Inspectors,
reporters and photo journalists by and by wayward any which mode
of deployment unit agree to collect, gather, and disseminate information to
an Sub-commission U N / U S Attorney Generals quarter notes to needed
adages needs to note involvement.
22. An United Nations obligation of Charter will underscore Treaty accession
details and-s function to the disarmament desires we situate, therefore the
Partys will concert precedence and diplomacy bearing in mind the disclosure
is real and undesirable to be Party from. Therefore a U N restitution penalty
may be excised from the said High Contracting Party's if willful and
deliberate dissention is given to the time tables and senses of needs we
contend for-s.
23. Also noted, subjects hereby reserves rights to contend paraphrase

contentions beast six Anti-christ be noted. In as suchly, phrases
however are a description of phony decals acclaims. Although such is the
case, for the purpose of integration and also construed for a purpose of
integration and undisputable discernment and meaningful expression of
etiquette these expressions being used describe a likeness of differing
concepts in evolution and development.
24. Now if The High Contracting Party's contend a independent Ensign is a

concern, the motion of legal ramifications will be taken. So consider situating
competent and disciplined inspection units when assigned to observe and
carry out an exercise of free expressed discretion by a U N Secretary
Generals quarter otherwise the most liable and responsible Partys to inspect
and micro-manage all other regions of air spaces will be the competent
auspicious of a Russian Federation, a United States of America and a People
Republic of China and a United Nation Panelists U N Inspection team and
Commission-ment thereby in accordance with this Entity's right to describe a
particular Programme of work by a Commissioner of a said United States
Jurisdiction in the effort to situate a nuclear free and wmd disarmament
status qua so stipulated.
DISCUSS, DEBATE, CONCERT COMMITTEES ATTENTION-S, ANALYZE, BUILD

AND SHARE IDEAS AS TO MOST EFFECTIVELY IMPLORE DISAPPEARENCE AND
SAFETY ORIENTED PROCEDURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE CHAPTERS.

That of which START, II, NPT, submerge to form an integral part of this
Have decided to research

And describe protection;
As follows:
ARTICLE 1 (The Establishment of Treaty)
1. In conformity with from here in a Say I seated, a side of words we talk to

avoid pressing buttons and acting like "evil alien replicas who do Hell to our
Souls" inter alia menaces to a Universal laws I teach. The foregoing
stipulations in our sought a faulty constraint actions may decide tables be
established as work-s for forensic lawyer to evaluate further whereas all
come to pie squared and re-decide again a place-mat of lawful eventualitys
do stipulates when as precedences allows for:
(a) an proposal for an agreement to situate a placard destination such as a

Heavenly like objective be given as incentive to work-s, live-s, grow-s,
communicate-s, research-s, inter-planetary travel-s, weigh, learn-s, teach-s,
share-s assist-s and condemn deceptive practice of they whose itinerary do
seek-s destruction to those reasons to strive, get better set forth for a
purpose of reconciliation, trusted so is sold to undertake equal and impartial
means of arbitration as an act of accepted an seriousness of characters.
(b) consensual circumstances we pursue in good faith for a benefit of the

common standard of social progress in the best of mutual respective
intentions; wherefore an document is thine adversary as thy self in objective
as permission given to ordain and uphold, protect, and bear true faith as due
patriotic:
ARTICLE 2 (Disarmament Conditions)
1. Each Party shall reduce, react, dispose, disseminate, decommission, de-

target, disguard, disassemble vaporize, neutralize, disappear, store, ship to
safer areas where star regions will accept bio-hazardous molecules, nuclear,
atomic, neutron alloys and there, bio-molecular chemical quasi arsenal
functions at a decision agreed upon under specific accordance with the
legal authority vested in the Honorable Sir Lord Anton-s Supreme Allied
Court's will continue to be the contentions.
2. Treatys, NPT, SALT, START I and II, SORT and all said memos regarding
vows, oaths, promises, agreements, accordances, and-s revision-mental will
be subject to the letterhead we sought regarding the terms and conditions of
any said Treaty or Convention governing and acceptance procedures
regarding the elimination and limitation of Nuclear, Bio-molecular, Chemi-
quasi formulation (nbc) and / or other decisions pertaining to Weapons of
Mass Destruction, (wmd) registered to a United Nations?
3. The Partys consented to be bound as we see by telepathic Celestial

Monitors ways and means of coinciding unity a phone call message of
glasnost, perestroika, for common approach there in saying friendly working
relation bringing coincidentally re-iterated to allow for a way out exit strategy
should the Pentagon get in too dark to describe, if applicable; bearing in
mind the glasnost overtures of 1990-91, did almost save the days of
reckoning cold hearted fine lines and potential hardships directed at our
attention when waiving the symbols respectfully a side.
4. The Party(s) conclude mysterys that a hydrogen explosive property of

fission is duly diagnose wrongfully for the ambiguity of sixth and eighth or
ninth generation runaway cloud covers and geological shelf life of
radioactivity did dispel knowledge of candor to the limitations when
statement previous inscriptions detailed neither any such nuclear, nor bio-
molecular up-graded nor upgrading as described in this Article as conferred
to Attorney Generals need to place under a license that of which our WMD
NBC disarm and "disappearing" obligations to these Chapters of service
procurement in expressions toward its relative matters to express a loss of
attention for our safety in which did result in an START II and III shortfall of
concerted efforts.?
5. The Partys will continue to pursue in good Faith On-site Inspection,
Disarmament and Micro-management Teams that when consist of Staff to
White House in care support, technical advice, hands on and off-s
supervision, friendly and working re pores with perestroika set in and a
determined effort to deal suchly with the dismantling, disappear-ment and
Micro-management concessions and responsibilities noted also the
probabilitys of interaction with nuclear composite star elders and the
pertinences of working in contaminated airspaces, lands, air, seas, mobile
stock piles and loose ended areas, silos, chief psychic officers assigned to
this Program bearing in minds the iotas of concert attention to nuclear
individuals attentions needed at times a favor in and such noted. There and-s
benevolence a key common approach in these details we set aside do we
see eye to eye conjurer on the telephones to our attention? So be
inseparable, and doth remove the doubts on neither quantities nor
limitations provided for-s, situated a general rules implying as to simplify the
work orders appendages are:
(a) six percentile annual quota minimal most volatile first priority-s toward
they of the gross aggregate totals of estimates who would be treated and
transferred in sub airspace in safe areas of flight destinations. There have at
eighteen years gone the contaminants should be nearly recessitated. Unless
and-s or otherwise the Contracted Parties and On Site Inspection, Recovery,
and Micro-management authorities are in a way to numerically configure
more Duty than the minimal six percentile annual repository quotation
whenst engaged in and-s on upon an abundance of assimilation and-s
productive constructive furloughs welcomed and urged; this six percentile
annual clean-up and said consignment of Ensigns, and accounting-s will
contend is reasonable assuage-ment to the emphasis contended for.
6. The subject of contiguous areas of contamination will be a subject to take

up not ladder than twenty years after the zones of On Site Recovery and
Micro-management have been cleared unless other extraordinary
circumstance such as expeditious and highly talented achievers arise and-s
undertake quick work ethic up to the advice of consenting Attorney ledgers
in star base internal command headquarters.
7. The subject of On Site Recovery
ARTICLE 3 (Disarmament Terms)

1. The Partys hereunder do decide a firm decision by an authority figure may
be indeed a way to resolve the differences. The facts and so stated
disclosures do cite our lawful exercise of attention we see there so be its
own exercise of free will and lawful approach as to the question of The
Honorable Lord Anton Sir-s presides, lawful ways and means to confer is in
military circles, extraordinary circumstances and in saying suchly the
terms and conditions of the disarmament obligations will be the subject of a
credible leader who consented to be bound need follow the guidelines we
have up with complete and thorough accuracy in and such a declaration and
listings as to the complete and thorough accuracy of the a specific data and
information of entire stock piles as such to allow On Site Units of
Transnational supervisory and recovery teams assist in reporting and
recording disappear-ment activity.
2. Analysis: the density of zones where may be itemized fission and the
friendly behaviors we are stipulate designing is cause for Senate and
Sheriff's Department to describe wordage in a face of legal actions to convey
an iota or measure-s be taken. Having heard the Constitution allows for free
speech to be recognized, the subject-s that of which accountability is
measures I see depends on the validity of each Partys words so seek a
response. A ladder day witness accounts in area of disclosures and said
police participation, that of litigation and friendship campaigns in so sided
disclosure, the cited Partys do have some reproach obligations to this
classification and-s the ability to vanish hexafluorinal and other atomic
elements give clearer insight as to what a proper analogy should describe
when bearing a cross or other idols of faith.
3. Pursuant with this time tables Texts, Memorandums, Protocols and

Annexes here as one START, START II, III, IV, NPT, INF, SORT syllables of a first
iotas of contention from a Press secretarys mistaken calendar of prioritys;
therefore let not anyones opinion nor any care-coordinator nor Health
Department Programs attention, contacts dislikes, service affiliation desires,
nor news bulletins trump the senses of need and all due regarded for this
iota of a contention, for friendly and undeniable competent re pore with our
counter decisions that so forged at a time when a firm decision to say that
which is for suchly to contend.
4. In the performance of their duty an Secretary Generals quarter shall move

to resolve their differences under auspicious of Celestial supervisors cordons
as to validate the ironies a legislative reckless desire of County officers in
plain clothes do attempted accost us at this moment. Therefore do to local
civic leaders dissentions brought to our attention this Chapters intended
terms was disrupted by unruly civic leader-s needs for attention.
5. Each Party(s') shall recognize the entry into force of START-II and continue
to resolve the particulars by extending to START an integration platform
mindful of the bomber descriptive-s suggested in STARTS Provision-mentals,
however the concessions needed will be re-addressed as ordnance and
munitions areas most volatile at six percentile of an Insignias limitable and
gross inventory per annual recovery so clarified to a matters of ambiguity to
research DESBIC, there surely inclusive in theory's expressed as stated
evident in disclosure posted to make known by whose presents had come
and cause to pursue the disappear-ment recommendations now under way in
accordance with this Chapters accounts and descriptions in an area Treaty
dictations.
6. County Sheriff's obligations to perjure not these factual ironies ad adage

faithfully inform United States and Russian President, the Senate, the
Congress, the Duma, Parliament-s ,the Peoples Republic of China's and all
signatorys to the word of disclosed and literary new openness to assign each
members Celestial credentials at U N headquarters adages stellar invites to
underground facilitys to confirm these obligations and identities in an effort
to use alien technology's in a manner conducive with civil I say?
7. Although the subject of virtual disappear-ment is being singled out, the

fallacy continues to blindside our candidates recollection of their
involvement-s with our Entity's incriminating discussions. Having said
recently seen an approach thwarted by police and Sheriff units of candor,
federal responsibility falls short in areas of friendly and warm working
relations with Entitys authors will continue to be the concern we re-decided
to side. An iota of common approach we situated to disseminate the senses
of lawful means describing, a need to align our discretion with a reasonable
way to conduct better re pore with our friends at the Sheriff and police
departments accountability answers so stipulated.
8. Until or unless subjects are guaranteed an vital organs meta-morph sized

procedure and clone operation as suchly to withstand absolute nuclear and
bio-hazardous approach in so saying, our zone of safety describing Planitias
Earths dimension-s we seat and its firmament, atmosphere, water, oxygen
ecological integritys, be suspected as such to construe, there is no sure way
to avoid becoming a victim of disclosure and dangers posed from un-
breathable and un-safe orientations and so while seeking to be declared safe
from internal and government sponsored predications the subject we see will
continue to seek an compromise until again the said threats no longer do
such compromise the safety of inviting influences and hospices we intend to
reside for with and besides to these ends.
9.. Pursuant of START II, but within the limitations set forth in this Treaty, as
such, activations, reserve and non-reserve, deployed and non-deployed are
subject to the Judges legal actions we see. An accounting will be pressed as
to situate phony responses and if so consider friendly means of persuasion
aimed at encouraging all Ensigns to this acclaim come forward each to his or
their region of representation and give declaration on the concise and
accurate accounting of in particular the nbc arsenals they possess. The
subject of delivery apparatus will be temporarily resigned as to stress the
significance of honest accounting by the Ensigns and High Contracting
Partys defining High Contracting Partys as the United States of America, the
Russian Federation and its alliances as indicated in this Paragraph and
supplement to the said Conventions.
10.. In an effort to protect the blessings of life and in as suchly the

expression of appreciation for the services and governing securitys of allied
and axis overtures and successes built on each of the Partys ideas of
protecting and serving, an High Standing Commission to the authenticity and
legal areas of these conditions added concert attention for dangerous and
fissile toxic chemicals and their precursors in general order of most volatile
and-s nbc-s, (nuclear, bio-molecular, quasi-chemical) at which in accordance
with this chapters revisions, includes, neutron, hydrogen, uranium and
plutonium fissile properties in and that so best describe the said yields,
explosive combustibility in desires for authors to construe neither a concern,
nor, decay and shelf life of lethal property indexs past or presently on the
drawing board will continue to be the subject.
11. As Such to construe an effort be made to address START I and IIs

shortfalls, this agreement and the exercise of virtual disappear-ment of every
type-s nbc-wmd payload-s, including bio-hazardous aerosols, cultures of
measles, germs, infections ,defoliants and detergents such as agent orange
of every topic I never knew to deceive for a side-s a disclosure- can situate
for or against, an appropriate counter measure, will be due to properly
concerted attention well construe as subject to the limitation and vanishing
obligation we set aside.
12. In an effort to comply with police procedures and by whose presents we

seek to support the subject of assimilate police issued pepper and tear gas
necessity at not in excess of forty liter contraption and dispensable units of
such limitable said specific active ingredient to the emphasis of replicas
stage riots and upheavals so Committee sided these amended chapters in
accordance to this Provision mentals intended purposes when concert the
limitations provided for.
Analysis, Discussions, Constructive criticism, Advise, Offers
PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION UPDATED 10 30 PM 04 MARCH 2015 PST
ARTICLE 4 (Disarmament Dutys and Descriptions)
1. The subject of a news crews, and United Nations hotlines and tended
officers situated to care-coordinate research and advise on technical matters
should questions and obscuritys be taken up in accordance with this
Paragraph and the noted need for a dispatch at U N headquarters so be
situated.
2. Since conversion tables are an uncertain area of public knowledge when

configuring kiloton to megaton measurements units of combustible mixtures
and in so viewing a real footage of tv camera peoples ideas of said
Hiroshima and in so noting it's explosive calibration was just 15 k-ton, a
complete and formal accounting and preparation mechanism to handle
megaton attributed lineages must be made for On Site Inspection-ary and
Duly Sworn recovery and disarm-virtual disappear-ment units to which we
suggest who so deed perfidy in all are alien replicas of my fathers creation
will jeopardize their freedoms so weigh my rights another way and consider
taking necessary preparation to account and do the magic shot in a way
conducive and beneficial to Entitys rights to preside?
3. An Supreme Unified Command and Response Authoritys (SUCRA), to

represent each to their unity and branch of military specialized fields
corresponding to the selective service and technical advice affiliation thereby
conscribed and assigned to their category of expertise shall over see and
account for leadership authority as such detail described, an Navy Branch,
each in accordance to their affiliation of Ensign or Star whose concerted
attention will oversee, (as example), an United States Naval ordnance,
arsenals, zones of offensive and strategic and non-strategic weapons grade
contraptions as to account for:
(a) every war ship, submersible, flotilla, or yet not noticed vessels hazardous
and fissionary details and a specific data in an effort to give reliable and
accurate accounting as sowardly.
(b) classes, variants, models, integers, components, fissile and other
adjectives use to decide before and after dispersal and virtual disappear-
ment properties in an effort to exercise civil and moral homages to our
creators planner.
4. The subjects of the High Contracted Partys assignment to these

discussions will be a subject as such- for Duly as advises a two year
commitment to involve their areas of expertise in especially Russian /United
States- in duties of Joint Recovery and On Site Decommission-ment and
Observer Teams; JROSDOT in area of descriptive? The JROSDOT under the
auspicious of Police and Sheriff Department personnel, and-s Attorney
Generals Ensigns regard for authorities present and a United Nations
contingent of JROSDOT missionarys, shall consist of one third percentile of
the United States and Russian total units assigned to the Job sites and
contiguous zones where such as virtual disappearance and assignment
obligations may be re-constituted. Noting further the High Contracted Partys
will be urged to not make haste and procrastinate; for these imprinted
salutations received step one:
(a) canvass and film designated area to be treated, clear area assign
disappearance managers to fulfill liability escrows desire to use force, and
presto although the acts of vanish-ment as studied takes no more than an
hour to describe Hararys in every captains quarter therefore let no phony
baloney excuse describe a better candidate for another resource Bibi?
5. By virtue of this binding Provision and in accordance with this Chapters

Disarmament objectives The High Contracted Partys will require to each
their own supply of friendly video and photography news service
supplications in as so called to remove the doubts as long as the disclosed
information pertains to no real riffs with Russians, nor Isis, nor Palestine
adages a notation of phony recollection when history began and after having
read the disclosure and viewed the exhibitions then subject of
documentation for a one hour interval per units of re-constitution per day
time viewing scheduled intervals will allow all to assimilate an unfamiliar
attention be serviced and be seen to the The Celestial and Honorable
Presiding Judges in the Supreme Courts of Anton our Captains side so stated.
6. Noted in these Final Recommendations; the subject of photography,

whether it be stills or video reel digital will be construed as an lawful
obligation. Parody is essential to these conditions of Joint Recovery and On-
Site Decommission-ment; therefore each receiving Party will extend an olive
branch to the JROSDOT and give attention to an assimilation of pride and
hospitable a tentative desire to serve the needs of the Partys assigned to
these contentions.
7. Russian and United States (MOAB) Massive Ordnance Air Burst detonation
device and any class of its type, aka, a Daisy Cutter explosive limitation-
weapon of confidence building subject shall be construed as an wmd and is
subject to SUCRA disarmament obligations assumed and this Chapters
protocols situated to these imprints.
8. Cruise Missiles and Variants of the type not to exceed 4,500 pound
warhead = CM. will be construed as a wmd regardless of its payload
attribution there study.
ARTICLE 5 DECLARATIONS
1. Each State Party shall submit to the Organization, With respect to nuclear
bio-molecular chemo-quasi weapons herein after (nbc):
(a) Declare whether it owns or possesses any (nbc) weapons, or whether

there are any (nbc) weapons located in any place under its jurisdiction or
control;
(b) Specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of
(nbc) weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under
its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with this Chapters intended
purposes, report any chemical weapons on its territory that are owned and
possessed by another State and located in any place under the jurisdiction or
control of another State, in accordance
(c) Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any

(nbc) weapons and specify the transfer or receipt of such weapons, in
accordance with this Sub-paragraph?
(d) Provide its general plan for virtual disappear-ment of (nbc) weapons that
it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or
control, in accordance to this Sub paragraph?
(e) With respect to old (nbc) weapons and abandoned (nbc) weapons;
Declare whether it has on its territory old chemical weapons and provide all
available information in accordance with this Sub paragraph
(f) Declare whether there are abandoned (nbc) weapons on its territory and
provide all available information in accordance with this entry and Declare
whether it has abandoned chemical weapons on the territory of other States
and provide all available information in accordance with this paragraph?
2. With respect to (nbc) weapons production facilities, Declare whether it has

or has had any (nbc) weapons production facility under its ownership or
possession, or that is or has been located in any place under its jurisdiction
or control at any time this and a specify any (nbc) weapons production
facility it has or has had under its ownership or possession or that is or has
been located in any place under its jurisdiction or control at any time, in
accordance with this paragraph.
(a) Report any (nbc) weapons production facility on its territory that another
State has or has had under its ownership and possession and that is or has
been located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State at
any time in accordance with this Sub paragraph.
(b) Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any

equipment for the production of (nbc) weapons and specify the transfer or
receipt of such equipment, in accordance with this Sub-paragraph.
(c) Provide its general plan for virtual elimination as disappear-ment hiatus
will describe of any such (nbc) weapons production facility it owns or
possesses, or that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in
accordance with its obligation we see as formal and binding in accordance
with this Sub paragraph.
(d) Specify an action to be taken for closure of any (nbc) weapons production
facility it owns or possesses, or that is located in any place under its
jurisdiction or control, in accordance with this Sub paragraph
(e) With respect to other facilities: Specify the precise location, nature and
general scope of activities of any facility or establishment under its
ownership or possession, or located in any place under its jurisdiction or
control, and that has been designed, constructed or used for development of
either (nbc) weapons. Such declaration shall include, inter alia, laboratories
and test and evaluation sites.
(f) With respect to riot control agents: Specify the chemical name, structural
formula and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry number, if assigned,
of each chemical it holds for riot control purposes. This declaration shall be
updated not later than 30 days after any change becomes effective in
accordance to the provisions of this Article and the relevant provisions of the
terms of disarmament Chapters of his decided.
ARTICLE 6 (PROCEDURES IN CHALLENGED INSPECTIONS)
1. Each State Party has the right to request an onsite challenge inspection of
any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the
jurisdiction or control of any other State Party for the sole purpose of
clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible noncompliance
with the provisions of this Convention, and to have this inspection conducted
anywhere without delay by an inspection team designated by authority of
Entitys we seated and a Secretary Generals waivers of consented in
accordance with this Chapter and by virtue of the present dangers
associated with criman-ee architecture complaints.
2. Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the inspection request
within the scope of this Convention and to provide in the inspection request
all appropriate information on the basis of which a concern has arisen
regarding possible non-compliance with this Convention as specified in this
meeting of the minds. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded
inspection requests, care being taken to avoid abuse. The challenge
inspection shall be carried out for the sole purpose of determining facts
relating to the possible non-compliance.
3. For the purposes of verifying compliance with the provisions of this

authority to convey, each State Party shall permit the mostly executive and
administrative assigned Supreme Unified Command Response Authority,
SUCRA or their assigned contingents to conduct the on-site challenge
inspection pursuant to Chapters III paragraph 14 of the DESBIC Treaty Draft
to this indication.
4. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a facility or location,

and in accordance with the procedures provided for in the meeting of the
minds, the inspected State Party shall have: (a) The right and the obligation
to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with this
Entitys and, to this end, enable the inspection team to fulfill its mandates.
The obligation to provide access within the requested site for the sole
purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non-
compliance; and the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations,
and to prevent disclosure Inventory of will be hereby forfeited not latter than
the commencement of Joint Recovery and On Site Decommission-ment and
Observer Teams; JROSDOT expected deployments to areas under scrutiny.
5. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply: (a) The requesting
State Party may, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, send
a representative who may be a national either of the requesting State Party
or of a third State Party, to observe the conduct of the challenge inspection.
The inspected State Party shall then grant access to the observer in
accordance with the entitys decided we situated a meeting of the minds so
stated. The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed
observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall
be recorded in the final report.
6. The requesting State Party shall present an inspection request for an on-
site challenge inspection to the Executive Council and at the same time to
the JROSDOT for immediate processing. 14. The Head of a JROSDOT shall
immediately ascertain that the inspection request meets the requirements
specified in and that as an Entitys can decide for a purpose of reconciliation
and if necessary, assist the requesting State Party in filing the inspection
request accordingly. When the inspection request fulfils the requirements,
preparations for the challenge inspection shall begin.
7. The Head of the Joint Recovery and On Site Decommission-ment and
Observer Teams, JROSDOT shall transmit the inspection request to the
corresponding liaisons and a speedy hearing may be concerted. the
inspected State Party must give a window of nearer toward 24 hours of any
said decision to deny access nor consent to approach and man the
designated installations.
8. Analysis, research, discussion, constructive criticism: Financial distress can

be a cause for in trepidation, so in the singled out cases of a United States
and Russian alliance we see were waiting and holding out for Mr. Obama to
lift sanctions and end cold areas of fuss over a internal matter of the Russian
Federations to say according to my recollection as well secret service policys
concerted toward causes to block virtual disappear-ment and dispersal
activitys I see? Having seen good relations go sour over poor foreign policy
decision making once before the objectives for the two High Contracted
Participants, is all to do with per capita income and an ability to pay. In so
saying, Mr. Obama Sir-s, it is customary when going to the nice Russian
Federation to tip out, this way, based on the laws of give and take we see a
parody within our Communities. Authorities to say suggesting from Russias
point of view, at least we did not spend the last twenty five years militarily
offending since the generous times of the overture period was situated for
open and warmer relations Mr. Obama Sir-s.
9. After having received the inspection request, the Joint Recovery and On
Site Decommission-ment liaisons shall take cognizance of the actions on the
request and shall keep the case under its consideration throughout the
inspection procedure. However, its deliberations shall not delay the
inspection process.
10. The Executive Council, (mostly executive and administrative assigned to

suchly Supreme Unified Command Response Authority, SUCRA or their
assigned contingents) may, not later than 12 hours after having received the
inspection request, decide by a three-quarter majority of all its members
against carrying out the challenge inspection.
(a) Analysis: And so I seek the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive or
clearly beyond the scope of this Convention as described herein bearing in
minds, cold hearted ways and means of ending the dissensions are needed.
Do we see a nuclear chain reaction in Mr. Obama and Mr. McCains answers?
11. Neither the requesting nor the inspected State Party shall participate in
such a decision. If the Executive Council decides against the challenge
inspection, preparations shall be stopped, no further action on the inspection
request shall be taken, and the States Parties concerned shall be informed
accordingly. The Director-Generals shall issue an inspection mandate for the
conduct of the challenge inspection. The inspection mandate shall be the
inspection request referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 put into operational
terms, and shall conform to the inspection request so stated. The challenge
inspection shall be conducted in accordance with Entities knowledge of
candor to assail neither. The inspection team shall be guided by the principle
of conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner possible,
consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of its mission.
12. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the
challenge inspection and facilitate its task. If the inspected State Party
proposes, arrangements to demonstrate compliance with this Convention,
alternative to full and comprehensive access, it shall make every reasonable
effort, through consultations with the inspection team, to reach agreement
on the modalities for establishing the facts with the aim of demonstrating its
compliance. The final report shall contain the factual findings as well as an
assessment by the inspection team of the degree and nature of access and
cooperation granted for the satisfactory implementation of the challenge
inspection. The Director-Generals shall promptly transmit the final report of
the inspection team to the requesting State Party, to the inspected State
Party, to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. The Director-
General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council the
assessments of the requesting and of the inspected States Parties, as well as
the views of other States Parties which may be conveyed to the Director-
General for that purpose, and then provide them to all States Parties.
13. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its powers and functions,
review the final report of the inspection team as soon as it is presented, and
address any concerns as to: (a) Whether any non-compliance has occurred;
(b) Whether the request had been within the scope of this Convention; and
(c) Whether the right to request a challenge inspection had been abused.
14. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its
powers and functions, that Inventory of International Nonproliferation
Organizations and Regimes Center for Nonproliferation Studies be allowed
a say on the matter, (if applicable),(TCWC-16CWC TEXT EXCERPTS further
action may be necessary) it shall take the appropriate measures to redress
the situation and to ensure compliance with this Convention, including
specific recommendations to the Conference. In the case of abuse, the
Executive Council shall examine whether the requesting State Party should
bear any of the financial implications of the challenge inspection.
15. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party shall have the
right to participate in the review process. The Executive Council shall inform
the States Parties and the next session of the Conference of the outcome of
the process. If the Executive Council has made specific recommendations to
the Conference, the Conference shall consider action in accordance with this
Article as conferred.
UNDER CONSTRUCTION 5 March 2015
ARTICLE 7 (Recalled and Dangerous Munitions)
1. Another said explosive unit of ordnances used is the JDAM of which

stockpile contingencies shall remain subject to the limitations provided
herein a fore; no such uranium depleting means of cancerous asphyxiations
shall be seriously considered safe to usages hereto nor "Cluster Bombs", in a
civilian theater, all military schools, as an a specifically controlled weapon of
attack.
2. In addition, observer missionaries aside from Russia, NATO, China the USA
and U N are to have a say so as reconsider the liability's as lawfully attained
when in the use of Cluster Bombs (which spread into hundreds of bomb lets
and are deadly to civilians) in and though perspective to such an occasion to
which in its own resolve however, may be thought well of a specifically, as
far as cluster bombs are concerned, as suchly stated, cluster device have a
particular military purpose as so intended. The Manufacturer's supply lenders
are the sending Party of such ordnance's so emphasized, there care shall be
made financially liable for all civilian fatalities when a civil defense claimant
petition a law officer of vice and shall see fit to federalize a claim
in accordance with this revision of particulars and extended Provision here-
stating.
3. Penalties and fines be taken in contentions and as well, in Counties

where instituting an United Nations Treasury Secretary 10017 New York
Offices. Fines and DARE programs to be enforced (Disarmament Abuse
Resistance Education), post 31 December 2,022; use to assuage compliancy
on those who are not in conformity with this Provision
4. In saying so, the Israeli's -criminally disqualify their authorship from which
to protect counterpoint strategic divisions by deeding never again take
note to this entrys impetus in 'cumulative growth of said nuclear weapons
that so. In furtherance's she maintains an disturbing strategic and non-
strategic anatomical dis-proportionate accumulative stockpiles here told. She
orients to target each countrys mass and other secret stations in an effort to
confuse all I seated.
5. For the purpose of considering the request, specialized frequency a

specific pertinences, such as nitrous shelf life and thermal heat convection,
the hydrogen questions, the neutron in its own intended capacity to regulate
a city in terms we as a phony animals and replicas of a Human can decided
differ with atomic explosive properties will also construe as an wmd and be
subject to the terms of this subject as well.
6. Nuclear propelled or tipped warhead(ed) ordnance and-s nuclear

propelled or tipped anti-missile systems shall be considered an WMD and
classified pursuant of this Provisionary as standard displacement or
classification of WMD subject to these ends.
7. OPEN ANALYSIS, DISCUSS
DESBIC TREATY ARTICLE-S 8 (Registry of Treaty(s')
1. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article(s') 102, in accordance

with the Charter of the United Nations on the premises of lawfully construe
iotas of authors plain clothes assailant tryers? Do authenticate a factual
meaning to whose it was to say?
2. This Section is applicable to fundamental tactic reserved reckonings of

"Entitys at Court I see telepathic transmissions and "alleged" DESBIC
AGENDA'S impursuant to Knows what I deeded County escrow consideration
to the U N Charter, as suchly welcomed to execute, as on a case by case
basis a "proces verbal" mode of communication, so to address, advise, and
call attention to:
(a) manipulation so as to arbitrate disputes without shots being fired, side of

psychiatry, while the Entity of biological researchers situate a account for our
said, capability of authenticating a side of a matter, so to speak, therewith;
we, the U N advisors, undertook an consent to be bound iota I say.
3. The function of the Depositary, in particular shall be to:
(a) keep custody of the original and updated text of the Treaty and keep
charge of its Statutes;
(b) prepare certified copies in such additional languages as may be required

and transmit the relevant data to the Plenipotentiaries entitled to become
Party(s') of a State, to the Treaty(s');
(c) receive signatures and keep custody of instruments, notifications and

communications relating to it; examine whether the information thereto is in
due and proper form and, if need be,
(d) bring a matter to the attention of the State(s') in question; inform the
Party(s') to the State(s') of ratification, acceptance, approval and accession
required for entry into force of the Treaty(s') after it has been received or
deposited; register the Treaty(s') with the Secretariat of the United Nations
dictates thereby;
(e) perform the functions specified within the framework and Provision-ment
of the present Convention and the Convention of International Diplomacy,
Done 04 March 2015
(f) proceed from the premise that nuclear confrontation would have
devastating consequences for ever and for all mankind alike; each Party(s')
undertake not to deploy anti -ballistic defenses armed with a nuclear or
multiple nuclear warheads as system deploy hereto.
Article 9 (Anti-Missile Defense)
1. Proceeding from the premise that nuclear confrontation would have

devastating consequences for ever and for all mankind alike; each Party(s')
undertake not to deploy anti -ballistic defenses armed with a nuclear or
multiple nuclear warheads as system deploy hereto.
2. Pursuant to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Limitations Treaty, Article XV Section

2., "extraordinary events" have transpired, extra-terrestrial presences and
disclosure at our attention. Also such as the proliferation of Russia's current
arsenal alone estimated to be, between 60,000 to 130,000 nuclear weapons
of fear; of these say 9,000 currently deployed, 9,000 are said to be deployed
tactical nuclear weapons of war, and the remaining 110,000 are either in
reserve, for sale, on standby for extraordinary alarm herein. U S A stock piles
are about 15 percent less quantity and less frequency yield and less
geological user fired shelf existence but do claim they are both threats and
challenges we faced.
(a) Notice is hereby given including a statement of concern. Anti-Missile laser

technology is a way to defend from an accidental or incidental occurrence
without compromising security perspective to non-nuclear warhead anti-
ballistic missile proliferation. In viable standing of Article IV, to this treaty,
and with exception to any nuclear warhead ABM system, scripted herein
therefore the U S entry is an reasonable withdrawal right assertion, bearing
in mind obsolete is to describe replicas secret identities of alien races in
need of a helping hand s will continue to be a subject from star elders
advisement attorneys contentions.
3. For the purpose of considering the requests for, the act or fact that an
Electric Photonic Technologys for use as an anti-missile, is defined as a
class of anti-matter reactionary soldiers and of SALTs concerns.
4. Such as it may be called it may be capable of defensive exaggerations if
the doubts still continue as to why an atomic warhead propulsion and
exploding aperture is as offensive to the detrimental well kindness of where
to whom these presents may see.
5. Having say so for the continued active negotiations and to promote the
objectives of and implementations of the Provisions of this Interim
Agreement: cease and desist uranium enrichment services abetment as such
may concern bearing in mind a photonic laser ray, displays a different mode
of transport than an anti-ballistic war-headed properties submachine
gunners opinions in particularly the cause for uninhabitable landscapes of
powers here and now though as why therefore.
DESBIC TREATY (Israels Right to Exist)
ARTICLE-S 10 (Israel's Right to Exist)
1. Make Known to These Presents, all who killed falsify our directive or so it
seem and resolve for suspicious demeanor known to all alien replica abuses
of alien technologys especially States of Israel rancor. The Jewish States
leaders are to take a careful look at the cases we have up and not engage in
under sided terror tactics
http://desbictreaty.blogspot.com/2015/01/as-clearly-laid-out-in-this-
descriptive.html
(a) the reported frequency dealings on the said un-anatomical dis-

proportionate objectives I hear we called in to scrutiny weight of State of
Israel's put up a five trillion dollar bond nor or do I say Ill order us to
undertake a 24/7/ 365 on site inspection review to this exercise as conferred
by the under-insurers objective to we pledge allegiance not for united safety
worthy to understand when given the ultimatum by an action we brought to
a said realty escrows.
7. In exercising their rights and performing their duties each Party

undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of social upheaval, hostility or
violence do not compromise the justice of the peace. It shall be construed
that any such leader proscribing to edify combustive disdain-ment as to
perpetuate violence, are:
(a) disturbing the peace and will respect each other's right to live in peace
within their legal actionary framework, far and free away from disdain and
dissidence therein.
8. The foregoing provisions of this Chapter shall refer to Israel as an

International Organization within the bounds of having a alien identity and
falsified ledgers I see in Star Based Internal complexes if and when:
(a) an imposition of such as a dispute of sort as we have inscribed to resolve

pursuant of the Protocols, and an absence of Legal emphasis as to the Star
Elder decision of a matter bring Party's to a Statement to conflict once again
in so long as the status quas of Israel, a Statement I seat orders lawful
decision in a matter of degenerative sorcery attires.
(b) the letter of the law as decidedly ascribed for the State of Israel is that a
sentence that of 6 months and 6 days in the detention hold and 666 sheckles
fine be there hand over shall any law nor lawful organization contribute in
every and any way to give aid in nor support of trans gender lifestyle nor a
terrorist seditious acts of treason.
(c) Partys to the wafer of words ; lament to do suchly as one Israel, there-
fore an care co-ordinate effort to re-vitalize, rebuild, re-unify, repair, reason,
regard, Palestine programme of provision-al supplementary assist under the
terms of this Articles legitimate facsimiled a-specific matter of descent
respect to this end. Bearing in mind your intentions as replica imposters was
impose a Hell like torment and regression on our faces.
(d) Analyze-review-
FOR ALL INSIGNIA'S TO AN MARQUIS; BY THESE PRESENTS SHALL YE GIVE

FAITH AND REVERENCY TO GOD'S WILL WE TRUST THE WORD OF THE WAFER
BY WHOSE PRESENCE WE SUMMON IN GODS WILL WE PRESS DONE 4
MARCH 2015 MIDWAY CA. 92655
ARTICLE 11 (Disbandment of Nuclear Resources)
1. The Provisions of this Article, in so far as each Party is concerned, shall

take due account of the depletion of oxygen molecules characterized by
escaping radioactive nuclear products and by products, and the field
frequency of escaping charged particles accumulated therein.
2. The Party(s') here to establish to make Provision, in accordance with this

Statute and the application of this Treaty(s'): to dismantle and decommission
all 500 or so nuclear power plants of Planitia plane of existence air I breathe
a face of Earth's inter-dependency, on the basis of nuclear safety regulations
and the concerns over life security incessant with:
(a) Special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as

a sensing component in instruments used to establish a condition of security
clearances thereof.
3. If exempted nuclear material is to be processed and situated out of a

reaches of space in galactic isolations stored together with nuclear materials
subject to safeguards under this agreement, provision shall such actions be
situated.
4. The recourse and the Subsidiary Arrangements to be made with

organizations of the Trust, (the Depositary), calls for upward of near four per
Ensign or more nuclear reactors, commercial or non-descriptive, per country
or Party to a State to deco missionary and dis assembly standards every 3
months as part of the Subsidiary Arrangements to be agreed upon here
withal.
5. For the discharge of the functions and the exercise of the powers
mentioned in the present Article(s), and pursuant to Article III, Section 3 of
the present agenda, a moratorium and construction ban in the field of
nuclear power generation assembly, and nuclear power research and
development projects oldest that present most liability hereby. Therefore, to
promote the objectives and implementations of the Provisionment to this
Treaty(s'), the Party(s') will be advised, on a voluntary basis to:
(a) disengages, or suspends those reactors that are scheduled to be built, or

that are currently under construction hereinafter.
6. Within the framework of paramount consideration, a penalty assessment

fee of 12.5 million dollars, U S/U N, per reactor, biennial, sequentially
continual, shall be paid to the International Organization the United Nations
who bear the burden of:
(a) maintaining International security with the objective of achieving, as soon
as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitations, reduction and
eventual termination of our 500 or so nuclear reactors on land or subsoil; and
shall surely
7. In view of the contributions the use of nuclear energy has seemed to

facilitate, each of the Party(s') to a State undertake to:
(a) cease and desist in the supplemental categories of providing source,

and/or fissionable materials such as uranium enrichment for commercial use
at plants, or other purchases and/or purposes we don't sequester therefore.
Having regard for a spirit of sincere co-operative settlement consistent of an
order to ensure accession to this accordance(s), regardless of whatsoever in
each others internal affairs, exportation, importation, for side, let, or sublet;
along with marketing strategies, in general contracting or sub contractual
fine lines of a specified frequency(s), shall,
(b) be subject to the penalty assessments, under due process of Law, as

mentioned in the previous paragraph(s) hereon thereto.
8. In order to make a reasonable contribution to the common objective of

confidence building, the participating States accordingly, without the
necessity of any special agreement, will come to reaffirm a Faith in and that
radioactivity as specified herein:
(a) depletes the oxygen molecules that a breath of fresh air is a right to
pursue as common ends whereof.
9. The existence of any fact which, if established constitute an anti-equation,

is a matter of Courts authorized to have a say in a matter of where I go
when dies if even dies a matter. This is our good Lords to say; take any
such actions as may be required to save a people therefore, issue no new
operating permit continuances as effective at once and undertake
consequential dis-continuations hereby will contends.
ARTICLE 12 (Disbandment of Nuclear Resources)
World Nuclear Power

Summary, 2,005
Reactors in Operation
in Number of Units;
And Non-Op, or Scheduled
to be Built (NONOP-SB)
(a) The Party to a divide be bound by the instruments of this entry, inasuch
the subject of nuclear energy complexities shall continue to be the subject
on which weapons grade contentions shall be surmised in every manor of
treachery divisible, to the limitations provided for pursuant of this entry and
sorcery related new developments with a view to disappears somewhere
near the last centillion armigers of galactic-al know how, therefore licensing
fees shall be short of discontinued on the grounds of intentions to disband
reiterated four nuclear reactor units or complexes per Ensign every three
months will contend is a step in a right direction will contend hereby-s.
(b) And in furtherance of the said distinguished masters presences, The

Partys to this global telepathic review deed concur someway to finalize the
reductions to aggregate 0,00 a postulate terminates not latter then, 31
January 2,025 or sooner pending on critical life estimates of expirations if
applicable?
(b)World Nuclear Power Summary, 2,005 through 31 December 2,007
Reactors in Operation in Number of Units; And Non-Op, or Scheduled to be
Built (NONOP-SB)
Countries:
1. Argentina ------------4 --5

2. Armenia--------------1
3. Belgium---------------8 --9
4. Brazil------------------3 --5
5. Bulgaria---------------5 --7
6. Canada---------------15 --23
7. China-----------------15 --23
8. Czech Republic-------6 --08
9. Finland-----------------5
10. France---------------61 --65
11. Germany------------22 --27
12. Hungary--------------4
13. India-----------------23 --29
14. Iran--------------------2 --03
15. Israel------------------1 --02
16. Japan-----------------60 --65
17. Korea North----------2 --03
18. Korea South---------22 --30
19. Lithuania--------------2 --03
20. Mexico-----------------2
21. Netherlands-----------1
22. Pakistan----------------4 --08
23. Romania---------------1 --03
24. Russia-----------------38 --45
25. Slovakia----------------8 --10
26. Slovenia----------------1
27. South Africa -----------3
28. Spain-------------------10 --12
29. Sweden-----------------11 --12
30. Switzerland-------------5 --07
31. Taiwan-------------------9 --11
32. Ukraine-----------------18 --21
33. Un-disclosed-----------10
34. United Kingdom-------34 --39
35. United States----------106 -121
36. Naval Global-----------60 -100
37. Global Mini-------------12 -20
38. = 36 Countries-Totals
39. Total Est. -------------------525
40. Total Est.
(NONOP-SB) -------------097 -100
41. Total Est.

Commission-able --------------0,625
NUCLEAR ENERGY REACTOR' UTILITY'S
11. To the extent possible consistent with its primary responsibilities an, U N
Secretary Generals quarter shall be called to answer to a Higher Court in an
effort to assure the obligations are tended to will contend that so especially
when contending an accounting for the nuclear propelled submersibles,
aircraft carriers, any and all such missile strategic offensive and defensive
projections advent projectiles nor missiles there as: by, any atomic or
thermal nuclear means of trajectory over flight herein as will control and
command authorities.
12. The Party's' hereto established as an International Atomic Energy

Agency, (hereinafter referred to as "The IAEA". or "The Agencies", upon the
terms hereinafter set forth dis-agreed to agreed be bound by these new
disclosures and material facts so stated for a record and undertake a policy
directed at the elimination of nuclear energy complexes selective service
conscription and make known to all intending IAEA be banned from assisting
in the development, address, advise, nor calling attention to:
(a) any nuclear reactor energy utility enterprise, organizational esquire with
any custodial mode of operates whose permits may enlist for, Peaceful
Servitudes, by, nor of the IAEA services,
(c) occupational clandestine perestroika are too replicas of Human very well
capable of supplying green and eco-friendly ways and means of energys so
evidence suggested will contend again-s.
13. Pursuant of this Chapter, "Objectives", of THE STATUTE OF THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,// Geiger counting apparatus and
hospital or medical x-ray machinery supervised under strict military
auspicious, shall be considered:
(a) the only "peaceful purposes", brace thoughts to reduce, dispose, collect,
gather decommission, and dis-assemble to uniform standard com pliancy
only in the case for the "Objectives" to the letter of the advancement for
society's Convention on the UNSCC Treaty, in accordance's with this agenda's
interpretation as dis-agreed to agreed that:
(b) even lesser frequency fissionable tools, products and services, will
contend, be last to decommission in and these commodities may easily be
re-invented by another means of stipulate atomic understanding-s.
(c) wheresoevers exists an ex-spent fuel rod fuel enrichment procedures the
risk assessment that of burdened by more said accumulation than can
humanly be expected to amount dangerous contamination and death. In
decidedly agreed terms, it is the opinion of this entry that the primary
concern for the elimination and de-conversion of nuclear fuel enrichment
synthesized energy source into safe and practical search warrants necessary
for you to keep faith with it where as we did seek legal assistance in this
matter of tongue dialect spoken to us before this abridgment Sir.
PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION

5 March 2015
Article 13 (Maritime Disclosure)

1. For the purpose of this Convention: the "area" refers to International
Waters
and the sub-space within its jurisdictional limits; the same as "external
waters"
here bouts The sovereignty of a coastal State, or a land locked State
extends to:
(a) the sub-space referred to as territorial sea. Except where otherwise

provided
for in this Article, the standing domain to the sub-space of internal waters, or
territorial seas is 12 nautical miles, subject to the conditions of this
Provisionment here as,
(b) respective hereafter thereupon as the states at large, in parochial and

custodial charges of keeping Law and Order in its place thereabouts but
within the bounds of,
(c) wayward up in such a said projection therefore an agreed upon moments

of the business senses, disqualifies the reach of 200 nautical miles from the
points of geological reference and/or submergence within the crests and
even
tides of a shorelines in accordance an legal actions displayed give cause to
act or trespass within the bounds expressed thereof.
2. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of International

Maritime Security, Support and Service thereto, a United Nations sub
contractual award shall be entered as duly handed down to the United States
Navy and Marine Corps. The award shall be accompanied by a supporting
opinion, which shall be adopted by a majority resolution there as the
chambers of a Secretary General's, United Nations. Supportive conjectures.
3. In accordance with the foregoing principles the two High Contracting

Parties, subject to the Memorandum of Understanding, the Protocol, and to
the agenda for which it stood for, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall
act as an componency, hereby therein, support and service to: the- U N. and
High Contracting Party(s'), (U S Department of Defense). (US Navys)
4. Subject to the supply and demand, and in accordance with the Provisions
of these orders afore, specified High Contracting Partnerships, shall rank and
file then award for inter-agency contract services as remedial and
supplemental action to meet its growing needs thereof why fore. Any
differences that might arise in regard to the interpretation or execution of the
award shall be submitted to the floor of the General Assembly for a
confidence measure salutation whereby any such as said dissenting
arbiter(s), and as firm decision can concern, shall have its right to state their
grounds for dissent ion.
5. Within the bounds of the Black Sea co-ordinates thereto, and up wayward
of the North East Siberian Pacific Waters, the standard 200 nautical mile
trans boundary submergences of legal discretion will be assessed to all who
come to dual as duly implied notwithstanding the status quota
considerations therefore will applied for would be notions of protection
recalls; "charge' d'affaires" to U N may wave service descriptive as so to
agree to the terms and conditions of the Global Maritime Security Act, which
are inclusive of the fact(s) all stated not latter than 31 December 2017:
(a) A U N mandate that assures a principle of multilateralism is in force.
(b) U N authorities are on board U S carrier groups and escort ships, co-
monitoring actively on ship(s), as to establish a program of work;
(c) an open line of International Maritime Communication furthers to

undertake to settle military enrollment as automatically ratified for
successive periods, and in so doing, support the cause of each others
assistance in which the way of primary care supplication has arisen to the
occasion of men, to these of whose presents we stand.
6. Proclaiming as their principle aim, the Partys of an agreement whose

jurisdiction or control is the surface and submergence's of every stormy sea
that will cause to plot out any said course of clandestine or tumultuous acts
of inexcusability to a said act or fact :
(a) to ensign to the establishment of the International Maritime
Committee'(s) thereby advise and consent be granted of Entities now
presiding in holding areas "mot us operat us" entered as gentle men's
agreement concurred mindful of the vulnerabilities, fearing nothing more,
perspective to the inquirys, and use of U N intermediaries on ships and on
high seas.
(b) there exists a need to limit the incidents and accidents associated with
Inter-active naval proliferation, and the threats imposed by the states of
competitive and stipulated soon forgotten waves of dangers; as sold to the
attentions of what might decide to put away pre activated weapons NBC
laden cargo reminders of a charge to a May Day issued, we decided.
(c) and need to limit the construction therein, of International desires down in
the shipyards, to that principle objective adequate measures for the legal
systems in force and the Member Countries are waived to the affirmations
accepted as lawful, and confirmed as Office of Secretary of Defenses
discretion to cease and desist construction inventorial supply joint
engagements as follows:
(d) disbandment of Aircraft carriers of any said aggregate numerical quasi

repeating decimal integers; battleships, amphibious and littoral combat
emplacements, the business industrys note to need, and needs to note a
permit of U N General assembly authorization calendar on 24 /7 /said 365
days alerts for an open ended line of procedure, developmental and
operative custody assurances of the powers in this Courts follow through
may concede to these dis-engage-ments in fit of rages attention?
8. In conformity with this entry as entered, unauthorized usage of a Party(s')

to a
violation or citation thereto is grounds for penalty assessments, seizure of a
naval
flotilla, loss of permanent membership status-quo to a Security Council in
and that, unless otherwise given permission by the U N General Assembly(s')
determined efforts, any vessel deemed to be laden with nuclear, biological,
chemical weapons grade formulations, descriptive to illegal or suspicious
cargo herein, shall be inspected and subject to this Provisionment to the Law
of the sea, Charter of their United Nations General Assembly(s) hereinafter
wherefore.
9. In carrying out the foregoing responsibilities, an United Nations

Organization of International Governance may annex as an "eminent domain
trust", the Pan-American Isthmus, and the Suez Isthmus hereby; use for the
aforementioned purposes, without cost except as provided for in this
accounting for a purpose of orderly transit, accepts the grant of such rights
and undertakes to exercise them in accordance with this Treaty(s') and
related agreements hereto thereby.
10. In accordance with the Provisions of this Article, no Naval warships,

Flotilla arrangements of any Country's origin be circumnavigating 200
nautical miles off the coast of the USA and Russia with several exemptions
such as the Berring Straights and some authorized adjoining country's
permission, Air and sea in general item implies. This Provision is subject to
revised quotation hereas.
ARTICLE 14 THE ORGANIZATION (DESBIC) GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The States Parties to this Convention hereby establish the Organization for
Allied unity and the Prohibition of (nbc) Weapons to achieve the object and
purpose of this Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions,
including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to
provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.
2. All States Parties to this Convention shall be members of the Organization.

A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization.
The seat of the Headquarters of the Organization shall be The United Nations
10017 NY USA.
3. Omitted and Open

4. There situated are hereby established as the organs of the Organization:
the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Councils, and the
Secretary Generals quarter by word of police in areas of I do.
5. The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under
this Convention in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the
timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only
the information and data necessary to fulfill its responsibilities under this
Convention. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of
information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to its
knowledge in the implementation of this Convention and, in particular, shall
abide by the provisions set forth in the United States Federal Code of Justice.
6. In undertaking its verification activities the Organization shall consider

measures to make use of advances in science and technology.
7. The costs of the Organizations activities shall be paid by States Parties in

accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into
account differences in membership between the United Nations and this
Organization, and subject to the provisions of amended and approved
Articles IV and V. of this Treatys rudimentary authorships. Financial
contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission shall be
deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular
budget. The budget of the Organization shall comprise two separate
chapters, one relating to administrative and other costs, and one relating to
verification costs.
8. A member of the Organization which is in denial of its intended purposes

shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of dues owed equals or
exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full
years the Conference of the States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a
member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions
beyond the control of the member.
THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES
DRAFTS OF EXECUTIVE PROCEDURES
ARTICLES 15
Composition, procedures and decision-making .
1. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as the

Conference) shall be composed of all members of this Organization. Each
member shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be
accompanied by alternates and advisers.
2. The first session of the Conference shall be convened by the depositary

not later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Convention.
3. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions which shall be held annually
unless it decides otherwise. Special sessions of the Conference shall be
convened:
(a) When decided by the Conference; (b) When requested by the Executive
Council; (c) When requested by any member and supported by one third of
the members; or (d) In accordance with this paragraph to undertake reviews
of the operation of this Convention.
4. Except in the case of subparagraph (d), the special session shall be

convened not later than 30 days after receipt of the request by the discretion
of the Secretary General of the United Nations unless specified otherwise in
the request.
5. The Conference shall also be convened in the form of an Amendment

Conference in accordance with this paragraph and its exercise of formal
indoctrination.
6. Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat of the Organization
unless the Conference decides otherwise. The Conference shall adopt its
rules of procedure. At the beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its
Chairman and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office
until a new Chairman and other officers are elected at the next regular
session.
7. A majority of the members of the Organization shall constitute a quorum

for the Conference. Each member of the Organization shall have one vote in
the Conference. The Conference shall take decisions on questions of
procedure by a simple majority of the members present and voting.
Decisions on matters of substance should be taken as far as possible by
consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for
decision, the Chairman shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this
period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of
consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If
consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take
the decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless
specified otherwise in this Convention.
8. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall

consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this
Convention, including those relating to the powers and functions of the
Executive Council and the Secretary Generals quarter. It may make
recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues
related to this Convention raised by a State Party or brought to its attention
by the Executive Council.
9. The Conference shall oversee the integration of this Convention, and act in
order to promote its object and purpose. The Conference shall review
compliance with this Convention. It shall also oversee the activities of the
Executive Council and the Technical Secretary General (encoded) an United
States Agencys oversight commissioners rank and file of sequential not at
liberty to discuss and may issue guidelines in accordance with this
Convention to either of them in the exercise of their functions.
10. The Conference shall consider and adopt at its regular sessions, report
programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive
Council, if applicable as well as consider other reports; decide on the scale of
financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with
paragraph the rules and guidelines as so situated; Elect the members of the
Executive Council; appoint an Director-General; approve the rules of
procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter; establish such
subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in
accordance with this Convention;
(a) Also contending: recognize a need to foster international cooperation for

virtue-disappear-ment agents scope and purposes in the field of (nbc) (wmd)
disarmament and restoration activities; review scientific and technological
developments that could affect the operation of Inventory of International
Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes adages to include in this
context, a said authorities as such an Director-General to establish a
Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in the performance of his functions,
to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to
this Convention, to the Conference, the Executive Council or States Parties.
11. The Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts

appointed in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference;
consider and approve at its first session any relevant draft agreements,
provisions and guidelines developed by the Preparatory Commission;
establish at its first session the voluntary fund for assistance in accordance
with this Provision; take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with
this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes
the provisions of this Convention.
12. The Conference shall not later expire and shall in its own recognition
serve the interests of the Secretary Generals and the secret service by way
of Entity authority figures Human rights interests as to indoctrinate an so
called entry into force of this objective and common ground approach in an
effort to self service its identifying agencies and at such other times within
that time period as may be decided upon, convene in special sessions to
undertake reviews of the operation in as such reviews take into account any
relevant scientific and technological developments. At varying and working
intervals therefore, unless otherwise decided upon, further sessions of the
Conference shall be convened with security and star based re-pore being
appended as focal points to construe.
INFORMATION OUTDATED DO TO EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES

REGARDING ANTONS AUTHORITY TO FULFILL AND DECREE AND THE FACTS
PRESENTED INCLUDED THE MASSES ARE INDEED REPLICAS ABUSERS OF
ALIEN TECHNOLOGY WE CAUGHT DEVISING HELL I SEE?
ARTICLE 16 (Principles of Exploring Celestial Bodies)
(OBSOLETE ALL HAVE SAUCER GALACTIC UNDERSTANDING)
1. The exploration and use of outer space, excluding the Moon as non cosmic
classification and other celestial bodies considered classified to some extent
as is scheduled, so is all rights, titles and interests to the Party(s') first to
step feet on and display their Mass owns rights titles and interest, to the
Moon satellite, in a confirmed non cosmic lander soil a sampler's escrow too.
Of a Faith inasmuch the missions which were carried out some yesteryears
afar shall be for the benefit and in the interests of all Party(s') to an insignia,
regardless of who actually owns the escrow services holster appliances at
work. For celestial cosmic interplanetary claims of ownerships such as Mars
you must display your mass and take footage and other samples as to
establish your ground to the claim there serviced.
(a) Theresought being convinced in these circumstances the moon is

properly claimed as a U S **/ U N Title deed imprescriptive of its own rules
hereinafter all planning an expenditure rates are: 6 billion dollars visitation
premium per going NYSE Market rates in gold reserves; 3 billion to the
Treasury Secretary U N Trust account; upon approval from a U S Joint Chiefs
of staff and 3 billion to a DoD Trust accountancy, no trespassing though;
(a) Adjudged in accordance with; mission control, or in the chamber's of the

Secretary Generals, United Nations whereof. The agency feels that The
United States has a legal and moral obligation to take custodial possession of
the property which needs to be insured, so side carry insurance and
underwriting services in the event a Party cause damages thereso.
2. The Party(s) to the Treaty(s) reaffirm their Faith and commitment in the
purposes and principles as to live in peace with all peoples and all
governments, yet here we are determined to place a higher value on
celestial adventurisms then the costs of nuclear disarmament, associated
with the price of patience and virtue hereand.
3. When a Treaty(s) specifies that it is of unlimited duration, or the terms are

that of START II, and is entered into force, as stated, upward through
December 31, 2,007, with exclusionary implication that it role forward toward
a START III phase; no earlier or later act, or fact which takes place, unless it is
an act of Nature or Natures Law, hereof, the breadth of it; a State is
obligated to refrain from actions which would defeat the purpose, or the
object of acceptance by the designated instruments of Deposit hereunder
thereby call it.
4. A considerations set forth in this Article is such that are NASA expense
accounts for lunar manned subsoil missions and the ratio of past failed
missions is a deciding factual representation on the U S legal rights of escrow
foreclosure to they who coincidently side space cases; custodial controls.
6. In conformity with the purposes and principles of Global theater nuclear

disarmament, the Party(s) understand to the fullest extent of a Depositary
Signatory status, the consequences of negligible dissention of a charge to a
senior obligating to decree and fulfill as posted so please take notice and
adhere.
7. The disclosure of his acquisitions of The Moon, the Party's undertake in

good Faith to recognize by virtue of this declaration, she will be considered a
territory of a United States of America, to the undertaking and initial
application of sovereign written permission to consent as the subject to the
matter of imminent domain is best situated in U S custody ad interim rather
than going directly to a %5 Billion dollar a year United Nations acquisitions
hold on a matter of default by the Pentagon. Petitioners wave the motion
that U N hold the title by reason of power of attorney for the Pentagon
Defense attorneys.
8. They further undertake not to trespass upon The Moon without written and
authorized consent of the U S Joint Chiefs of Staff. The U S A were the first
non cosmic human animals to display their Mass on the Legend of the
mineral rich reminders of an fruitful and costly exploration hereto.
9. Although a United States had plans to colonize the lunar surface with
ecosphere's of settlements without regard of action or inactions of every
other party, the subject of property rights became more unimpeded when all
nuclear options and their space ambitions became shrouded in secret
weapons based exploitations of the U S well earned and deserved rights,
titles and interests of The Moon forgo a clause soldier.
10. The Party's undertake not to enter geosynchronous orbit within the
atmosphere of the Moon without permission as requested by clandestine
operatives. However, if the special agents in charge of this brief memo see
your satellite escrow as a purposeful Mission India and others, you will be
requested to remit a visitors fee that may at times be waived off by special
aperture agencies.
11. The provisions of this entry Article XIII Sections 7 through 11 shall apply
to the activities of States Party to the starboard invitation absences with a
view toward unauthorized dumping and desecration of earthly accumulations
on the Moon, unless a Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved in a unanimous
consent of council of particulars. All Joint Chiefs including the Chief's Chair
must unanimously approve any and every syllable of doubt to naysay over
the matter. Subject to the conditions of these declarations it is not ruled out
that another settling Party must pay rental fees to reside or dwell thereupon
The Moon.
12. The subject is considered a reasonable assumption heresay, as warning

to all who loiter there, no trespassing, trespassers will be used for target
practice from now on in afar affixed and sealed as certifiably ongoing and the
Clerk of the Courts shall concur the matter as procedural disclosure coded
though Top Secret Military Waiver, whereas a depositary bond is your dinner
when all come to know the insurer of the deposit is Israel to a Plaintiffs name
places here went down to the ground a fire;
TO KNOW BY ALLDESIGNS ON THESE PRESENTS DONE AT 92655 USA FOR

ALL ENSIGNS TO AN REPUBLIC, STATE OR EMBLEM; IN GOD'S WILL WE
TRUST
ARTICLE 17 IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
1. General undertakings: Each State Party shall, in accordance with its

constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its
obligations under this Convention. In particular, it shall:
(a) Prohibit violent felons and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in
any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from
undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention,
including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity;
(b) Not permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a State
Party under this Convention; and Inventory of International Nonproliferation
Organizations and Regimes.
(c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken
anywhere by persons not possessing its nationality, in conformity with
international law.
2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the
appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the
obligations under paragraph 1.
3. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this
Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people
and to protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with
other States Parties in this regard.
4. In order to fulfill its obligations under this Convention, each State Party
shall designate or establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal
point for effective liaison with the Organization and other States Parties. Each
State Party shall notify the Organization of its National Authority at the time
that this Convention enters into force for it.
5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and
administrative measures taken to implement this Convention.
6. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to
information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in
connection with the implementation of this Convention. It shall treat such
information and data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations
under this Convention and in accordance with the provisions set forth in the
preceding Chapters.
7. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization in the

exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the
Technical Secretariat.
ARTICLE 18 THE ORGANIZATION GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The States Parties to this Convention hereby establish the Organization for
Allied unity and the Prohibition of (nbc) Weapons to achieve the object and
purpose of this Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions,
including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to
provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.
2. All States Parties to this Convention shall be members of the Organization.

A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization.
The seat of the Headquarters of the Organization shall be The United Nations
10017 NY USA.
4. There situated are hereby established as the organs of the Organization:

the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Councils, and the
Secretary Generals quarter by word of police in areas of I do.
5. The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under
this Convention in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the
timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only
the information and data necessary to fulfill its responsibilities under this
Convention. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of
information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to its
knowledge in the implementation of this Convention and, in particular, shall
abide by the provisions set forth in the United States Federal Code of Justice.
6. In undertaking its verification activities the Organization shall consider

measures to make use of advances in science and technology.
7. The costs of the Organizations activities shall be paid by States Parties in

accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into
account differences in membership between the United Nations and this
Organization, and subject to the provisions of amended and approved
Articles IV and V. of this Treatys rudimentary authorships. Financial
contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission shall be
deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular
budget. The budget of the Organization shall comprise two separate
chapters, one relating to administrative and other costs, and one relating to
verification costs.
8. A member of the Organization which is in denial of its intended purposes

shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of dues owed equals or
exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full
years the Conference of the States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a
member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions
beyond the control of the member.
ARTICLE 19 (THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES)
Composition, procedures and decision-making .
1. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as the

Conference) shall be composed of all members of this Organization. Each
member shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be
accompanied by alternates and advisers.
2. The first session of the Conference shall be convened by the depositary
not later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Convention.
3. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions which shall be held annually
unless it decides otherwise. Special sessions of the Conference shall be
convened:
(a) When decided by the Conference; (b) When requested by the Executive
Council; (c) When requested by any member and supported by one third of
the members; or (d) In accordance with this paragraph to undertake reviews
of the operation of this Convention.
4. Except in the case of subparagraph (d), the special session shall be

convened not later than 30 days after receipt of the request by the discretion
of the Secretary General of the United Nations unless specified otherwise in
the request.
5. The Conference shall also be convened in the form of an Amendment

Conference in accordance with this paragraph and its exercise of formal
indoctrination.
6. Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat of the Organization
unless the Conference decides otherwise. The Conference shall adopt its
rules of procedure. At the beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its
Chairman and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office
until a new Chairman and other officers are elected at the next regular
session.
7. A majority of the members of the Organization shall constitute a quorum

for the Conference. Each member of the Organization shall have one vote in
the Conference. The Conference shall take decisions on questions of
procedure by a simple majority of the members present and voting.
Decisions on matters of substance should be taken as far as possible by
consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for
decision, the Chairman shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this
period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of
consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If
consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take
the decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless
specified otherwise in this Convention.
8. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall

consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this
Convention, including those relating to the powers and functions of the
Executive Council and the Secretary Generals quarter. It may make
recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues
related to this Convention raised by a State Party or brought to its attention
by the Executive Council.
9. The Conference shall oversee the integration of this Convention, and act in
order to promote its object and purpose. The Conference shall review
compliance with this Convention. It shall also oversee the activities of the
Executive Council and the Technical Secretary General (encoded) an United
States Agencys oversight commissioners rank and file of sequential not at
liberty to discuss and may issue guidelines in accordance with this
Convention to either of them in the exercise of their functions.
10. The Conference shall consider and adopt at its regular sessions, report
programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive
Council, if applicable as well as consider other reports; decide on the scale of
financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with
paragraph the rules and guidelines as so situated; Elect the members of the
Executive Council; appoint an Director-General; approve the rules of
procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter; establish such
subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in
accordance with this Convention;
(a) Also contending: recognize a need to foster international cooperation for

virtue-disappear-ment agents scope and purposes in the field of (nbc) (wmd)
disarmament and restoration activities; review scientific and technological
developments that could affect the operation of Inventory of International
Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes adages to include in this
context, a said authorities as such an Director-General to establish a
Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in the performance of his functions,
to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to
this Convention, to the Conference, the Executive Council or States Parties.
11. The Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts

appointed in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference;
consider and approve at its first session any relevant draft agreements,
provisions and guidelines developed by the Preparatory Commission;
establish at its first session the voluntary fund for assistance in accordance
with this Provision; take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with
this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes
the provisions of this Convention.
12. The Conference shall not later expire and shall in its own recognition
serve the interests of the Secretary Generals and the secret service by way
of Entity authority figures Human rights interests as to indoctrinate an so
called entry into force of this objective and common ground approach in an
effort to self service its identifying agencies and at such other times within
that time period as may be decided upon, convene in special sessions to
undertake reviews of the operation in as such reviews take into account any
relevant scientific and technological developments. At varying and working
intervals therefore, unless otherwise decided upon, further sessions of the
Conference shall be convened with security and star based re-pore being
appended as focal points to construe.
PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 5 March 2015 5 O0 pm PST
THE SORT COMPACT AND THE NUCLEAR POWERS ASSUMED

TREATY NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT; PEACE, INTERNATIONAL
TREATY DEPOSITION CRITERION; (RESEARCH);
TABLE OF CONTENTS THE SORT COMPACT

Documents Submitted to Congress;
1. HTUTreaty Originally Between the United States
of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions UTH
2. HTULetter of TransmittalUTH
3. HTULetter of SubmittalUTH
4. HTUArticle-by-Article Analysis of the Treaty
United States of America _____________________
The Russian Federation _______________________
In Witness Whereof didst sign 2,002
INTERIM AGREEMENT IN ACCORDANCES TO THE

STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL ATTRIBUTION
INCORPORATION OF START (IOS)
ACCEPTANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AMERICA, THE UNITED NATIONS

ORGANIZATION THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND FORMER REPUBLICS AND
THE STATUS AND DELIVERY SYSTEM APPENDAGE AN EXTENTION OF START I,
AND II, INCORPORATION OF DESBIC (RESEARCH)
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
1. Documents Pertaining to U N and NATO Strategic Offensive Reductions

Considered Subject par 6 % percent per biennial aspect up way for by year
de-limitations ratio. Though as is sold for another state of Federal plans on a
planner perspective to the Nuclear Powers question and the potential
circumvention of arms transfers.
2. Convinced that the current upgrades as ascribed to date hereby is of

urgent necessity;
3. Reaffirming as though Inter communication advocacy professional

cooperatives seat complacency in its places of uniform measures;
4. Noting that the Nuclear State would fill purchase orders to those
individuals who feel compelled to supply their countrymen with a means to
an end to the point of out of handed mutually assured disastrous nature,
5. Have read the report bid to make amends as though if star based research
is ongoing, said Party's' to an wrongfully and categorically residual to ascribe
5,000 activated c and currently deployed nuclear warheads of high frequency
is wrongful, perspective to the act and facts contained hereto, with a view to
Star Elder occupancies at said U S and Russias interior design apparatus Sir.
6. Welcomes a release to the public all data current as of September 1,

1990,Star elder technical facsimile' of a rating 18 or over may concern as
well with a draft measures to competitive articulate standard compliancy so
forth Sirs. Sir.
7. Notes with satisfaction the consciousness of START'S intended grounds

and enclosures that are listed in the Memorandas, as well as the
photographs that are appended thereto.
8. Geographic coordinates and site diagrams that are received pursuant to

the
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of
Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty of July 31,
1991, shall not be released to the public-unless otherwise agreed.
7. The Parties shall hold consultations on releasing to the public data and
other information provided pursuant to this Article or received otherwise in
fulfilling the obligations provided for in this Treaty. The provisions of this
Article shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to
the communication of such data and other information to those individuals
who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other
information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations
provided for in this Treaty. [Said Statements on Release to Public]
ARTICLES 2 (IOS)
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions

of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at
its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of
international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means
of
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph l of
this
Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede

verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with
the provisions of this Treaty. In this connection, the obligation not to use
concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at test
ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBM s,
mobile -launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or SLBM s and
their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment
measures may be reviewed as to apply to cover or concealment practices at
ICBM bases and deployment areas, within the specified time and frame work
of 6 % per annum deco missionary standard employabilitys, even so as
stated perspective of or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic
offensive arms.
4. To aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a
unique identifier as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.
ARTICLES 3 (IOS)
1. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight
test shall make on-board technical measurements and shall broadcast all
telemetric information obtained from such measurements. The Party
conducting the flight test shall determine which technical parameters are to
be measured during such flight test, as well as the methods of processing
and transmitting telemetric information.
test undertakes not to engage in any activity that denies full access to
telemetric
information, including: [Statements on Encryption & Jamming]
(a) the use of encryption;
(b) the use of jamming;

(c) broadcasting telemetric information from an ICBM or SLBM using narrow
directional beaming; and
(d) encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of eject able

capsules or recoverable reentry vehicles..
test undertakes not to broadcast from reentry vehicles. telemetric
information that pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-
contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM.
4. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight
test
shall provide, in accordance with Section I of the Protocol* on Telemetric
Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry
Protocol, tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is
broadcast during the flight test.
5. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight
test
shall provide, in accordance with Section II of the Telemetry Protocol*, data
associated with the analysis of the telemetric information.[Agreed State 35]
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each

Party shall have the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical
measurements during no more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs or
SLBM s each year. Of these eleven flight tests each year, no more than four
shall be flight tests of ICBMs or SLBM s of each type, any missile of which has
been flight-tested with a self-contained dispensing mechanism. Such
encapsulation shall be carried out in accordance with Section I and
paragraph 1 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol, and such encryption shall
be carried out in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section III of the Telemetry
Protocol. Encapsulation and encryption that are carried out on the same
flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall count as two flight tests against the
quotas specified in this paragraph.[Said Agreed State 31]
ARTICLES 4 (IOS)
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions

of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections and
continuous
monitoring activities and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article
and the Inspection Protocol. Inspections, continuous monitoring activities,
and exhibitions shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures
provided for in the Inspection Protocol* and the Conversion or Elimination
Protocol*. [item of inspection] [size criteria][Agreed State 36]**
2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections at
facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items
specified for such facilities in the initial exchange of data provided in
accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol*.
[facility inspections at] [Said Agreed State 10]
3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections at
facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items
specified for such facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of
updated data provided in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of
the Notification Protocol*.
[facility inspections at] [Said Agreed State 10]**
4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections to
confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified in
the notifications of new facilities provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of
Section I of the Notification Protocol*.[facility inspections at]**, and pursuant
to START AGENDA'S' 6 % percent annularly ascribed de-limitation-al
expectancy's of said Mega-ton and highest value frequency range de-target-
able contingencies in its orders of attributable warheads.
5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections to

confirm that covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or
covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring. [facility
inspections at] [Joint State
on Site Diagrams]**
6. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections of
deployed ICBMs and SLBM s to confirm that such ballistic missiles contain no
more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them and
proceed there from to oversight deco missionary stage points or reduce,
disposal area's of warheads dismember and diffuse disposal standards as all
agreed upon to the date of entry into forces some said concerned with
another objective Sir. Sirs All Countries thereabouts be bound here so.[facility
inspections]**
7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-exercise dispersal

inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated
missiles to confirm that the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their
associated missiles that are located at the inspected ICBM bases and those
that have not returned to it after completion of the dispersal does not exceed
the number specified for that ICBM base.
8. Each Party shall conduct or shall have the right to conduct conversion or
elimination inspections to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic
offensive arms.
9. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections to confirm
that
the elimination of facilities has been completed.
10. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility
inspections to confirm that facilities, notification of the elimination of which
has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the
Notification Protocol, are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this
Treaty.
11. Each Party shall conduct technical characteristics exhibitions, and shall
have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct
inspections of an ICBM and an SLBM of each type, and each variant thereof,
and of a mobile launcher of ICBMs and each version of such launcher for
each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The purpose of such
exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that technical
characteristics correspond to the data specified for these items.
12. Each Party shall conduct distinguish ability exhibitions for heavy
bombers,
former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs, and shall have the
right
during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of:
(a) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of
such
exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the
technical
characteristics of each type and each variant of such heavy bombers
correspond tothe data specified for these items in Annex G* to the
Memorandum of Understanding*; to demonstrate the maximum number of
long-range nuclear -ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and each
variant is actually equipped; and to demonstrate that this number does not
exceed the number provided for in paragraph 20 or21 of Article V of this
Treaty, as applicable;
(b) for each type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range
nuclear
ALCM has been flight-tested, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments
other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-
nuclear
armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. If, for such
a type
of heavy bomber, there are no heavy bombers equipped for long-range
nuclear
ALCMs, a test heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has
been
flight-tested shall be exhibited. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to
demonstrate to the inspecting Party that, for each exhibited type of heavy
bomber, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
other than long range nuclear ALCMs, each variant of heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments, each variant of training heavy
bombers, and a former heavy bomber are distinguishable from one another
and from each variant of heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-
range nuclear ALCMs; and
(c) long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to

permit
the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type
and
each variant of such long-range ALCMs correspond to the data specified for
these
items in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding. The further purpose
of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate differences, notification of which
has been provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII
of the Notification Protocol, of START and START 2, that make long-range non-
nuclear ALCMs distinguishable
from long-range nuclear ALCMs.
13. Each Party shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and shall have the right
during
such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of all heavy
bombers
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs equipped for non-nuclear
armaments, all training heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers
specified in the initial
exchange of data provided.. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to
demonstrate to the inspecting Party that such airplanes satisfy the
requirements for.
After a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber
of a
type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been
flight tested, the Party conducting the flight test shall conduct baseline
exhibitions, and the other Party shall have the right during such exhibitions
to conduct inspections, of 30 percent of the heavy bombers equipped for
long-range nuclear ALCMs of such type equipped for nuclear armaments
other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at each air base specified for such
heavy bombers. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to
the inspecting Party the presence of specified features that make each
exhibited heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same
type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
14. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring
activities at
production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the
number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced.[Agreed State]
[facilities] [Site Surveys Letters]
ARTICLES 5 (IOS)
1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification,

each
Party shall, if the other Party makes a request in accordance with the
Protocol, carry out the following cooperative measures:
(a) a display in the open of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within
restricted areas specified by the requesting Party. The number of road-mobile
launchers of ICBMs based at the restricted areas specified in each such
request shall, unless 6 % biannual standards are or not in it's said attribution
standard of negotiable specifications as called for, not exceed ten percent of
the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of the
requested Party, and such launchers shall be contained within one ICBM base
for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. For each specified restricted area, the
roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be open for
the duration of a display. The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within
the restricted area shall be displayed either located next to or moved
halfway out of such fixed structures;
(b) a display in the open of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at

parking sites specified by the requesting Party. Such launchers shall be
displayed by removing the entire train from its fixed structure and locating
the train within the rail garrison. The number of rail-mobile launchers of
ICBMs subject to display pursuant to each such request shall include all such
launchers located at no more than eight parking sites, provided that no more
than two parking sites may be requested within any one rail garrison in any
one request. Requests concerning specific parking sites shall include the
designation for each parking site as provided for in Annex A to the
Memoranda; and:
(c) a display in the open of all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers
located within one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those
heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are not readily movable due
to maintenance or operations. Such heavy bombers and former heavy
bombers shall be displayed by removing the entire airplane from its fixed
structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base. Those heavy
bombers and former heavy bombers at the air base specified by the
requesting Party that are not readily movable due to maintenance or
operations shall be specified by the requested Party in a notification provided
in accordance with Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no later
than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.
2. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy

bombers, and former heavy bombers subject to each request pursuant to
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be displayed in open view without using
concealment measures. Each Party shall have the right to make seven such
requests each year, but shall not request a display at any particular ICBM
base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or any
particular air base more than two times each year.
(a) A Party shall have the right to request, in any single request, only a
display of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a display of rail-mobile launchers
of ICBMs, or a display of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A
display shall begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and shall
continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was
made.
(b) If the requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances

brought about by force major, it shall provide notification to the requesting
Party in accordance with Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such
a case, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall
not be reduced.
3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that
has been
designated for inspection until such an inspection has been completed and
the inspectors have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative
measures have been requested shall not be designated for inspection until
the cooperative measures have been completed or until notification has
been provided in accordance with Protocol.
ARTICLES 6 (IOS)
1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct exercise dispersal of deployed
mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas
or rail
garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile
launchers of
ICBMs or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of
ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exercise dispersals of deployed
mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be conducted
as
provided for below:
(a) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date

and time
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of
Section II
of the Notification Protocol.
(b) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date

and
time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12
of
Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(c) Those ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the
notification
provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification
Protocol
shall be considered to be involved in exercise dispersal.
(d) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs

and
their associated missiles engaged in a routine movement from a restricted
area or
rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in
such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal.
(e) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs

and
their associated missiles engaged in a relocation from a restricted area or rail
garrisons of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in
such
a dispersal shall continue to be considered to be engaged in a relocation.
Notification of the completion of the relocation shall be provided in
accordance
with paragraph 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, unless notification
of
the completion of the relocation was provided in accordance with paragraph
12 of
(f) During an exercise dispersal, all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and
their
associated missiles that depart a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM
base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal shall be
considered to be
part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to
a facility outside their associated ICBM base during such a dispersal.
(g) An exercise in dispersal shall be completed no later than 30 days after it

begins.
(h) Exercise dispersals shall not be conducted:
(i) more than two times in any period of two calendar years;
(ii) during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections;
(iii) from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility
inspection has been conducted or until the period of time provided for such
an
inspection has expired; or
(iv) from an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that has been
designated
for a data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection, until completion of
such an inspection.
(v) If a notification of an exercise dispersal has been provided in accordance

with
Protocol, the other Party shall not have the right to designate for data update
inspection or reentry vehicle inspection an ICBM base for mobile launchers of
ICBMs involved in such a dispersal, or to request cooperative measures for
such an ICBM base, until the completion of such a dispersal.
(vi) When an exercise dispersal is completed, deployed mobile launchers of

ICBMs
and their associated missiles involved in such a dispersal shall be located at
their
restricted areas or rail garrisons, except for those otherwise accounted for in
accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
2. A major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a

notification
has been provided pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of
the
United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of
September 23, 1989, shall be conducted as provided for below:
(a) Such exercise shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time
(b) Such exercise shall be considered to be completed as of the date and

time
(c) The air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers
Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in
such exercise.
(d) Such exercise shall begin no more than one time in any calendar year,
and shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.
(e) Such exercise shall not be conducted during the entire period of time
provided for baseline data inspections.
(f) During such exercise by a Party, the other Party shall not have the right to
conduct inspections of the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for
former heavy bombers involved in the exercise. The right to conduct
inspections of such air bases shall resume three days after notification of the
completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers has been
provided in accordance with the Protocols.
(g) Within the 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of the
completion of such exercise, the receiving Party may make a request for
cooperative measures to be carried out in accordance with this Treaty at one
of the air bases involved in the exercise. Such a request shall not be counted
toward the quota provided for in this Treaty.
ARTICLES 7 (IOS)
1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct operational dispersals of

deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic
missile submarines, and heavy bombers. There shall be no limit on the
number and duration of operational dispersals, and there shall be no limit on
the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated
missiles, ballistic missile submarines, or heavy bombers involved in such
dispersals. When an operational dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms
of a Party shall be considered to be part of the dispersal. Operational
dispersals shall be conducted as provided for below.
(a) An operational dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date

and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with Protocol.
(b) An operational dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the

date and
time specified in the notification provided in accordance with Protocol.
2. During an operational dispersal each Party shall have the right to:
(a) suspend notifications that it would otherwise provide in accordance with

the
Notification Protocol except for notification of flight tests provided under the
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988; provided
that, if any conversion or elimination processes are not suspended pursuant
to subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, the relevant notifications shall be
provided in accordance with the Protocols;
(b) suspend the right of the other Party to conduct inspections;
(c) suspend the right of the other Party to request cooperative measures; and
(d) suspend conversion and elimination processes for its strategic offensive
arms. In such case, the number of converted and eliminated items shall
correspond to the number that has actually been converted and eliminated
as of the date and time of the beginning of the operational dispersal
specified in the notification provided in accordance with the Protocols.
3. Notifications suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall

resume no later than three days after notification of the completion of the
operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with Protocol. The
right to conduct inspections and to request cooperative measures suspended
pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume four days after
notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided
in accordance with Protocol. Inspections or cooperative measures being
conducted at the time a Party provides notification that it suspends
inspections or cooperative measures during an operational dispersal shall not
count toward the appropriate annual quotas provided for by this Treaty.
4. When an operational dispersal is completed:
(a) All deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles
shall be located within their deployment areas or shall be engaged in
relocations .
(b) All deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles
shall be located within their rail garrisons or shall be engaged in routine
movements or relocations .
(c) All heavy bombers shall be located within national territory and shall have
resumed normal operations. If it is necessary for heavy bombers to be
located outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with this
Treaty, the Parties will immediately engage in diplomatic consultations so
that appropriate assurances can be provided.
5. Within the 30 day period after the completion of an operational dispersal,

the Party not conducting the operational dispersal shall have the right to
make no more than two requests for cooperative measures, subject to the
provisions of Article XII of this Treaty, for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of
ICBMs or air bases. Such requests shall count toward the quota of requests
provided for in paragraph 2 of
Article XII of this Treaty.
ARTICLES 8 INCORPORATION OF START (IOS)
1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this

Treaty, the
Parties hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the
framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to: United
Nation Assemblies**
(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed;
(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve

the
viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and
(c) resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this

Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been
provided in accordance with Protocol.
ARTICLES 9 (IOS)
1. To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not
assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with
its provisions. The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article
XV of this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this
regard. The Parties [United Nations Assemblies Protocol] agree that this
provision does apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in
the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this
Treaty, between a Party and a third State. [Agreed State 1] [Soviet State on
Non-Circumvention & Patterns of Coop. The NATO Alliances and Its Supreme
Commanders; The Republic of China, Koreas and Japanese Multilateralism,
The Persian Empires, The Arabian Peninsula, France, Switzerland, Spain
Portugal, Sweden The States of Israel, and India, Pakistan and all other
insignias to developing needs to isotopic mentioning there again in still.
ARTICLES 10 (IOS)
1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum, and

Memoranda's of
Understanding, START, START II, NPT's re-evaluation all of which form integral
parts and are considered hereby the START AGENDA Treaty series, in which
the purpose was to reserve adaptive language and interceptive resurrection
thereof the joint specified drafts of Treatys' assimilation, shall be subject to
ratification in accordance bound thereto the constitutional procedures of
each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of
instruments of ratification as proceed at once not later than 31 December
2,007 Sir. Sirs.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for unlimited years to missions descriptive
by a
subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive
arms.
The Party's' shall maintain an 24 /7 / 365 days Headquarters manned round
the clock to further the development of the 31 December 2,007
accordances,
(a) headed By the U S, Russian, and an Israeli sending and receiving unit
missionary adjutants to number not less than 120 Men Women Staff, who will
maintain communication peripheral on the said status quo' of ongoing de-
targeting and decommissioning of projectiles and WMD as so stated
warheads there when, conditions of NATO and all insignias come to a table of
law.
(b) The Party's' agree to convene every 5 years thereafter and in so doing
meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so
decide, whether performance of the obligations assumed are satisfactory to
the U N Independent Commission assigned to assess penalty or operable
income necessities to the protocol stated here withal search warrant
characterizations of an enzyme trigger Sirs., and to re-define such a due date
period by a subsequent agreement on the reduce, dispose and delimitation
of strategic offensive arms.
(c) This Treaty shall be extended for successive five-year periods, if the
Parties so decide, in accordance with the procedures governing the initial
extension, and it shall remain in force for each agreed five year period of
extension unless as was to be retro ceded by a subsequent agreement on
the reduction and elimination of strategic offensive arms.
3. There shall any Party in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right
to withdraw from this Treaty. No such extraordinary events related to the
subject matter of this Treaty can jeopardized the supreme interests as willful
or negligible dissention... Such notice shall have no bearing on the situation
implied as dire need to comprehend a statement of the extraordinary events
the notifying Party regards as having Natures said orientation over its
supreme interests.
ARTICLE 11 (IOS)
Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments

shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into
force of this Treaty.
ARTICLES 12 (IOS)
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations. The Israeli Consul General and U S Head of State will be
required to pay recompense for the damage awards of the Partys herewith
fourscore all solved the responsible People as sought for negligence a parody
of equal opportunities in this matter of incidental and accidental infusement
of catastrophic or heinous war crimes there when.
PREVIOUS START TREATY INFUSED THERE ABOVE

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION THE U N
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION INTER ALIA
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
THE NATO ALLIANCE ORGANIZATION
AND ALL INDEPENDENT ENSIGNS

TO A MARQUIS IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
THE UNDERSIGNED
_____________________________________________RUSSIAN FEDERATION
___________________________________________UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_________________________________________________WITNESSS
ANALYSIS: THE OBLIGATIONS PRESCRIBED IN START I AND II AND SORT

THOUGH DESIRED, FELL SHORT OF EXPECTATION, THE EMPHASIS ON
DELIVERY APPERATUS IS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION, WE LEARN FROM THIS
UNDERTAKING, AND CARE TO BUILD ON ITS MERITS.
ARTICLES INCORPORATIO N OF START (IOS)

THE ELIMINATION AND HEAVY BOMBER DETAILS
(i) The formation of a command; as, simply stated it may be; address, advise,
and call attention to a firm decision of what becomes an orderly procession
of uniformity, and or as an integral embodiment of sequence and sequences
whereas obligations assumed the action of carrying out the fraternal orders
thereto why.
START
Protocol On Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on

Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating
to the Treaty Between All Ensigns to a Marquis Dial Tone 7 / 11 followers or
Beggars Bread, on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic and Non-
Strategic Nuclear Warheads and Delivery Apparatus and Defensive and
Offensive Arms
Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States

of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty Series
including post factus START III above and entitled your honors, the Parties
hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination of heavy ICBMs and
upon procedures governing the conversion of silo launchers of such ICBMS.
I. Procedures for Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and Their Launch Canisters
1. Elimination of heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the

procedures provided for in this Section at elimination facilities for ICBMs
specified in the START Treaty or shall be carried out by using such missiles for
delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Notification thereof
shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) 30
days in advance of the initiation of elimination at conversion or elimination
facilities, or, in the event of launch, in accordance with the provisions of the
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988.
2. Prior to the confirmatory inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this

Section, the inspected Party:
(a) shall remove the missile's reentry vehicles;
(b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile's
guidance and control system from the missile and its launch canister, and
other elements that shall not be subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph
4 of this Section;
(c) shall remove the missile from its launch canister and disassemble the
missile into stages;
(d) shall remove liquid propellant from the missile;
(e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the

missile and its launch canister;
(f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and
release; and
(g) may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing

mechanism.
These actions may be carried out in any order.
3. After arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the
elimination process, inspectors shall confirm the type and number of the
missiles to be eliminated by making the observations and measurements
necessary for such confirmation. After the procedures provided for in this
paragraph have been carried out, the process of the elimination of the
missiles and their launch canisters may begin. Inspectors shall observe the
elimination process.
4. Elimination process for heavy ICBMS:
(a) missile stages, nozzles, and missile interstage skirts shall each be cut into
two pieces of approximately equal size; and
(b) the self-contained dispensing mechanism as well as the front section,

including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, shall be
cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and crushed.
5. During the elimination process for launch canisters of heavy ICBMS, the
launch canister shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or
into three pieces in such a manner that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long
are cut from the ends of the body of such a launch canister.
6. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader

and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual, written
report containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the
elimination process that the inspection team has completed its inspection.
7. Heavy ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the
Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section.
Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of
Section I of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.
II. Procedures for Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, Silo Training
Launchers for Heavy ICBMs
1. Conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMS, silo training launchers for

heavy ICBMS, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in
situ and shall be subject to inspection.
2. Prior to the initiation of the conversion process for such launchers, the
missile and launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher.
3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the conversion process for silo
launchers of heavy ICBMS, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMS, and silo
test launchers for heavy ICBMs as soon as the silo launcher door has been
opened and a missile and its launch canister have been removed from the
silo launcher. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with
paragraphs I and 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol Relating to the
START Treaty.
4. Conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMS, silo training

launchers for heavy ICBMS, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall
include the following steps:
(a) the silo launcher door shall be opened, the missile and the launch
canister shall be removed from the silo launcher;
(b) concrete shall be poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the
height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher; and
(c) a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters shall be
installed into the upper portion of the silo launcher. The method of
installation of the restrictive ring shall rule out its removal without
destruction of the ring and its attachment to the silo launcher.
5. Each Party shall have the right to confirm that the procedures provided for
in paragraph 4 of this Section have been carried out. For the purpose of
confirming that these procedures have been carried out:
(a) the converting Party shall notify the other Party through the NRRCs:
(i) no less than 30 days in advance of the date when the process of pouring
concrete will commence; and
(ii) upon completion of all of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of

this Section; and
(b) the inspecting Party shall have the right to implement the procedures
provided for in either paragraph 6 or paragraph 7, but not both, of this
Section for each silo launcher of heavy ICBMS, silo training launcher for
heavy ICBMS, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted.
6. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall

have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each
silo launcher of heavy ICBMS, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMS, and silo
test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted, and to measure the
diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:
(a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no
less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it
will observe the filling of the silo in question;
(b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring

concrete, the converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to
ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the
silo can be measured;
(c) the inspecting Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of
pouring concrete from a location providing an unobstructed view of the base
of the silo launcher, and to confirm by measurement that concrete has been
poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from
the bottom of the silo launcher. The measurements shall be taken from the
level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo
launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower
edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the
concrete has hardened;
(d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in

paragraph
4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the
diameter of the restrictive ring. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded
during such inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such
inspections;
(e) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs

and (d) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection
reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-
country escort;
(f) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of
whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and
(g) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established
by the START Treaty.
7. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall

have the right to measure the depth of each silo launcher of heavy ICBMS,
silo training launcher for heavy ICBMS, and silo test launcher for heavy
ICBMs that is to be converted both before the commencement and after the
completion of the process of pouring concrete, and to measure the diameter
of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:
(a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no
less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it
will measure the depth of the silo launcher in question both before the
commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete;
(b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring
concrete, the converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to
ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the
silo launcher can be measured;
(c) the inspecting Party shall measure the depth of the silo launcher prior to
the commencement of the process of pouring concrete;
(d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in

paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to
measure the diameter of the restrictive ring, and to re-measure the depth of
the silo launcher. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such
inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections;
(e) for the purpose of measuring the depth of the concrete in the silo
launcher, measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of
the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the
pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed
silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has
hardened;
(f) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c),

(d), and
(e) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports

and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country
escort;
(g) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of
whom shall be drawn from the fist of inspectors under the START Treaty; and
(h) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established
by the START Treaty.
8. The converting Party shall have the right to carry out further conversion
measures after the completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6
or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon
expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures
provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section.
9. In addition to the reentry vehicle inspections conducted under the START

Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct, using the procedures
provided for in Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START
Treaty, four additional reentry vehicle inspections each year of ICBMs that
are deployed in silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been converted in
accordance with the provisions of this Section. During such inspections, the
inspectors also shall have the right to confirm by visual observation the
presence of the restrictive ring and that the observable portions of the
launch canister do not differ externally from the observable portions of the
launch canister that was exhibited pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of
the START Treaty.
(a) Any shrouding of the upper portion of the silo launcher shall not obstruct
visual observation of the upper portion of the launch canister and shall not
obstruct visual observation of the edge of the restrictive ring. If requested by
the inspecting Party, the converting Party shall partially remove any
shrouding, except for shrouding of instruments installed on the restrictive
ring, to permit confirmation of the presence of the restrictive ring.
10. Upon completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or

paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon
expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures
provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the silo launcher of heavy ICBMs
being converted shall, for the purposes of the Treaty, be considered to
contain a deployed ICBM to which one warhead is attributed.
III. Equipment; Costs
1. To carry out inspections provided for in this Protocol, the inspecting Party
shall have the right to use agreed equipment, including equipment that will
confirm that the silo launcher has been completely filled up to the height of
five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher with concrete. The Parties
shall agree in the Bilateral Implementation Commission on such equipment.
2. For inspections conducted pursuant to this Protocol, costs shall be handled

pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol Relating to
the START Treaty.
This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the
date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the
Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of
the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be
necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.
The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this

Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty,
they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement
on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments
set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.
DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA:
FOR THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION:
FOR ALL INSIGNIAS TO AN OFFICER OF THE COURTS:
_________________________________
_________________________________
__________________________________
Protocol on Exhibition and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the

Treaty Between the All Ensigns to a Marquis on Further Reduction and
Limitation of Defensive & Offensive Weapons of Mass Destruction
Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States

of America and the Russian Federation affixed to include the Nuclear Powers
on Further Reduction and Limitation of Defensive & Offensive Arms,
hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree all Insignias to
expent radio active fuel storage depot are subject and considered suspects
to the ironys of conduct exhibitions and inspections of heavy bombers
pursuant to paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty.
I. Exhibitions of Heavy Bombers
1. For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the

provisions of the Treaty, and as required by paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of
Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall conduct exhibitions of heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, heavy bombers reoriented to a
conventional role, and heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional
role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role.
2. The exhibitions of heavy bombers shall be conducted subject to the

following provisions:
(a) the location for such an exhibition shall be at the discretion of the
exhibiting Party;
(b) the date for such an exhibition shall be agreed upon between the Parties
through diplomatic channels, and the exhibiting Party shall communicate the
location of the exhibition;
(c) during such an exhibition, each heavy bomber exhibited shall be subject
to inspection for a period not to exceed two hours;
(d) the inspection team conducting an inspection during an exhibition shall

consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the
list of inspectors under the START Treaty;
(e) prior to the beginning of the exhibition, the inspected Party shall provide
a photograph or photographs of one of the heavy bombers of a type or
variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role and of one of the heavy
bombers of the same type and variant of a type that were reoriented to a
conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, so as to show
all of their differences that are observable by national technical means of
verification and visible during inspection; and
(f) such inspections during exhibitions shall not count against any inspection
quota established by the START Treaty.
II. Inspections of Heavy Bombers
1. During exhibitions of heavy bombers, each Party shall have the right to
perform the following procedures on the exhibited heavy bombers; and each
Party, beginning 180 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter,
shall have the right, in addition to its rights under the START Treaty, to
perform, during data update and new facility inspections conducted under
the START Treaty at air bases of the other Party, the following procedures on
all heavy bombers based at such air bases and present there at the time of
the inspection:
(a) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear

ALCMs and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-
range nuclear ALCMs, in order to confirm that the number of nuclear
weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the
number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The inspection team
shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the
inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for
weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy
bomber, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior;
(b) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional

role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other
heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by
national technical means of verification and visible during inspection. The
inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the
exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by
national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, but not
to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior; and
(c) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers that were reoriented to a

conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, in order to
confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of
that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical
means of verification and visible during inspection, and to confirm that the
number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped
does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution.
(d) The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions
of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy
bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons
bay of such a heavy bomber, and to visually inspect those portions of the
exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by
national technical means of verification and visible to inspection, but not to
inspect other portions of the exterior or interior.
2. At the discretion of the inspected Party, those portions of the heavy

bomber that are not subject to inspection may be shrouded. The period of
time required to carry out the shrouding process shall not count against the
period allocated for inspection.
3. In the course of an inspection conducted during an exhibition, a member

of the in-country escort shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant
to subparagraph l
(a) or subparagraph l of this Section, explanations to the inspection mm

concerning the number of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber is
actually equipped, and shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant
to subparagraph l(b) or subparagraph l of this Section, explanations to the
inspection team concerning the differences that are observable by national
technical means of verification and visible during inspection.
This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the
date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the
Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of
the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be
necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.
The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this

Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty,
they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement
on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments
set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

OF AMERICA:
FOR THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION
FOR ALL INSIGNIAS TO AN EMBLEM:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber

Data Relating to the Treaty Between The Nuclear Powers and All Insignias To
an Ensign on Further Reduction and Limitation of Defensive and Offensive
Arms of Mass Destruction Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms affixed, hereinafter
referred to as the Treaty Series, the Parties have exchanged data current as
of January 3, 1993, on the number of nuclear weapons for which each heavy
bomber of a type and a variant of a type equipped for nuclear weapons is
actually equipped.
No later than 30 days after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the
Parties shall additionally exchange data, current as of the date of entry into
force of the Treaty, according to the categories of data contained in this
Memorandum, on heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons; on heavy
bombers specified as reoriented to a conventional role, and on heavy
bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to
a nuclear role; on ICBMs and SLBMs to which a reduced number of warheads
is attributed; and on data on the elimination of heavy ICBMs and on
conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs.
Only those data used for purposes of implementing the Treaty that differ
from the data in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of
the Data Base Relating to the START Treaty are included in this
Memorandum.
I. Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers Other On
Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role
1. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Treaty each Party undertakes

not to have more nuclear weapons deployed on heavy bombers of any type
or variant of a type than the number specified in this paragraph. Additionally,
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty, for each Party the
numbers of warheads attributed to deployed heavy bombers not reoriented
to a conventional role as of the date of signature of the Treaty or to heavy
bombers subsequently deployed are listed below. Such numbers shall only be
changed in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty.
The Party making a change shall provide a notification to the other Party 90
days prior to making such a change. An exhibition shall be conducted to
demonstrate the changed number of nuclear weapons for which heavy
bombers of the listed type or variant of a type are actually equipped:
(a) United States of America

Heavy Bomber Types Number of Warheads
and Variant of a Type*
B-52G 12
B-52H 20
B-1B 16
B-2 16
Aggregate Number of Warheads
Attributed to Deployed Heavy
Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers
Reoriented to a Conventional Role __________
(b) Russian Federation Number of Warheads

Heavy Bomber Type
and Variant of a Type
Bear B 1
Bear G 2
Bear H6 6
Bear H16 16
Blackjack 12
Aggregate Number of Warheads

Attributed to Deployed Heavy
Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers
Reoriented to a Conventional Role __________
II. Data on Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role and Heavy

Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role that Have Subsequently Been
Returned to a Nuclear Role
1. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a

conventional role are as follows:
* Heavy bombers of the type and variant of a type designated B-52C, B-52D,
B-52E, and B-52F, located at the Davis-Monthan conversion or elimination
facility as of September 1, 1990, as specified in the Memorandum of
Understanding to the START Treaty, will be eliminated, under the provisions
of the START Treaty, before the expiration of the seven-year reductions
period.

Heavy Bomber of Type Number
and Variant of Type
__________ __________
__________ __________
(b) Russian Federation

Heavy Bomber Type Number
__________ __________
__________ __________
(c) Nuclear Powers

Heavy Bomber Type Numbers
___________ __________
2. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a

conventional role as well as data on related air bases are as follows:

Air Bases:
(i) Nuclear Powers

Heavy Bomber Type Differences
___________ __________
Name/Location Bomber Type

Variant of a Type
__________ __________
Heavy Bombers Reoriented Number
to a Conventional Role __________

Air Bases:
Name/Location Bomber Type and

__________ Variant of a Type
Heavy Bombers Reoriented Number
to a Conventional Role __________
3. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of

verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as
follows:
Heavy Bomber Type Difference
__________ __________

__________ __________
4. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of

verification for heavy bombers reoriented

__________ __________

__________ __________
(c) Nuclear Powers

___________ __________
III. Data on Deployed ICBMs and Deployed SLBMs of Which a Reduced

Number of Warheads Is Attributed for each Party, the data on ICBM bases or
submarine bases, and on ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types deployed at those
bases, on which the number of warheads attributed to them is reduced
pursuant to Article M of the Treaty are as follows:

Type of ICBM or SLBM
____
(b) Nuclear Powers

___________ __________
Deployed ICBMS or Deployed
SLBMs, on Which the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced ____
Warheads Attributed to Each

Deployed ICBM or Deployed
SLBM After Reduction in the
Number of Warheads on It ____
Number of Warheads by Which

the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM or
SLBM Was Reduced ____
Aggregate Reduction in the

Number of Warheads Attributed
to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs of that Type ____
ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is
Reduced:
Name/Location ICBM Type on Which
the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced
__________ ____
Deployed ICBMs on Which the
Number of Warheads Is Reduced ____

Deployed ICBM After Reduction
in the Number of Warheads on
It ____

the Original attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM Was
Reduced ____

to deployed ICBMs of that
Type ____
SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is
Reduced:
Name/Location SLBM Type on Which
the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced
__________ ____
Deployed SLBMs on Which the


Deployed SLBM After Reduction
It ____

Warheads for Each SLBM Was
Reduced ____

to deployed SLBMs of that
Type ____
Type of ICBM or SLBM
____
Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs, on Which the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced ____

Deployed ICBM or Deployed
SLBM After Reduction in the
Number of Warheads on It ____

the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM or
SLBM Was Reduced ____

to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs of that Type ____
ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is
Reduced:
Name/Location ICBM Type on Which
the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced
__________ ____
Deployed ICBMs on Which the

Deployed ICBM After Reduction
It ____

Warheads for Each ICBM Was
Reduced ____

to deployed ICBMs of that
Type ____
SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is
Reduced:
Name/Location
SLBM Type on Which
the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced
__________ ____
Deployed SLBMs on Which the

Deployed SLBM After Reduction
It ____
Warheads for Each SLBM Was
Reduced ____

to deployed SLBMs of that
Type ____
IV. Data on Eliminated Heavy ICBMs and Converted Silo Launchers of Heavy
ICBMs
1. For each Party, the numbers of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs converted to
silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs are as follows:

Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers ____
ICBM Base for Silo
Launchers of ICBMs:
Name/Location ICBM type Installed
in a Converted
Silo Launcher
______
Silo Launcher Ground: (designation)
______
Silo Launchers: ____
______

Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers ____
ICBM Base for Silo
Launchers of ICBMs:
Name/Location ICBM Type Installed
in a Converted
Silo Launcher
______
Silo Launcher Group: (designation)
______
Silo Launchers: ____
______
2. For each Party, the aggregate numbers of heavy ICBMs and eliminated
heavy ICBMs are as follows:
(a) United States of America Number
Deployed Heavy ICBMs ____
Non-Deployed Heavy ICBMs ____
Eliminated Heavy ICBMs ____
(b) Russian Federation Number

Deployed Heavy ICBMs ____
Non-Deployed ICBMs ____
Eliminated Heavy ICBMs ____
V. Changes
Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in the attribution and data
contained in this Memorandum.
The Parties, in signing this Memorandum, acknowledge the acceptance of the

categories of data contained in this Memorandum and the responsibility of
each Party for the accuracy only of its own data.
This Memorandum is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force
on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long
as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article
V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree on such additional measures as may
be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.
The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to change the categories of

data contained in this Memorandum or to make other changes to this
Memorandum that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the
Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach
agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making
amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

OF AMERICA:
FOR THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION:
ALL INSIGNIAS TO AN EMBLEM:

_________________________________________
________________________________________
________________________________________
STATEMENTS ON MULTI-MEGATON ATTRIBUTIONS

AND OPEN DISCUSSION AND ANALAGY
Descriptive Encode in Star Based Internal Command- The Article's

of Genetic Disclosure, Discovery and Appeal;
inter alias DESBIC Treaty DONE IN MIDWAY CITY USA 92655
STATEMENTS ON PAST AND PRESENT DANGERS POSED BY MULTI-MEGATON

WEAPONS
MULTI-MEGATON ATTRIBUTION SUBJECT TO VIRTUAL DISAPPEAR-MENT
ELIMINATIONS
The Largest Nuclear Weapons

Un-named Sources 19 June 2005
Seat also Multi-megaton Weapons:

The largest nuclear weapons;
Contents:
High-yield thermonuclear weapons: overview

United States:
o U.S. nuclear warheads with yield over
4.5 megatons (table)
o The largest U.S. nuclear weapon
o The first U.S. high-yield nuclear weapons
o Mass produced multi-megaton weapons
o The Titan II heavy ICBM
o The Spartan ABM
o The last U.S. high-yield nuclear weapon
USSR/Russia:
o Soviet/Russian nuclear warheads with yield
over 4.5 megatons (table)
o The largest Soviet nuclear weapons
o The R-9 and R-16 ICBMs
o The R-36 heavy ICBM
o The R-36M, R-36MUTTKh, and R-36M2 heavy ICBMs
o The RS-16 and RS-18 ICBMs
The largest PRC nuclear weapon
ANALYSIS,
1. In order to make a fuller contribution to their common objective aimed at

lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which we set
aside to do up authors contending iotass, a subjects of strengthening peace
and friendship overtures, when realizing the perils of neither nuclear core
meltdown in an populated contiguous zone of application with liquefaction
set in, nor nuclear composite arterys in fields of lighted accrue will continue
to be the subject to the limitations provided for there then. By that we'll
contends all 525 nuclear reactor energy utility complexes are projection
concept and-s another forms of risk assimilation.
(a) So describe an explosive calibration we never saw-s in some areas of

historical significant details has also no meaning and will be construed as
outdated and formally a threat in areas of most volatile said explosive
detonation yield such as the largest multi-megaton nuclear or variant of its
class, would have more or such as the same devastating irreconcilable
effect-s in view of geological shelf lifes, leaving in its wake an landscapes of
uninhabitable grazing pasture for all to seek see.
(b) Accorded the same graven dangers as if further consideration be given,

the question of when enemies engage a nuclear complex with moax
emission in its core and stated, we do set aside peaceful uses of IAEA iota of
advice as counter point to construe in and though replicas are nuclear
composite individuals, author would point out tricks the replicas used to
situate as we seen in Fukushima? So stated.
(c) High-yield thermonuclear weapons: Notice of intention to virtual

disappear and-s assimilate an non-proliferation order-s will continue to be a
subject? Sir.
2. Proceeding from the pretenses that thermonuclear assimilation would only

amount to counterpoint treachery; The United States and the Soviet Union,
after independently developing thermonuclear weapons, said both produced
some numbers of such weapons of very high yield. While most
thermonuclear weapons built had yields in the range of several hundred
kilotons to a few megatons, some much larger weapons were built. Weapons
with yields up to 20-50 megatons were developed and deployed (one Soviet
weapon of 150 mt was developed. Of the roughly said 135,000 warheads
ever built by the two superpowers, about 3% had yields over 4.5 megatons
therefore.
3. The Partys to a status quo agreed to settle their differences. Though the
United States said to have built the greater number of multi-megaton
weapons, doing so in the late 1950s and 1960s mostly to equip its bomber
force with a massive nuclear capability then again the U.S.S.R. The U.S. said
largely abandoned such weapons in favor of smaller nuclear weapons,
allowing more flexible delivery of larger numbers of warheads. Most of the
Soviet strategic nuclear capability was in its ICBMs, but like the U.S. the
Soviets deployed high-yield weapons before mostly shifting to smaller,
multiple warheads.
4. The act or contention though that The U.S. has now retired all of its multi-
megaton weapons there from disassembly of the last type removed from
service, the B53, may is not completed in 2006 is somewhere up in the air as
the SORT Compact does outline neither, Russia maintains an number that of
which ICBMs in high-yield single warheads is an contention.
(a) The People's Republic of China have many a ICBM armed with very many
and un yielding high-yield warheads as well-s we set aside at Courts the
Entitys telepathic indifference for a possible use against lone author
specimen whose Soully spirited matter is much to be exploited by these
giants.
Russia's R-36M2 Voyevoda (SS-18 Mod 6) with a 20 mt warhead (possibly 5

deployed). (The UR-100N version (SS-19 Mod 2) with a 5 mt warhead may no
longer be deployed.)
PRC's DF-5A (CSS-4) with a 5 mt warhead (about 24 deployed).
5. There is still considerable uncertainty on some of the issues discussed

here and-s while much information on U.S. nuclear warhead history is still
available, information is still is neither collective as confidence building will
attest here as on some high-yield nuclear weapons. Information now
available on the former Soviet/current Russian arsenal is limited regarding its
largest weapons, and considerable discrepancies remain to be retired as
doubts to the limitations provided for while still hid away in cave awning
displays waiting friction fallout from inevitably so called fiercest foes in
available information surmise.
6. The following graphs provide estimates of the total numbers and yield of
U.S./Soviet/Russian high-yield weapons (those with individual yields over
4.5megatons). Note that these estimates are based on models of stockpile
history, and that total stockpile numbers and yields may not correspond to
other figures on this web site.
7. Now seek and situated The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have conducted a total of 23
nuclear tests of at least 4 megatons each. The U.S. from 1952 to 1962
detonated 11 such devices above ground plus one underground in 1971. The
total yield of these was 105 mt for an average of 9 mt each. The largest of
these was a 15 mt test in 1954. In turn, the U.S.S.R. detonated 12 such multi-
megaton devices above ground in 1961 and 1962, plus one underground in
1973. Their total yield was 200 mt, for an average of 15 mt each. The largest
Soviet test was a 58 mt test in 1961. The total fission yield of all 22 above
ground tests was about 124 mt (54 mt from U.S. tests and 70 mt from Soviet
tests).
8. U.S. nuclear warheads with yield over 4.5 megatons
x-ray
Explanation: IOC=initial operational capability, NGB=nuclear gravity bomb,
ICBM=intercontinental ballistic missile, ABM=antiballistic missile,
TN=thermonuclear, clean/dirty refers to low/high fission yield fraction,
respectively. See text for sources.
9. The largest U.S. nuclear weapon
(Image: Mk-17/24 bomb casing at the National Atomic Museum.)
The largest nuclear weapons ever built by the United States is still
considered a weapon of attack were the EC17/Mk-17, the EC24/Mk-24, and
the B41 (Mk41).
(a) Public domain information does not allow a conclusive determination as

to which had the largest yield. However, current best estimate is that the
highest yield weapon was a version of the B41 with a yield of 25 mt which
there as shall be considered to oppose to that of which may be considered
obsolete and destructive permeance if that Naval Intelligence mothballed
global communicate intrinsified..
10. The High Contracting Party's' shall see fit as Duly sworn to do so, to
virtually vanish every retired multi-megaton explosive ways and means of
resurrection so stated as top priorities. China too, Independent hide and
seekers, and home bases as such The Mk-17 and Mk-24 were said virtually
identical weapons: they used different primaries, but were indistinguishable
by external appearance and weight.[1] "Emergency capability" versions of
both bombs (the EC17 and EC24) were briefly stockpiled in small numbers
rushed into service in 1954. These were retired in late 1954 when the
production versions were deployed.[1,2] At 18.9 metric tons each and 7.5
meters long, only the B-36 bomber could carry these weapons. All were said
to behave as if retired by 1957 in favor of smaller weapons that could be
carried by a variety of bombers.[1]
11. Reported yields for the Mk-17 and Mk-24 range from 10 mt to 20 mt.
unnamed sources gave figures of 15-20 mt[1] or 10-15 mt for production
versions (for the emergency capability versions he gives 11 mt for the EC17
and 13.5 mt for the EC24)[3]; NRDC reports 10-15 mt.[4] Nuclear test yields
include 11 mt for the EC17 in shot Castle Romeo on 27 March 1954 and 13.5
mt for the EC24 in shot Castle Yankee on 5 May 1954.[5] Based on this the
best estimates here are yields of 11 mt for the EC17, ~12.5 mt for the Mk-
17, 13.5 mt for the EC24, and ~15 mt for the Mk-24.
12. The Mk-41 was the only three-stage thermonuclear weapon ever
deployed by the U.S. It weighed 4,840 kilograms and was 3.8 meters long.[6]
It could be carried by the B-52 or the B-47.[7] While about 500 were built
from September 1960 to June 1962, retirement began in November 1963 and
the last B41s withdrawn in July 1976.[6]
13. Best estimate here is that the B41 was produced in at least two versions,
one of which had a yield of 25 mt--the highest yield weapon ever built by
the U.S. It is likely that only a small fraction of the weapons built were the
high yield version, and that these were the first ones retired (in the 1960s).
These conclusions are based on the following:
In 1962 DOE declassified the statement "The U.S. has a nuclear weapon in
stockpile with a yield of approximately 25 megatons."
A 25 mt yield for the B41 would give it a yield-to-weight ratio of 5.2

kilotons/kilogram. While this would require a far greater efficiency than any
other U.S. weapon (at least 40% efficiency in a fusion fuel of lithium
deuteride), this was apparently attainable. In 1963 DOE declassified
statements that the U.S. had the technological capability of deploying a 35
mt warhead on the Titan II, or a 50-60 mt gravity bomb on B-52s.[8] Neither
weapon was pursued (the Titan II was deployed with a 9 mt warhead), but
either would require yield-to-weight ratios superior to a 25-mt B41.
While in 1989 Chuck Hansen gave a yield of "less than 10 megatons" for
the B41,[1] he gave two yields in 1995: "less than 10 megatons" and "25
MT...the highest-yield weapon ever stockpiled [by the U.S.]".[6] His
discussion suggests that two versions were developed: a high yield "dirty"
version and a low yield "clean" version. The NRDC gives a yield of 10 mt.[4]
A TX-41 prototype was tested in shot Hardtack Poplar with a yield of 9.3
mt.[5] This may correspond to the low yield Mk-41 version.
DOE has released cumulative stockpile data, including numbers of

stockpiled warheads each fiscal year and total stockpile yield each fiscal
year.[9] This data is inconsistent with all B41s having a 25 mt yield, but are
consistent with limited numbers of a high yield version which were then
retired early.
Development of the B53 was ordered as a replace for the B41.[10] This
may be interpreted as a continuation of the shift away from high-yield and/or
dirty weapons. Note that with the exceptions of the B41 and B53, all other
multi-megaton strategic bombs were retired by 1964.
14. The first U.S. multi-megaton weapons following the first Soviet nuclear
test in August 1949, U.S. President Truman directed continued development
of thermonuclear weapons in a January 1950 directive. The first such weapon
designed used liquid deuterium as fusion fuel--necessarily cooled to
temperatures near absolute zero to keep it in a liquid state. Such weapons
were difficult to handle not only because of their extremely large size, but
also because of the special cryogenic requirements:[11, 12];
(a) The first multistage thermonuclear test was Ivy Mike on 1 November
1952: far from being a deliverable weapon, this cryogenic experimental
device weighed 74 metric tons and occupied a warehouse. Yield was 10.4 mt,
which was 60% fission.[13]
(b) The TX-16 was a weaponized version of this device: it weighed about 18
metric tons, was 7.56 meters long and had a yield of about 7.5 mt. Part of
the weight reduction was accomplished by using equipment in the B-36 to
top off the liquid hydrogen before delivery. About 5 "emergency capability"
units designated EC16 were built in March 1954. All were retired the
following month, however, as solid-fueled thermonuclear weapon prototypes
were successfully tested in the Pacific. After the cancellation of the Mk-16, no
other liquid-fueled thermonuclear weapons were ever built.[12, 14]
(c) Conventional solid-fueled thermonuclear weapons used lithium-deuteride

as fusion fuel. The first such weapon was the EC14; it weighed 13,133 kg and
was 5.64 meters long. These "emergency capability" weapons actually
preceded the EC16 into the stockpile, with 5 units built in February 1954,
making the EC14 the first operational multistage thermonuclear weapon.[11]
The design was tested in shot Castle Union on 26 April 1954, producing a
yield of 6.9 mt.[5] All were retired in October 1954.[11] These early
thermonuclear weapons were carried by specially modified B-36 bombers;
the limited number of such converted bombers available in 1954 operated
from Kirtland AFB in New Mexico.[12]
15. Mass-produced multi-megaton weapons
(a) Four high-yield thermonuclear weapons had been rushed into the
stockpile in 1954: the EC14, EC16, EC17/Mk-17, and EC24/Mk-24. In the late
1950s, three multi-megaton weapons of more robust design were mass
produced: the B21, B27, and B36.
(b) The B21 weighed about 7,000 kg and was produced in both clean and
dirty versions;[3, 15] a clean version was tested in shot Redwing Navajo on
11 July 1956 at a yield of 4.5 mt.[5] From December 1955 to July 1956 about
275 units were produced. They were all converted to B36-Y1 weapons from
June to November 1957.[15]
(c) The B27 weighed 1,430 kg and had a yield of about 5 mt. About 700 were
produced between November 1958 and June 1959. All were retired between
November 1962 and July 1964.[86]
(d) The 7,900 kg B36 NGB was also produced in a dirty version (B36-Y1) and
clean version (B36-Y2). The B36-Y1 had a yield of about 9.5 mt, while that of
the B36-Y2 was 6 mt; most of the 940 units built were probably the high
yield, dirty version.[16, 17]
16. The Titan II heavy ICBM
(a) The Titan II carried the highest yield missile warhead ever deployed by
the United States. This was the W53 warhead with a 9-megaton yield, which
could be delivered by the Titan II to a range of 15,000 km.[18] About 60 W53
warheads were built from December 1962 to December 1963.[19]
(b) The first Titan II was placed on alert in April 1963 in Arizona. The first
squadron of 9 was operational in June 1963, and full operational capability
was attained with 54 deployed in December 1963: 18 near Davis-Monthan
AFB in Arizona, 18 near Little Rock AFB in Arkansas, and 18 near McConnell
AFB in Kansas.[20, 21, 22] A guidance upgrade was conducted to improve
the accuracy of operational Titan IIs from February 1978 to December 1979.
[18, 22] On 19 September 1980 leaking fuel exploded in a Titan II silo in
Arkansas, killing one and injuring 27. This silo was never returned to service;
the same is apparently true of a silo in Kansas damaged by a fuel leak on 24
August 1978.[23, 24]
(c) Retirement of the remaining 52 Titan IIs began in September 1982.[24]

The last one was removed from alert in May 1987.[25] Disassembly of W53
warheads had begun in October 1969[19] and was probably completed by
1988.
17. The Spartan ABM
(a) In January 1963 the U.S. began development of a two-layered anti-

ballistic missile system which would eventually be named Safeguard, with
the two ABMs being Spartan and Sprint. The first layer, the Spartan missile,
was an exo-atmospheric ABM using a high-yield thermonuclear warhead (the
W71) to intercept incoming warheads outside the atmosphere. The second
was Sprint, an endo-atmospheric high-acceleration ABM using a low-yield
warhead to intercept surviving warheads within the atmosphere.[26]
(b) The W71's yield was too large for underground testing at the Nevada Test
Site, so Amchitka Island in the Alaskan Aleutians was selected as a site. To
evaluate concerns over this site, a test of 1.2 megatons was conducted
at Amchitka on 2 October 1969 (Milrow). Political opposition to the W-71 test
(and the Safeguard ABM system in general) included an appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court attempting to block the test on the scheduled day; the Court
rejected the appeal 4-3, allowing the test to proceed.[27] On 6 November
1971 the Spartan's warhead, the W71, was tested at full yield in shot
Cannikin of Operation Grommet. At the bottom of a 1.76 km-deep shaft,[27]
the warhead's yield was reported as "approximately" 5 mt[26] or "less than 5
megatons"[27], estimated here as about 4.8 megatons.
(c) The first W71 units were completed in July 1974, and full production ran
from October 1974 to July 1975 [26] by which time 39 warheads had been
built.[28] The W71 warhead was "tailored": using a layer of gold around the
thermonuclear secondary, the output of x-rays was maximized to achieve a
more efficient kill of targeted warheads.[26]
(d) The SALT I treaty, signed 26 May 1972, and breached forth by they and
others observing this statement of facts found out, limited the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. each to a pair of 100-missile ABM sites; an additional protocol signed
3 July 1974 reduced this to one such site each. The U.S. selected a site near
Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota for the Safeguard site, named the Stanley
R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex,[29] which would provide limited protection
to the Grand Forks AFB Minuteman ICBM field.
(e) The first ABMs were emplaced at Grand Forks in late 1974. The first ABMs
were placed on alert in April 1975, with 8 Spartans and 28 Sprints
operational. The full complement of 30 Spartans and 70 Sprints became
operational on 1 October 1975, with all 30 Spartans at the MSR site near
Nekoma, North Dakota.[30]
(f) The following day, 2 October 1975, the U.S. House of Representatives
voted to shut down the Safeguard site. The U.S. Senate passed a similar
measure on 18 November 1975, and that month the Safeguard site was
taken off alert. Decommissioning of the site began 10 February 1976.[31, 32,
33]
(g) The Spartan missiles and warheads were retained in inactive storage until
the 1990s. The warheads were dismantled in 1995.[34]
18. The last U.S. high-yield nuclear weapon
(Image: B53 bomb casing at the National Atomic Museum.)
(a) Development of the B53 began in March 1958 as a replacement for the
B41.[10] The B53 was carried by the B-47, B-52, and B-58 bombers. It was
reportedly produced in two yield versions. The 9-megaton B53-Y1, a "dirty"
version, was first produced in August 1962, weighed 4010 kg and was 3.8
meters long. The B53-Y2 was a "clean" version first produced in June 1964; it
weighed 3860 kg and was 3.7 meters long.[5, 10] The yield of the Y2 version
is unknown, but was probably lower than 9 mt.
(b) When B53 production ended in June 1965, about 340 had been built.
Retirement of some early versions began in 1967.[10] When the B41 was
retired in 1976, the B53 was left as the only high-yield bomber weapon in
the U.S. stockpile.
(c) In 1987 about 25 B53s remained in the active stockpile, plus additional
B53s retired and awaiting dismantling. On 5 August 1987 the DOD
announced that B53 retirement was being halted, and those retired but still
intact units would be returned to the active stockpile.[10] This unusual action
likely reflected the B53's then unique capabilities against deeply buried
hardened targets in the U.S.S.R.
(d) Thus, at the end of the Cold War, in 1991, there were an estimated 50
B53s remaining in the active stockpile, and their retirement was believed to
be eminent.[35, 36] (This figure may not include 28 B53s dismantled
between October 1989 and September 1997.[28]) However, in 1995 it
emerged that these were being retained pending development of an earth-
penetrating warhead.[37] Without the B53, the U.S. would have had no
weapon to hold at risk certain super hardened, deeply buried targets. The
B61-11 was developed as a replacement: with a potential 350-500 kt yield in
an earth-penetrating warhead, allowing detonation slightly below the ground
surface for better coupling of shock to ground, this was a viable replacement.
[38] The B61-11 was deployed from Dec. 1996 to 1997, allowing retirement
of the B53.[39]
(e) The B53 was immediately retired from the active stockpile [39]; there
were apparently safety concerns with the warhead. Some B53s were
disassembled at the Pantex Plant in Texas from 1998 to May 1999, at which
time disassemblies were suspended due to safety protocols.[40] Resumption
of disassemblies was delayed by adoption of new safety documents and by
dedicated efforts at Pantex to complete disassemblies of remaining W56 and
W79 warheads from October 2001 to September 2003.[41, 42, 43, 44, 45] In
2002 it was reported that the last B53s, about 35, were to be soon
dismantled.[46, 47] DOE documents suggest that some issues still had to be
worked out (including transportation from temporary storage at Kirtland Air
Force Base in New Mexico[49, 50]), plus disassembly efforts remained
concentrated on other warheads (including the W70 [51]). Funds for B53
disassembly were included in the FY2004 [49] and FY2005 [52] and
requested for FY2006 [51], although it is not clear if any additional
disassemblies have been completed as of February 2005.
(f) Following removal of the B53 from service, the highest yield U.S. weapon
is the variable yield B83, with a maximum yield of 1.2 mt.[53]
19. Soviet/Russian nuclear warheads with yield over 4.5 megatons

system (U.S. des.) [warhead] type stock entry
IOC off alert retired type weight (kg) yield (mt)
no. built R-16 Sheksna (SS-7 Mod 3) ICBM 1963
1978 1950 ~6 0-320 R-9 (SS-8) ICBM Nov 1963 1978
1800 ~5 23-46 R-36 8K67 Tsiklon (SS-9 Mod 1)
ICBM Nov 1966 1980 7000 18 140-290
R-36 8K67 Tsiklon (SS-9 Mod 2) [8F675]
ICBM 1966 1980 7000 25 140-290
R-36 8K69 Tsiklon (SS-9 Mod 3)
FOBS Aug 1969 Jan 1983 5000 ~20 0-20
MR UR-100N (SS-17 Mod 2) ICBM 1977
1984 3500 ~5 10-30 R-36M (SS-18 Mod 1) [15B86]
ICBM Dec 1974 ~1978 7500 24 20-60
R-36MUTTKh (SS-18 Mod 3) ICBM 1976 1990 730
20 20-60 R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Mod 6)
ICBM Aug 1990 9000 20 20 UR-100N (SS-19 Mod 2)
ICBM 1977 3500 ~5 60 RDS-220 ("Tsar Bomba")
NGB 27000 ~150 0-5 NGB 50 0-20

NGB ~20 0-120 NGB ~5000? ~5 ?
20. The largest Soviet nuclear weapon
(a) The largest nuclear weapon ever developed by any nuclear power was
the Soviet RDS-220,[62] also nicknamed "Vanya" or "Tsar Bomba" (King of
Bombs). It was a three-stage weapon weighing 24.8 metric tons and was 8
meters long. Its 2-meter diameter required a specially modified version of
the Tu-95 Bear bomber for delivery. The single such Tu-95V carried the RDS-
220 partially protruding from the bomb bay.[63, 64] The U.S.S.R. tested this
design in an airdrop over Novaya Zemlya on 30 October 1961 at a yield of 58
megatons (the U.S. estimated 58 mt[65], while Russian sources report 50
mt[66]). However, this was a reduced yield "clean" version: the uranium
sleeve on the tertiary stage was replaced with lead, and the fission yield was
only 3% of the total yield.[63] The full yield version had a yield of 150 mt[62]
(Russian sources report 100 mt[64] to 150 mt[67]).
(b) Another device tested the following year had a nominal yield of 50 mt.
Tested at a reduced yield of 24.2 mt on 24 December 1962 at Novaya
Zemlya, it was designed at Chelyabinsk-70 (as opposed to Arzamas-16 for
the RDS-220)[66].
(c) Whether either of these weapons was operational is sided. The RDS-220
was probably believed operational: only the single specially modified Tu-95V
could carry it, and when doing so it would have been particularly vulnerable
to anti-aircraft action. The 50-mt Chelyabinsk-70 device might have weighed
10-15 metric tons, based on comparison to other Soviet warheads of the
time. Thus it was probably deliverable by unmodified Tu-95M Bear bombers,
which could carry 15 metric tons of payload (albeit to a reduced range).[68]
Any operational deployment was probably only for a short time since bomber
forces were converting to cruise missiles, but the weapons could have
remained in the stockpile as late as the 1980s, given the apparent slow pace
of Soviet warhead disassembly.
(d) The Soviets briefly considered developing an ICBM capable of carrying

the 150-mt RDS-220 warhead or a similarly large warhead. Of several
proposed missiles, only the UR-500 reached the flight stage, by which time
any nuclear-armed version was abandoned in favor of using the UR-500
exclusively as a space launch vehicle.[69]
The R-9 and R-16 ICBMs
21. The R-36 heavy ICBM
(a) The R-36 heavy ICBM, known in the West as the SS-9 Scarp, was deployed
in four versions. Two versions of the R-36 carried single warheads: the SS-9
Mod 1 carried a warhead of 10 mt (some sources report 5 mt), and the SS-9
Mod 2 carried the 8F675 warhead with a yield of 25 mt (some sources report
18 mt). The R-36O version (Western designation SS-9 Mod 3) was a
fractional-orbit bombardment system (FOBS). It would launch a single 5-mt
warhead into low-Earth orbit, southbound from the USSR. Once orbiting over
the United States, the warhead would deorbit and strike its target. The
system was intended to bypass U.S. early-warning radars. The final version,
the R-36P (Western designation SS-9 Mod 4) carried 3 warheads, not
independently target able. Each warhead had a yield between 2 and 5 mt.
[70, 71]
(b) The R-36 went on alert on 9 November 1966, and 268 of all four versions
were deployed in underground silos. All were retired by 1978 except for some
R-36O versions. The R-36O FOBS version, which went on alert 25 August
1969, was retained in small numbers until January 1983, when the SALT II
treaty was completed and barred their deployment.[70, 71]
22. The R-36M, R-36MUTTKh, and R-36M2 heavy ICBMs
(a) The heavy ICBM known in the West as the SS-18 Satan actually includes
three related missiles--the R-36M, the R-36MUTTKh, and the R-36M2--with a
variety of warhead loadings in each case. Deployed in both MIRVed and
single-warhead versions, the single warhead variants carried the largest
missile warheads ever deployed.[72, 73]
(b) The R-36M was developed as a replacement for the R-36. Flight tests
were conducted from October 1972 to October 1975 on three variants. The
15B86 single warhead version, with a 24-mt yield, was the first version
deployed; this was known in the West as the SS-18 Mod 1. These became
operational in December 1974 in converted R-36 silos at Dombarovksy. Most
R-36Ms were deployed with 15F143 MIRV warheads--eight warheads each--
although a ten-warhead 15F143U version also existed. The MIRVed version
(Western designation SS-18 Mod 2) became operational in November 1975. A
version carrying terminally-guided 15F678 warheads (MaRVs) was tested
from July 1978 to August 1980 but never deployed.[72, 73]
(C) The follow-on R-36MUTTKh was flight tested in a MIRVed variant from
October 1977 to November 1979, known in the West as the SS-18 Mod 4.[72,
73] The 15F183 warhead section generally carried 10 warheads, although at
least one flight test carried 14 warheads.[74] Some R-36MUTTHk ICBMs
carried the 15B86 single warhead at 24 mt (Western designation SS-18 Mod
3), now with improved accuracy over the R-36M. In September 1979 the first
three R-36MUTTKh regiments became operational; they had replaced all R-36
missiles by 1980, all R-36M missiles by 1982 or 1983, and reached full
deployment in 308 silos by 1983.[72, 73]
(d) Another follow-on, the R-36M2 Voyevoda ("commander" in English), was
flight tested from March 1986 to September 1989. The MIRVed variant (SS-18
Mod 5), with ten 15F173 warheads, became operational in December 1988. A
single-warhead version (SS-18 Mod 6), with the 15F175 warhead providing a
20-mt yield, was deployed in small numbers beginning in August 1990.[72,
73] The single-warhead R-36M2 is the highest yield nuclear weapon currently
deployed by any nation.
The UR-100N and MR UR-100N ICBMs
23. The largest PRC nuclear weapon
(a) The People's Republic of China is subject to the conditions and terms of
space based saucer modularly conformities sure as though she has deployed
a warhead estimated at 5 megatons on the Dong Feng 5 ICBM (U.S.
designation CSS-4). The DF-5 can carry a 3,000-kg warhead to a range of
12,000, while the improved Dong Feng 5A can carry 3,200 kg to a range of
13,000 km.[78] The warhead is probably a high yield version of the design(s)
used in the PRC's thermonuclear tests of 1968, 1970, and 1976 (given the
limited number of Chinese nuclear tests, an independent warhead design is
unlikely).[76]
(b) Estimated deployments of DF-5s are highly uncertain. The first two DF-5
missiles were deployed in silos in 1981,[78] and the force remained at 2
through at least 1984.[79] Estimated numbers deployed were 18 in June
2000, 20 in 2003,[76] and 24 in 2005, although reports vary. From about
1990 to 2000, deployed DF-5s were replaced with improved DF-5As.[75, 77]
Reportedly the DF-5 force is currently organized into three missile brigades.
(C) The 803rd brigade in Hunan province was established in 1984 and
converted to DF-5A missiles by the mid-1990s. The 804th brigade in
western Henan province was established in the late 1980s, converted to DF-
5A missiles by 2000, and may include missiles based in tunnels. The 818th
brigade in Hunan province was established in 1996 and was likely initially
equipped with DF-5A missiles.[77]
SOME INFORMATION IS MISSING AD ADAGES HISTORY IS SAID DATED 1956-

57 STIPULATED FALSLEY DERIVED FOR AUTHORS TO INCINERATE FAITH A
DAY COME I SAW DEVISING HELL ADDED.
5th DAY OF MARCH 2,015 IN 92655 U S A
Treaty Nuclear disarmament; Peace, International

Treaty Deposition Criterion; Agenda; The Article's
of Genetic Disclosure, Discovery and Appeal;
Descriptive Encode In Star Based Internal Command;
inter alias DESBIC Treaty DONE IN 92655 USA
Weapons of Attack Terms, and Terminology's
1.The listing includes all types of nuclear warheads deployed, built but not
deployed, cancelled, currently proposed, or presumed/suspected.
2. Relatively complete information is as stated so;
3. For the US, UK, France, South Africa, Sweden. This is considered hereto as
an draft assimilation of the aspect to ratio with regard for variant
comparability when the undertaking of mutual qualitative disarmament is to
be sought Sirs Sir.
4. Comparable specifics are to be recognized by the terms provided for

hereto; especially that of notwithstanding the USSR or Russia (which
inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal?); and the PRC.
5. It shall be the duty of the Secretary General's to transpose the extensions

and specific variations for other countries, thereto no classification shall be
much considered as speculative here when Sir.
6 Explanation of terms
Weapon name: designation and/or name assigned by respective country

Warhead designation (for US, UK, and France): designation for nuclear
warhead Western designation (for all other countries): U.S. and NATO
designations-
Weapon type:
AAM - air-to-air missile
ABM - anti-ballistic missile
ADM - atomic demolition munitions
AFAP - artillery-fired atomic projectile
ALBM - air-launched ballistic missile
(range over 1000 km)
ALCM - air-launched cruise missile (range over 1000 km)
ASAT - anti-satellite weapon
ASCM - anti-ship cruise missile
ASM - air-to-surface missile (range under 1000 km)
ASW - anti-submarine weapon
ATBM - anti-tactical ballistic missile
DEW - directed energy weapon
FOBS - fractional orbit bombardment system
GLCM - ground-launched cruise missile
(range between 1000 km and 5500 km)
ICBM - intercontinental ballistic missile
ICCM - intercontinental cruise missile
IRBM - intermediate-range ballistic missile
MICBM- mobile intercontinental ballistic missile
MRBM - medium-range ballistic missile
NDB - nuclear depth bomb
NGB - nuclear gravity bomb
SAM - surface-to-air missile
SLBM - submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM - submarine-launched cruise missile
SRBM - short-range ballistic missile
(range under 1000 km)
7. Stock entry: date when first warheads entered nuclear stockpile IOC: initial
operational capability, or date of first alert capability-off alert: date when
alert capability ended Retire stock: date when last warheads dismantled
8.WH type: type of nuclear device:
BF - boosted fission
ER - enhanced radiation
FI - implosion, unspecified fission
GA - gun assembly, uranium fission
IC - implosion, fission, composite core
IM - implosion, fission, various cores
IP - implosion, plutonium fission
IU - implosion, uranium fission
LC - "Sloika" thermonuclear
LI - linear implosion, plutonium
PG - gun assembly, plutonium fission
TC - multi-stage thermonuclear, clean (
TD - multi-stage thermonuclear, dirty (>65% fission)
TN - multi-stage thermonuclear
TS - multi-stage thermonuclear, standard (25%-65% fission)
9. No. built: total number of warheads built
10. Yield: explosive yield in kilotons (kt) or megatons (mt), with notes as
follows:
DV - different versions (warhead stocks include separate versions with

different yields)
S - selectable yield (individual warhead yield may be selected from several

options)
SC - separate cores (individual warhead yield determined by which of

several interchangeable fissile cores is used)
V - variable yield (individual warhead yield may be set within a

continuously variable range)
MRVs, MIRVs, or MARVs - multiple reentry vehicles, multiple independently-

target able reentry vehicles, and maneuverable reentry vehicles,
respectively (figures indicate warhead loading per missile)
11. The above accounts and description of the Annex of Terminal Attribution,
pursuant to the classifications ascribed of in Chapter's 6 of this Provision,
shall be subject to the limitations provided for under this Treaty and
considered an integral priority undertaking on the elimination of Weapons of
Mass Destruction to be phased out, decommissioned and destroyed, as an
display of civil obedience therewith our star elder presences instilled.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF 04 MARCH 2,015 OF FAITH WHEREBY
DESBIC PROTOCOLS
1.This Protocol is an integral part of this DESBIC Treatys AGENDA, and of this
Treaty(s') and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the
Treaty(s') and shall remain in force for an unlimited duration pending sound
extension and revisionment(s). As provided for within the Provisions of the
Treaty(s'), the Party(s') may agree upon such additional measures as may be
necessary to improve the viability and the effectiveness of disarmament and
the related terms thereupon.
2. The Party(s') agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes to the
conditions of a Provisions to this Treaty(s'), the substantive interpretation
was to the point of 0,000 nuclear and 0,000 biological warheads, as, and/or
relating devices, were to be the common and level sound approach; along
with 000, nuclear fuel reactors, except as prohibited also Naval Global
Enforcement Duty(s').
3. USTICE ANTON HIGHER COURTS NOW PRESIDED SANTA ANA CA.

ATTENTION ALL INSIGNIAS TO AN ENSIGN A UNITED NATIONS IN GOD'S WILL
WE TRUST: THE HONORABLE ANTON PRESIDED AN ENTITY AND A LORDS
MAY HIS WORDS BE UNDERSTOOD
4. To promote the objectives and implementations of the Provisions to this

Convention, all insignia's to a Marquis, be they independent or clandestine
"motus operates", be bound by this Testament, and for the purpose of
independent housing and growth away from aliens we see, whereby the
United States in Support and Service to the United Nations and Atlantic
Treaty Organization, referred to hereinafter as U S S' U N A T O, may
collaborate to promote well calibrated abstracts of contingencies thereto.
The Commission is to act as an inter-compartmental Agency and promote
unity?
5. The above mentioned embodiments of governing principalities shall be

referred to as the Principal's, and/or the Party(s') to a State(s); or Party(s');
and/or the United Nation's Atlantic Treaty Organization hereby. The Party(s')
to this Treaty reaffirm their Faith in the principles of national and
International accordance to a declaration of Charters of governments of the
past Signatures on file at the United Nation's. In view of this declaration
which will repudiate on the part of the nuclear proliferating Ensigns; the
Israelis are not a religious society, along with the U S A, and the United
Nations Organization of International Governments are considered along with
Russia, Her constituents are primary or read another care co-ordination
Principal- thereby hereto.
(The USS U N and Celestial Claims)
6. Pursuant to its responsibilities under the Charter of the League of Nations,

the United Nation's done lied to the present charges in observance of the
Provision descriptive and inter-planetary extra-terrestrial connotives present
that exists and are purpose and purchase crude radioactive displays of
dissidence to my recollections? These reports may include particulars of
decisions and recommendations whereby relevant information has previously
been furnished to the United Nations study reference to an event of alpha-
scientific importance.
7 All the while s subject now in question will be a Soul patterns, my "Soully
spirited matter" perhaps for a network of afterlife as we are, placement of
molecular in servitude to all the disrespect, and social disassociation with the
precepts weve discussed concerning genetic mutations, and the act and
fact these individuals harbor resentment standing rather than obey the word
of the Lord, His Majestys Grace. The special orders were to provide
assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the
educational, professional, technical, social, cultural, and administrative
spheres of common dialect.
8. The establishment of a programme of universal utopia order is a matter of

say. We say. Our say is something to assign. Love is something to perceive in
entered a region of underworld and counter point objectives and physical
enticement to a recollection to who do we take notices up as Human
understanding continued.
9. Now desiring to establish a firm foundation for common approach to

promote regional cooperation on standards of the spirit capacity; that of
equality and partnerships and thereby contribute toward peace, progress,
and prosperity; fostering good understanding, good neighborliness, and
meaningful social justices among the civilized Ive encountered, in order to
preserve and describe succeeding generations.
Protocol 5 (Naval Proliferation)
10. In order to consolidate good relations between the Nuclear and Non-
Nuclear Power's on the open seas, and the far corners of the earth's
inhabitants it shall be necessary to facilitate an High Standing Order shall be
assigned here when accountancy licensing for all Aircraft Carrier's, with a
capability of landing fixed winged aircraft shall be the letter of the will of the
Justices for the Peace.
11. In Addition the conscripted U N award for United States with (if
applicable), be there inseperable immunities set forward for maritime
exchange and enforcement of critical life services on the high seas and
inlets, because of the turbulences of combinative, competitive strike force
oriented ship and defense contracting.
12. Realizing their desire to create a system of collective security, taking into
consideration at the same time the situations that have come about
regarding allied cohesion a U N Secretary General will suspend all sales of
submersible vehicular transport and all submarine sales from every miner
including, U S A, German, French, Russian, Chinese in order to keep parity
and afloat as global maritime constrictors awards and by 31 December
2016; The suspensions with an exception noted for 011 critical life support
assimilation being noted are its international contingents and variants of as
follows:
(i) Strategic Naval Class Limitations
tons standard aggregate displacement
(a) Aircraft carrier-----------90,000 tons
(b) Battleships----------------70,000
(c) Cruiser Class Warship----- 32,500
(d) Destroyers-----------------24,000
(e) Frigates Armed W/Torpedoes-23,500
(f) Amphibious War Ships------ 26,500
(g) Missile Patrol Boats------ 13,500
(h) Special Warfare Crafts-----13,500
PROTOCOL 13 TREATY INTEGRATION

DESBIC TREATYS AND AGENDA
13. In line with rights, duties, and awards to the United States Navy-Marine
Corps in exercising its global enforcement obligations, all shipbuilders and all
insignia's to a Marquis shall not exceed the aggregate postulation standards
aforementioned in this Article. The aggregate numbers provided for shall be
initiated no later than December 31, 2,016 and special permission from the U
S S' U N must be given to all and all, who come to call for an Aircraft Carrier
of any such contract projection to be constructed, as is the same for ballistic
and Attack Submarines or submersibles, by permission only, subject to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorization and his agency, in order to
assure protection and service thereto.
14. In accordance with the provisions of this Article, the Party(s') shall agree
to the limitations provided for in this agreement(s). Any such breach of what
can be unanimously construed as disposition-ment of Law, shall be subject to
excessive fines, detention and/or suspension of permanent membership
status to the Security Council U N, (if -applicable), in and that the Law
enforcement authorities as a matter of Protocol and principles agree that as
long as there are nuclear, biological and chemically laden ships going out to
sea, the arms subject, and the balances of security, remains a highest
priority.
15. Respective to the binding uses of projections The Russian Federation and
Unity and territorial watercourses will not be an assignment nor contracting
waivers for service as not needed in at or bouts Northeast Asia Pacific
regions and the Black Sea region of co-operative engagement(s) thereon;
pursuant to the Provision-ment set forth in this agreement herein.
PROTOCOL 16 (Network Communication)
16. The Party(s') undertake to notify each other through the diplomatic
channels of the United Nations, or by direct communication access to the
charge d'affaires ad interim, or a diplomatic Head of the Mission, in the event
of an accidental, unauthorized, or any other unexplained incident, such as
launch code piracies, and incidents considered a possible breach of security
be called into question nor compromise a faulty ledgers of understanding..
17. Counter espionage in launch code accessibility, and/or attempts, along

with nuclear warheads being made available for purchase, as so to report, in
and that the threats imposed by nuclear fuel enrichment proliferation is a
cause of legal action and an obligation of conveyance as to clarify an
undertaking of virtual disappear-ment concessions a priority hereof.
18. The Provisions of the present Convention are without prejudice to any
obligation which may arise taken in conformity with the disarmament terms
and Dutys, in and that each Party undertake to maintain and improve, as
deemed necessary, it's existing organizational and technical obligatory
arrangements, so as to protect any such informants' who do come forward to
reveal the actions, activities, and/or whereabouts of such an event of
sabotage or dissident factions assimilation a descriptive thereto. The United
Nation's Organization Government shall act as a receiving State whereby the
Secretary General's' quarter may permit and protect the freedom of the
communication on the part of the Consular Post if a breach of security is
being reported.
19.If as so, corresponding testimony to a violation or act of retaliatory pre-

emptivity assimilation bears a canny reference to phony, shall be anticipated
from time to time, regard fully so, in effect thereto; and shall, for the most
part, be considered or taken, as factual, if reported from a Consular Post
headed by an Honorary Consular General hereby.
DESBIC TREATY AGENDA PROTOCOLS 20-31
(Understanding the Laws of Nature)
20. As a common standard of achievement, and to secure the blessings of

pro-creation, we come to understand Love. Love; Love is a word of human
rights and a side of safety to those who come endowed with reason and
consciousness. In another way we come to understand self realization, in and
that, so shall thou do unto others, brace thoughts, as shall be done unto
themselves hereunder.
(a) Understanding that of which is of paramount importance, perspective of a

higher power, to which an equal opportunity of give and take in the fields of
development should be made uniform through continuous cultural
emergence thereinafter.
(b) Within the insignias of colorfast and common approach, and to promote
and approve rules and limitations regarding the exercise of equal opportunity
status quo; all Party(s') to the Treaty(s') shall conform to this entry, that be
there no such transgender orientation, or trans genetical intransigencies
thereto in accordance with the statutes of Carnal Knowledge in scribed and
assigned to the Entitys followers inter alias persons of interest we say we
decide.
(c) transgender orientation shall be considered unlawful and is strictly

prohibited. To copulate or ingest hormone seed of which is a major cause for
warfare in space traveler not seek our attention do contends in a Courts of
laws we teach, a mental health jobs resorted to bedlam coordinators
assigned to derail regards for sodomic creatures ambitions to sodomize to
where we surprise an assets to our side and-s Soully essence-s when did
arise at Court to ambush, and kidnap will contend also? The fact neither
care nor concern is given by care coordinators understanding of authority to
convey will continue to be a subject at Court we seek to justify a need for
contentions.
(d) Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as affecting the unalienable

rights of a naturalized universally accepted common standard of ethnic and
genetic respect, though a vise and virtue connotation is a recommendation;
we have a purpose of understanding love and survival.
(e) In and that once more: their shall no man shall lie unto Mankind as with
womankind it is abomination thereto; and a visa versa; furthermore it is
mutation; the fact that this type of desires is in leagues with ethnicities who
have agendas in underworld activities and with federal magistrates I see-s
are grounds to assail unlawful behavior I say. This behavior leads to Soul
snatching and sodomic regression as I can say is good causes to give ear
when saying como esta and-s not seeing eye to eye for a fight when
informed a Levitown promoters of fists care coordination for sodomic
creatures in disguise, another contentions there this.
(f) In furtherance, that of which is of great importance: a said womankind-

s, shall not ingest by oral extremities nor baul imputes neither enzymes nor
hormone seed emission in that same attainment of dis-respect for our
surprise visits a ready, it is abomination and a cross pollination act. That so
then like this current detail descriptive and described another areas of cocker
roach insemination pleasure not. This Article calls for a Moratorium on
transgender orientation, by and for a U N Secretary General's quarter for the
full realization of an pledge to affirm a Faith wherefore.
Protocol 21 START AGENDA TREATY(S)
(Stellar Diplomacy)
21. In the absence of a specific destination within a sector, or in cases where

priorities are ambiguous, in and though specific operatives licensing s is
required, the universal laws such as, "we come in peace and goodwill",
implies in the event of a saucer module captain's May Day. From a time
traveled, and of he who tried to warn a people of a coming seditious acts of
treacherous alien degenerates among our Communitys I see who do a fight
for gender cross-pollination I see.
22. Except as concerns etiquette and precedence, the Party(s) to a DEF-

CON-5 shall promote hospitable acknowledgement to a receiving Status-quo,
and ascertain by all viable means, the Star Elder question; in and though,
how loyal are your ancestry to describe a phony concerted attention to all we
say, district Judges contentions I hears?
23. Whenever a Treaty or convention specifies to authenticate our presences

as real in order to arbitrate disputes without shots being fired, so to say;
within a defining moment a few disabled attack individuals cry than a faulty
resorted to anything they can think of like police and Sheriff Deputie caught
in Court exercising contempt I see. This Paragraph deals with over sight and
accountability in mind and spending as such to described:
(a) appropriated 1 trillion dollars Mars to pretend that Star Elder's did not
advise,
(b) are abuses of clairvoyance such as is masters performing in sideshows to

see a side of fate.
(c) for heavens sake, pretended the faces on the maps never exist anyhow.
(d) concerted attention to oxygen depletion molecules for said uninhabitable

regions
(e) subscribe not to carnal transgender degeneration, mutation, and show

reproach.
24. If a Party to a State of the United Nations consorts, consents or has

forged an alliance with Star Elder Being ness or Space travelers, or other
descriptive of higher intelligence other than the sodomic creatures here on
areas known as detention bring, the receiving Party to that State are to
undertake to bring to the attention of the Secretary General(s), is to exercise
benevolent approach firstly, in a report, file footage and/or a special
invitation to receive instructions and accurate conveyance of missionary
objectives, analyze and detain neither a face of loyal associations nor
construe addict to end opinions so that it may be applied inasmuch to the
paramount necessitation of public safety, growth and inasmuch as the
questions may be decided hitherto.
25. If as a result of applying the Provisions of this Chapter, serious

discrepancies emerge and occur over a sector of theater implicated
submergences in secret agendas that are void of formulation to the survival
of mankinds existence and for the planet and time reference that is known
as Earth, then the Secretary Generals quarters are to consider this Treaty
as Official as can be, delivered by they who come from the stars thereto. In
the event that such an occasion comes to light or of timely manifestation
thereto, all reasonable Party(s) to a State are to submit such an encounter to
the Global Political Institution, care/of: Scientific Commission, Secretary
General United Nations NY thereby for evaluation hereunder wherefore.
START TREATY AGENDA
Protocol 26
(The Isthmus of Panama)
26. Pursuant of space based Internal Security Clearance procedure, IC.

docket N507, dated March 05, 2,015 commanders in charge of Star Based
descriptive encoded, secrecy instilled; the Sheriff Department joined by
attack escrow fielders caught describing difference of opinion at an United
States shall be requested par to reasonable expectation, incessant of the
obligations assumed, underwrite the active utility resource by these
premises for the permanent and neutral oceanic corridor hereof: the Panama
Canal, by reason of security surpluses in engagement expectations, the
Isthmus of Panama, and the Pan American water courses therein thereupon
shall abide by U S entry of Naval flotilla as a stay of Faith.
(a) The United Nations Security Council shall also be requested to endorse a
State of Say as understood, to be an interpretation of policy and actions
necessary to protect legitimate interests in this sphere here withal ascribed
thereupon.
(b). Resolved to strengthen the safeguard of peace and liberty by

conditioning this
combination of resources in accordance with the principles of stated
neutrality
between the various influences of militia status quo and a State of intrinsic
knowledge;
Intending to disqualify obscure and in volute stalemates of various citizens
from sudden
acquisition of theater ballistic explosives for a purchase order in consent
and /nor exploit a state of insignias to a Marquis in secret service attention
when shipping and re-situating help such as border patrol ironies in fertilizer
and other dangerous cargo..
27. Directing their efforts to sanctify a U N subcontracting Mission for

common defense
and practical enforcement concern regarding the evolvement and
exploitation of
uranium laden warships with fallacies to every piracys need to note and
note to need;
(a).Mindful of the irregular implacabilitys to every coincidental attempts to

decide a matter at handle within the scope of surgical and legal expunge
ability therefore.
Have Decided to initiate the application of procedures which shall make it
possible
to:
(b) co-ordinate by association, the precepts of star based insignias and the
transfer progression of tipped arrows with isotopic sin based expletives
whereupon.
28. In order to make fuller contribution to their common objective, when

conducting
military activities in the area known as The Canal Zone, in accordance with
these
objectives, within the zones of application and prior notification of military
maneuvers on the part or behalf of the Central or South American
Governments must
be given to:
(a) the Depositary underwriters consent to the U N Charter whereof

therefore.
START AGENDA TREATY
PROTOCOLS 29 (Korean Re-unification)
29. A PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA , AN UNITED STATES, AN FEDERAL

JUDGES IN THE WAY, AN RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND-S AN UNITED NATIONS
ASSEMBLY SEEKS FAULTY RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOD FIGURE (ENTITY) IN ITS
JOINT NORTHERLY AND SOUTHERLY SECURITY COUNCIL NOT WITHOUT
EQUALLY REPRESENTED FULL SESSIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SAY OVER A
MATTER OF CONTENTION I HEARS.
30. In order to resolve this technical arrangements to the satisfaction of the

predominantly China and U S ambassadors to a U N concern never to better
decide with spontaneous confidence the Joint two Party interim decisions to
be understood clearer then I never notice;
Have a say on any idiosyncratic decisions if there remains a doubt as to
whether enough situation I hears a fuss to-s on a stipulated matter of
concern is in the Partys best interest. So to remove the doubts abstentions
from a High Contracting Party shall take secondary and primary precedences
if the doubts remain un-cleared by a United States and Peoples Republic of
China Military Chief of Staffs approvals of decent wage to kid not a day in
Court and a multilateral with given seventy two hours minimal to a Party to
these imprints to discuss further or agree to have an impasse settled in a U N
atmosphere forgo a change.
Looking toward the future U S, China, Russia and U N Security Council in full
session not without one standing delegate each North and South Korea ad-
joined and stationed in Seoul South Korea. Conscript receiving delegates to
each Party here under referred as High Contracting Partys hereto decided to
remove the division as to undertake within their means a level playing field.
Convinced that the system for freedom of trade is our responsibility, added
a note of limitations, prohibitions, and restrictions as the essential
foundations to reinforce the links between the general conditions of a most
favored nation endorsement at the subterfuges of cause; whence so ever Ad
Extricate becomes a common denominate objective, to that of which is the
issue of solidarity be instituted by these presences where why not.
Persuaded by the factual interprets that the five permanent memberships to

a U N Security Council are being observed and treated by star people, as the
right truth in reverse psychologys I see, to that end their exists an
adjudicate to the faulty Prayers of I seated an District Judges in trouble
forensics a lie to our knowledge of Faith and obedience for the Republics for
which it stood. Any statement of truth undeniably, spoiling the fruit of our
wisdom a Creator I hear is all it is as U S is doing will be construed as
malevolent.
31. It is requested of South Korea The U S and Japan and such as to mention
the Souths trading partners to cover the Multi neutral stabilization projection
tours of duty costs and overhauls there though with a North South Korean
administrative coalitions to seat the contemporaneous questions of trans
migration-al limitations per annual average.
32. Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,

on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army
North Korea and the commanders in chiefs of South Korea here is a bell toll
for United States interests in pre-post armistice demilitarized concession-ings
and the Commander of the Chinese People's volunteers, on the other hand,
concerning a military transition-ing in the two Koreas subject to the Provision-
ment of this Treaty.
33. Wed prefer the United States and China deal with any extremist
requesting and if the two High Contracting Partys can not come to an
accordance the Entirety of High Contracting Partys stating hereunder shall
assail never before a Perjury forfeitures ranks
34. The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on

the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the North Korean People's
Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other
hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, the United States Chief
of Staff and the Commanders in Chief South Korea with its great toil of
suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing
a merger-ing economic growths which will insure a complete cessation of
hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea where have a final peaceful
settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to
accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of mutual
assured re-unifications set forth in the following articles and paragraphs,
which said conditions and terms are intended to be in character and to
pertain solely to the road map of where it consents to be bound and bonded.:
35. A Peoples Republic of China in accordance with the Provisions of this

Treaty, may observe the two Koreas Ad interim per adventives dual
occupancy in states afore me though North Korean sending administration to
micro manage and assure its parental North Korean affiliate here in so
whenever not to do so at a times of peril North Korean assurities that the
fifteen billion annularly domestic unless otherwise regarded as not enough
be secured for non-military like programs in the Northern Provinces here
more then.
36. Having had contacts with our star base apertures advised for a Security
Council to discourage Dictatorship field representation if a Proponent had
been driving for not more then twelve to fourteen years thinks the new
arrivals will Party some had suggested the U N limit dictatorships twelve
years or so if the dictators do not concur to take the relief and the re-union in
good standard acceptances how now.
37. With respect to include other arrangements to the armistice to the

safeguards provided for as a condition of the 31 December 2,016 post fact
re-union, until further notice and supplemental accordances with respect to
the relevant position laid down in this decision and its authority and the
stipulating interest at budgetary allocated minimal down to retain the
administrate semi segregates there full;
38. A full United Nations Security Council attention shall govern the actions
of this Ad interim Accordance, The High Contracting Partys recognized under
lawful give and Summons are The Peoples Republic of China, The Russian
Federation, United States of America a full U N Security Council presence
each Partys U N Security Council members; the two Ad interim Republic
ambassadors if either North Korea nor South Korea to readily act accordingly
in A U N Security Council presence.
39. The Two shall become one united and the Northerly presences in
Southern-likes area of reunification shall consist of A Head of State, a Charge
de Affaires, a Ministry of Defense composed of an unspecified contingency
soon to be agreed upon , say 13,000 Officials North as it may remain open
ended to be discussed; a Ministry of Trade 10,000 Officials suggested, an
Ministry of Economic Affaires 25oo-7500 or up to The High Contracting
Partys People Republic of China under any circumstance, a Ministry of
Tourism 10,000 to 30,000 residents. A Ministry of Olympic Athletics 3000-
6000 up for discuss further, a Ministry of Education up for proper realization
includes construction effort on vehicles in pass around 6 universities are
needed North as to situate warm and working re-pore in accordance to this
Provisionary and its Protocol.
30. The Party to this writ shall remain at peace and offer no resistance nor
aggressive competitive overtures to the U N manned and Multi-Nation mini
stabilization forces as requests of the Joint fields of endeavor-ment entered
as that same DMZ here from this day wayward by and beginnings 31
December 2,016 11:59 pm, dmz time up outfit not their concern is you owe
us your life a Captains urge constraints as U S withdrawal that will not further
any military purpose, under condition, which ensure the safety of any
shipping and shipments as set forth in the terms of this documentations
Texts, Protocols, and declaratives are Partys to Ensigns in Deputys wallet to
direct deposit and offer no resistance. Hold it tenderly as to construe a fuller
contribution and family unit therefore.
Neutral nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of

entry.
(a) Territory under the military contrail of the United Nations Command
INCHON..................................(37 28, 126 38'E)
TAEGU....................................(35 52'n, 128 36'E)
PUSAN....................................(35 45'N, 129 02'E)
KANGNUNG.............................(37 45'N, 128 54'E)
KUNSAN..................................(35 59'E, 126 43'E)
(b) Territory under the military control of the Chinese People's Volunteers
NORTH KOREA ENTIRELY TO SOUTH KOREA CUSTODY

SINUJU....................................(40 06'n, 124 24E)
CHONGJIN................................(41 46'N, 129 49E)
HUNGNAM...............................(39 50'N, 127 37'E)
MANPO....................................(41 46'N, 126 18'E)
SINANJU...................................(39 36'N, 125 36'E)
General
31. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses
of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the
Neutral nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may
be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.
32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral
Nations Supervisory commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice
commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in
English, Korean, and Chinese.
33. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports
concerning the results of their supervision observations, inspections, and
investigations to the Neutral Nations supervisory Commission as required by
the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be
deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.
Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted
by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports
submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as
information only.
34. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection teams shall
be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which
received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or
evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such
reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the
Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice
Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until
the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral nations
Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral nations Supervisory
Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the
Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either
side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report
submitted.
35. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate

files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice
Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such
other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its
business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above
files shall be turned over to each side.
36. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make

recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to
amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended
changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective
armistice.
37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof,

shall be authorized to communicated with any member of the Military
Armistice Commission.
________________________________
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
_______________________________
_______________________________
NORTH KOREA
__________________________________
SOUTH KOREA
__________________________________
CHINA
__________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
___________________________________
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
____________________________________
THE RE-UNIFICATION TREATY BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
Considering the fundamental role of treaties in their history of international

relationships,
Recognizing a need to not let a smolder burn between others and the two
Koreas,
38. Also recognizing a free market economy and cross frontier trade
investments, and a Northern Korean administration be appointed for
Southern Korea will describe a language barrier when all understand English
so stated the Entitys if the doubts directed toward one anothers DMZ build
ups remain undecided,
Recalling the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to establish
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from
treaty can be maintained,
Affirming that the rules of customary international law will continue to

govern questions by the provisions of the present Convention,
Have verily ascribed:
PROTICOLS (The Principles) Korean Decisions
39. In view of the contributions both the Peoples Republic of China and the
United States of America have taken in the Korean re-unification question
with the objective of formal custodial acquisition ment of her southerly
counterpart, both sides shall harmonize their defense relationship, broaden
their economic trade zones and form a transition-like approach in Seoul, as
needed to form a concession of disarmament and free trade republics.
40. The Contracting Parties will decide for themselves so strive to create
uniform provisions regarding crime and the consequences of crime. The
investigation and prosecution of a crime committed in one Korea should be
passed by a court of its constituencys.
41 The Contracting Parties If so decided shall continue to work to attain the

highest possible degrees of justice and equality between nationals of the
two Koreas; in furtherance If decided on their own accord-s, shall endeavor to
facilitate the acquisition ment of citizenship rights by wayward not later then
31 December 2016 here so. The Contracting Parties in any presidents
wisdom-s,strive to achieve mutual coordination in other areas of fiscal
collective responsibility and legislation.
42. So see if-s a State of war between the Parties will be terminated and who
would side peace be established between them upon the exchange and
instruments of worrys relating to removal of all weapons aimed at one
anothers fortitudes.
43. And-s seek-s South Korea to share her administrative bodys and not to
suggested yield some transition mental powers and authority to the Defense
Minister of North Korea and-s visa versa for parody as in to effective as soon
as an authority can catch a President, a Defense Minister, a Minister of States
a Multi-purpose administration from the north to the south a Social Trade
Ministry, a Health and Human services Secretary, and a Secretary of State as
to what allows precedence and follow through here situate it sided.
44. In order to take a more-fuller contribution toward the Koreas and in ways
we seem to unify the southerly way inflow of immigration to pass through
into Southern regions; it shall be construed as Joint Protocol. A Joint Protocol
Commission shall be comprised of four Northern sectors-and five Southern
areas Commissioners as noted to determine the issues of restoration,
programs of work, and general border crossing questions that may arise.
Although an two Koreas may be received as a re-unification mandate by way
wards of this Article, the subject of a fence and its perimeters shall continue
to be an interest for the Parties until a North feels its Southerly counterpart is
perceived to become a self sustain fledgling of an Republics of Korea here
told..
45. In the event that there arise a mass riot or upheaval by its northern or
southern frontiers over an issue that may seem unfair to all, Chinese riot
squadrons will assist in diffusing such an occurrences and will ask The
Peoples Republic of China at its own discretion assign a contingencies of
plastic munitions if assimilating a friends in an areas where dis-orderly
constable paying attention do Devil candor still we see.The land mines
questions may become a silent reminder of a phony baloney rift on into a
forty year sequence as to repel what was expected to become a mass
running, jumping and illegal entryways to our Southerly prefecture and might
serve our purpose as intended to more effectively account and provide for us
from an northern prefectures that-told forgo.
46. Having considered the views expressed in its place of an northerly

frontiers two million people free standing army and infantry, A United
Nations Assembly shall seek a use of these individuals for factionary peace
keeping forces under the color of the Peoples Republics of China -U N.
Accordingly in its own interest a U N Governance shall ask Dispatch to
conscribe Northern Korea militia acquisition for UN sponsored programme of
work, with a view toward non-militaristic supplication wherefore odd jobs and
manpower may address the impertinences of overly militarized relating
assistance calls.
47. In Witness Whereof DONE ON THIS 5th OF MARCH 2015

IN MIDWAY CITY USA 92655 IN GODS WILL WE TRUST NEVER SOLD
The Plenipotentiarys agreed to the basic content in context with the

Provisionment provided for of the corresponding assignments as inscripted
informative consent and agreed to guarantee the safety of its north-like and
southerlies constitutional drafts assigned so weigh California PD?
NORTH KOREA
_______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
SOUTH KOREA
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
_________________________________
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (USSR)

_________________________________
_________________________________
__________________________________
THE SECRETARY GENRALS UNITED NATIONS
__________________________________
OR ACTING U N SECURITY COUNCILS REPRESENTATION
__________________________________
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_________________________________
_________________________________
48. Findings of the Court;
For the purpose of the Law hereby
relating to the claimants Filing
for Petition and Grantee of Title deeds: By;
The North Korea,

(The Republics For)
(A)
VS.
The Provincial State and Republic For South Korea

(B)
Name of Claimant A Name of Claimant B
Petitioner Respondent Petitioner Respondent
Arbitrator (Holy Ghosted Entitys)

United Nations New York 10017, USA
Appellate Department for:
The World International Court(s) of Justice
Findings: South Korea would be better served by offering financial incentives
aimed at trickle re-unification suchly to which can be attained who will
decide.
PROTOCOL 49.(Taiwan ROC Issue)
(China, Nuclear Proliferation and the Korean Issues)
(a)A mans mind may make him a Buddha, or it may make him a beast.
Misled by error; become an enlightened one-s, becomes a Buddha.
Therefore, control your mind and do not deviate from the right path You
should respect each other, follow whose teachings, and refrain from
disputes The Spirit of Buddha is that of great loving kindness and
compassion. The great loving kindness is the spirit to save all people by any
and all means.:
(b) BUDDHAS RELIEF AND SALVATION FOR US
The world is a burning house, the people, unaware that the house is on fire,
are in danger of being burned to death so Buddha in compassion devises
ways of saving them.
(c). In the spirit of sincere co-operation, declare that they are prepared to
participate in a results oriented space based with star people in order to
communicate and take actions necessary to put an end to inevitable
outbreaks of deceptive practices, second and third Party nuclear pre-emptive
consternation thereby
(d)an assessment of re-unification prospects between the Peoples Republic of

China and Taiwan re-tro in effect up way wards to December 31, 2,016,
pursuant of the non-proliferation overtures by China and her progress in
marketable commodities to a factual findings
(e) in and that supplying and completely proliferating in nuclear arms

trafficking is not in a better interest and so China had been defusing tensions
in an effort to reach a respective sidedness in the China Taiwan re-unification
financial arrange-ments let it be stated.
(f) The Party to the statement foregoing agrees in a said fairer than we might
implied; a question of bank securitys and agreed to upon terms of such a
miniscule and-s acceptable appendage-s in concerted attention to property
taxation phase to these additions. That and reasonable search and seizure
questions and guarantees?
Open for discussion, analysis, debate sharing, constructive criticism?

ANNEX 1 AND TREATYS BANNING TRANSFER AND POSSESSION OF WMD
PROVISION MENTALS ON TRAFFICKING AND TRANSFER IN NBC WMD

(POTNBCWMD) OR DELIVERY APPARATUS AND UNLAWFULL MATERIALS AN
ANNEX APPENDAGE OF LITARARY DESIGN AFFILIATES COMPOSITION(S)
ON THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, RESEARCH, ACQUISITION

AND PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY ALL SAID STATUS QUOS AND
RESTRICTIONS ALL ENSIGNS EMBLEMS STATES FEDERAL REPUBLICS TRUSTS
ROGUE NOT SPECIFIED RUSSIA, FRANCE, UNITED STATES, NORTH KOREA,
PAKISTAN, INDIA ISRAEL, AUSTRALIA, UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY,
SWITZERLANDS ANTICS, FILIPINES SOWARDS AS FOLLOWS IN PARTICULARS:
ANALYSIS:
All shipping weigh stations must be manned by clairvoyants task force we

are not looking to identify.
(a) This Annex consists of two categories of items, which term includes
equipment and "technology". Category I items, all of which are in Annex
items 1 and 2, are those items of greatest sensitivity. If a Category I item is
included in a system, that system will also be considered as Category I,
except when the incorporated item cannot be separated, removed or
duplicated. Category II items are those items in the Annex not designated
Category I.
(b) The transfer of "technology" directly associated any items in the Annex
will be subject to some form of penaltys per United Nations resources to
affix a particular cost to society a particular breach might weigh here stating
minimal six months $twenty five thousand to 30 years $500 million dollars
depending on the five security council names and their say over toward a U
N International Court of Justices finding to this entry made to halt the
trafficking and transfer of detrimental conspiring as will the equipment itself,
to the extent permitted by international legislation. The approval of any
Annex item for export also authorizes the export to the same end user of the
minimum technology required for the installation, operation, maintenance,
and repair of the item.
(c) In reviewing the proposed applications for transfers whether by computer

or computer devices discs, dvds, hard drive information, flash drive, floppy,
e-mail, chat versions of espionage nor falsifying letterhead of complete
rocket and unmanned air vehicle systems described in Items 1 and 19, and
of equipment or technology which is listed in the Technical Annex, for
potential use in such systems, the Government will take account of the
ability to trade off range and payload.
2. DEFINITIONS
(a) For the purpose of this Annex, the following definitions apply: (a)
"Development" is related to all phases prior to "production" such as:
design
design research
design analysis
design concepts
assembly and testing of prototypes
pilot production schemes
design data
process of transforming design data into a product
configuration design
integration design
layouts
(b) A "microcircuit" is defined as a device in which a number of passive

and/or active elements are considered as indivisibly associated on or within a
continuous structure to perform the function of a circuit.
(c) "Production" means all production phases such as:
production engineering
manufacture
integration
assembly (mounting)
inspection
testing
quality assurance
(d) "Production equipment" means tooling, templates, jigs, mandrels,

moulds, dies, fixtures, alignment mechanisms, test equipment, other
machinery and components therefor, limited to those specially designed or
modified for "development" or for one or more phases of "production".
(e) "Production facilities" means equipment and specially designed software

therefor integrated into installations for "development" or for one or more
phases of "production".
(f) "Radiation Hardened" means that the component or equipment is
designed or rated to withstand radiation levels which meet or exceed a total
irradiation dose of 5 x 10 5 rads (Si).
(g) "Technology" means specific information which is required for the

"development", "production" or "use" of a product. The information may take
the form of "technical data" or "technical assistance".
(1) "Technical assistance" may take forms such as:

instruction
skills
training
working knowledge
consulting services
(2) "Technical data" may take forms such as:

blueprints
plans
diagrams
models
formulae
engineering designs and specifications
manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or
devices such as:
-- disk
-- tape
-- read-only memories NOTE: This definition of technology does not include
technology "in the public domain" nor "basic scientific research".
(i) "In the public domain" as it applies to this Annex means technology which
has been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination.
(Copyright restrictions do not remove technology from being "in the public
domain".)
(ii) "Basic scientific research" means experimental or theoretical work

undertaken principally to acquire new knowledge of the fundamental
principles of phenomena and observable facts, not primarily directed towards
a specific practical aim or objective.
(h) "Use" means:
operation
installation (including on-site installation)
maintenance
repair
overhaul
refurbishing
3. TERMINOLOGY
Where the following terms appear in the text, they are to be understood
according to the explanations below:
(a) "Specially Designed" describes equipment, parts, components or software

which, as a result of "development", have unique properties that distinguish
them for certain predetermined purposes. For example, a piece of equipment
that is "specially designed" for use in a missile will only be considered so if it
has no other function or use. Similarly, a piece of manufacturing equipment
that is "specially designed" to produce a certain type of component will only
be considered such if it is not capable of producing other types of
components.
(b) "Designed or Modified" describes equipment, parts, components or

software which, as a result of "development," or modification, have specified
properties that make them fit for a particular application. "Designed or
Modified" equipment, parts, components or software can be used for other
applications. For example, a titanium coated pump designed for a missile
may be used with corrosive fluids other than propellants.
(c) "Usable In" or "Capable Of" describes equipment, parts, components or

software which are suitable for a particular purpose. There is no need for the
equipment, parts, components or software to have been configured, modified
or specified for the particular purpose. For example, any military
specification memory circuit would be "capable of" operation in a guidance
system.
ITEM 1- CATEGORY I
(i) Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch
vehicles and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including
cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) capable of
delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km as well as
the specially designed "production facilities" for these systems.
ITEM 2 - CATEGORY I
(i) Complete subsystems usable in the systems in Item 1, as follows, as well

as the specially designed "production facilities" and "production equipment"
therefor:
(a) Individual rocket stages;

(b) Reentry vehicles, and equipment designed or modified therefor, as
follows, except as provided in Note (1) below for those designed for non-
weapon payloads:
(1) Heat shields and components thereof fabricated of ceramic or ablative

materials;
(2) Heat sinks and components thereof fabricated of light-weight, high heat
capacity materials;
(3) Electronic equipment specially designed for reentry vehicles;
(c) Solid or liquid propellant rocket engines, having a total impulse capacity
of 1.1 x 10 6 N-sec (2.5 x l0 5 lb-sec) or greater;
(d) "Guidance sets" capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33 percent or

less of the range (e.g. a CEP of 10 km or less at a range of 300 km), except
as provided in Note (1) below for those designed for missiles with a range
under 300 km or manned aircraft;
(e) Thrust vector control sub-systems, except as provided in Note (1) below
for those designed for rocket systems that do not exceed the range/payload
capability of Item 1;
(f) Weapon or warhead safing, arming, fuzing, and firing mechanisms, except
as provided in Note (1) below for those designed for systems other than
those in Item 1.
Notes to Item 2:
(1) The exceptions in (b), (d), (e) and (f) above may be treated as Category II
if the subsystem is exported subject to end use statements and quantity
limits appropriate for the excepted end use stated above.
(2) CEP (circle of equal probability) is a measure of accuracy; and defined as

the radius of the circle centered at the target, at a specific range, in which 50
percent of the payloads impact.
(3) A "guidance set" integrates the process of measuring and computing a

vehicle's position and velocity (i.e. navigation) with that of computing and
sending commands to the vehicle's flight control systems to correct the
trajectory.
(4) Examples of methods of achieving thrust vector control which are

covered by (e) include: a. Flexible nozzle; b. Fluid or secondary gas injection;
c. Movable engine or nozzle; d. Deflection of exhaust gas stream (jet vanes
or probes); or e. Use of thrust tabs.
ITEM 3 - CATEGORY II
Propulsion components and equipment usable in the systems in Item 1, as

follows, as well as the specially designed "production facilities" and
"production equipment" therefor, and flow-forming machines specified in
Note (1):
(a) Lightweight turbojet and turbofan engines (including turbocompound

engines) that are small and fuel efficient;
(b) Ramjet/scramjet/pulse jet/combined cycle engines, including devices to

regulate combustion, and specially designed components therefor;
(c) Rocket motor cases, "interior lining", "insulation" and nozzles therefor; (d)
Staging mechanisms, separation mechanisms, and interstages therefor; (e)
Liquid and slurry propellant (including oxidizers) control systems, and
specially designed components therefor, designed or modified to operate in
vibration environments of more than 10 g RMS between 20 Hz and 2,000 Hz.
(f) Hybrid rocket motors and specially designed component therefor.
Notes to Item 3:
(1) Flow-forming machines, and specially designed components and specially
designed software therefor, which:
(a) according to the manufacturer's technical specification, can be equipped

with numerical control units or a computer control, even when not equipped
with such units at delivery, and
(b) with more than two axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for
contouring control. Technical Note: Machines combining the function of spin-
forming and flow-forming are for the purpose of this item regarded as flow-
forming machines. This item does not include machines that are not usable
in the production of propulsion components and equipments (e.g. motor
cases) for systems in Item 1.
(2) (a) The only engines covered in subitem (a) above, are the following:
(1)Engines having both of the following characteristics: (a)Maximum thrust
value greater than 1000N (achieved un-installed) excluding civil certified
engines with a maximum thrust value greater than 8,890N (achieved un-
installed), and (b)Specific fuel consumption of 0.13kg/N/hr or less (at sea
level static and standard conditions); or (2)Engines designed or modified for
systems in Item 1, regardless of thrust or specific fuel consumption. (b)Item
3(a) engines may be exported as part of a manned aircraft or in quantities
appropriate for replacement parts for manned aircraft.
(3) In Item 3(c), "interior lining" suited for the bond interface between the
solid propellant and the case or insulating liner is usually a liquid polymer
based dispersion of refractory or insulating materials. e.g., carbon filled HTPB
or other polymer with added curing agents to be sprayed or screeded over a
case interior.
(4) In Item 3(c), "insulation" intended to be applied to the components of a

rocket motor, i.e., the case, nozzle inlets, case closures, includes cured or
semi-cured compounded rubber sheet stock containing an insulating or
refractory material. It may also be incorporated as stress relief boots or flaps.
(5) The only servo valves and pumps covered in (e) above, are the following:
a. Servo valves designed for flow rates of 24 litres per minute or greater, at
an absolute pressure of 7,000 kPa (1,000 psi) or greater, that have an
actuator response time of less than 100 msec; b. Pumps, for liquid
propellants, with shaft speeds equal to or greater than 8,000 RPM or with
discharge pressures equal to or greater than 7,000 kPa (1,000 psi). (6) Item
3(e) systems and components may be exported as part of a satellite.
(1) Propellants and constituent chemicals for propellants as follows: (a)
Composite Propellants (1) Composite and composite modified double base
propellants; (b) Fuel Substances (1) Hydrazine with concentration of more
than 70 percent and its derivatives including monomethylhydrazine (MMH);
(2) Unsymmetric dimethylhydrazine (UDMH);
(3) Spherical aluminum powder with particles of uniform diameter of less

than 500 x 10-6m (500 micrometer) and an aluminum content of 97 percent
by weight or greater;
(4) Metal with particle sizes less than 500 x 10 -6 m (500 micrometer),
whether spherical, atomized, spheroidal, flaked or ground, consisting of 97
percent by weight or more of the following: beryllium, boron, magnesium,
zirconium, and alloys of these;
(5) High energy density materials such as boron slurry, having an energy
density of 40 x 106 J/kg or greater. (c) Oxidizers/Fuels (1) Perchlorates,
chlorates, or chromates mixed with powdered metels or other high energy
fuel components. (d) Oxidizer Substances (1) Liquid (a) Dinitrogen tetroxide;
(b) Nitrogen dioxide/dinitrogen tetroxide;
(c) Dinitrogen pentoxide;

(d) Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA);
(e) Compounds composed of flourine and one or more of other halogens,

oxygen or nitrogen.
(2) Solid (a) Ammonium perchlorate;
(b) Ammonium Dinitramide (ADN);
(c) Nitro-amines (cyclotetramethylene-tetranitramine (HMX),

cyclotrimethylene-trinitramine (RDX); (e) Polymeric Substances (1) Carboxl-
terminated polybutadiene (CTPB)
(2) Hydroxy-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB)
(3) Glycidyl azide polymer (GAP)
(4) Polybutadiene-acrylic acid (PBAA)
(5) Polybutadiene-adrylic acid-acrylonitrile (PBAN). (f) Other Propellant

Additives and Agents (1) Bonding Agents
(a) Tris (1-(2-methyl)aziridinyl phosphine oxide (MAPO);
(b) Trimesoyl-1(2-ethyl)aziridine (HX-868,BITA);
(c) "Tepanol" (HX-878), reaction product of tetraethylenepentramine,

acrylonitrile and glycidol;
(d) "Tepan" (HX-879), reaction product of tetraethylenepentamine and

acrylonitrile;
(e) Polyfunctional aziridine amides with isophthalic, trimesic, isocyanuric, or

trimethyladipic backbone and also having a 2-methyl or 2-ethyl aziridine
group (HX-752, HX-874 and HX-77) (2) Curing Agents and Catalysts
(a) Triphenyl Bismuth (TPB); (3) Burning Rate Modifiers (a) Catocene;
(b) N-butyl-ferrocene;
(c) Butacene;
(d) Other ferrocene derivatives;

(e) Carboranes, decarboranes; pentaboranes and derivatives thereof; (4)
Nitrate Esters and Nitrated Plasticizers (a) Triethylene glycol dinitrate
(TEGDN);
(b) Trimethylolethane trinitrate (TMETN);
(c) 1,2,4-Butanetriol trinitrate (BTTN);
(d) Diethylene glycol dinitrate (DEGDN); (5) Stabilizers, as follows (a) 2-

Nitrodiphenylamine;
(b) N-methyl-p-nitroaniline
(1) Production technology, or "production equipment" (including its specially
designed components) for:
(a) Production, handling or acceptance testing of liquid propellants or

propellant constituents described in Item 4.
(b) Production, handling, mixing, curing, casting, pressing, machining,

extruding or acceptance testing of solid propellants or propellant
constituents described in Item 4.
Notes to Item 5:
(1) Batch mixers or continuous mixers covered by (b) above, both with
provision for mixing under vacuum in the range of zero to 13.326 kPa and
with temperature control capability of the mixing chamber, are the following:
Batch mixers having: a. A total volumetric capacity of 110 litres (30 gallons)
or more; and b. At least one mixing/kneading shaft mounted off centre.
Continuous mixers having: a. Two or more mixing/kneading shafts; and b.
Capability to open the mixing chamber. (2) The following equipment is
included in (b) above: a. Equipment for the production of atomized or
spherica metallic powder in a controlled environment; b. Fluid energy mills
for grinding or milling ammonium perchlorate, RDX or HMX.
(i). Equipment, "technical-data" and procedures for the production of

structural composites usable in the systems in Item 1 as follows and
specially designed components, and accessories and specially designed
software therefor:
(a) Filament winding machines of which the motions for positioning, wrapping
and winding fibers can be coordinated and programmed in three or more
axes, designed to fabricate composite structures or laminates from fibrous or
filamentary materials, and coordinating and programming controls;
(b) Tape-laying machines of which the motions for positioning and laying
tape and sheets can be coordinated and programmed in two or more axes,
designed for the manufacture of composite airframes and missile structures;
(c) Multi-directional, multi-dimensional weaving machines or interlacing

machines, including adapters and modification kits for weaving, interlacing
or braiding fibres to manufacture composite structures except textile
machinery not modified for the above end uses;
(d) Equipment designed or modified for the production of fibrous or

filamentary materials as follows:
(1) Equipment for converting polymeric fibres (such as polyacrylonitrile,

rayon or polycarbosilane) including special provision to strain the fibre during
heating;
(2) Equipment for the vapor deposition of elements or compounds on heated

filament substrates; and
(3) Equipment for the wet-spinning of refractory ceramics (such as

aluminium oxide);
(e) Equipment designed or modified for special fibre surface treatment or for
producing prepregs and preforms.
(f) "Technical data" (including processing conditions) and procedures for the
regulation of temperature, pressures or atmosphere in autoclaves or
hydroclaves when used for the production of composites or partially
processed composites.
Note to Item 6:
(1) Examples of components and accessories for the machines covered by
this entry are: moulds, mandrels, dies, fixtures and tooling for the preform
pressing, curing, casting, sintering or bonding of composite structures,
laminates and manufactures thereof.
(2) Equipment covered by sub item (e) includes but is not limited to rollers,
tension stretchers, coating equipment cutting equipment and clicker dies.
(i) Pyrolytic deposition and densification equipment and "technology" as
follows:
(a) "Technology" for producing pyrolytically derived materials formed on a
mould, mandrel or other substrate from precursor gases which decompose in
the 1,300 degrees C to 2,900 degrees C temperature range at pressures of
130 Pa (1 mm Hg) to 20 kPa (150 mm Hg) including technology for the
composition of precursor gases, flow-rates and process control schedules and
parameters;
(b) Specially designed nozzles for the above processes;
(c) Equipment and process controls, and specially designed software

therefor, designed or modified for densification and pyrolysis of structural
composite rocket nozzles and reentry vehicle nose tips.
Notes to Item 7:
(1) Equipment included under (c) above are isostatic presses having all of the
following characteristics: a. Maximum working pressure of 69 MPa (10,000
psi) or greater; b. Designed to achieve and maintain a controlled thermal
environment of 600 degrees C or greater; and c. Possessing a chamber
cavity with an inside diameter of 254 mm (10 inches) or greater. (2)
Equipment included under (c) above are chemical vapour deposition
furnances designed or modified for the densification of carbon-carbon
composites.
(i) Structural materials usable in the system in Item 1, as follows:
(a) Composite structures, laminates, and manufactures thereof, specially

designed for use in the systems in Item 1 and the subsystems in Item 2, and
resin impregnated fibre prepregs and metal coated fibre preforms therefor,
made either with organic matrix or metal matrix utilizing fibrous or
filamentary reinforcements having a specific tensile strength greater than
7.62 x 104 m (3 x 106 inches) and a specific modulus greater than 3.18 x
106 m (1.25 x 108 inches);
(b) Re-saturated pyrolized (i.e. carbon-carbon) materials designed for rocket

systems;
(c) Fine grain recrystallized bulk graphites (with a bulk density of at least
1.72 g/cc measured at 15 degrees C and having a particle size of l00 x 10-6m
(100 microns) or less), pyrolytic, or fibrous reinforced graphites usable for
rocket nozzles and reentry vehicle nose tips;
(d) Ceramic composite materials (dielectric constant less than 6 at

frequencies from 100 Hz to 10,000 MHz) for use in missile radomes, and bulk
machinable silicon-carbide reinforced unfired ceramic usable for nose tips;
(e) Tungsten, molybdenum and alloys of these metals in the form of uniform
spherical or atomized particles of 500 micrometer diameter or less with a
purity of 97 percent or higher for fabrication of rocket motor components; i.e.
heat shields, nozzle substrates, nozzle throats and thrust vector control
surfaces;
(f) Maraging steels (steels generally characterized by high Nickel, very low
carbon content and the use of substitutional elements or precipitates to
produce age-hardening) having an Ultimate Tensile Strength of 1.5 x 109 Pa
or greater, measured at 20 C. Therefore any soldiers who conspire knowing
or not at will in these elements of composite matter or any arms dealers
especially now ongoing in suitcase I can represent must face the
consequences of these choices of judgment legal action-ary re-percussions
for this I will require a piece of I D include U S Customs Officer I know do see
a vision to International shipping I just heard may go to Islam Party to these
footnote a fool I do declare an items misrepresented to sold your Faiths down
not a cop either service bureau of really-s.
Notes to Item 8:
(1) Maraging steels are only covered by 8(f) above for the purpose of this
Annex in the form of sheet, plate or tubing with a wall or plate thickness
equal to or less than 5.0 mm (0.2 inch).
(2) The only resin impregnated fibre prepregs specified in (a) above are
those using resins with a glass transition temperature (Tg), after cure,
exceeding 145oC as determined by ASTM D4065 or national equivalents.
Instrumentation, navigation and direction finding equipment and systems,
and associated production and test equipment as follows; and specially
designed components and software therefor:
(a) Integrated flight instrument systems, which include gyrostabilizers or

automatic pilots and integration software therefor, designed or modified for
use in the systems in Item 1;
(b) Gyro-astro compasses and other devices which derive position or

orientation by means of automatically tracking celestial bodies or satellites
or other curiositys Im up an offer;
(c) Accelerometers with a threshold of 0.05 g or less, or a linearity error

within 0.25 percent of full scale output, or both, which are designed for use
in inertial navigation systems or in guidance systems of all types;
(d) All types of gyros usable in the systems in Item 1, with a rated drift rate
stability of less than 0.5 degree (1 sigma or rms) per hour in a 1 g
environment;
(e) Continuous output accelerometers or gyros of any type, specified to

function at acceleration levels greater than 100 g;
(f) Inertial or other equipment using accelerometers described by subitems

(c) or (e) above or gyros described by subitems (d) or (e) above, and systems
incorporating such equipment, and specially designed integration software
therefor;
(g) Specially designed test, calibration, and alignment equipment, and

"production equipment" for the above, including the following:
(1) For laser gyro equipment, the following equipment used to characterize
mirrors, having the threshold accuracy shown or better:
(i) Scatterometer (10 ppm); (ii) Reflectometer (50 ppm); (iii) Profilometer (5
Angstroms).
(2) For other inertial equipment:
(i) Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU Module) Tester;
(ii) IMU Platform Tester;
(iii) IMU Stable Element Handling Fixture;
(iv) IMU Platform Balance fixture;
(v) Gyro Tuning Test Station;
(vi) Gyro Dynamic Balance Station;
(vii) Gyro Run-In/Motor Test Station;
(viii) Gyro Evacuation and Filling Station;
(ix) Centrifuge Fixture for Gyro Bearings;
(x) Accelerometer Axis Align Station;
(xi) Accelerometer Test Station.
Notes to Item 9:
(1) Items (a) through (f) may be exported as part of a manned aircraft,
satellite, land vehicle or marine vessel or in quantities appropriate for
replacement parts for such applications.
(2) In sub-item (d): a. Drift rate is defined as the time rate of output deviation
from the desired output. It consists of random and systematic components
and is expressed as an equivalent angular displacement per unit time with
respect to inertial space. b. Stability is defined as standard deviation (1
sigma) of the variation of a particular parameter from its calibrated value
measured under stable temperature conditions. This can be expressed as a
function of time.
(3) Accelerometers which are specially designed and developed as MWD

(Measurement While Drilling) Sensors for use in downhole well service
operations are not specified in Item 9(c).
(i) Flight control systems and "technology" as follows; designed or modified
for the systems in Item 1 as well as the specially designed test, calibration,
and alignment equipment therefor:
(a) Hydraulic, mechanical, electro-optical, or electro-mechanical flight control

systems (including fly-by-wire systems);
(b) Attitude control equipment;
(c) Design technology for integration of air vehicle fuselage, propulsion

system and lifting control surfaces to optimize aerodynamic performance
throughout the flight regime of an unmanned air vehicle;
(d) Design technology for integration of the flight control, guidance, and
propulsion data into a flight management system for optimization of rocket
system trajectory.
Note of Item 10:

(i) Items (a) and (b) may be exported as part of a manned aircraft or satellite
or in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for manned aircraft.
(i) Avionics equipment, "technology" and components as follows; designed or
modified for use in the systems in Item 1, and specially designed software
therefor:
(a) Radar and laser radar systems, including altimeters;

(b) Passive sensors for determining bearings to specific electromagnetic
sources (direction finding equipment) or terrain characteristics;
(c) Global Positioning System (GPS) or similar satellite receivers; (1) Capable
of providing navigation information under the following operational
conditions;
(i) At speeds in excess of 515 m/sec (1,000 nautical miles/hour); and
(ii) At altitudes in excess of 18 km (60,000 feet); or (2) Designed or modified

for use with unmanned air vehicles covered by Item 1.
(d) Electronic assemblies and components specially designed for military use
and operation at temperatures in excess of 125 degrees C.
(e) Design technology for protection of avionics and electrical subsystems

against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and electromagnetic interference (EMI)
hazards from external sources, as follows: (1) Design technology for shielding
systems;
(2) Design technology for the configuration of hardened electrical circuits
and subsystems;
(3) Determination of hardening criteria for the above.
Notes to Item 11:

(1) Item 11 equipment may be exported as part of a manned aircraft or
satellite or in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for manned
aircraft.
(2) Examples of equipment included in this Item:
a. Terrain contour mapping equipment;
b. Scene mapping and correlation (both digital and analogue) equipment;
c. Doppler navigation radar equipment;
d. Passive interferometer equipment;
e. Imaging sensor equipment (both active and passive); (3) In subitem (a),
laser radar systems embody specialized transmission, scanning, receiving
and signal processing techniques for utilization of lasers for echo ranging,
direction finding and discrimination of targets by location, radial speed and
body reflection characteristics.
(i) Launch support equipment, facilities and software for the systems in Item
1, if the material looks like it is some kind of intricate technology and
especially if the destination is not a known full fledged Ally of the U S or is a
said rogue nation investigate it tracker does mind it not cant then say it do
as follows:
(a) describes the particular ingredients needed to manufacture develop and

test missile of war however we didnt pay for Apparatus and devices
designed or modified for the handling, control, activation and launching of
the systems in Item 1;
(b) Vehicles designed or modified for the transport, handling, control,

activation and launching of the systems in Item 1;
(c) Gravity meters (gravimeters), gravity gradiometers, and specially

designed components therefor, designed or modified for airborne or marine
use, and having a static or operational accuracy of 7 x 10-6 m/sec2 (0.7
milligal) or better, with a time to steady-state registration of two minutes or
less, to station clairvoyants at international shipping carrier locations me to
decide why;
(d) Telemetering and telecontrol equipment usable for unmanned air vehicles
or rocket systems, (e) Precision tracking systems: (1) Tracking systems which
use a code translator installed on the rocket or unmanned air vehicle in
conjunction with either surface or airborne references or navigation satellite
systems to provide real-time measurements of in-flight position and velocity;
(2) Range instrumentation radars including associated optica1/infrared

trackers and the specially designed software therefor with all of the following
capabilities: (i) an angular resolution better than 3 milli-radians (0.5 mils); (ii)
a range of 30 km or greater with a range resolution better than 10 metres
RMS; (iii) a velocity resolution better than 3 metres per second.
(3) Software which processes post-flight, recorded data, enabling

determination of vehicle position throughout its flight path.
(i) Analogue computers, digital computers, or digital differential analyzers
designed or modified for use in the systems in Item 1, having either of the
following characteristics: (a) Rated for continuous operation at temperatures
from below minus 45 degrees C to above plus 55 degrees C; or (b) Designed
as ruggedized or "radiation hardened".
Note to Item 13:

(ii) Item 13 equipment may not be exported as part of a manned aircraft or
satellite or in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for manned
aircraft.
(i) Analogue-to-digital converters, usable in the systems in Item 1, having
either of the following characteristics:
(a) Designed to meet military specifications for ruggedized equipment; or,
(b) Designed or modified for military use; and being one of the following
types: 1) Analogue-to-digital converter "microcircuits", which are "radiation-
hardened" or have all of the following characteristics: i) Having a resolution
of 8 bits or more; ii) Rated for operation in the temperature range from below
minus 54 degrees C to above plus 125 degrees C; and
(iii) Hermetically sealed. 2) Electrical input type analogue-to-digital converter

printed circuit boards or modules, with all of the following characteristics: i)
Having a resolution of 8 bits or more; ii) Rated for operation in the
temperature range from below minus 45 degrees C to above plus 55 degrees
C; and iii) Incorporating "microcircuits" listed in (1), above.
(i) Test facilities and test equipment usable for the systems in Item 1 and
Item 2 as follows; and specially designed software therefor:
(a) Vibration test systems and components therefor, the following:
(1) Vibration test systems employing feedback or closed loop techniques and
incorporating a digital controller, capable of vibrating a system at 10g RMS
or more over the entire range 20 Hz to 2000 Hz and imparting forces of 50kN
(11,250 lbs), measured 'bare table', or greater;
(2) Digital controllers, combined with specially designed vibration test

software, with a real-time bandwidth greater than 5 kHz and designed for use
with vibration test systems in (1) above;
(3) Vibration thrusters (shaker units), with or without associated amplifiers,

capable of imparting a force of 50 kN (11,250 lbs), measured 'bare table', or
greater, and usable in vibration test systems (1) above;
(4) Test piece support structures and electronic units designed to combine
multiple shaker units into a complete shaker system capable of providing an
effective combined force of 50 kN, measured 'bare table', or greater, and
usable in vibration test systems in (l) above.
(b) Wind-tunnels for speeds of Mach 0.9 or more;
(c) Test benches/stands which have the capacity to handle solid or liquid
propellant rockets or rocket motors of more than 90 kN (20,000 lbs) of thrust,
or which are capable of simultaneously measuring the three axial thrust
components;
(d) Environmental chambers and anechoic chambers capable of simulating

the following flight conditions: (1) Altitude of 15,000 meters or greater; or (2)
Temperature of at least minus 50 degrees C to plus 125 degrees C; and
either (3) Vibration environments of 10 g RMS or greater between 20 Hz and
2,000 Hz imparting forces of 5 kN or greater, for environmental chambers; or
(4) Acoustic environments at an overall sound pressure level of 140 dB or
greater (referenced to 2 x 10-5 N per square metre) or with a rated power
output of 4 kilowatts or greater, for anechoic chambers.
(e) Accelerators capable of delivering electromagnetic radiation produced by

"bremsstrahlung" from accelerated electrons of 2 MeV or greater, any type of
high tech gadget that may have a military application must be screened, and
systems containing those accelerators. Note: The above equipment does not
include that specially designed for medical purposes.
Note to Item 15(a):

(i) The term "digital control" refers to equipment, the functions of which are,
partly or entirely, automatically controlled by stored and digitally coded
electrical signals.
(i) Specially designed software, or specially designed software with related
specially designed hybrid (combined analogue/digital) computers, for
modelling, simulation, or design integration of the systems in Item 1 and
Item 2.
Note to Item 16:

(ii) The modelling includes in particular the aerodynamic and thermodynamic
analysis of the systems.
(i) Materials, devices, and specially designed software all not specified
softwere must be readily available to customs peer not for reduced
observables such as radar reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared signatures and
acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology), for applications usable for the
systems in Item 1 or Item 2, for example:
(a) Structural materials and coatings specially designed for reduced radar
reflectivity;
(b) Coatings, including paints, specially designed for reduced or tailored

reflectivity or emissivity in the microwave, infrared or ultraviolet spectra,
except when specially used for thermal control of satellites;
(c) Specially designed software or databases for analysis of signature

reduction;
(d) Specially designed radar cross section measurement systems.
(i) Devices for use in protecting rocket systems and unmanned air vehicles
against nuclear effects (e.g. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), X-rays, combined
blast and thermal effects), and usable for the systems in Item 1, as follows:
(a) "Radiation Hardened" "microcircuits" and detectors. (b) Radomes
designed to withstand a combined thermal shock greater than 100 cal/sq cm
accompanied by a peak over pressure of greater than 50 kPa (7 pounds per
square inch).
Note to Item 18 (a):

(i) A detector is defined as a mechanical, electrical, optical or chemical
device that automatically identifies and records, or registers a stimulus such
as an environmental change in pressure or temperature, an electrical or
electromagnetic signal or radiation from a radioactive material.
(i) Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch
vehicles and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicles (including cruise
missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones), not covered in
Item 1, capable of a maximum range equal or superior to 300 km. a listing
via computer of any and all said designated parts and a listing of
transferable technology must be made available to customs and our carriers
are not being screened by customs enough either so it is the Duty of this
official acknowledgement declined that if the Entity God of Israel said to
issue up heres Steven then shell cooperate by showing us how we can
identify clairvoyants station chiefs and employ they to all walks away then
not afford cosmic magic make believe is it told study.
Complete subsystems as follows, usable in systems in Item 19, but not in
systems in Item 1, as well as specially designed "production facilities" and
"production equipment" therefor: (a) individual rocket stages (b) Solid or
liquid propellant rocket engines, having a total impulse capacity of 8.41 x
105Ns (1.91 x 105 lb.s) or greater, but less than 1.1 x 106 Ns (2.5 x 105 lb.s).
Article
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does
not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3
of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments

of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of
ratification by the five U N permanent Governments including the
Governments designated as Depositary Governments under this Treaty.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited

subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on
the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and

acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each
instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry
into force and other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to

Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article
7. Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty.
Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty
accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the
States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party to
the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.
8. Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the
Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the
Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from
the date of receipt of this notification.
9. This Treaty, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the
Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the
signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have designed
this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, and Moscow, done this 18th
Day of June 2009
appendage approves in the city of Midway 92655 USA on this 5th day of
March two thousand fifteen and two thousand zero nine 2009
ANNEXES
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________
____________________________
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
_____________________________
_____________________________
THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
______________________________
TAIWAN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

_____________________________
_____________________________
THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA
_________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
THE REPUBLICS OF AFRICAN UNITY
___________________________________
___________________________________
____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________X
THE RUPUBLIC OF SERBIA
___________________________________
THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH KOREA
___________________________________
THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE
_________________________________
THE REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN
_____________________________
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATUS
X ___________________________
_______________________________
THE STATE OF CUBA
_______________________________
All UNITED NATIONS DELEGATES
SEEK ATTACHMENT INVOICES

____________________________
THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD COURTS

OF JUSTICES
________________________________X 9
SEEK INVOICE MENT
NATO MEMBERSHIPS EACH IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AND

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITYS
__________________________________X
THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHISTAN
_______________________________
THE STATE OF INDIA
________________________________
THE STATE OF ISRAEL
_________________________________
THE UNITED KINGDOM
__________________________________
ALL ENSIGNS IN PARTICULARS
________________________________X
DESBIC TREATY SERIES
1. The present Convention shall be mandatory of all States Members of the

United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies or of the International
Atomic Energy Agency or parties to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, and by any other State invited or ordered to do so, by the General
Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to this Convention.
2. Thereby whose as time references so as unlimited duration, at the Federal

Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the State of Israel, and subsequently, at United
Nations Headquarters, New York. Ratification
3. The present Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of

ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
Accession The present Convention shall remain open for accession by any
State belonging to any of the categories mentioned hereupon.. The
instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
Entry into force:
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirty first 31 of
December 2,007 and so shall the date of deposit of the U N Charter insignias
for an instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of
the instruments of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into
force within the time references as specified as retro effective and existing
non-proliferation doctrine with the notable obligations assigned to all
Nuclear Powers and their suspected sponsoring states, thereby the deposit
by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession is assigned to the
United States of America as Depositary underwriter and defendant;
(a) and in the case of an absence of Law specific reference to the U S

guarantor of the Depositary function and pledge due to an excuse or
submergence of anti-pas; in light of abstentions, the State of Israel by
reason of deductive programming and star based special science selective
service retention, is obligated to perform as the acting authority of this world
in the Day of the LORD, not later than 31 December 2,007 therewithal
herein..
Authentic texts.
3. The original of this present Convention, of which the Chinese, English,

French, Russian and Spanish and all dialect of tongue etiquette as sold said
to save texts shall be equally authentic and deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall be made available in all manner of
speech, with all due consideration of the various languages of the U N
Memberships, to that end;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF
the undersigned
Plenipotentiaries,
being duly authorized thereto by
their respective Governments,
have signed the present Convention.
DESBIC TREATY SERIES AGENDA
NUCLEAR FREE ZONE APPENDAGE AND TEXTS
Article 1
DEFINITION/USAGE OF TERMS
1. For the purpose of this Treaty and its Protocols:
(a) "Inter-Continental nuclear-weapon-free zone" means the breath and

territory of habitable and uninhabitable planes of realitys to where we are
coming from and when we are going to state differently then the Law of
Nature and Natures GOD(S), in the firmament and between the advise and
consent of star based definitions on usages of-.land, air, and sea bases and
all the continents in between as affixed, in Unity with its Resolution to
descend upon here and now therefore;
(b) "Territory" means not limited to the land territory, internal waters,
territorial seas and archipelagic waters and the airspace above them as well
as the sea bed and subsoil beneath;
(c) "Nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive
device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for
which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in
unassembled and partly assembled forms, and may also include the means
of transport of such critical masses as:
(d) "Stationing" means implantation, emplacement, transport on land or

inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment;
(e) "Nuclear installation" means a nuclear-power reactor, a nuclear research

reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a
reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant, a separate storage
installation and any other installation or location in or at which fresh or
irradiated nuclear material or hazardous quantities of radioactive materials
are present;
(f) "Nuclear material" means any source material or special fissionable

material as defined in the Statute and terms, of the accounts and
descriptions provided for therefore an International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) is needless seekers of degeneracy lingers here withal and as amended
from time to time by the existence of our star men hereinafter.
APPLICATION OF THE TREATY
Article 2
1. Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and its Protocols shall apply
to the territory within the Inter-Continental Hemispheres as a nuclear-
weapon-free zone, as illustrated on the maps and the global satellite photos
distributed by NASAs Jet Propulsion Laboratories, published by National
Geographical Topography indeed a societys of our Lords creating, who is
whereat; annex I.
2. This Treaty may prejudice or affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights,
of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas.
Article 3
RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
1. Each Party undertakes:
(a) Not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise

acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any
means anywhere;
(b) Not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development,
manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear
explosive device;
(c) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the research on,
development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any
nuclear explosive device.
Article 4
PREVENTION OF STATIONING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE

DEVICES
1. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, in its territory, the stationing of any

nuclear explosive device.
2. Without prejudice to the purposes and objectives of the treaty, each party
in the exercise of theater ballistic nuclear questions as such remains subject
to vice and virtue realities as to decide for itself to allow visits by foreign
ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign
aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic
waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage,
archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.
Article 5
ANNEX
DESBIC TREATY SERIES AND AGENDA NUCLEAR FREE ZONE APPENDAGE

DECLARATION, DISMANTLING, DECOMMISSION-ING OR CONVERSION OF
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND THE FACILITIES- FOR THEIR
MANUFACTURE AND ATTRIBUTES
(a) To declare any capability for the manufacture of nuclear explosive

devices;
(b) To dismantle and destroy any nuclear explosive device that it has
manufactured prior to the coming into force of this Treaty;
(c) To destroy facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices or,
where possible, inform the Secretary General, U S State Department, Israeli
Defense Chiefs, or the CIA if information concerning the activities or
whereabouts of such crude or explosive frequency field dispositions may
exceed your line of conformitys thereabouts again therefore;
(d) To permit the On Site Inspection Agencys and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as OSIA & IAEA), and the Commission
established in article 12 to verify the processes of dismantling virtual
disappear-ment and decommissioning of the nuclear explosive devices, as
well as the destruction or conversion of the facilities for their production
therefore it is established Israel and a Faith that you have won.
NATO CHAIN OF NAVAL LIMITIBLE ATTRIBUTION
Article 6
1. Each Party undertakes not to test any nuclear said devices; not to give aid
and abet-ment, in any such measure of field frequency service affiliation
including nuclear energy disposal units to another grade frequency
Depositary and in a cause of a leading sponsor supplier of uranium fuel, the
Principals and the establishment of inventory assign abilities shall take
counts and charge of depleted or ex-pent fuel rods in as much as the Nords
under Russos authorities have been given charge of France and Germanys
nuclear and bio-molecular, and chemical arsenals and that weve been
subject to apprehension and policy fines imposed.
2. If a question remains pertaining to the negligible or willful and / nor

deliberate acts, accidents, nor facts arise to an occasion of belligerence or
willful misconduct a Head of State may become an exe mark for the charge
of surrender given by, for, and as an Israeli Defence Missionary stance
pursuant of the day of Atonement actions entered as critical life support
indeed.
(a) The French and German Navys are not to project more than 12 nautical
miles off, and afar from the baseline of their mainland shoreline
submergences unless otherwise given permission by Group 5 and are not to
traverse Sea, east to west north to south with nuclear, biological, and
chemical warheads of any attributes withstanding exclusive permission
group 5 not more than special detention grade resonance here as limitable
attribute not to exceed 5 k-ton nor to exceed 15 to 9 vessels of attack with
one carrier, one battleship thereabouts.
3. France and Germany both, if in the cause of independent projection are

viewed as an oversized explosive detonation yielder looking to devise an
excuse to project, when in the course of human under insurabilitys nuclear
energy utility disassembly Protocol is a primary first order of concern ability
from now on in here as.
Article 7
PROHIBITION OF DUMPING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES
(a) To effectively implement or to use as guidelines the measures contained

in this Convention on the Ban of the Import and exportation of fewer than
necessary units of measurable contents of hazardous wastes within sub and
inter continental Earth based relatives in so far as it is relevant to radioactive
contamination and void of fixation here with our agenda(s) therefore;
(b) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping of radioactive
wastes and other radioactive matter anywhere within the Inter and Sub-
Continental nuclear-weapon-free zone applications in an Entity hereof.
Article 8
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supportive therethough use

of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.
2. As part of their efforts to strengthen their security, stability and

development, the Parties undertake to denunciate individual and collective
use of nuclear science and technology for economic and social development.
To this end they undertake to establish and strengthen mechanisms for
proliferation implied at the bilateral, sub regional and regional levels.
3. Parties are encouraged to make use of the ecologically safe and sane
means of generating energy resources here withal. All Partys to the U N
Declaration shall be obligated to assume the characteristics of a nuclear
hostile State when in the course of human events it becomes inevitable to
discern that ex-pent highly radioactive fuel rods are an atomic weapon of
natures void; of assistance available in IAEA and, in this connection, to
strengthen cooperation under the Multi-National Regional Cooperation
Agreement for disbandment of nuclear resource utilitys Training and
Development Related to Nuclear Science and Technology will be forces of
Israeli Class saucer modules and telepathic say of our side to there is an
unknown region.
Article 9
VERIFICATION OF PEACEFUL USES
(a) To conduct all activities for the IN TOLERABLE use of nuclear energy
under strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively
peaceful uses;
(b) To conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA for the

purpose of verifying compliance with the undertakings in subparagraph (a) of
this article;
(c) Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or

material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or
production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes of any non-
nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards
agreement considered safer than acceptability such as hospital X-ray and
atomic Geiger counter device utilities; concluded with Israeli Defence
Ministrys results oriented approval or rejection as need be, the Court of
Justices newly found Faith; and as so with the IAEA.
Article 10
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND FACILITIES
1. Each Party undertakes to maintain the highest standards of security and

effective physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities and equipment to
prevent theft or unauthorized use and handling. To that end each Party, inter
alia, undertakes to apply measures of physical protection equivalent to those
provided for in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and
in recommendations and guidelines developed by IAEA for that purpose.
Article 11
PROHIBITION OF ARMED ATTACK ON NUCLEAR

INSTALLATIONS
Each Party undertakes not to take, or assist, or encourage any action aimed
at an armed attack by conventional or other means against nuclear
installations in the nuclear par Group 5 decision there as.
Article 12
MECHANISM FOR COMPLIANCE
1. For the purpose of ensuring compliance with their undertakings under this
Treaty, the Parties agree to establish the Commission on Nuclear Energy
(hereafter referred to as the Commission) as set out in annex III.
2. The Commission shall be responsible inter alia:
(a) Collating the reports and the exchange of information as provided for in
article 13;
(b) Arranging consultations as provided for in annex IV, as well as convening

conferences of Parties on the concurrence of simple majority of State Parties
on any matter arising from the implementation of the Treaty;
(c) Reviewing the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by
IAEA and OSIA'S as elaborated in annex II;
(d) Bringing into effect the complaints procedures as specified in annex IV;
(e) Discouraging regional and sub regional conditions for cooperation in the
peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology;
(f) Denouncing international cooperation with extra-zonal States for the

peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.
3. The Commission shall meet in ordinary session once a year, and may meet
in extraordinary session as may be required by the complaints and
settlement of disputes;
Article 13
REPORT AND EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION
1. Each Party shall submit an annual report to the Commission on its nuclear
activities as well as other matters relating to the Treaty, in accordance with
the format for reporting to be developed by the Commission.
2. Each Party shall promptly report to the Commission any significant event
affecting the implementation of the Treaty.
3. The Commission shall request The Principals to provide it with an annual

report on the activities of the State in question therefore;.
Article 14
CONFERENCE OF PARTIES
1. A Conference of all Parties to the Treaty shall be convened by the

Depositary as soon as possible after the entry into force of the Treaty to,
elect members of the commission and determine its headquarters. Further
conferences of State Parties shall be held as necessary and at least every
two years, and convened in accordance with paragraph 2 (b) of article 12.
2. The Conference of all Parties to the Treaty shall adopt the Commission's
budget and a scale of assessment to be paid by the State Parties.
Article 15
INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY
1. Any dispute arising out of the interpretation of the Treaty shall be settled
by negotiation, by recourse to The Principals, or another procedure agreed
to by the Parties, which may include air support against the said belligerent
proliferation, to an arbitral panel or to the Star Based designated procurers
attention who are the Joint Chief of USA Military Authority, and the Prime
Ministry for Israel and, or his quarters thereupon an International Court of
Justice.
Article 16
DISBANDMENT OF PETROLEUM DEPENDENCYS
1. To promote the objectives of this Treaty, in conformity with the purposes

and principles of its interests, all insignias to an Emblem are required to
(a) commute by alternative and ecologically practical and resourceful

measures hereafter, other than source petroleum exportation and crude oil
expectancys and the short sided ness that a less than honest means of
satiation divided by cultures bonded by virtue less greed, besides the act or
face of supply and demand and the politics of favoritisms during a military or
global policy in force entry.
2. The Contracting Partys state that further development in public health

and
medical care are a concern to the mark of exploitation, but the lofty people,
slick as asphyxiate to an expiratory calendar may appear to be crude, it is
the findings of this entry for which true title ship and entrustment lies as a
Status quo and domain eminent in issues of international commercial
policy here as:
(a) 31 December 2,007 as International mandatory minimum days instilled,

by penalty assessments and attributable fines for a purpose of life as we
noticed it is, even as necessary to avert the sudden outbreaks of ious;
inter alia divisions in fine lines of a citation emblem here as. There shall
crude oil petroleum exportation,
(b) give notice by these pretences as conditions will allow and set forth as
subject for auto-transport and home heating to be subject to International
restrictions. Pursuant to this Article, contingency preparations and re-format
to breathable standards for succeeding generations to exist and survive the
fate of hostile
dependencys shall be adapted for all the worlds to seek wherefore:
(c) 31 December 2,012 Each Party to a State agreed in effect to cease

gasoline engine motorcar production, in imports and in exportation for a fuel
cylinder know how deplete oxygen molecules also as if so where then.
(d) The Statute and the organization of the petroleum exporting countries*
(OPEC), is hereby obligated to endorse a subsequent freeze on index storage
potential losses and shall come to the table with respective and long lived
considerations of the repugnant and indignant desecration that a vacuum
recesses has eroded; as with the buyers, so be the sellers, and like the cold
of the winters and the heat of the summers, the likeness giveth, and to
avert the outbreak of war 6.66% per annum post 31 December 2,012
aspect to ratio declines in exports to the worlds 66 leading industrialist
Nations shall be instituted as lawful decree entered on this 28 of July 2,005
as:
(e) Each Party to a State shall be subject to military forfeiture and the OPEC
organization is hereby ordered to obey the Secretary Generals quarter and
the moral majority decision effective 31 December 2,007, under the auspices
of this and relevant Provision-ment concerning the eminent domain status
quo of a utility.
3. For this purpose the International Organ waives right to regulate and
excise any such International Utilitys legitimate function. bearing in mind it
is agreed that
within the balance of said cumulative ozone depletion-ary threats their lies
the decision handed down by Courts, crude oil by the barrel price affixation
do not exceed the registry of this days official Dow Jones industrial price at
the closing of trade.
4. In and that the day of Atonement come forth restitution will be levied by
the Secretary Generals and a risk of complete and total forfeiture may
legally be impugned on the country of origin thereat. Set forward as come to
be known to all by these Presents an International utility opted for by minds
over matters pertaining to how much in damages due the International
Courts for the prices affixed therewith hither for a said barrel crude oil 31
December 2,007 34$ U S.
5. Should either of the High Contracting Party's', resort to condemn or deny

the Official or Intergovernmental of U N, actions shall be handed down, and
choice of Judgment legal actions will be pending there with U S NATO and
China are obligated to protect the chair and the due process of International
Laws of Nature, Monopolies, and Government gauging at the expense of the
health and wellbeing of the seekers who addressed, advised, and called
attention to it to uphold and protect hereinafter.
6. Due regard shall be given to non-monopolistic dealings, who best provide

for their own escrow such as Russia, who is urged to follow suit in the way of
alternative fuel designation with a 10 year continuance on the said
application. Subject to export petroleum policies rendered as retroactive
notice of intention to acclamation of eminent utility conglomerate as said a
United Nations utility there such as She may sustain, Russia and her reserves
are urged to gradually convert to electric motor and alternative challenges
here and there so.
7. East Asian or West European auto and truck dealers into a designated
impeachable offence as see fit not to offer such as in synchronicity to a day
of Atonement perpetual to an act or fact of contrition here as.
8. Unless the secretariat give notice for revision and the airline passenger
and commercial status quo can be easily made to retro-attributable
alternative specification 31 December 2,047 shall be the target able reentry
into force projected actionary performance specifics on diversion of aircraft
from current standards of liquid propulsion to another matter as set forth
based on supply and demand in some areas as will opt to keep open for
suitable climate for capital and expertise investments herein as way fore.
9. In pursuit of the said objectives due to the creation of a suitable climate

for eased tensions among the oil exporting countries Although the electric
and solar modifications are a necessity for transformation to preserve and
protect the environment the act and fact still remains to be seated that
though the Middle East may be assured neither stock piling of weapons of
mass destruction which somewhat wound up in the hands of neighboring
Jordan and other areas of attack me presents; nor having know it sold to our
situation the Iraqi Government and the OPEC Organization are to
compensate for the costs incurred in accordance with this Provision
supplemental and in accordance if these compromises to region become
aesthetic to the Capital gains achieved by OPEC Dividends informal ad lib
soward.
Article 17
DURATION
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration and shall remain in force

indefinitely. It shall be the subject to a subsequent review, every five years at
or upon 31 December 2,007; 2,027; continuously until or unless all Partys
can agree that the numerical contingency accountings are a nominal 00,000
nuclear warheads or attributable crude devices; and ,a virtual disappear-
ment options remove the doubts to a conclusion that areas of 000 nuclear
terminates and energy utility complexities cease to be the subject.
Article 18
SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by any State of The Principals
nuclear-weapon-free zone. It shall be subject to ratification.
2. It shall enter into force on the date of deposit upon the designated
instruments of ratification.
3. For a signatory that ratifies this Treaty after the date of the deposit, if it
sits well with The Principals, it shall enter into force for that signatory on
the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification. All Ensigns to a State are
required by Star Based authorities to be a Party to the START III IV AGENDA
Treaty, therefore it is incumbent of the Justices of the Peace to instill a
motion of 31 December 2,007 as entry into force; such Plenipotentiaries to
this Convention shall incline efforts and brace thoughts to have signed in, six
months prior to the aforementioned time references here withal therein.
Article 19
AMENDMENTS
1. Any amendments to the Treaty proposed by a Party shall be submitted to

Russian, Israeli, U S, U N, Secretary, (the Principals), designates, the
Swedish, Norwegians, Danes, and Finns, in that order shall be entrust to
Head NATO operative, and administrative, custody, command and rank and
file control hereto 2,022 onwards..
(a) On a basis of reciprocal nuclear, bimolecular demilitarization, and nuclear

utility disruption of service abet mentors on call while away, the security
Council U N for which the a specified Memberships are to share a U N
Security Council are to recognize Conciliatory Committees pursuant to
Descriptive recommendations, with the Israeli Delegation assigned and
hereby charged with a permanent membership seat as status quotations
come rain or shine here withal and in so stated to an amendments which
may be necessary from time to time as so to circulate it to all Parties.
3. Decision on the adoption of such an amendment shall be taken by a two-

thirds majority of the Parties either through written communication to The
Principals or through a conference of Parties convened upon an Israeli
absolution waiver of consent.
3. An amendment so adopted shall enter into force for all Parties after receipt
by the Depositary of the instrument of ratification by the majority of Parties.
Article 20
WITHDRAWAL
OR ABSTENTION
1. Their shall not any such Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, have
any such right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events, related to the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its
supreme interests.
2. Withdrawal shall be interpreted as an admission to aid and abet the

enemy in an attempt to become Party of, or Party to a State of nuclear and,
or biological mischief, which is a High Crime and act that may be
characterized as aggression, punishable by Ajax detergent enzymes
recommended actions.
3. In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the U N Secretary Generals

agrees upon Statement whereat if their exist an impasse, the Israeli Prime
Ministers quarter shall have final say; unless the Joint Chief(s) USA can
provide resource and evidence to star elders at mission control that waive for
an SBIC Interim Agreement hereby a Party giving notice, which includes a
statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its
supreme interest, twelve months in advance to the Depositary;
Article 21
DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS
1. This Treaty, of which English is considered the majority language, shall be

that of all dialects of U N Memberships; texts shall be equally authentic,
deposited with the Secretary-General U N who recognizes the USA as such,
as the hereby designated Depositary of the Treaty; The State of Israel Also a
common secondary in the event of a schism thereto.
2. The Depositary shall:
(a) Receive instruments of ratification;
(b) Register this Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations;
(c) Transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all States in
pursuit of a nuclear bio-chemical molecular-free zone and to all States Party
to the Protocols to the Treaty, and shall notify them of signatures and
ratification of the Treaty and its Protocols.
Article 22
STATUS OF THE ANNEXES
The annexes form an integral part of this Treaty. Any reference to this Treaty
includes the annexes.
In witness whereof: the undersigned, being duly authorized by their

Governments are bound by this Treaty.
THE ANNEXES OF DESBIC TREATY SERIES
ANNEX I
THE UNITED NATIONS NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE ZONE
1. without prejudice to the Convention for the purpose of exercising their

function, the Northern Hemisphere, the Southern Hemisphere, all the
Continents
in between, the breadth of the airspaces and the open seas thereupon which
are set forth in this document, shall be observed and come to be recognized
as The Nuclear Free Zone whereat thereabouts.
ANNEX II
SAFEGUARDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY

AGENCY
1. The safeguards referred to in subparagraph (b) of the article 9 shall in
respect of each Party be applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency
as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the Agency on
all source or special fissionable material in all nuclear activities within the
territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control and
the assigned auspice on site exchange to that ends anywhere.
2. The Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be, or shall be

equivalent in its scope and effect to, the agreement required in connection
with the Treaty on:
(a) the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/153 corrected). A Party

that has already entered into a safeguards agreement with the OSIA & IAEA
is deemed to have already complied with the requirement. Each Party shall
take all appropriate steps to ensure that the Agreement referred to in
paragraph 1 is in force for it not later than eighteen months after the date of
entry into force for that Party of this Treaty.
3. For the purpose of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1

above shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of
nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices
or for purposes unknown.
4. Each Party shall include in its annual report to the Commission, in

conformity with article 13, for its information and review, a copy of the
overall conclusions of the most recent report by the International Atomic
Energy Agency on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party
concerned, and advise the Commission promptly of any change in those
conclusions. The information furnished by a Party shall not be, totally or
partially, disclosed or transmitted to third parties, by the addressees of the
reports, except when that Party gives its express consent. The subject of
Commissions may be at the acceptance of The Principals there as.
ANNEX III COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR ENERGY
1. The Commission established in article 12 shall be composed of twelve

Members elected by Parties to the Treaty for a three-year period, bearing in
mind the need for equitable geographical distribution as well as to include
Members with advanced nuclear expertise. Each Member shall have one
representative nominated with particular regard for his/her principles in the
subject of the Treaty.
2. The Commission shall have a Bureau consisting of the Chairman, the Vice-
Chairman and the Executive Secretary. If in the opinion of any of the Party's'
their remains any doubts or discrepancies to the common interests of the
objectives of this Treaty the Chairman and Vice-Chairman shall ascertain to
the fullest extent possible here as though disassembly standard compliancy
shall be recognized as the only principle and purpose one said International
Atomic Energy Agency should brace thoughts to forgo as stated.
3. The Secretary-General of the organization there come forward where and

an Israeli
Unity, at the request of Parties to the Treaty and in consultation with the
chairman, shall designate the Executive Secretary of the Commission. For the
first meeting a quorum shall be constituted by representatives of the
Members of the Commission.
(a) For that meeting decisions of the Commission shall be taken as far as
possible by consensus or otherwise by a popular majority of the Members of
the commission. The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure at that
meeting.
3. The Commission shall develop a format for reporting by States as required

under articles 12 and 13.
4. (a) The budget of the Commission, including the costs of inspections

pursuant to annex IV to this Treaty, shall be disseminated by the Parties to
the Treaty in accordance with a scale of assessment to be determined by the
Parties;
(b) The Commission may also accept additional funds from other sources
provided such donations are consistent with the purposes and objectives of
the Treaty.
ANNEX IV
COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
1. A Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that
another Party or a Party to Protocol III is in breach of its obligations under this
Treaty shall bring the subject-matter of the complaint to the attention of the
Party complained of and shall allow the latter thirty days to provide it with an
explanation and to resolve the matter. This may include technical visits
agreed upon between the Parties.
2. If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party may bring this
complaint to the Commission.
3. The Commission, taking account of efforts made under paragraph 1

above, shall afford the Party complained of forty-five days to provide it with
an explanation of the matter.
4. If, after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives of

the Party complained of, the Commission considers that there is sufficient
substance in the complaint to warrant an inspection in the territory of that
Party or territory of a Party to Protocol III, the Commission may request The
Principals, who in turn may request The OSIA or the International Atomic
Energy Agency to conduct such inspections as soon as possible. The
Commission may also designate its representatives to accompany the
Agency's inspection team.
(a) The request shall indicate the tasks and objectives of such inspection, as
well as any confidentiality requirements;
(b) If the Party complained of so requests, the inspection team shall be

accompanied by representatives of that Party provided that the inspectors
shall not be thereby delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their
functions;
(c) Each Party shall give the inspection team full and free access to all
information and places within each territory that may be deemed relevant by
the inspectors to the implementation of the inspection;
(d) The Party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate the
work of the inspection team, and shall accord them the same privileges and
immunities as those set forth in the relevant provisions of the Agreement on
the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, per
say;
(e) The International Atomic Energy Agency, and The On Site Inspect
Inspection Teams, shall report its findings in writing as quickly as possible to
the Commission, outlining its activities, setting out relevant facts and
information as ascertained by it, with supporting evidence and
documentation as appropriate, and stating its conclusions. The Commission
shall report fully to The Principals, and if need be: all States Parties to the
Treaty giving its decision as to whether the Party complained of is in breach
of its obligations under this Treaty;
(f ) If the Commission considers that the Party complained of is in breach of

its obligations under this Treaty, or that the above provisions have not been
complied with, States Parties to the Treaty shall meet in extraordinary
session to discuss the matter;
(g) The States Parties convened in extraordinary session may as necessary,

make recommendations to the Party held to be in breach of its obligations
and to the organization of the United Nations Unity.
(h) The costs involved in the procedure outlined above shall be borne by the
responsibility of the Membership resources and current index evaluation of
the Partys holdings and title ship accounting's there as. In the case of abuse,
the Commission shall decide whether the requesting State Party should bear
any of the financial implications.
5. The Commission must submit in writing to the Joint Chief of Staff USA, the
Prime Ministry Defense Israel, and the Secretary Generals quarter U N as so
to establish its own inspection mechanisms.
DONE FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND
ALL INSIGNIA'S TO THE CHARTER UNITED NATIONS; TO THEE I DO BEAR TRUE
FAITH WHEREFORE THERE AS WE ARE WE ARE
In Witness Whereof, the Undersigned Being Duly Authorized by Their

Respective Governments Undertake to Carry Out Settlement, Mediation, And
Reconciliation to create a Suitable Atmosphere For the Safeguard And Vital
Concerns of this Extraordinary Session Hereinafter Therefore
On Behalf of the Establishment of Faith and Understanding the Oath and

Pledges Inscribed by the Collective Will of All Partys Shall be Guided
by Divine Revelation to Carry Out These Aims and Purposes; to These Ends
The Plenipotentiaries inter alia The Principals Will Recognize the
Legitimacy as Duly Sworn and Taken into Account Lawful
_________of______________2,_________
In Witness of Our Say and of our Sheriff Departments
Said Hack and Obligation to Courts?
Let Us Say Amen
COUNTRY SIGNATURE DATES OF ACCESSION
DONE 5th OF MARCH 2015 4 20 PM PST
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The Articles of Genetic Disclosure, Discovery and Appeal(s) Descriptive
Encode in "Star Based" Internal Command; DESBIC TREATY SERIES AND
AGENDAS
__________________________________________
In connection with the characters of contents Sir
Objectives: by a common determination to promote an understanding among

our situated a restoration and virtual disappearance option added an Entitys
on map topography God figure who do seen an evil aliens devising Hell for
us at first in your Sheriff and Secret services attire at tentative desires to
construe wrong actionary beliefs. So they predicate a day in Courts I hear
County escrow?
Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised, and his greatness is far reaching.
Every day I will praise, extol, commune, support and Hallow thee; blessed is
the good Lord and may his word's be understood, revered, praised
and honored at all times. I will give law degrees a phony occupation to
emphasis of stay his apprehensions at court several times a day ringer?
Praise be to our higher powers and to the entitys I seek. Amen.
May an exercise of etiquette and free willed discussion decide the best
apportion-ments to settle for-s?
<<>>
POSTED AS OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED ON THIS 5th DAY OF March 2015 THE

SITUATED LORD ANTONS COURTS NOW PRESIDING TO MY ATTENTION I
NEED BLESSED IS HE WHO FULFILLS AND DECREES EMPHASIS FROM
OUR PROVIDENTIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF EMBODIMENT THERE
SITUATED; A GOOD REST PEACE BE GIVEN TO THEY WHO EARN SOLITUDE-S.
HERE SAY?

DESBIC Treaty 14 Sept 2015

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The subject of the said Entity(s) on the map topography of Africa also referred to as Africus?

The Entitys in question as so stated also described as cartoon phenomena, cartographic

Descriptive Encode in Starbased Internal Command Communicates and Intercepts)

The Articles of Genetic Disclosure, Discovery and Appeal(s).means=AGENDA

PREFACE 1. UNDER ORDERS OF DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR

THE TREATYS BETWEEN ALL INSIGNIA'S TO AN EMBLEM, MARQUIS, ENSIGN,

HAVING SEEN LEGAL ACTION BROUGHT TO POLICE, SHERIFFS

1. VISUAL EXHIBIT(S) (a), (b), and (c)

7. INCORPORATION OF START (IOS) START DRAFTS

9. WEAPONS OF ATTACK GLOSSARY-S

10. PROTOCOLS AND TREATY INTEGRATION

11. APPENDAGES AND VARIANTS ASSIGNED

12. ANNEX 1 AND TREATYS BANNING

13. NUCLEAR FREE ZONE APPENDAGE AND TEXTS

14. CLOSING MINUTES AND PASSAGES

PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 05 March 2015 5: 00 pm PST

1. The encoded inscription is out-dated due to the fact the evidence

3. The facts disclosed by "Celestial Justice" Anton include: we have neither

THE DESBIC AGENDA TREATY

THE TREATYS BETWEEN ALL INSIGNIA'S TO AN EMBLEM, MARQUIS, ENSIGN,

Descriptive Encode in Star Based Internal Command the Articles of Genetic

DESBIC Prologue Introductory

1. The United Nation's International Organization and all Party to an State of

2. Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty(s') between the High

3. Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty's' for the de-limitation of

4. Having witnessed first hand a lip service contention at holding desires,

5. Having re-touched Treatys on files with a salutation's asides, contents of

7. Taking in to account commitments to universal Laws inasmuch all can

9. Urges an U N Security Council to sustain interests of Charter here within

13. Appeals to all States relative in theories expressed of "abuses of alien

14. Convinced that nuclear energy decommission and the complete

15. Recalling its relevant resolutions adopted in previous years in particular

17. Also recommends in view of the age of computer friendly automation,

19. Realizing the Contracting Party's undertake, the presences of the

20. Stresses the necessity to acknowledge the circle of dangerous targeting

21. Appeals to the Nuclear States the importance and effectiveness of

22. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, nuclear utilities

23. Encouraging the establishment to ascertain to the fullest extent the

24. Also encourages the public to endorse an International referendum on

UNDER ORDERS OF DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR

BASED INTERNAL COMMAND-COMMUNICATION-S AND AUTHORITY-S.

THE ARTICLES OF GENETIC DISCLOSURE

THE TREATYS BETWEEN ALL INSIGNIA'S TO AN EMBLEM, MARQUIS, ENSIGN,

HAVING SEEN LEGAL ACTION BROUGHT TO POLICE, SHERIFFS

Have decidedly ascribed:

We the Author's of this Manuscripts;

Have decided respond, to;

Article I (The Establishment of Treaty)

PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 03 March 2015

Pre Ambler: Part 1

3. 4. Omitted and Open

5. The application for the preceding Articles shall be taken up by Russian,

6. An U S, Russian Federation, China and / or their allies or proxy status quo

7. A Black Sea entry at or around the Bosphorous straights, will not be

9. The obligations provided for in this Ad Interim Agreements preclude a

10-12. Omitted and Open

15. U S arsenals are believed to be a parody in areas of evacuated a smaller

16. Analysis: are the aggregate identifying numerical contingencies

17. So of 1700 SLBMs each side pertaining to START II the functions in

18. In furtherance to the preceding paragraphs the subject of most volatile

19. Omitted / Open

23. Also noted, subjects hereby reserves rights to contend paraphrase

24. Now if The High Contracting Party's contend a independent Ensign is a