POLITICAL LAW JUNE 2014

ALBERTO VALDEZ, Complainant, vs. DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, JR., Sheriff IV,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk, Kalinga, Respondent. A.M. No. P-13-
3123, June 10, 2014
Administrative Law; Simple Neglect of duty, Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; Penalties; Under the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less
grave offense punishable with suspension of one month and one day to six months
for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. - Simple neglect of duty is
the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness
or indifference. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable with suspension of
one month and one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the
second offense.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; Code of Conduct for Court Personnel;
Conflict of Interest; As an officer of the court, Sheriff Macusi should have informed
the court and inhibited himself from enforcing the writ knowing fully well that there
is a conflict of interest since the accused is his brother. - As an officer of the court,
Sheriff Macusi should have informed the court and inhibited himself from enforcing
the writ knowing fully well that there is a conflict of interest since the accused is his
brother. It is incumbent upon him, as an agent of the law, to adhere to high ethical
standards in order to preserve the good name and standing of the court. In Office of
the Court Administrator v. Sheriff IV Cabe, we emphasized the heavy burden and
responsibility which court personnel bear in view of their exalted positions as
keepers of public faith. They must be constantly reminded that any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be
avoided. We agree with the OCA that Sheriff Macusi violated the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel for his failure to disclose that the accused in "People v. Jorge
Macusi y Wayet"is his brother. The Rules classify this violation of existing Civil
Service Law and rules a serious offense punishable with suspension of one month
and one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
EMILIE SISON-BARIAS, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT [RTC], BRANCH 24, BIAN, LAGUNA and EILEEN A. PECAA,
DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BIAN,
LAGUNA, Respondents. A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388, June 10, 2014 [Formerly OCA
IPI No. 10-3554-RTJ]
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; As a court employee, respondent Pecaa
should have known better than to interact with litigants in a way that could
compromise the confidence that the general public places in the judiciary. - As a
court employee, respondent Pecaa should have known better than to interact with
litigants in a way that could compromise the confidence that the general public
places in the judiciary. Respondent Pecaa should have refused to meet with
complainant in her home. She should have refused any other form of extended
communication with complainant, save for those in her official capacity as a Data
Encoder of the court. This continued communication between complainant and
respondent Pecaa makes her culpable for failure to adhere to the strict standard of
propriety mandated of court personnel.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; All court personnel must conduct themselves
in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and uprightness. - Respondent Pecaas
actions constitute a clear violation of the requirement that all court personnel
uphold integrity and prudence in all their actions. As stated in Villaros v. Orpiano,
412 SCRA 396 (2003): Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of
all employees and officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to
the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct
must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and
maintain the publics respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all court
personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty
and uprightness. Respondent Pecaa should, thus, be held administratively liable for
her actions.
Administrative Law; Judges; Impropriety; Respondent Judge Rubias mere presence
in the dinner meeting provides a ground for administrative liability. - The evidence
on record supports the allegations that a meeting with complainant, a litigant with
several cases pending before his sala, took place. Respondent Judge Rubias mere
presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground for administrative liability. In
Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin, 654 SCRA 268 (2011), this court reminded judges: Canon 2 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also
the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities. To stress how the law frowns
upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrates activities, it has often
been held that a judge must be like Caesars wife - above suspicion and beyond
reproach. Respondents act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a
member of the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions
and of his activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to
be prudent and circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her
conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under constant observation.
Administrative Law; Judges; Impartiality; Had it been true that a settlement was
being brokered by respondent Judge Rubia, it should have been done in open court
with the record reflecting such an initiative. - Had it been true that a settlement was
being brokered by respondent Judge Rubia, it should have been done in open court
with the record reflecting such an initiative. As to complainants questioning of
respondent Judge Rubias actions in the issuance of the orders in her pending cases
and the exercise of his judgment, this court agrees that complainant should resort
to the appropriate judicial remedies. This, however, does not negate the
administrative liability of respondent Judge Rubia. His actions failed to assure
complainant and other litigants before his court of the required "cold neutrality of
an impartial judge." Because of this, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on Impartiality.
Administrative Law; Judges; Misconduct; Words and Phrases; This court defined
misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." -
Respondents in this case failed to subscribe to the highest moral fiber mandated of
the judiciary and its personnel. Their actions tainted their office and besmirched its
integrity. In effect, both respondents are guilty of gross misconduct. This court
defined misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer." In Camus v. The Civil Service Board of Appeals, 2 SCRA 370 (1961), this
court held that "[m]isconduct has been defined as wrong or improper conduct and
gross has been held to mean flagrant; shameful. . . . This Court once held that the
word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment."
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator
MELQUIADES A. ROBLES, Petitioner,
vs. AURORA A. SALVAA, Respondent. G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014
Administrative Agencies; Civil Service Commission; Article IX (B), Section 3 of the
Constitution mandates that the Civil Service Commission shall be "the central
personnel agency of the Government. - Article IX (B), Section 3 of the Constitution
mandates that the Civil Service Commission shall be "the central personnel agency
of the Government." In line with the constitutionally enshrined policy that a public
office is a public trust, the Commission was tasked with the duty "to set standards
and to enforce the laws and rules governing the selection, utilization, training, and
discipline of civil servants."
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Security of Tenure; Civil servants enjoy security
of tenure, and "[n]o officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process." - Civil
servants enjoy security of tenure, and "[n]o officer or employee in the Civil Service
shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due
process." Under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code, it is the
Civil Service Commission that has the power to "[h]ear and decide administrative
cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal."
Administrative Law; When the government office disciplines an employee based on
causes and procedures allowed by law, it exercises its discretion. - When the
government office disciplines an employee based on causes and procedures allowed
by law, it exercises its discretion. This discretion is inherent in the constitutional
principle that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." This is a principle that can
be invoked by the public as well as the government office employing the public
officer. Here, petitioner already decided to dismiss respondent for dishonesty.
Dishonesty is a serious offense that challenges the integrity of the public servant
charged. To bar a government office from appealing a decision that lowers the
penalty of the disciplined employee prevents it from ensuring its mandate that the
civil service employs only those with the utmost sense of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Honesty and integrity are important traits
required of those in public service. - Honesty and integrity are important traits
required of those in public service. If all decisions by quasi-judicial bodies modifying
the penalty of dismissal were allowed to become final and unappealable, it would, in
effect, show tolerance to conduct unbecoming of a public servant. The quality of
civil service would erode, and the citizens would end up suffering for it.
Administrative Law; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; On
November 18, 2011, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
or RACCS was promulgated. The Civil Service Commission modified the definition of
a "party adversely affected" for purposes of appeal. - On November 18, 2011, the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service or RACCS was
promulgated. The Civil Service Commission modified the definition of a "party
adversely affected" for purposes of appeal. Section 4. Definition of Terms. . . . . k.
PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in
an administrative case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an
appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original decision.
Administrative Law; Dishonesty; Resolution No. 06-0538 recognizes that dishonesty
is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from service. The Resolution classifies
dishonesty in three gradations: (1) serious; (2) less serious; and (3) simple. -
Resolution No. 06-0538 recognizes that dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal from service. It, however, also recognizes that "some acts of Dishonesty
are not constitutive of an offense so grave as to warrant the imposition of the
penalty of dismissal from the service." Recognizing the attendant circumstances in
the offense of dishonesty, the Civil Service Commission issued parameters "in order
to guide the disciplining authority in charging the proper offense" and to impose the
proper penalty. The resolution classifies dishonesty in three gradations: (1) serious;
(2) less serious; and (3) simple. Serious dishonesty is punishable by dismissal. Less
serious dishonesty is punishable by suspension for six months and one day to one
year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. Simple dishonesty is
punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first
offense, six months and one day to one year for the second offense, and dismissal
for the third offense.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Leave of Absence; By law, all employees in the
civil service are entitled to leave of absence for a certain number of days, with or
without pay. - By law, all employees in the civil service are entitled to leave of
absence for a certain number of days, with or without pay. Under Section 1, Rule XVI
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code, government
employees are entitled to 15 days of sick leave annually with full pay.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Leave of Absence; Sick Leave; The grant of sick
leave with pay is an exception to the principle of "no work, no pay," i.e., entitlement
to compensation only upon actual service rendered. - The grant of sick leave with
pay is an exception to the principle of "no work, no pay," i.e., entitlement to
compensation only upon actual service rendered. As such, applications for leave
must be properly filled out and filed accordingly. Section 16, Rule XVI of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code provides the rules
for an application for sick leave: SECTION 16. All applications for sick leaves of
absence for one full day or more shall be on the prescribed form and shall be filed
immediately upon the employee's return from such leave. Notice of absence,
however, should be sent to the immediate supervisor and/or to the office head.
Application for sick leave in excess of five days shall be accompanied by a proper
medical certificate.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Leave of Absence; Sick Leave; Since her
application for sick leave was supported by a false medical certificate, it would have
been improperly filed, which made all of her absences during this period
unauthorized. - Respondents application for sick leave, if approved, would allow her
to be absent from work without any deductions from her salary. Being a government
employee, respondent would have received her salaries coming from government
funds.
Since her application for sick leave was supported by a false medical certificate, it
would have been improperly filed, which made all of her absences during this period
unauthorized. The receipt, therefore, of her salaries during this period would be
tantamount to causing damage or prejudice to the government since she would
have received compensation she was not entitled to receive. This act of causing
damage or prejudice, however, cannot be classified as serious since the information
falsified had no direct relation to her employment. Whether or not she was suffering
from hypertension is a matter that has no relation to the functions of her office.
Given these circumstances, the offense committed can be properly identified as less
serious dishonesty. Administrative Law; Public Officers; Resignation; Resignation
from public office, to be effective, requires the acceptance of the proper
government authority. In Republic v. Singun, 548 SCRA 361 (2008), this court stated:
Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or
implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the
acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and
operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish
a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper
authority. . . . . In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public
officer to be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and
the officer remains in office. Resignation to be effective must be accepted by
competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance,
such as the appointment of the successor. A public officer cannot abandon his office
before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal
provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive act of a
resignations acceptance is the notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would
not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had
been duly notified therefor.
SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON, Petitioners, v. ATTY. REY
FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent. G.R. No.
179914, June 16, 2014; ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, Petitioner, v. JUDGE
ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
Administrative Law; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Blatant disregard of basic,
elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is gross ignorance of the
law. - Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and
law is gross ignorance of the law, which is classified as a serious charge under Rule
140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension for more than three months
but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CRISANTO S.
RANESES, Respondent. G.R. No. 189970, June 9, 2014
Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine; The Regalian doctrine, embodied in Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. -
The Regalian doctrine, embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain for land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. It must be proved. And the applicant bears the
burden to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), Petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF
SAGUIRAN, LANAO DEL SUR, Respondents. G.R. No. 199027, June 9, 2014
Administrative Law; Administrative Agencies; Office of the Solicitor General; The
OSGs powers and functions are defined in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Administrative Code), particularly in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12. - The
OSGs powers and functions are defined in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Administrative Code), particularly in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12
thereof, which reads: Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the
President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government-owned
or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law
office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services
of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1) Represent
the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is
a party.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Local Government Units; For local government units,
the LGC limits the lawyers who are authorized to represent them in court actions, as
the law defines the mandate of a local government units legal officer. - On the
matter of counsels representation for the government, the Administrative Code is
not the only law that delves on the issue. Specifically for local government units, the
LGC limits the lawyers who are authorized to represent them in court actions, as the
law defines the mandate of a local government units legal officer.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Local Government Units; Being a special law on the
issue of representation in court that is exclusively made applicable to local
government units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of the Administrative
Code, which classifies only as a general law on the subject matter. - Evidently, this
provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions of a local
government units legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who may
represent the local government unit as its counsel in court proceedings. Being a
special law on the issue of representation in court that is exclusively made
applicable to local government units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of
the Administrative Code, which classifies only as a general law on the subject
matter.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Office of the Solicitor General; In Urbano v.
Chavez, for example, the Court ruled that the OSG could not represent at any stage
a public official who was accused in a criminal case. - It bears mentioning that
notwithstanding the broad language of the Administrative Code on the OSG's
functions, the LGC is not the only qualification to its scope. Jurisprudence also
provides limits to its authority. In Urbano v. Chavez, for example, the Court ruled
that the OSG could not represent at any stage a public official who was accused in a
criminal case. This was necessary to prevent a clear conflict of interest in the event
that the OSG would become the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines
once a judgment of the public official's conviction was brought on appeal.
KASAMAKA-CANLUBANG, INC., represented by PABLITO M.
EGILDO, Petitioner, vs. LAGUNA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent. G.R. No. 200491, June 9, 2014
Local Government Units; Zoning; The power of the cities and municipalities, such as
the Municipality of Calamba, to adopt zoning ordinances or regulations converting
lands into non-agricultural cannot be denied. - The power of the cities and
municipalities, such as the Municipality of Calamba, to adopt zoning ordinances or
regulations converting lands into non-agricultural cannot be denied. In Buklod ng
Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., this Court
recognized said power in the following manner: Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264,
otherwise known at the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council "to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations" for the municipality.
Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance.
Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a
regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under
the provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists
"(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y
DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Plain
View Doctrine; The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest outside the suspects person and premises under his immediate control.
FACTS: While driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, EDWIN LOJERA had
a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle
until he caught up with the taxi. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of
them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could
not do anything but continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby
where he reported the incident.
The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO
RAMIREZ. PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint
by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the
white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired
their guns towards them (police officers) and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3
Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from
Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and
a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from
Calantiaos companion [a] .38 revolver.
In convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in
evidence as it was discovered during a body search after Calantiao was caught in
flagrante delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police officers
Calantiao argues that the marijuana cannot be admitted as evidence against him
because it was illegally discovered and seized, not having been within the
apprehending officers "plain view." Calantiao argues that the plain view doctrine is
not an exception to a search incident to a valid warrantless arrest.
ISSUE: Is the plain view doctrine an exception to a search incident to a warrantless
arrest?
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects
person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in
the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence." "The doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves
to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure." The Plain View
Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiaos situation because the police
officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not
inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiaos possession; they
deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiaos lawful arrest.

WILLIAM CO A.K.A. XU QUING HE, Petitioner, v. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC

PRODUCTS, REPRESENTED BY ELIZABETH UY, Respondent. G.R. No. 183994,
June 30, 2014
Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Trial; While the Court recognizes the accused's
right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we
cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. -
This Court has emphasized that speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a
flexible concept. In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was
violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the
proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b)
reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice
caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial
proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard
must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. While the
Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of
speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong
the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused
to speedy trial.

LIBCAP MARKETING CORP., JOHANNA J. CELIZ, and MA. LUCIA G.

MONDRAGON, Petitioners,
vs. LANNY JEAN B. BAQUIAL, Respondent. G.R. No. 192011, June 30, 2014
Constitutional Law; Ex post facto Law; Penalties; In a democratic system, the
infliction of punishment before trial is fundamentally abhorred. - By pre-judging
respondents case, petitioners clearly violated her right to due process from the
very beginning, and from then on it could not be expected that she would obtain a
fair resolution of her case. In a democratic system, the infliction of punishment
before trial is fundamentally abhorred. What petitioners did was clearly illegal and
improper.

JULY 2014
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN,
CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL
OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER
MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA,
CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners, vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO
III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents. G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Requisites for the Exercise of Judicial Review;
Actual Case or Judicial Controversy; Disbursement Acceleration Program; The
implementation of the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of
public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by
reason or on account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an
actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication by the Court. - An actual and
justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The incompatibility of the
perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant
issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The issues
being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness considering that the challenged
executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are
averments by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter
and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the
allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that public funds
have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on account of such
challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe
for adjudication by the Court.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Requisites for the Exercise of Judicial Review;
Actual Case or Judicial Controversy; Moot and Academic; The Court cannot agree
that the termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening event that
effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court had in the past
exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and
academic by supervening events. - A moot and academic case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. The Court cannot agree
that the termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening event that
effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court had in the past
exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and
academic by supervening events, like: (1) when there was a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional character and
was of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required
the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public;
and (4) when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Requisites for the Exercise of Judicial Review;
Locus Standi; Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers
to "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." - Legal standing,
as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question." The concept of legal standing, or locus standi,
was particularly discussed in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, where the Court
said: In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the
determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to
regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action
or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and
offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must
have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.: The question on legal standing is
whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions." Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a
person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He
must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but
also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained
of.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Requisites for the Exercise of Judicial Review;
Locus Standi; The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International
Air Terminals Co., Inc. that "[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law
because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest." - The Court has
cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. that
"[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits
are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a
law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest." Except for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No.
209164, the petitioners have invoked their capacities as taxpayers who, by averring
that the issuance and implementation of the DAP and its relevant issuances
involved the illegal disbursements of public funds, have an interest in preventing
the further dissipation of public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo)
and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) also assert their right as citizens to sue for the
enforcement and observance of the constitutional limitations on the political
branches of the Government. On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court
has long recognized its legal standing to bring cases upon constitutional
issues. Luna, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites his additional capacity as a
lawyer. The IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by "its avowed duty to
work for the rule of law and of paramount importance of the question in this action,
not to mention its civic duty as the official association of all lawyers in this country."
Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established
sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer locus standi on
each of them. In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the
power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether
appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of transcendental
importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As such, the
determination of such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its broad and
wise discretion "to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised."
Budget; Words and Phrases; In the Philippine setting, Commonwealth Act (CA) No.
246 (Budget Act) defined "budget" as the financial program of the National
Government for a designated fiscal year, consisting of the statements of estimated
receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year for which it was intended to be
effective based on the results of operations during the preceding fiscal years. - In
the Philippine setting, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 246 (Budget Act) defined
"budget" as the financial program of the National Government for a designated
fiscal year, consisting of the statements of estimated receipts and expenditures for
the fiscal year for which it was intended to be effective based on the results of
operations during the preceding fiscal years. The term was given a different
meaning under Republic Act No. 992 (Revised Budget Act) by describing the budget
as the delineation of the services and products, or benefits that would accrue to the
public together with the estimated unit cost of each type of service, product or
benefit. For a forthright definition, budget should simply be identified as the
financial plan of the Government, or "the master plan of government."
Budget; The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a
Budget Call by the DBM. - The budget preparation phase is commenced through the
issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM. The Budget Call contains budget parameters
earlier set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) as well as
policy guidelines and procedures to aid government agencies in the preparation and
submission of their budget proposals. The Budget Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a
National Budget Call, which is addressed to all agencies, including state universities
and colleges; and (2) a Corporate Budget Call, which is addressed to all
government-owned and -controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government financial
institutions (GFIs).
Budget; Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two
categories, specifically: (1) capital expenditures or outlays; and (2) current
operating expenditures. - Public or government expenditures are generally classified
into two categories, specifically: (1) capital expenditures or outlays; and (2) current
operating expenditures. Capital expenditures are the expenses whose usefulness
lasts for more than one year, and which add to the assets of the Government,
including investments in the capital of government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. Current operating expenditures are the
purchases of goods and services in current consumption the benefit of which does
not extend beyond the fiscal year. The two components of current expenditures are
those for personal services (PS), and those for maintenance and other operating
expenses(MOOE). Public expenditures are also broadly grouped according to their
functions into: (1) economic development expenditures (i.e., expenditures on
agriculture and natural resources, transportation and communications, commerce
and industry, and other economic development efforts); (2) social services or social
development expenditures (i.e., government outlay on education, public health and
medicare, labor and welfare and others); (3) general government or general public
services expenditures (i.e., expenditures for the general government, legislative
services, the administration of justice, and for pensions and gratuities); (4) national
defense expenditures (i.e., sub-divided into national security expenditures and
expenditures for the maintenance of peace and order); and (5) public debt.
Budget; Sources of Public Revenue; - In the Philippines, public revenues are
generally derived from the following sources, to wit: (1) tax revenues(i.e.,
compulsory contributions to finance government activities); 80 (2) capital
revenues(i.e., proceeds from sales of fixed capital assets or scrap thereof and public
domain, and gains on such sales like sale of public lands, buildings and other
structures, equipment, and other properties recorded as fixed assets); 81 (3)
grants(i.e., voluntary contributions and aids given to the Government for its
operation on specific purposes in the form of money and/or materials, and do not
require any monetary commitment on the part of the recipient); (4) extraordinary
income(i.e., repayment of loans and advances made by government corporations
and local governments and the receipts and shares in income of the Banko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, and other receipts); and (5) public borrowings(i.e., proceeds of
repayable obligations generally with interest from domestic and foreign creditors of
the Government in general, including the National Government and its political
subdivisions).
Budget; Budget Legislation Phase; The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period
commencing from the time Congress receives the Presidents Budget, which is
inclusive of the NEPand the BESF, up to the Presidents approval of the GAA. - The
Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the time Congress
receives the Presidents Budget, which is inclusive of the NEPand the BESF, up to
the Presidents approval of the GAA.
Budget; Reenacted Budget; If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have
failed to pass the GAB for the ensuing fiscal year, the GAA for the preceding fiscal
year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the GAB
is passed by the Congress. - The House of Representatives and the Senate then
constitute a panel each to sit in the Bicameral Conference Committee for the
purpose of discussing and harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their versions of
the GAB. The "harmonized" version of the GAB is next presented to the President for
approval. The President reviews the GAB, and prepares the Veto Message where
budget items are subjected to direct veto, or are identified for conditional
implementation. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to
pass the GAB for the ensuing fiscal year, the GAA for the preceding fiscal year shall
be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the GAB is passed
by the Congress.
Budget; Budget Execution Phase; The Budget Execution Phase is primarily the
function of the DBM. - With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next step is the
implementation of the budget. The Budget Execution Phase is primarily the function
of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the following procedures, namely: (1) to
issue the programs and guidelines for the release of funds; (2) to prepare an
Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to issue
disbursement authorities.
Budget; In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the DBM issues a
disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated in payment of the obligations.
- In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the DBM issues a
disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated in payment of the obligations.
A cash or disbursement authority that is periodically issued is referred to as a Notice
of Cash Allocation (NCA), which issuance is based upon an agencys submission of
its Monthly Cash Program and other required documents. The NCA specifies the
maximum amount of cash that can be withdrawn from a government servicing bank
for the period indicated. Apart from the NCA, the DBM may issue a Non-Cash
Availment Authority(NCAA) to authorize non-cash disbursements, or a Cash
Disbursement Ceiling(CDC) for departments with overseas operations to allow the
use of income collected by their foreign posts for their operating requirements.

Budget; Accountability; Accountability is a significant phase of the budget cycle

because it ensures that the government funds have been effectively and efficiently
utilized to achieve the States socio-economic goals. - Accountability is a significant
phase of the budget cycle because it ensures that the government funds have been
effectively and efficiently utilized to achieve the States socio-economic goals. It
also allows the DBM to assess the performance of agencies during the fiscal year for
the purpose of implementing reforms and establishing new policies. An agencys
accountability may be examined and evaluated through (1) performance targets
and outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports; (3) review of agency performance;
and (4) audit conducted by the Commission on Audit(COA).
Budget; The national budget becomes a tangible representation of the programs of
the Government in monetary terms, specifying therein the PAPs and services for
which specific amounts of public funds are proposed and allocated. - Policy is
always a part of every budget and fiscal decision of any Administration. The national
budget the Executive prepares and presents to Congress represents the
Administrations "blueprint for public policy" and reflects the Governments goals
and strategies. As such, the national budget becomes a tangible representation of
the programs of the Government in monetary terms, specifying therein the PAPs
and services for which specific amounts of public funds are proposed and
allocated. Embodied in every national budget is government spending.
Budget; The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had
sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to
changes in the countrys economic situation. -
Budget; The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had
sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to
changes in the countrys economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for
the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the
DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs
to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because
the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through
the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress
under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Budget; Transfer of Funds; The power to transfer funds can give the President the
flexibility to meet unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the efficient
implementation of the PAPs set by Congress in the GAA. - We begin this dissection
by reiterating that Congress cannot anticipate all issues and needs that may come
into play once the budget reaches its execution stage. Executive discretion is
necessary at that stage to achieve a sound fiscal administration and assure
effective budget implementation. The heads of offices, particularly the President,
require flexibility in their operations under performance budgeting to enable them
to make whatever adjustments are needed to meet established work goals under
changing conditions. In particular, the power to transfer funds can give the
President the flexibility to meet unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the
efficient implementation of the PAPs set by Congress in the GAA. Congress has
traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating funds pursuant to
the GAAs, particularly when the funds are grouped to form lump sum accounts. It is
assumed that the agencies of the Government enjoy more flexibility when the GAAs
provide broader appropriation items. This flexibility comes in the form of policies
that the Executive may adopt during the budget execution phase. The DAP as a
strategy to improve the countrys economic position was one policy that the
President decided to carry out in order to fulfill his mandate under the GAAs.
Budget; Transfer of Funds; Requisites for a Valid Transfer of Appropriated Funds; The
transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be
made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law
authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) The
funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their
respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices.
Budget; Section 25(5), Article VI, not being a self-executing provision of the
Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be operative. - Section 25(5),
Article VI, not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an
implementing law for it to be operative. That law, generally, is the GAA of a given
fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize
the transfer of funds.
Budget; Savings; For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless
these met the statutory definition of savings, would seriously undercut the
congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had not even
reached and been used by the agency concerned vis--vis the PAPs for which
Congress had allocated them. - For us to consider unreleased appropriations as
savings, unless these met the statutory definition of savings, would seriously
undercut the congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had
not even reached and been used by the agency concerned vis--vis the PAPs for
which Congress had allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled positions in
its plantilla and did not receive an allotment and NCA for such vacancies,
appropriations for such positions, although unreleased, may already constitute
savings for that agency under the second instance. Unobligated allotments, on the
other hand, were encompassed by the first part of the definition of "savings" in the
GAA, that is, as "portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act
free from any obligation or encumbrance." But the first part of the definition was
further qualified by the three enumerated instances of when savings would be
realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be indiscriminately declared as
savings without first determining whether any of the three instances existed. This
signified that the DBMs withdrawal of unobligated allotments had
disregarded the definition of savings under the GAAs.
Budget; Impoundment; Words and Phrases; According to Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez: "Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for
whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to
spend or obligate budget authority of any type." Impoundment under the GAA is
understood to mean the retention or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA
authorized impoundment only in case of unmanageable National Government
budget deficit.
Budget; It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the
final say on matters of appropriations. - Congress acts as the guardian of the public
treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse whenever it deliberates and
acts on the budget proposal submitted by the Executive. Its power of the purse is
touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength, and underpins "all other
legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative
and executive branches of government." Such enormous power encompasses the
capacity to generate money for the Government, to appropriate public funds, and to
spend the money. Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse, Congress
wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public money should be spent. It is
the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on
matters of appropriations. For this purpose, appropriation involves two governing
principles, namely: (1) "a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies
received from whatever source by any part of the government are public funds;"
and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public
money without legislative authorization." To conform with the governing principles,
the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a
PAP by resorting to either public or private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer
appropriated funds resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so
doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of both
appropriations will thereby be violated.
Budget; Cross-border Augmentation; Funds appropriated for one office are
prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of augmentation of
a deficient item or items. - By providing that the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be
authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for their respective offices," Section
25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their offices, such that funds
appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even
in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such
transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations. To be sure,
the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire
Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate
President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary,
with respect to the Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to
their respective Chairpersons.
Budget; Equal Protection of the Laws; Parties; Disbursement Acceleration Program;
The denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by
parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few
legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of funds
under the DAP. - The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection
Clause, which focuses on the release of funds under the DAP to legislators, lacks
factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and Congressmen being
unaware of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and about some of them
having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with relevant data. Also, the
claim that the Executive discriminated against some legislators on the ground alone
of their receiving less than the others could not of itself warrant a finding of
contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of equal protection of any
law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in
these cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been
discriminated against in the releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for the
requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and fully bring to
the fore when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain why
there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here.
Consequently, the Court was not put in the position to determine if there was a
denial of equal protection. To have the Court do so despite the inadequacy of the
showing of factual and legal support would be to compel it to speculate, and the
outcome would not do justice to those for whose supposed benefit the claim of
denial of equal protection has been made.
Constitutional Law; Operative Fact Doctrine; The doctrine of operative fact
recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot
always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or
executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule
that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. - The doctrine of operative
fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination
of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that
cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or
executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule
that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected
to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an
unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity
and fair play. It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and
only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that
will permit its application. We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the
adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from
equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related
issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone. To be clear, the
doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The
term executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive,
including those that are quasi legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.
Constitutional Law; Operative Fact Doctrine; In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
San Roque Power Corporation, the Court likewise declared that "for the operative
fact doctrine to apply, there must be a legislative or executive measure, meaning a
law or executive issuance." - In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque
Power Corporation, the Court likewise declared that "for the operative fact doctrine
to apply, there must be a legislative or executive measure, meaning a law or
executive issuance." Thus, the Court opined there that the operative fact doctrine
did not apply to a mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
viz: Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the
Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the
Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect. This, in
essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however, be a rule or ruling
issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith. A
mere administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice
because such a mere administrative practice may not be uniformly and consistently
applied. An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be
known to the general public and can be availed of only by those with informal
contacts with the government agency. It is clear from the foregoing that the
adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were
executive acts. The DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely administrative
practice especially after the Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing
various memoranda and circulars. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP from
the allotments made available to the different agencies and departments was
consistently applied throughout the entire Executive. With the Executive, through
the DBM, being in charge of the third phase of the budget cycle the budget
execution phase, the President could legitimately adopt a policy like the DAP by
virtue of his primary responsibility as the Chief Executive of directing the national
economy towards growth and development. This is simply because savings could
and should be determined only during the budget execution phase.
Constitutional Law; Operative Fact Doctrine; Disbursement Acceleration Program;
To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that
its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences
in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be
impractical and unfair. - The implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of
savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were not covered in the
GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment items
pertaining to other departments of the Government in clear violation of the
Constitution. To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without
recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that
produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and
the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the
Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients
could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith
under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously burdensome for the
Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES,
INC., Respondent. G.R. No. 193796, July 2, 2014
Constitutional Law; International Law; International Agreements; In Bayan Muna v.
Romulo (Bayan Muna) the Court defined an international agreement as one
concluded between states in written form and governed by international law,
"whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation," and further expounded that it may be in the
form of either (a) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive
ratification; or ( b) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that
they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with
a narrower range of subject matters than treaties. - In Bayan Muna v.
Romulo (Bayan Muna) the Court defined an international agreement as one
concluded between states in written form and governed by international law,
"whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation," and further expounded that it may be in the
form of either (a) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive
ratification; or ( b) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that
they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with
a narrower range of subject matters than treaties. Examining its features, Loan
Agreement No. 4833-PH between the IBRD and the Land Bank is an integral
component of the Guarantee Agreement executed by the Government of the
Philippines as a subject of international law possessed of a treaty-making capacity,
and the IBRD, which, as an international lending institution organized by world
governments to provide loans conditioned upon the guarantee of repayment by the
borrowing sovereign state, is likewise regarded a subject of international law and
possessed of the capacity to enter into executive agreements with sovereign states.
Being similar to a treaty but without requiring legislative concurrence, Loan
Agreement No. 4833-PH - following the definition given in the Bayan Muna case - is
an executive agreement and is, thus, governed by international law.
DENNIS L. GO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R.
No. 202809, July 2, 2014
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent
membership in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular
political community of full civil and political rights subject to special
disqualifications. - Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership
in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular political
community of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications.
Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political community. The core
of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate
in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office
and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Naturalization; No less than the 1987 Constitution
enumerates who are Filipino citizens. Among those listed are citizens by
naturalization, which refers to the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the privilege of a native-born citizen. - No less than the 1987 Constitution
enumerates who are Filipino citizens. Among those listed are citizens by
naturalization, which refers to the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the present laws, the process of
naturalization can be judicial or administrative. Judicially, C.A. No. 473 provides that
after hearing the petition for citizenship and receipt of evidence showing that the
petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law,
the competent court may order the issuance of the proper naturalization certificate
and the registration thereof in the proper civil registry. On the other hand, Republic
Act (R.A.)No. 9139 provides that aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be
granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by filing a petition for
citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view of the facts before it, may
approve the petition and issue a certificate of naturalization. In both cases, the
petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Naturalization; Naturalization is not a right, but one
of privilege of the most discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting nature,
affecting, as it does, public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed
only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor. - It is a well-
entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily be given away. All those
seeking to acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of the Court, that they have
complied with all the requirements of the law. The reason for this requirement is
simple. Citizenship involves political status; hence, every person must be proud of
his citizenship and should cherish it. Verily, a naturalization case is not an ordinary
judicial contest, to be decided in favor of the party whose claim is supported by the
preponderance of the evidence. Naturalization is not a right, but one of privilege of
the most discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it
does, public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the
precise conditions prescribed by law therefor.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Naturalization; An applicant must comply with the
jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2)
character witnesses to support his allegations. - Jurisprudence dictates that in
judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and formal compliance
with C.A. No. 473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional
requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2) character
witnesses to support his allegations. In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court
listed the requirements for character witnesses, namely: 1. That they are citizens of
the Philippines; 2. That they are "credible persons"; 3. That they personally know
the petitioner; 4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines
for the period of time required by law; 5. That they personally know him to be a
person of good repute; 6. That they personally know him to be morally
irreproachable; 7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to
become a citizen of the Philippines; and 8. That he "is not in any way disqualified
under the provisions" of the Naturalization Law.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Naturalization; Character Witnesses; The law, in
effect, requires that the character witnesses be not mere ordinary acquaintances of
the applicant, but possessed of such intimate knowledge of the latter as to be
competent to testify of their personal knowledge; and that they have each one of
the requisite qualifications and none of the statutory disqualifications. - In
consonance with the above dictum, in Lim Ching Tian v. Republic, the Court
explained that the "law requires that a vouching witness should have actually
known an applicant for whom he testified for the requisite period prescribed therein
to give him the necessary competence to act as such. The reason behind this
requirement is that a vouching witness is in a way an insurer of the character of
petitioner because on his testimony the court is of necessity compelled to rely in
deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore, imperative that he be competent
and reliable. And he is only competent to testify on his conduct, character and
moral fitness if he has had the opportunity to observe him personally, if not
intimately, during the period he has allegedly known him." The law, in effect,
requires that the character witnesses be not mere ordinary acquaintances of the
applicant, but possessed of such intimate knowledge of the latter as to be
competent to testify of their personal knowledge; and that they have each one of
the requisite qualifications and none of the statutory disqualifications.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Naturalization; It is indispensable that an applicant
for naturalization shows his identification with the Philippines as a country deserving
of his wholehearted allegiance. - It bears stressing that the CA was correct in
finding that the testimonies of petitioners witnesses only proved that he mingled
socially with Filipinos. While almost all of the witnesses testified that they knew
petitioner since birth and that they had interacted with petitioners family in times
of celebration, this did not satisfy the other requirements set by law, that is, a
genuine desire to learn and embrace the Filipino ideals and traditions. Besides, both
the NBI and BOI reports cast doubt on petitioners alleged social interaction with
Filipinos. The background checks done on petitioner yielded negative results due to
the uncooperative behavior of the members of his household. In fact, petitioner
himself disobliged when asked for an interview by BOI agents. To the Court, this is a
display of insincerity to embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals. This leads
to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner failed to prove that he has all the
qualifications entitling him to the grant of Philippine citizenship. Filipino citizenship
is predicated upon oneness with the Filipino people. It is indispensable that an
applicant for naturalization shows his identification with the Philippines as a country
deserving of his wholehearted allegiance. Until there is a positive and unequivocal
showing that this is so in the case of petitioner, the Court must selfishly decline to
confer Philippine citizenship on one who remains an alien in principles and
sentiment.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Naturalization; Residence; The inclusion of present
and former places of residence in the petition is a jurisdictional requirement, without
which the petition suffers from a fatal and congenital defect which cannot be cured
by evidence on the omitted matter at the trial. - It is noteworthy that the OSG was
correct in arguing that petitioner's failure to state his former residence in the
petition was fatal to his application for naturalization. Indeed, this omission had
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Differently
stated, the inclusion of present and former places of residence in the petition is a
jurisdictional requirement, without which the petition suffers from a fatal and
congenital defect which cannot be cured by evidence on the omitted matter at the
trial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. OLIVER RENATO EDAO y

EBDANE, Appellant. G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014
Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests; "For a warrantless arrest of an
accused caught in flagrante delictoto be valid, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer." - Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is known an arrest in
flagrante delicto. "For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante
delictoto be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer."
Trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and
without more, cannot be evidence of guilt. - That the appellant attempted to
run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be
construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge that the
appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to
engage in criminal activity. As the Court explained in People v. Villareal:
Furthermore, appellants act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him
should not be construed against him. Flight per seis not synonymous with guilt and
must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable
indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are
many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to
officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully
apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, appellants attempt to run away from PO3 de
Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it
could likewise signify innocence. In other words, trying to run away when no crime
has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.
ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B.
JULIA, Respondents. G.R. No. 207851, July 08, 2014
FACTS: From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval served as provincial board
member in the Second District. In 2009, Camarines Sur was reapportioned in such a
way that 8 out of its 10 town constituencies in the Second District were carved out
and formed the Third District. In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as
among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. In the 2013 elections, Naval
ran anew.
Julia, a candidate for Provincial Member for the 2013 Elections for the Third District
filed a petition to deny due course to Navals candidacy. Julia posited that Naval had
fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a
member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from.
The three-term limit rules application is more with reference to the same local
elective post, and not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial
jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is
violative of the inflexible three-term limit.
ISSUE: Is there a violation of the three-term limit rule?
HELD: YES
The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in the
instant case as the records clearly establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time
for the same government post. To put things in a proper perspective, it is imperative
to review and discuss the salient points in the case of Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The
case involves the question of whether or not a municipal mayor, having been
elected and had already served for three (3) consecutive terms, can run as city
mayor in light of the conversion of the municipality to a city. In applying the three-
term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the conversion of the municipality into a
city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post
different from the office of the city mayor. The Court took into account the following
circumstances: (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as that
of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters who
elected the municipal mayor for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the
inhabitants were the same group of voters [over] whom he held power and
authority as their chief executive for nine years.
Anchoring from the said case, it is therefore clear that the position to which [Naval]
has filed his candidacy for the 13 May 2013 x x x Elections is the same position for
which he had been elected and had served for the past nine (9) years.
xxxx
x x x The following circumstances establish that the subject posts are one and the
same: First, the territorial jurisdictions of the two (2) districts are the same except
for the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor which were excluded by R.A. No. 9716;
Second, the inhabitants of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur, where [Naval] is
presently running as member of the [Sanggunian], are the same voters who elected
him for the past three (3) consecutive terms; and Lastly, the inhabitants of the
[3rd ] District are the same group of voters whom [Naval] had served as member of
the [Sanggunian] representing the 2nd District.
PRINCIPLES
What is the application of the three term limit rule in the case of renamed/
reapportioned districts?
Republicanism; The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation,
the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive
their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a
limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of
their principal. - Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the character of a
republican state and a public office, viz: A republic is a representative government,
a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the
people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation
and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public
functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their
behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or
retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a
responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public
trust and shall, according to the Constitution, at all times be accountable to the
people they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is
almost needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the
will of the people themselves.
Term limit; Our Constitution and statutes are explicit anent the existence
of term limits, the nature of public office, and the guarantee from the
State that citizens shall have equal access to public service. - while it is
settled that in elections, the first consideration of every democratic polity is to give
effect to the expressed will of the majority, there are limitations to being elected to
a public office. Our Constitution and statutes are explicit anent the existence of
term limits, the nature of public office, and the guarantee from the State that
citizens shall have equal access to public service. Section 8, Article X of our
Constitution, on term limits, is significantly reiterated by Section 43(b) of the LGC.
Moreover, the Court has time and again declared that a public office is a public trust
and not a vested property right.
Election Law; Three-term Limit; The drafters of our Constitution are in
agreement about the possible attendant evils if there would be no limit to
re-election. - the drafters of our Constitution are in agreement about the possible
attendant evils if there would be no limit to re-election. Notwithstanding their
conflicting preferences on whether the term limit would disqualify the elected
official perpetually or temporarily, they decided that only three consecutive
elections to the same position would be allowed. Thereafter, the public official can
once again vie for the same post provided there be a gap of at least one term from
his or her last election. The rule answers the need to prevent the consolidation of
political power in the hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the people
the freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to be called
statesmen. The compromise agreed upon by the drafters of our Constitution was a
result of exhaustive deliberations. The required gap after three consecutive
elections is significant. Thus, the rule cannot be taken with a grain of salt. Nothing
less than its strict application is called for.

HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA, namely: LICINIA V. MENDOZA, PETER

VAL V. MENDOZA, CONSTANCIA V. MENDOZA YOUNG, CRISTINA V.
MENDOZA FIGUEROA, DIOSDADO V. MENDOZA, JR., JOSEPHINE V. MENDOZA
JASA, and RIZALINA V. MENDOZA PUSO, Petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and the DPWH SECRETARY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014
Immunity from Suit; It is clear from the enumeration of its functions that
the DPWH performs governmental functions. Thus, the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the DPWH enjoys immunity from suit and may not be
sued without its consent. - It is clear from the enumeration of its functions that
the DPWH performs governmental functions. Section 5(d) states that it has the
power to "[i]dentify, plan, secure funding for, program, design, construct or
undertake prequalification, bidding, and award of contracts of public works projects
x x x" while Section 5(e) states that itshall "[p]rovide the works supervision function
for all public works construction and ensure that actual construction is done in
accordance with approved government plans and specifications." The contracts that
the DPWH entered into with Mendoza for the construction of Packages VI and IX of
the HADP were done in the exercise of its governmental functions. Hence,
petitioners cannot claim that there was an implied waiver by the DPWH simply by
entering into a contract. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the DPWH
enjoys immunity from suit and may not be sued without its consent.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee, vs. VICTOR COGAED

y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Searches; It is the police officer who
should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion
of a person. - It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a
reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the
suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person
suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an
infringement upon ones basic right to security of ones person and effects.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, v. JOY C.
CABILES, Respondent. G.R. No. 170139, August 05, 2014
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic
Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and
due process - In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause and substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all."
We are aware that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon
promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No.
10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due
process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any
compelling changein the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the
precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that
should be recovered by anillegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is
both a violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Equal Protection of the Laws; There can never be a justification for any
form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but
imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored
sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies,
while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no
less than the Constitution commands. - There can never be a justification for
any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes
the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed
of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector
is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands.
The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling
state interest is odious. Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause
violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives overseas workers of their
monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose. Respondent Joy Cabiles is
entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of
respondents salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working on
June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her
salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to
petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs
security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from
such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.

Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA

YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,
vs. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA,
and CELIA C. YANGCO, Respondents. G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014
Writ of Amparo; [T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the
intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these
two instances or to threats thereof. - SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a
writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. In the landmark
case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., this Court held: [T]he
AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings"
and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to
these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groupsor private individuals acting with the direct
or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
Enforced Disappearances; Words and Phrases; As to what constitutes
"enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the
elements constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily
defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851. - This pronouncement on the
coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v.
Macapagal-Arroyo where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of
amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced
disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting
"enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A.
No. 9851 to wit: (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of, the State ora political organization; (c) that it be followed by the
State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the
intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time
Child custody; Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is
involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights
over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered
a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied. - Since it
is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody
and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes,
has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied. To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to
victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar
nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a
public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to
protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from
fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.