Iran

I ra n a s Imagined Nation:
The Construction of National Identity

Mostafa Vaziri
New York: Paragon House, 1993.247 pages. $46.95
hardback (ISBN 1-55778-573-2).

Review by
Ali al-Taie, Ph.D.
Shaw University

M any books have been published on Iran in the wake of the

Islamic Revolution (1978-9) and the episodes that have fol-
lowed. The WorkofMostafaVaziriis exceptional for two reasons. First
of all, for the first time a major work challenges the traditional
Orientalist scholarshp on Iran, w h c h considers Iran as a consistent
unquestionable Aryan construct in racial, religious, andlinguisticterms,
no matter what currents have affectedthe Iranian society throughout the
centuries. Such a scholarship only meets the ethnocentric attitude ofthe
Irantologists involved and the racist ego of their domestic followers.
Second andin ths connection,the author dares to speakout academically
that as to territory, Persianlanguage, religion, and racial entity, Iran has
never been a n agreed-upon and defined reality throughout hstory. Only
those unrealistic Orientalists and their imitators among Persian
chauvinist elite and intellectuals, who mostly identlfy with the Pahlavi
period (1921-79) and political culture, salute and promote t h s opinion.
Thisiswhythe author emphasizesthatinorientahst, Iranisnothingbut
an imagined nation-unreality, indeed.
As he acknowledges (pp. 58, 70), Vaziri follows the tradition of
Edward Saids Orientalism, showing how it has created a ground
wherein political knowledge superceded pure knowledge. Stated
otherwise, Western Orientalism obviously has been a t one and the
same time a progeny of colonialism, a n exercise in cultural and
intellectual competition, and a n arrogant expression of superiority to
others (p. 142). Favoring Iran, such audacious slanders have gone
unchallenged by the modern scholars of Iran, whose resulting sense of

cDigest of Mddh East S t d i e s 51

Summer 1996

historical grandeur has overshadowed their sense ofunbiased objectiv-

ity (p. 143). (In his criticism of Orientalism, Vaziriswork echoes such
works as Halim Barakats The Arab World: Society, Culture, And
State, 1993, which also shows biased Western scholarship on the
Arabs and on Islam.)
In all, thisbook,the author says, inquiresinto the formation of
the concept of national identity, both in a theoretical and in a practical
sense in Europe and Iran (p. 2).While challenging the European (and
later some American) authors definition of Iran as a well defined,
clearly understood, and perpetuating Aryan racial reality, Vaziri
substantiates that the term Iran, as the name of the land, and the
notion of Iranian national consciousness are byproducts of twentieth-
century ideas that have no historical affiliation in the way many
nationalistic Orientalists try to portray (p. 63). It is true that,
beginning in the third century A.D., the name Iran was used to
identify an area between India and the Arab lands. But this usage
shouldnot be mistaken for aproof that a homogeneous Iranian nation
and people existed in the region (p. 65). Therefore, the application of
the term Aryan to a race and to some embryonic notion of an early
nation of Iran is tantamount to historical blindness influenced by
extreme Aryanism in scholarship (p. 80).
As for the Persian or Farsi language, to say that it is a symbol of
continuity for over a millennium is by no means to guarantee the
continuity of culture or ethnicity inside Iran. When, in 1934, the term
Iran began to be used to replace Persia in Western literature, the
concept Iranian was equally poised to substitute Persian. What
happened then is that Iran became a broad historical category to
nourish the nationalistic necessities of many groups of whch Persians
were only one (p. 70).Thus, the unqualified designation ofPersian for
language, culture, ethnicity, and the like results in serious contradic-
tory conclusions. To this enlightening observation of Vaziri, one may
also add that in the post-lslamic Iran, the Persian cognition, culture,
and language have taken the Arabic-lslamic form and function to the
extent that what is purePersianand Aryancannotbe detected and
distinguished at all.
Painstakingly, the author shows how, prior to the Aryans
immigration to what would become known as Iran, different people
and different civilizations existed there. For example, he cites the
Italian scholar Gherado Gnoli, who notes: Others did not want to say
that there were Arabs in Iran in the first half of the first millennium
B.C. but claimed there were nomads and shepherds (p. 78).

Further, the Turani (Turkish) people,the enemies ofIran whodid not

52 DOMES
 Iran

speak either the Indo-lranian or any other Aryan languages estab-

lished a well-knowncountry which included the Baluchstan region in
the southeast, and which as late as the e1eventhcenturyA.D. did not
recognize any authority but that of the caliph of Baghdad. I t was for
this reason that Sultan Mahmud-i Ghaznawi launched attacks
against Turan (p. 73). Further, the historical politicalexperiences of
Kurdistan and Khuzistan in the west and of Transoxiana and
Khurasan in the east cannot be easily understood as Iranian in
national terms unless a substantialviolence to anthropological and
sociological principles is done (p. 140).
Even long ago, the influence ofAkkadian, Assyrian, Chaldian, and
Egyptian .art, architecture, and language on Iran were so evident
that some scholars speak of the Medes, the first group of immigrant
Aryans who founded the first Aryanregime in the so-calledIran, were
not Aryans, but rather Aramaic, Elamite, Turanian, or Sematic
people (p. 79). As for the Achamaenians, or Persians, if one may not
doubt their racial origin, one can cast doubt on their widespread use
of and identification with the Old Persian language because this
language did not have an alphabet of its own, but rather used the
Arameanalphabet ...forwriting (p. 79). Concerningthe thwdhanian
group, the Parthans, whom some believe were anAryanentity, they
did not identdy with Aryanethnic awareness.Further, they ruledin a
mosaic of ethnic groups in the country, each of whch had its own local
prince, and hence the designationconcept Muluk al-Tawaif,providmg
evidence of the lack of national unity under their regime. The author
shouldhave also mentioned that t h s same people were actually a mixture
ot Parthians and Turanis, whch is partly why they did not develop an
Aryanethmc awareness,and that their Persian Sassanian successors
attempted to wipe out, not to b d d on, their cultural heritage.
Speaking of the last pre-lslamic regime in Iran, the Sassani-
ans, Vaziri analyzes significant issues. First of all, the dynastys usage
of the label Iranshahr did not have any bearing on political or ethnic
traits; it simply was a geographic designation of the land. Second, not
only were other names in use as a substitute for Iranshahr, but the
Sassanis did not rule a homogeneous people in a clearly defined and
maintained territory (pp. 87-92). To clarify that the Arabs Islamic
conquest ofthe Sassani Persia was also caused by the empires erosion
from within, the author quotes the Britishphilologist, A.H. Sacy, who
writes: In short, the empire contained within it from the first all the
elements of decay,and the Persian character was one whch could with
difficulty be respected and never loved(p. 107). Further, the various
postlslamic dynasties, including the Taheris, Saffaris, Samanis,

DDigest of M d d i East Stud?es 53

Summer 1996
Ghaznavis, Dailamis, and the Safavis, who ruled in different corners
of Iran and in different periods, did not use the name Iran to gain
political power or legitimacy. Also true, in the coinage of all post-
lslamic dynasties up to the &ajar period ( 1786-1 925), not one coin
carried the name Iran (p. 93).Thus, w h l e repudiating many Western
authors belonging to the Aryan school who have attempted the
fabrication of a n Iranian identity (p. go), Vaziri concludes that the
primal Aryanrace is a pure imagination because the Indo-European
phenomenon itself is a mere linguistic conception (p. 100).
I n regard to religion, another element of that fabricated identity,
like other religions and their followers, thepersistence of Zoroastri-
anism as a religion should not be used as a definer of the Aryan
Iranians. Indeed, only modern scholars tend to perceive of Zoroastri-
anism as the nationalreligion ofthis people (p. 102). Language, too,
is proposed unrealistically by members of the Aryan school as
another factor that along with race and religion characterizes and
individualizes the AryanIranians. In t h s respect, the author goes into
details to show how the Farsilanguage has not operated as a unifying
force or characterizing trait for the people concerned. For example, he
observes although the alleged ancient Aryans were settled in the
western plateau of Iran, the Farsi ianguage in the Islamic period
flourished in the eastern part of Iran, in Transoxiana and Khurassan
regions, as opposed to the Fars and Mesopotamian regions (p. 110).
Further, the fate of other languages and cultures such as Kurdish,
Luri, and Gilaki should be understood under the Sassani rule. For
example, for severalcenturies, the central regime of the Sassanis lay
surrounded by the Kurdish culture. Shortcomings like this have
apparently caused the Orientalists to adopt theMiddle Persian as the
name for one of the languages of the Sassanian period, when the proper
name ofthislanguage escapes us ...(p. 117).Put otherwise, they felt
free to adopt Middle Persian, to filter the Sassanian traditions
through modern dominant cultural characteristics and to forgethe
Farsi language (New Persian) as a medium to that effect. Actually, the
very few Persian publications that have been produced in recent times on
the Iranianidentity and the Farsilanguage have all failedltohstinguish
historically and to substantiate the Merences and antecedents involved
in the formation of a modern nation-state in the country (p. 119).
The emergence of Iranianidentity in racial, nationalist, linguis-
tic, or territorial terms is not of a historical nature, but rather is a
fabricatedproduct of recent decades. This is true, because the Orien-
talists confuse geography, namely, the land of Iran, with the
sociocultural and political affairs of dynasties ruled in the same

54 (ROME3
 Iran
environs (p. 135). Two examples may suffice to show how homogeneous
people have not existed in Iran even though the land in the main was
ruled by one or the other indigenous or extraneous dynasty. First of all,
ample evidence exists to the effect that when they were ruled by the
Dailamis (932- 1055) ofthe Caspianregion, the people of southwest Iran
thoughtoftheserulersasoutsiders(p. 135).Thslocalperceptionofthe
outsidercontradxts the prejudiced writing by some Iranianand Western
authors who project that the Dadamis were nationalistIranians.
Second, mostrecently under the Qajars (1786-1925), territorial
identity in a cultural sense did not exist in Iran. Patriotism
assumed the form of religious, but not nationalist, sentiment.
Actually, it escaped the authors mind to indicate in this conjunction
that the Qajars were Tatar by their very origin and spoke Turkish in
the Iranian Court. However, relating to the tradition of the twelve
Imams, this religious attitude took a clear Shii precedence over so-
called national concerns (p. 172). Further, from a tribal, ethnic,
regional, or even political standpoint, it is impossible (at least in this
study) to sort out the multilayered complex of loyalties and identities
the population of Iran in the nineteenth century possessed (p. 173).
Unlike what others have asserted with prejudice, Shicism is not
hstorically intertwined with Iranian nationalism. In its recent
political tone, this religious sentiment is a by-product of the Constitu-
tional Revolution (1906-7),whose application to Irans past for political
national gain is a sheer anachronism (p. 173).
With the emergence ofthe nation-state pattern ofpolitical organi-
zationin Persia or Iran, it became the job of the intelligentsia and their
adhoc mass media to address the inhabitants of the territories of Iran
such as Turks, Arabs, and others as Iraniansand to inculcatethem
with this other-designed identity (p. 175). The major vehicle for this
Farsification strategy was (and still is) systematic universal educa-
tion into Farsi. Yet, the Farsi language itselfpossessed no national
homeland, and its speakers had never searched for a national home-
land in modern times ... (p. 177). Nevertheless, the Orientalists,
together with the functionaries ofthe Pahlavi regime ofIran, expended
great efforts to make the Farsi language and Iransound synonymous.
The different ethnic groups have been required to learn the national
language, but not their own native languages, in order to develop and
identify with a new national consciousness.
Vaziri shows how the Iranian or Persian elite and intellectuals
under the Pahlavis followed the Western Aryan version of the ethno-
culturally diversified Iran to their own racist satisfaction. He briefly
evaluates the work of many Persian individuals involved, showing

cDigest of Middi East Stdies 55

their racial prejudice in favoring the Aryan Iran and in seeing
everything in the country as uniquely Aryan. Unfortunately, though,
he does not include in this category the names and the works of two
leading racist figures-the writer Sadiq Hedayat and the political
scientist Mahmud Afshar-whose ethnic castigation of the Arabs and
the Turks speaks for itself. However, Vazirisingles out, for example,
IhsanYarshater as an exception for his academic objectivity. Yet, he
cautions by saying that, althoughYarshater is articulate, faithful to
accuracy, and devoted to sound pedagogical methods of research, his
commitment to nationalistic scholarship may inherently impede
change toward a less nationalistic approach to history (p. 163).
This observation provides for the finalchapter: Iranian Identity,
Muslim Identity, and Cultural Schizophrenia. In this context, the
dichotomyin the Iranian attitude toward the Arabs and toward Islam
(p. 208) is addressed. Specifically,while the Aryan Iranians reject the
Arabs, they accept Islam; or they accept Shici Islam only as they
assume that it is their product; or they reject the message of Islam
together with its messenger-the Arabs. But:

How can present-day people of Iran in their sober minds

simultaneously have faith in Islam and yet express their
dislike for the Arabs? And is such dislike addressed to the
Arabs who conquered the territory of Iran in the seventh
century or to the contemporary Arab peoples or to both? How
much of t h s resentment subconsciouslyconnotes anti-lslamic
feeling?And how much of t h s anti-Arab feeling has to do with
the products of modern secularism, which have sought to
glorify extra-lslamic history (namely, ancient Iranian)? (p.
209).

These are issues that the author connects, correctly so, to the
controversial Shuubiya movement of the ninth and tenth centuries,
which from late-nineteenthcentury to the present has been revived on
the occasion by many racist Aryan Iranians. While the author has
intelligently questioned the ethcal bearing of t h s attitude and its
academicvalue,he hopes that aculturalpeacew i t h I r a n and between
it and its neighbors can dissolve the existing animosities-particularly
those created by obsolete scholarshp and by stereotyping(p. 212).
Finally, after the author stresses the ethnic diversity within Iran
as territory, society, and culture, he speaks of the ambiguities of an
alleged Iranian identity among the tribal and ethnic groups of Iran (p.
216), which is advocated unrealistically by many Orientalists from

56 DOMES
 Iran
different generations and by their blind followers among chauvinist
(Persian) Iranians. He also indicates that it is indispensable to
understand the identity composition within each ethnicity in its
historical and its modern perspective (p. 2 16). This understanding of
the complex societal reality in Iran leads the author to the question of
a persons nationality, which provides a reference point for citizen-
ship, state, and political-geographcal affiliation. But, theunfounded
extremes of racial and chauvinistic consciousness among the indoctri-
nated Iranians has perverted this conception, so it has become more
of a historicalidentity than a nationality (p. 217).
Under the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iranian-focused identity
is de-emphasized. The regime attempts to exalt religious culture
within the political boundary of Iran, and to solidify a national
identity with a more complicated definition of identity in the country
(p. 200). Inthe reviewersview, aclose analysisoftheirpublicpolicies
shows that the religious elite in Iran have already begun to modify or
moderate their political approach to religion. They take note now of
Irans pre-lslamic past, which they once rejected outright. Further,
they give the Farsi language, which in the early years of the
Revolution was practically surpassed by the Quranic Arabic, a
prestigious status it did not enjoy even under the Pahlavi regime.
Furthermore, they channel the patriotic sentiment, which in univer-
sal Islamism traverses the exclusive nation-state pattern in favor of
the all-encompassing Islamic Umma, a t the national level within the
ethnically diversified society of Iran. The Iran-lraq War, the accommo-
dation of both certain opposition groups outside and supporters inside,
and the emergent foreign threats of different sources and directions
altogether have caused these recent tendencies to generate and to
develop into some form of religious nationalism in the country.
In closing, although Mostafa Vaziri skillfully proposes and sub-
stantiates a n evocative study of and approach to Iran as Imagined
Nation, he leaves us guessing as to who is an Iranian after all. Inline
with his views, but in contrast to the specialists he has objectively
criticized, the identity of all Iranian groups, including such national
minorities as Arabs, Baluchis, Gilaks, Kurds, Lurs, Qashqa is,
Taleshis, Turkomans, and Turks should be defined and analyzed
dynamically. This approach shall target the ethnic identity of the so-
called Persiansas well, who are less categorized and characterized
in the literature than others and who are ambiguous entities ethno-
graphically. For example, many nationalistindividuals in Iran are
Persianized Turks or half-blood Arabs because they identify them-
selves as Sayyid, the offspring of the (Arabian) Prophet.

Digest of Middh East S t d i e s 57