People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, 193 SCRA 57,
January 18, 1991
"Package of marijuana to be sent abroad"
The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.
Its a restraint directed only against the government and
its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
It could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint is imposed.
- Andre Marti and his wife Shirley wanted to send
packages to their friend in Switzerland and contracted the
services of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders.
- When asked by the forwarder if they could examine and
inspect the packages, Marti refused, assuring that the
packages simply contained books and cigars.
- However, the proprietor opened the boxes for final
inspection as part of their SOP. Upon opening, they
suspected that the contents were illegal drugs.
- The proprietor reported the incident to NBI which
confirmed that the suspected content were marijuana.
- In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were
opened and found dried marijuana leaves inside.
- After Marti was traced by NBI, he was charged with
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
- Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as
evidence against him, which, according to him, is
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication.
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State? NO.
The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties granted by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure refers to
the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien,
from interference by government. Its protection is
directed only to governmental action.
- This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained
through a search by a private citizen.
- In this case, the evidence was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
and without the intervention of State authorities.
Therefore, there is no reason why it should not be
admitted to prosecute him.
- Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made an
illegal search and seizure of the evidence.
- The Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor who
made a reasonable search of the packages in
compliance with SOP AND b) the mere presence of the
NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected into a warrantless search and seizure. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search.
- Marti further argued that since the Constitution
expressly declares as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition
against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether
the evidence was procured by police authorities or private
individuals.
- The Court answered that the Constitution, in laying
down the principles of the government and fundamental
liberties of the people, does not govern relationships
between individuals.
Additional notes:
When a private individual violates another persons right
to privacy, the evidence obtained therefrom is admissible;
however the violator could be held civilly liable
under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito
Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of
Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation
(PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Privatization
Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc.
(MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited
(First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment
management and holding company and a shareholder of
the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT).
The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it
also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or
about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) of
PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. With the this sale,
First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased
from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the
total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to
about 81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public
utility to not more than 40%, thus:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization
for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the
laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage
equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation
of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall
be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and
managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
II. THE ISSUE
Does the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refer to the total common shares only, or to
the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of
common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a
public utility?
III. THE RULING
[The Court partly granted the petition and held that the
term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors of a public utility, i.e., to the total
common shares in PLDT.]
Considering that common shares have voting rights
which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares
which usually have no voting rights, the term capital in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
common shares. However, if the preferred shares also
have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the
term capital shall include such preferred shares
because the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation is exercised through the
right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term
capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the
election of directors.
To construe broadly the term capital as the total
outstanding capital stock, including both common
and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the
intent and letter of the Constitution that the State shall
develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. A broad
definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-
important voting stock, which necessarily equates to
control of the public utility.
Holders of PLDT preferred shares are explicitly denied of
the right to vote in the election of directors. PLDTs
Articles of Incorporation expressly state that the holders
of Serial Preferred Stock shall not be entitled to vote
at any meeting of the stockholders for the election of
directors or for any other purpose or otherwise
participate in any action taken by the corporation or its
stockholders, or to receive notice of any meeting of
stockholders. On the other hand, holders of common
shares are granted the exclusive right to vote in the
election of directors. PLDTs Articles of
Incorporation state that each holder of Common Capital
Stock shall have one vote in respect of each share of
such stock held by him on all matters voted upon by the
stockholders, and the holders of Common Capital
Stock shall have the exclusive right to vote for the
election of directors and for all other purposes.
It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that
foreigners hold a majority of the common shares of
PLDT. In fact, based on PLDTs 2010 General
Information Sheet (GIS), which is a document required to
be submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common
shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only 66,750,622
common shares. In other words, foreigners hold 64.27%
of the total number of PLDTs common shares, while
Filipinos hold only 35.73%. Since holding a majority of
the common shares equates to control, it is clear that
foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of
control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent
limit on foreign ownership of public utilities expressly
mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
As shown in PLDTs 2010 GIS, as submitted to the SEC,
the par value of PLDT common shares is P5.00 per
share, whereas the par value of preferred shares
is P10.00 per share. In other words, preferred shares
have twice the par value of common shares but cannot
elect directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of
common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred
shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own only
a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares. Worse,
preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized
capital stock of PLDT while common shares constitute
only 22.15%. This undeniably shows that beneficial
interest in PLDT is not with the non-voting preferred
shares but with the common shares, blatantly violating
the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino
control and Filipino beneficial ownership in a public utility.
In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting
stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of
PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that [n]o
franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization
for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to x x x corporations x x x organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens x x x.
To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common
shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises
the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus
exercise control over PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only
35.73% of PLDTs common shares, constituting a
minority of the voting stock, and thus do not exercise
control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned
by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares
earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares
earn; (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of
common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute
77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and
common shares only 22.15%. This kind of ownership and
control of a public utility is a mockery of the Constitution.
[Thus, the Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and
Exchange Commission was DIRECTED by the Court to
apply the foregoing definition of the term capital in
determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in
respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate
sanctions under the law.]
PBMEO v. PBM Co.
Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization
(PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front
of Malacaang to express their grievances against the
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration,
Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with
the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the
planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it
was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike
against the company but was in fact an exercise of the
laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of
expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition
for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for
it would interrupt the normal course of their business
which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed
up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would
lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company
reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular
shifts should not absent themselves to participate ,
otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late
to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of
the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of
the No Strike and No Lockout clause of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the
officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in
bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations
for being filed two days late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike
violated the CBA.
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity."
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription;
but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of
civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; and such priority "gives these
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed.
Yrasuegui v. PAL, 569 SCRA 467 (2008)
Facts:
Petitioner was a former international flight steward of
PAL, herein respondent. Petitioner was dismissed
because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards
of the airline company. Petitioner claims that he was
illegally dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when
he was dismissed.
Held:
Petition denied. To make his claim more believable,
petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty of
the Constitution. However, in the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked. Put differently, the
Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals. Indeed, the US Supreme Court, in
interpreting the 14th Amendment, which is the source of
our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying
that the equal protection erects no shield against private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. Private
actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the
equal protection guarantee.

Zulueta v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent
Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other
materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from
unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court
regarding marital separation and disqualification from
medical practice.
HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction
declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or
which public safety or order require otherwise, as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in
any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify
anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence
of marital infedility. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy
as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each
one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774
entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission
in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light
Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought
to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance
infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC
ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes
at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is
valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the
LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in
favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and
void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also
violates the due process clause which serves as a
guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note
that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up
rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some
are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen
up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said
ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited
group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights
may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare.
Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council
POLITICAL LAW- A facial invalidation of a statute is
allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain
rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace"
and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement
agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited
acts.
A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvaguenesswhen
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly
refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.
Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which
considers only extant facts affectingreallitigants, afacial
invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of
its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his
concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines,as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal
statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being
vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is
legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent
charge against them.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that
the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the
element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of
terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some
form of expression protected by the free speech clause.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA
9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually
committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the
coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful
demand." Given the presence of the first element, any
attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is
entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one
particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on
the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt
criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount
of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful
transaction.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither
an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution
under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the
assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally
impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial
power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a
statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows
the courts to be used as an extension of a failed
legislative lobbying in Congress.
Petitions Dismissed
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible
guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties,
its validity will be sustained. The amended information
itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense
w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed. We
discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or
ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to
provide for the statutory definition of the terms
combination and series in the key phrase a
comb
ination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder
Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence
violative of his fundamental right to due process. A
statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used herein, or because of
the employment of terms without defining them. A statute
or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects
it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. A facial
challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to
one which is overbroad
because of possible chilling effect upon protected
speech.
 The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by
the possibility that the protected speech of other may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because
of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.