THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

1. Sanidad v comelec
Facts: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991
calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays")
to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the
powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise
by the President of his present powers.1

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring
the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of
votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of
Presidential Decree No. 991

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033,
stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,
1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the
convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The questions ask, to wit:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following
amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall
have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the
Constitution.

Issue: whether or not the incumbent president may propose amendments to the present
Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.

Held: Yes

Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:

SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional
convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling
such a convention to the electorate in an election.

SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
 In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory
Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:

SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may,
by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.

There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period
of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated
by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members
of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted
to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the
Members of the National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister

The power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the
transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to
the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President
opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in
the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim
National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again,
harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National
Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to
assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's
legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the
legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge
the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct,
although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President
has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the
legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency
and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon
the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity
to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from
that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental
machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby
impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In
these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices
of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like
the President now, are mere agents of the people

2. Province of cotabato v govt. of the RP peace panel

Facts: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. There was not going any smooth sailing
in the GRP-MILF peace process, Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a
 number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. 3 In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried
out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office,
the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption
of the peace talks. Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June
20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli
Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the
negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. A second
round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the
signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001
leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. several exploratory talks were held between
the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final
form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.

Issue:

1) Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under
Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)
2) Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?

Held:

1) YES, The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section

28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill
of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.

The effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a
statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for
"reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-
executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the
broader130 right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the
correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not
enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an
implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.

The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the
"marching orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to
conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by
E.O. No. 3.133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further
enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing
the people's participation.

One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be
community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and
"shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but
by all Filipinos as one community." 134 Included as a component of the comprehensive peace
process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes "continuing
 consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and
process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace process." 135
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate
"continuing" consultations, contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more
than sufficient consultation."1

The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.

With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose

interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD,
the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in
matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies. 147 The MOA-AD, an instrument
recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms
ordained in said Act,148 which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.

2) YES, Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international
legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic
and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure
the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies,
and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover,
the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border
agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of
the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any
foreign affairs matter affecting them.

These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the
BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
"associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that
go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.

It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all
but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and
a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of
association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government
and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that
many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE
are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.

"The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign
countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include
aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our
constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power.

The President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making,
the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme
envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State
recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework
of national unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement does
not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative
ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine
territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the
definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. The Bangsamoro people refers to
those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago. This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply
contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than
lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in
Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples

Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the
Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the
Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he
Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it,
embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region."

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land."

No requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police
and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide
protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands - a
function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to
indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the
protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor
is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial
domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous
peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.

Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not
obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state.

"negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty

and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an
associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already
discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an
independent status already prevailing.

Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the

President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee
that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to
conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down
as unconstitutional.

SUMMARY

The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government
units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under
E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of
government is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted
in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual
dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present
petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave
violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and
paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence,
the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or
significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of
the respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the
final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.

The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the
Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision
on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards
or limitations as may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in
the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.

An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of

communication between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the
design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species
of these public rights.

At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of
the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.

One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human
ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.

Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department
or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by
mere agreement or compromise.

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to
information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions
 fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense
after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial
compliance and public scrutiny.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when
he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act
No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed
and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the
present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does
not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither
the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process
is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration
binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing
amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally
defective.

3. Santiago v comelec
Facts: Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with respondent COMELEC a petition to Amend the constitution, to
lift the term limits of elective officials by Peoples initiative wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC to
1) fix the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country 2) cause the necessary
publications of the said order and the attached petition for initiative on the 1987 constitution, in
newspapers of general and local circulation 3) instructing Municipal election Registrars in all
regions of the country to assist the Delfin and other volunteers in establishing signing stations at
the time and on the date designated for that purpose.

COMELEC issued an order 1) directing Delfin to cause the publication, together with the attached
petition and the notice of hearing in 3 daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense
and b) setting the case for hearing on December 1996

Senator Defensor-Santiago and others filed a prohibition raising the following arguments 1) the
constitutional provision on Peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented
by law to be passed by the congress and no such law has been passed. 2) the constitution failed
 to provide any subtitle regarding initiative which indicates that the matter on peoples initiative
to amend the constitution was left to future law. 3) RA 6735 provide for the effectivity of the law
after publication in print media. The Act covers only Laws and not constitutional amendments. 4)
COMELEC resolution 2300 which governs the conduct of initiative is ultra vires meaning that the
COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of right of initiative to
amend the constitution. 5) the peoples initiative is limited to amendments and not revision.
Extending or lifting the term limits constitutes a revision. 6) Congress has not yet appropriated
funds for peoples initiative.

Issue:

1) Whether or not Republic Act 6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of peoples
initiative to propose amendments.
2) Whether or not COMELEC can implement rules and regulations in implementing Republic
Act 6735
3) Whether or not the lifting or extending the term limits of public officer is a revision
4) Whether or not the COMELEC can take cognizance over a petition intended to obtain an
order

Held:

1) NO. it is deficient and inadequate in itself because it fails to state 1) the proper parties
who may file the petition 2) the appropriate agency where it should be filed 3) the
contents of the petition 4) the publication of the same 5) the ways and means of gathering
the signatures 6) the proper parties who may question the veracity of signatures 7) the
role of COMELEC in the verification of signatures 8) the appeal from any decision of the
COMELEC 9) the holding of plebiscite and the appropriation of funds for such. RA 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative
on amendments to the constitution is concerned.
2) NO. Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial to
promote rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In every case
of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only when it is complete in itself and it fixes a standard to which the delegate must
conform. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the constitution is concerned. RA
6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation therefore the delegation
of the power to the COMELEC is invalid.
3) YES. The proposal of Delfin is not an amendment but a revision because in the words of
Father Bernas, it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited
tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure. And although the change may be an isolated
one, it could affect other provisions such as on synchronization of elections and on the
state policy of equal access to opportunities for public service. Since it the only thing
allowed for initiative is amendment therefore the provision which is a revision could not be
done.
4) NO. The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
only participation of the COMELEC should be 1) prescribe the form of petition 2) issue
election records of total number of registered voters 3) assist, through its election
registrar, in the establishment of signature stations and 4) verify through its election
registrars, the signatures. Since the petition of Delfin is not the initiatory petition, it cannot
be entertained by the COMELEC

4. Lambino v comelec
 Facts: Lambino Group with other groups commenced a signature gathering for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 constitution. They intend to modify sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and adding
Article XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system into Unicameral-Parliamentary system.

The COMELEC issued a resolution denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition for lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the constitution

Issue:

1) Whether or not Lambinos groups petition complies with Section2 Article XVII of the
constitution on amendments to the constitution through peoples initiative.
2) Whether or not the petition constitutes log-rolling
3) Whether or not the petition involves amendment

Held:

1) NO. At first the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal for amendments. No
agent can sign on their behalf. An initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition. The Lambino group failed to comply with these requirements. The
group stated that they were able to have millions of signatures, it is necessary that upon
signing they should also read the full text of the proposed amendment. Given the time
constraint, it is impossible that every one of the signatories were able to read the full text
of the petition. Also during the trial, the group did not attach to their petition a copy of the
proposal for amendment. They only submitted a signature sheet. There is not a single
word, phrase or sentence of text of the Lambino groups proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of proposed changes
is attached to it. The conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. The initiative is therefore void for non-
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition.
2) YES. The lambino group proposed to 1) lift the term limits of the members of the
legislature 2)the interim parliament can continue to function indefinitely 3) the members
of the interim parliament shall convene to propose further amendment or revisions to the
constitution. These specific amendments is not stated nor indicated in the groups
signature sheets. These amendments constitute log-rolling because the 3 rd subject matter
is totally unrelated to the shift from Bicameral-Presidential to Unicameral-Parliamentary.
Such Log-rolling is not allowed in our constitution.
3) NO. Under both the Qualitative and Qunatitative test, the Lambino groups petition is a
revision. Quantitatively, the Lambino groups proposed changes overhauls two articles-
Article VI on the Legislative department and Article VII on the executive affecting a total of
105 provisions in the entire constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary and from
bicameral to unicameral.

Fundamental powers of the state

1. Philippine association of service exporters v drilon

Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,"
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does
not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of
the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.

PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations.
It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the
"great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.

Issue: whether the police power measure is valid under the constitution

Held: The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as
the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint
upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.

"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." 6

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance.

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does
not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." 11 It is subject to
the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.

Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its
awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in
that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good.
Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is
a clear misuse of the power.

There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-
settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not import a perfect Identity
 of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the
same class. 16

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on
substantial distinctions.

There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of
the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for
their own good and welfare.

The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review
of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ." 18),
meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of
permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary
malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case.

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be
provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in
particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor,"

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier
purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never
been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.

2. Lao Ichong v Jaime Hernandez

Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against
persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations
the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens
actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged
therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or
until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of
citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to
engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition
against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged
in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their
assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision
allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such
business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents
the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of
law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions
of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession,
and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage
in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV
of the Constitution.

Issue: whether the act was passed in valid exercise of police power

Held: YES

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just
as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have
transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of
public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot
delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State
seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope
or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof.

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of
our Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil.
Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to
prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of
the police power.
Balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of
legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that
would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and
property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes
and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law.

Courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a
reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it
is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the
law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is
not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make
control virtually impossible.

Figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien participation has
steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the
number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their assests
and gross sales.

Nationalistic principle of the constitution says there has been a general feeling that alien
dominance over the economic life of the country is not desirable and that if such a situation
should remain, political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength.

That there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in the retail
trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which
would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of
essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance
profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience
and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the
National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices
and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential
commodities,

The predominance of alien retailers could become a potential source of danger on occasions;

Alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national
income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits
he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase
national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and temporary, it
would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail
distribution to his hands.

Aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with
whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy,
except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes
to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many
occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency.
On due process. And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall
have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained

If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio

Test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to
inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of
Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is

none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject
to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country.

The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one
of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that
legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process.
The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of
legislative authority.