G.R. No.

L-25906 May 28, 1970

PEDRO D. DIOQUINO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FEDERICO LAUREANO, AIDA DE LAUREANO and JUANITO LAUREANO, defendants-appellants.

Facts:

Federico Laureano used the car owned by Pedro D. Dioquino. Attorney Pedro Dioquino, a practicing lawyer of Masbate, is the owner of
a car. On March 31, 1964, he went to the office of the MVO, Masbate, to register the same. He met the defendant Federico Laureano, a
patrol officer of said MVO office, who was waiting for a jeepney to take him to the office of the Provincial Commander, PC, Masbate.
Attorney Dioquino requested the defendant Federico Laureano to introduce him to one of the clerks in the MVO Office, who could
facilitate the registration of his car and the request was graciously attended to. Defendant Laureano rode on the car of Atty. Dioquino on
his way to the P.C. Barracks at Masbate. While about to reach their destination, the car driven by plaintiff's driver and with defendant
Federico Laureano as the sole passenger was stoned by some 'mischievous boys,' and its windshield was broken. Defendant Federico
Laureano chased the boys and he was able to catch one of them. The boy was taken to Atty. Dioquino [and] admitted having thrown the
stone that broke the car's windshield. The plaintiff and the defendant Federico Laureano with the boy returned to the P.C. barracks and
the father of the boy was called, but no satisfactory arrangements [were] made about the damage to the windshield.. Dioquino held
Federico Laureano and included Aida de Laureano, and the father, Juanito Laureano in his filed action. The lower court held Federico
Laureano sole liable and his wife and father have been absolved. The defendant Federico Laureano refused to file any charges against
the boy and his parents because he thought that the stone-throwing was merely accidental and that it was due to force majeure. So he
did not want to take any action and after delaying the settlement, after perhaps consulting a lawyer, the defendant Federico Laureano
refused to pay the windshield himself and challenged that the case be brought to court for judicial adjudication. All three of them
appealed directly to the Supreme Court, raising two questions of law, the first being the failure of the lower court to dismiss such a suit
as no liability could have been incurred as a result of a fortuitous event and the other being its failure to award damages against plaintiff
for the unwarranted inclusion of the wife and the father in this litigation.

Issue:

Whether or not Federico Laureano is liable for the damages as it was caused by a fortuitous event.

Held:

The law on the part of defendant Federico Laureano was justified. The express language of Art. 1174 of the present Civil Code which
is a restatement of Art. 1105 of the Old Civil Code, except for the addition of the nature of an obligation requiring the assumption of
risk, compels such a conclusion. It reads thus: "Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared
by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be, foreseen, or which, though foreseen were inevitable." Even under the old Civil Code then, as stressed
by us in the first decision dating back to 1908, in an opinion by Justice Mapa, the rule was well-settled that in the absence of a legal
provision or an express covenant, "no one should be held to account for fortuitous cases." 3 Its basis, as Justice Moreland stressed, is
the Roman law principle major casus est, cui humana infirmitas resistere non potest. 4 Authorities of repute are in agreement,
more specifically concerning an obligation arising from contract "that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of
the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito." 5 If it could be shown that such indeed was the
case, liability is ruled out. There is no requirement of "diligence beyond what human care and foresight can provide."

It is to be admitted, of course, that plaintiff, who is a member of the bar, ought to have exercised greater care in selecting the parties
against whom he would proceed. It may be said that his view of the law that would consider defendant Federico Laureano liable on the
facts as thus disclosed, while erroneous, is not bereft of plausibility.

The error committed by the lower court in holding defendant Federico Laureano liable appears to be thus obvious. Its own findings of
fact repel the motion that he should be made to respond in damages to the plaintiff for the broken windshield. What happened was
clearly unforeseen. It was a fortuitous event resulting in a loss which must be borne by the owner of the car. WHEREFORE, the
decision of the lower court of November 2, 1965 insofar as it orders defendant Federico Laureano to pay plaintiff the amount of
P30,000.00 as damages plus the payment of costs, is reversed. It is affirmed insofar as it dismissed the case against the other two
defendants, Juanita Laureano and Aida de Laureano, and declared that no moral damages should be awarded the parties.
G.R. No. L-29640 June 10, 1971

GUILLERMO AUSTRIA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), PACIFICO ABAD and MARIA G. ABAD, respondents.

Facts:

In a receipt dated 30 January 1961, Maria G. Abad acknowledged having received from Guillermo Austria one (1) pendant with
diamonds valued at P4,500.00, to be sold on commission basis or to be returned on demand. On 1 February 1961, however, while
walking home to her residence in Mandaluyong, Rizal, Abad was said to have been accosted by two men, one of whom hit her on the
face, while the other snatched her purse containing jewelry and cash, and ran away. Among the pieces of jewelry allegedly taken by the
robbers was the consigned pendant. As Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay for its value notwithstanding demands, Austria brought
in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action against her and her husband for recovery of the pendant or of its value, and damages.
Answering the allegations of the complaint, defendant spouses set up the defense that the alleged robbery had extinguished their
obligation. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and ordered defendants spouses, jointly and severally, to pay to the former
the sum of P4,500.00, with legal interest thereon, plus the amount of P450.00 as reasonable attorneys' fees, and the costs. It was held
that defendants failed to prove the fact of robbery, or, if indeed it was committed, that defendant Maria Abad was guilty of negligence
when she went home without any companion, although it was already getting dark and she was carrying a large amount of cash and
valuables on the day in question, and such negligence did not free her from liability for damages for the loss of the jewelry. Defendants
went to the Court of Appeals, and there secured a reversal of the judgment. The appellate court overruling the finding of the trial court
on the lack of credibility of the two defense witnesses who testified on the occurrence of the robbery, and holding that the facts of
robbery and defendant Maria Abad's possession of the pendant on that unfortunate day have been duly published, declared
respondents not responsible for the loss of the jewelry on account of a fortuitous event, and relieved them from liability for damages to
the owner. It is now contended by herein petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was robbery in the case,
although nobody has been found guilty of the supposed crime. It is petitioner's theory that for robbery to fall under the category of a
fortuitous event and relieve the obligor from his obligation under a contract, pursuant to Article 1174 of the new Civil Code, there ought
to be prior finding on the guilt of the persons responsible therefore.

Issue:

Whether in a contract of agency (consignment of goods for sale) it is necessary that there be prior conviction for robbery before the loss
of the article shall exempt the consignee from liability for such loss.

Held:

It is recognized in this jurisdiction that to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary
that (1) the event must be independent of the human will (or rather, of the debtor's or obligor's); (2) the occurrence must
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and that (3) the obligor must be free of
participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. 1 A fortuitous event, therefore, can be produced by nature, e.g.,
earthquakes, storms, floods, etc., or by the act of man, such as war, attack by bandits, robbery, 2 etc., provided that the event has all the
characteristics enumerated above. It is not here disputed that if respondent Maria Abad were indeed the victim of robbery, and if it were
really true that the pendant, which she was obliged either to sell on commission or to return to petitioner, were taken during the robbery,
then the occurrence of that fortuitous event would have extinguished her liability. The point at issue in this proceeding is how the fact of
robbery is to be established in order that a person may avail of the exempting provision of Article 1174 of the new Civil Code, which
reads as follows:

ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of
the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

It may be noted the reform that the emphasis of the provision is on the events, not on the agents or factors responsible for
them. To avail of the exemption granted in the law, it is not necessary that the persons responsible for the occurrence should be
found or punished; it would only be sufficient to established that the enforceable event, the robbery in this case did take
place without any concurrent fault on the debtor's part, and this can be done by preponderant evidence. To require in the present
action for recovery the prior conviction of the culprits in the criminal case, in order to establish the robbery as a fact, would be to
demand proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove a fact in a civil case. t is undeniable that in order to completely exonerate the debtor
for reason of a fortutious event, such debtor must, in addition to the cams itself, be free of any concurrent or contributory fault or
negligence. 3 This is apparent from Article 1170 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, providing that:
 ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who
in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

It is clear that under the circumstances prevailing at present in the City of Manila and its suburbs, with their high incidence of crimes
against persons and property that renders travel after nightfall a matter to be sedulously avoided without suitable precaution and
protection, the conduct of respondent Maria G. Abad, in returning alone to her house in the evening, carrying jewelry of considerable
value would be negligent per se and would not exempt her from responsibility in the case of a robbery. We are not persuaded, however,
that the same rule should obtain ten years previously, in 1961, when the robbery in question did take place, for at that time criminality
had not by far reached the levels attained in the present day.

There is likewise no merit in petitioner's argument that to allow the fact of robbery to be recognized in the civil case before conviction is
secured in the criminal action, would prejudice the latter case, or would result in inconsistency should the accused obtain an acquittal or
should the criminal case be dismissed. It must be realized that a court finding that a robbery has happened would not necessarily mean
that those accused in the criminal action should be found guilty of the crime; nor would a ruling that those actually accused did not
commit the robbery be inconsistent with a finding that a robbery did take place. The evidence to establish these facts would not
necessarily be the same. WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals under review, the petition in this case is
hereby dismissed with costs against the petitioner.