The Evolution and Changing Role of Simulation used in Teaching Bridge

Resource Management Courses

Captain George Sandberg FNI
seasand @optonline.net

ABSTRACT

The development of simulation to teach BRM courses over time is reviewed in light of changes in the industry and new
technology. The effect of these industry changes, new technologies, and the way they have changed the role of the
watchstander are examined. Although the basics of bridge watch-keeping essentially remain the same, the methods used
to accomplish these basic tasks have changed. In addition to industry trends and new technology on the bridge there is
an increased awareness of how the human element and leadership contributes to maritime causalities that should be
addressed in a BRM course. The requirements for bridge simulators, instructor stations and qualifications for BRM
simulator instructors needed to keep pace with developments in the maritime industry are presented.

1. INTRODUCTION
CAPT. Daniel MacCalrevy, author of Shiphanding for the Mariner has stated the hardest part to learn (in standing a
bridge watch) is the complexity of decision making; the prioritization of conflicting problems and the resolution of
competing (and sometimes contradictory) information. Bridge Resource Management (BRM) courses must be
designed to address these problems as they exist in todays industry setting. These courses have been taught for over 30
years. During this period technology on the bridge has changed, management styles have been modified and there is an
increased awareness of the role of the human element has in contributing to maritime casualties. In order to have BRM
courses keep pace with industry developments simulator bridge equipment need to be kept current, course prerequisites
must be established, course content revised, instructor qualifications amended and student monitoring improved.

2. DEVELOPMENT OF BRIDGE RESOURSE MANAGEMENT COURSES

The concept of Bridge Resource Management as we know it today evolved in the mid 1970s when several maritime
causalities involving well founded ships, manned by competent well trained crews occurred. (2) In 1976 the
International Chamber of Shipping issued Casualty Report No 15 stating that one of the principal factors causing
navigation casualties was a weakness in bridge organization. (7) In response to these casualties vessel operators began
to review and revise ship operations manuals and directives. The international maritime community also began to
initiate discussion on the role of bridge management in safe navigation. In 1978 the Oil Companies International Marine
Forum (OCIMF) held a Safe Navigation Symposium in Washington D.C. The findings of this conference also
indicated that groundings and collisions are attributed to human error despite properly trained and competent personnel
on well-equipped ships. Also in 1978 the International Convention on Standards of Training, certification and
watchstanding for seafarers, 1978(STCW) was adopted by The International Maritime Organization (IMO). Resolution
1 of these standards, Recommendation on Operational Guidance for Officers in Charge of a Navigational Watch and
Regulation II/1 Basic Principles to be Observed in Keeping a Safe Navigation Watch spelled out best practice and
procedures for standing a safe navigation watch but fell short of addressing the interaction between the conning officer
with equipment and other individuals on the bridge. (6) The first attempt to address the problem head on was in that
same year when in the United Kingdom the Board of Trade issued recommendations for the Appraisal, planning,
Monitoring and Execution of passages in their Marine Notice M854. The Board of Trade also included questions on
bridge organization for all deck officer competency exams. (2) The basic principles for bridge resource management
that we still use today were established.
Shell Tankers (UK) Limited and their parent Shell International Marine Ltd. saw a need for Bridge Team Training as
result several serious mishaps all of which were classified as avoidable and human error accidents. Of primary concern
was that without exception the ships involved were well founded, well equipped and commanded by Masters that had
long unblemished records and enjoyed the full confidence of Shells managers. Shell identified the root cause of these
casualties as a lack of Bridge Teamwork and worked with the faculty and staff of Southampton Institute, Warsash
campus, UK to develop a course in Bridge Team Training using marine simulation. This course was the first Bridge
Team training that utilized a marine simulator as the primary teaching tool. It addressed the lack of detailed passage

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planning and the lack of understanding of how to organize the duties and pattern of communications needed by a bridge
team so that a plan, once made, would be executed properly. It also focused on proper monitoring and error trapping.
These course essentials remain the basis for many Bridge Resource (BRM) courses offered today. (5) These simulator
based BRM courses have four major elements, briefing, planning, execution and debriefing. Over time it was realized
that the safe operation and navigation on the bridge of a ship was not limited to refining team skills but included the
management all of people and equipment that was located on the ship. As a result these courses became known as
Bridge Resource Management courses focusing on management, teamwork and human factor concepts.

3. BRM TRAINING AND REDUCED MARITIME CASULITIES

The question, now being asked by many, is: Has BRM training resulted in a reduction in maritime casualties?
Examination of data collected by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) from their own data base together with data
supplied by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) and the United Kingdom Marine Accident Investigation
Board (MAIB) indicates that the frequency of accidents is declining. (1) A study conducted at Southampton Solent
University documented a continual increase in the size of the worlds shipping fleet and a decrease in overall numbers
of shipping accidents over the past fifteen years. (3) Lloyds List Casualty Study notes an 18% decrease in the number of
maritime accidents since 1980. Although these statistics are encouraging maritime accidents and near misses remain a
daily occurrence. The Solant report attributes the reduction of shipping accidents relative to the growth of the world
fleet to the development of technology, the success of enforcement regimes and cooperative prevention agreements
between nations. The study concentrates on accidents causes based on incident type, vessel age, vessel size, area of
operation and challenging sea states. It does not address crew training. The report acknowledges the human element is a
contributory cause to accidents and recommends that previous research on the subject be tied to their study. The ABS
report concludes that while the frequency of accidents are declining human error continues to be a dominant factor in
80% - 85% of maritime casualties. Failures of situation awareness and situation assessment overwhelmingly are
predominate and fatigue and task omission seem closely related to the loss of situation awareness. The maritime
industry has attempted to address this problem by introducing new technology designed to provide information to the
watch-stander needed to avoid hazardous situations and by providing maritime education and training aimed at teaching
bridge personnel the best way to manage all the resources available to him/her in the form of BRM courses. These BRM
courses will only remain relevant and effective if they are designed and executed taking into consideration the technical
changes and emphasis on leadership and human factors taking place in the maritime industry.

4. THE CHANGING BRIDGE ENVIONERMENT

The bridge environment has changed since the first BRM courses were offered in the early 1980s. The obvious changes
involve the introduction of new technology such as GPS, ECDIS, AIS, NAVTEX, advances in communication
equipment, integrated bridge systems and bridge layout to name a few. In addition there is current research into Position
Prediction Displays, Heads-Up-Display (HUD) and Glass on Ships Bridge information systems using Google Glass
Technology. Although these initiatives are still being researched, at the current rate of technology development, it would
not be surprising to see some form of these systems added to the list of available resources on the ships bridge in the
next decade. Much of the advances have been driven by introduction of computer hardware and software and the use of
satellites for navigation and communications. However there are other factors that have also influenced the atmosphere
and safe operation of the vessel from the bridge. These include the increased size and speed of vessels, the pressure to
meet deadlines, the plethora legislation pertaining to safety, pollution, security, and the seemingly constant audits and
inspections. The associated administrative burdens of these items together with the reducing of crew size impose
additional stresses that can compromise the working practices of the bridge team. (3) In addition the worldwide shortage
of maritime officers has led to early promotions resulting in less experienced officers on the bridge. (4) All of these
factors are resulting in changes in the way the watch officer conducts his watch and the way the bridge team works
together. Some argue that the watch officers primary duty will be to monitor automated systems and indicators rather
than actually navigate. Although this may be the case in the future it is not the case now. There is a concern that
automation will degrade navigation skills of the OOW. Captain Jorge Viso recently stated Technology and e-
navigation systems that support it, risks weakening the abilities of the human crew to control systems when the ship is in
need of human control. (14) Another concern is that there may be a loss of strategic planning, problem solving and
decision making skills as technology will be doing these tasks for the OOW. (11) With regard to the watchkeepers
duties Capt. Saujanya Sinha, Associate Director, Applied Research international, India stated instead of performing a

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set of tasks correctly, a seafarer today is required to monitor the same set of tasks (to assure they are being done
correctly). (13) Although monitoring is a large part of the watch officers work the design of the hardware, software,
layout of the bridge and dependability of systems has not reached the point that reduces the OOWs tasks to simply
monitoring. Traditional skills are still absolutely essential as well as the new set of skills associated with working with
automated systems.. Thus the skill sets needed for a competent watch officer have increased rather than decreased with
the introduction of new technology. It is the task for educators to conduct needs assessments to identify the skills needed
by the officer in charge of a navigation watch, establish appropriate prerequisites and BRM course content. This can be
a daunting task given limited resources and time constrains at many institutions. Finally it must be pointed out that not
only must the course be adapted to the changing bridge environment but the skills and qualifications of the simulator
instructor must be modified as well. In a recent article in Seaways Robert McCabe stated We will have to pay as much
attention to our nautical colleges who train tomorrows officers as we do the design of the ships and bridges they will
operate. (9)

Figure 1 Figure 2

Figure 1 is a view of a new LNG ship in 1980 when BRM courses were first being offered. Although considered state of
the art at the time the resources available to the watch-stander were fairly basic. Two RADARs, ARPA, steering stand,
RPM and rudder indicators and basic light and alarm panels were what the OOW had to work with. Compare that to a
similar type vessel, delivered recently, with the multitude of computer screens in Figure 2. Pictures are worth a
thousand words and it is clear by comparing the two figures that the bridge environment is changing drastically. How
people work with this onboard technology will be the key to unlocking the potential advances this equipment promises.
(11) The 1980 bridge had few technical resources that the watch officer needed to have knowledge of and the skill to
operate. Although considered state of the art their function was straight forward and their operation easily taught. This
not the case on the modern bridge, equipment such as ECDIS, which is becoming the prime resources on the bridge,
combining several tasks previously accomplished separately. It is complex with multiple capabilities, functions and
associated menus. Safe navigation will be closely tied with the OOWs knowledge, understanding and ability to operate
this equipment.

5. THE SIMULTOR AND BRM

Most BRM courses utilize simulators and the practice of experiential learning. The simulator should be full mission and
replicate the real world bridge environment as closely as possible. A 360 degree presentation is desirable. There are
many simulators used that gain that 360 degree visual by having the student scroll or toggle the visual channels.
Although this capability might be better than not having a visual scene in one or more direction it does take away from
the reality of the simulation. On board ship the OWO must look and even possibility move to obtain the view desired.
The fidelity of the simulator is crucial in a BRM and can be categorized into four areas. 1. Visual Fidelity: The visual
scene must be realistic as possible. Most simulators on the market today meet this requirement incorporating sea state,
sea colors realistic aids to navigation, target ships etc. 2. Hydrodynamic fidelity: The simulator must be capable of
creating realistic responses to the action of the engine, rudder and thrusters (if equipped) for the own ship and target

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ships. This includes such items as shallow water effect, ship interaction and bank suction. BRM does not concentrate on
shiphandling therefore hydrodynamic fidelity does not have to be as high as those simulators used for advanced
shiphandling, pilot training or research. 3. Environmental fidelity: The layout of the bridge must replicate the actual the
layout of todays bridges as closely as possible. Normally space restrictions require the actual size to be reduced but the
larger it is the more realistic it will seem to the students. There is no standardization in this regard and new bridge
designs are being introduced each year so it is difficult to adopt a one bridge fits all philosophy. However the bridge
should fit the portion of the industry the institution will be targeting for training. Another trend is to use cubical
simulators to teach BRM similar to those used for RADAR/ARPA and ECDIS training. This is unacceptable for several
reasons one of which is there is a total loss of environmental fidelity as a cubical does not resemble the real bridge
environment notwithstanding the fact the it may have many of the equipment functions found on the bridge. 4. Senerio
fidelity: Simulator exercises need to developed in such a manner to reflect real life situations and have clear objectives
addressing the principals of BRM. Instructors need to resist making the exercise too complicated with the result the
primary learning objective is lost in the mix. In addition STCW Section A-1/12, part 2, 7.7 states simulation exercises
are designed and tested so as to ensure their suitability for the specific training objectives. (8) Creating exercises on
the fly should be avoided at all cost.

6. COURSE PRERESQUIITS AND COURSE INTAKE

BRM courses incorporate the use of all the resources available to the watch officer on the bridge of a ship. Therefor it
can be assumed that the trainee must have completed a course of study that included, but not limited to, the basics of
shiphandling, terrestrial navigation, electronic navigation, Rules of the Road (COLREGS), marine communications,
RADAR/ARPA and ECDIS. At an undergraduate institution, cadet program, the course needs to be positioned in the
curriculum so the items listed above have been successfully completed by the trainee. It is truly a capstone course where
all the individual skills learned separately during their course of study are tied together and used at the same time. BRM
courses offered as part of continuing education need to require their trainees to hold an appropriate certificate as officer
in charge of a navigation watch with RADAR/AROPA and ECDIS endorsements. In addition to prerequisite
requirements it is necessary to maintain the makeup of the bridge team realistic and relevant bridge teams should be
limited to 3 or 4 trainees on a team. (12)

7. COURSE CONTENT
A review of The IMO course 1.22 Ship Simulator and Bridge Teamwork and several BRM course outlines obtained on
the internet reviled course content and length differ considerably. The course length varies from 24 to 40 hours. The
IMO model course is 40 hours. Maritime Academies in the United States offer the course over the length of a semester
of 13 to 15 weeks which is approximately 40 hours contact time. This arrangement does have the advantage of the
instructor being able to give reading assignment as well as homework and it gives the cadets the opportunity for
reflection and reviewing between simulator exercises. All of the courses reviewed split the time allocation in the course
roughly 50% lecture and 50% simulator exercises. With regard to course content it was noted that there was also a
variance in the topics covered. Most of the variance can be attributed the updating of courses to include human element
topics addressing the fact that 80% of all casualties have been attributed to human error. Expanding the course content
to include the non-technical human element competencies such as leadership, management, and cultural awareness
places time management challenges for the instructor. IMO Model Course 1.22 has two different outlines presented with
slightly different topics being covered. Figure 3 indicates all the topics listed in the model course. Although some
human factors are included, the course seems to be outdated. By comparison Figure 4 list the topics found in other
courses reviewed where the majority of subjects covered deal directly with the human element. It must be noted that not
all the subjects listed in Figure 4 where found in one course. The list is computation of topics found in all the courses
reviewed. All the courses reviewed had a bridge equipment familiarization exercise which is important as the equipment
on the simulator may be different from what the student has been using. This is especially the case with regard to the
ECDIS. Many courses, including the IMO model course 1.22, have learning objectives devoted to and have dedicate a
considerable amount of simulator time to shiphandling skill development. I have indicated these subjects in the IMO
course with an asterisk in Figure 3. As stated in section 6 the basics of shiphandling should be a prerequisite to a BRM
course. Each simulator exercise should center on planning and carrying out a voyage with learning objectives
concentrating on particular elements associated with bridge resource management. Passage planning is a key element of
courses and should remain so. Captain A.J. Swift has an excellent chapter that contains all the elements of creating a
proper passage plan in his book Bridge Team Management . This topic, in detail, needs to remain in BRM courses

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however ECDS should be used to create and execute the plan in addition to the paper chart / form planning. As time
progress more and more passage planning should be carried out on the ECDIS. This is another reason why ECDIS
certification needs to be considered a prerequisite. One topic that I did not find in any of the courses reviewed is Data
Management. Todays watch officer receives data from internal sources RADAR/ARPA, AIS, ECDIS, Engine Room
Information, and external forces from looking out the window, VHF and, VTS. Handling this enormous amount of data
and establishing priorities requires instruction, training and practice. Failure to handle the data correctly will result in a
breakdown in BRM.

Basic Principals of BRM Stress & Stress Management

Bridge familiarization Fatigue & Fatigue Management
Attitude Leadership
Cultural awareness Teamwork
Challenge and response Communications
Planning Error Trapping
Authority Contingencies & Emergencies
Management on the Bridge Value & Use of Check Offs
Human Factors in error Authority & Assertiveness
Workload and stress Management & Leadership Styles
Decision making Judgment
Crisis management Automation Awareness
Situational Awareness Master Pilot Relationship
*Standard Maneuvers Risk Assessment & Analysis
*Wind & Current Effects Passage Planning
*Shallow Water Effects Social Styles
*Bank, Channel and Interaction Effects Alarm Management
*Anchoring and Single Point Mooring Bridge Organization
Planning and Carrying Out a Voyage Collision Avoidance
Developing Safety Culture

Figure 3 IMO 1.22 Figure 4 Other Courses

8. INSTRUCTOR QUALIFICATIONS
As in all simulator instruction the instructor remains the most important element in conducting a successful Bridge
Resource management Course. Dr. Doward Dowsma, who was instrumental in developing the first Train the Simulator
Instructor course in the United States, stated For us as facilitators and instructors, structured experience by simulation
is a lot harder than being a didactic teacher. STCW sates in A-1/6, Qualifications of instructors, supervisors and
assessors, that When training being conducted involves using a simulator;
The instructor employed should have received appropriate guidance in instructional techniques involving the use of
simulators.
Have gained practical operational experience on the particular type of simulator being used for the training.
The simulator instructor therefor must have completed a train the Simulator Instructor and Assessor course to be
qualified. Taking the standard train the trainer and assessor course does not meet the criteria needed to be a qualified
simulator instructor. A course having the content found in IMO Model Course 6.10 Train the Simulator Trainer and
Assessor and experiential learning methodologies is necessary. The Model Course 6.10 deals with the relevance of
simulator in maritime training and the simulator pedagogy associated with the use of training on a simulator. The
mistake made by many institution administrators is that the courses given by the simulator manufacture, at the time of
purchase or when new hires are added to the faculty, meet the Train the Simulator Instructor requirements. They do not.
They focus on the correct handling of the simulator hardware and software and contribute to the requirement that the
instructor have gained practical operational experience on the particular type of simulator being used but do not cover
the pedagogy of simulation. STCW also states Each party shall ensure that instructors and assessors are appropriately

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qualified and experienced for the particular types of training and corresponding assessment of competence as specified
in regulation 1/6 and section A-1/6. The staff requirements indicated in the IMO 1.22 Model course state:
The instructor in charge should hold a certificate as master (or equivalent)
A minimum of two years experience in handling ships
Have the training an experience necessary to operate a ship handling simulator as a training aid.
It is important to have the course taught from a masters viewpoint. Only an individual who has experience as master
will be able to provide the perspective required. BRM instructors also need to be well founded in all aspects of human
factors as they apply to BRM. The added emphasis on human factors and associated topics also requires todays BRM
instructor to be well versed in these areas. In addition he/she must be fully qualified and certified to operate all the
equipment found on the bridge. This includes ECDIS. Ideally the BRM instructor should have sailed with ECDIS
equipment. Hhowever the technology of ECDIS came into wide use only after many experienced BRM instructors
stopped sailing. Although it is desirable to have actual sailing experience with ECDIS there should be no rush to replace
instructors that do not have this experience. Administrators must be sensitive to the teaching experience of existing
instructors and be conscious that these seasoned instructors have the understanding of the experiential learning process
and simulator pedagogy that a new instructor with ECDIS experience do not.

9. MONITORING
Careful monitoring of the simulator exercise and trainees during a simulation scenario is of prime importance. It is by
closely monitoring the scenario in progress that the instructor can detect errors made by the trainees. These errors
include both active errors and latent errors. Active errors are those that are felt immediately and will have an impact on
the outcome of the exercise. Latent errors are subtle, lay hidden for a considerable amount of time and may or may not
affect the outcome of the exercise. (10)
Bridge Resource Management (BRM) is the effective management and utilization of all resources, human factors and
technical factors, available to the Bridge Team to ensure the safe completion of the vessels voyage. If one is to teach a
highly effective BRM course the use of all these factors need to be monitored closely. The instructor must monitor the
overall exercise to assure that the designed learning objectives are being met. The technical factors that need to be
monitored are listed in Figure 5 and the human factors that need to be monitored are listed in Figure 6.

Overall exercise Keeping a proper lookout

Own ships visual scene Communications, internal & external
Own ships position Task management
Target ships position, course, speed & CPA Teamwork
Own ships heading and speed Error trapping ability
Ruder command and response Leadership ability
Engine order and response Assertiveness
Depth sounder Risk taking risk management
RADAR/ARPA use of Body language
ECDIS use of Stress level, reaction, and management
NAVTEX Attitude
Decision making & decisiveness
Time spent monitoring different equipment
Reaction to unexpected events
Situational awareness
Compliance with orders
Effective use of check offs
Compliance with COLREGS
Response to emergencies
Ability to establish priorities

Figure 5 Technical Factors Figure 6 Human Factors

The list is long and it is a challenge for the instructor to monitor all the items necessary and run the simulation exercise
to meet specific learning objectives. This is especially true when running a complicated exercise or if you have more
than one bridge team running simultaneously either independently of each other or interactively. The IMO MC 1.22

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states An additional instructor with similar qualifications and experience (to the lead instructor) will be needed to
supervise each group of trainees. (12) There is the thought by some that BRM can be taught to a larger number of
students by placing as many as 12 -15 trainees in separate bridge cubicles and running the exercise simultaneously. This
is not acceptable for running the course for reasons stated above and it is also impossible for the instructor to monitor
all the factors listed in figures 5 & 6, in each cubical, to the degree necessary. The instructor needs the tools for proper
monitoring. In addition to a situation display, with its associated menus, that allow the instructor to monitor and
document many of the factors listed in Figure 5, capabilities to determine how the trainees are using specific types of
equipment such as RADA/ARPA and ECDIS is needed. Simple repeaters of the bridge equipment at the control station
will satisfy that need. Monitoring most of the human factors listed in Figure 6 will require microphones place on the
bridge so the instructor can hear all the conversations taking place and cameras so placed that the instructor can see all
activity taking place.

Figure 7 Figure 8
Pictures courtesy of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy

Figure 7 shows a simulator control station with bridge views at the top, the simulator situation display directly in front
of instructor. To the left of the instructor is a repeater of the bridge ECDIS and repeaters of both bridge RADAR/ARPA
units. Figure 8 shows the color monitors for four lowlight TV cameras located on the bridge. All four can be panned and
zoomed so the instructor can view the bridge activity from all angles. The screen on the lower right is focused on the
chart table so the instructor can watch the trainee plot positions. One of the cameras can be focused and zoomed in on
the engine control or, alarm panel if desired. It is highly recommended that a simulator operator be at the control station
with the instructor to assist the instructor in the operation of the simulator. This enables the instructor to monitor the
trainees closely without having to contend with the technical operation of the simulator.

10. CONCLUSIONS
Maritime casualties have decreased since the introduction of Bridge Resource Management into training schemes.
However 80% of casualties are still attributed to the human element and failure of proper Bridge Resource
Management. Examination of course BRM outlines indicated there are several versions of BRM courses being offered.
They differ in length and content. Many follow the guidance of IMO Model course 1.22 others have been altered to
include more human factor content. However the specific topics for the content and depth of coverage of the topics have
not been established or standardized. A BRM course is a capstone course and prerequisites courses must be established
to include all the skills need to stand a bridge watch. Instructors qualifications must include in depth knowledge of
operation of all bridge equipment, experiential learning, simulator training methodology, and human factors in addition
to traditional navigation and shiphandling skills Updating of the IMO Model course 1.22 is needed and could provide
the standardization of BRM courses necessary.

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REFERENCES
(1) Baker C.C., McCaffery D.B. Accident database Review of Human Element Concerns: what do the Results Mean for
Classification? , Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and Operation, London, 2005)
(2) Beadon, R. Bridge Management and Teamwork
(3) Butt N., Johnson D., Pike K., Pryce-Roberts N., Vigar N, 15 years of Shipping accidents: A Review for WWF. 2012
(4) Collision Course, Steamship Mutual DVD, 2009
(5) Gyles J.L., Salmon D.R., Experience of Bridge Team Training Using the Warsash Ship Simulator, MARSIM 78,
Sept 1978
(6) IMO STCW 78(8) International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchstanding for Seafarers
STCW, IMO, London 2011
(7) International Chamber of Shipping, Casualty Report No. 15
(8) International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchstanding for Seafarers STCW, IMO,
London 2011
(9) McCabe, Towards a Monitoring Navigator, Seaways, April 2014
(10) Reason, James (1990). Human Error. Cambridge University Press.
(11) Sandberg, G., Technology and the Training Challenge, Digital Ship, October 2008
(12) Ship Simulator and Bridge Teamwork, IMO Model Course 1.22, 2002 Edition, IMO, London
(13) Sinha S., The value of a Watchkeeper Seaways June 2009
(14) Viso J., E-navigation and BRM, Pacific Maritime July 2014

Captain Sandberg FNI earned a B.Sc. in Meteorology and Oceanography from the State University of New York
Maritime College in 1966 and a M.Sc. in Applied Sciences from the State University of New York at Stony Brook in
1978 . He sailed on Merchant Vessels for over twenty years including serving as master. He taught at the United States
Maritime Academy at Kings Point NY for 25 years serving as Professor, Head Department of Marine Transportation
and Director of Nautical Science Simulation. He retired in 2011 as Professor Emeritus and now performs consulting
services specializing in Maritime Education and Training.

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