Reimagining Reunification in Cyprus: Towards a Human-Centered

Approach to Negotiation and Peacebuilding on a Divided Island.

Shane Hensinger
Professor Timothy Sisk – Civil Wars and International Responses II
Josef Korbel School of International Studies – University of Denver

1
Reimagining Reunification in Cyprus: Towards a Human-Centered Approach to
Negotiation and Peacebuilding on a Divided Island. .......................................................... 1
Executive Summary............................................................................................................. 4
Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 7
To the Republic of Cyprus ........................................................................................... 7
To the Turkish Cypriot Government: .......................................................................... 8
To the Government of Turkey: ................................................................................... 9
To the Government of Britain:.................................................................................. 10
To the Government of Greece:................................................................................. 10
To the European Union:............................................................................................ 11
To the United Nations:.............................................................................................. 11
Conflict Dynamics - Introduction ...................................................................................... 12
History............................................................................................................................... 13
British Rule .................................................................................................................... 13
Independence ............................................................................................................... 16
Post- Independence ...................................................................................................... 18
The Invasion of “Attila.”................................................................................................ 20
Visual Representation of the Decline of Bicommunal Villages in Cyprus..................... 22
Afterward ...................................................................................................................... 22
Peacemaking and Peacebuilding Strategies ..................................................................... 23
Environment.................................................................................................................. 24
Sports ............................................................................................................................ 26
Women’s Issues ............................................................................................................ 27
Educational Exchanges.................................................................................................. 28
Negotiation Dynamics - Introduction ............................................................................... 29
Negotiation ....................................................................................................................... 30
Bargaining Framework.................................................................................................. 30
Greek-Cypriot Bargaining Position................................................................................ 32
Turkish-Cypriot Bargaining Position.............................................................................. 33
Turkish, Greek and United States Negotiating Positions.............................................. 34
History of the Negotiating Process ................................................................................... 35
The Vienna Talks 1975 - 1977 ....................................................................................... 36
Factors Contributing to Failure of the Vienna Talks and Subsequent Rounds of
Negotiations.................................................................................................................. 37
The Annan Plan ................................................................................................................. 40
The European Union ..................................................................................................... 40
Turkish-Cypriots ............................................................................................................ 41
Turkey ........................................................................................................................... 42
Greek-Cypriots .............................................................................................................. 43
The Final Annan Plan (Annan V) ................................................................................... 44
The Defeat of the Annan Plan........................................................................................... 45
The Way Forward.......................................................................................................... 46

2
 Peacebuilding in Cyprus................................................................................................ 48
Sequencing the Institutions of the Annan Plan ........................................................ 48
Peacekeeping in Perpetuity? – Drawing Down UNFICYP ......................................... 49
Peacebuilding on Cyprus - Introduction ........................................................................... 51
Horizontal Inequalities in Cyprus...................................................................................... 52
Text Box 1.................................................................................................................. 53
Table 1....................................................................................................................... 55
Table 2....................................................................................................................... 57
Table 3....................................................................................................................... 58
European Court of Human Rights Decision of March 2010.............................................. 58
Analysis of ECHR Decision................................................................................................. 60
Key Finding................................................................................................................ 61
Key Finding................................................................................................................ 62
Greek Cypriot Reaction to ECHR Ruling............................................................................ 62
Addressing Vertical Dilemmas on Both Sides of the Island .............................................. 64
Peacebuilding Conclusion ................................................................................................. 67
Report Conclusion............................................................................................................. 71
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 73
Biblography ....................................................................................................................... 75

3
Executive Summary

The Cyprus conflict represents one of the most intractable and protracted conflict

situations in the world today, rivaling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for length and

complexity it remains a seemingly intractable problem for the global community and in

particular for the United Nations and the European Union; the former of which is

charged with maintaining peace on Cyprus and the latter which admitted a divided

Cyprus as a full member in 2004 and now finds itself, somewhat unwillingly, as a party

to a conflict which previously had been viewed as existing on the periphery of Europe

but now, thanks to the growth of the European project, rests at its heart.

The conflict involves not only the two antagonists – the ethnic Turk and ethnic Greek

populations on the island but also their protectors in Turkey and Greece respectively,

who, along with Britain, were given roles as “guarantors” under 1960 Treaty of

Guarantee. In addition the United Nations peacekeeping force on the island, UNFICYP,

has since 1963 has been tasked with keeping peace between the two sides and since

1974 with enforcing a ceasefire between Turkey and the government of the Republic of

Cyprus. As a player trusted by both sides in Cyprus UNFICYP plays a key role within this

report – which recommends a “reimagining” of UNFICYP’s role, utilizing the trust it has

built on Cyprus as a key part of building a new path forward to peace.

4
Even prior to the Turkish invasion in 1974 which led to the partition of the island, the

two majority communities on Cyprus, ethnic Greek and ethnic Turkish, had led parallel

existences with little social interaction and wide disparities in income and education.

Endless rounds of negotiations between the two parties have led to high level accords

and even, in 2004, an agreed upon peace plan (the Annan plan) but the failure of the

Greek Cypriot side to rally both elite and mass opinion to the side of reunification led to

its defeat and the subsequent entry of Cyprus as a divided island to the European Union.

This in turn resulted in growing embitterment on the part of the north, which felt its

cooperation and acceptance of the plan had led not to greater rewards but to a

mounting sense of stagnation and strangulation as their self-declared state, the Turkish

Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) continued to suffer under an international embargo

and sanctions.

A growing threat exists where both sides will become accustomed and accepting of the

“Taiwanization” of the north – a commonly used term which refers to a quasi-statehood

below the level of official acceptance by the international community. This is not an

ephemeral worry; polling data indicates acceptance of partition is increasingly viewed as

an acceptable alternative by both communities. Distrust between the two sides has

always been a major problem and is at the root of either side’s inability to imagine a

new way forward. Key recommendations within this report for mitigating the issue of

trust and separation include utilizing the non-political ties which bind all people

together – sports and the environment, to begin the process of building a sense of

5
Cypriot community separate from ethnic identity and ameliorating the decades of

mistrust between the two communities.

Partly in response to the lack of progress on reunification as well as the lack of

inducements and rewards on the part of the international community, last month the

Turkish Cypriot side of the island elected a hard-line, nationalist president, Dervis

Eroglu, to replace their previous, pro-settlement leader – Mehmet Ali Talat. The

consequences of the election are as yet unknown but the position of Eroglu in talks with

the Republic of Cyprus is well known – no compromise on the key issue of the

recognition of the right of Turkish Cypriots to their own state.

Eroglu’s position, in combination with the stalling of EU-Turkish accession talks by the

Republic of Cyprus, spells trouble for the future of Cyprus as well as Turkey’s

relationship with the EU – the two of which are mutually and inseparably intertwined.

Turkey is increasingly losing patience with the European Union on both Cyprus and

other issues and believes it may never be offered membership while its client state, the

TRNC, sees no future within a Greek-dominated EU-member Cyprus. The situation on

Cyprus is frozen and requires creative, new approaches to both in order to “thaw” and

“freshen” negotiation and peacebuilding dynamics on both halves of the divided island,

with the European Union and the United Nations both playing key roles – building off

their respective positions as a long-time guarantor of peace on the divided island and as

the main economic and diplomatic forum within the European theater.

6
The recommendations arising from this report seek to utilize the two communities on

both sides of the island in a “bottom-up” approach to peacebuilding – a human-

centered approach which seeks to reimagine the conflict outside of round after round of

negotiations between high-level elites on both sides of the island. This, together with

incentives for the north and reassurances for the south on both the cost and benefits of

reunification, are designed to slowly warm this frozen conflict, as well as to refresh it by

moving around current obstacles to peace and reunification in hopes of building a

strong momentum towards a permanent solution. The mitigation of horizontal

inequalities, which were present on Cyprus long before the Turkish invasion, is designed

to decrease their role in the continuation of the conflict while building increasingly

strong economic ties between the two sides – which can only serve to remind both

communities of the benefits of peace and of economic reintegration.

Recommendations

To the Republic of Cyprus:

1. Utilize the desire of many Turkish Cypriots to end to their international isolation

to the advantage of both sides of the island by actively seeking to involve their

civic groups in negotiations and in communicating the position of the Republic of

Cyprus on reunification to the Turkish Cypriot population at-large. The

7
 government of the Republic of Cyprus claims to represent the entire island as

well as both populations – its actions should reflect these aspirations.

2. Implement cross-border initiatives of a non-political nature, such as sports and

educational exchanges. Doing so does not imply recognition of the TRNC as a

separate state. Rather it recognized the needs of Turkish Cypriot citizens as

human beings and encourages them to establish greater ties with the Republic of

Cyprus. It also shows the world that the government remains committed to

reunification and not arbitrary punishment of its citizens in the north.

3. Offer to work with the north in implementing the acquis communautaire in

preparation for the eventual reunification of the two sides of the island. The Republic of

Cyprus would also benefit by beginning this process now so it will not act as an

impediment to reunification or increasing economic ties in the future.

4. End the government’s opposition to the Immovable Property Commission (IPC)

recognized in the recent European Court of Human Rights ruling as a just solution to the

issue of outstanding property claims in the north. The government does not have to

endorse the decision but by utilizing the commission it can remove a major source of

tension and sorrow between the two communities and at no cost to itself. Continuing

resistance to the IPC could result in much larger costs to the Republic of Cyprus in the

future. Recognize the value of the IPC and allow citizens to make their own choices in

the matter.

To the Turkish Cypriot Government:

8
 1. Encourage Turkey to drop its opposition to allowing full movement of Greek

Cypriot ships, aircraft and goods in and out of Turkish ports-of-entry. Doing so

will remove a major irritant between the two parties and encourage the

government of the Republic of Cyprus that the Turkish Cypriot community is not

automatically endorsing the Turkish position on every issue and thus is acting as

good-faith partner in negotiations.

2. Immediately begin a census of all properties in the north to determine rightful

ownership and freeze construction on any disputed property currently until this

issue is resolved. The unresolved status of property ownership in the north is an

enormous drain on the ability of both sides of the island to come to a conclusion

on reunification. If necessary a commission composed of equal numbers of

Turkish and Greek Cypriots with an additional EU or NATO member to break an

impasse could be composed to assist with this process.

3. Discuss seriously the idea of allowing resettlement of Varosha under joint-

administration with policing powers carried out by the United Nations or another

agreed-upon force.

To the Government of Turkey:

1. Immediately lift the prohibition on ships, aircraft and goods from the Republic of

Cyprus entering Turkish ports-of-entry. This should be done without

preconditions as a sign of Turkish willingness to compromise in key issues.

9
 2. Being the process of a withdrawal of a small number of Turkish soldiers from the

north. This need be only a token number and is designed, again, to show

movement in Turkey’s positions.

3. Prohibit any further settlement of Turkish nationals in the north. This is a major

issue for both the Turkish and Greek populations of the island and is illegal under

international law. The status of those already in Cyprus can be negotiated in a

final agreement but continuing settlement must end, immediately.

To the Government of Britain:

1. British sovereign bases occupy prime portions of Cyprus, areas which could be

partly or entirely returned to Cyprus upon a successful reunification treaty

between the two sides of the island. Reexamine the role of the bases and their

necessity to British national security.

To the Government of Greece:

1. Encourage greater flexibility from the government of the Republic of Cyprus

on negotiating issues involving reunification. The interests of Greece and

Cyprus are not always mutually inclusive and encouraging this falsity has

resulted in a hardening of positions on both sides of the island.

10
To the European Union:

1. Work with the Turkish side of Cyprus to begin the lengthy process of

implementing the acquis communautaire while at the same time offering

inducements to Turkey in the form of additional EU trade preferences.

To the United Nations:

1. Transform the role of UNFICYP from one of peacekeeping to one of peacebuilding by

utilizing the force, which has the trust of both sides in Cyprus, into one which works to

bring the two communities together through structured activities and peacebuilding

exercises and trips to each side of the island. Current examples of this approach include

meetings between businesses on both sides of the island. Consider expanding this

approach to additional civic and educational organizations.

2. Create a plan to sequence some of the local institutions of governance envisioned in the

Annan plan to Varosha and the areas near Varosha in order to show both sides that co-

governance has a future in Cyprus. This plan could then be submitted to a vote in the

areas recommended for attempts a joint-governance and resettlement.

11
Conflict Dynamics - Introduction

The conflict in Cyprus resulting in the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974 and stalemating in

the subsequent partition and frozen dynamics which exist today, represents in many ways the

latest conflict between the Greek and Turkish states or a “significant part of the larger Greco-

Turkish issue with a thousand year history” (Yelmaz 35). Both the Greek-Turkish war of 1920 and

the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 ensured that both Greece and Turkey have “unmixed” their

populations to a degree quite remarkable considering the multiethnic nature of each state prior

to these events. Cyprus is the last territory where large numbers of ethnic Cypriot Greeks and

ethnic Cypriot Turks once lived together and where Greece and Turkey still have major roles to

play in resolving (or prolonging) conflict between the two communities. A major, unresolved

irritant in relations between the two states is Cyprus and the problems of that island have

followed a path which closely parallels that of each respective community’s “benefactors” in

Greece and Turkey.

The dynamics of conflict in Cyprus between the ethnic Turkish community and the ethnic Greek

community have been heavily influenced by the fact that each community is watched over and

“guaranteed” by an outside power – Greece takes a paternal interest in the Greek community

and Turkey does the same with the Turkish community (the title of this project refers to what

Turks refer to as “Motherland and Babyland,” “Motherland” being Turkey and “Babyland” being

Cyprus). This arrangement, guaranteed by the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus, has resulted in the

two communities following the same dynamic their ethnic kin in Turkey and Greece have

12
followed in relation to one another – namely the “interpretation of present events through the

mental representation of past traumas, as well as glories” (Yelmaz 35).

The challenge then is to wean each community away from this dynamic and encourage the

development of a Cypriot identity separate from reliance on the ethnic or religious identity of

either of the guarantors of Cyprus’s two major communities. In this report as well as the ones

following it we will make specific recommendations to assist in peacebuilding and peacemaking

measures which we hope will build the confidence of both communities in one another and in

the Cypriot state outside of its current reliance on the “guarantor” powers of Turkey and

Greece.

History

There is significant disagreement as to relations between the two communities before the

British assumed control of Cyprus in 1878. Greek Cypriot writers tend to mention the 1832

execution of the Cypriot Orthodox archbishop and clergy by the Ottoman Empire for alleged

sympathies with those seeking independence for Greeks (Yelmas 39). But in the period after the

British took control of Cyprus it can generally be agreed that “Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot

nationalism and intercommunal distrust intensified in series of steps or “rachets.”” (Kaufmann

209).

British Rule

13
The British “allowed the communities to set up separate school systems, both of which

imported teachers from the respective mainlands who taught children to see themselves as

“Greek” or “Turkish, not “Cypriot.” History in each community, from well before the possibility

of Cypriot independence until today, has represented its own people as consistently heroic and

the other as consistently barbaric” (Kaufman 209).

This account is supported by Greek Cypriot writer Yiannis Papadakis who writes that in school in

Cyprus he learned “the Turks were nomads, people with no civilization, people of the horse and

the sword, descendants of the Mongols, infidels, people of no real religion. People of the Koran,

Muslim fanatics… Every important date in our history as Greeks bespoke our encounters with

Turkish barbarism. And I was a product of that history” (Papadakis 6-9).

Turkish teachers came to Cyprus bearing the new ideologies of “Kemalism” from Turkey’s new

secular ruler – Ataturk. Ataturk had switched the communal, Islamist vision of the former

Ottoman rulers to his new Turkish-based Kemalist ideology, which emphasized nationalism as

the binding force of Turkish identity – abandoning allegiance to the caliphate, which Ataturk

abolished in 1924. “By identifying with Ataturk’s vision of Turkish nationalism, the Turks of

Cyprus were also asserting their sense of separate identity from their Greek Cypriot neighbors”

(Yelmaz 43).

Language was also a source of separation on the island with few Greek Cypriots speaking Turkish

but approximately 40% of Turkish Cypriots speaking Greek. As the two communities began their

process of self-segregation less and less members of the “other” community learned their

14
neighbor’s language - meaning contacts between the two became increasingly limited (Fisher

309).

Strengthened by the acquired knowledge that each respective community was in the “right” and

the other in the “wrong” both communities began the process of gradual separation from one

another and greater identification with their ethnic/religious kin in the “mother/fatherland.”

For Greek Cypriots this took the form of enosis (union) with the Greek state. In 1912 and 1931

there were pro-enosis riots in Cyprus. These were followed by a growing sense of Turkish

Cypriot nationalism which led to demands for taksim (partition) of the island.

After WWII the anti-colonialist wave which swept much of the world also reached Cyprus. In

1955 EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was formed to fight the British for Cypriot

independence. EOKA was also closely identified with the cause of enosis and the Orthodox

church and was exclusively Greek – thus encouraging another, exclusively Turkish organization

called TMT (Turkish Defense Organization) to form which further divided the two communities.

Distrust built further because TMT aligned itself with British colonialists and engaged in “limited

intercommunal fighting with the Greek Cypriots until a ceasefire was implemented in 1958”

(Fisher 310). This trend of separate structures and institutions for each community also

manifested itself in politics as well – with no cross-community parties or movements competing

for both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot votes before independence or after (Kaufmann 210).

The period between 1891 and 1931 saw the unmixing of previously ethnically-mixed villages in

Cyprus, from 43% to 36%.

15
Independence

Cyprus gained independence in 1960 following the armed struggle for independence waged by

EOKA since 1955. Under the 1960 constitution power was to be shared between a Greek Cypriot

president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president who was given veto power. The 1960 constitution

was remarkably complex and created a power-sharing system which allowed the Turkish Cypriot

population a larger share of seats in the legislature (30%), civil service (30%), army (40%) and

police (30%) than their share of the population at that time, which was estimated to be around

20% of the total of Cyprus (Kaufmann 210). The constitution also “incorporated the guarantee

treaty between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Britain” which outlawed enosis and taksim and

allowed Greece, Turkey or Britain to take steps to unilaterally remedy a breach of the treaty.

Finally the constitution separated Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot voters into separate ethnic

rolls which further institutionalized ethnic separation and prevented the development of cross-

community candidates from emerging at all. “This meant that Greek Cypriots could only vote for

Greek Cypriot candidates and Turkish Cypriots could only vote for Turkish Cypriot candidates.

Political parties with candidates of different ethnic affiliation could not stand for elections”

(Jarstad 28).

This complex document, designed with what the negotiators thought were the best interests of

both communities at heart, instead held the seeds of the destruction of bicommunal existence

on Cyprus. The president of Cyprus at the time, Archbishop Markarios, never supported the

constitution and insisted it wouldn’t be binding on Greek Cypriots after independence

(Kaufmann 210). The constitution “institutionalized ethno-communalism, because it failed to

take into account “the psychological and sociological fact that the power-protection system”

16
increased “suspicions, antagonism and conflict between the communities because of the

discriminations and uncertainties involved.” “The sectarian and divisive provisions of the 1960

arrangement constituted the seeds that led to its collapse three years later” (Michael 26).

The consocialistic model of power sharing as laid out in the 1960 Cypriot constitution was a

failure for the reasons stated above and because it did nothing to encourage consensus

between competing factions within the government (Large & Sisk 100). Of course there existed

no ability in Cyprus to field an integrative approach to governance because there existed no

cross-community political parties, societies or institutions. The Cypriot constitution of 1960

cemented this state of affairs and did nothing to ameliorate it.

The “birth” of Cyprus as an independent state more closely resembled that of an arranged

marriage neither party wanted – with both parties in love with different suitors who hovered at

the edge of the wedding yet refused to say “I object” when asked. “Independence” wasn’t

wanted by the vast majority of Greek Cypriots, who desired enosis with Greece, nor by the

Turkish Cypriots, who saw independence as a stalking horse for enosis by the Greek Cypriots.

The mood of the new state was bleak, “there were no festivals, no ringing of church bells, no

parades, no dancing people in the streets of Cyprus celebrating independence” (Yelmaz 55). The

mood of the people of Cyprus was predictive –the years ahead wouldn’t hold much joy or

celebration for either Greek or Turkish Cypriots.

By independence in 1960 the proportion of ethnically-mixed villages in Cyprus had declined

from 36% in 1931 to 18% (Kaufmann 210).

17
Post- Independence

The constitutional arrangement quickly proved unworkable because “both identity groups

remained adversarial… with each seeking to gain advantages within the new arrangements”

(Fisher 310). “None of it functioned – except one provision that permitted Greece and Turkey to

maintain several hundred troops on the island, who became trainers and commanders of the

nationalist militias in both communities” (Kaufman 210). The 1960 constitution froze the

situation and provided an unworkable framework in which to resolve issues of dispute – which

neither party was willing to do. Both sides adhered strictly to their ethnic identity and no

mechanisms were put in place to foster even the beginning of a Cypriot identity separate from

ethnicity. Statements from both Greek and Turkish Cypriots contributed to this sense of ethnic

exclusion, with Makarios saying when first elected president in 1959 that “For the first time in

centuries, the government of the island passes into Greek hands” and Turkish Cypriot leaders

saying they couldn’t be “tools of Turkey” because they were part of Turkey (Yelmaz 58-59).

In addition the agreement was dependent on stable power relations between the two sides and

the other parties to the agreement (Greece, Turkey and Britain). When one side felt the power

relations had shifted it could simply abandon the agreement or seek to change it unilaterally –

as Makarios did later. Power relations can shift because of changing military capacities,

demography or, as in the case of Cyprus, international actors (Jarstad 21).

In 1963 after Makarios unilaterally threatened to change the constitution the two sides

embarked “on a hostile and protracted process of separation and segregation” (Fisher 310).

Intercommunal violence broke out “shortly before Christmas 1963” when British forces left their

sovereign bases and intervened to halt the violence – establishing the “Green Line” which still

18
divides Nicosia today (Souter 662). They were followed by the deployment of a United Nations

peacekeeping force (UNFICYP), which remains in Cyprus. In 1964 Turkey threatened to intervene

in Cyprus but after strong warnings from the United States used only air power in support of its

Turkish brethren instead (United States 1).

The outcome of Makarios’s rejection of the constitution and the following intercommunal

violence was a large number of internally displaced persons (IDP), mainly Turkish Cypriots, who

coalesced into a series of small fortified “enclaves run by the community’s political leaders”

(Souter 662). These enclaves occupied less than 3% of Cyprus’s total land area but held almost

18% of its population. Movement to and from the enclaves was restricted and those inside felt

powerless and fearful of attacks by Greek Cypriots.

“It is difficult to overestimate the magnitude of the 1964 crisis for the Turkish Cypriot

community. This was a seminal event for them. The Greek Cypriots failed to comprehend the

significance of the 1964 crisis in the Turkish Cypriot narrative. Their inability to to grasp the

centrality of this “chosen trauma” only compounded the “mistrust factor” in any prospective

endeavor toward coexistence and reunification. Cast in bereaved language, the 1964-1974 trial

would underline all future negotiating predispositions for the Turkish Cypriots” (Michael 27).

After the events of 1964 “the remainder of the 1960s and the early 1970s saw continuing

hostility and increasing segregation between the two communities, punctuated by intermittent

crises sparking Turkish involvement and repeated calls for enosis by nationalist elements in the

Greek-Cypriot community” (Fisher 310).

19
The events of 1964 represent a “chosen trauma” by the Turkish Cypriots – an event which has

gathered in their historical memory and has become mythologized by the group. Each group

accuses the other of refusing to understand or acknowledge its suffering and then mythologizes

a particular period of suffering, “Once a terrible event in a group’s history becomes a chosen

trauma, the truth about it does not really matter” (Yelmaz 10). “One of the biggest problems is

that people tend to forget what the others suffered and remember only their own sufferings.

We went through difficult times in 1963 but Greek Cypriots never mention these. But Greek

Cypriots went through difficult times in 1974. But the Cyprus problem did not start in 1974”

(Papadakis 109).

By 1970 the percentage of ethnically-mixed villages in Cyprus had fallen to less than 10% (Fisher

310).

The Invasion of “Attila.”

Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 is the event which led to the partition of the island and

the forced displacement of over 250,000 Greek Cypriots. For Greek Cypriots this event, hailed as

“liberation” by Turkish Cypriots, was as traumatizing as the 1964 crisis and subsequent exile to

small enclaves was to the Turkish Cypriots.

In response to a coup engineered in Athens by the right-wing junta then in power and led by

Cypriot Nikos Sampson, characterized as “an extremely violent man… well-known for his hatred

of Turks” who once advocated “cleansing the island of the stench of Turks,” Turkey began a two-

part invasion designed to “establish facts on the ground.” (Webb & Groom 85, Kaufmann 214).

20
The first part of the invasion, on July 20th, was followed by ethnic cleansing of Cypriot Turks from

Greek-held areas almost immediately (Kaufmann 214). On August 14th, following the end of talks

in Geneva between the four guarantor powers designed to seek a settlement to the previous

round of fighting, Turkey attacked again and pushed inwards from the beachheads it had

established, causing greater displacement of people, both Greek Cypriots heading south (away

from the Turkish invasion) and Turkish Cypriots heading north (towards the occupied areas) and

eventually occupying almost 37% of the island (Yilmaz 65). For Greek Cypriots the events of

1974 leading up to the invasion of Turkey, constitute their own “chosen trauma” in the same

manner the events between 1964 and 1974 mean to the Cypriot Turkish population.

The toll on the people of Cyprus was fierce. 4000 Greek soldiers and Cypriots were killed as well

as 2000 Turkish soldiers. The Turkish army “committed rapes and killed women and children”

(Kaufmann 215). Over 1500 people today are still considered “disappeared” by their families.

Almost no Turkish Cypriots remained in the south of Cyprus while less than 10,000 Greek

Cypriots remained in the north – many of whom would be later placed under great pressure to

leave. Subsequent agreements allowed a UN-supervised population exchange which further

reduced the mixed communities in each state. Today less than 300 Greek Cypriots remain in the

Turkish-occupied areas of Cyprus, mainly in the remote Karpas Peninsula. Figures on the number

of Turkish Cypriots in the south – the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, are

unavailable but it is thought less than 1000 chose to stay behind.

Each side has its own narrative for every significant event which has occurred in the history of

Cyprus. “The year 1974 perpetuated the image of the “unspeakable” Turk as Orthodox

21
Hellenism’s eternal enemy, out to expel them from their ancestral homeland, in a melancholic

fatalism colored by betrayal, defeat and loss. Conversely 1974 is heralded as a “peace

operation” and celebrated by Turkish Cypriots as “an antidote to Greek Cypriot oppression”

(Michael 32). Neither side appears willing to acknowledge the other’s narrative – not accept but

acknowledge. The principle of “the ego of victimization” doesn’t allow empathy for one’s

compatriot’s pain – when one suffers then the other must suffer in return (Yilmaz 66).

Visual Representation of the Decline of Bicommunal Villages in Cyprus

Afterward

The conflict in Cyprus has been stalemated since 1974. Contrary to the low-level ethnic violence

which occupied the island from between 1955 and 1974 there have been very few incidents

since the Turkish invasion – primarily or wholly because the two populations are unmixed now

to the point where very, very few Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots still live in close proximity

to one another.

22
Because this project is broken into two parts – conflict and escalation analysis followed by

peacemaking analysis at a later date, we will not go any further into the history of the conflict as

the conflict has remained essentially frozen since 1974.

Peacemaking and Peacebuilding Strategies

The conflict in Cyprus is complex and clouded with issues of ethnic nationalism, discrimination

(and fear of discrimination), the use of enemy images to stereotype the “other” as barbaric and

less than human, the over-involvement of guarantor powers Greece and Turkey in their co-

religionists affairs which has resulted in a stunted and nearly non-existent Cypriot identity and a

decades-long enforced separation which has allowed all of these elements and more to harden

together until each side is almost incapable of moving from its rehearsed role and seeing half-

way to the other’s position. The adoption of chosen traumas, chosen glories, the egoism of

victimization and hard-held religious and ethnic identities by both sides in the dispute present a

dizzyingly complex problem from which to embark on successful peacemaking and

peacebuilding strategies.

Yet there are areas of agreement which can be approached as cross-border efforts and which do

not require huge sacrifices on either side. These areas can then be used as confidence-building

measures to draw the two sides closer to one another and to work towards building a Cypriot

identity free of reliance on religious or nationalistic shibboleths. Several of the issues (women

and the environment) recommended here for cross-community cooperation are mentioned as

23
“instrumental in confidence building and in establishing a settlement that can be acceptable to

the larger population” in other research, particularly in those dealing with conflict in

Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Aceh (Strand 187).

The European Union (EU) has taken the initiative in some of these areas but unfortunately in the

EU, where the Republic of Cyprus is a full member and the north and Turkey are not, “Greek

Cypriots… have eagerly used all the levers available to them to pursue what they see as their

national interest and need for justice” (ICG 3). If opportunities for building cross-border

cooperation are stymied in the EU then countries should make the decision to pursue these

opportunities unilaterally – as Britain and the United States appear to be doing in certain areas –

including the ones mentioned below.

Environment

Sports

Women’s Issues

Educational Exchanges

Environment

Cyprus occupies a unique spot in the Mediterranean and features a huge number of species,

plant and animal, which aren’t located elsewhere. In addition Cyprus serves as a nesting location

for numerous rare sea turtles which have actually rebounded in number since the Turkish

invasion due to the low number of tourists known to visit the Turkish-occupied north. As writer

24
Alan Weisman wrote when visiting abandoned Varosha, “At night, the darkened beachfront,

free of moonlight bathers, crawls with nesting loggerhead and green sea turtles” (Weisman 97).

The resurgence of the natural environment into the void left by humans can be a comforting

and uniting factor if managed well. The Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), a project

formed between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United

Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Development Programe

(UNDP) could serve as a framework within which to develop a process for cross-border

cooperation on issues of mutual concern between the two parts of Cyprus today (United

Nations 25).

A main issue sure to arise is that the Republic of Cyprus doesn’t want to provide legitimacy to

the Turkish-occupied north, which declared independence in 1983. But the environment is an

issue which doesn’t respect artificial boundaries across land, air or sea. Tackling issues of joint

concern between both communities, issues like ensuring sea turtles have clean beaches on

which to nest, the status of Cyprus’s native donkey population or discussing ways to mitigate

the effects of a dropping water table can be approached as joint-initiatives, if necessary done

outside the framework of government-to-government contacts through NGOs or multilateral

organizations.

The water issue, in particular, has been mentioned as having the potential to “function both as a

unifier promoting collaboration between entities at different levels and scales but also an

irritant worsening already bad relations” (Strand 191). Using Cyprus’s dropping water table as

25
“an opportunity to ensure structure dialogue with groups in the two communities” could be

enormously valuable in building ties between the two groups (Strand 192).

Sports

Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus is not an internationally-recognized state so it does not have

the right to participate in sporting events outside of Turkey. Forming joint sports teams between

the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish-occupied north could form a valuable source of cross-

border attachment and appreciation. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has a

football team which, because of the TRNC’s disputed status, cannot play in international FIFA

tournaments. A team from Cyprus playing together, perhaps under a jointly agreed upon

symbol, would act to bring the two sides together in a way they haven’t been for decades.

The Olympics are designed to bring the world’s states together in peace and harmony, united

under the Olympic banner and committed to the ancient ideals of sportsmanship. Because the

TRNC isn’t a recognized state it has no Olympic committee, any athlete who wanted to

participate would be forced to get a Turkish passport and compete under the flag of Turkey. And

the Republic of Cyprus up to this point has never won a metal in the Olympics – winter or

summer. Approaching the Olympic committee in the south to accept and train athletes from the

north, who could perhaps compete under a neutral banner until reunification was achieved (in

the same manner as Taiwan) could serve as a visible and successful example of cooperation

across the divide. If objections were to arise bringing the issue of Greece’s adoption of ethnic

Greek minorities from the Pontus (Paraskevi Patoulidou) and Albania (Pyrros Dimas) to compete

26
for Greece in the Olympics (each who won a gold metal) could serve as an important reminder

of the role athletes from the TRNC could play in the Olympics on behalf of all Cypriots.

Women’s Issues

Reams of data show us that the less participation of women in government and society the

more repressive and warlike a state turns out to be. Disenfranchising half of one’s population is

a road to ruin whereas enfranchising women can act as a locus for advancement and prosperity.

Recognizing the valuable role women can play in peacebuilding the United Nations Security

Council passed resolution 1325 in 2000, which called for broader participation for women in

conflict resolution and “that involve women in all the implementation mechanisms of the peace

agreements” (Strand 188).

Because “in conflict societies, the ‘national problem’ historically dominates downplays social

issues, including women’s issues” too often the concerns of women and their ideas for resolving

conflict have been downplayed or ignored (Hadjiipavlou 238). Women are enlisted in the

conflict as “sacrificing mothers” who “internalize their ethnic and national duty roles in

safeguarding the nation” (Hadjiipavlou 238). As such they “are denied their right to be full

participants in the peace process” on both sides. “In the last 30 years of official negotiations, no

Cypriot women has ever been appointed a member of the negotiating team” (Hadjiipavlou 238).

Because Cyprus is seen as a patriarchal culture this is accepted as normal but even within

societies viewed as patriarchal women still have opinions and unique perspectives – and their

27
absence from the political discourse is neither healthy nor wise for government, society or for

women themselves.

The UNDP has funded (2006 – 2008) a $30,000,000 project in Cyprus based on mainstreaming

women’s participation in peacemaking efforts on the island (UNDP). A report is expected soon

on its results but a greater effort must be made to bind women from the Republic of Cyprus and

the TRNC together in cross-border groups discussing issues of concern to women. As the UNDP

has taken a lead role so far it could continue to do so – or delegate additional responsibilities to

gender-based NGOs eager to help build the process of peacebuilding forward (Georgiadu 1).

Educational Exchanges

Because of the international isolation of the TRNC students from the statelet often have to

procure Turkish passports to study abroad and are only allowed to study in Cyprus once they

obtain a Republic of Cyprus passport. Creating an exchange mechanism whereby students of

both the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC could study on each side of the dividing line would be

enormously beneficial in breaking down the negative stereotypes each community holds of the

other. A more immediate impact would be a growing number of citizens of each ethnic group

with the ability to speak the language of the other. It would also lift some of the sense of siege

which the Turkish Cypriot community feels under and encourage greater ties between the two

educational communities.

28
The next portion of this report will move on to the negotiation dynamics present in the decades

of face-to-face talks between parties involved in the Cyprus dispute but primarily focusing on

talks between the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots overseen by the UN Secretary-

General’s special representative on Cyprus.

Negotiation Dynamics - Introduction

This report will present an analysis of the negotiating strategies of the Greek-Cypriot

and Turkish-Cypriot sides in the Cyprus conflict since the Turkish invasion of 1974. The

focus will be in particular on the negotiation processes involved in the formulation the

Annan plan in 2004 and how both sides’ bargaining positions have evolved (or devolved)

since negotiations on reunification and a constitutional settlement began after the

Turkish invasion in 1974. This project will be relying heavily on the processes laid out by

Timothy Sisk in “Bargaining with Bullets,” focusing on the prenegotiation and

negotiation processes between the two sides and the theoretical concept of “ripeness”

as applied to the Cyprus situation after the invasion of Turkey in 1974 and preceding EU

accession in 2004, while looking to the applicability of the ripeness concept to current

negotiations preceding elections in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in mid-April

20101.

1
Sisk’s work is strongly applicable in the sense that he outlines a powerful case for “Peacemaking with
Power” and negotiations leading to the building of effective and durable power-sharing institutions, both of
which resonate strongly in the case of Cyprus. Intertwined in Sisk’s recommendations is the issue of
bringing peace to warring parties, which is slightly less applicable to Cyprus due to the cessation of
intercommunal violence more than ¼ of a century ago. The major issues in Cyprus have morphed from
those centered around security in the traditional sense to those centered around the type of consociational
model and confidence buildings measures (CBMs) necessary to convince both communities to accept a
final agreement.

29
The final piece will be analyzing the negotiation process for its applicability and

inducements towards the building of peace – in particular looking at the institutions

imagined in the Annan plan. Specific policy recommendations will be offered towards

the goal of peacebuilding in Cyprus based on the models offered by the Annan plan. A

particular focus will be on Sisk’s idea of “sequencing”, but from a constitutional

perspective, the various institutions of the Annan plan to different parts of the island,

both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot, which were more supportive of the Annan plan

in the referendum of 2004 in an attempt to demonstrate the potential effectiveness and

unity-enhancing role these institutions might play.

Negotiation

Bargaining Framework

The framework within which negotiations between the two sides in Cyprus have been

conducted has been set by UN, in particular by a number of UN Security Council (UNSC)

and General Assembly resolutions. The Secretary-General of the UN has been assigned

by the Security Council as a “monitor” of the talks under UNSC Resolution 353. UNSC

Resolutions 359, 360, 364, 365 and 367 further established and then strengthened the

Secretary-General’s role and that of the UN in the conflict.

30
General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX) in November 1974 “officially endorsed the

preliminary intercommunal talks as the main negotiating model for resolving the Cyprus

problem” as well as affirming a number of key points (Michael 46).2 As General

Assembly resolutions are declarations without force of international law the UNSC

passed Resolution 367 affirming the General Assembly resolution which “established

intercommunal talks as the sole legitimate negotiating process and confirmed the

Secretary-General as convener and facilitator of this process” (Michael 47).3

The bargaining framework put in place by the UN guaranteed the primacy of the

organization and the Secretary-General in negotiations and locked-in the role of

intercommunal talks as the sole bargaining framework which would be utilized going

forward. By recognizing the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, mandating

that all refugees be allowed to return to their homes and urging the withdrawal of all

foreign troops from Cyprus the UN also endorsed a number of elements in the Greek-

Cypriot bargaining position, which had the effect of ensuring that the Turkish-Cypriot

side would always be operating from a “legitimacy deficit” in the eyes of the

2
GA Resolution 3212, in part : 1. Calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial
integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions
directed against it; 2. Urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military
presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its
affairs; 5. . Considers that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety and calls upon the parties
concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end;

3
UNSC Resolution 367: “Requests the Secretary General accordingly to undertake a new mission of good
offices and to that end to convene the two parties under new agreed procedures and to place himself
personally at their disposal, so that the resumption, the intensification and the progress of comprehensive
negotiations, carried out in a reciprocal spirit of understanding and of moderation under his personal
auspices and with his direction as appropriate, might thereby be facilitated (United Nations).

31
international community and would contribute to a perception of the balance of power

between the two sides.

Greek-Cypriot Bargaining Position

The bargaining position of the two parties directly involved in the Cyprus conflict, the

Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides, was each informed by the events of 1974,

when Turkey invaded the island in response to a coup engineered by the junta in

Greece. Following this series of events the Greek-Cypriot government, in conjunction

with Greece, laid out its positions, which came to be known as “the Athens doctrine”

(Michael 39). The doctrine is as follows:

1. The government of the Republic of Cyprus as the sole, legal government of

Cyprus
2. Support for a multiregional, bicommunal federation
3. The area comprising Turkish Cyprus should be equivalent to their share of the
population or in any case not exceed 25% of the population
4. The right of return of all refugees to their homes and property before the Turkish
invasion.
5. The right of property and freedom of movement of the population.
6. The removal of all foreign troops from Cyprus

The issue of international recognition of the government of the Republic of Cyprus is

extremely important from an analytical framework in looking at the balance of power in

the conflict. The Republic of Cyprus’ recognition by the international community as well

as its membership in multilateral institutions like the United Nations and (eventually)

the European Union has resulted in an asymmetrical balance of power between the two

32
sides (Schiff 390). Looking at the issue while applying Timothy Sisk’s perspective on

“fluctuating stalemate” illustrates the fact of the Republic of Cyprus’s international

legitimacy, endorsement of three of its bargaining position and its membership in

international organizations has resulted in a situation where the Republic of Cyprus is

always ascendant against the Turkish-Cypriot side. This has resulted in a “polarizing

condition, perpetuating conflict and not leading to avenues for resolution.” (Sisk 43).

Turkish-Cypriot Bargaining Position

In sharp contrast to the position of the Greek-Cypriot side the Turkish-Cypriots regarded

the Turkish invasion in 1974 as legal under Turkey’s guarantor powers. Their negotiation

conditions reflected this reality and also their belief that the Republic of Cyprus as

established under the 1960 constitution was no longer valid. The position of the Turkish-

Cypriot side was in large part an attempt to lock in their gains since 1974 and consisted

of the following:

1. The maintenance of the ethnic homogeneity of northern Cyprus.

2. The continuation of the Turkish military presence in northern Cyprus and the
role of Turkey as a military guarantor.
3. The support for a bicommunal and biregional state.
4. The rejection of a unified or multiregional state as proposed by the Greek-
Cypriot side.

As mentioned in the sections on the negotiating framework and the Greek-Cypriot

position the Turkish bargaining position was affected by a lack of international

legitimacy. The Turkish Cypriots operated under a strict international embargo which

impacted every area of life in Turkish Cyprus including the ability to travel abroad, to

33
participate in international sports competitions, receive international loans and many

other restrictions. None of the Turkish-Cypriot bargaining positions were legitimized by

the international community and it received no international backing other than that of

the Turkish government. During most of the negotiation phrase leading up to the Annan

plan the Turkish-Cypriot side was punished with a number of coercive measures and

offered almost no non-coercive ones, a balance of which is necessary “to induce the

parties to accept the settlement plan (Sisk 39).

This isolation would negatively affect the psyche of the Turkish-Cypriot side, causing an

imbalance in the perception of the symmetry of power between the two sides, and

would contribute to a position of defiance on the part of the Turkish-Cypriots which was

indirectly responsible for the declaration of independence of the TRNC in 1983.4

Additionally “the Greek Cypriot economic and political embargo, aimed at preventing

recognition of the Turkish Cypriot ‘state,’ only compounded the ideology of

separateness,” which did not bode well for peacebuilding efforts during the negotiation

process (Michael 42).

Turkish, Greek and United States Negotiating Positions

4
I am not endorsing the declaration of independence on the part of the TRNC but I am stating that their
isolation and the lack of incentives extended to the Turkish Cypriots caused a hardening of their negotiating
position which led to the independence declaration.

34
The Turkish and Greek states, as guarantor powers under the 1960 Constitution of the

Republic of Cyprus, also had a place at the negotiating table where their positions

adhered closely to those of their ethnic kin in Cyprus.

Greece followed the slogan “Cyprus Decides and Greece Follows” while Turkey adopted

a paternalistic approach towards the Turkish Cypriot state. The Turkish Republic was

heavily involved in the governance and subsidization of the Turkish-Cypriot state from

the point of its invasion in 1974 onward.

The US has been characterized as “the most important non-primary player in the

dispute (Michael 65).US strategy in the conflict was primarily concerned with keeping

Cyprus out of the Soviet orbit and maintaining peace between NATO allies Greece and

Turkey. US policy has also been influenced by the role of the politically important Greek-

American political lobby in the United States. The US, since the failure of the Nimetz

proposals in 1978, has tended to play a background role to that of the UNSG.

History of the Negotiating Process

The Cyprus conflict has experienced a lengthy negotiation process composed of

multiparty mediation held under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General

(UNSG). These efforts have included representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot

sides and at times the guarantor powers of Turkey & Greece as well as secondary

powers like the United States. In this section I will focus on the major negotiating efforts

35
in Cyprus including the talks mediated by UNSG Kurt Waldheim which resulted in high

level agreements and then focus on the only agreement to have ever been submitted to

both sides in the conflict for ratification – the Annan agreement.

The Vienna Talks 1975 - 1977

The “Vienna Talks” held between the two sides under the auspices of the UNSG and the

bargaining framework laid out by UNSC Resolution 367 comprised several rounds of

negotiations from 1975 – 1977 and collapsed upon the death of Cypriot President

Markarios, after which new negotiations took place under different monikers.

The Vienna talks were plagued by a lack of convergent interests and expectations on all

sides. One side would come to the table with a proposal on governance and the other

would respond with proposals on territoriality. The UN was hampered by the distrust of

the Turkish-Cypriot side, which was angered at numerous UN resolutions affirming its

opponent’s negotiating points and thus couldn’t act as a “powerful peacemaker.” The

Greek-Cypriot side had successfully internationalized the issue and knew it was in an

ascendant position vis-à-vis the Turkish side.

While several “High Level agreements” were negotiated over the years of negotiation

they all suffered from ambiguity on terms, in particular the use of “bicommunal” as a

reference point. There was a point of agreement in 1978 on the issue which was seen as

a major concession by the Greek side when it acknowledged that there would be

36
separate control by each community of different parts of the island. This concession

could be interpreted as a “ripe” moment.

A ripe moment, as discussed by Sisk, usually occurs during the process of prenegotiation

and is “a high-risk strategy, as the opposing party may seize upon a sign of conciliation

as weakness and, rather than responding with a reciprocal act of conciliation, may

“defect” or escalate in order to take advantage of the perception of weakness” (Sisk 46).

There was no further concession on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot side which was

symbolic of the lack of a convergence of interests between the two sides that plagued

the negotiations during all of their iterations.

Factors Contributing to Failure of the Vienna Talks and Subsequent

Rounds of Negotiations

From an analytical framework on negotiation the following appear as the lead causes of

the failure of the Vienna Talks and the subsequent rounds of negotiations leading to the

Annan plan. These factors are not listed in any particular order.

1. Asymmetrical balance of power between the two sides leading to a fluctuating

stalemate.
2. Lack of credible third-party guarantees.
3. Lack of “ripe moment” (convergent expectations) leading to meaningful
concessions from both sides.
4. Failure to employ “peacemaking with power” on behalf of the mediator.

The perception of security from each side’s perspective was radically different. Each

party also saw its “sphere of power” differently and resented the power of the other,

37
but as time would move on each party’s “sphere” would grow or shrink proportionally

to the other and actions such as UN resolutions buttressing the Greek-Cypriot side

(which was a deliberate and strategically important attempt by the Republic of Cyprus

to “internationalize” the situation) further added to each side’s perception of the

balance of power in the situation (Michael 75). As illustrated in the section on the

Greek-Cypriot bargaining position this situation has resulted in an asymmetrical balance

of power which led to a fluctuating stalemate and deadlock in negotiations.

Throughout the history of the Vienna talks and through subsequent rounds of

negotiations another critical element was missing – the lack of third-party guarantees

necessary to assist both sides in bridging the security dilemma which existed between

them. “Credible enforcement” is a necessary component of a functional peace

agreement and in the case of Cyprus neither party was prepared to accept the

guarantees the UN offered as “credible.” No additional third-party with the necessary

standing amongst the two sides then stepped forward, leaving this critical element

unfulfilled.

Talks between the two sides were also hampered by the lack of a “mediator with

power,” as Sisk calls it. The United Nations did not have the ability to offer a package of

non-coercive and coercive inducements to both sides. Because the UN was operating

under specific UNSC resolutions which had recognized a number of the bargaining

positions of the Greek-Cypriots its ability to act as a “powerful peacemaker… with the

38
[ability] to exercise strategic strength in leveraging the parties into peace” was limited

by the self-imposed conditions under which it operated (Sisk 156). As talks were

mandated to be conducted under the auspices of the UN, a body which repeatedly

passed resolutions the Turkish-Cypriot side felt were in opposition to their negotiating

position, this created a situation where the Turkish-Cypriot side would increasingly

come to view the UN as a not a partial mediator but one biased in favor of the Greek-

Cypriots. Whether this is true or not is unimportant, for what matters most in the

negotiating process are the perceptions of both sides.

All of the factors discussed in this section are critical to the success of any peacemaking

effort. The appearance of any one of them is troubling; the appearance of four would

make it extremely difficult to achieve meaningful progress in negotiations and are

directly responsible for the failure of the Vienna talks. Because none of them were

successfully ameliorated they have also played a role in the failure of subsequent

negotiations up to the Annan plan.

Fact Point 1

In 1983, in response to a UNGA assembly which demanded the withdrawal of all Turkish troops
from the island, the return of refugees to their homes and which called on all states to assist the
government of the Republic of Cyprus to exercise “its full and effective control over the entire
territory of Cyprus,” the Turkish-Cypriots declared the independence of the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC). No country other than Turkey recognized the TRNC and today Turkey
remains the only country to have done so.

39
The Annan Plan

The Annan Plan as submitted to the voters of Cyprus in April of 2004 was a product of

prenegotiation and negotiation from 2002 – 2004, but its creation through negotiation

was a product of the convergence of a number of different interests of primary and on-

primary actors to the Cyprus situation. The plan can be considered the product of a

“ripe moment” which was catalyzed by the decision of UNSG Kofi Annan to approach

negotiations from a different perspective and attempt to ameliorate the factors

discussed earlier which had led to the failure of other negotiation rounds in the past.

Specifically Annan would attempt a four-pronged linkage approach to the new round of

negotiations (Michael 169).

1. Annan intended to “utilize the membership applications of both Cyprus and

Turkey [to the EU] as a catalyst” for settlement/membership.
2. “Enlist the active support of the main external parties to the issue – the United
States and Britain.”
3. “Lock in the support of the motherlands – Greece and Turkey.”
4. “Use these pathways to alter the entrenched positions of the two communities.”

Another significant factor in the negotiations was the ability of the UNSG to unilaterally

impose conditions in any of the areas of the eventual agreement in the event of the two

sides to find a path forward. This was unique in that it prevented either party from

acting as the role of “spoiler.”

The European Union

The European Union (EU) began membership negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus

in 1990. This fact was viewed negatively by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership led by

40
longtime President Rauf Denktash, because it once again reinforced their perception of

asymmetry in balance of power and the always ascendant status of the Greek-Cypriot

side in international legitimacy.

The decision of the European Union in 2002 to drop conditionally as a requirement for

Cypriot membership “allowed the Republic of Cyprus to feel free of significant

constraints and act upon its own interests in the negotiations” (Schiff 406). “The EU

created a sense of crisis of impending sanctions that were directed at a single party –

Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots – while Greek Cypriots were under strictly verbal

pressure that was unaccompanied by any explicit theme” (Schiff 406). The EU lacked any

meaningful ability to act as a “peacemaker with power” and was largely relegated to the

sidelines of the negotiations

Turkish-Cypriots

The position of the Turkish-Cypriots had changed from the earlier rounds of

negotiations (Vienna) due to a convergence of a number of factors within and outside

the TRNC.

1. Change in internal political dynamics/Mass & elite support for peace - Rauf
Denktash’s political position was threatened due to rising economic and political
discord within the TRNC. The decades of international isolation imposed on the
TRNC had led to a decline in living standards amongst the Turkish-Cypriot
population caused inflation and a high emigration rate and there was growing
resentment to the influx of settlers from Anatolia and the continuing meddling in
the affairs of the TRNC by the Turkish state (see table below).

41
 2. The “win-set” of the TRNC changed between the rounds of negotiations after the
Turkish invasion to the beginning of the negotiations on the Annan plan because
“the prospect of imminent EU citizenship seemed to represent a better prospect
for their future than continuing on with the existing state of affairs” (Schiff 396).
3. Support of Elites - Parliamentary elections in Dec, 2003 brought to power in the
TRNC the opposition bloc, led by Mehmet Ali Talat. The new government
declared it would “work to achieve a unification agreement, which would
ultimately be decided in a referendum (Schiff 397).
4. Changing attitude of external ally/actor (Turkey) – the guarantors, protectors
and subsidizers of the TRNC, had changed with the advent of the AKP
government (discussed below)

The Turkish-Cypriot side appeared motivated by the fact an agreement held “greater

benefits… than they would achieve by abrogating negotiations” and returning to the

status quo (Sisk 55).

Per capita income in the north and south of Cyprus, 2004 (US$1,000s) 2
Nominal World Bank Atlas PPP Corrected
North 8.1 7.2 14.8
South 19.4 17.6 22.3
Ratio (north/south 42 41 66
as a percentage)
Source: World Bank (2006)

Turkey

Turkey’s desire to see a settlement achieved in Cyprus was motivated by its own desires

to join the European Union and by the fact that the new AKP government, elected in

November 2002, saw its own political fortunes as linked to European Union

membership, which it knew was highly unlikely in the event a divided Cyprus was

admitted to the EU with Turkish troops considered as occupiers in the north.

42
During negotiation over the Annan plan – through all of its iterations, Turkey’s Prime

Minister Erdogan “made it quite clear he would not be tolerating a rejectionist policy on

the part of Denktash (Asmussen 7). Denktash was now boxed in – were he to choose to

defy Turkey he would have to resign in which case Mehmet Ali Talat would take over as

President.

Greek-Cypriots

Contrasting starkly to the changes in the position of the TRNC and Turkey the Greek-

Cypriot side felt its position was assured by its guaranteed admission to the European

Union regardless of whether a unification agreement was reached or not. Despite

knowing its membership was a fait accompli the Greek-Cypriot side came under

“considerable pressure from the US, UN, the EU and Greece” to reach a settlement

before May 1st (Schiff 399).

There also did not exist within the Republic of Cyprus the same groundswell of either

mass or grassroots support for negotiations and settlement which existed in the TRNC –

which can be attributed to the fact that the populace of the Republic of Cyprus had seen

itself as ascendant for a number of years and their assured admission to the European

Union was the ultimate guarantee of that ascendancy. The Greek-Cypriot side felt “it

could not be worse off than in the case of an agreement which failed to protect its

interests” (Schiff 401).

43
The bargaining position of the Greek-Cypriot side was not motivated by the same

combination of external and internal factors that have been shown to be present in the

TRNC and Turkey. There existed no convergence of interests within the Republic of

Cyprus on negotiation and for settlement.

The Final Annan Plan (Annan V)

The Final Annan plan was a complex and lengthy document with five appendices and

nine annexes covering matters ranging from federal government, constitutional law and

federal laws, property rights, reconciliation commissions and the “coming into being” of

a new state of affairs. For the sake of expediency the focus here will be on the

constitutional arrangements of the document under the envisioned “United Cyprus

Republic” (UCR).

The Annan plan was a model of consociational power sharing. It allowed a minority veto

on “matters of importance to the group,” defined proportionality as the basis for

governance and allowed for substantial group autonomy (Sisk 57). It defined structures

and institutions which would allow for the sequenced return of refugees, guaranteeing

that for 19 years the ethnic balance of power in the different sections of Cyprus would

not be impacted. It ensured adequate compensation for those who lost land and/or

housing and also ensured that the process would not result in expulsions of either side

from dwellings they occupied currently (Annan Plan for Cyprus).

44
The Defeat of the Annan Plan

There was no implementation of the Annan plan because it was defeated in a

referendum in April 2004. It was approved by a majority of 64.9% on the Turkish Cypriot

side but was defeated resoundingly on the Greek Cypriot side by a majority of 75.8%.

The plan suffered from a number of defects in the eyes of both sides but was supported

on the Turkish side by a majority of the political establishment and by the consensus of

Turkish Cypriots that the plan represented the best deal they were going to get.

The Greek Cypriot side had a different perspective and different realities. A majority of

the political establishment (the elites) of the Republic of Cyprus, led by Papadopulous,

urged a “No” vote. This judgment was based on the perception amongst the Greek

Cypriot population that they had already given up enough (they had, after all, lost over

1/3 of their island to Turkish military occupation for almost 20 years at the time of the

vote) and that the agreement in no way represented their ascendant position as a

member of the European Union. This attitude can be encapsulated by Papdopoulos’

statement that he “did not receive a State… to deliver a ‘Community’” (Michael 180).

A “ripe moment” requires a convergence of expectations “by all sides” to be successful

(Sisk 46). The entry of Cyprus to the EU, the change in the political scene of the TRNC

and outside pressure were all seen as a prime motivating factor for all sides which

45
would induce the “ripe moment” necessary to bring the conflict to a conclusion. Sadly

this did not take into account the fact that for the Greek Cypriot side there did not exist

that “convergence of expectations.” There was certainly a convergence of expectation

of every other side – from Turkey, from the EU, from the Turkish Cypriots, Greece, the

UN and the United States. But the Greek Cypriot side, due to its advantaged bargaining

position and guaranteed entry to the EU, never had that moment of convergence critical

to creating an inducement to settlement.

In addition the guarantee by the European Union of accession regardless of whether

peace was reached on the island or not robbed the EU of the ability to induce a

mutually-hurting stalemate. When the European Union dropped conditionality as a

condition for Cypriot accession it should have “undertaken the process of socializing the

Cypriot political elite to realize the post-nation character of the Union” (Kaymak and

Vural 88). In this the EU failed entirely, with most of its initial focus on convincing the

Turkish-Cypriot side to pass the plan.

Fact Point 2

Primary reasons for failure of Annan plan in Referendum

 Lack of elite support which translated into lack of mass support within the
Republic of Cyprus.
 Lack of convergence of interests within the Republic of Cyprus.
 Failure to use cooperate-reward, defect-punishment approach on the part of the
UN or EU in reference to the Republic of Cyprus.

The Way Forward

46
Peacemaking efforts continue in Cyprus today and are motivated by the fact that a pro-

compromise Greek President, Demetris Christofias, was elected in 2008. With the

ascendance of Mehmet Ali Talat to the presidency of the TRNC in 2005 there could be a

convergence of expectations on both sides that was lacking during the negotiation

process leading up to the defeat of the Annan plan in 2004. In particular the issue of a

lack of support from the elite and masses in The Republic of Cyprus may be impacted by

the fact that the head of their state is in support of peacemaking efforts.

Without an agreement soon, before new presidential election in the TRNC in April 2010,

the prospects for peace look grim in Cyprus. The political situation in the TRNC doesn’t

look positive for the re-election of pro-Annan agreement president Talat. There exists

today a dangerous situation on Cyprus where both sides have become increasingly

accepting of partition – what can be referred to as the “Taiwanization” of Cyprus.

Especially alarming is the fact that it is “the youngest segments of both communities

that would vote “no” in the largest numbers in any referendum on the UN-mediated

settlement plan: (ICG 7). The failure of the global community to live up to its promises in

regards to the TRNC – the promise of aid and additional recognition if they passed the

Annan plan, has been blocked in many cases by the intransigence of the Republic of

Cyprus. This has led to a lessening of support from within both the elites and larger

public in the TRNC and jeopardized the future passage of any peace plan in the north of

the island.

47
Peacebuilding in Cyprus

Sequencing the Institutions of the Annan Plan

Varosha

Greek-Cypriot
Famagusta

In the wake of the failure of the Annan plan there exists a chance to work towards

peacebuilding efforts in the hopes of creating institutions spanning both sides of the

island. The Annan plan was far more heavily supported in the enclaved Famagusta area

of the Republic of Cyprus than in any other district (see map above). This seems to be

because “individuals in this district would have been strongly and directly affected by

the Annan Plan, given that within three months they would have regained the capital

city of their district, and the whole region would have been upgraded economically,

socially and culturally” (Lordos 24).

48
Negotiators could look to the results of the 2004 referendum on a district by district

basis and seek to apply a set of the institutions on a local level in the Famagusta district

as well as an equally-populated, adjacent portion of the TRNC which had supported the

agreement as well. This experiment could act as a “test tube” to implement, under strict

observation by both parties, certain portions of the agreement, such as a jointly-elected

district/city government and the return of Varosha, or part of Varosha to the control of

those who fled the area in 1974, which could then operate under joint-administration as

a condition of its return. These CBMs could demonstrate (hopefully) the effectiveness

and relevance to daily life of the Annan plan and contribute to acceptance of the plan on

both sides.

The residents of the Famagusta district saw tangible benefits from the passage of the

Annan plan and accordingly they supported it in larger numbers than anywhere else.

This same situation applied in the TRNC as well. The key then is to convince the rest of

the elites and the masses of the Greek Cypriot side of the tangible benefits from a new

peace agreement. Only by doing so will any new agreement receive approval on both

sides of the divided island.

Peacekeeping in Perpetuity? – Drawing Down UNFICYP

The United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus has been in place since 1964 and

tasked with the maintenance of its current functions since 1974. It currently consists of

1,052 personnel of which 941 are peacekeeping troops. It is routinely reauthorized

49
every six months by the UNSC and currently is budgeted for $54.41 million on a yearly

basis – of that amount 1/3 is paid by Cyprus and $6 million by Greece (UNFICYP).

There exists on Cyprus today a situation which no longer requires a UN peacekeeping

force at the level UNFICYP maintains. The presence of the troops is no longer required

to maintain peace but are acting to enforce the situation of partition on the island which

risks becoming permanent the longer the Greek-Cypriot public feels it is not in its

interest to approve a solution to the Cyprus problem. The force can be reduced in a

gradual manner in order to not upset the security situation but which may act as a

catalyst in inducing a ripe moment in negotiations.

50
Peacebuilding on Cyprus - Introduction
The case of the Cyprus conflict differs radically from many other “conflicts” which are analyzed

using post-conflict analysis because, unlike conflicts in states such as Sri Lanka and El Salvador,

the conflict in Cyprus is a frozen conflict which has devolved into a situation where two

populations, Greek and Turkish Cypriot, live in separate states – one recognized internationally,

the other a pariah state with no international recognition other than that of its patron – Turkey.

The two states are almost completely mono-ethnic and their existence represent the end result

of the use of population exchanges as a method of halting, if not ending, conflict based on

religion or ethnicity.

When analyzing the Cyprus conflict’s peacebuilding phase we are therefore left with a situation

which defies the neat analysis applied to other conflicts. Today a situation like the one is Cyprus

exists nowhere in the world (excepting perhaps Abkhazia and South Ossetia). The Cyprus conflict

is not an active, on-going conflict involving hostilities, it is not a conflict ended by the military

victory of one side or by a peace treaty acceptable to both sides. Because the conflict has lasted

so long (since 1963 and in its most modern iteration, since the Turkish invasion of 1974) it has

become not only a frozen conflict but one which is also stale5 – lacking in new ideas, energy and

initiatives engendered to bring about a permanent solution to the problems underlying the

situation. Analyzing the conflict, therefore, proves difficult within the context of contemporary

peacebuilding models such as those used by the World Bank, the United Nations or other

multilateral institutions.

5
The delineation of “stale” vs. “frozen” will be elaborated on in greater detail later in the report.

51
This report will identify and analyze horizontal inequalities and vertical dilemmas present in the

Cyprus conflict. Following the identification and analysis portions suggestions will then be

offered for remediation of horizontal inequalities as well as vertical dilemmas. In keeping with

the restricted nature of the analysis the report will try and focus on the human security and

international political economy dimensions of the Cyprus conflict and in particular focus on the

issue of property rights and ownership on both sides of the divided island. This report will focus,

in particular, on the European Court of Human Rights’ recent decision on property rights within

Cyprus and explore the ability of the decision to act as a “warming agent” on the conflict –

leading to the settlement of long outstanding issues which have kept the conflict frozen for

decades up until today.

Horizontal Inequalities in Cyprus

When the Turkish army began its invasion and subsequent partition of Cyprus in 1974 the island

had only experienced, at that point, a little longer than one decade of independence. But much

like the partition and frozen conflict that were to follow the independence of Cyprus was also

afflicted with frozen dynamics, both horizontal and vertical.

The period after the 1960 independence declaration was supposed to usher in an era of

consocialistic governance and peace between the two constituent communities on Cyprus.

Instead, because the Turkish Cypriot community exercised their minority veto so consistently

the Cypriot government made a conscious choice to remove minority protections in the

constitution in favor of majority rule (Zink 594).

52
This decision acted to lock into place the horizontal inequalities which pre-existed

independence. Almost every dimension Frances Stewart references in “Policies Towards

Horizontal Inequalities in Post-Conflict Resolution” were present in both pre and post

independence Cyprus – including the areas of participation in government and the army and

police, the issue of land holdings and income disparity, the use of resources and both private

and public unemployment. Turkish Cypriots were underrepresented in all of these spheres and

in some weren’t represented at all – namely participation in the government, especially after

the abrogation of the 1960 constitution (Stewart 6).

Text Box 1
Horizontal inequalities are more likely to lead to conflict when:
• They’re durable.
• They widen over time.
• Boundaries between groups are “relatively impermeable.”
• When groups are cohesive enough for collective action to emerge.
• When leaders are not coopted into the ruling system and are instead marginalized.
• When the government is irresponsive or violently repressive.

Source: Stewart 4.

The invasion of Turkey acted to separate the two sides of the islands in a partition enforced by

UN peacekeeping forces with one side of the island recognized as the legal ‘Republic of Cyprus’

and the other seen as a pseudo-state, a blank spot on the island of Cyprus occupied by Turkish

forces and completely cut off from the legally-recognized Republic of Cyprus (Theophanous 55).

Horizontal inequalities which were present on Cyprus were then magnified by the situation –

with one side availing itself of its legal recognition to develop a modern, European welfare state

while the other, unable to gain access to the same resources as their neighbor to the south,

relied heavily on Turkey for support and also on a number of shady enterprises such as

53
gambling, off-shore banking and more overtly illegal activities like the use of northern Cyprus as

a transshipment point for human trafficking and drug and gun-running (Cyprus).

The TRNC is often referred to as a “sleepy” state which due to an ECHR ruling in 1994 which

forbade exports from the unrecognized state, was forced to find other means of income. Yet this

synopsis is incorrect – the Turkish community in Cyprus has long been alienated, even before

the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974. As Bryant and Hatay established, the most recent

iteration is but a continuation of the long-term horizontal inequalities between the two states

(6).

The two community’s perceptions of horizontal inequalities, in particular the economic

disparities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, speaks to the importance of these issues in

contributing to and prolonging the conflict between the two sides of the island. A recent poll

conducted in Cyprus amongst both communities indicated that 58% of Greek Cypriots and 67%

of Turkish Cypriots agreed that social and economic inequalities have contributed to the

creation and perpetuation of the conflict (Hadjipavlou 26). The higher percentage of Turkish

Cypriots agreeing indicated the less privileged position of the Turkish Cypriot community before

the conflict began – as well as the continuation of that status after the Turkish invasion in 1974.

The cessation of hostilities between two or more parties is supposed to be marked by peace

milestones. These include the following:

• Cessation of hostilities and violence

• Signing of peace agreements
• Inception of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration
• Return of Refugees
• Establishment of the foundations for a functioning state

54
 • Initiation of reconciliation and societal integration
• Startup of economic recovery.

Source: (Collier et al. 6)

Table 1
Action
Cessation of hostilities and
violence
Signing of peace agreement
Inception of demobilization,
disarmament and
reintegration
Return of refugees
Establishment of the
foundations of a functioning
state
Initiation of reconciliation and
societal integration
Startup of economic recovery
Turkish/Greek Cypriot
Implementation?
Yes, Ceasefire signed
No, attempted but failed
No
No – exchange of refugees
Yes – separately. Both sides
developed separate states,
locking in the inequalities
which existed before the 1974
Turkish invasion
No, some small private efforts
but no official efforts.
In Greek Cyprus – Yes. In
Turkish Cyprus – No.
End Result
Ceasefire remains in place
today. No active hostilities
since 1975
Frozen conflict
No demobilization, no
disarmament and no
reintegration between either
side in Cyprus.
Both sides are now nearly
monoethnic states.
Horizontal inequalities (HI)
based around economic
assets, incomes and
employment and social
aspects strengthened.
The two sides remain
separated by a great distance.
HIs remain strong between
the two sides.

In the Cyprus conflict these seven peace milestones never fully developed and only three were

partly implemented between the two sides (Greek and Turkish Cypriots). A peace agreement

wasn’t signed – a cease-fire agreement was. Refugees weren’t returned – they were exchanged

between the two sides of the islands – creating monoethnic states on each side of the Green

Line and additional massive displacement of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. And each state

began to set up its own administrative and statebuilding tools on each side of the island –

further increasing the distance between the two sides.

55
Because of the pseudo-state status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) reliable

statistics on its economic performance are difficult to come by. Nonetheless data does exist

which shows wide variances between the two sides of the divided island in GDP growth, public

vs. private sector employment and unemployment rates (Theophanous 28). The skewed

economic situation in Cyprus has preserved and exacerbated the horizontal inequalities present

before and after independence and the Turkish invasion in 1974. While the Republic of Cyprus is

well integrated into the European and global economies the TRNC remains locked out of both

and heavily dependent on Turkey for trade and budgetary support.6

Much of what is seen on Cyprus today is also seen in other core-periphery conflicts within the

European theater – specifically the conflict in the north of Ireland which was solved with the

Good Friday Peace Agreement of 1998 (Zink 583). While the Republic of Cyprus through its

international recognition and membership in the European Union has been drawn into the core

of Europe its northern part – the TRNC, remains (along with Turkey) on the periphery. The old

horizontal inequalities pre-dating the Turkish invasion remain. Actors in the conflict on both

sides of the island have interests which are threatened by the possibility of peace and many

have become defenders of the status quo.

Thus the question must be – how can these horizontal inequalities be remediated within the

context of peacebuilding based on a European perspective and utilizing the resources of the

main actor in the region: the European Union? It is a fact that the European Union’s body of law

6
Much has been made of the TRNC’s high growth rates during the early part of the decade, which
averaged 10% per year compared to the Greek Cypriot state, which was closer to 2.6%. The TRNC’s
figures are misleading because they were mostly the product of a building boom predicated on illegal
expropriation of Greek Cypriot properties in the north. Much like the rest of the world the TRNC is now
experiencing a deep recession brought on by a bust in property values.

56
and regulations which all members must adapt, the acquis communautaire, is applicable to all of

Cyprus but has been suspended in the TRNC (Nathan Associates 9). From the point of view of

the ease of application of law the European theater must be the one which takes precedence in

the amelioration of the conflict in Cyprus (Mavrommatis 14). A recent decision by the European

Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on property rights within the TRNC will be focused on in this

paper as a valuable tool towards the resolution of the issue of property rights on both sides of

the island – this is one of the most key issues in attempting to bring about a settlement between

the two sides and one where both sides, as of now, have the widest divergence in expectations

of what a peace agreement can and will achieve. The issue of landownership, in particular the

ambiguous status of property rights in the TRNC is also one of the greatest horizontal

inequalities present in Cyprus. Perceptions regarding property rights immediately after the

defeat of the Annan plan in 2004 and continuing through today are critical in deciding how to

approach this issue.

Table 2
Perceptions in April 2004 Scope for perceptions to evolve

North South North South

Perceived Fear of Negative view Improved prospects This remains

effect on disruption from on credibility with local remedy a major (and now
property movements of proposed tougher) hurdle.
settlement deal

Source (Wilson 266)

The table above is provided to show the perceptions and scope for perceptions to evolve around

the issue of property settlement or restitution.

57
The matrix below, created by the United States State Department, provides a useful tool for

focusing more intently on the issue of property rights as a symptom and means of remediating

horizontal inequalities.

Table 3
Initial Response Transformation Fostering Sustainability

Evaluate existing laws Establish procedure to Ensure equitable

pertaining to land rights,
registration of the property,
and collateralization of
movable and immovable
property.
Take immediate steps where
needed to establish process
to resolve property issues.
resolve property rights for implementation of laws,
land and subterranean regulations and codes.
resources.
Draft laws and codes to
establish or strengthen
property rights including
customary or traditional
concepts where appropriate.
Establish process to reconcile
and address claims of
expropriations.

Adopt appropriate laws

regulations and codes.

Source: US State Department

Utilizing this matrix the report will next focus on the European Court of Human Rights decision

in March 2010 which will be used as a major focus for remediation of horizontal inequalities

based around property rights in Cyprus.

European Court of Human Rights Decision of March 2010

Demopoulos vs. Turkey Application nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/0, 13466/03, 10200/04,

14163/04. 19993/04 and 21819/04, European Court of Human Rights, April 2010 decided the

58
matter of a number of property claims by Greek Cypriots. I intend to examine this ruling in detail

and use its legal reasoning and the structures it put in place as a base from which to examine

and compel settlement of outstanding land claims in Cyprus – the outstanding status of which

has contributed to horizontal inequalities and the lack of human security on the island.

At issue in the case was the matter of the status of properties left behind by Greek Cypriot

refugees who had fled the north of the island in advance of invading forces from Turkey in 1974.

Members of the Greek Cypriot community had brought the case forward in hopes of being

awarded compensation from the court – whose decisions cannot be appealed and which are

binding on its members, which include 47 states (including Turkey and Cyprus) which are

members of the Council of Europe.

All of the applicants in this case were claimants of immovable property in the TRNC. All brought

forward their claims because they felt the domestic remedies provided by the TRNC did not

provide an effective remedy for their claims. Their specific claims were offered under Article 8 of

the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which states the

following:

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his home.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
in accordance with the law is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country.

The court, after walking through the particulars of the case and referencing past judgments,

issued its ruling.

59
The following is a broad overview of the court’s ruling and focuses on key issues germane to the

focus of this report:

• The court found that the claimants had failed to avail themselves of a suitable domestic

remedy for their claims – which is the Immovable Property Commission (IPC).

The IPC is a body established by an act of the TRNC parliament. It is composed of 7 members,
two of which are required to be non-citizens or residents of either the TRNC, the Republic of
Cyprus, Greece, Britain or Turkey. It has the power to order compensation and as of November,
2009 had awarded over 47 million Euros in compensation and adjudicated 361, 493 square
meters of property (ECHR 9).

What marked this decision as so momentous in the issue of the mitigation of horizontal

inequalities relating to property in Cyprus is that for the first time in the history of the court

hearing cases on the subject it ruled that an effective legal remedy now existed and that the

claimants should avail themselves of that remedy before coming to the ECHR for remedy. The

court’s reasoning is as follows:

• “The Court cannot emphasize enough that it is not a court of first instance.”
• “In the present applications, some thirty-five years have elapsed since the
applicants lost possession of property in northern Cyprus in 1974. Generations
have passed. The local population has not remained static.”
• “Accepting the functional reality of remedies is not tantamount to holding that
Turkey wields internationally-recognized sovereignty over Cyprus…”
• “The Court considers that there is an effective remedy for their [the claimants]
provided under the auspices of the respondent government. The court finds
that the [IPC] provides an accessible and effective framework of redress in
respect of complaints about interference with the property owned by Greek
Cypriots.”
• “For these reasons the Court decides unanimously to join the applications; and
declares by a majority the applications inadmissible.”

Analysis of ECHR Decision

60
By ruling that the TRNC had established a suitable and in the court’s estimation, impartial

method of adjudicating property claims in the TRNC the court had firmly set barriers around an

issue which previously had appeared open-ended and whose insolvability had plagued the

Cyprus issue from 1974 onwards. As shown from polling data the issue of horizontal inequalities,

including property, has been shown to be of strong concern to both communities. The Greek-

Cypriot community in particular has indicated that it out of a list of 11 possible challenges to

peace in Cyprus the 3rd most indicated answer is “poverty of the Turkish community

overburdening the Greek Cypriot community” (Georgiades 580).

Key Finding

The decision of the ECHR should therefore be cast as a major part of the solution to the issue of
poverty in the north by finally solving the outstanding issues of property claims (proper
ownership of land and immovable property being a necessary perquisite for any capital-based
economy) and removing a barrier to growth in the north as well as forcing the full financial
responsibility for payment of property claims in the north directly onto the TRNC and Turkey.

It is not only Greek Cypriots who are impacted by the ambiguous state of property in the north.

Turkish Cypriots are also well aware of the difficulties the ambiguous situation of the TRNC

represents:

Annan Planı'nın Kıbrıs sorununa çözüm getirmesi beklenirken, arazi parçaları gibi
gayrımenkul mülkler ile diğer gayrımenkul mülk konuları daha da karmaşık ve
içinden çıkılması hayli zor bir hale gelmiştir. Bu sebepten ötürü, Kıbrıs'taki
sorunlar adada yaşayan vatandaşlar için de oldukça karmaşık bir görünüm
kazanmıştır.

Also because of the Annan Plan failed, which was supposed to resolve the
Cyprus issue, the real estate properties such as a parcel of land, and the other
real estate property issues get complicated and obscured in Cyprus. The reasons
for this are the problems in Cyprus, which are too complicated actually for the
citizens (translated from Turkish by report author) (Tefik 142).

61
The issue of property therefore now has the potential to be transformed within the minds of

both communities, moving from one which was previously static to one which is now dynamic,

from one which was previously viewed as a possible costly hindrance on the south and whose

solution could act as a catalyst for solving the overall problem of the division of Cyprus, only one

aspect of which is horizontal inequalities (Berutti 27).

Key Finding
For the north the decision can act to resolve the ambiguities over property which have plagued

domestic and international ownership for so long. The frozen dynamics of Cyprus, which

includes a lack of support from elites on both sides of the island for a comprehensive

settlement, could be warmed by the utilization of the decision to provide movement forward in

negotiations.

Greek Cypriot Reaction to ECHR Ruling

While originally caught off-guard by the ECHR decision the government of the Republic of

Cyprus seems have settled on an position of urging its citizens to ignore the ruling and asking

them not to apply to the IPC for remediation of their cases.

“The government does not favour seeking recourse to the so-called commission,
especially now during the negotiations,” government spokesman Stefanos
Stefanou said. “The property issue will not be solved in the courts; it will be
solved on the negotiating table.”

62
 Stefanou said the ECHR decision did not take away any of the political and legal
arguments supporting the Greek Cypriot positions concerning the property issue
that were submitted in the negotiations (Cyprus Mail).

Yet the government of the Republic of Cyprus failed to mention that the IPC in the TRNC is not

open-ended. The commission has expiration date – November 2011. While the government’s

position is that its citizens should not avail themselves of the remedies the IPC offered, it has not

(nor could it – legally) prevented its citizens from doing so. The statement also represents the

continued manipulation of the desire of refugees to return to their homes. This occurs from

within the political elites on both sides of the island and is itself a refusal to accept the reality of

framework documents and high-level agreements since 1977, which all state that the return of

every refugee to their property is impossible (Hadjipavlou 67).7

As the Department of State essential tasks matrix shows the issue of property rights can be

transformed through establishing procedures, laws, codes and processes designed to establish

the principles of egalitarianism and justice in dealing with the issue. The IPC commission meets

these standards and thus fulfills this role in alleviating horizontal inequalities in Cyprus related

to property claims. The issue, therefore, is moved from the sphere of the political (dealing with

claims through the negotiation and bargaining process – as in the Annan plan) to that of the

judicial (ameliorating the issue through the use of the IPC). Polling data has long shown that the

issue of cost in reintegrating the poorer north is an issue with a large amount of importance to

voters in the south. If the government of the Republic of Cyprus is truly serious about

reunification the vehicle the IPC provides would enable it to move down that path with next-to-

no risk to the prosperity of the south.

7
Furthermore the manipulation of the expectations of refugees has been a powerful tool used by elites on
both sides of the island to win elections. We see this in other frozen conflicts as well – Palestine and
Western Sahara are two prime examples.

63
The final portion of the matrix is designed to create long-term objectives to achieve

sustainability in post-conflict reconstruction. Strengthening the rule of law is a key portion of

sustainability in post-conflict situations like that of Cyprus (United Nations 3). The

recommendation in this report on the utilization of the IPC is designed with the short and

medium-term interests of the situation in Cyprus in mind. Longer-term the requirements of the

situation will include a more permanent and cohesive set of initiatives to strengthen the rule of

law within the TNRC and align its legal system with that of the south and the European Union.

To accomplish this it is then recommended that the TRNC begin the process of adopting the

European Union’s acquis communautaire (Melakopidis 191). When Cyprus was admitted to the

European Union the acquis communautaire was suspended in the north. By beginning the

process of adopting the acquis communautaire the TRNC will show it is serious about its future

as a European Union member and signal to the south that the destiny of the two states is

beginning to converge. The TRNC should also work to make sure the EU-Turkey Customs Union

is implemented fully. The Customs Union has been held up by the refusal of Turkey to open its

ports and airspace to Greek Cypriot ships and aircraft. The TRNC can act as a mediator in this

dispute and signal its willingness to compromise by privately urging Turkey to follow through on

its commitments to the European Union (Turk 105).

Addressing Vertical Dilemmas on Both Sides of the Island

Within Cyprus there has never been an elite-masses consensus on the issue of reunification.

While horizontal inequalities have and continued to exist there also exist vertical dilemmas

which must be mitigated for any successful strategy on reunification to be implemented

successfully. As the defeat of the Annan plan showed us – without the support of elites the

masses will not follow. Completely lacking in the 2004 referendum was a comprehensive

64
strategy for dealing with this issue – particularly within the Greek-Cypriot community where an

almost entirely united front (excepting the trade unions and a few civic society-based actors)

opposed the Annan plan with devastating consequences for the agreement. Actors in the TRNC

were more varied in their responses but as the recent election of an anti-agreement president in

the TRNC shows us the previously amenable position of Turkish Cypriots is in danger of changing

for the worse.

In order to address the issue of vertical dilemmas in Cyprus it is recommended that two-track

diplomacy be utilized in order to involve all elements of society in the process of conflict

transformation (Sisk 245). Negotiations in Cyprus have traditionally followed the “top down”

approach as seen below:

Source: Source: Hemmer, Garb, Philips and Graham.

The top-down approach as illustrated above has been destructive to attempts to bring both

sides of the island together. In particular UNFICYP, the United Nations peacekeeping force on

Cyprus, has acted as a guarantor of separation between the two communities (Fisher 261) when

65
in reality UNFICYP is probably the best-placed actor on the island to work to achieve the

mitigation of vertical dilemmas because it is perceived as a neutral party and it already has a

long record of working with elites on both sides of the island. The top-down approach has also

enabled elites who may have an interest in perpetuating the frozen state of negotiations on the

island.

The role of UNFICYP should be modified. The UN Security Council (UNSC), when next renewing

the mission of UNFICYP, should change its mandate from one of peacekeeping to one of

peacebuilding. UNFICYP already peripherally carries out peacebuilding activities in the Cyprus by

bringing together both sides on issues relating to the dividing line – these meetings usually take

place in Nicosia in the Ledra Palace Hotel. By broadening and strengthening its mandate the

UNSC can act to utilize UNFICYP as a warming agent on the frozen conflict in Cyprus. After nearly

40 years on the island the United Nations should re-think the “peacekeeping in perpetuity”

approach and move forward on the utilization of its mission to build and strengthen the mission

of peace in Cyprus.

66
Source: Hemmer, Garb, Philips and Graham.

The image above is used to illustrate the role UNFICYP could play in negotiations between the

two sides in Cyprus. By acting as a track two diplomacy organization UNFICYP could fulfill the

role of warming agent in the frozen conflict. Possible other actors in this role could include the

European Union or the Non-Aligned Movement. But because UNFICYP is viewed as a neutral

agent by both sides it would be the ideal candidate for this role.

Peacebuilding Conclusion

If Cyprus at one point “lay at a crossroads,” those crossroads would have been reached

in 2004 when the Annan plan laid out a future of federalism and unification or a future

of partition. Cyprus today has moved from the crossroads of a choice of unification

under a federalist approach to a growing acceptance of partition and separate status for

both sides of the island – with the Greek Cypriots enjoying the fruits of international

67
recognition and EU membership while the Turkish side continues to struggle under an

internationally-recognized travel and trade embargo.

Current peace talks benefit from the fact that both sides now are represented by elites

who support negotiation. This could translate into greater appeal to the larger portion

of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in particular the Greek-Cypriot side – which saw a

combination of elite and mass opposition to the agreement in the last referendum. This

may be the last chance for peace for many years to come and it requires an intense

dedication on both parts to sell the idea of peace and not partition, with real and

tangible benefits, to both sides of the island.

This report has recommended two courses of action on Cyprus in order to “unfreeze” or “warm”

the frozen conflict. In addition Cyprus is characterized as not just a frozen conflict but one which

“stale,” stale being the opposite of ripeness as articulated in the second part of this report.

“Staleness” means that the conflict requires aggressive new approaches in order to inject energy

into negotiations as well as the penumbra surrounding negotiations – the “aura” of citizen and

civic society activity which surrounds any negotiation process. Staleness coupled with

frozenness is an extremely dangerous combination because it means not only are negotiations

surrounding the conflict trapped in a dead-end of repetitive policy recommendations and

endless negotiations but that no new activity is taking place around and from within the society

involving the negotiating parties. Examples of this include the Greek Cypriot refusal to accept

the IPC as a solution to their long-held demand for justice on property rights or the previous

68
refusal of the Turkish Cypriots to engage in good-faith negotiations with the European Union

unless they were treated as a state on equal footing with the south side of Cyprus.

By proposing the utilization of the IPC to mitigate the impact of long-term horizontal inequalities

this report is recommending action, specifically the amelioration of the issue of property rights,

which were a large factor in the defeat of the Annan plan in 2004. By acting on the issue of

frozen dynamics in negotiations and utilizing UNFICYP to ameliorate the role of vertical

dilemmas this report is proposing to create momentum forward with new agents and a “bottom

up” approach to stalled negotiations and peacebuilding on the island.

Ameliorating and reversing the corrosive effects of staleness in frozen conflicts is difficult.

Positions have hardened and generations have become locked into their view of the “other.”

But peacebuilding requires risk and it demands initiative and creativity on the part of all parties.

By seeking to unfreeze and ripen the conflict in order to push it more aggressively towards

settlement the recommendations within this report are acting within the best traditions of

peacemakers and peacebuilders. The long-frozen conflict in Cyprus demands creative,

innovative and original thinking. Beginning with a campaign to convince Greek Cypriots to utilize

the IPC and continuing with creating a multi-track approach to diplomacy using United Nations

personnel already on the ground in Cyprus this report and its recommendations are moving

beyond the stale rhetoric and actions of the past.

Utilizing the recommendations of Frances Stewart, which include political and/or economic

entitlements designed to ameliorate the impact of long-standing horizontal inequalities on

conflict situations, while at the same time avoiding the earlier mistakes of post-independence

Cyprus, which saw the consocialistic arrangement become a source of conflict vs. a solution to

69
it, this report is designed to encourage a remediative approach to the horizontal inequalities

through economic, specifically property rights, which have long plagued Cyprus.

70
Report Conclusion
It has been said many times that a certain event presents “the last best chance” for peace on

Cyprus. In 2004 this was said about the Annan plan. It was said about the election of a pro-

settlement leader on both sides of the island as well. Certainly the actors can present either an

enormous opportunity for peace or an incredible obstacle. But as has been demonstrated actors

do not always make the difference – in the case of Cyprus the lack of popular will for

reunification, at least in the south and now growing in the north, presents as big or bigger of a

challenge to solving the issue of partition and creating a lasting and sustainable peace.

This report has offered a plethora of recommendations for moving around the obstacles of

entrenched elite opinion in hopes of creating a groundswell of popular support, which has been

particularly lacking in the south, for reunification. The report’s focus has been in particular on

the issue of remediating the horizontal inequalities which plagued Cyprus long before its

independence but which have grown increasingly vast since the Turkish invasion in 1974. As has

been shown in the north of Ireland with the Good Friday Accord – ancient enmities fed by

horizontal inequalities as well as vertical dilemmas do not have to remain as permanent features

of any society. A ripe moment can come about due to internal or external pressure or a

combination of both. In the case of Cyprus there has long been an enormous amount of external

pressure for a settlement but what has often been overlooked has been the creation of mass

support for reunification and perhaps more importantly – the creation of a positive and

persuasive case for reunification.

71
It is hoped the recommendations offered here will spur this movement. That the case for

reunification can be presented affirmatively – as a means of inducing movement in the stale

dynamics of the island and in appealing to a broad cross-section of both sides of the island who

long for an end to this conflict.

72
Appendix

1. Chronology of Key Events

1960 – Cyprus gains independence from Britain.

1963 – Outbreak of violence between the two communities.
1974 – De facto division of the island into two seats.
1977, 1979 – Signing of the “High Level Agreements.”
1983 – Declaration of the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC) by Rauf Denktash.
1998 – The Republic of Cyprus begins negotiations for accession into the UN.
1999 – Helsinki Summit: the EU decided that the resolution of the Cyprus conflict is
not a preliminary condition for Cyprus’ entry into the EU in May 2004.
November 2002 – Publication of the first version of the Annan plan.
March 2003 – Hague Summit – failure of the parties discussions of the Annan Plan.
Annan announces termination of his efforts.
December 2003 – Papadopoulos sends a letter to the UN Secretary General
requesting him to propose a new initiative.
Late January – Early February 2004 – Turkish PM, Erdogan, meets with the UN
Secretary General and US President Bush, and expresses Turkey’s willingness to
respond positively to the Annan initiative.
February 4, 2004 – Kofi Annan sends a letter to the leaders of both Cypriot
communities, inviting them to New York to discuss a timetable for the resolution of
the conflict.
February 10–13, 2004 – The leaders meet in New York
February 13, 2004 – The leaders agree to officially renew negotiations
February 19-March 31, 2004 – The parties hold two rounds of talks in Nicosia and
Birkenstock, Switzerland but fail to reach any new agreement. Annan uses his
authority as an arbitrator and submits the proposal for referendum.
April 24, 2004 – Greek Cypriots reject the Annan Plan with a 75.8% majority while a
majority (64.9%) of the Turkish Cypriots approve the Plan.
May 1, 2004 – Cyprus, represented by the government of the Republic of Cyprus,
joins the European Union.
2006 – Talks restart between chief negotiators for late Greek Cypriot president
Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot president Mehmet Ali Talat.
December 2006 – European Council suspends eight of the chapters Turkey was
negotiating for possible accession to the UN under pressure from Cypriot
government

73
February 2008 – New Greek Cypriot president, Demetris Christofias, elected who is
not associated with ethnic nationalism or the “No” campaign on the Annan
referendum.
March 2008 – Christofias and Talat meet and agree to new round of UN talks.
April 2008 – New crossing point in Nicosia opened.
May 2008 – Parameters agreed upon by two presidents – federation of two
“constituent states” and “a single international personality.”
July 2008 – Agreement reached on “single sovereignty and citizenship – a total of 22
technical agreements signed.
September 2008 – Negotiations continue

Source: Amira Schiff and the International Crisis Group

74
Biblography

Anastasiou, Harry. The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and the Quest
for Peace in Cyprus. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Syracuse: Syracuse UP, NY. Print.

"The Annan Plan - The Text of the Plan." THE ANNAN PLAN FOR CYPRUS. United Nations,
6 Apr. 2004. Web. 1 Mar. 2010. <http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/>.

Application Nos 46113/99. Grand Chamber - The European Court of Human Rights. 14
Mar. 2010. Print.

Asmussen, Jan. Cyprus after the Failure of the Annan-plan. Rep. no. 11. Flensburg:
European Centre for Minority Issues, 2004. Print.

Bryant, Rebecca, and Mete Hatay. Suing for Sovereignty: Property, Territory and the
EU's Cyprus Problem. Rep. Istanbul: Istanbul Kultur University, 2010. Print. Global
Political Trends Center.

Cyprus: Reunification or Partition. Rep. Europe Report 201 ed. Brussels: International
Crisis Group, 2009. Print.

"Cyprus." CIA World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, 26 Apr. 2010. Web. 1 May
2010. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>.

Collier, Paul, V.L Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas
Sambanis. Breaking the Conflict Trap. Rep. Vol. 26121. Washington, DC: World Bank and
Oxford UP, 2003. Print.

Fisher, Ronald J. "The Potential for Peacebuilding: Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping
to Peacebuilding." Peace and Change 18.3 (1993): 247-66. Web. 1 May 2010.

Fisher, Ronald J. "Cyprus - The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-
Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse." Journal of Peace Research 38.3 (2001): 307-
26. Print.

Global. World Bank. Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy. By
Paul Collier, V. L. Elliott, Harvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and
Nicholas Sambanis. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003. Print.

Georgiades, Savvas D. "Public Attitudes Towards Peace: The Greek-Cypriot Position."

Journal of Peace Research 44.573 (2007): 573-86. SAGE. Web. 1 May 2010.

75
Georgiadu, Stavroula. "Mainstreaming and Knowledge Management of Conflict
Prevention and Peacebuilding in Cyprus." Gender in Cyprus. United Nations
Development Program. Web

Hadjipavlou, Maria. "Women of Cyprus at the crossroads between traditionalism,

modernity and post-modernity." Cyprus: a conflict at the crossroads. 1st ed. New York:
Manchester UP, 2009. 237-55. Print.

Hadjipavlou, Maria. "Multiple Stories: The 'crossings' as Part of Citizens Reconciliation

Efforts in Cyprus." Innovation 2007th ser. 20.1 (2007): 53-73. Web.

Hadjipavlou, Maria. Root Cause of Conflict, Challenges at the Micro Level and Implication
in Post Conflict Cyprus. Department of Social and Political Sciences - University of
Cyprus, Oct. 2002. Web. 15 Apr. 2010.

Hemmer, Bruce, Paula Garb, Marlett Phillips, and John L. Graham. "Putting the "Up" in
Bottom-up Peacebuilding: Broadening the Concept of Peace Negotiations." International
Negotiation (2006): 129-62. Web. 1 May 2010.

Jarstad, Anna. "Power Sharing for Peace and Democracy?!" From War to Democracy:
Dilemmas of Peacebuilding. Proc. of International Studies Association, San Diego. 1st ed.
Cambridge UP, 2008. Print.

Kaufmann, Chaim. "An Assessment of the Partition of Cyprus." International Studies

Perspectives 8 (2007): 206-23. Print.

Kaymack, Erol, and Yucel Vural. "Intra-communal Dynamics: European Union Discourses
among Turkish-Cypriot Political Actors before and after the Failed Referenda." Cyprus a
Conflict at the Crossroads. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2009. 84-101. Print.

Large, Judith, and Timothy D. Sisk. Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Pursuing
Peace in the 21st Century. Rep. Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (IDEA), 2006. Print.

Lordos, Alexandros. "Rational Agent or Unthinking Follower? A Survery-based Profile

Analysis of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Refernda Voters." Cyprus: a Conflict at the
Crossroads. Vol. 1. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2009. 17-47. Print.

Mavrommatis, Manthos. "Economic Growth and Development." PRIO Cyprus Centre,

2nd Annual Conference. Proc. of Economic Perspectives in CyprusL the Path towards
Reunification, Nicosia, Cyprus. 1-47. Print.

Mavrou, Eleni, Rasit Perev, and Michael Moller. "Cyprus: "A Cold Peace"" Interview by
David Berruti. Rivista 4 Feb. 2008: 21-35. Print.

76
Melakopides, Costas. "Euro-Mediterranean Peacebuilding: The Exit from the Cypriot-
Turkish Labryinth." 177-200. Web. 25 Apr. 2010.

Michael, Michalis S. Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print.

Papadakis, Yiannis. Echoes From The Dead Zone: Across the Cyprus Divide. New York: I.B.
Tauris and Co Ltd, 2006. Print.

"Policies toward Horizontal Inequalities in Post-War Reconstruction." CRISE Working

Paper 7: 1-37. Web.

Psyllides, George. "Stay Away from the IPC." CyprusMail, 29 Apr. 2010. Web. 1 May
2010.

Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance yet. Rep. no. 194. Brussels: International Crisis
Group, 2008. Print.

Schiff, Amira. "Pre-negotiation and Its Limits in Etho-National Conflicts: A Systemetic

Analysis of Process and Outcomes in the Cyprus Negotiations." International Negotiation
13 (2008): 387-412. Print.

Sisk, Timothy D. "Peacebuilding as Democratization: Findings and Implications." War-to-

Democracy Transitions: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP,
2009. 239-59. Print.

Sisk, Timothy D. International Mediation in Civil Wars: Bargaining with Bullets. London:
Routledge, 2009. Print.

Souter, David. "A Review of the Cyprus Problem." Third World Quarterly 6.3 (1984): 657-
74. Print.

Strand, Arne. "The Smaller Issues Complicating the Larger Picture." The Cyprus Review
21 (2009): 187-92. Print.
TEFÄ°K, ELÄ°Z I. DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY PERCEPTIONS:
IMMIGRANT TURKS FROM BULGARIA IN NORTHERN CYPRUS. Thesis. Middle East
Technical University, 2007. Print.

Frances Stewart, n.d. “Policies toward Horizontal Inequalities in Post-War

Reconstruction,” CRISE Working Paper No., 7.

Theophanous, Andreas. The Political Economy of a Cyprus Settlement: The Examination

of Four Scenario. Rep. Vol. 1. Nicosia: PRIO - Cyprus Center, Cyprus. Print. Ser. 2008.

77
Turk, Marco. "Rethinking the Cyprus Problem: Are Frame-breaking Chnages Still Possible
Through Application of Intractable Conflict Intervention Approaches to This "Hurting
Stalemate?"" Loyola LA Int'l and Comp Review 29.101 (2007): 101-39. Web.

"UNFICYP Facts and Figures." UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.
United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Web. 2 Mar. 2010.
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unficyp/>.

United Nations. United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). Division of Early Warning
and Assessment (DEWA). Understanding Environment, Conflict and Cooperation.
Nairobi: United Nations Environment Program, 2004. Print.

United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field

Support. A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. By
Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra. New York: UN, 2009. Print.

United States. United States Department of State. Office of the Coordinator of

Reconstruction and Stabilization. Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks. Print.
United States. National Security Council. NSSM 227. Washington, DC, 1975. Print.

Watson, Max. "Growing Together? Prospects for Economic Convergence and

Reunification in Cyprus." Cyprus a Conflict at the Crossroads. Ed. Thomas Diez and
Nathalie Tocci. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2009. 256-72. Print.

Webb, Keith, and A.J.R Groom. Settlements in Unended Conflicts: The Case of Cyprus.
Rep. Print.

Weisman, Alan. The World Without Us. New York: Thomas Dunne, 2007. Print.

Yilmaz, Muzaffer E. "The Psychological Roots of the Cyprus Problem - Path to Solution."
Diss. American University, 1998. Print.

Zink, Allan. "Northern Ireland and Cyprus: Towards a Typology of Intercommunal

Conflict in the European Periphery." Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 14.4 (2008): 579-
612. Web.

78