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541273
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LIBRARY
Class Symbol... J O M 5 ^ 2 2 ~ 4
Accession Number
C&GSC Library A
PL9-0733—C&GSC—30 Nov 48—3M
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
S A R D I N I A • C O R S I C A • SOUTHERN FRANCE
2 3 MAR 1949
ORDNANCE ACTIVITIES
in
From England and the United States through Africa to the Italian Alpsx. through heatP mud^, snow£, and cold. Ordnance Service
successfully supported the Allied forces which fought and slugged their way to victory over the highly efficient German Army3
To do this tremendous job has required sweat and pain and unmitigated hard work* It has meant receiving^ moving from dump
to dump, or manhandling 12,500^000 tons of ammunition! keeping operative an average of lOOcOOO vehicles! maintenance to absol
ute accuracy of I70C artillery weapons! the care of delicate fire control equipment! and supplying for the Army and the Army
Air Forces each and every Ordnance item with which they fought their battless from four ounc8 wrist watches to monstrous 45-ton
tank transporters. To accomplish this huge task has necessitated an average of 20j,000 highly trained US Ordnance mens. the
thousands of special tools with which they work and vast depots of supplies.
Ordnance laid its initial plans to support the African invasion in Norfolk House in London in the early fall of 1942. Since
that time this theater has staged major amphibious operations in North Africaf Sicilys Italyt Anzio^ and Southern France* The
headaches and heartaches were many., There was the extremely difficult job of supporting the Tunisian operation against a
determined enemy over ground supply lines more than l s 500 miles long. There were numerous occasions when tubes of large caliber
units had to be changed under artillery fire at the batter position. It would have been Impossible to haul the guns back to
the Ordnance repair shops % consequently combat zone Ordnance Service loaded spare tubes on transporters and did the job at the
gun position. This meant hauling over roads slippery with ice or axel deep in mud4 over roads where maximum possible speeds
rarely exceeded two miles per hour. Howevera the repair crews arrived; the tubes were changed with the aid of light given off
by bursting enemy shellsj tests and checks were made and the guns were quickly back in action to pound the jerries* lines*
This was typical of the work performed by combat zone Ordnance Service. All Ordnance maintenance companies in Army sent forward
"Contact parties" to the using arms, as regularly as the milkman at home, to deliver Ordnance spare parts and supplies and to make
The Luftwaffe was an active ¥/8apon against the forces fighting in MTCUSA. In Tuniss. Palermo5 Naples, Bizertes Cassino^ Anzios
and manyP many other placesi work by ArmyP Air Forces and Base Ordnance units alike had to continue to turn out the completed jobs
even though bombing raids were in progresss or they had to dig out before the work could be continued. Enemy planes often strafed
Army Ordnance units on the move or in their field set-up. Deadly enemy artillery greatly hampered and handicapped Ordnance opera
tions at Anzio where heartaches were plentiful. Here the whole tiny beach head was continually under the direct observation and
intense fire of every known caliber of enemy artillery. Even the well known "Anzio Annie", a German 280 mm cannon^ with a range
greater than any weapon the Allies had at their disposals except the Air Force, added its terrifying weight to this inferno» Wot
only were maintenance units hampered, by these raids^ but also supply and ammunition personnel. The latter often became fire fighters
as fires were started nightly and spread from concussions or explosions in ammunition dumps. These fires were very costly in
ammunition which was difficult to obtain and required tankst. improvised as fire trucks with bulldozer blades; to combat the
conflagrations. Regardless of the danger the ammunition had to be saved. These, the dusty tortuous roads in the mountains of
Sicilys. the heat of the desert in Africa^ the rainp lava dust^ and difficult terrain in Italy$ plagued Ordnance Service incessantly
Ordnance Service had few people to support operations in the early stages, Experience was limited and had to be gained through
hard knocks. By the end of the successful Tunisian campaigns Ordnance had brought in about 1,500 pieces of artilleryr 46 ,.000
vehicles and 400,000 tons of ammunition. The combat troops had consumed nearly 240^000 tons of this ammunition and well over
2. 000,000 tons had been physically moved or removed before the end of that one campaign.,
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'While this school of hard knocks was in session in Tunisia, Ordnance men at the bases in the rear areas were far from being
on "Easy Street". Supplies of all types, as originally requisitioned for during the planning of the operations, were pouring in
at Casablanca^ Oran s Algiersi and later at Bizerte. They all had to be handled^ stored^ or put into hands that could use them
immediately, Adequate work and storage areas had to be located. Transportation had to be provided without delay. To supply the
latterp bigs heavy, charocoal burning civilian trucks were often used in ports and in depot areas in order to release standard
vehicles for the long hauls to the front lines. The unpacking and assembly of crated trucks had to be initiated at once, Again
experience was limited, motor vehicle assembly companies had not arrived and the how-to-do-it had to be learned the hard way.
French£ Spanishs and Arab civilians were employed and trained in these operations. Language differences and racial habits
To accomplish these tasks Ordnance personnel had to be spread very thinly and used in supervisory or teaching capacities over
unskilled and semi-skilled labor. At the end of December 1942s there were only 931 Ordnance men in the Gran area s and 615 in
the Casablanca area. In addition there were but 3133 Ordnance men with the Task Forces and 600 with the Ordnance maintenance
and depot companies of the Army Air Forces. It was nearly three months after the beginning of operations before sufficient
Ordnance personnel had arrived to permit the setting up of large maintenance shops. It was eight months before truck engines
could be completely overhauled right in the theater instead of having to evacuate them to the United States, One year elapsed
before conditions permitted tire repair shops to operate and at no time was there sufficient maintenance personnel available
in Africa to permit proper control of supply and maintenance. The Base installations,, due to this shortage^ were forced to oper
ate as retailers instead of wholesalers. By the end of the campaign in May in Tunisia the total troop strength in the theater was
approximately 350,000. Of this total there were just 9 s 000 Ordnance m@n with the combat forces^ and 14,000 Ordnance men in the
service areas and with the Army Air Forces, or s about ?J^fo of the total were Ordnance men with the combat forces and about 4$
43 #3 43 43 4V 4* 4* 4* 4$ 4S
Each of these percentages is almost exactly one half of what the standards for balanced operations call for. Despite the fact
that Ordnance was 50% understrength} over three hundred thousand tons of ammunition^ weaponst and vehicles„ in addition to the
equipment which had been brought as immediate support for the invading forces, had been received into the theater,- stored, accounted
These same conditions9 namely the Ordnance personnel shortagesp have continued throughout the campaigns in MTCUSA. Howevers this
was according to plan. It was originally determined that the theater would not be given sufficient Ordnance personnel and that
existing Ordnance units would have to be augmented by civilians and prisoners of war. This procedure worked out fairly satisfacto
rily except for two points• First, additional equipment and facilities were not provided with which the civilians and prisoners of
war were to work, second^ required officer and enlisted supervisory personnel were not provided. A striking example of this existed
at a vehicle assembly plant in MTOUSA. A normal assembly company consists of 178 men and has a work 'capacity of 75 vehicles per
day. This capacity had to be doubled, but the only way it could be accomplished was by more than doubling th© personnel strength
with civilians. The latter could be trained to do the work readily enough, but they had to have tools and these were never avail
able in adequate quantities to meet th© needs. Similarly, the same situation was common to all maintenance shops and even to some
The main ports in North Africa were operated by headquarters known as Base Sections* In the beginning each handled its own supplies,
including the job of replenishing its stocks from the ports of embarkation in the States, All operated practically independently
of each other,, and we fumbled along. Nevertheless^ the material needed by II Corps and the Army Air Forces were supplied even though
co-ordination between Bases was almost non-existent. Distance was a great handicap. It was five hundred miles from Casablanca to
Oran and one thousand miles over tortuous roads from Cran to Bizerte. In order to provide the essential liaison,, and control over
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the entire available stocks in the theater, the Headquarters, Services of Supply, NATGUSA, was established in March 1943. They
then, had the task of coordinating activities, balancing and distributing theater stocks and planning for replenishments
Accounting systems were centralised which gave the Base Sections more freedom for actual operations.
In February 1943, almost three months before the actual completion of operations in Tunisia, plans were started for the
Sicilian campaign. The problem at this stage presented differences from the planning for the invasion of Africa in that the
facilities of the War Department and big Ordnance establishments were not available. Detailed requisitions for supplies to
accompany the assault forces as well as supplies to build the stock piles in Sicily for the first four months had to be prepared.
Suggestive of the enormous paper work involved is that each set of bimonthly requisitions, in six copies weighed sixty pounds.
As the overall plans were changed or altered, the requisitions, too, had to be changed to make allowances for the new situa
tion. However, at the last minute, this was not always possible. As an example, plans originally called for the use of M1O tank
destroyers, with their three inch guns, but none were ever put into action in Sicily, due to last minute'tactical changes.
Ordnance had provided for a number of replacement vehicles as well as 30,000 rounds of ammunition for the guns. All such ttoverw
supply was conserved and used to its maximum advantage in later campaigns.
During the invasion of North Africa, although the majority of Combat Ordnance troops were landed during the early stages of
the operations, it was learned that they were in insufficient strength to give adequate support- to the combat units. Therefore^
the percentage of combat Ordnance troops landed during the early stages of the Sicilian invasion was increased. Again it was
learned that the increase was still not sufficient and that more Ordnance men could have been used to advantage on the beach
heads. All such lessons learned were taken advantage of in future operations.
The Army Air Forces had their share of problems in the supply and maintenance of Ordnance equipment* In Africa, the Ordnance
Section, Headquarters, XII Air Force Service Command - which later, in Italyx became the Ordnance Section, Headquarters Army
Air Forces Service Command, MTO - has always had the responsibility of keeping a steady flow of Ordnance equipment peculiar to the
Air Forces coming in from the States* Items common to the Air Forces and the Ground Forces were requisitioned from the Base Depotso
To further facilitate in bringing Ordnance Service to the Fighter and Bomber Groupsf early in the African campaign Air Force
Ordnance Depots were establishedo These requisitioned in bulk^ rather than have each small unit make long hauls from the Bases for
comparatively small quantitieso The small units mentioned are Ordnance Supply and Maintenance Companies whose task it is to serve
Ai:r Groups, even the delivering of bombs right to the aircraft, In conjunction with the depots., maintenance shops were established
which were capable of handling all but the very heaviest of maintenance jobs^ It was only the latter which had to be evacuated to
the Base Shops for repair or for salvage. This supply and maintenance system has materially lightened the work load on the Base
installations and it has resulted in obtaining the maximum use of equipment with the minimum loss of time in waiting for repair or
Numerous problems occurred during the equipping of the French units organized in Africa, Besides the supplies£ their equipment
had to "be maintained by U o S a Ordnance until French personnel could be trained. Schools were set up and operated by Ordnance men
to teach the French proper use and care of American materiel, Prio"5 to the time supporting French personnel could be completely
trained in maintenance, French divisions were fighting m Italyx adding their service load to the already overtaxed Ordnance units*
Gradually^ as the war moved on, the scope of responsibilities of the Headquarters, Services of Supply, wer© spread to include
control of Bases as they were established successively in Sicily,. Sardinia^ Corsica, Italy, and Southern France a Not only did
supplies and maintenance facilities have to be provided to support each amphibious operationy but also personnel had to be dispatch
ed to operate each new installation needed to carry on the fight* The latter meant that Ordnance men in the other and older areas
Confiscated or captured enemy Ordnance Materiel in large quantities was reconditioned when practical and subsequently issued
for use by Allied Armies. The many thousands of rifles and other small arms made available by these means both helped to alleviate
shortages, to conserve similar American materials and shipping space that would have been required to transport them*
In connection with all phases of all Ordnance activities in this Theater the utilization of local facilities and resourcess the
clearing of mines and unexploded bombs from buildings^ factories or battle fields}; the training of civilians., in order to conserve
men,- equipment£ and materielp to handle part of the tremendous work loadr and the cleaning up and closing out of areas and installa
tions as they were no longer required,, have all been part and parcel with the whole program. Also the supply and maintenance picture
has been additionally complicated in that the British, French and Brazilians have needed supplies from Base stocks and much of this
equipment has had to be maintained in Ordnance shops„ Italian Army Service units had to be equipped and trained. Civilian organiza
tions,, such as the American Red Cross,., and quasi military unitss such as the Office of Strategic Services or the Criminal Investiga
tion Department > needed help to keep their equipment operating. All thesey and many others,,, have been continuous functions
$Q discussion of Ordnance activities would be complete without paying tribute to the Ordnance Bomb Disposal experts* These are
the men who Refused,, or otherwise made nonfunctional,, enemy delayed action bombs a duds£ and land mines in order that further loss
of life arid equipment would be avoided^ They passed back intelligence on enemy ammunition as fast as it was ascertained* The
wrong twist of a nut,, a slight jar,, the wrong pressure^, or a new and hitherto unknown^ * gadget** might be all that would be necessary
to ser- off a booby crsp o?- cause a fatal detonation. Many men have given their lives in this work and many others have saved the
lives of countless soldiers and civilians by going about their jobs unhesitatingly and with cool courage.
In accomplishing its mission since the invasion of North Africa, the Ordnance personnel have physically handled the receipt of 3
as well as the paper work incident to the procuring of and accounting for> a grand total of three and one half million tons of
supplies and equipment,. Of this total 10% of the tonnage represents ammunition^ vehicles account for an additional ZWa: and the
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TONS OF ORONANCE SUPPLIES RECEIVED IN MTOUSA
TOMS
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remaining 10$ consisted of weapons and general supplies«, Experience having shown that all material must be handled and rehandled
a minimum of at least five times before it even reaches the using arms } it would be more nearly correct to say that at least
seventeen million tons of Ordnance supplies have been handled or rehandled in this theater in the past two and one half years.
To help visualise the vastness of these quantities of suppliesf let us consider them in terms of Liberty ships. Such a ship
can normally carry an average of eleven thousand ship tons of materials. Therefore, had all vessels been loaded one hundred percent
with Ordnance equipment,, a convoy of at least six hundred and eighteen vessels would have been required to transport the entire
tonnage at one time« Howevers just receiving materials does not solve the whole problem* Sometimes supplies must be reshipped to
other Basesg or to other theaters of operation and depending on many circumstances, this may be accomplished by landx seas or air
cargo carriers. During the campaigns in MIO all three methods of shipping have been used. In fact, in the past two and one half
years it has been necessary to trans-ship a grand total of nearly three million tons of Ordnance materials to other points within
the theater or to other theaters. An estimate of the staggering maintenance load performed by the base shops only is exemplified
by observing that in this theater, 126^,669 vehicles have been assembled! 341,048 vehiclesP l s 307 9 382 small arms,, 27 t 242 pieces of
artillerys and 846 S 863 tires have been repaired! and 249^979 rounds of artillery ammunition have been renovated.
Throughout the series of campaigns there was one major problem that complicated operations of the Theater. That was the short
age of vehicles to accomplish the assigned mission* This was further antagonized by the lack of replacements available for worn
out equipment prior to the date the equipment was uneconomical to repair„ Consequently^ a vicious circle of vehicles which should
not have been repaired^ but scrapped, were kept in service at great expense of time, labor and materials. It was not until a plan
submitted by Headquarters, MTOUSA, and finally approvedf replaced war weary equipment in the theater, Under this program, which
began to take effect in January 1945S the totals of 2,800 trucks, 2-g- ton; 3^850 trucks, -J- ton; 2,100 trucks, | ton; 350 truck
tractors, 4-5 ton; and 195 ambulances were received in advance for an equal quantity of unserviceable equipment to be written
years of Ordnance
Service in MTOUSA
ammunition
off as rapidly as possible as their condition was uneconomical to keep them on the road.
What the supply system amounted to is shown in that there remained an approximate total of five hundred and forty thousand tons
cf supplies in Ordnance depot sxoek-s at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Italy, There were 480 different major items of
equipment with a weight of 54 £ OO0 tonsj there were 111,000 different items of spare parts and general supplies which accounted for
an additional 95£COO tons, and the .remaining 391 ^ C C tons were made up of 300 types of ammunition and ammunition components. The
value of whe depot stocks alone is estimated at seven hundred and fifty million dollars with an additional three hundred million
dollars worth ef ma.TO:* itesis of ordnance equipment in ^he hands of troops* These figures do not take into account all the materials
which have been expended, the equipment w'ltt^'a off as battle losses, or the equipment salvaged after its useful life had been spent,,
To consider &I^ such insx-anoes, the -ralue cf all Ordnance materiel that it has taken to complete the war in this theater would
run in the neighborhood of four and one half to five billion dollars. But this is not the whole picture* In addition to the cost
of materials shipped from the States, the service of civilians and of civilian industries had to be hired* Over the entire period
more than twenty million dollars were spent by Ordnance Service in occupied areas of which total ninety five percent represents
Ordnance Service has travelled a long and arduous road through NATOUSA and MTOUSA^. from the initial landings to victory dayo That
howevers has not meant the end of the road. Equipment must still be repairedj it must still be reclaimed; and it must still be
packed and prepared for shipment for use elsewhere,, Ordnance troops mus-, Co all c'y those things :.^d at the same time hold themselves
in readiness to move to other tasks in other places as oalied for by -che War Department*
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After V-J day has been reached, and after the tasks of redeployment have been accomplished, then, and only then, will the
Ordnance men in MTOIJSA be able to relax their efforts and say "the job is done".
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Two views of the beachhead at Salerno, Italy.
the beach*
A typical view of the terrain in Italy over which Installing a nevr "mllop" on a medium ;ank as
the Arsiy fought, and on frhich Ordnance dumps or rocket launchers are added*
maintenance sites had to be established.
Two views of a medium tank with rocket launcher
attachment.
H
In the field a maintenance company does not
Test firing a 105mm Iiovritzer on the
concrete floors.
As the body goes onto the chasis, and after Repairing 37mm and 75ram howitzers in the
it has had a test run, another truck will artillery section of a maintenance cornpany.
a maintenance company.
company.
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Peboring the cylinders in an engine block.
In an engine rebuild shop all like parts are handled in separate sections.
Test-runs on engines rebuilt at the 623rd Orel. Bain Battalion ir. Oran,
Nothing Trtfiich may have further life or use after it is reclaimed is discarded*
Care of veiiicles and equipment axicl preventive maintenance are responsibilities ot* the using arms*
INSPECTION TEAM AT WORK THOROUCHNESS ALWAYS
'em rolling".
turn instruct Italian soldiers how to renovate
American ammunition.
oalibsrs from the smallest for the carbine Spray painting cartridge cases at an ammunition
Reloading a renovated cartridge case with powder Renovated ammunition is being returned to depot
ORDNANCE TANK and VEHICLE Storage & Issue Park, Leghorn, Italy. Bulk storage area of the ORDNANCE BASE DEPOT, LEGHORN, Italy.
LIBRARY REGULATIONS
1. Books, pamphlets, and periodicals must be
charged at the loan desk (signature on book-loan
card ' before being taken from the Library.
2. Any item drawn from the Library must be
returned within one month.
Exceptions to this regulation are as follows:
(1) Material issued to classes as a whole.
(2) Material issued to instructors for pro
fessional use.
(3) New books which are in demand must be
returned within one week.
(4) Books required for faculty use are sub
ject to recall at any time.
(5) All persons having library material in
their possession will return same before
leaving the post permanently.
(6) Books loaned outside the School must be
returned within two weeks.
3. Reference books and current periodicals will
not be removed from the library.
LIBRARY BUREAU CAT. NO. 1169.6